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BATTLES 



OF THE 



AMERICAN REVOLUTION 

1775-1781. 
HISTORICAL AND MILITARY CRITICISM, 

WITH 

TOPOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION. 



JUSTITIA ET PBJETEBEA NIL. 



V ^y/ BY 

HENRY B. CARRINGTON, M.A., LL.D., 

COLONEL UNITED STATES AEMY, 

PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE AND DYNAMIC ENGINEERING, WABASH COLLEGE, 
STATE OP INDIANA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



3f'"^ 



A. S. BARNES & COMPANY, 
NEW YOKK, CHICAGO, NEW OKLEANS. 

1876. 



W 'V. .'W; , 






COPYRIGHT, 1876, A. S. BARNES & CO. 



PERSONAL TRIBUTE. 

THIS VOLUME, WHICH SEEKS TO INSPIRE FRESH INTEREST IN THE PRINCIPLES WHICH 

UNDERLIE 

NATIONAL DEFENSE, 

AND TO ILLUSTRATE THOSE PRINCIPLES BY REFERENCE TO THE WAR FOR AMERICAN 

INDEPENDENCE, 

IS, BY PERMISSION, DEDICATED 



WILLIAM T . SHERMAN, 



GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



\ 



/ 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Personal Tribute iii 

Greeting i 

I. — The Revolutionary Epoch 3 

II. — Lexington and Concord. Their Lessons 8 

III. — Military Science the Key to Military History 13 

IV. — Apology for the Military Art 18 

V. — Wars between Nations 24 

VI. — Civil War. Distinction between Insurrection, Rebellion and Revolution. 29 

VII. — Providence in War illustrated 35 

VIII. — Statesmanship in War illustrated 40 

IX. — Principles defined. Strategy illustrated 4*^ 

X. — Strategy in War continued 53 

XI. — Grand Tactics illustrated 60 

XII.— Logistics 68 

XIII. — Miscellaneous Considerations 73 

XIV. — The Hour of Preparation 82 

XV.— Bunker Hill. The Occupation 92 

XVI. — " " " Preparation 99 

XVII.— " " " Battle 104 

XVIII.— Battle of Bunker Hill. Notes 112 

""XIX. — The Northern Campaign. Preliminary Operations II7 

XX. — Expeditions to Quebec and Montreal. Their Value 122 

XXI. — The Assault upon Quebec 130 

XXII. — Campaign of 1775. Brief Mention 138 

XXIII. — Campaign of 1776. Boston evacuated. Concurrent Events 146 

XXIV. — Washington at New York. April to July, 1776 155 

XXV. — American Army driven from Canada 161 

XXVI. — British Preparations. Clinton's Expedition unfolded 170 

XXVII. — The Republic of South Carolina. Preparations for Defense 176 

XXVIII.— Clinton's Expedition. Attack on Fort Moultrie 185 

XXIX. — The two armies in July and August, 1776 191 

XXX. — Battle of Long Island. Preparations i^ I99 

XXXI.— Battle of Long Island ' . : ^ 207 

XXXIL— Retreat from Long Island " 214 

XXXIII. — The American Army retires from New York .1. 220 

XXXIV.— Harlem Heights and Vicinity, 1776 .'.. 228 

XXXV. — Operations near New York, White Plains, Chatterton Hill 234 



; 






VI CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

XXXVI. — Operations near New York. White Plains to Fort Washington. . 242 

XXXVII. — Phans and Counter Plans. Fort Washington to Trenton 254 

XXXVIII. — Washington returns the Offensive. Trenton his first Objective 264 

XXXIX. — Plessians surprised at Trenton 270 

XL. — Miscellaneous Events. Washington clothed with Powers of Dictator. 

Opinions of Trenton 278 

XLI. — From Princeton to Morristown. The Assanpink and Princeton 284 

XLII. — Minor Events. January to July, 1777 294 

XLIII. — Burgoyne's Campaign opened, 1777 31)3 

XLIV. — From Ticonderoga to Fort Edward, 1777 313 

XLV.— ^Fort Schuyler, Oriskany and Bennington, 1777 322 

XLVI. — Battle of Freeman's Farm 335 

XLVII. — Bemis Heights, Burgoyne's Surrender, 1777 345 

XLVIII. — Clinton's Expedition up the Hudson. Capture of Forls Clinton and Mont- 
gomery, 1777 355 

XLIX.— Movement on Philadelphia. From New York to the Brandywine, 1777. . 362 

L. — Battle of Brandywine 360 

LI- — Operations near Philadelphia. Battle of Germantown, 1777 382 

LIT — " " " Minor Mention. Closeof Campaign, 1777. 392 

LIII- — " " " From January to June, 1778. Valley Forge. 



Barren Hill. 



401 

LIV. — From Philadelphia to Monmouth. Monmouth and Vicinity, 1778 412 

LV. — Preparations for the Battle of Monmouth, 1778 422 

LVI. — The Battle of Monmouth, 1 778 433 

LVII.— From Monmouth to New York. Siege of Newport. Concurrent Events.. 446 

LVIII. — Campaign of 1778, July to December 457 

LIX.— January to July, 1779. Position of the Armies. Incidents of the general 

Campaign 463 

LX. — ^July to December, 1779. Desolating Incursions. Minor Mention 46S 

LXI. — Siege of Savannah. General Clinton sails for Charleston, 1779 477 

LXII.— January to July, 1780. Condition of the Armies 485 

LXIII. — South Carolina and New Jersey invaded. Siege of Charleston. Battle 

of Springfield, 1780 403 

LXIV. — French Auxiliaries. Arnold's Treason. Southern Skirmishes, 17S0 ... 503 
LXV. — Battle of Camden. King's Mountain. Position of Southern Armies .... 513 
LXVI. — Minor Mention, 1780. European Coalition against England. General 



Greene at the South. 



523 

LXVI I. — Condition of Southern affairs. Mutiny at the North. Operations of Gen- 
erals Greene and Cornvvallis. Battle of Cowpens 534 

LXVIII. — From Cowpens to Guilford Court House. Manoeuvers of the Armies 547 

LXIX.— Battle of Guilford Court House 556 

LXX. — Southern Campaign. Battle of Hobkirk Hill 566 

LXXI. — Battle of Eutaw Springs. Closing Events of Southern Campaign, 1781. 

Partisan Warfare 577 

LXXII. — La Fayette's Virginia Campaign. Condition of the two armies 584 

LXXIII. — La Fayette and Cornwallis in Virginia eqS 

LXXIV. — Washington and Rochambeau. Arnold at New London. From the Hud- 
son to Yorktown 5j7 

LXXV. — Siege of Yorktown. Surrender of Cornwallis. Close of Campaign, 178 1. 631 
LXX VI. — Conclusion 647 



TOPOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATIONS. 



I.-Outline of Atlantic Coast Frontispiece 

2.— Battle of Bunker Hill fol'o^'s P^ge m 

3. — Siege of Quebec ^ ' 

4. — Boston and Vicinity ^54 

5. — Operations in Canada ^ *^ 

6. — Battle of Long Island ^ ^'3 

7. — New York and Vicinity ' 

8.— Capture of Fort Washington " '^ ^53 

9. — Trenton and Vicinity " ^ ^ 

[O. — Trenton and Princeton ^^ '^ 

r r. — Operations in New Jersey 3°- 

12. — Burgoyne's Saratoga Campaign 3i- 

13. — Battle of Hubbardton 32i 

14. — " " Bennnigton -''''* 

15. — " " Freeman's Farm -^^^ 

16.— " " Bemis Heights " "^ 349 

17. — Surrender of Burgoyne ^^ _^ 3=4 

l8._Capture of Forts Clinton and Montgomery " '' 3"' 

ig. — Battle of Brandywine ^^ 3 

20. — " " Germantown -^^ 

21. — Operations on the Delaware ^ ^^ 39d 

22. — " near Philadelphia 39 

„ IT ,, T- " " 401 

23. — Encampment at V alley i- orge ^^ ^ _ 

24'.— La Fayette at Barren H ill ^^ ^_ "*°^ 

25. — Battle of Monmouth ^^ _ '^'^^ 

26. — Siege of Newport 

27. — " " Savannah 

28.-" "Charleston " " 497 

29. — Battle of Springfield ^^ _^ 

00. — Outline Map of lluJ.son River, Highlands 5i- 

31. — Battle of Camden 

Q2. — Arnold at Richmond and Petersburg ^-^-^ 

" " 546 

33. — Battle of Cowpens 

34. — Operations in Southern States 

35.— Battle of Guilford [^ _, ^ ' 

36.— " '■ Hobkirk's Hill " _^ ^"l^ 

37. — " " Eutaw Springs " 

3S. — Operations in Chesapeake Bay ^^ ^^ 

39. — La Fayette in Virginia 

40. — Benedict Arnold at New London ^^ _^ J 

41. — Siege of Yorktown ' 



GREETING. 



IT is eminently proper that an effort to give fresh distinctness to 
facts and principles should be introduced to the public by some 
outline of the method adopted. 

The author has accepted the reports of commanding officers as to 
all matters peculiarly within their personal knowledge, unless some 
serious conflict of opinion, or marked discrepancy in statements of 
fact, has compelled resort to other authority. 

Anecdotes, whether authentic or traditional, as well as incidents 
affecting the personal habits or life, of officers engaged in the Revolu- 
tionary War, are excluded from consideration. So long as military 
negligence, errors of judgment, or of execution, and incompetency, 
or the correlative excellencies, can be determined from operations and 
results, without the introduction of special criticism, it has been more 
agreeable to the author, and more consonant with the spirit of this 
undertaking, to submit all issues to that simple test. 

The Bibliographical Table, at the end of the volume, embraces the 
list of authors consulted. 

No statements of fact have been made without responsible 
authority. 

No map has been completed without the cafeful study of those 
heretofore published, and of many never in print at all, and a personal 
examination of the battle-fields, or consultation with those who have 
made such examination. 

In the correction of river courses, as in the " Plan of the Battle of 
Monmouth," reference has been made to modern atlases and actual 
surveys, geological or otherwise. 

The delineation of surface is not designed to furnish a technical 
exactness of detail, but aims to so impress the reader with the objective 
of the text, that there may be that real recognition of the battle-fields 
and battle movements which topographical illustration alone can 
supply. 



2 GREETING. [^775- 

The inducements which led the author to preface the historical 
record with simple outlines of military science are elsewhere stated. 

While it has appeared best to avoid technical terms as a general 
rule, tlicrc has been ever present, as the prime incentive to the whole 
work, the assurance that the education of the times, and the depend- 
ence of all authority upon the people for its ultimate protection, 
enforce upon the people the consideration of military principles, as 
well as of military history. A nation which values a patriotic record, 
and has the nerve to sustain that record, is never harmed by an intel- 
ligent idea of " The principles which underlie the national defence." 
The dedication of this volume is therefore the key to its mission. 

The impulse which started this venture upon the sea of thought 
has gained fresh breath from the sympathy of scholar and soldier. 
The words of Bancroft, Woolsey, Day, Evarts, Brinsmade and Crane, 
and of Generals Sherman, Townsend, and Humphreys, have imparted 
courage, as well as zest, to both study and execution. 

If nothing new has been cvoK^ed out of fresh readings of many 
authors, there will be tliis satisfaction to the citizen or stranger — that 
the substantial issues of arms which marked the war of American 
Revolution have been compressed into a single volume ; that the 
topographical illustrations are in harmony with all fair historical 
narratives of that war, and that they so reconcile the reports of 
opposing commanders as to give some intelligible idea of the battle- 
issues themselves. 

It would be indeed rude not to thank the British and French 
authorities, American Legations abroad, and many em.inent scholars 
of both countries, as well as gentlemen in charge of American public 
libraries, who extended courtesies, facilitated research, and expressed 
their warm sympathy, during visits in behalf of the enterprise now 
Jloatijig out of port to vicct its destiny. 

It would be a violation of honor not to testify of obligation to one 
who, long since, visited every battle-field herein discussed, who 
obtained from survivors of the revolutionary struggle the data which 
otherwise would have had no record, and who, as the only living link 
which connects times present with times a hundred years ago — has 
invited the author to share the benefit of his labors, and has made 
possible much that must have been crude or imperfect but for the 
generous cooperation of Benson J. LossiNG. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH. 

THE soldiers of 1 775-1 781 were not deficient in military skill and 
ready appliance of the known enginery and principles of war. 
In spite of modern improvements in gunnery, transportation, and 
hospital adjustments, and in all that relates to pure Logistics, there 
has been no substitution of agencies that has involved other prin- 
ciples than those which belonged to those campaigns. Then, as 
now, every contest was largely determined by the skillful application 
of the laws which underlie all human success. Even the introduction 
of steam-propulsion has not suspended the laws of Nature, which 
laws, for all time, have made sport of those who go upon the sea in 
ships. The repeated storm.s which diverted British and French fleets 
from their projected course, or those which affected the operations on 
land at times of real crisis, are not without their equally decisive 
counterparts in all wars of early or later date. It is an instructive 
fact, in military as in civil life, to illustrate the inability of human fore- 
sight to force the future to its feet and then compel its issues. No 
more then than since did the negligence of a picket-guard, the reck- 
lessness of a rash leader, or the waste of a commissary, prove fatal to 
well-advised movements and blast a fair promise of real fruit. Then, 
as since, one gallant defense at an unexpected point, one error of 
guides, one precipitancy of an issue not fully ripe, determined that 
issue adversely. 

Then, as since, injustice to an antagonist, or an undue confidence 
in attack or defense, brought dismal defeat. Then, as ever, the 
violation of the claims of humanity, contempt for conscientious oppo- 
nents and attempts to use force beyond a righteous limit, worked its 
fatal reaction ; and then, as since, the interference of cabinets, or the/ 



4 THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH. [1775, 

substitution of extrinsic for vital issues, worked the discomfiture of 
wise military plans on either side of the struggle. It is equally true 
that in the face of the more sharply defined social grades then exist- 
ing the general spirit of the warfare was honorable to both parties ; 
and the issues between Washington and Howe, or other generals of 
responsible command, as disclosed in their correspondence, were as 
courteously discussed as are like issues now. 

Even with the modern miracle of journalism, which fastens its 
imprint upon the minutest word or fact in the career of men and 
nations, there is as much of license, of hyperbole and partisan abuse, 
as in those days when the mother country and the colonies engaged 
in a deadly wrestle. Jealousies of rank, thirst for office, aspersions of 
character, and suspicions of all who attained success, had their place 
then, as since ; and as a century of time has revived only the more 
agreeable features of that struggle, it is not to be overlooked that 
Howe and Clinton and Cornwallis, as well as Washington and his 
generals, had their heartaches as well as their laurels, and administered 
their trusts under responsibilities and burdens never surpassed. 

The war itself was no sudden rebellion against authority, nor a 
merely captious and arbitrary assertion of the popular will. It was 
even then admitted by. the noblest of English statesmen that the 
English government, as so tersely stated by Mr. Bancroft, " made war 
on the life of her own life." 

The era of facts, therefore, which marks this volume, was the fruit 
of English thought relating back to Magna-Charta. 

Humanity made constant progress in the assertion of normal 
rights, and the passing issues which ripened into American independ- 
ence only indicated the culmination of those issues to a more substan- 
tial vindication. Prerogative of church and state, the centralization 
of property and authority, the irresponsibility to the people of men 
who asserted absolutism by virtue of ancestry, or the so-called divine 
right, had involved England in bloody wars, alienated faithful subjects, 
induced domestic disorders, and made natural, as certain, the separa- 
tion of the American colonies. 

Emancipation from Papal dictation did not bring a corresponding 
grant of genuine religious liberty to the earnest people. 

Human conscience, bound to its Author by intrinsic obligation, 
which no human authority can long control or evade, asserted its 
power over the lives and conduct of sober-minded men. 

The bonds which confined its expression, and drove devout Chris- 



I775-J THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH. 5 

tian men and women to secret conclave and worship, became too 
stringent for those who obeyed God as the Supreme Arbiter of Hfe 
present and Hfe future. 

The presumption that the governed should have a voice in shap- 
ing the policy which exercised control, v/as solved by its positive 
averment as a principle; and the reluctance of authority to bend its 
measures to meet this human craving and rightful demand, only 
quickened the sentiment of resistance to every evasion or defiance 
of the right. Every domestic struggle which marked the centuries 
of British growth, had this warp for every woof 

Invisible, but present ! despised, but quick with life, the new ele- 
ment was giving robustness and nerve to the British people, and both 
shape and endurance to the British constitution. 

The state itself, as it began to feel the spur of the new impulse, 
began also to render tribute to the true patriotism which a high moral 
and religious obligation alone develops. 

The interregnum of Cromwell was resplendent with national 
glory ; and the enthusiasm of free men began to testify in clear and 
significant tones of the greatness of a people, who so freely con- 
tributed of life and treasure to dignify and maintain a genuine national 
liberty. 

Ripe statesmen and hereditary officials, alike, saw the drift of 
human thought ; but, as this pulse-beat strengthened, the hatred of 
innovation, and cultivated doubt of the capacity and nerve of the 
commons to mingle with and share the control of public affairs pro- 
longed the established contempt for the commons, while intensify- 
ing the popular purpose to resist the presumption of caste and undele- 
gated authority. 

The exodus of colonists to America, was the combined fruit of 
this misconception of the rights of the people, and of the latent 
resistance which rules the life whenever the human soul makes duty 
its purpose, and conscience its guide. 

The Puritans of New England, the Huguenots of South Carolina, 
and the emigrants to Maryland, alike shared in the impulse to escape 
from hierarchical control, and work for freedom, self-government, and 
the best interests of the governed. The emigration to Maryland 
had its small element which maintained the obligation of conscience 
to superior, foreign control ; but the majority, who were laboring 
men, and independent of every such obligation, asserted their due 
share in giving shape to the colony, and thus its birth-hour was 



D THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH. [1775. 

accompanied by the same birth-rights which made the New England 
colonies memorable for all time. 

A century, and then a half century more, passed by, while the 
dynastic element persistently failed to realize the fact, that the col- 
onies were energized by principles which belonged to man by right, 
and which no physical forms could long restrain. 

They were the principles which, in fact, made Great Britain great. 
The Anglo-Saxon blood was directing the heart-beats, but it had the 
oxygen of a higher life, and a bolder, if not a fiercer, activity. Prompt 
to meet obligation and render legitimate homage to lawful authority, 
it brooked no trammels which partook of oppression or injustice ; 
still hopeful, and for a long time confident, that sagacious statesmen 
would so control and shape dynastic power as to admit of genuine 
loyalty without the loss of self-respect. 

The old French war of 1756, brought home to the colonies some 
very heavy responsibilities, and these they met with a free expendi- 
ture of blood and treasure. But it taught them how much they must 
cultivate their own resources, and how little could be realized from 
the throne, in the assurance of a pervasive and lasting peace. 

Sacrifices brought only partial equivalents, so that ordinary taxes 
took the color of enforced tribute. Slowly but surely the procrasti- 
nation, uncertainty, and prevarications of officials compelled the sub- 
jects to repeated demonstrations of their wishes, and of their claim to 
be represented in the councils of the nation, until the Revolution 
enforced their will and determined their future. 

After the lapse of more than a century, the great English Nation 
and the American Republic review that period of struggle with equal 
satisfaction, as the evidence of the superintending control of a Higher 
Authority, and both nations accept the results of the war and the 
developments since realized, as the best possible conclusion of the 
ordeal undergone, and the best pledge to the world of the spirit with 
which both nations shall aim to dignify national life, while honoring 
the rights and highest interests of every individual life. 

The power and glory of England, are not in her army or navy, or 
her displays of physical force, so much as in the development of all her 
people of all classes, in the culture and ripeness which peace and free- 
dom involve. And the American Republic, which dismissed to their 
farms and merchandise a million men, when their use was needless, 
while unarmed, is, by the compensations of intelligence and industry, 
armed to the teeth against all unrighteous intervention or violence. 



j^yj-j THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH. 7 

It is the earnest man of peace, calmly pursuing life's ends, render- 
ing justice and thus deserving justice, who, in the aggregate, makes a 
st^te respected ; and thus let the future develop both mother country 
and its first born, so that the world shall render to each the homage 
which every true man deserves ! 



CHAPTER II. 

LEXINGTON AND CONCORD. THEIR LESSONS. 

THE skirmishes of Lexington and Concord were such pulsations 
of an excited people as not to have a proper place in a strict 
Battle Record, except as they mark the progress of public sentiment 
toward the maturing issue of general war. 

Raw militia, jealous of the right to bear arms, and thoroughly set 
in purpose, to vindicate that right and all the franchises of a free peo- 
ple, by the extreme test of liberty or life, had faced the disciplined 
troops of Great Britain, without fear or penalty. 

The quickening sentiment which gave nerve to the arm, steadiness 
to the heart, and force to the blow, was one of those historic expres- 
sions of human will, which over-master discipline itself. // was the 
method of an inspired madness. The onset swept back a solid column 
of trained soldiers, because the moral force of the energizing passion 
was imperative and supreme. No troops in the world could have 
resisted that movement. Discipline, training, and courage are expo- 
nents of real power ; but there must be something more than these 
to enable any moderate force of armed men to cope with a people 
already on fire with the conviction, that the representatives of national 
force are employed to smother the national life. The troops them- 
selves had a hard ordeal to undergo. Sent out to collect or destroy 
some munitions of war, and not to engage an enemy, they were under 
a restraint that stripped them of real fitness to meet so startling an 
issue as one of open resistance and active assault. There was a clear 
reluctance on their part, to use force until the first hasty delivery of 
fire opened hostilities. 

The ill-judged policy which precipitated these memorable skir- 
mishes was directly in the way of military success. It impaired the 
confidence of soldiers in their ability to maintain the impending 



I775-] 



LEXINGTON AND CONCORD. 9 



Struggle, while at the same tune intensifying the fever and strength- 
ening the nerve of the uprising commons. 

Lexington and Concord were the exponents of that daring which 
made the resistance on Breed's Hill possible. The invincibility of 
discipline was shattered, when the prestige of the army went down 
before the rifles of farmers. The first tendency was to make those 
farmers too confident of the physical strength of moral opinions, and 
to underrate the value of an organized force. Years of sacrifice and 
waste, enforced an appreciation of its value; and the failures, flights, 
and untoward vicissitudes of many battle-fields were made their 
instructors in the art of war. 

The military demonstration of April 19th, 1775, was but supple- 
mental to similar movements for the suppression of the general arm- 
ing, and for the seizure of guns and powder, which began in 1774. 

A battery had been established on Boston Neck as early as Au- 
gust of that year. The citizens had refused to furnish quarters for the 
royal troops, and when the government, during the month of Sep- 
tember, attempted to build public barracks, the mechanics of Boston 
refused to work at any price, and both artisans and laborers had to be 
brought from the colony of New York. Under date of August 
twenty-seventh, 1775, Dr. Joseph Warren wrote as follows : "As yet, 
we have been preserved from action with the soldiery, and we shall 
endeavor to avoid it until we see that it is necessary, and a settled 
plan is fixed on for that purpose." 

The Provincial Congress that organized October twenty-sixth 
adopted a plan for the organization of the militia, with the express 
understanding that one-fourth of the aggregate force should be in 
readiness for service at the shortest notice. The "minute men" of 
the Revolution, were thus called into being. 

Artemas Ward and Seth Pomeroy were chosen general officers. 
A concentration of military stores and arms at Concord and Worces- 
ter was formally authorized. Under date of November tenth, Gen- 
eral Gage denounced as treasonable the proceedings of that body. 

On the ninth day of February, 1776, a second Provincial Congress, 
" empowered and directed the Committee of Public Safety, to 
assemble the militia whenever it was required, to resist the execution 
of certain Acts of Parliament," just then promulged. 

The following citizens composed that committee, viz., John Han- 
cock, Joseph Warren, Benjamin Church, Richard Devens, Benjamin 
White, Joseph Palmer, Abraham Watson, Azor Orne, John Pigeon, 
William Heath, and Thomas Gardner. 



10 LEXINGTON AND CONCORD. [1775. 

The following " Committee of Supplies," was announced, viz., 
Elbridge Gerry, David Cheever, Benjamin Lincoln, Moses Gill, and 
Benjamin Hall. 

At the same time, John Thomas and William Heath were added 
to the list of general officers. That legislative body went so far 
as to warn the people that it was, " The Christian and social duty of 
each individual, with a proper sense of dependence on God, to defend 
those rights which heaven gave them, and no one ought to take from 
them." 

By the first day of January, 1775, the garrison of Boston had been 
increased to thirty-five hundred men, and mounted three hundred 
and seventy men as a daily guard-detail, besides a field-officers' guard 
of one hundred and fifty men on Boston Neck. Three brigades were 
organized and were officered, respectively, by Generals Lord Percy, 
Pigott and Jones. In November of 1774, General Gage had advised 
the British government, that he, " was confident, that to begin with an 
army twenty thousand strong, would in the end save Great Britain 
blood and treasure." 

Meanwhile, the militia drilled openly, rapidly completed company 
organizations, and made many sacrifices to procure arms, powder 
and other materials of war. The Home government, in view of the 
serious aspect of affairs, ordered Generals Howe, Clinton, and Bur- 
goyne to join General Gage, and announced that " ample reinforce- 
ments would be sent out, and the most speedy and effectual measures 
would be taken to put down the rebellion," then pronounced to 
already exist. 

On the eighth of April, the Provincial Congress resolved to take 
effectual measures to raise an army, and requested the cooperation 
of Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Connecticut. On the thir- 
teenth, it voted to raise six companies of artillery, to pay them, and 
keep them at drill. On the fourteenth, it advised citizens to leave 
Boston and to remove to the country. On the fifteenth, it solemnly 
appointed a day for *' Public Fasting and Prayer," and adjourned to 
the tenth day of May. 

The Committee of Public Safety at once undertook the task of 
securing powder, cannon and small arms. A practical embargo was 
laid upon all trade with Boston. The garrison could obtain supplies 
only with great difficulty, and, as stated by Gordon, "nothing was 
wanting but a spark, to set the whole continent in a flame." 

As a matter of military policy, the statesmanship of war, the 



1775.] LEXINGTON AND CONCORD. II 

whole drift of the Governor's conduct was not to placate, but to 
excite the people. It was the precursor of military failure. All 
demonstrations were those of force, and not those of wisdom, or 
comity. His purpose to seize the stores then accumulating at Con- 
cord had no indorsement of his officers or council, for he advised 
with neither. It was predicated upon his individual opinion, by 
which he afterwards sought to justify his conduct, that the show of 
force in the field and the arrest of leading patriots would extinguish 
the rebellion. 

This rapid and very partial outline of events which immediately 
preceded the skirmishes of Concord and Lexington, is important in 
order to disclose the circumstances which so quickly culminated in 
the siege of Boston, the action on Breed's Hill, and the evacuation 
of the city. General Gage, as he said, communicated his plan for 
seizure of the stores at Concord to but one person, and yet it was 
soon known to Hancock and Adams, so that the colonists took 
prompt measures to meet the issue. When Lord Percy left Head- 
quarters on the evening of April eighteenth, he passed a group of 
men, on Boston Common, and heard one man say : " The British 
troops have marched, but they will miss their aim." "What aim?" 
inquired Lord Percy, " Why, the cannon at Concord," was the reply. 

The detachment, consisting of the Grenadiers of the garrison, 
the Light Infantry, and Major Pitcairn, of the Marines, all under com- 
mand of Lieutenant Colonel Smith of the Tenth regiment of infantry, 
started on the night of the eighteenth, with every reason to believe 
that their movement was a secret to all but the Governor and them- 
selves. Taking boats up the Charles river as far as Phipps farm, 
now Lechmere Point, they landed promptly, and pushed for Con- 
cord, twenty miles from Boston. The ringing of bells and the firing 
of small arms soon showed that the country was aroused. A mes- 
senger was sent for reinforcements. Sixteen companies of foot, 
and a detachment of marines, under Lord Percy, was promptly 
advanced to their support, uniting with them at about two o'clock in 
the afternoon, on their return from Concord, and making the aggre- 
gate of the entire command about eighteen hundred men. 

This eventful day closed. The stores at Concord, which had not 
been removed, were destroyed. The casualties on the British side 
were seventy-three killed, one hundred and seventy four wounded, 
twenty six missing. The colonists lost forty-nine killed, thirty-nine 
wounded, and five missing. 



12 



LEXINGTON AND CONCORD. [1775- 



Stedman thus sums up the result. " The events of the day on 
which blood was first shed, in the contest between Great Britain and 
her colonies, served to show that if the Americans were unacquainted 
with military discipline, they were not destitute of either courage or 
conduct, but knew well how, and dared, to avail themselves of such 
advantages as they possessed. A kind of military furor had by this 
time seized the inhabitants of the colonics. They were willing to 
risk the consequences of opposing in the field, their juvenile ardor to 
the matured strength of the parent state, and in this resolution they 
were encouraged to persist, by recollecting the events of the nine- 
teenth of April, by which it appeared, according to their manner of 
reasoning, that in such a country as America, abounding in danger- 
ous passes and woody defiles, the British troops, with all their valor, 
discipline and military skill, were not, when opposed to the Ameri- 
cans, so formidable as had been generally apprehended." 

The promptness, coolness and moderation of Lord Percy saved 
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Smith. It was worn out by hard 
marching, and the fretful kind of warfare which decimated its ranks, 
and only under the escort of his command were they enabled to 
reach Boston in safety. It is a historical fact, that Major Pitcairn, 
whose reputation and character were of a high order, deeply felt the 
misfortune which so intimately associated his name with the affair at 
Lexington. 

Dr. Dwight says that the expedition to Concord, " was one which 
in other circumstances would have been merely of little tales of 
wonder and woe, but it became the preface to the history of a nation, 
the beginning of an empire, and a theme of disquisition and astonish- 
ment to the civilized world." 

The issue was joined. The siege of Boston followed. The begin- 
ning of the end began to appear in full view of many English states- 
men, and thenceforth their disregarded warnings, and their unex- 
ampled assurance of sympathy with the American people, were 
among the most inspiring elements which sustained the struggle and 
assured the ultimate result. 

And now, that the presentation of some of the principles which 
distinguished the epoch of the American Revolution and gave char- 
acter as well as strength to the new State, and a brief statement as 
to the issue at arms which introduced the struggle have been made, 
the discussion of the art of war is next in order, to be followed by 
its application to the battle-issues themselves. 



CHAPTER III. 

MILITARY SCIENCE THE KEY TO MILITARY HISTORY. 

IT is a prime factor in the right estimate of any historical epoch, 
or issue, that the data command confidence; and the value of all 
conclusions will be determined by the fitness with which cognate 
principles are applied to the events or characters unfolded. 

The integrity of a narrative may indeed be verified through the 
absolute want of conformity to another version ; but the consistency 
of either with a sound final judgment must depend upon the success 
of the effort to clear the story of all extrinsic color and stage-effect 
which the locus, or animus of the author has cast upon the scenes and 
actors. To review the battles of the American Revolution and so 
test their record as to impart lessons of value to the student of mili- 
tary science, is equally an effort to interest the general scholar ; and 
the earnest youth who struggles to attain ripeness for true citizenship 
by aesthetic culture and faithful brain-work, cannot afford to break 
away from the examination, as from some cold and barren sphere of 
thought. 

More than this is involved in the present discussion. History is 
the life-record of man, and its fruitage matures in proportion as 
experience evolves wisdom for the future. National history is there- 
fore not the exclusive possession of its subject ; but stands as a wit- 
ness to all nations, and it is their right as well as duty to demand a 
just interpretation of its facts. 

Patriotism that is mature and abiding, is linked with charity. 
Justice is embosomed with love of country. Both elements attach 
to an abiding record. 

We measure a painting by the rules of art, and gauge a freshly 
invented motor by the principles applied. Thus, also, and in a truly 
catholic spirit, are battles and battle-direction to be estimated, and 



14 MILITARY SCIENCE THE KEY TO MILITARY HISTORY. [1775- 

thus alone can there be developed out of human conflict some 
enduring product for the instruction and benefit of succeeding gen- 
erations. 

While all axiomatic truth is but indifferently served by many 
who, of necessity bow to its dicta; so a worthy purpose may fail of 
standard fruition through fault of the agent. The proposed discus- 
sion seeks to analyze all accessible data, and thus afford to the gen- 
eral student some basis for sound judgment as to the battle-fields 
and battle-direction of the war of the American Revolution, while 
applying to their elucidation those accepted principles of military 
science which impart value to military action. 

The consideration of minor issues and isolated skirmishes is 
foreign to the purpose; but it is requisite, that the annual campaigns 
of the struggle shall obtain their legitimate sequence, and hold their 
intrinsic relations to the ultimate achievement of American Inde- 
pendence. 

The swift progress of international courtesy in the direction 
of closer national affinities imparts signal interest to the investi- 
gation ; and although an era of universal peace is not already over- 
lapped by the hastening present, it is safe to assert that the time 
has come when Great Britain and the United States can pleasantly 
do justice to old-time valor, and welcome, as already assured, a future 
identity of aspiration and progress. 

Other incidents peculiar to this age of general education, force the 
people themselves to a closer view, and wiser appreciation of military 
art. Great Britain already depends largely upon her organized militia 
for national defense. Her regular army, the nucleus for efficient 
expansion, is but a national police, to watch over her world-wide 
interests, and assure her subjects that the mother country does not 
neglect the rights of any who render homage. 

The mobilization of Germany and the conscript system of France 
bear home to every household the consideration of military contin- 
gencies and military antecedents. But it is true of the United States, <• 
as of Great Britain, that the regular army has but light responsibility 
for domestic peace. The conservation of resources, attended by 
education of the masses and the wise development of industrial labor, 
furnish a basis of resistance to assault from without, that will wear 
out any antagonist which estimates its means of aggression by the 
numerical list of bristling bayonets which it holds in position, at the 
expense of civil growth. 



I775-] MILITARY SCIENCE THE KEY TO MILITARY HISTORY. 1 5 

Continental army budgets, and continental military dilation have 
involved one error ; and the American militia system, notwithstanding 
its elasticity and its prodigious expenditures of vital force in an 
extreme hour of national peril, has involved an equally serious error. 
The responsibility for military direction has been cast upon military 
experts exclusively ; or the attainment of high positions by the 
adventurer has developed the idea that any good patriot might, by 
easy transition, leap to a place of honorable command, and discharge 
its functions with eminent success. 

But the philosophy of war is not exclusively within the province 
of the military man, and there are governing laws which translate the 
events of battle history, and impart to them a life and meaning well 
worthy the sober thought of the citizen and scholar. 

Hitherto, the literature of military science has been addressed to 
experts only, and the world at large has been satisfied with some 
graphic narrative, regardless of the mental processes which evolved 
the results and made success possible, or assured defeat. While 
physics and physiology are deemed indispensable to every sound 
curriculum of study, the logic of war has been as listlessly and coolly 
ignored, as if its precepts imposed upon the time of the general 
scholar, and were utterly foreign to a sound education of the young 
men of Great Britain and the United States. 

In Continental Europe, however, with a little more of theoretical 
instruction, the physical drill in arms has largely absorbed that indus- 
trial labor which is the life-blood of a civilized state, and the Individ • 
uality of the citizen has been merged in the military martinet. He 
may be one small cog in the vast complication of adjusted macJiinery, or 
one little nerve in the enfolding sheath, but he is not a responsible part 
of the controlling element that works the machine, or thrills the nerve 
with its vital force. 

In the United States, where military obligation is feather-light in 
time of peace, and hardly less in Great Britain, the assumption is ever 
at hand, that when a crisis shall demand the soldier, there will be 
found the hero and the victory. 

This is trifling with grave issues. It is a very rare, if not an im- 
possible matter in modern times, for a great war to ensue without 
antecedent deliberation on the part of one or both of the parties 
in interest. The mighty aggregate of European armies is closely 
related to intense brain-work, and no advocate more exhaustively 
anticipates the contingencies of evidence and the scope of past ad- 



1 6 MILITARY SCIENCE THE KEY TO MILITARY HISTORY. [1775. 

judications, than do the adepts in miUtary science review their maps, 
and speculate upon the very recesses, as well as the resources of the 
country they purpose to attack. 

It is, therefore, possible and becoming, for the educated masses of 
a free people to learn something of the principles which underlie the 
national defense. These principles have not been unfolded in due 
proportion and with that familiarity, which has carried those of natural 
science into every household. The heads of mechanics and of farm- 
ers' sons, have ached from the elaboration of some fresh invention ; 
and this, the fruit of independence of thought and personal action, 
rightly fits the demand of the times. But with all this, there is a sub- 
tle, unacknowledged sentiment, that the civil functions of the state 
will be smoothly and fairly performed by those in charge. This is 
predicated upon the fact that laws are in force, and that those laws are 
assured of wise and competent sanction. Here begins for military 
science, its starting point, its genesis. And yet, before its discussion, 
there is to be established certain ground-work, necessarily ignored by 
strictly military writers, while integral and fundamental to the general 
purpose in view. 

Military law, while that of force, as is all police law, is founded 
upon the adaptation of all necessary means to meet an impending 
cricis, and its methods of application are controlled by that cricis. 
The wisdom of the statesman is only different in degree from that of 
the householder, and both aim after a wise constraint of offending 
elements, and the radication of those that are eminently just and 
proper. 

To meet the demand adequately, wisely, and successfully, to antici- 
pate all counter-action, and thereby assure ultimate results, is the 
expressive logic for personal action, municipal action, and military 
action. 

The brain-power is banded to various shaftings. The mental pro- 
cesses are different, by virtue of different applications, but the prime 
activities are the same. 

The domain of natural science has its departments and sections. 
It is so with all physics. And yet, to the great enigma of essen- 
tial force, the military art, all sciences extend their aid. No labor- 
atory fails of experts in its behalf. All dynamic force pays tribute 
to its demand. This rests upon a simple necessity. Inasmuch 
as offenses against society and law, require the sanction of force, 
so shall all appliances of art and science contribute their full measure 



I775-] MILITARY SCIENCE THE KEY TO MILITARY HISTORY. 17 

SO to perfect and apply that force as to secure to the state its integ- 
rity and safety. 

Military science is, therefore, the art of employing force to vin- 
dicate or execute authority. Its offices task all possible energies, 
involve all possible errors, and meet all possible trials, that betide 
human experience. The guerilla and bandit may, through wisdom, 
nerve and commensurate skill become a soldier ; while the scholar, 
in high command, may drop the sceptre of the state which he is 
called to uphold, not from want of patriotic zeal, but because he is 
not wise in a life-and-death struggle. 

In the battles of the American Revolution, illustrations of the art 
of war, in the more scientific, as in the more generally accepted 
meaning of the term, were numerous and memorable. Independently 
of the numbers engaged, the vast territory involved, the distances 
traversed with an ocean to be crossed, the consanguinity of the parties 
at issue, and the new political principles evoked, that battle history 
has peculiar value. Not a single principle put under tribute by great 
captains, before and since that period, failed to have its expression, 
and not unseldom its masterly application. The philosophy of 
Frederic and Jomini assert nothing beyond the skill and wisdom 
therein illustrated. 

It is assumed that all truth which bears direct relation to a better 
understanding of those battles, is of value to the student. History 
must be placed side by side, with the philosophy which interprets 
that history. Civil codes bear their part in the elucidation, and mil- 
itary science must fill its place, or the judgment will fail to reach the 
conclusions which convert the antecedent experience of men into safe 
guides for the resolution of the future. In the proposed brief dis- 
cussion of military science, the purpose is to set forth only those 
fundamental laws and relations which will aid the reader in his judg- 
ment of the facts, inspire fresh respect for that talent which sustains 
the commonwealth in an hour of danger, and possibly induce a higher 
sense of responsibility for a fit preparation to meet all the contin- 
gencies which can come to the body politic. 

In the discussion of battles and battle-direction, including the 
topographical illustration, the standard authorities of both countries 
have been summoned to the witness-stand, and are duly accredited. 
2 



CHAPTER IV. 

APOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY ART. 

THE principles of the military art, having their application in the 
use of force, all normal elements that shape or apply to force, 
in the direction of establishing or protecting the state, have their 
appropriate place and relations. Those principles, as already inti- 
mated, are not of necessity and exclusively professional, nor are they 
so much matters of discovery as the direct application of human 
wisdom to recognized exigencies. 

All primitive questions of ethics or morals, and all discussion as 
to the abstract right to go to war, are merged in the actual, inevi- 
table struggles that do and must occur. 

The progress of invention has indeed developed machinery to 
intensify physical force and multiply its forms of action ; but the 
essential principles have not been created ; they are only more fully 
detected, unfolded and utilized. 

The successful man, of whatever calling, must achieve that success 
through intimacy with the springs and modes of human action, and 
by use of such skill in the adjustment of plans as to meet or anticipate 
such action. 

Mental philosophy demands as much credit for military success, 
as for any other success. 

Geographical discovery, so called, has always had some antecedent 
hypothesis of the proper harmony of the physical world, and has thus 
been impelled to push the conviction to assurance. So with physics, 
whether of earth or heaven. Even the diversities of the earth's sur- 
face and all avenues of inter-communication have proved as vital to 
military as to commercial or political relations. The art of war, in 
common with other science, applies sound reasoning to all possible 
contingencies that can come within its sphere of duty. 



t775-] APOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY ART. ig 

It shares the limitations of all finite knowledge, and is not closeted 
with some military bureau, nor stored in any arsenal. It inheres 
wherever sagacity, observation, quickness, and precision, have their 
best harmony and material. 

Types of mind of equal strength in all those elements will drift 
with the circumstances of birth, or education — will seek various 
objectives and exhibit dissimilar manifestations, so that society, in all 
its civil adjustments and growth, only employs the same faculties 
which conserve the rights of the state, and vindicate its honor, when 
peril invokes the aid of sanction and a corresponding physical sup- 
port. The maxims of English common law which affect civil life, and 
civil relations, are but accumulated experience, beyond date or mem- 
ory, indicating how society may so happily and securely subsist, that 
the rights of the many shall be but the aggregate of individual 
rights. 

These flow from the past, gaining volume and illumination with 
the centuries: but these are not older nor more consistent with 
human reason than are the general maxims which inspire a wise self 
defense, and the consequent, national defense. They flow together, 
one and indivisible. It is as great an error to predicate of the art of 
war, that it is abnormal and beyond the field of the scholar, as to 
treat the whole system of state and municipal politics as of imma- 
terial concern to the individual citizen, in his comparatively passive 
sphere of trust and dependence. 

In proportion as the citizen freely exercises his civil rights, and 
takes part in their establishment and perpetuation, so does it become 
his privilege and duty to understand, zvJiy, luhcn, and ]ioiv, he shall 
respond to their hearty support if assailed. The delegation of certain 
trusts to the cabinet, the bench, or the bailiff, is predicated upon the 
idea that these are agents of the people, duly responsible for the 
trusts in their charge ; but the obligation to render all needed physi- 
cal and moral support to the faithful discharge of the functions of 
their trust, is imperative in every well ordered state. These functions 
are performed almost automatically during peace, with but incidental 
friction, and under light burdens. 

But the contingencies of lawlessness and violence and a conse- 
quent appeal to force are not to be ignored, because in abeyance, or 
out of sight. 

In the state, as in the household, during wholesome peace, the 
supremacy of law seems to be most positive when the external display 



20 



ArOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY ART. [1775- 



of sanction is least prominent. The visible whip stands for its ready use. 
There is no exception in the case of states having large armies ; for 
there every outlook comprehends a possible struggle, which of itself 
precludes the idea of substantial peace. There is no rest, and peace 
means rest from conflict, with a corresponding devotion of personal 
and national resources to permanent good. 

While therefore, that sanction which is the reserve force to com- 
pel order, may not be paraded in the sight of all men, its existence 
must be pervasive ; and the capacity to defend or assert rights must 
be coextensive with the ultimate value of the rights enjoyed. Other- 
wise, every franchise depends alone upon outside forbearance, or that 
most fickle of all elements, falsely styled policy. It is therefore 
accepted, that all citizens have a deep concern in every primary truth 
that lies in the direction of national defense, or guides their judgment 
to a right estimate of the national history, as compared with that of 
other nations. If peace, with its compensations and possibilities, its 
sweet domesticities and its crowning glories, be indeed the sphere 
wherein man can alone secure renewal of primeval perfection, there 
must be large wealth of values in those deeds of self-sacrifice and 
heroism which hasten its advent. 

While the assurance of penalty acts as a preventive of crime, and 
the capacity to vindicate rights wards off assault, so does true valor 
rescue war from its most brutal aspects, and assimilate the guardian 
of public peace to the administrator of law and justice. 

The history of all legitimate warfare is instinct with the exhibition 
of noble attributes and profound wisdom. If the object of this vol- 
ume were but the simple compilation of battle-narrative, there would 
be no place for the present discussion ; but the desire is, to place the 
battles in the scales, and test their merits by the experience of other 
nations and other great captains, in order that all non-military schol- 
ars who have set up false standards of judgment, or have presumed 
upon the ignorance of past generations, may determine for themselves 
as to the assumption advanced in behalf of the battles and battle- 
direction of the American Revolution. 

There are those who will reject the term, " science of war." 
Some will deny to the soldier a higher purpose than self-support, 
and ambition for place and power, and decry the profession as servile, 
or denounce it as despotic. 

There will not be wanting those who will treat the general educa- 
tion of Germany and the elastic resources of France, as at variance 



1775.] ArOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY ART. 21 

with the assumption, that nations habitually armed to the teeth arc 
sloivly bleeding to death. Nevertheless, it is true that the normal con- 
dition of society is peace ; and in proportion as the resources of the 
state are diverted to warlike uses, except in extremis, or in the indis- 
pensable preparation for impending or contingent danger, society 
suffers, and suffers just in proportion as the obligations of God's law 
are imperative, and vital prosperity depends upon adherence to those 
obligations. 

All similar and related questions of every kind are swallowed up 
in the fact, that as society suffers from internal violence, so nations as 
such, are put in peril. True wisdom lies in such a just and honorable 
discharge of every duty that war without just cause, is only possible, 
as an outrage, which humanity at large would condemn and resent. 

Should any maintain that the time has passed for rendering 
homage to military attainment, it must be first made to appear that all 
nations are prompt to render justice, and to accept and practice the 
cardinal principles which Montesquieu declares to be the spirit of laws, 
or, that the higher refinement of duty which attaches to the precepts 
of the Saviour himself, has already blossomed into fruit. The great 
fact is, that true life is made up of struggle. Emulation in labor, 
resolution as against oppression, and ambition for preferment are parts 
of all inner life. When these partake of self-sacrifice and exposure 
for holy ends, at the risk of life, the subject is lifted above the plane 
of mere living, to that of monumental worth and bright example. 
Where these elements work evil, and assail the rights of man, the 
issue must be squarely met by every agent available for their 
suppression. 

No nation rises by easy spring to well balanced independence. 
Injustice and wrong assert their claims, and unless a people will so 
far indicate their self-respect as willingly to understand their duty 
under any possible phase of the future, there will be brought home 
to their experience the bitter lessons which have involved so many 
listless, corrupted, and conceited nations in remediless ruin. 

If a nation, like the man, be doubly armed, in a just cause, so the 
conscious dignity that follows an assured ability to maintain that 
cause, is strong assurance of independence, and a stern warning to 
aggressors. No student of history will fail to see that the profession 
of arms has ever been esteemed honorable. 

The sacred record which lies at the foundation of society itself, 
and thus becomes the vitalizing and essential element ot all true pro- 



22 APOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY ART. [1775- 

gress, bears honorable testimony to the prowess of those who bore 
arms against unrighteous violence. The Bible, therefore, recognizing 
the necessity for those who bear the shield in the front of battle, both 
records and honors their triumphs. Where, in classic epic, will be 
found more jubilant refrains over victories won, than the song of 
Deborah ! and what can surpass the majesty and all-embracing full- 
ness of the chorus of Miriam and Moses ! 

The very laws and usages of chivalry were predicated upon the 
idea that the true soldier represented the best type of refinement and 
honor. Piety itself, now so exalted, self-denying, and precious, was 
once but a synonym for generous courage and true manhood. In 
its manifestations of filial love, combined with brave deeds, was found 
the hero of Virgil. There have indeed been periods of history, when 
the soldier knight was almost exclusively the scholar, and the cloister 
alone furnished those who, besides himself, could transcribe thought 
upon parchment or paper. 

Bunyan and Milton assume the metaphors and terms of military 
life, while they delineate their highest characters, and expend the 
best efforts of their genius in forms which borrow strength and signifi- 
cance from the military profession. Both sacred and profane history 
combine to honor him who honors himself in arms. The " good 
fight " has not been fought out. This is not the day for the gracious 
glories of millennial peace; neither should the military profession be 
crowned for other merit than that which attaches to its faithfulness to 
duty, as the conservator of just and sacred rights. 

The ever increasing responsibilities that attend the rapid increase of 
the world's population, and the commercial enterprise zuhich brings half- 
civilized and barbarous people into intimacy and interfusion zuith less 
populous, but better educated nations, are pregnant with issues ivhich 
provoke human passion and human conflict. Tidal waves of armed 
ignorance, superstition, and brutalism are not impossible because a 
select minority of the earth's inhabitants are enlightened and civil- 
ized. 

History has recorded such events under circumstances no more 
difficult than the future may evolve. So also, the irresponsibility of 
despotic power, and the fiery scourge of religious fanaticism, are not 
barred out because just now restrained. 

There is already a relaxation of fealty to authority, an indepen- 
dence of individual obligation to the rights of the many, a jealousy 
of superiority, whether of mental or industrial attainment, which 



1775-j APOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY ART. 23 

tend to anarchy ; and these work in the same direction with the 
arrogant spirit of centraHzation and oppression, which gradually and 
inquiringly Hfts its arm as in the middle ages. 

The final issue must be resolved, either by intelligent recognition 
of a common moral obligation, and respect for the rights of all ; or 
the conflicts of physical force will go beyond their true mission and 
introduce unparalleled conflict. 

There is no aspect in which the knowledge of military science does 
not commend itself to the favor of the present generation. The les- 
sons to be derived from history were never so pre-eminently useful 
as now, and they will hereafter hold a more solemn place in the 
mind of the thoughtful scholar. In introducing those principles 
which place military attainment in fellowship with true science, thereby 
stating the laws by which to test the deeds of the American Revolu- 
tion, it can not be entirely foreign or discursive thus to blend their 
statement with honorable mention of its history. 



CHAPTER V. 

WARS BETWEEN NATIONS. 

THE use of force to assert rights, or redress wrongs, — the inter- 
ruption of friendly relations between states, — organized resist- 
ance to the supreme authority of a single state ; and the sweep of 
some over-mastering passion or opinion, carrying with its ebullition 
violence and the upheaval of existing order, alike bring zvar. 

Whether the rights asserted be just, and the wrongs alleged be 
real, is a matter that mainly affects that moral force which imparts to 
physical force its best assurance of success. Without this electric 
impulse, the superior in numbers and general resources may become 
the vanquished party. 

Barbarism and fanaticism^ alone, are unrestrained \\\ war. 
One is the expression of the brute, the other of madness; and yet, by 
a strange anomaly in human nature, certain classes of wars among 
civilized nations partake of both elements. 

Ex-President WoOLSEY defines a just war, as " one that is waged 
in the last resort, when peaceable means have failed to procure 
redress, or when self-defense calls for it." 

The common-law rule for the magistrate in the execution of his 
duty, and for the citizen in self-defense, admits, however, of only the 
necessary force required for the immediate issue. This principle is 
agreeable to international law as best interpreted, and should be 
regarded as the standard of waste which a state can afford in exercise 
of the right of war. Excessive or vindicative force is retro-active 
upon the party exercising it, and is fatal to all concert of nations in 
relief of the hardships of war. 

Vattel declares that, " whenever justice is done, all right of em- 
ploying force is superseded." He divides wars into two sorts ; lawful 
and unlawful, the latter being those undertaken without apparent 
cause and for havoc or pillage ; all others being lawful. 



1775] WARS BETWEEN NATIONS. 2$ 

Grotius makes the distinction between those solemnly undertaken 
by the state, and those non-solemn, that grow out of the acts of sub- 
ordinate authority, not ratified by the head of the state. 

Wheaton asserts that, if war be declared in form by one state, it 
entitles both belligerent parties to all the rights of war against each 
other, whether the war be just or not. 

Halleck notices the distinction between perfect and imperfect 
wars, when, in one case, all the citizens of two states are placed in 
antagonism, and in the other, there is a limitation of persons, places, 
and things, as illustrated in the character of hostilities authorized by 
the United States against France in 1798. 

The terms offensive and defensive have also been applied to dis- 
tinguish wars, although more applicable to military operations, since 
every war of considerable magnitude or duration, has its alternations 
of attack and defense. Even in the shaping of cabinet policy, these 
terms are rather those of action than of type of contest, the verbal 
or diplomatic initiative being so aggressive as to compel protest and 
armed resentment. 

An equivalent principle obtains at common law, where " verbal 
acts," so called, may warrant physical redress. It is not proposed to 
carry this discussion into the domain of international law, which is 
largely that of ethics, but to recognize the distinctions and energizing 
principles of battle-issues. 

Writers have needlessly enlarged upon the classification of wars, 
and only a brief allusion is deemed necessary to cover all the ground 
which has real value to the citizen or student. 

While wars vary in the manifestation and use of force, their suc- 
cess involves the same principles of the military art. The elements 
that inspire hostility, and tender the battle-issue, largely determine 
the character of the war, and decide whether a whole nation is to 
put its resources and existence at risk, or only to display a partial 
force for some temporary advantage to itself, or in behalf of another 
nation seeking its support. But when two nations, as two pugilists, em- 
ploy their resources exhaustively against each other, the term national 
Wrtr has proper application. Such wars are peculiarly free from those 
heathenish exhibitions which attach to internecine types of conflict. 
The national honor, sensitive and forced to the issue, aims to pay 
respect to international law, and thereby to challenge the moral recog- 
nition of civilized neutrals. 

It is not an error, in a qualified sense, to treat as national wars. 



26 . WARS BETWEEN NATIONS. [1775 

the struggles of a once vanquished people to regain their indepen- 
dence. The suppressed nationality has its patriotic longings, and 
although lacking public recognition until successful, the struggle par- 
takes of a national character. Poland and Hungary for example, 
tried to resume their place among nations, so that revolt was not 
merely insurrection, but assertion of national entity, kept in subjection 
by the force of conquest. Such cases differ, however, from a pre- 
tended re-assertion of national character in attempted disruption of a 
union which had the consent of both parties, and where the merger 
of individuality has been voluntary and complete. Thus Scotland 
became an integral part of Great Britain, and Texas became an 
integral part of the United States by common consent. Turkey has 
repeatedly made war with Russia to ward off the accumulating force 
which threatened her independence, her national life. 

The struggle of the Netherlands against Spain, of the Spanish 
peninsula against France, of France against the allies, are treated by 
General Halleck as wars for independence, and yet those were 
national wars, to perfect and vindicate national existence. The war 
of 1 8 1 2, between Great Britain and the United States, has been treated 
as a war for independence. It was, however, largely the culmination 
of misunderstandings, put at issue indeed by the dawning develop- 
ment of those rights of citizenship which in later years have gained 
general acceptance. The claim of America was no more an assertion 
of independence from British control, than was that of Great Britain 
a claim for independence in the control of her home-born subjects. 
The former was the outgrowth of questions .unsettled by the Ameri- 
can Revolution, and the latter but the instinctive adherence to long 
existing prerogative. The former guaranteed to the adopted citizen 
the full measure of national protection ; the latter claimed the per- 
petual allegiance of all once citizens, and the right to reclaim their 
persons even on the high seas, whenever found. The war, however, 
was truly a national war. A war for independence suggests its own 
mission. It is the struggle of a colony, a dependent section of the 
state or of a distinct race, to obtain and maintain public recognition 
as a distinct nation. It finds its key in the first grade of Revolution 
hereafter considered. 

Baron Jomini declares that. " the spontaneous uprising of an 
united nation, must not be confounded with a national defense, in 
accordance with the institutions of the state and directed by the gov- 
ernment." His statement originates in the idea, that the govern- 



1775.] WARS BETWEEN NATIONS. 2^ 

merit may act independently of the people, and foreign to their interests 
or wishes. He would thus limit national wars to popular outbursts in 
search of independence, or such as are necessary to save the national 
life which has been put in peril. The statement ignores those states 
whose government is representative, and therefore the executive of the 
will of the people. He adds : " The term national, can only be 
applied to such wars as are waged against an united people, or a 
majority of them, filled with a noble ardor, and determined to sustain 
their independence." Wars, however, may be precipitated upon an 
entire nation by blunders of administration, misconception of con- 
flicting issues, or want of that catholicity and generous negotiation 
which will generally command peace when nations really desire peace. 
There may be realized in such cases only a lukewarm support of the 
government by the people ; but the nation is responsible for the war, 
and its government is responsible to the people. Sometimes a war 
is begun which dishonors national character and strikes at the rights 
of other nations, without any reasonable equivalent to the party tak- 
ing the aggressive. Wars for eonqiiest are of this type, and so are 
wars for the propagandism of ideas, whether political or religious. 
Upon the assumption, not to be thoughtlessly discredited, that every 
nation, as an abstract matter, has a rightful independence in legitimate 
pursuits of peace, but no right to enforce its domestic policy upon 
equally independent nations, all forms of propagandism by force of 
arms are destructive of society, and violate that international comity 
which, as between nations, is but the application of the wise restraint 
which governs citizens in the exercise of individual personal rights. 

The Crusades and the Moslem wars were of the character adverted 
to, full of evil passions and evil fruit, and in defiance of all social and 
national rights. Fortunately, wars for mere conquest have rarely 
perpetuated the state which committed the robbery. The compensa- 
tions of time under Providence brand conquest. The mark of Cain 
shows itself. To rob a nation of life, is not to be a glorious mission 
in the future. 

Wars of Intervention, once so common in behalf of a so-called 
balaiice of power, are almost invariably of doubtful expediency, and 
can only be justified when there has been that willful violation of the 
law of nations, which calls upon the strong to protect or vindicate the 
weak from an attempt at conquest, or the destruction of rights which 
are fundamental and essential to national life. 

The true balance of pozver, is that of moral and industrial excel 



28 WARS BETWEEN NATIONS. [1775. 

lence. All else savors of the dark ages, and is as absurd in essence, 
as the impossible equality of individuals in wealth or accomplishments. 
Equality to-day, will end to-morrow, just in proportion as the deserving 
improve their acquisitions and the unthrifty and selfish waste them. 
When the French army shall equal the German^ the German impulse 
will prompt a fresh expenditure to retain ascendency in the material 
of war, at the expense of domestic rest. Such are the considerations 
which, as a general rule, are to determine the character of national 
wars and indicate their limit. 

A nation has in fact no right to go to war unless it can pledge its 
entire national resources to the hazard. Neither has a nation the right 
to go to war if there be any attainable settlement of controversy upon 
a just basis without war. As a general rule, one nation has no pur- 
pose to destroy or absorb its opponent, but only to wear it out a little, 
so that it will be too tired to keep up controversy. As an equally 
general rule, nations are left after war pretty much where they started 
in respect of the issue made, but fearfully poor in the elements of a 
truly national life 



CHAPTER VT. 

CIVIL WAR, DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSURRECTION, REBELLION. 

AND REVOLUTION. 

CIVIL war is a war of one's own household, intestine, and full of 
bitter issues. 

In proportion as a state conserves the rights of its citizens and 
dispenses even justice, a civil struggle has the same merit which the 
claim of any bodily member might assert against the supremacy of the 
head or the heart. Just as the mangled limb or deranged function 
imperils the whole system, and can only revive its normal use by 
wholesome acceptance of its dependence, and such treatment as sub- 
serves the welfare of the uninjured parts, so do civil feuds and strifes 
endanger the state at the expense of the disaffected members, crown- 
ing the struggle with the ruin of all alike. 

Civil war proper, is a war of factions, not necessarily aiming at the 
integrity of the state, but involving separate aspirations to obtain 
control of the state, or at least supremacy over the rival faction. The 
South American States and Mexico furnish impressive examples of 
civil war. The English " War of the Roses," that of the League in 
France, and of the Guelphs and Ghibellines in Italy, are suggestive 
of the mischief to the body-politic which must attend an effort to 
push personal or party strifes to the usurpation of national authority. 
Success itself has no sound basis of perpetuity, because essentially 
maintained only in defiance of others' rights. Such wars were rife in 
feudal times ; and more than once the powers of Burgundy and 
France were well-nigh paralyzed for national offense or defense, by the 
selfish strife of rival aspirants for local power or influence at court. 

Civil war, however, has a general sweep which includes other and 
related classes ; these having subjective relations while full of dis- 
similar elements, viz., INSURRECTION, REBELLION, Revolution. 



30 CIVIL WAR. [1775- 

Each alike, belong to civil war, insomuch as the parties at issue 
belong to the state which is put in labor by their struggle. 

(a) Insurrection is resistance to the authority of the state in con- 
tempt of existing law. It has no dignity, no worthy aspiration, and is 
as lawless as it is illegal. It has none of the elements which make 
rebellion formidable, which vindicate revolution, and give to both 
rebellion and revolution a memorable place among wars. 

The failure of a state to govern wisely, in accordance with divine 
obligation, may engender distrust, antagonisms, and ultimate over- 
throw ; but insurrection is limited to that style of popular outburst, 
which, with no possible hope of redress for alleged wrongs, or benefit 
to the complaining parties, puts the rights of all in peril. 

It mocks at law and order and the remedies of the courts, and 
trifles with the rights of property and person. This statement is pre- 
dicated upon the supposed existence of legitimate authority, and' that 
the functions of the body-politic are working in the usual channels of 
a state of peace. 

Jealousy of a superior social condition, conflict with wise social 
laws, sudden impulses to take crimes or political issues out of the 
sphere of their legitimate control and adjudication, and even political 
or religious enthusia, are among the causes of insurrection. 

The violence is limited, and in a state which is upheld by a healthy 
moral sentiment on the part of the people, must be short-lived and 
fruitless except for evil. In this class of conflict occur those strikes 
of labor against capital, which both waste capital and degrade honor- 
able industry; and to this ephemeral and suicidal ebullition of passion 
the reckless partisan, with no ambition beyond office, is the incentive. 

Insurrection has no apology, short of a condition where the resist- 
ance of an individual to lawless force is his only salvation ; and then 
insurrection is merged in the duty of Revolution. In a just, civilized 
state, there is redress, however slow, by legal methods, and deferred 
redress is better than law defied. The mob-law, which hangs a crim- 
inal in advance of legal process, breathes the spirit of insurrection, and 
its impulse may shift, and may in turn, strike the best friend of the 
state and people. History bears frightful testimony to the character 
of such demonstrations. 

In 1358, the Jacquerie, on the assertion that the nobles were 
oppressive and guilty of all license, began an unqualified slaughter 
of all who had preeminence for education, station, or wealth, until 
the catalogue of outrages upon person and life became the synonym 



I775-] CIVIL WAR. 3 1 

for all time, of the possibilities of insurrection in the degradation 

of man. 

Under the cloak of religious zeal, an equal fury burned in the 
breasts of bigots during the middle ages, and the spirit has not yet 
taken its flight from earth to its own place. On the fifth of March, 
1770, when the people of Boston were almost at open issue with the 
authorities, and the leaven of revolution was already working to the 
surface, a mob precipitated a needless quarrel with the soldiery, 
caused the death of Attucks and two other citizens, and threatened 
the entire city with fire and blood. The dignity of the courts, and 
the vindication of the soldiers by Quincy and Adams, alone restored 
order and averted extremes. 

In December, 1786, Shay's rebellion broke out in Massachusetts. 
The claim that the Governor's salary was excessive, that the State 
Senate was aristocratic, and that taxes were odious, was pushed so vio- 
lently and wildly, that courts were interrupted, and it seemed as if 
anarchy was to bury all memory of holy sacrifices made in the war 
which had so recently closed. 

When a rightful duty was imposed upon spirits in 1795, the pop 
ular resistance set Pennsylvania on fire with similar demonstrations. 
The mails were robbed, and nameless crimes against virtue and inno- 
cence followed in the wake of pretended assertion of civil rights. It 
required the promptest exertion of President Washington and Gov- 
ernor Lee, and the employment of fifteen thousand troops to restore 
order, and society did not resume a placid surface for a long time 
thereafter. 

No less conspicuous, in a military relation, were the uprisings of 
both British and American troops in New Jersey. In both cases, the 
exhibition of force had nothing to gain, but put in jeopardy the very 
interests which the men were sworn to uphold. In one case, the 
English proposition to compromise with the colonies, was the exclu- 
sive prerogative of the state ; and in the other, the very ability of 
Congress to pay arrears due the troops, depended eventually and 
wholly upon the moral force which discipline could impart to the 
army. Moreover, the officers suffered equally witii the men. 

{b) Rebellion has a broader domain. While insurrection ignores 
or trifles with authority, and substitutes selfishness and passion for le- 
gitimate means of redress, the former disobeys and defies the author 
ity of the state. Halleck defines rebellion as, " usually, a war between 
the legitimate government of a state, and portions or parts of the 



32 CIVIL WAR. [1775 

same, who seek to overthrow the government or to dissolve the alle- 
giance to it, and set up one of their own," citing the war of the Great 
Rebellion in England, and that of the Southern States in America in 
1861. Rebellion has organization and method, embraces more defi- 
nite plans for prolonged resistance, and differs therein from insurrec- 
tion, which expends its strength upon sudden and temporary expres- 
sion, affecting good order, indeed, but lacking the coherence and com- 
prehension of issues which characterize its development into open 
rebelHon against the state itself. 

(c) Revolution advances with purpose to overthrow the state 
and substitute a new form of government, or a new dynasty. The 
nominal RigJit of Revolution is asserted by many, as if it were a high 
reserve franchise belonging to the people, and one which they may 
exercise according to their choice. This is not true. There are 
indeed, conditions under which a people may assert such a choice ; 
but these conditions must have foundation in principles which under- 
lie social organization itself. To vindicate the claim of the people to 
be governed wisely and justly is one proposition ; but to admit that a 
majority may exercise their choice as a matter of abstract right, and 
by violence, is to strike a fatal blow at real liberty. The dogma savors 
of the worst forms of civil war, gives dignity to insurrection, develops 
formal rebellion, and refuses to the minority their equal rights with 
the majority. The deliberate and matured modification of existing 
forms, peaceably and constitutionally effected, is of course an entirely 
different matter. The fluctuations of opinion which mark all truly 
enlightened nations, are the true life of real development, and the 
alternations of civil control which attend these conflicts of opinion, 
are designed to work out ultimate peace and prosperity for the 
entire body -politic. A false assumption as to this alleged right of 
revolution has often disguised civil war, and has made Mexican Rev- 
olution an expression for license, insecurity, and general waste. 
There are but two conditions which lift revolution to the dignity 
of a right, and then the law of duty compels the revolution. It is not 
sought, but comes as an inevitable assertion of the principle of 
self-defense. 

The first grade is that which devolves upon distant dependencies, 
the assertion of INDEPENDENCE, when the controlling authority is 
unable or unwilling to grant the people their rights and proper rep- 
resentation ; when laws are constraints without equivalents, and the 
subjects are, in fact, slaves, without the filial relation which people are 



1775.] CIVIL WAR. 33 

to bear to the state, and which reciprocally binds the state to legis- 
late for the common good of all who render homage. 

The second condition is cumulative of the first; when the ab- 
sorption of power in the governing authority is wholly set upon its 
own aggrandizement in defiance of popular rights, and no redress 
can be found through legislative or judicial sources. Mere errors of 
judgment in line of policy, or the administration of law through mis- 
taken forms, is not a fair basis for overthrow of existing state sov- 
ereignty. There must be such a condition that no redress is obtain- 
able through established methods, and existing authority has lost its 
legal hold upon its subjects, by subverting the principles which under- 
lie and impart all authority. 

There is a divine right of authority. That social crystallization 
which enlarges the family relation and forms the state, carries with it 
not only the obligation of wise control, but that of wise obedience. 
The parent may outrage that relation, and the law will give to the 
child a guardian, or emancipate it from the abused control. It is 
under just such a phase of civil suffering that the remedy lies in rev- 
olution and independence. The obligation of the child to endure 
until no other remedy is possible, is the type of the patience and 
duty which must possess the citizen until the necessity of self-defense 
demands the ultimate remedy. 

In its assertion there must be an unqualified search for a true 
social peace, and not an ambition for independence such as a mind 
would covet under the irksome restraint of wholesome or even 
stringent control. 

The whole history of continental revolutions is full of lessons of 
warning to those who, for nominal changes, or nominal forms of gov- 
ernment, make haste to overturn existing order without the moral 
purpose or capacity to remedy the evils which are the burden of 
complaint. 

Authority is intrinsically arbitrary. So long as men are fickle and 
human, there will be a tendency to abuse that authority, and an 
equally fatal tendency to despise all authority. The power of the 
many is no less despotic than that of the ic\\r ; and the law of man, is 
to aim at the highest good of the greatest number, and not to fly in 
the face of authority because of a fancied improvement through 
coveted change. Outside of this law of social life there is no stability, 
no progress, no abiding peace. 

Revolution is therefore a last resort, and the subordination of 
3 



34 CIVIL WAR. [1775. 

temporary issues or burdens to the general peace will bring ultimate 
benefit to any enlightened people who have legitimate avenues by 
which to control or shape the policy of rulers, without a spasmodic 
dash for its overthrow, and a plunge from bad to doubtful, or worse. 
Revolution, like civil war in all its phases, involves cost, waste, and 
long stagnation of the offices of true peace. These must be risked in 
the last resort, but only when legitimate methods fail, and the 
issue hurries the solution to a crisis. 



CHAPTER VII. 

PROVIDENCE IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. 

THE war for American Independence was marked by many crit- 
ical events which were beyond human control or remedy. 
Some of these changed the relations of contending armies in a single 
night. More than once, a few hours of unexpected rain, wind or fog, 
were enough to assure lasting results. These determining events, 
because belonging to the sphere and operation of physical laws, are 
not beyond the recognition of nature's Master. They testify very 
clearly at least, the absolute uncertainty of the best human plans, 
whether for peace or war, and the value of the promptness which 
seizes every opportunity as it passes, and thus gives shape to material 
issues which are ripe for solution. 

A few facts are grouped together in advance of their relations to 
specific battles, to illustrate the principle. 

Early in the month of November, 1775, the expedition of Arnold 
to Canada was rashly pushed through a pathless wilderness to the 
shore of the river St. Lawrence. The possibilities of success were fair, 
if the invader could have struck the feeble and astonished garrison 
promptly upon arrival. Sleet and rain continuing for several days, 
kept the adventurer fast at Point Levi, and prepared the way for his 
signal failure. 

On the morning of August twenty-eighth, 1776, just after the 
battle of Long Island, a drizzling mist, succeeded by heavy rain which 
continued for most of the day, retarded the approach of the British 
army to the American intrenchments at Brooklyn, and prevented the 
fleet itself from approaching New York. Toward evening the rain 
ceased, and work was resumed upon the British lines. 

August twenty-ninth was a second day of rain ; but every hour 
was improved by Washington to collect all kinds of boats, including 



7^6 PROVIDENCE IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. [1775. 

sloops, SCOWS, and row-boats, with view to rescue his army from 
impending capture. The masterly execution of the retreat was made 
possible by an unexampled fog, which lingered until the last detach- 
ment had taken passage. The wind itself, which threatened to drive 
the boats toward sea, shifted suddenly and quickened the transit. 
The fog lifted. The wind, so long unpropitious, had detained the 
British fleet at the Narrows, while by the change v/hich had done so 
much for the Americans, that fleet was borne up the bay to assert 
control of the harbor and river passage, but too late to foil the move- 
ment of the American commander. 

On the evening of the thirtieth of October, 1776, Earl Percy 
joined Lord Howe, then encamped in front of the American lines at 
White Plains, and it was resolved to storm the works at daybreak 
following. A north-easter came down upon the camps at midnight, 
raging wildly for nearly twenty-four hours ; but before the advance 
was attempted, Washington had again rescued his army by with- 
drawal to the heights of North Castle, and occupied a position too 
strong to warrant assault. 

On Christmas night, 1776, the parting ice at McConkey's Ferry, 
nine miles above Trenton, on the Delaware river, admitted of the 
safe passage and landing of one column of the American army, 
although other divisions were foiled in like attempts at ferries still 
nearer Trenton, and thus the battle of Trenton made its stamp upon 
the entire history of the struggle. It impressed all nations with re- 
spect for the prudence, courage, and faith of Washington, and relieved 
the American troops of the impression that the Hessians were a pecu- 
liarly fierce and invincible race. 

The renewal of the offensive by Washington on the first of Janu- 
ary, 1777, by again crossing the river, and in force, during compar- 
atively mild weather, was followed by the abrupt closing of the 
Delaware, not sufliiciently for safe retreat over the ice, but solid 
enough to threaten his entire force with destruction or capture. The 
same extreme cold froze the roads, made them passable for artillery 
and men, and the whole situation was so skillfully improved, that the 
action at Princeton followed, and his retreat to secure winter-quarters 
on the heights of New Jersey, not only saved his command, but 
threatened the British posts about New York and affected the entire 
New Jersey campaign. 

The battle of Brandywine which occurred September eighth, 1777, 
was not accepted by Washington as decisive of the fate of Phila- 



1775-] PROVIDENCE IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. 37 

delphia. After a brief rest, the armies were again face to face Sep- 
tember sixteenth, near White House Tavern, twenty miles from 
Philadelphia, Washington seeking the issue. General Howe skillfully 
turned the right flank of the American army, and skirmishing had 
begun, when a storm of unusual severity put arms and ammunition out 
of condition for use, filled the small streams, parted the combatants, 
and ultimately gave to the British the barren acquisition of the city. 

The sudden renewal of the offensive at Germantown, on the fourth 
of October following, and with large promise of success, was neutral- 
ized and turned into a repulse by the interposition of dense fog which 
confused the troops and compelled a retreat, but thereby secured the 
column from the pressure of overwhelming forces which Cornwallis 
hastened from Philadelphia to the support of General Howe. 

On the eleventh of October of the same year, when the army of 
Burgoyne had crossed the Fishkill, and was supposed to be in full 
retreat, General Gates pushed Morgan's rifle corps and the brigades of 
Nixon and Glover across the river under cover of a dense fog. A 
deserter gave warning and the movement was suspended. As the 
fog lifted, the entire army was seen to be in line of battle to meet the 
attack. 

A succession of head winds delayed the fleet of Count D'Estaing 
during the voyage to America in 1778, so that Admiral Howe with- 
drew his squadron from the Delaware river. The prompt evacuation 
of Philadelphia by General Clinton, pursuant to orders, was thus the 
means of saving both army and fleet. 

A propitious voyage of the French squadron would have been 
fatal to both. The squadron of Lord Byron, which was to have sailed 
from England, when information was received of the departure of 
Count D'Estaing from France, was detained until June the fifth, and 
was so disabled by a storm as to be compelled to refit before taking 
the offensive on the American coast. 

On the tenth day of August, 1778, a storm disabled both British 
and French fleets off the harbor of Newport, Rhode Island, deprived 
General Sullivan of the support of the French troops in the siege of 
that city, and compelled both a retreat from the island itself, and 
abandonment of the siege. Almost immediately after. General Clin- 
ton arrived with a reinforcement of four thousand British troops. 

The supposed insecurity of the southern coast during the fall 
months, forced Count De Grasse to a premature assault, followed by 
defeat, at Savannah in the month of October, 1779, when completed 



■38 PROVIDENCE IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. [1775. 

trenches and adequate forces gave entire assurance of a successful 
siege. Two days after he left, his fleet was dispersed by a tempest. 

On the ninth of January, 1 780, General Lord Stirling took a force of 
twenty-five hundred men from Elizabethtown, New Jersey, to Staten 
Island in sleighs, crossing the river on the ice, for the purpose of 
attacking the British in their quarters. The harbor itself had been 
closed so that heavy cannon had been hauled across on the ice. 
Quite unexpectedly, the channel had opened between New York and 
the island, so that the British posts had been reinforced during that 
very day. The snow was three feet deep, and nearly five hundred 
men paid the penalty of frozen limbs for this mammoth midnight 
sleigh-ride. 

On the twenty-ninth day of January, 1 781, Lord Cornwallis march- 
ing between Broad and Catawba rivers, pursued Morgan with the hope 
of recapturing the prisoners which that officer acquired in the battle 
of Cowpens. The pursuit was successful. Night came on, and it was 
left for sunrise to assure the victory. Morgan crossed the Catawba. 
A heavy rain filled the river to its banks, and cut off further pursuit. 

Morgan gained the banks of the river Yadkin on the second day 
of February. An equally sudden storm came on. Morgan swam his 
horses across the river, and transported his troops in batteaux, which 
he secured on the other bank, so that his pursuer again failed of 
success. 

On the thirteenth day of the same month, Morgan having effected 
a union with Greene, the whole command successfully crossed the 
river Dan, and then renewed rain interposed the shield of an impass- 
able barrier for a third time, and Lord Cornwallis, disheartened, 
abandoned pursuit and retired to Hillsborough. 

At the critical period when the Count De Grasse entered Ches- 
apeake bay with a formidable fleet of men-of-war and transports, to aid 
the American army in the reduction of Yorktown, a Franco-Spanish 
fleet of more than sixty sail was on its way to the West Indies to 
operate against the British colonies. The former fulfilled its mission. 
The latter, separated by storms, and thoroughly demoralized for any 
concerted action, returned to Europe, leaving the record of a profitless 
venture. 

During the night of the sixteenth of October, 1781, when stillness 
pervaded the air, and a calm surface invited the attempt, the vanguard 
of the beleaguered army of Cornwallis crossed York river by boats 
and landed safely at Gloucester Point. It was the beginning of a 



1775] PROVIDENCE IN WAR ILLUSl Ki\.TED. 



39 



brave and earnest effort to extricate his army from impendinj^ sur- 
render, and to make a bold push for New York by land. Suddenly, 
without warning, a storm of rain and wind burst over the heads of 
the hopeful garrison. The detachment already over, was safely re- 
called, and the drama of the war proceeded to its catastrophe. 

Such facts as are thus grouped from the record of the war of 
1775-178 1, are not exceptional. Neither was the overthrow of the 
Spanish Armada exceptional. The majority of large maritime expe- 
ditions have had similar vicissitudes, and the battle of Waterloo itself 
vibrated under the strokes of the storm king. 

Such facts step in along the life record of nations, to show on the 
one hand, how utterly dependent are all human enterprises upon ele- 
ments largely beyond human control, and on the other hand to de- 
monstrate that wise and earnest men, resolute of will, and prompt to 
execute, have converted storm itself and seeming misfortune into 
permanent benefit, and have even rescued victory from the grasp of 
the elements themselves. It is a part of the philosophy of war to 
study such examples, and the American struggle is the history of 
seven years of characteristic fluctuations which worked in the direc- 
tion of American Independence, even when hardships and misfor- 
tunes seemed to alternate during the operations of the contending 
armies. 

It is not alone, however, in the realm of physical nature that life's 
issues bear the impress of external force. Opportunity is given to men 
and nations, and all probation is full of the neglect or improvement 
of opportunity. Slight causes, no less than those more impressive 
and prominent, give shape to issues and assure results. The states- 
manship of war grapples with all classes of influences which work 
for or against success, and a brief consideration of its principles and 
obligations is regarded essential to the proper fulfillment of the 
purpose in view. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

STATESMANSHIP IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. 

WAR begins in the closet. The purpose to fight is definitely 
settled before the army moves to strike. The entire success 
of that army will largely depend upon the wisdom of the policy 
adopted by the state. While military men must bear the burden of 
field-work, and be held accountable for adequate preparation for all 
its contingencies, there is a kind of closet work which will make, or 
mar,the success of all field-work. 

Inasmuch as the army is but the strong arm of the state, to be 
employed in last resort to support the state, so will there be a tend- 
ency on the part of the state to confound its own relations with those 
of the executive force, and usurp functions, or dictate action, which 
should be determined mainly by the exercise of military judgment, 
acting in harmony with a sound state policy. The primary principles 
which in the outset are to determine for or against war, belong pecu- 
liarly to the consideration of the statesman. Some of these principles 
are such as equally concern the soldier and bind him to the study of 
their relations as causes of war. 

A fundamental condition of rightful war is, that it be essentially 
just, be absolutely necessary, and be prosecuted by just methods for 
its legitimate ends. There are circumstances which compel war. 
These have been sufficiently outhned in the consideration of wars 
between nations. 

The present inquiry teaches the management of war which has 
been already determined upon by the state. The problem whether 
one state "shall be able with ten thousand to meet one that cometh 
against it with twenty thousand," involves the corresponding inquiry, 
" whether, while the other is yet a great way off, an embassage shall 
go forth to propose conditions of peace." 



I775.J STATESMANSHIP IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. 41 

The parable of the Saviour is suggestive of that solemn delibera- 
tion which the contingency of war devolves upon the state. 

The first consideration, therefore, which demands notice, is that of 
the character, resources, and location of the force opposed. A state, 
whether near or remote, having maritime relations, is not to be esti- 
mated as is a border state non-maritime and entirely restricted to 
operations by land. 

The whole question of supply for troops, and of the exclusion of 
supplies from the opposing force, is largely affected by this single 
question. It affects the selection of a proper base of operations for 
the army itself, and no less determines the character of the force to be 
retained at home for defense against a possible intrusion from hostile 
fleets. The right and application of blockade is thereby brought under 
serious notice, as well as many delicate questions concerningthe rights 
of neutrals, since the sea itself is the free highway of nations, and all 
nations, even while at war, are under high obligations to protect all 
other nations, so far as possible, from the waste and burdens which all 
wars involve. If war ensue between border-states, the questions 
which affect other nations are more restricted, and offenses against 
neutrals are less likely to enlarge the field of war and involve those 
nations whose interests lie in a continued peace. It is important 
that the issues joined are not those of political or religious opinion. 
There is no natural end to such a contest, and the passions aroused are 
absolutely foreign to a fair settlement of legitimate international 
differences. Hence it is the part of intrinsic wisdom, so to carry on 
war, that neither the political nor religious opinions of the opponent 
are stirred up and made the impelling force which resists the demand 
for a fair settlement of the controversy begun. 

There are times, however, but rare, when moral questions force 
themselves into that " military policy " which is very properly classed 
by Jomini as the statesmanship of war. The war which began in 
1861, between different sections of the American Republic, involved 
such a question, and its part in the war was the result of changing 
condition, and not an original impulse of the national authority in its 
assertions of national unity. The abolition of slavery was not a real 
issue at the outset. A declaration of that issue as a purpose, would 
not have rallied to its support an united citizenship, as did the vindi- 
cation of the national flag and the national life. Its subsequent intro- 
duction into the contest was a matter of military necessity, on the 
ground that the prolonged warfare compelled a blow at the vital ele- 



42 STATESMANSHIP IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. [1775. 

ment upon which the resistance hinged. It took its place as an 
element of the war, because permanent peace under reinstated author- 
ity was impossible, so long as an abnormal social condition con- 
flicted with the law and essence of pure individual and personal 
liberty. 

The suppression of the Mamelukes in 1811, and of the Janizaries in 
1826, became indispensably necessary to the maintenance of legitimate 
authority, because the creature usurped authority over the state, its 
creator, and would not accept the legitimate control which the state 
asserted. It will not be questioned now that the aspiration of slavery 
to hold perfect equality of footing with liberty, forced it into an atti- 
tude wholly at war with the charity which had so long tolerated its 
presence as a transmitted incubus upon the national life. Hence, it 
became an objective of attack. 

The expulsion or suppression of the order of Jesuits by certain 
European states, is not predicated upon their holding certain religious 
faith, but upon their supposed organization to contravene the author- 
ity, or seek the overthrow, of the very state which affords them pro- 
tection and a home. Neither of these exceptions are in conflict with 
the principles asserted. 

In view of war once undertaken, it is equally important that regard 
be had to the social and moral circumstances of the state assailed. Its 
government may have forced the war, while its people oppose or reluc- 
tantly support it. The whole policy of operations is to be shaped by 
regard to such issues. A just advocacy of rightful claims, as between 
civilized and enlightened nations, will gradually constrain a people to 
put their own government in the right, and compel the admission of 
such claims, if there be no manifest aggression for selfish ends, and in 
disregard of a sound discussion of the issues made. Hence, an tin- 
reasonable ultimatum, propositions looking to national humiliation, or, 
a claim for vindictive, consequential damage for injuries alleged, is 
not only provocative of protracted, bitter resistance, but will leave 
heartburns, thirst for revenge, and seed for future conflict. Regard 
must be had even for national peculiarities. An issue with Turkey is 
not well presented if it offend Moslem prejudices, unless that state 
shall intrude such prejudices in the way of equal justice to non- 
Mohammedan nations. An issue with China is not well presented if 
it make war upon its social customs, irrespective of their relation to 
international intercourse. In a word, the instincts of christian gen- 
tlemen are not to be cast away by nations any more than by individ- 



1775] STATESMANSHIP IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. 43 

uals when differences arise, and the ricjhts of each are to be weighed 
in the balances of even-handed justice. 

A poHcy that will allay passion, and impress the opponent with 
the justice of the claim at stake, will hasten peace and a final settle- 
ment of all interests involved. In harmony with this line of conduct, 
is such a course as strongly appeals to sound patriotism at home, and 
thus unites the people in a hearty support of the government which 
carries on the war on their behalf. 

An attitude which vindicates a merely partisan ascendency, is 
repugnant to the sober judgment of an intelligent people, and such a 
war must soon languish and fail, or be fruitless of substantial benefit 
to the nation involved. It is therefore just that the cause of the war 
be fairly stated, and that the men who are to furnish lives and treas- 
ure to feed war, shall be in full sympathy with its prosecution. Mere 
national aggrandizement, or the reduction to a lower grade of a state 
which is confessedly superior, will not meet the requirements of sound 
statesmanship. " To live and let live," is the duty of nations as well 
as of individuals. Predicated upon such principles, and working in 
such channels, a war advances to execute its work. Shall the nation 
take the offensive or await the attack? This must be determined by 
the respective preparations of the parties, the location of objectives 
most susceptible of attack with view to hasten the final result, and the 
character of the issue itself If a boundary be in dispute, a prompt 
occupation and armed possession of the territory involved may prove 
a virtual solution of the whole controversy. 

Dispossession of a firmly established force may be more costly 
than a surrender of claim to the title. Barren points of this kind 
have cost many lives and large treasure. A state can not afford to go 
to war for barren issues, and when no national benefit can possibly 
ensue from the contest. 

It is always bad statesmanship to make merely nominal issues, or 
to stake the settlement of differences upon questions of pride, as fot 
instance, the occupation of an enemy's capital, or any other particular 
and merely formal success, which does not of necessity work to the 
quickest conclusion in peace. 

It is equally wrong to over-ride the jurisdiction of military men to 
whom the armies are entrusted, by loading them down with instruc- 
tions that are non-military, and too late for application when the 
issue of arms has been joined. Confidence must be given to the 



44 STATESMANSHIP IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. [1775. 

« 

commanders when they have been wisely selected, or their success is 
put in hazard at the outset. 

During the year 1861, the American Congress and a portion of the 
American press reiterated the cry of " on to Richmond " ad nauseam, 
until outside non-combatant energies largely precipitated the first 
battle of Bull Run, and even contributed spectators to see how 
thoroughly a brilliant triumph would vindicate the manifold criticisms 
upon the delay of the national army to move to the front. 

The movement made at the close of the Mexican war to super- 
sede Major-general Scott by appointment of a citizen to the grade 
of lieutenant-general, was an intrusion of folly into matters strictly 
military, and failed through its inherent simplicity. 

It is already evident that strategical combinations, and considera- 
tions such as Baron Jomini calls " making war on the map in contradis- 
tinction to operations on the field," fall within the considerate regard 
of the statesman as well as of the soldier ; and much that belongs to 
the consideration of strategy proper, is eminently worthy of the study 
of that cabinet which rules the affairs of states, and acts by author- 
ity in initiating the war itself. 

It only remains to add that wise statesmanship in war embraces a 
careful consideration of the military and financial resources of the 
opposing state, in comparison with those of the state making war, so 
that adequate means may be furnished for the purpose required, with 
the least possible drain upon the state, and the least possible suspen- 
sion of the industrial pursuits of those not called upon to take active 
part in the war itself. 

To break up a nest of pirates, to vindicate a wrong done to a citi- 
zen by a half civilized or barbarous state, would involve a very differ- 
ent expenditure of means and men from a contest with a state fully 
up to all standard improvements in the capacity to carry on war. 
Extravagant means, beyond the necessity of the end in view, always 
beget a suspicion that the state is only seeking an excuse to increase 
its warlike capacity at the expense of the people, and the demands 
of a healthy and permanent peace. Strong armaments beget occa- 
sions for their use, and true statesmanship in war is that which is best 
in peace. 

Finally, let it be understood that " amenities in war," belong to 
the age. Christianity, which is the true life of all national life, only 
declares the demand which civilization now affirms, that war shall have 
its issue between real combatants only, and that in the effort to 



I775-J STATESMANSHIP IN WAR ILLUSTRATED. 45 

deplete the enemy of resources for continuing the struggle, there is 
to be recognized a high regard for Hfe itself, and for those personal 
rights which belong to the family and society. Of this class are those 
which deal with prisoners of war and certain grades of private property. 
Plunder is no longer a just right of the individual soldier. Starvation 
or abuse of captives only rebounds to irritate the enemy, and make a 
good cause partake of all the dishonor and natural fatality of a bad 
cause. 

High statesmanship in war, which includes statesmanship during 
its inception and looking to its prevention, affords the best promise 
that the time will hasten when reason and charity combined will dis- 
arm the nations, and leave the settlement of national issues to that 
kind of arbitrament which long since abolished the " wager of battle." 
and the duelist's senseless "code of honor." 



CHAPTER IX. 

PRINCIPLES DEFINED. STRATEGY ILLUSTRATED. 

WAR may be formally declared, — may start in the collision of 
armies stationed on the border, or may be forced by invasion 
or some other aggressive act of another state. The United States 
and Mexico were put at war with each other in 1845 by the advance 
of General Zachary Taylor upon territory then in controversy. 
Napoleon III. hurled the announcement of war against Prussia 
in 1870 only as he advanced his army of invasion. 

Lexington and Concord opened the war of 1776-1781. The 
principles involved by the beginning of war are, however, entirely 
within the sphere of international law, except so far as policy or the 
statesmanship of war has considered the issue, for the purpose of 
determining what methods shall be adopted for its prosecution. 

At this period physical force enters the arena. Practical questions 
take the place of theory. Shall the state take offensive measures, 
thereby to make the struggle upon foreign soil, or limit its action to 
defense of its own soil ? 

The offensive not only bears to the territory of the adversary the 
local waste of war, but carries with it the incentive which attends a 
first success. It assumes a superiority by assertion of the aggressive, 
and often excites enthusiasm at home while discouraging the adver- 
sary. The offensive must work by careful plans, with close counsels, 
and thus keep the enemy busy to meet them as they unfold. But it 
must be followed up with vigor and with adequate resources. These 
resources, whether of men, munitions, provisions, or transportation, 
must be continually renewed and continually protected. Otherwise, 
the advancing force will be so wasted by casualties as to become 
inferior to the resisting force, and will then fall an easy prey to a 
revived adversary backed by an aroused people, restored to a fresh 



I775.J PRINCIPLES DEFINED. 47 

consciousness of their ability successfully to resist. Failure to sustain 
the offensive is generally the prelude to ultimate defeat. The defens- 
ive, on the other hand, inspires a nation to earnest resistance, if its 
people are united in thought and policy, and if there be no elements 
in the issue which prompt a sympathy with the cause of the invaders 
and induce a liikezvarin resistance. 

Supplies are more readily at hand. The superior knowledge of 
the country is of great use in keeping up communications and dis- 
turbing those of the enemy. The social instincts, obligations, and 
sympathies, are more closely bound to every incident of the struggle, 
and the national life itself may be so imperiled as to evoke the max- 
imum of resistance which the state and people combined can possibly 
put forth. Many classes of supplies which are essential to invasion. 
can be largely dispensed with under many phases of a simple defense. 

When the defensive by adequate resistance is enabled to assume 
the offensive in return, and to follow this with vigor and resources 
adequate to the opportunity, the war may be considered as near its 
final crisis. But the passive or persistent defensive will ultimately be 
fatal in any struggle, whenever the aggressive force patiently main- 
tains its pressure. 

The terms offensive and defensive have pointed application in 
single actions, which are often decisive of a campaign, or of the war 
itself, whatever may have been the original policy of the state which 
took the initiative at the outset of hostilities. 

Washington at Princeton, and Clinton at Monmouth, alike re- 
turned the offensive, under circumstances which accomplished for 
each the object in view, and alike testified of their courage, conduct, 
and military skill. In the war of 1775-1781, there were peculiar cir- 
cumstances to give value to the defensive, having offensive return. 
The territory was quite generally thickly wooded ; bridges were infre- 
quent, the population was scattered, roads were poor, water courses 
were not only numerous and large, but Avere peculiarly susceptible to 
overflow, because of the mountains and hills which everywhere 
abounded. 

In regions not hilly, or near the sea-coast, the numerous swamps 
interposed equally serious obstacles to the movements of organized 
commands, and afforded special opportunity for that partisan species 
of warfare which is then so efficient in defense, and so annoying to an 
invader. 

War having in fact begun, the elements which control its destiny 



48 PRINCIPLES DEFINED. [1775. 

are embodied in simple propositions. These embody five universally 
recognized divisions of the art of war, and will be defined as follows : 

I. Strategy. 

To secure those combinations which will assure the highest possi- 
ble advantages in the employment of military force. 

II. Grand Tactics. 

To handle that force on the battle-field. 

III. Logistics. 

The practical art of bringing armies fully equipped to the battle- 
issue. 

IV. Engineering. 

The application of mathematics and mechanics to the mainte- 
nance or reduction of fortified places, the interposition or removal of 
natural or artificial obstacles to the passage of an army, and the erec- 
tion of suitable works for defense of territory or troops. 

V. Minor Tactics. 

The instruction of the soldier individually and en masse, in the 
details of military drill and the perfection of discipline. 

With regard to the last two divisions, it is only necessary to notice 
that the early drill of Washington, as a practical civil engineer and 
frontier officer, was made conspicuously useful in the selection of 
mihtary positions for his army in the progress of the war of 177 5-1 781. 
Although he had the cooperation of several foreign officers of real 
attainment, he gave his personal attention to the location of field- 
works on occasions of great necessity. He had strong faith in a 
system, now so indispensable, of casting up light earthworks when his 
army halted, and an enemy was within a short march of his lines. 
Baron Steuben and Generals Lee, Greene, Wayne, Varnum, and Max- 
well, were among his most skillful and urgent officers in imparting 
instruction in the details of minor tactics. The success was only 
limited by the fluctuations of army organization, and the short terms 
of enlistment. The continental troops which were enlisted for the 
war, very properly styled the " American Continental Army," vindi- 
cated their drill and discipline in the field. The first three divisions of 
the art of war, in their order as named, will receive brief consider- 
ation. 

Strategy deals first with the theatre of war. This involves a clear 
consideration of several included topics, viz., — the character of the 
country, its natural resources, its topographical features, its means of 
inter-communication, in short, all elements which form or impede the 



1775] PRINCIPLES DEFINED. 49 

movement of an army under the changing circumstances which affect 
all armies in the field. 

During the war of 1775-178 1, the theatre of war extended from 
the St. Lawrence river to Florida, and from the Atlantic ocean 
nearly to the Mississippi river. It was not then, and never is, enough 
simply to take cognizance of the theatre of active operations. 

In the contingenc}' of a collision between England and the United 
States, Canada would be, as then, a possible base of British operations, 
requiring observation at least as a hostile border, if it did not become 
an actual field of operations by intrusion of American troops. 

Equally important, in case of trouble between the United States 
and Spain, would be such a naval observation of Cuba as to anticipate 
a concentration of troops on the island and a descent upon the 
American coast. Either Canada or Cuba might become a field of 
active operations, and neglect to anticipate these contingencies, would 
violate the demands of sound strategy as well as wise statesman- 
ship. 

Arnold's fatal attempt upon Quebec will be hereafter considered 
in connection with the battle record proper. Sufficient to say in this 
connection, that it had but one possible element of merit, and that, 
the wild conjecture that Canada had a common interest, and was 
willing to make common cause in the issue with the mother country. 

In a wise examination of X.\\q theatre of tvar, thQ outlook must 
include natural strategic positions, just as in the operations of a cam- 
paign there will be found accidental and conditional strategic positions, 
having their sole value in the temporary strength or opportunity which 
they afford to one army, and the temporary detention or reverse 
which they involve for the adversary force. 

The wise location of an army at the end of a day's march, will 
often secure determining positions which directly involve ultimate 
success, while a corresponding error will bring a quick attack and 
a speedy reverse. 

Compactness, so that the whole force can be handled, and suchi 
disposition, that no surprise can be effected, are alike indispensable to 
such a position. West Point was a natural strategic point in respect 
of operations along the Hudson river. Forts Lee and Independence 
had a similar element of value, inasmuch as these positions, if sub- 
stantially supported, were links to assure speedy communication 
between New England and the other colonies, and impart to each sec- 
tion the confidence which a prompt mutual support would engender. 
4 



50 PRINCIPLES DEFINED. [1775. 

Their early reduction, and that of Forts Clinton, Montgomery, and 
Stony Point, crowded this link of inter-communication far up the 
Hudson river. Such positions as the "straits of the Dardanelles" 
have a similar permanent strategic value, to be regarded, whether 
actually occupied or not. 

Strategic movements have as their philosophy the use of all meas- 
ures, other than those of detail and the mere physical struggle of the 
field, which tend to enhance success, and reduce to their lowest 
grade of destructive force the resources of the enemy. Thus a vic- 
tory may be won without a battle, whenever a prompt and felicitous 
strategic movement, or the timely seizure of a single position, shall 
compel an enemy to abandon his own position as untenable, in view 
of the movement made. 

The simulated attack upon New York by Washington, in 1781 
which was carried so far as to have brick bread-ovens erected in Nev\ 
Jersey, opposite Staten Island, was a strategic movement which held 
the garrison fast to that city, induced a call upon Lord Cornwallis for 
reinforcements, and ultimately resulted in the capture of Yorktown. 
Thus the American army had substantially a double presence, repre- 
sented a double force, and presented a double front, — one false, and 
one real. 

The establishment of Washington's Headquarters at Morristown^/ 
was of high strategical value, inasmuch as New England, New York, 
New Jersey, and the Southern States, were all on radii from that 
centre, and almost equally accessible by his command. On the other 
hand, the occupation of Philadelphia by General Howe, lost the value 
which was predicated upon the movement, for want of adequate force 
by which to reduce the army of Washington still in the field. It 
simply afforded a comparative rest in comfortable winter quarters, but 
was barren of military results. 

Lord Rawdon exercised sound strategy at the battle of Camden, 
when he secured for his army the protection of both flanks by an 
impassable marsh, while maintaining communication with his base, as 
the means of turning the American left. 

A base of operations is of prime importance to an invading army, 
and is equally important in the consideration of suitable and deter- 
mining objective points. 

The general purpose of the campaign will largely determine the 
choice of the base and the immediate objective. Jomini declares 
that " it is important to establish the base upon those points where it 



1775.] PRINCIPLES DEFINED, 5 1 

can be sustained by all the resources of the country, and at the same 
time insure a safe retreat." 

During the American war of 1 861-1865, when the federal troops 
of the middle zone of operations made Louisville, Kentucky, their 
military base, as well as the base of supplies, with Nashville as the 
objective point to be reached, it became necessary first to drive the 
confederate force from Bowling Green, a fortified position between 
Louisville and Nashville, and then to reduce Forts Donaldson and 
Henry on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. The former was 
directly on the railroad line to Nashville. The latter made possible 
the control of the Ohio river by hostile vessels, or a flank movement 
to the rear, by land, and the loss of the base itself. Their capture 
gave a second line of operations by water, in concert with the main 
movement upon Nashville, which lay on the left bank of the Cumber- 
land, and thus realized the desired result. 

New York was made the chief base of General Howe's operations / 
not long after the evacuation of Boston. In one sense it was a double 
base. While Staten Island gave peculiar facilities for operations 
towards Philadelphia and the south, the control of New York Island 
and of the accompanying entrance to Long Island Sound, was equally 
valuable in view of operations up the Hudson river and toward New 
England. As a depot of supplies and the general rendezvous of the 
British naval forces, it also operated as the primary base for all enter- 
prises in the direction of Georgia and the Carolinas. 

One objective, as already stated, was the capture of Philadelphia. "V 
Although this result was finally consummated, only by a detour 
through Chesapeake bay by aid of the fleet ; the movement was 
originally organized as an operation by land. This involved the 
military occupation of New Jersey. 

Washington's offensive return at Trenton and Princeton, modified 
the original purpose, and his command was suffered to hold the posi- 
tion at Morristown in the very heart of New Jersey, and to become a 
source of constant uneasiness and even of danger to New York itself. 

The selection and successful occupation of Charleston, South ^, 
Carolina, as the immediate base of operations in the Southern States 
was eminently wise and timely, but was not supported by a force 
adequate to the necessities of the movement. 

Canada was made a base for a third line of operations, threatening -T 
the separation of New England from the other colonies ; but the 
failure to destroy the army of Washington, which remained on the 



52 PRINCIPLES DEFINED. [1775. 

alert, within striking distance of New York, still paralyzed the arm 
which was to strike with Burgoyne, and his operations closed at Sara- 
toga. While a base resting on the sea must be adequately supplied, 
as was New York, through superior maritime resources, it is equally 
true that an army forced back upon the sea by a competent force, as 
was that of Cornwallis, is lost. 



CHAPTER X. 

STRATEGY IN WAR CONTINUED. 

THE prime objective of the war of 1775-1781, was the reduction 
of the colonial armies and enforcement of the authority of the 
crown. The occupation of territory or cities by an inadequate force, 
while the opposing armies kept the field, was therefore of transient 
benefit. 

Philadelphia was made the objective of the British army during 
the campaign of 1777, mainly because it was the capital of the enemy. 
Congress removed to Wilmington,— Washington struck a blow at 
Germantown, close to the city, and the issue was as far as ever from 
conclusion. A single remark is therefore proper as to the value of a 
national capital as a chief military objective. 

Colonel Hamley, commandant of the British Staff College, in his 
excellent volume upon " The Operations of War," (edition of 1875) 
states the proposition very precisely. " The mere possession of the 
capital is not final, so long as the enemy can still make head in the 
field. It is when the seizure of the capital is coupled with such 
ascendency over the defensive armies that they can never hope to 
retake it, that further resistance is felt to be hopeless, as leading only 
to national extinction, and that any terms not absolutely unendurable, 
are accepted by the vanquished." 

This, as a general rule, is true as between independent nations. 
During the American war of 1861-1865, another element entered into 
the question. If Washington, with its archives, public buildings, and 
foreign representation, had fallen under Confederate control, especially 
as its soil was within the original territory under influence of Southern 
sympathy, there would have been a claim on the part of the success- 
ful party, that the Confederacy was, de facto, the United States. 
Neither would there have been wanting a certain extent of foreign 
sympathy with the demand, and also a color of right. On the other 



54 STRATEGY IN WAR CONTINUED. [1775. 

hand, Richmond, while a legitimate base of operations, was not a 
national capital, in any permanent sense. The transfer of its execu- 
tive and of its legislative body to Montgomery, was not analogous to 
that of the removal of the American Congress to Baltimore, during 
the war of 1775-1781. The popular pressure for the premature occu- 
pation of Richmond at great hazard, on the ground that it was a 
capital was sentimental and unsound. Its sole value was in its 
character as a military base, having solid relations to an advance upon 
Washington. Moreover, European capitals have been repeatedly 
occupied, with no permanent benefit to the invader, and with no appre- 
ciable effect upon the issues of the war itself. 

Immaterial objectives only impair general operations. The vari- 
ous British expeditions to Connecticut and Virginia committed waste, 
but accomplished nothing else, except to embitter the struggle and 
arouse fresh passion to resist. 

Lines of operations are the patJnvays of armies, and include such 
contiguous territory as render the march secure and practicable. 

Deep lines are those which advance far beyond the base. Napo- 
leon's march to Moscow is the type of an extreme line. The Burgoyne 
campaign was another instance in point. It assumed impossible data 
as certain. It threw away communication with its base, which also 
included its base of supplies, since the supply-train was too limited 
for the entire movement ; it over-estimated the resources of the 
country invaded, and depended upon the support of another far dis- 
tant army for success, while that army was to operate from an oppo- 
site base, with no such assured readiness of communication as to 
assure the concert of action indispensable to the /esult. That other 
army projected a line of operations one hundred and fifty miles beyond 
its base, with the positive knowledge that if the movement were made 
with adequate force, it must imperil that base, and put the whole 
purpose of the war in peril. Justice to the high military qualities of 
Burgoyne and Clinton, requires the statement that this measure was 
at the dictation of bad statesmanship which controlled the English 
commander at New York. 

Lines of operation may be parallel with or perpendicular to the 
base, this depending upon the strength of the forces, and the topog- 
raphy of the country occupied. It may be along a river, or through 
a region which gives strategic value to the movement, and thereby 
gain additional advantages to that of a mere advance. Thus the 
river Raritan, in New Jersey, repeatedly exercised a marked influence 



I775.J STRATEGY IN WAR CONTINUED. $$ 

in giving direction to the lines of operation respectively adopted by 
the British and American armies in their movements to and from the 
Delaware river. Washington's retreat from Fort Lee, in 1776, was 
secured only by a prompt withdrawal behind the Hackensack, and a 
movement down its right bank, holding the river itself as a cover from 
the left flank of the army. 

A /ro?it of operations includes not merely the territory occupied 
towards the enemy, but so much as must be observed, in order to 
anticipate a hostile advance, while also affording margin for counter 
maneuvers. Jomini, as well as other writers, limits this front to the 
equivalent of a two days' march. This is, however, an artificial dis- 
tance, wholly dependent upon the nature of the country. The strict 
front of the army itself, has been called the strategic front. If an 
army be behind an impassable stream, its front is sharply defined. 
This becomes an indication of the tract within which the army may 
operate with decisive advantage, so that the actual front and the 
strategic front may thus coincide. 

As a matter of fact, there is little value in maintaining the dis- 
tinction, since it must be assumed of any wise commander, that he 
will pay special attention to an issue which presents such a pressing 
demand as the presence of an enemy within easy striking distance. 
It often devolves upon a commander to maintain a double strategic 
front. This invariably attends the presence of a substantial force 
upon either flank. It may also become necessary by the very con- 
figuration of the country, and this necessarily increases as the army 
advances into an enemy's territory. This involves the separation 
from the command of large detachments. The failure of General 
Sullivan to maintain such a front to the right flank of the American 
army at Brandywine, coupled with defective reconnoissance, precip- 
itated that action before the army could be adjusted to meet the 
skillful flank movement of Generals Howe and Cornwallis. 

A line of defense, independent of the base, is not always indispens- 
able, when the protection of the base is adequate, and the forces in 
hand are equal to any required advance movement. 

Washington's policy being the preservation of his army, he adopted 
a line of defense across the New Jersey hills, which not only served 
as a base, but gave a definite character to his operations, and repeat- 
edly saved that army. Natural or artificial obstacles should be made 
to serve as supports to the army when driven to the stationary de- 
fensive. Rivers often form lines of defense, as in repeated instances 



$6 STRATEGY IN WAR CONTINUED. [1775. 

during the campaign of 1781 in the Southern States. The winter 
quarters of the American army at Valley Forge, 1777-8, were a line 
of defense no less than a peculiarly well selected strategic position. 
A large back country was accessible for supplies, although greatly 
impoverished by the waste of war, and the distance from the British 
army at Philadelphia fulfilled all the conditions which were necessary 
to secure reasonable safety, keep the troops on the alert, and afford 
both opportunity and inducement for observation and operations to 
the front. 

A line of defense should be as compact as possible, with a strategic 
front so limited as to give prompt concentration of the army upon 
critical points. One consideration is worthy of suggestion to the 
student who would rightly estimate the merits of an issue, when one 
army is assured of artificial means of defense. If forces be otherwise 
equal, that army which holds a firm position, hdiS plus strength equal 
to the advantage of that position, while the assailant has minus 
strength equal to the estimated loss involved in forcing that position. 
In an open field where successful movements and hard fighting make 
up the issue, the force of discipline and both the moral and physical 
elements which command success are left to their free exercise. 

No line of defense should ha passively occupied. The advance of 
La Fayette to Barren Hill, and Washington's attack at Germantovvn, 
were expressions of force which gave value to the position at Valley 
Forge, exalted its defensive properties, and put the British army 
itself upon a quasi-defensive. The latter army during the New Jersey 
campaign, had tivo ultimate lines of defense. The banks of the Dela- 
ware, with the cordon of posts extending to New Brunswick and Perth 
Amboy, formed one, and the river Raritan on the right, was auxiliary 
to the former, so long as the fleet controlled the waters about Staten 
Island. The latter was practically an advanced base for operations 
working southward from New York, with a strategic front looking to 
the movements of Washington's army which occupied the heights of 
middle New Jersey. 

Zones of operation are belts of territory controlled by moving col- 
umns, or those within which columns can act in real concert. Several 
Hnes of operation may fall within one zone. 

During the war .of 1 775-1 781, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were 
within the centre zone, while Georgia and the Carolinas belonged to 
the left. 

During the American war of 1861-1865, the trans-Mississippi 



1775.] STRATEGY IN WAR CONTINUED. 57 

states filled the right zone ; the country eastward to Virginia, indi- 
cated the centre ; while the Atlantic belt, with operations on Rich- 
mond, determined the zone of the left. 

It is possible, with the modern telegraph and railroad system, for 
a competent commander to ordain a general policy, by which opera- 
tions in different zones may determine together toward the general 
result. Thus General Grant on the left, and General Sherman in the 
centre, acted in full concert during the spring and summer of 1864, 
so to occupy the Confederate forces as to neutralize the benefit which 
otherwise enured to the latter by virtue of a series of interior railroad 
lines, which inabled their armies to operate alternately against the 
Federal armies of either zone, by a shorter route than was available 
for the latter troops. 

During July, 1862, the author was instructed by competent author- 
ity, to meet Generals Halleck and Pope on their arrival at Wash- 
ington, to which place they had been called by telegram, and to 
inform them that an immediate interview was desired by the Presi- 
dent, then at the Soldiers' Home, a short distance from the city. The 
whole object of the proposed interview was, that the President might 
determine in his own mind whether the different operations in Mis- 
souri, Kentucky, and Tennessee, were the result of one forecast, or 
judgment, or merely accidental. As the result of their arrival, Gen- 
eral Halleck was placed in general command, under the style of chief 
of staff to the President, who thereby asserted his constitutional pre- 
rogative as commander-in-chief, upon the assumption that General 
Halleck had the mental scope and executive ability to handle all 
the armies over the entire theatre of war. General Pope was also 
assigned to a highly responsible sphere of duty. 

The details of separate zones are necessarily distinct, as are many 
operations of single armies moving on separate lines in the same zone. 
General Sherman's march to the sea was practically but one line of 
operations, because he kept up such constant communication with his 
entire command, that it was at all times in hand for concentration, and 
the efficient accomplishment of his plans. If it be regarded as the 
equivalent of two lines of operations acting together within one zone, 
it had the perfect accord of purpose and action, which under skillful 
hands, makes every key in music to vibrate in harmony together. 
The grand divisions of his army moved as a unit, on their mission. 

During the war of 1775-1781, the operations of General Clinton 
were marked by great wisdom, and a fixed purpose to secure a suf- 



58 STRATEGY IN WAR CONTINUED. [1775. 

ficient concentration of force to realize success on the three zones of 
proposed operation. The right zone, bounded on the left by the 
Hudson river and its defenses, was favored by Lord George Germaine, 
but at the sacrifice of results elsewhere, and without an appreciation 
of the resistance with which he had to cope, and the character of the 
country in which the war was carried on. 

Although Massachusetts was left unassailed by British troops, 
after the evacuation of Boston, a base was secured at Newport, 
Rhode Island, which was far more eligible for operations in that zone 
than was Boston itself. Its distance from that city was but seventy 
miles. General La Fayette went from Newport to Boston, baring the 
siege of Newport in 1778, in seven hours, and returned in six and a 
half hours. It was sufficiently near to threaten the former city, and 
to somewhat restrict Massachusetts in contribution of troops to the 
central army of Washington. The harbor was excellent. Long 
Island Sound afforded a safe interior passage to the head-quarters at 
New York, so that the success of the apparently useless diversions 
into Connecticut would have had substantial method, if troops had 
been furnished up to the demand of the British General-in-chief. 
Herein, as elsewhere, the military judgment was superseded in opera- 
tions strictly military, by a purely civil control. If military policy was 
considered in the English cabinet at all, it omitted to make the 
movement independent by the supply of means adequate to assure 
results. 

Lines of covnminication are defined by their title. Modern science 
has facilitated the connection of armies with their base and with each 
other. It was with difficulty that Colonel Hamilton, aid-de-camp of 
General Washington, could determine the position of his own flanking 
parties, which were watching the movements of General Clinton's 
army during the retreat of that officer from Philadelphia in the year 
1778 ; and it was not until the afternoon before the battle of Mon- 
mouth, that he could report the exact facts. 

Intcrhr lines, exterior, concentric, and divergent lines, are also self- 
expressive. It is obvious that in covering a capital or any other 
commercial centre, which is approached by different army corps on 
different roads, the defense can concentrate a superior force more 
speedily than the advancing army, unless the advance be made a sur- 
prise, or with greatly superior numbers. 

In the advance upon Germantovvn, during October, 1777, the 
extreme left wing of the American army was too widely spread, so 



1775] STRATEGY IN WAR CONTINUED. 



59 



that the right wing of the British army actually reinforced the centre, 
and settled the issue without receiving a single blow from the force 
which had been sent to occupy its attention during the main attack. 

On the British left a similar concentration took place, the observ- 
ing party sent by General Washington to engage the Hessian forces 
having utterly failed to follow up the enjoined movement. 

The inferior forces employed during the war of 1775-1 78 1, as 
compared with great continental armies, limited the range oi stratcnc 
operations, although demanding the right use of all general principles ; 
and while army formations have been modified, and greater mobility 
has been secured during the century and more which has passed since 
that struggle began, the review of the actions themselves will prove 
that the lessons of antecedent warfare were carefully studied, and 
judiciously applied, up to the extent of the then realized facilities 
for war. 



CHAPTER XT. 

GRAND TACTICS ILLUSTRATED. 

TO handle well a military force on the battle field," which the 
author offers as a concise exposition of the term " Grand 
Tactics," involves several principles which all military writers accept 
as fundamental. 

Although these truths have been elaborated and illustrated by 
eminent scholars of modern times, they obtained recognition and 
application at very early periods, and thus imparted success to mili- 
tary enterprise as long ago as the days of Hannibal and Csesar. Their 
maxims, and their instructions to commanders are sound and practical 
now, as they were then. Baron Jomini states them thus : 

First. " To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army suc- 
cessively upon the decisive points of a theatre of war, and also upon 
the communications of the enemy as much as possible, without com- 
promising one's own." 

Second. " To manoeuvre to engage fractions of the hostile army 
with the bulk of one's forces." 

Third. On the battle field, to throw the mass of the forces upon 
the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is 
of the first importance to overthrow." 

Fourth. " To so arrange that these masses shall not only be 
thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the 
proper time and with energy." 

To apply military force upon these conditions, involves the high- 
est wisdom, — a keen perception of the relations and circumstances 
which attend the changing issues of war; — a lightning-like logic, by 
which to interpret both relations and circumstances, and both skill 
and nerve to strike home the blow, with precision and force. 

The introductory chapters have demonstrated the philosophy 
which underlies the conduct of war. 



I775-] GRAND TACTICS ILLUSTRATED. 61 

As with all theories, however perfect, the issues themselves are 
often confronted with facts which no human foresight can anticipate. 
If all great battles could be traced through the minute details which 
marked their progress, the human mind would be humbled by the 
evidence, that very often, an unexpected and apparently trivial event 
has been the pivot upon which the entire event changed its drift and 
destiny. 

Notwithstanding these contingencies, common to all pursuits in 
life, the operations of the battle field have general features which 
work in the direction of the conditions laid down, and these are 
entitled to a brief review. 

The war of 1775-1781, afforded illustrations of the changes which 
have characterized modern warfare from the time that Frederic 
William, of Prussia, father of Frederic the Great, combined rigid 
drill and exact discipline, with swift and impetuous movement upon 
exposed or cramped bodies of the enemy. 

The British Light Infantry and Light Dragoons were active troops, 
and both mobility and flexibility began to take the place of those 
heavy strokes which simply measured the relative momentum of 
colliding bodies. 

Braddock's campaign was a type of the old method. Tarleton's 
operations were characteristic of that new system which gained fresh 
spirit during the French revolution and afterwards distinguished 
Napoleon I. 

The first Italian campaign of that commander, which, in a mere 
handful of days, made memorable the names of Legnano, Castiglione, 
Mendola and Mantua, has the magic thrill of romance. Like Habib, 
of the Arabian Nights, he seemed to wield the sword of Solomon, 
and at every stroke, its talismanic emblem, '' poivcr^' only shone 
forth with increasing lustre, — disenchanting all machinations to check 
his advance, and melting all barriers of men, or matter, as the summer 
sun dissolves, dissipates and bears away the lingering, contending 
snows of winter. 

It was in the maturing ascendency of this new system of tactics, 
that the British and American armies came to an issue. The colonists 
had been thoroughly proven in the skirmishing warfare of the Indian, 
had acquired signal skill in the use of the rifle, and by contempt of 
exposure and repeated battles upon the frontier, had been taught many 
lessons which were wild, but impressive, in the direction of attack and 
defense. 



62 GRAND TACTICS ILLUSTRATED. [i775- 

Upon this training, if but slowly, the stern discipline and military 
vigor of Washington, Greene, Steuben and Lee were to be grafted. 

Another element gave character to the American army, and made 
soldiers quickly. Independently of the spirit of the struggle itself, 
the colonists possessed unusual intelligence and mental culture for 
men of that period ; and those who controlled the public policy were 
men whose capacity and moral worth were preeminent above all 
others. 

The great skill in manoeuvre which characterized Frederic was well 
represented by Clinton, Knyphausen, Percy and Tarleton, and the 
German troops came promptly up to duty in accordance with the 
methods of severe schooling to which they had been trained. 

Washington, Greene, Lee, Maxwell, and other competent com- 
manders, both American and foreign, who took the American army 
in hand, were compelled to enter the contest before their soldiers, 
however well-drilled, individually, could possibly acquire that concert 
of action which makes of an educated army a perfect machine. 

This affords the clew to many disasters which attended operations 
in the field. An illustration of recent date will define the point in 
view. 

Before the battle of Bull Run, in the American war of 1861-1865, 
the single regiments of the Federal army had been thoroughly 
instructed in battalion drill. These movements were exact. Brigade 
commanders had been assigned, so far as possible, from the colonels 
of the regular army, and evolutions of the line, in skeleton and by 
divisions, had been commenced and well advanced. Practically, how- 
ever, the regiment was the unit, and these units largely maintained 
their organic coherence, when the freshly organized brigades and 
divisions, /^arUd, in the first trial at arms with an earnest adversary. 
The general commanding, McDowell, himself a model type of the 
complete soldier, was crowded to the front, and did all that any great 
captain could have done with an army not yet perfected in that 
discipline which must inter-penetrate all parts and hold them fast to 
system, even in the decimation of battle. 

But, as with that army, so with the army of Washington, the 
opportunity was forced, while the exigencies were too pressing to 
give time to make a really perfect army, and that result had to be 
evolved out of the battle struggle itself. 

The most difficult position which troops can hold, is that which 
requires them to stand under fire, in passive waiting but with entire 



1775.] GRAND TACTICS ILLUSTRATED. 63 

confidence that this position is for eventual benefit, whenever the 
controlling mind shall unfold his purpose. A ''forlorn hope " has a 
stimulus. The other demands supreme steadiness, the hardness of 
adamant. This text is not discursive, nor without interest and direct 
relations to the battle narrative hereafter furnished. All that has 
been said is but a meagre indication of that exhaustive drain which 
war makes upon all possible resources that can apply force to the 
resolution of battle issues. 

As grand tactics deals with the conflict of armies, so their organ- 
ization and composition is worthy of consideration. Moreover, it 
involves good combinations before, as well as during the progress of 
battle. 

It is to be noticed, in passing on, that military nations promptly 
seize and apply all improvements that any single nation originate, so 
that the balance stands nearly ti\e same as when war was waged 
under systems of an earlier period. Brain and muscle give force and 
value to all alike. 

As a full discussion of the military art is reserved for a future 
volume, only those elements will be considered which afford a key to 
the battles of the period under review. 

T/ie chief branches or arms of military service, Artillery, Cavalry 
and Infantry, proportioned as in order named, from least to most 
numerous, have varying values, according to the service required, 
Infantry composing the fundamental strength of all armies. 

Improvements in artillery have made impossible that mighty sweep 
of mounted troops, which now and then, in early days, bore down 
whole armies by their intrinsic weight. Swift desolation may still be 
carried over a wide range of country, communications may be cut off 
and distant points may be struck suddenly by such a force ; but there 
can be no overwhelming assault, by cavalry, upon a strong army well 
supplied with well handled guns. 

During the war of 1 775-1 781, a real restriction was imposed upon 
the movements of cavalry by the nature of the country, so that their 
service was largely confined to attack upon columns already broken, 
independent operations against similar forces, raids upon supply 
trains, or the dispersion of small detachments. 

The British dragoons did substantial service at Germantown, 
Monmouth and Brandywine, although in the last named action they 
were not employed until after the division of General Sullivan was in 
full retreat. Some of the Royalist volunteer cavalry proved quite 



64 GRAND TACTICS ILLUSTRATED. [1775. 

efficient ; but Tarleton's Legion was especially known for its sleepless 
activity, its keenness of scent in pursuit, and sometimes, for its relent- 
less vigor of stroke. 

1 During the early part of the war, the American army was deficient 
in this arm of the service. Colonel Lee, known as '* Light Horse 
Harry," and Colonel Washington, handled mounted men with signal 
ability, and the latter, at the battle of Cowpens, inflicted a blow upon 
Colonel Tarleton which, according to his own " Narrative," almost 
ruined " The Legion." Sumter, Marion and Horry performed 
brilliant feats and made their respective corps distinguished for a 
semi-ubiquitous warfare in the swamp districts of the Carolinas. 

It was rarely the case that artillery determined an action in the 
field, simply by superior weight of metal and its destructive force. 
The short range of the guns then in use, the difficulty of moving them, 
and the general reliance upon infantry, in close action, limited the 
supremacy of this great arm of war. 

The infantry had its scouts and skirmishing parties, but such 
detachments were more frequently mounted men ; and modern skir- 
mishing was hardly known until the French initiated the system of a 
thin line of sharp-shooters in advance of moving columns. 

General Morgan's rifle command, or brigade, was the nearest 
approach to a systematic skirmishing force, while equally efficient in 
general action. The British army itself, especially in the southern 
districts, followed the example of the Americans and organized inde- 
pendent rifle corps, which, more than once, did efficient service. The 
brigades were generally small in numbers, often not exceeding eight 
hundred men, and by this means the number of opposing forces was 
often greatly over-estimated on both sides. 

Although the artillery was then employed, as now, wherever 
actually needed, it was habitually posted in the centre unless required 
at the flank, and was used mainly to hold or assail positions occupied 
by troops. It lacked the mobility which the light artillery of modern 
times has attained. General Burgoyne was sharply criticised before 
the " House of Commons " for taking too many heavy guns upon his 
expedition frorri Canada, and yet, it appears from a careful review of 
the evidence offered in his case, that he was simply cumbered with 
the exact proportion which rigid precedent assigned to his com- 
mand, irrespective of the field of service it was to be dragged 
Over. •/'' L :.;■:-:... I'.:-. . 

The engineer corps of that period was well organized and well 



1775-] GRAND TACTICS ILLUSTRATED. 65 

handled, and by virtue of the short range of guns, they had full as 
much active work in the trenches as in more modern times. 

The Order of Battle varies with the features of the country, the 
position of the armies, and the object in view. Whether the move- 
ment be offensive or defensive, which circumstances alone can 
determine, there are certain prevailing methods of arranging a com- 
mand to meet the issue. 

The parallel order must have, on one or both sides, elective posi- 
tions to be held or seized, or the issue will be simply one of physical 
strength and the contingency of superior numbers or skill. In this 
order, whether the centre or one wing be the object of attack, it is 
certain that the concentration must be prompt for the blow or it will 
fail, provided that the enemy is closed up, so as to be able, quickly, to 
reinforce the part assailed. It can rarely, if ever, be of indifferent 
value whether to strike the centre, or one wing, unless the force be 
so small as to meet either attack equally well. 

At the battle of Germantown, Washington advanced with his 
main force upon the British centre, striking full at the outpost in the 
village, while large detachments were sent to confront each wing and 
hold them back from giving support to their centre. 

The parallel order may be modified by reinforcement of the 
centre or either wing, and this will often happen during the manoeu- 
vers or feints, which are resorted to, that the enemy may not antici- 
pate the genuine attack. 

A crochet upon the flank like the letter L is often of value, —i, r-, 
thus offering two faces for defense, or presenting a second front per- 
pendicular to the first, for the purpose of turning the flank of the 
enemy or striking to his rear. The advance of the British right wing 
at Long Island secured the latter result, first capturing the American 
centre, and then cutting off the right wing and capturing its com- 
mander. In this action the flanking force swept the whole American 
line, routing it utterly. 

The crochet proper is susceptible of being roughly dealt with, if 
the adversary can mass artillery at the angle ; and the movement 
generally is hazardous, unless to resist an attempt upon a flank, or 
the force be strong enough to take some risk in an advance. 

The convex and concave orders of battle are self-expressive. One 
advances and the other refuses its centre. At the battle of Cowpens 
the display of the American centre, as a feint, followed by its prompt 
withdrawal, enticed Tarleton within a trap and it was sprung upon him. 



66 GRAND TACTICS ILLUSTRATED. [1775 

TJic oblique order has advantages for an inferior force, as it may 
rapidly gather up the refused wing to support the advance, or concen- 
trate rapidly if compelled to retire. 

The order by echelon on the centre, or one wing, is flexible ; and 
while holding the refused battalion as a reserve, affords prompt 
support by a direct advance, and so disposes the whole command that 
it may, with equal promptness, operate toward either flank, or to the 
rear. 

Modifications of these forms are various, but unimportant in this 
connection. The exaet formation of parade is never long-lived in 
real action. Whatever may be the form adopted, there must be care 
not to prolong the line beyond support and thus leave a gap which 
will admit a quick and intelligent adversary. This gap at Bunker 
Hill will be noticed hereafter. A wise determination of choice in this 
important matter, may enable an inferior force to retard a superior 
force, may persuade it to fight at disadvantage, or even force it to 
movements which will set the inferior force free from peril. 

In this connection may be applied the suggestion, that both van- 
guard and rear-guard of armies which are on the verge of action, are 
to be especially warned of the importance of their trusts. 

When Cornwallis approached Trenton in January, 1777, with full 
purpose to capture or destroy Washington's army, his rear-guard was 
dropped so far behind as to involve a severe contest to extricate it 
from the grasp ot his adversary. 

Before the battle of Camden, the van-guard of the two armies, each 
intent upon surprising the antagonist, met after midnight, and by 
their mutual surprise, hurried the American army prematurely into 
action, at bitter cost. 

On the other hand the strong van-guard of the American army 
was so loosely handled at Monmouth, that Clinton put in jeopardy 
one half of the entire American army, and extricated his own army 
from a position of no little peril. 

To these general remarks as to the battle-issue, there may well be 
added the opinion of Colonel Hamley. "Orders of battle establish 
the relations existing between the hostile lines before or during the 
encounter." "The great object in modern battles is to bring at a 
certain point of the battle field a superior number of troops to bear 
upon the enemy. The design is screened by false attacks, by features 
of the ground, by a general advance of skirmishers, and by deceptive 
formations and manoeuvers. The attacking force must be strengthened 



1775-] GRAND TACTICS ILLUSTRATED. 6/ 

at the expense of some other portion of the Hne. To engage that 
other part would be to offer to the enemy the opportunity of restor- 
ing the equilibrium of the battle which it has been the object of the 
manoeuver to disturb. Therefore modern battles have been for the 
most part partial attacks, when the assailant puts his foot no farther 
than he can be sure of drawing it back again." 

The following is a brief epitome of Baron Jomini's views upon the 
selection of tactical positions: 

That it be easier to fall upon the enemy than for him to 
approach. 

That artillery have all its possible effect in defense. 

That the ground selected conceal subordinate movements from 
the enemy, while commanding a view of the movements of the enemy. 

That the line of retreat be unobstructed, and the flanks well 
secured. 

Thematter of retreats will have brief notice in another connection. 
Those of the war under review were frequent and often masterly. 



Notes to ChapterZI 



Farallel Order of Battle. 








A. 




B. 


\ 
\ 






'\ 





Jle ift/orced ffiHg. 



D. 



A , JTkeekle/t )ri/(g, Jr/ii^/ffts, Uirea& 

t/ie CroMef,maae/ofierearbyB. 
'Q.MaAes re in/orced Cretc/tetto fM 

front to gain t/ie//ank. Cmaiesa 

Cro/cAet to tAe rear. 
I. Echeton by ioti mW/j, refutvig 

t/te center, ffssmt/atea to cmeaffi 

formatioft. 
F. OMi(fue Order, g/i'i»gready/orma- 

tiojt to tie Ze/t, orFro/tt. 
C . Jit EcMott iy tAe Jligtif, indica- 

ijftgtkereaifuiess qfCAa/tge of 

ly-oftt to the le//,per/oe/tcficu/af 

to vn'ginat /or/natiex . 
H. EeMon J^^/Aerigftt;a/n/MAoIff 
/ifte adi'a/fcea,outq/'EcJlteto». 
\. Advance in coiimtt to break ffi)^ 



E. 



I I 



J 2 3 ^ e 



F. 

\ \ V 



G. 
< f ■ 



D 






tih 



Origindllbrmation. 

31 I I IC— I 

Jig a * s 



H. 

12 3 » S 

I I I 1 ' 1 1 1^^ 

Front advanced » 

t 



/ 2 Oritrinat Line, e 
^^ cr£=3 dE=] i==] c=] 



\ CHAPTER XII. 

LOGISTICS. 

LOGISTICS was defined as, " The practical art of bringing armies 
fully equipped into the field." 

The primary necessity for a thorough preparation of all the ele 
ments which go to equip, transport, and sustain an army, is apparent 
without discussion. 

It is equally obvious that while the strategist and tactician must 
have wisdom in all elements that make the successful soldier, it is 
impossible for all the details of army outfit and army movement to be 
under their immediate care, while laden with the burden of directing 
war and fighting battles. 

The details of logistics are therefore more especially within the 
sphere of various staff duty, and that department of public trust which 
superintends army supply. But it is far from sufficient, that arsenals 
be filled, that provisions abound, that hospital supplies have accumu- 
lated, and that every possible item which can be needed in camp or 
field, in victory or defeat, by night or by day, has been provided, 
unless each item shall be accessible at the right time and at the right 
place. Certain materials must accompany the first advance of an 
army ; some attend the main army, and others are supplied as con- 
tingency requires. All these must be at hand in fit proportion to the 
force, with no surplus to embarrass movements, and no deficit to 
retard them. The supply must never fail, but flow on as the army 
moves, smoothly, adequately, and inevitably. 

It is in small details, numberless and perplexing, which worry 
men more than grave issues, that logistics finds its great burden. In 
one contingency, a box of horse-shoes may be of more value than a 
box of cartridges ; and in another, a roll of lint may do more service 
than a bale of clothing. 

The wants of the soldier as well as the requirements of the gen- 



I775-] LOGISTICS. 69 

eral, are to be met promptly and sufficiently, or embarrassment must 
attend every movement, and the entire campaign will be imperiled 
or sacrificed. 

It is not to be questioned that the failure of the movement of 
Napoleon III. upon Prussia, was considerably promoted by bad 
logistics, and that the success of the allies during the Crimean war 
was secured through excellent adjustments and prompt execution in 
this very branch of military art. The Prussian logistics in the P'ranco- 
Prussian war were admirable, and no operations of modern times, 
within a period so short and decisive, have evinced a more thorough 
preparation and adaptation of materials to meet the demands of 
battle-issues. 

The Abyssinia and Coast of Guinea campaigns of Great Britain 
were marked by commensurate skill in adjusting the outfit of the 
command to its necessities, whether of service or climate. It would 
be difficult to estimate the expenditure of material which entered into 
the American war of 1861-1865. The several staff departments were 
severely tasked by the enormous drain upon their resources, and yet 
the exacting demand was fully met. 

The division of labor alone made the result possible. The sphere 
of logistics however, is not bound up in merely mechanical work. In 
modern war the single direction of transportation requires the control 
of a master mind. Great talent is found at the head of railroad cor- 
porations; and similar capacity is necessary to move armies. 

The Prussian railways moved more than six hundred thousand 
troops. The advance upon Paris involved the adjustments of rolling 
stock and material to different roads. Every department of bridge 
building and engineering was called into requisition, and such was 
the precision and omnipresent control, that accidents were rare, and 
the vast army was unfailingly supplied with all things essential to its 
comfort and its offensive work. The inspection of troops and of 
supplies belong to this department. 

There can be no deficiency in the means of equipping an army that 
is not referable to bad logistics. To give effect to this responsible trust, 
there must be thorough concert of purpose and exact system in the 
execution. Overcrowded transports or trains, the indiscriminate 
shipment of supplies, the confusion of material belonging to different 
arms of the service, and the misdirection of these supplies are inevi- 
table, unless the method be laid down clearly, and competent officers 



yo LOGISTICS. [1775- 

discharge the duty. It is not, however, the whole of logistics to fur- 
nish the army in the manner indicated. 

The duties of warehouse man, and forwarder of merchandise, 
however wisely planned and executed, are not up to the demands of 
the army. Depots and hospitals are to be established and sustained ; 
a watchful eye must constantly guard against any deficiency at every 
point where the army will make its demands, and this demand is 
coextensive with every army movement whether of general or of 
minor concern. The broken down bridge must find a guardian at 
hand to restore it promptly. 

Siege-guns must be found, side by side with the means and talent 
necessary to put them in position ; the regulation of the movement of 
the troops themselves must be so discriminating and exact, that no 
conflict of route or orders shall cross the plan of the general command- 
ing ; and the assignments for rest, for intrenching, or advancing, must 
be intelligently communicated to the officers who are respectively 
called upon to discharge these special duties. The protection of all 
supplies, and their location and movement, so that they shall not be 
mere impedimenta, to cripple the general command, is equally impor- 
tant to the highest success. 

No department of duty in military operations is more imperative 
in its necessities, or more painfully embarrassing under neglect, than 
the care of the sick and wounded ; and no other department, if neg- 
lected, is such a trying encumbrance during the active issues of a 
campaign. Here logistics must come in with the fullest possible 
equivalent fordistress that is inevitable, and here the stern machinery 
of war must have the appliances of a great heart, so that even in its 
rigid outline, the soldier shall feel that there is represented the 
abundant s)^mpathy of the state for which he imperils life. 

Independently of all these mechanical adjustments, however intel- 
ligently administered, there is a vast field of intellectual labor that is 
behind the physical facts. Whatever may be the capacity of the 
master brain which directs the battle and shapes its antecedents, the 
details must be so conformed as to exactly accord with his purpose. 
Details themselves must be modified by circumstances, and the fluc- 
tuations of battle issues are often as critical as those of a game of 
chess, calling for new adaptation of material to meet the modified 
relations of the forces employed. 

Clear instructions are indispensable to military success, and these 
must be as clearly understood by those who are to execute those 



I775-] LOGISTICS. /I 

instructions. Battle history is full of disasters which attach discredit 
to great captains, when the responsibility properly belonged to those 
who failed to appreciate, or accurately to execute, the will of the 
commander. 

It is authoritatively stated, that on the evening of July 4th, 1809, 
before the battle of Wagram, the night being dark, and the rain fall- 
ing in torrents, when one hundred and fifty thousand men were 
pushed across the arm of the Danube, there one hundred and fifty 
yards wide, by three bridges, that it was assigned to Davoust, who 
commanded the right wing, to cross the centre bridge, and to Oudinot, 
who commanded the centre, to cross the bridge to the right. These 
commanders obeyed the orders as received, and such was the marvel- 
lous discipline of the troops that the armies passed each other with- 
out disorder, and the movement was accomplished without knowledge 
of the enemy. While the error is attributed to Napoleon's haste in 
dictating the order, Berthier is criticised for not observing the mis- 
take, since he was called upon to make ten copies of the order for 
information of the army. 

Jomini broadly asserts, that " Napoleon made no provision for the 
contingeiicy of retreat, and lived, not only to demonstrate what might 
be done, but what a good general should avoid." 

It was in the sphere of logistics that the British army excelled, and 
the American army was deficient. The colonies had furnished army 
contingents in the old French war, but these operated under the 
control of experienced officers of the British army. 

The sudden demand for the thorough equipment of twenty 
thousand men designated for the siege of Boston, devolved vast mili- 
tary responsibilities upon inexperienced citizen militia. The public 
trusts which involved the purchase of supplies were too often con- 
fided to ignorant or dishonest parties. The eager struggle for place 
and preferment entered into the army at the outset, and almost as 
soon as certain regiments received an outfit, the expiration of their 
short enlistment involved a new issue of arms and equipments, or the 
transfer of those already issued from the returning to the incoming 
recruits. Those considerations will find their illustration in the his- 
tory of successive campaigns, and will be therefore passed by until the 
efiect of bad logistics shall mark the issues themselves. 

The British army realized difficulties of a different kind in the 
same general direction, until taught that the antagonist was one that 
would enforce respect at their cost, if the full measure of military 



7- LOGISTICS. [1775. 

preparation was not made to meet an enemy fully competent to test 
their mettle. 

The first action itself, that of Breed's Hill (Bunker's Hill), was 
marked by carelessness, which amounted to gross neglect, the shot for 
the guns first landed being of larger caliber than the guns themselves. 

The Army of Burgoyne, as already indicated, was inadequately 
furnished for the expedition, and many similar defects in preparation 
were predicated upon the supposition that the adversary was to be 
dealt with as an inferior in all military qualities, and therefore the 
risks taken were not unmilitary, but either economical or non-essen- 
tial elements in the struggle. 

A crowning element of logistics obtains in all truly military opera- 
tions, and that is, that so far as possible, they shall be without the 
knowledge of the enemy. The battle of Bennington had its incentive 
in the purpose of General Burgoyne to complement his own scanty 
supplies from the depot, reported to have been accumulated near 
that place for the army of General Schuyler. Many of the minor 
operations of each army were predatory, and to secure rations for the 
needy troops. The British forces endeavored at times to live off the 
country, and the American troops during the scarcity of genuine 
money, were compelled to seize horses, cattle, flour, and other pro- 
visions which merchants and farmers refused to sell. 

During the term that General Greene was quarter-master-general 
of the American army, the logistics were as good as possible under 
the changing circumstances of that fluctuating, uncertain force ; and 
Colonel Alexander Hamilton, who had been introduced by General 
Greene to Washington as a young man of promise, gained deserved 
credit for his skill in the preparation of orders and accuracy in their 
distribution. 

In this department, however, the remark which Baron Jomini 
applies to Napoleon, can with truth be said of Washington. " He 
ivas J lis own best chief of staff." 



CHAPTER XIII. 

MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. 

" A FINE RETREAT," says Baron Jomini, "should meet with 
J~\_ a reward equal to that given for a great victory." 

" A beaten army," says the Archduke Charles, " is no longer in 
the hands of its general." 

" When an army makes a compulsory retreat," says Colonel 
Hamley, " it is not in a condition to renew the contest. The troops 
that have been driven from the field will be slow to form front for 
battle ; confusion, too, will be added to despondency, for regiments 
will be broken and mixed, artillery will be separated from its ammu- 
nition, supply trains will be thrown into disorder by the sudden 
reflux, and the whole machine will be for the time disjointed." 

In the American war, 1 861-1865, the Federal retreat under Gen- 
eral Banks from the Shenandoah Valley, and those of the Confederate 
army from Yorktown, Antietam, Corinth, and Murfreesboro, were 
signal for their good military dispositions and preeminent success. 

But during the war of 1775-1781, the fluctuations of the tide of 
war induced retreats, under even more pressing exigencies and with 
equally skillful execution. 

The march of General Clinton from Philadelphia to the shelter of 
the fleet near Sandy Hook, was in all respects a proof of his merit as 
a soldier and brave commander ; but while it was a retreat, it was not 
the sequel of defeat, and a desperate race for an asylum of safety. 
The transfer of his army to the original base with view to a new des- 
tination, was a prudential and strategic movement ; but failure to 
achieve anticipated results at Philadelphia, did not so demoralize his 
command as if it had been beaten out of its city quarters by a hostile 
force. 

The retreats of Washington from Long Island to Pennsylvania, — 
from Princeton to the hills of New Jersey— and from the field of 



74 MISCFXLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. [1775 

Germantown — of Lafayette from Barren Hill, and of Morgan and 
Greene from the Carolinas, were made under circumstances of extreme 
peril. The rescue of the armies from impending ruin, was in each 
case quite material to the fate of the whole war. The most cursory 
reference to the maps will vindicate the claim of those officers to the 
tribute which introduces this chapter. 

The movement of Cornwallis to Yorktown in 1781, while embrac- 
ing ulterior plans, was substantially a retreat, and neither his general- 
ship nor that of General Clinton is impeached by the circumstance 
which enforced his final surrender. The record will vindicate this 
position, and show that the misunderstanding between those officers 
which so long annoyed parliament and the British public, was unne- 
cessary, provided that the burden of their failure had fallen where the 
responsibility belonged, upon the ministry. 

The conditions of a wise retreat are many. The tendency is to 
panic. The whole matter of essential supplies is thrown into con- 
fusion. All facilities for food or rest are disturbed, and the only 
remedy lies in the self-possession, firmness, and daring of the com- 
manding officers. Absurd panics have attended the best of troops. 
False alarms have converted a well organized retreat into a precipi- 
tate flight, and more than once the real victor has lost his laurels by 
failure to realize his success. 

While the army of Washington was embarking at Brooklyn for 
passage to New York, on the night of September twenty-ninth, 1776, 
that general dispatched an aid-de-cauip to General Mifflin, who was 
superintending the movement, with orders to hasten all the troops 
on their march. This order, given in the broadest sense, started the 
very troops which had been posted in the redoubts and trenches, to 
keep up the appearance of vigilant watch over the movements of the 
enemy. These men, impressed with the necessity of haste, pushed 
for the landing; but Washington's prompt measures suspended their 
march, and they coolly resumed their positions. This temporary 
desertion was not known to the beseigers, and thus the retreat was 
secured and the army saved. It is just such crises which dignify 
retreat, and exalt the wisdom and heroism of its execution. 

The rear guard in a retreat, while adequate to check pursuit, must 
not be so strengthened as to recall the whole army for its support, 
unless some position be secured which will warrant a renewal of battle. 
The elements as stated by Colonel Hamley, are too significant to 
warrant hope of such coolness and concentration of material and men. 



1775] MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. 75 

as will warrant success under the ordinary phases of a positive retreat 
from a beaten field. 

The pursuit of a retreating army involves hardly less wisdom, 
unless the victor has sufficient cavalry to harass his adversary, suc- 
cessfully cut off all fugitive detachments, and occupy the rear guard 
until adequate force can be brought up to induce a new action. The 
pressure, however, upon the retiring force, should be so constant 
and earnest as to keep it too busy, in escape, to allow time for the 
destruction of bridges and the interposition of obstacles to the pur- 
suit. Cavalry and artillery may thus be stopped for a sufficient 
length of time to save the army pursued. 

It is of high importance that the pursuit shall be so directed by 
flank movements, as to crowd the retiring army upon rivers or por- 
tions of country which check their progress, and give strategical 
advantage to the adversary pursuing. 

Diversions, such as those made by the British army from New 
York into Connecticut, are calculated to interfere with the general 
plans of the adversary. They have value in proportion as that result 
is effected, and the army which spares the detachment still retains 
an adequate force for its general operations. It is due to General 
Washington to state, that he was so bent upon his purpose to strike 
those armies which kept the field in force, that he could not be 
diverted from chief and paramount objects by those which were minor 
and transient, even while such movements inflicted local waste and 
real loss in property and life. 

The diversions of Greene and Morgan in 1781, which threatened 
Ninety-six and other posts to the rear of the British headquarters at 
Camden, really exposed the army to be beaten in detail. The feint 
was however successful. Fearing lest the base so far advanced from 
Charleston would be imperiled, and every benefit of the recent 
victory over Gate:? would be lost, the army was divided for the pro- 
tection of the threatened posts, and the American detachments 
rejoined the army with safety. 

Improvement of success. After the battle of Bennington in 1777, 
the American troops, elated with the result of the day's fight, occupied 
themselves so intently with the plunder of the battle field, that the 
artillery of Colonel Breyman, alone, aroused them to the conviction 
that another enemy was on their hands, and that victory itself was 
well nigh lost. 

General Howe habitually failed to realize the best fruits ot success. 



76 MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. [1775. 

It was characteristic of Wellington and Napoleon, as of Marlborough 
and Frederic, that there was 710 rest after victory. What next? 
Strike on and finish war, that peace may replace conflict. If either 
of these great captains failed to achieve the highest possible results, 
it was Napoleon, when ambition and restless pursuit of military- 
supremacy would not let him rest when peace was within reach, and 
when its blessings were most of all things essential to the well being 
of France. 

Passage of rivers. The multiplication of machinery and the great 
respect paid to mechanical skill, have greatly facilitated the passage 
of streams. The British army transported a bridge of boats and 
pontoons to New Jersey in December, 1777, ^^^ returned it to the 
coast, as soon as Washington refused to be enticed from the 
fastness of Morristown. Upon his original retreat to Pennsylvania, 
he had cleared the left bank of every accessible craft, so that although 
he was landing his rear guard as the British troops reached the river, 
there were no facilities for further pursuit. 

While at Valley Forge, the American army established a bridge 
across the Schuylkill, for the double purpose of communication with 
the country, and to secure a means of retreat in case the British army 
should threaten his camp. 

During the war of 1861-1865, "The Board of Trade Battery," and 
regiment from Chicago, was so thoroughly composed of skilled 
mechanics, that their bridge building and their co6pera.tion in the 
passage of streams by the armies of the middle zone was simply 
wojiderfnl. 

Such movements are generally to be anticipated, or covered by 
light earthworks or bridge heads — tetes de pont. A memorable 
instance of the value of such a position is that of the defense of the 
bridge-head and a light earthwork at Franklin, Tennessee, just after 
the principal action, November thirtieth, 1864, when a Federal corps 
commanded by General Schofield, crowded by the entire army of Gen- 
eral Hood, successfully crossed the Harpeth river, and effected their 
retreat upon Nashville together with artillery and baggage. The 
river banks were precipitous, the stream was not fordable, a single 
railroad bridge had to be adapted to the pressing emergency ; and the 
assailing force, more than double in numbers, was that army which 
immediately after attempted the capture of Nashville itself. 

The neglect to establish a sufficient rear guard and light earth- 



I775-] MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. 77 

work at Cowan's Ford, in 1781, especially ordered by General Greene, 
gave to the advance of Cornwallis a brilliant success. 

The passage or attempted passage of rivers, is often a fci}it to 
mislead an enemy. Such movements involve strategical no less 
than tactical considerations, and this in proportion as the hostile 
force, the character of the river, and the immediate issue assume 
importance. The passage of the East river at New York, September 
twenty-eighth, 1776, and of the Delaware river on Christmas night of 
the same year, are characteristic operations in the passage of streams. 

Obstructions. In the war of 1 775-1 781, the movements of armies 
were largely affected by that class of labor, which, without fighting, 
gave distinctive shape to more active operations by obstructing the 
advance or retreat of armies. The destruction of bridges, the felling 
of trees, and other obstructions were of signal service. The policy 
of the British army was to strike quickly and hard, before the colonies 
could concentrate men, improve discipline, procure arms, and inter- 
pose substantial defense. The American army was, constructively, on 
the defensive. Its policy was to delay and wear out its opponent, 
postpone premature collisions, and as far as possible, only to engage 
under such local advantages as would encourage troops and enhance 
the promise of success. Familiarity with the country, the scarcity of 
skillful engineers at the outset, and a large experience in frontier war- 
fare encouraged them to pursue this policy with success. 

In every struggle when invasion threatens the homes of a people, 
there has been this spontaneous movement, even of non-combatants, 
thus to add to the efficiency of military defense and imperil the 
hostile advance. It becomes the business oi everybody, and the troops 
in the field are both stimulated and strengthened by all such mani- 
festations of popular zeal. 

Guards and outposts. A single word only is required to magnify 
the office of scouts and pickets. Vigilance, obedience and nerve mark 
the true picket-man. In darkness and storm he is the uncompro- 
mising guardian of the safety of the entire army. Indifference is trea- 
son ! To sleep on post in an enemy's presence is worthy of death, 
its established penalty. He holds the key of the outer door. He 
has the pass-word ! The Sacred record thus testifies of the faithful 
and the faithless watchman. 

" Son of man, I have made thee a watchman unto the House of 
Israel, therefore hear the word at my mouth, and give them warning 
from me." 



78 MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. L^TTS- 

" His watchmen are blind ; they are all ignorant ; they are all 
dumb dogs, they can not bark ; sleeping, lying down, lying down to 
slumber !" 

Thus signals of alarm, often by watch-fires and smoking beacons, 
had early introduction, and there will appear in this narrative more 
than one instance when the salvation of armies and detachments 
entirely hinged upon skillful reconnoissance and faithful picket duty. 

The use of spies very naturally comes within this general class. 
Prisoners of war are also the source of valuable information. Each 
class is a doubtful dependence, unless corroborating circumstances 
confirm their statements. The memories of Andre and Hale are 
embalmed. Their loyalty to their cause, their intrinsic excellence as 
men, and their noble conduct in the extreme hour, have given them 
a like place of honor in British and American history. If Greene 
blotted his final signature to the order for Andre's execution with a 
tear, it was but the tribute which many an English soldier paid to the 
memory of Hale. 

The sincivs of luar. The fluctuation in tJie numbers of the Ameri- 
can army, was not more striking than their uncertainty of pay, and 
the scarcity of arms and proper equipments. Several battles were 
affected by their skill as marksmen. Others were changed at critical 
moments by possession and prompt use of the bayonet. If as a general 
rule, the American soldiers were individually better " shots" and could 
give an effect to the rifle which was beyond the reach of the " king's 
arms," the opposing force had the advantages which the bayonet and 
a complete equipment afforded. It had adequate supplies of powder, 
suitable camp equipage, an organized commissariat, and money. The 
history is not more instructive and interesting in respect of the par- 
ticular deeds done, than in the really extensive operations compassed 
through disproportioned means and under discouraging circumstances. 

Neither side was ready for war when it began. The British army 
fought with inadequate forces. The American army fought with 
inadequate means, only complemented by numbers and faith in their 
ultimate independence. This last consideration was the potent magic 
which transmuted continental paper into a semblance of money, and 
dignified semi-starvation into a heroic waiting for the rewards of the 
future. 

The assumption of independence, so long merely nominal, was 
found to be a poor antidote for hunger and rags, and Congress finally 
instituted that system of bounties so largely adopted in the war of 



1775.] MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. 79 

1861-1865, and clothed Washington with dictatorial powers, which 
were absolute and supreme. As the war progressed, artillery and 
other material of war was furnished by France, and the timely contri- 
bution of six million dollars by Louis XVI., as well as a loan then 
effected, inspired some fresh sentiment that nationality was at last 
real. This practical support, in addition to its moral value, greatly 
enlarged the facilities for carrying on this conflict. 

Alliances. The history of nations is full of treaties of alliance, 
offensive and defensive. They need no explanation. That of France 
with the United States had as its incentive the reduction of British 
power, and was not intrinsically an assurance of sympathy with the 
primary causes of the American war and of the principles which it 
asserted. That some phases of the asserted freedom reacted upon 
France, and made Louis XVL, and Lafayette indeed, to suffer under 
that license which affected the form of liberty, is a fact. That the 
French revolution reacted in like manner, and threatened America 
with the supremacy of a fanatical, godless, and irresponsible democ- 
racy is equally true. The names of Washington and Genet embody 
the whole history of that event. 

The proposition announced, does not lie in the discussion of the 
political issues of that period. It states that feiv alliances have a natu- 
ral and binding force. The interests of few families are exactly com- 
mon. Those of nations are common only within the province of 
rightfully accepted international law, just as families have a common 
relation to social law. 

The French alliance, valuable, and to be honored for real aid ren- 
dered, was repeatedly put in jeopardy by distinctness of interests ; 
and the proposed diversion of a portion of the American army to 
reassert and enforce French sovereignty over Canada was but one 
illustration in point. The extraordinary tact, unselfishness, and solid 
judgment of Lafayette are monumental, as determining elements 
which gave to the alliance much of its harmony and enhanced its value. 

If the cooperation of several powers in the Crimean war be cited 
as disproof of the proposition, let it be noticed that the Crimean war 
was based upon the supposed purpose of Russia to control the Dar- 
danelles at the expense of Turkey, and of all interested maritime 
nations, and was predicated upon a principle similar to that which 
binds society to protect its members against lawless assault. It was 
another protest against a war for conquest. 

Military commanders. The selection of men who shall vindicate 



80 MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. [1775. 

the authority of the state, and apply military force in the battle-issue 
tasks the highest capicity. Probity, wisdom, unselfishness, and 
energy belong to such a trust. Appreciation of the issue, and intelli- 
gent comprehension of the resources of either contestant, and a cor- 
dial adoption of sound military policy, which is in harmony with the 
best interests of the state, are vital to the highest success. 

Baron Jomini says : — " He must have a physical courage which 
takes no account of obstacles, and a high moral courage capable of 
great resolution. Unfortunately, this choice of a general is influenced 
by so many petty passions, that chance, rank, age, favor, party spirit, 
jealousy, will have as much to do with it as the public interest and 
justice." 

If this eminent scholar, so long confidential with Alexander of 
Russia, as well as with Napoleon, can so broadly state his conviction, 
it might be a source of congratulation both for Great Britain and the 
United States, and indeed for civilization itself, that in the fore-front 
of the battles of 1775-178 1, and during the introduction of the Great 
Republic to a place among nations, there stands in bold relief the 
name of Washington. 

Leaving to the battle record, however, the test of battle direction, 
it is not impolitic or discursive to state the training of one single gen- 
eral of that period, thus to indicate the type of mind and preparation 
which the period developed. 

A Quaker youth of fourteen spared time from the forge to master 
Euclid and geometry. Providence threw in his way Ezra Stiles, 
president of Yale College, and Lindley Murray, the grammarian. 
They became his friends and advisers. Before the war began, and 
while yet a young man, he carefully studied Caesar's Commentaries, 
Marshal Turenne's Works, Sharp's Military Guide, Blackstone's Com- 
mentaries, Jacob's Law Dictionary, Watts' Logic, Locke on the 
Human Understanding, Ferguson on Civil Society, Swift's Works, 
and some other models of a similar class of reading. In 1773 he 
visited a Connecticut militia parade to study its methods. In 1774 
he visited Boston, to watch the movements of British troops, and took 
back to Rhode Island a British sergeant who deserted, as the in- 
structor of the Kentish Guards, a militia company of which he was a 
member. Such was the proficiency attained by this company, that 
more than thirty of the private members became officers in the sub- 
sequent war. He commanded the brigade of sixteen hundred men 
which Rhode Island sent to the siege of Boston. 



1775.] MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. 8 1 

Modest, faithful, dignified, cool in danger, unprovoked, and un- 
daunted by rebuffs or failures, equable, self-sacrificing, truthful, and 
honest, a man like General George H. Thomas in simple grandeur of 
character and the fullness of a complete manhood — such a man for the 
hour, the peril and the duty, was Nathaniel Greene. 
6 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. 

AT length, the thrill of action drove forth on errands of war the 
long smothered passions which so slowly deepened into a settled 
conviction that peace could never smile upon the colonies while the 
supremacy of Great Britain endured. Multiply all assumptions of 
superiority, all public tokens of contempt, all enforcements of unpal- 
atable law, all restraints upon provincial commerce, and all espionage 
upon the brain-work which really wrought in behalf of peace, seeking 
a fair reconciliation with guarantees of representation and personal 
rights, and their product represents that incubus whose dead weight 
was upon the American colonies. 

That is the statement of history. The longer that burden re- 
mained, the heavier it felt. It fretted, then aroused, then inspired, 
and at last set free the pent-up fires which cast it off forever. 
Rocked to and fro by the heaving of the heart it would smother, it 
was compelled to increase its force in proportion as the real vitality of 
a true soul life pervaded the masses. British will was firm and daring 
in the child as with the parent. 

The legacies of English law, the inheritance of English liberty had 
vested in the colonies. Their eradication or withdrawal was impos- 
sible. The time had passed for compromise or limitation of their 
enjoyment. The issue long before fought out on English soil, and 
bearing fruit in English ascendency almost world-wide, had to be 
renewed ; and the authority which might have gladly welcomed the 
prodigious elasticity and growth of the American dependencies as the 
future glory of Great Britain, was armed to convert the filial relation 
into one of slavery. 

Lord ChatJuun announced that, " it would be found impossible for 
freemen in England to wish to see three millions of Englishmen 
slaves in America." 



17751 THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. 83 

Lord Dartmouth declared, " the effects of General Gage's attempt 
at Concord to be fatal." 

Granville Sharpe of the Ordnance department resigned rather 
than forward stores to America. 

Admiral Kcppcl requested not to be employed against America. 
Lord EffingJuDH resigned his commission when he learned his 
regiment was ordered to America. 

It was such demonstrations as these that indicated how deeply 
the mother country was jealous, even of the efforts of her own gov- 
ernment to assert a doubtful policy by force of arms. 

JoJin Wesley declared, that neither tzuentj', forty, nor sixty thou- 
sand men could end the dawning struggle. Thus revolution alone 
could roll off oppression. 

The year 1774 witnessed the formation of new militia companies 
in all the colonies. New England had made especial progress in that 
direction. The noiseless arming of the people, and the formation of 
independent organizations was of still earlier date. The experience 
of the old French war had developed a necessity for fair military 
acquirements, and had educated many leaders fully coinpctent for 
small commands ; while a growing uneasiness, in view of the increasing 
influx of British troops, inspired others to a studious preparation for 
the probable issue offeree with the mother country. 

The attempts of official authority to prevent the people from 
obtaining arms and munitions of war, and to seize those already in 
their possession, were not limited, as will hereafter appear, to Massa- 
chusetts and other New England colonies. 

The fortification of Boston Neck by General Gage had elicited 
from the first Continental Congress, which met on the fifth day of 
September, 1774, an unequivocal declaration of sympathy with the 
people of Boston and Massachusetts, and thus the local struggle was 
swiftly changing its character, and becoming the basis for organized 
general resistance. 

It has been noticed during comment upon the affairs of Lexington 
and Concord, how rapidly the provincial congress, which succeeded 
the Massachusetts assembly, developed its purpose to place its militia 
on a war footing-. 

During September, 1774, a report had become current that Boston 
had been attacked. The removal of powder from Cambridge and 
Charlestown, which belonged to the colony, was magnified, and taken 
as the open offensive, until the whole country was excited. One 



§4 THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. [1775. 

author states that, " within thirty-six hours, nearly thirty thousand 
men were under arms," and a profound impression was made even 
upon the American Congress then in session in Philadelphia. This 
only indicated the breadth of that feeling which already panted for 
armed expression. 

On Sunday, the twenty-second day of April, 1775, Massachu- 
setts declared a necessity for the employment of thirty thousand men 
in defense, and called upon adjoining colonies for their proportional 
quota, assuming as her own burden the enrollment of thirteen thou- 
sand six hundred men. 

On the twenty-fifth day of April Rhode Island devoted fifteen 
hundred men to "An army of Observation." 

On the day following, Connecticut voted a contingent of six thou- 
sand men. 

On the twentieth day of May, New Hampshire tendered her pro- 
portion, which was two thousand men. 

Each colonial contingent went up to Boston as a separate army, 
with independent organization and responsibility. The powder and 
food of each of these armies was distinct, and there was little that 
was homogeneous, except the purpose which impelled them to 
concentrate. 

Massachusetts selected Artemas Ward, who had served under 
General Abercrombie, to be general-in-chief, John Thomas to be 
lieutenant-general, and Richard Gridley, an experienced soldier and 
engineer, to organize artillery and act as engineer in chief. 

Connecticut sent General Putnam, whom active service in the old 
French war and in the West Indies, had inured to daring and ex- 
posure ; General Wooster, an old veteran of the expedition to Louis- 
burg thirty years before, who had served both as colonel and briga- 
dier-general in the French and Indian war, and General Spencer. 

Rhode Island entrusted her troops to General Greene ; with Var- 
num, Hitchcock, and Church as subordinates. 

New Hampshire furnished General Stark, also a veteran of former 
wars. 

Pomeroy and Prescott were also experienced in the operations of 
the old French and Indian wars. 

Thus these armies came together, and General Ward was by 
courtesy accepted as acting commander-in-chief. It was there before 
Boston, early in June, 1775, that General Greene declared that there 
were six indispensable conditions to the promptest success. 



I775-] THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. 8$ 

First. That there be one General-in-chief. 

Second. That the army should be enlisted for the war. 

Third. That a system of bounties should be ordained which would 
provide for the families of soldiers absent in the field. 

Fourth. That the troops should serve wherever required through 
the colonies. 

Fifth. That funds should be borrowed equal to the demands of 
the war, for the complete equipment and support of the army. 

Sixth. That Independence should be declared at once, and every 
resource of every colony be pledged to its support. 

The history of the war furnished its indorsement of the wisdom 
of these propositions. His patriotism was like that of Patrick Henry, 
who declared that " landmarks and boundaries were thrown down, 
that distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, 
and New Englanders were no more," adding, " I am not a Virginian, 
but an Avicricany 

By the middle of June, and before the battle of Breed's Hill, the 
colonies were substantially united in the war. During March, 1775, 
Richard Henry Lee offered resolutions before the second Virginia con- 
vention, " that the colony be immediately put in a state of defense," and 
advocated " the reorganizing, arming, and disciplining of the militia." 

The winds seemed to carry the sound of the first conflict. In six 
days it aroused Maryland. Intermediate colonies in turn responded 
to the summons. Greene's company of Kentish Guards started the 
morning after the Lexington skirmish. The citizens of Rhode Island 
took possession of more than forty cannon, and asserted their claim 
to control all colonial stores. 

New York organized a committee of one hundred, and then of 
one thousand leading citizens, to assure her support in the struggle, 
declaring, that "all the horrors of civil war could not force her sub- 
mission to the acts of the crown." The City Hall and Custom House 
were seized by the patriots. 

Arming and drilling were immediate. *' An association for the 
defense of colonial rights " was formed, and on the twenty-second 
day of May, the colonial assembly was succeeded by a Provincial Con- 
gress, and the new order of government was in full force and effect. 

In New Jersey the people seized one hundred thousand dollars 
which were in the Provincial treasury, and devoted it to " raising 
troops to defend the liberties of America " The news reached Phila- 
delphia on the twenty-fourth day of April. Prominent men at once 



86 THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. [1775. 

accepted command, among them General Dickinson, afterwards 
prominent in duty ; and on the first day of May, the assembly made 
an appropriation of money to raise troops. Dr. Franklin, just returned 
from England, was made chairman of the committee of safety, and 
the city was fully aroused to a hearty support of the common cause. 

In Maryland, the inhabitants seized the Provincial magazine and 
fifteen hundred stand of arms, enrolled *' volunteers for the army 
about Boston," appointed a committee of observation, "and recom- 
mended a system of economy, and abstinence from horse-racing, fairs, 
and other extravagant amusements as derogatory to the character of 
patriots at that solemn hour." 

Virginia was as tinder, ripe for the spark. A positive issue had 
been made between Lord Dunmore and the people. The former had 
sent powder of the colony on board of a vessel lying in the harbor. 
The militia gathered in force under Patrick Henry. The powder was 
paid for by way of compromise, but Henry was denounced as a traitor. 
The storm gathered hourly, and Lord Dunmore took refuge on board 
of the Fozvey, ship of war, then lying in York river. 

The governor of NORTH Carolina had also quarreled with the 
people, in his effort to thwart the organization of a Provincial Con- 
gress in April. It was organized, however, and while the people were 
consulting as to a permanent separation from Great Britain, the mes- 
sage from Boston intensified their purpose and ratified their judgment. 

In South Carolina, on the twenty-first day of April, committees 
appointed for the purpose, took eight hundred stand of arms, and 
two hundred cutlasses from the magazine for the use of the patriots, 
upon receiving information that orders had been sent to all governors 
to seize the arms and ammunition of the colonists. This order was 
based upon the act of parliament forbidding the exportation of arms 
to the colonies. The news from Lexington, received twenty days 
after that skirmish, added fuel to the flame. 

At Savannah, Georgia, six members of the " council of safety," 
broke open the public magazine, seized the powder, placed it in secret 
places for safety, and thus testified of their readiness to meet the 
grave future with decision and spirit, and this, before receiving news 
of the beginning of war. 

Such is the briefest possible outline of the state of concurrent 
feeling and preparation, which harmonized with the resistance offered 
at Lexington and Concord. 

The first Colonial Congress had authorized the formation of an 



1775] THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. Sy 

" American Association," under a " declaration of colonial rights," hav- 
ino- for its purpose entire non-intercourse with Great Britain, Ireland, 
and the West Indies. This was a measure of policy designed to force 
a financial crisis before the British cabinet, and compel a modification 
of its laws ; but it also was aggressive in spirit, and gave warning of 
ulterior measures in reserve. The second Continental Congress met 
on the tenth day of May, 1775, immediately after Allen's capture of 
Ticonderoga. 

Prompt measures were taken for the purchase of materials for the 
manufacture of powder and of cannon. Authority was given for the 
emission of two millions of Spanish milled dollars, and a resolution 
was adopted that the " Tivelve Confederate Colonies " be pledged for 
the redemption of bills of credit, then directed to be issued. 

A formal system of" Rules and Articles of war " was adopted, and 
due provision was made for raising an additional armed force, sufficient 
to meet the British reinforcements then expected from England, for 
the enforcement of acts of parliament which were denounced as " un- 
constitutional, oppressive and cruel." 

Meanwhile, the colonial troops continued in position before Boston, 
and the state of war was so fully accepted, that a regular exchange of 
prisoners was made on the sixth day of June. 

On the twelfth of June General Gage offered pardon to all, Sam- 
uel Adams and John Hancock excepted, who would lay down their 
arms, following this proclamation with a declaration of martial law. 

This second Continental Congress promptly adopted the forces 
before Boston, and such as should be afterwards organized, as THE 
American Continental Army. 

A light infantry organization was authorized on the fourteenth of 
June, to consist of " expert riflemen," of which six companies should 
be raised in Pennsylvania, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia, who 
should join the army at Boston as soon as possible. Additional 
companies were authorized before the adjournment of Congress. 

Onthefifteenthof June, the appointment of commander-in-chief of 
all continental troops then raised, or to be raised, was authorized, and 
George Washington was unanimously elected upon a vote by ballot. 

A brief outline of the personal and military antecedents of that 
officer is highly proper, since his identification with the struggle for 
American Independence is a memorial lesson for his countrymen to 
study, and no less valuable to the intelligent appreciation of American 
history by the world at large. 



88 THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. [1775. 

The author does not propose to fill up his volume with biography, 
or to enlarge upon civil issues. All readers have access to complete 
histories. He exercises a choice, freely to use whatever his limits 
will warrant in carrying out his own purpose. 

Washington was ready to enter the British navy as a midshipman 
at fifteen years of age, but withdrew from his chosen profession upon 
his mother's request. 

At the age of nineteen, full of zeal in military studies, and those 
relating to civil engineering, he accepted an appointment as an Adju- 
tant-general of Virginia, with the rank of major. 

In the year 1753, while organizing militia for frontier service, he 
was detailed by General Dinwiddie upon a delicate mission to the 
French commandants of the frontier posts, and made the trying 
journey through a country infested by hostile Indians, with signal 
credit. During this journey he selected the forks of the Mononga- 
hela and Alleghany rivers as the proper site of a fort, subsequently 
established by the French as Fort du Quesne, (now Pittsburgh), 

The journal of that winter's expedition is marked by critical notes 
of the military features of the country; and that journey without 
doubt, formed the basis of that peculiar skill and strategical exact- 
ness with which he adopted military positions during his subsequent 
career. At Great Meadows, Fort Necessity, and during Braddock's 
campaign he gained a high reputation for sagacity, practical wisdom, 
knowledge of human nature, and courage. These operations were 
followed by a careful inspection of all posts, and the careful organiza- 
tion of the Virginia militia, which was widely dispersed in small parties 
over an extensive range of wild country. 

During these inspections he caused the posts to be made more 
secure by felling trees which would cover an advancing enemy, and 
otherwise instructed officers and men in the details of a peculiarly 
trying service. With a thousand men, he was charged with the care 
and defense of four hundred miles of frontier. 

His formal suggestions as to army organization, movements, and 
supply, made from time to time, furnish maxims which are the eq^uiva- 
lent of those which obtain with standard modern writers, and indicate 
the thoroughness of his study, and the practical use he made of real 
experience. After his occupation of Fort du Quesne, abandoned by 
the French, and the establishment of comparative quiet along the 
frontier, he became commander-in-chief of all the troops raised in 
Virginia. 



1775-] THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. 89 

As an engineer and disciplinarian he achieved credit, and when 
summoned to the command of the Continental army, he brought to 
the public service those qualities which enforced success. 

The officers who were associated with Washington in high com- 
mand were as follows : 

Major Generals. 

1st. Artemas Ward; already noticed. 

2d. Charles Lee ; an officer once in the British army, and well 
skilled in military affairs. 

After a life of rare adventure a soldier of fortune from his eleventh 
year, a professional adventurer, he still possessed remarkable faculties 
as a disciplinarian, and at least brought to the army such a reputation 
for brilliant deeds in various European service that strong endeavor 
was made to give him the first command in place of General Ward. 
His aspirations were even higher still. 

3d. Philip Schuyler ; a man of rare excellence of character, who 
served in the French and Indian war, took part in Abercrombie's 
campaign against Ticonderoga, and was a member of the Continental 
Congress from New York at date of his appointment. 

4th. Israel Putnam ; already noticed. 

Brigadier Generals. 

1st. Seth Pomeroy ; already noticed. 

2d. Richard Montgomery ; who had served gallantly under Wolfe, 
and in the West Indies in 1762. 

3d. David Wooster ; already noticed. 

4th. William Heath ; who before the war was a vigorous writer 
upon the necessity of military discipline and a thoroughly organized 
militia. 

5th. Joseph Spencer ; who had served as major and colonel in the 
French and Indian wars. 

6th. John Thomas ; also a soldier of the old French and Indian 
war already in camp at Boston, at the head of a regiment recruited 
by himself. 

7th. John Sullivan ; a lawyer of New Hampshire; of Irish blood, a 
member of the first Continental Congress, and a man quick in 
sympathy with the first movement for the organization of armed 
resistance. 



90 THE HOUR OF PREPARATION, [1775: 

8th. Nathaniel Greene ; then at the head of the Rhode Island 
troops before Boston, and already noticed. 

Congress elected Horatio Gates as adjutant-general. He had 
served in the British army, commanded a company during Braddock's 
campaign, accompanied General Monckton as aid-de-camp to the 
West Indies, and gained laurels at the capture of Martinico. 

Both Gates and Lee had settled in Virginia after leaving the 
British army, and had there formed the acquaintance of the future 
commander-in-chief. 

On the twenty-first of June, Washington left Philadelphia for 
Boston, and on the third of July assumed command of the Continental 
army with head-quarters at Cambridge. Thenceforth the war pro- 
ceeded with slow but steady progress to its accomplishment. 

At this point the mind instinctively turns from the general retro- 
spect of these wide-spread pulsations, to again look upon the imme- 
diate theatre of active force. For two months the yeomanry of New 
England laid a close grasp upon all land approaches to the city of 
Boston. The pressure, now and then resisted by efforts of the gar- 
rison to secure supplies from the surrounding country, only brought 
a tighter hold, and incited a prime purpose to crowd that garrison to 
an escape by sea. The islands of the bay were miniature fields of 
conflict, and the repeated efforts to procure bullocks, flour, and other 
needed provisions, through the use of boats belonging to the British 
fleet, only developed a counter system of boat operations which neu- 
tralized the former, and gradually limited that garrison to the range 
of its guns. 

And yet, the beleaguering force fluctuated every week, so that few 
of the hastily improvised regiments maintained either identity of per- 
son or permanent numbers. The sudden summons from industrial 
duty was like the unorganized rush of men upon the alarm of fire, 
quickened by the conviction that there was wide-sweeping and com- 
mon danger to be withstood, or a devouring element to be mastered. 
That independence of opinion, however, which began to assert a claim 
to independent nationality was impatient of restraint, and military 
control was irksome, even when vital to success. Offices were con- 
ferred upon those who raised companies, regardless of character or 
other merit. 

Jealousies and aspirations mingled with the claims of families left 
at home, and many local excitements threatened disorder wherever 
officers of the crown were stationed. • ■ 



I775-J THE HOUR OF PREPARATION. 



91 



The flash of Lexington, and the hot heat of its fire had passed 
by, and it was dull work enough to stand guard by day, lie upon the 
ground at night, live a life of routine, receive unequal and indifferent 
food, and wonder when, and how, the affair would end. 

These elements, however, were not sufficiently depressing to lei 
loose the pent-in British forces. Strong wills carried men of stron^^ 
convictions everywhere among the people. The raw troops were 
under wise guardianship ! 

The integrity and far reaching forecast of great citizens, united 
their influence with that of a few real soldiers, to keep an adequate 
force in the field. The idle were at length set to work. Occupation 
lightened the restraints of camp life. Earthworks and redoubts grad- 
ually unfolded their purpose, and out of seeming chaos there was 
lifted into perpetual remembrance the issue of Bunker Hill. 



CHAPTER XV. 

BUNKER HILL. THE OCCUPATION. 

THE peninsula of Boston connects with Roxbury by the narrow 
neck of land which had been fortified by General Gage as early 
as October, 1774. 

North of Boston, and separated by the Charles river, is a second 
peninsula, fully a mile long, and a little more than half a mile wide ; 
also connected with the main land by a narrow isthmus, formerly sub- 
ject to overflow at unusually high water. 

By reference to the maps, — " Boston and vicinity ^^ and ''^Battle of 
Blinker Hill ^'' — the reader will gain a fair impression of the topography 
of the immediate field of operations. The positions there assigned to 
American commanders are such as were established after the arrival 
of General Washington ; but the entire circuit, with the exception 
of Dorchester, was in possession of the Provincial troops at the date 
of the battle of Bunker Hill, although with less completeness of earth- 
works and redoubts than after the investment was permanently 
developed. 

Morton's Hilly at Moulton's Point, where the British army landed 
on the seventeenth day of June, 1775, was but thirty-five feet above 
sea level, while " Breed's pasture," as then styled, and Bunker Hill, 
were respectively seventy-five and one hundred and ten feet high. 
The adjoining waters were navigable, and under control of the British 
fleet. 

Bunker Hill had an easy slope to the isthmus, but the other sides 
were quite steep, the position having control of the isthmus itself, as 
well as commanding a full view of Boston and the surrounding coun- 
try. The strategic value of this summit was very decided for either 
army, yet it had been overlooked or neglected by the British com- 
mander, even although the arrival of Generals Howe, Clinton and 
Burgoyne, with reinforcements, had swelled the nominal strength of 



1775 J BUNKER HILL. 93 

the garrison to about ten thousand men, and the importance of 
aggressive movements upon the colonial militia had been carefully 
considered and rightfully estimated. 

This garrison had been gradually weakened by constant skirmishes, 
by sickness and other causes, leaving an effective force, even for gar- 
rison duty, of hardly eight thousand men. Scarcity of supplies, 
especially of fresh meat, bore some share in a depreciation of physical 
fitness for the field. The troops, however, that were fit for duty, were 
under excellent discipline and ably commanded. 

The American army received information the thirteenth of June, 
that General Gage had definitely decided to take immediate pos- 
session of the Charlestown peninsula, and also of Dorchester Heights. 

As early as the middle of May, however, the " committee of 
safety," and the " council of war," had resolved to occupy and fortify 
Bunker Hill as soon as artillery and powder could be adequately fur- 
nished for the purpose ; while from want of definite knowledge of 
the military value of Dorchester Heights, a committee had been 
appointed for examination and report, respecting the merits of that 
position as a strategic restraint upon the garrison of Boston. 

On the fifteenth day of June, the " Massachusetts committee of 
safety," and the same " council of war, " voted to take immediate 
possession of Bunker Hill. This action was predicated upon positive 
information that the British council of war had resolved upon a sim- 
ilar movement, and had designated the eighteenth day of June for 
execution of that purpose. 

There is no more significant fact of the want of thorough military 
oversight and system in the then existing Provincial army, than the 
looseness of discipline with which the enterprise under consideration 
was initiated, and the want of specific responsibility which attended 
its execution. 

It is unquestionably true that the presence of Doctor Warren was 
one of the chief elements which inspired the prolonged resistance 
after the action began ; and the chief credit at the redoubt belongs to 
Colonel Prescott. There was at first no unanimity in approval of the 
plan, no thorough support of the detachment sent upon so serious an 
expedition, and there was a complete failure to furnish that detach- 
ment with adequate means to maintain a serious contest with an 
enemy of considerable force. 

More than a hundred writers have made this action the theme of 
diverse criticism, and many of them have run tilts for or against some 



94- BUNKER HILL. [1775. 

candidate for special honor in connection with the first formal battle- 
issue of the war of 1775-1781. 

The peculiarly loose organisation of the army, also, had much to d6 
with the inefficiency of the movement upon Bunker Hill ; and yet, the 
specific work of the detachment, independent of the want of support 
to back the movement, was well done. 

There were special considerations that undoubtedly exerted theii* 
influence at the time when the expedition was first considered. The 
supineness of the British army, the limitation of its outside demon- 
strations to simple excursions for supplies, and the impression that it 
was unable, or unwilling, to renew active hostilities against the force 
which controlled the main land and surrounding country, must have 
had effect upon the officers in command of the American army. 

If the contingency of a battle, such as transpired; that is, of an 
attempt in force, to dislodge a successful occupation of the hill, had any 
consideration whatever, there was terrible neglect, in failure to supply 
ammunition and rations for that em.ergency. That the occupation of 
Breed's pasture, instead of Bunker Hill proper, was a departure from 
the text of the original instructions, is undoubtedly true ; but a prompt 
and sufficient support would have assured the control of both, and 
have realized the complete repulse of the British assault. It will 
appear hereafter, that under all the circumstances, the judgment of 
Colonel Gridley, who laid out the intrenchments, was eminently wise 
and proper. 

The narrative will be cleared of extrinsic issues, and no attempt 
will be made to supply facts which history omitted and the grave 
buried. 

Few modern battles are described alike by different critics, and 
many a general would be puzzled to know whether he was in an action, 
where he actually commanded, if he sought information from con- 
testants who scramble for honors beyond their experience or reach. 
The controversy as to General Putnam's relation to the battle of 
Bunker Hill alone, has burdened the minds of many authors, and 
tried the brains of thousands of readers who could not see the impor- 
tance of the discussion. But, Bunker Hill was to be occupied. The 
decision was made. The emergency was pressing. 

General Ward, advanced in years arid feeble in body, was unequal 
to active service, and lacked that military acuteness and decision 
which the crisis demanded. He had no alternative but to obey the 
instructions of the committee of safety and the council of war. 



I775J BUNKER HILL. 95 

Mr. Bancroft clearly states an important element of pressing im- 
portance at the time. " The decision was so sudden that no fit pre- 
paration could be made. The nearly total want of ammunition 
rendered the service desperately daring." 

The decision to occupy the h'lU /f/cc/^ed support. As in fact trans- 
pired, the success was only limited by scarcity of powder. That 
should have been furnished or the expedition withdrawn. Prescott 
and Putnam had favored the movement, and urged it upon the coun- 
cil of war. Ward and Warren wished to avoid a general engagement, 
and the expenditure of powder necessarily involved in occupying a 
post so exposed to British attack. The latter, however, concurred in 
the final decision, and on the day of action left his place as president 
of the Provincial Congress, and traveled seven miles to bear part, as 
he offered his life, in the battle of Bunker Hill. 

Formation of the coniniand. Colonel William Prescott, of Pepperill, 
Massachusetts, was eager to lead the enterprise, and was intrusted 
with its execution. The men detailed to form the detachment, were 
for the most part from his own regiment and those of Colonels Frye 
and Bridge. The three colonels were members of the council of war 
which had been organized on the twentieth day of April, when Gen- 
eral Ward assumed command of the army about Boston. 

Captain Thomas Knowlton, of Putnam's regiment, who afterwards 
fell in gallant fight on Harlem Plains, at the head of the Connecticut 
Rangers, " Congress' Own," was to lead a detachment of two hundred 
men drafted from the Connecticut troops. 

Colonel Richard Gridley, chief engineer, with a company of artil- 
lery, was also assigned to the command. An order was, in fact, issued, 
for the first named regiment to parade at six o'clock on the evening, 
of the sixteenth, " with all the intrenching tools in the encampment." 
The original purpose was also to have the detachment number one 
thousand men. The field-order, however, covered about fourteen 
hundred men. Frothingham, in his valuable " Siege of Boston," 
shows conclusively that the force as organized, including artificers and 
drivers of the carts, was not less than twelve hundred men. 

Cambridge Common was designated for the rendezvous. Beneath 
the elms, solemn with that occasion, that band of earnest men, fresh 
from peaceful homes, but hurrying into the face of battle for home and 
country, was formed in perfect silence for the last duty which was to 
precede the onward movement. 

Rev. Samuel Langdon, president of Harvard College, invoked the 



96 BUNKER HILL [1775. 

favor of high heaven upon their mission, and with a benediction pecu- 
har to his stern and stately carriage, dismissed them to their silent 
march. 

" It was soon after sunset," says Bancroft ; — " then — as the late 
darkness of the mid-summer evening closed in, they marched for 
Charlestown, in the face of the proclamation issued only four days 
before, by which all persons taken in arms against their sovereign, were 
threatened, under martial law, with death by the cord as rebels and 
traitors." 

The command moved silently but rapidly, crossed Charlestown 
Neck, and then halted for consultation and definition of the enjoined 
duty. Major Brooks, of Colonel Bridge's regiment, here joined with 
a small detachment, as well as a company of artillery with their guns. 

Orders. The confused account of instructions given on this 
expedition is significant of the want of system then existing in the 
American camp. There has also been a needless worry about the 
matter, according as partisan authorities have selected favorites for 
the honors of the day. No general officer was embraced in the detail, 
and no general officer asserted authority over the operations of the 
eventful twenty-four hours that followed the advance movement. 

Such as were present at any time, advised as occasion required, 
worked hard and well, but enforced no personal authority over the 
conimand especially assigned to the duty. 

Frothingham furnishes ample evidence, that written orders from 
General Ward designated Bunker Hill as the summit to be occupied, 
and that these orders were to be communicated to the command 
after crossing the isthmus. The first order issued after the halt, was 
the detail of Captain Nutting's company with a small detachment of 
Connecticut men, to patrol Charlestown and the adjoining shore. A 
second consultation took place after the command reached Bunker 
Hill. Captain Maxwell's company, from Prescott'sown regiment, was 
detailed for patrol of the shore, and to keep watch of the British 
works at Copp's Hill, directly opposite, and of the ships of war 
then anchored within a short distance of the peninsula. 

The Annual Register, 1775, thus indicates the fleet ; Somerset, 68 
guns. Captain Edward Le Cros ; Cerberus, 36 guns. Captain Chads ; 
Glasgow, 34 guns. Captain William Maltby ; Lively, 20 guns, Captain 

Thomas Bishop ; Falcon, guns, Captain Linzee, and the Sjjfi- 

vietry, transport, with 18 nine-pounders. 

The details thus made, not only to watch those vessels, but to 



1775] BUNKER HILL. 97 

occupy Charlestown, not only discharged their duty well, but by 
availing themselves of houses, proved active annoyances to the left 
wing of the British army in its ultimate advance upon the American 
works. 

Occupation of the heights. The chief engineer, Colonel Gridley, 
laid out the intrenchments at " Breed's pasture " shortly after, first 
known as Breed's Hill. This was done after careful consultation with 
Colonel Prescott, Captain Knowlton, and other officers, and for the 
purpose of establishing a position giving the quickest control of the 
beach, in case of the landing of British troops. The eligibility of the 
situation will be noticed in the " military notes " belonging to the 
record of the action. 

Packs were unslung, arms were stacked, the intrenching tools pre- 
viously unloaded from the carts, were brought forward, and the troops 
were noiselessly distributed for duty. The bells of Boston struck 
tivclve ; and the new day, so fatal, so memorable, began its history, to 
the dull thud o{ the pick-ax and the grating of shovels. Those men 
knczv how to handle their tools ! 

Martin states, as appears from a foot-note in Frothingham's his- 
tory, that " about a thousand men were at work," and that " the men 
dug in the trenches one hour, and then mounted guard." All night 
that work went on, in solemn stillness, only relieved by the sentries' 
monotonous and encouraging "■ alfs ivell,"' which sounded from the 
battery across the river, and from the decks of the shipping. At dawn 
of day, the redoubt, about eight rods square, had been nearly closed, 
presenting a face nearly six feet high, with such hasty accommoda- 
tions behind the parapet, as would bring the men to a convenient 
position for delivering fire. 

More than once. Colonel Prescott and other officers quietly drew 
near the river, to be assured that no small boats were afloat, and that 
the apparent security was not the prelude to a surprise. He was 
everywhere present to inspire zeal and hope, and Bancroft's statement 
that General Putnam himself visited the works during the night and 
encouraged the men, is verified by respectable authority, and the con- 
temporaneous statement of soldiers who had no possible inducement 
to befog the narrative of events. The character of his aid rendered 
during the entire day is perfectly consistent with this statement. 

The situation. With daylight, the outline of the intrenchments, 
and the throng of busy v/orkers, brought to the notice of British 
sentries the night's aggressive work. It had veiled the work of the 



"98 BUNKER HILL. [i775. 

advancing patriots. The colonists were in earnest ! The Lively put 
a spring on her cable and opened fire. The battery of Copp's Hill 
responded. The roar of cannon awoke the sleeping garrison of 
Boston ; and while the streets resounded with the swift transit of 
messengers, and the tramp of assembling battalions, and the house- 
tops were crowded with anxious observers, the quickened and patient 
laborers were perfecting their preparations, resolute of purpose to 
meet face to face the veteran troops of George the Third. The vig- 
orous action of the land batteries aqd ships, only wasted their powder 
and ball. One man fell, and to convince his comrades that there was 
no time for fear or rest. Colonel Prescott walked the parapet, openly 
exposed, and re-inspired the men. 

Continuous labor, under high pressure, began to wear upon the 
stoutest. At nine o'clock a council of war was called. The activity 
of the Boston garrison, the accumulating array of boats, and all the 
activities of that city, were prophetic of a resolute purpose to resent. 
the offensive movement of the Americans, and still no reinforcements,, 
no relieving party, had appeared. 

The rations hastily issued for twenty-four hours of duty, had, as 
usual with raw and over-worked troops, become nearly exhausted, and 
urgent requests were made that men should be relieved by others 
who were fresh, and that reinforcements should be sent for, with an 
ample supply of food. In this emergency Major John Brooks was 
dispatched to head-quarters to present these demands. 

Note. As with the shield, one side gold, the reverse, silver ; so may critics ignore the 
double aspect of the command at Bunker's and Breed's Hills. The credit which is due to 
Prescott, for occupying and defending tlie latter, is perfectly consistent with the universal 
industry of Putnam, elsewhere. Extreme partisans of either must violate the laws of evi- 
dence and impeach witnesses who are the chief authority for other, more important facts of 
American history. 

Note. Moulton's Point or Morton's Point, both are family names of that period ; each 
adopted by reputable authority. The author has preserved both, in connection with Hill 
or Point. No injustice is done. Life is too short and history too remiss, for settlement 
of this doubtful point. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

BUNKER HILL. THE PREPARATION. 

REINFORCEMENTS. General Putnam was very early at 
head-quarters of the army at Cambridge, and urged that an 
additional force be sent to Charlestown Heights to reinforce Colonel 
Prescott's command. General Ward finally consented, so far as to 
order one-third of Colonel Stark's regiment to the front. The sequel 
will show that this was timely aid. 

Major Brooks met General Putnam and pushed forward on his 
errand, while the general himself proceeded directly to the field of 
danger. 

General Ward gave little heed to the urgent demand of Major 
Brooks, declining further to reduce his own force, lest the British 
garrison should make a movement upon Cambridge, and thus imperil 
the safety of accumulating stores, and even that of the entire army. 
The committee of safety was in session. Richard Devons, one of its 
most valuable members, is credited with the influence which per- 
suaded them to furnish additional reinforcements. Colonel Sweet 
states, that orders were also issued to recall from Chelsea the com- 
panies there stationed, in order to increase the force at head-quarters. 

The committee rested under a grave responsibility. " Their entire 
supply of powder, which could be obtained north of the Delaware,' 
according to Bancroft and other eminent authority, " was twenty- 
seven half barrels, and a present from Connecticut of thirty-six half- 
barrels more." Bancroft adds : " The army itself was composed of 
companies incomplete in numbers, enlisted chiefly within six weeks, 
commanded, many of them, by officers unfit, ignorant, and untried, 
gathered from separate colonies, and with no reciprocal subordination 
but from courtesy and opinion." 

Fearful to waste ammunition, solemnly bound to have regard to 
the whole army and ultimate ends, as well as constrained to support 



lOO BUNKER HILL. [1775. 

the movement which they had themselves enjoined, it is not strange 
that calm deUberation foreran the decision of the committee when the 
appeal of Major Brooks was made. 

It was therefore as late as eleven o'clock when the whole of the 
New Hampshire regiments of Stark and Read were ordered to re- 
inforce Prescott. This detachment reached its destination in time to 
participate in the action, although not until after the landing of the 
British troops. 

Sweet credits the regiments of Colonels Brewer, Nixon, Wood- 
bridge, and Major Moore, with a contribution of three hundred men each. 

Frothingham shows conclusively that, " several of the companies 
of Little's regiment were elsewhere on duty, one at Gloucester, one 
at Ipswich, one at Lechmere's Point, and some at West Cambridge " ; 
but adds that, " Lunt's company arrived on the field near the close 
of the battle." 

Bancroft carefully compiles from official reports and depositions, a 
statement, approximately as correct as can be derived from existing 
evidence, and thus states the force which " hastened to the aid of 
Prescott. 

*' Of Essex men, (Little's regiment) at least one hundred and 
twenty-five ; of Worcester and Middlesex men, (Brewer's) seventy or 
more, and with them. Lieutenant-colonel Buckminster ; of the same 
men, (Nixon's) fifty men, led by Nixon himself; forty men (Moore's) 
from Worcester ; of Lancaster men, (Whitcomb's) at fifty privates, 
with no officer higher than captain." 

The hot day wore out its hours, as the tired troops resting from 
their assigned duty, — panted for water, hungered for food, and waited 
for the enemy ; and neither food nor reinforcements appeared in view, 
while the hostile forces were rapidly marshaling for attack. 

The surrounding waters were salt sea water, or its brackish mix- 
ture with the flow from the Charles and Mystic rivers, and no fresh 
water was easy of access. A conviction that they were deserted 
began to spread through the ranks, that they had been pushed for- 
ward rashly, upon an ill-considered enterprise, and that there was 
wanting the disposition or nerve to undertake risks for their support 
or rescue. 

It was at such a moment, terrible in its doubts and grand in its 
resolution, that Seth Pomeroy, then seventy years of age, having 
wisely declined his commission as Brigadier-general, found hi* way to 
the redoubt, musket in hand, to fight as a private volunteer. 



1775] BUNKER HILL. lOI 

And it was just then that Dr. Joseph Warren, President of the 
Provincial Congress, loved and honored of all, the undoubted patriot, 
and already monumental for worth and courage, added his presence 
and the beams of his animation to cheer the faltering and faint. He 
also declined command, served under Prescott, and plied his musket 
with the best when the crisis came on. 

Ward himself, when the embarkation of the second British detach- 
ment furnished evidence that Cambridge was not in peril, hurried 
other troops toward the isthmus, but too late to avert the swift 
catastrophe. 

Disposition of the American forces. Upon completion of the re- 
doubt, it became painfully evident that the preliminary work was not 
yet complete. A new line of breastwork, a {q\w rods in length, was 
hastily carried backward and a little to the left ; and very hasty efforts 
were made to strengthen a short hedge, and establish a line of defense 
for a hundred and twenty rods in the same direction, thereby to con- 
nect with the stone fence and other protection which ran perpendic- 
ularly toward the Mystic river. This retreating line was begun under 
the personal direction of Prescott himself, but was never fully closed 
up. A piece of springy ground on this line was left uncovered by 
any shelter for troops acting in its rear, or passing to and fro behind 
the main lines. The stone fence, which took its course nearly to the 
river, was like those so common in New England at the present 
day. Posts are set into a wall two or three feet high, and these 
are connected with two rails, making the entire height about five 
feet. 

Freshly mown hay which lay around in winrows or in heaps, was 
braided or thatched upon these rails, affording a sJww of .y//r//rr, while 
the top rail gave resting place for the weapon. In front of this, an 
ordinary zig-zag, " j/i^/C'^- and rider'' fence was established, and the 
space between the two was also filled with hay. 

This line was nearly six hundred feet in rear of the front face of 
the redoubt, and near the foot of Bunker Hill. To its defense Pres- 
cott assigned Connecticut men under command of Captain Knowlton, 
supported by two field pieces on the right, adjoining the open space 
already mentioned. 

Still beyond the rail fence eastward, towards the river, and extend- 
ing by an even slope to its very margin, was another gap which 
exposed the entire command to a flanking movement of the enemy, 
endangering the redoubt itself, as well as the more transient works of 



102 BUNKER HILL. ' [l775. 

defense. To anticipate such a movement, subsequently attenipted, an 
imperfect stone wall was quickly thrown together by the assistance 
of Colonel Stark's detachment, whose timely arrival had cheered the 
spirits of the worn out pioneer command. 

Meanwhile, Putnam was everywhere present to encourage the. 
men, and superintended the establishment of light works on Bunker 
Hill summit, to cover the troops in case of forcible ejection from the 
advanced defenses. He caused the intrenching tools, no longer 
needed at the front, to be taken to that position. In spite of his 
entreaties and commands, some who thus carried the tools, threw 
them down upon reaching the summit, and took refuge behind the 
isthmus ; others returned to their places at the front. 

His movement, which would have been appreciated by well dis- 
ciplined troops, carried with it the suggestion of a contingency which 
defeated its purpose in the hands of men not soldiers. Putnam's 
efforts accomplished nothing of value in the preparation of ulterior 
defenses. The time was too short, the control of men too feeble ; and 
the organization and discipline of the reinforcements which arrived, 
were too slack for their immediate subjection to authority, while the 
advancing enemy began to absorb the whole attention. Prescott's 
force at the redoubt had dropped off to less than eight hundred men 
when Colonel John Stark arrived. " Next to Prescott, he brought 
the largest number of men into the field," says Bancroft. The British 
were already landing, as they crossed the isthmus under a heavy fire 
The execution of that movement was characteristic of their brave 
commander, and well calculated to impart the courage which after- 
ward sustained his men. When Captain Dearborn, advised a quick 
step, he decided, that " one fresh man in an action was worth ten 
fatigued ones," and then deliberately advanced to his position. 

As he descended the southern slope of Bunker Hill, his eye took, 
in the whole plan of preparation for the battle. He saw, as he after- 
ward related the affair, " The whole way so plain upon the beach 
along the Mystic river, that the enemy could not miss it." He went 
to work. Reed's regiment, which had been detailed with Starks' early 
in the morning, upon the importunity of Putnam, was at the rail fence 
with the Connecticut men. With every possible strain upon the New 
Hampshire men, this last obstruction was not sufficiently perfected to 
cover Starks' command, so that their ultimate defense was made while 
many were kneeling or lying down to deliver fire. 

No other troops than those already named, arrived in time to take 



1775] BUNKER HILL. IO3 

part in the action, and the total force which eventually participated 
in the battle did not exceed fourteen hundred men. 

Six pieces of artillery were in partial use at different times, but 
with inconsiderable practical effect, and five of these were left on the 
field when the retreat was made. 

Tlie landing. The embarkation of the British troops was the 
signal for renewed activity of the fleet. 

The base of Breed's Hill, and the low ground extending to the 
river, was swept by a fire so hot, that no troops, if any had been dis- 
posable for such a movement, could have resisted the landing. 

Perfect silence pervaded the American lines. A few ineffectual 
cannon shots were fired, the guns were soon taken to the rear, and a 
still deeper calm enveloped the hill. The day was intensely bright 
and hot. Barge after barge discharged its fully equipped soldiery, 
then returned for more. This brilliant display of force, nowhere sur- 
passed for splendor of outfit, precision of movement, gallant bearing, 
and perfect discipline, was spread out over Morton's Hill in well 
ordered lines of matchless array. With professional self-possession, 
these men took their noonday meal at leisure, while the barges 
returned for still another division. 

Simultaneously with this reinforcement, the roar of artillery was 
heard from beyond Boston. As if to threaten General Ward, then at 
Cambridge, and General Thomas, who with several thousand Massa- 
chusetts men was then at Roxbury, and to warn both that they 
could spare no more troops for the support of Prescott ; or, from the 
apprehension that an attempt might be made by the Americans to 
force an entrance to the city over Boston Neck, the batteries which 
covered the Neck opened forth a heavy fire of shot, shell and car- 
casses upon the village of Roxbury and its defenses. It was no less 
an indication to the silent yeomen on the hill, that mortal danger 
demanded a supreme resistance. 

The crisis was at hand. The veterans were ready. The people 
were also ready. 

The shaft of war, in the grasp of the trained legions of Great 
Britain was poised, and to be hurled at last upon the breasts of 
Englishmen, whose offense was the aspiration to perpetuate and 
develop the principles of English liberty. 

It was a blow at Magna Charta itself, a home thrust, suicidal, and 
hopeless, except for evil ! Its lesson rolls on to attend the march of 
the centuries. 



CHAPTER XVIT. 

BUNKER HILL. THE BATTLE. 

IT was nearly three o'clock of the afternoon of the seventeenth of 
June, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and 
seventy five, that the soHd mass of silent veterans which had landed 
upon Moulton's Point, and had prepared themselves with due delib- 
eration to execute the order of the day, moved forward to attack the 
American army, then intrenched on the summit of Breed's Hill. 

To General Howe himself was intrusted the responsibility of 
breaking up the American left wing, to envelope it, take the redoubt 
in the rear, and cut off retreat to Bunker Hill and the main land. 
The light infantry, therefore, moved closely along the Mystic river, 
threatening the extreme left, while the grenadiers directed their 
advance upon the stone fence, with their left wing demonstrating 
toward the unprotected gap which was clearly exposed between the 
fence and the short breastwork next the redoubt. General Pigot, who 
commanded the left wing, advanced directly against the redoubt 
itself. 

The movements were heralded by a profitless artillery fire from 
Morton's Hill, but this soon ceased, for the solid shot all ready for use, 
were designed for twelve-pounder guns, and those in position had the 
caliber of sixes. The prompt order to use only ^r^/^, was followed 
by an advance of the pieces to the edge of an old brick-kiln, the 
spongy ground and heavy grass not permitting their ready handling 
at the foot of the hill slope, or even just to its right. The guns, thus 
advanced, thereby secured a more effective range of fire upon the 
skeleton defenses of the American centre, and an eligible position 
from which subsequently to effect a more direct fire upon the exposed 
portion of the American front, and upon the breastwork and redoubt 
themselves. 

The advance of the British army was like a solemn pageant in its 



I775-] BUNKER HILL. 105 

steady headway, and like a parade for inspection in its completeness 
of furnishment. This army, bearing their knapsacks and the full 
equipment for campaign service, moved forward as if by the very 
force of its closely knit columns it must sweep away all obstructions, 
and overture every barrier in its way. But rigJu in the way was a 
calm, intense, and energizing love of liberty. 

It was represented by plain men of the same blood, and of equal 
daring. Contrast marked those opposing Englishmen very distinctly 
that summer afternoon. The plain men handled plain fire-locks. 
Ox-horns held their powder, and their pockets held the bullets. 
Coatless, under the broihng sun, unincumbered, unadorned by plum- 
age or service medals, — looking like vagabonds after their night of 
labor, and their day of hunger, thirst and waiting, this live obstruction 
was truly in the way of that advancing splendor. Elated, conscious, 
assured of victory, with firm step, already quickened as the space of 
separation lessens, there is left but a few rods of interval — a few steps 
only, and the work is done. 

A few hasty shots impulsively fired, but quickly restrained, drew 
an innocent fire from their front rank. The pale men behind the 
mock defense, obedient at last to one will, answered nothing to that 
reply, and nothing to the audible commands of those steady columns, 
waiting still. 

It needs no painter to make the scene seem clearer than it appears 
from the recital of sober deposition and the record of surviving par- 
ticipators on either side. History has no contradictions to confuse or 
explain away the realities of that fearful tragedy. 

The left wing is near the redoubt. It is notJiing to surmount a 
bank of fresh earth but six feet high, and its sands and clods can 
almost be counted, it is so near, so easy, — sure ! 

Short, crisp, and earnest, — low toned, but felt as an electric pulse 
from redoubt to river, are the words of a single man — of Prescott ! 
Warren by his side repeats it ! That word runs quickly along the 
impatient lines. The eager fingers give back from the waiting trigger. 
"Steady men!" " Wait until you see the white of the eye ! " "Not 
a shot sooner ! " " Aim at the handsome coats ! " " Aim at the 
waist-bands." " Pick off the commanders !" " Wait for the word, 
every man, steady ! " 

Those plain men, so patient, can already count the buttons, can 
read the emblem on the belt-plate, can recognize the officers and men 
whom they have seen on parade at Boston Common. Features grow 



I06 BUNKER HILL. [1775 

more and more distinct. The silence is awful. These men seem 
breathless — dead! It comes, that word^ the word, waited for — 
" Fire ! " On the right, the light infantry gain an equal advance, 
almost at the same instant that the left wing was treading so near the 
humble redoubt. Moving over more level ground, they quickly make 
the greater distance, and have passed the Hne of those who marched 
directly up the hill. The grenadiers also move upon the centre with 
the same serene confidence, and the interval has lessened to the 
gauge of space which the spirit of the impending word defines. That 
word, waits behind the centre and the left wing, as it lingers behind the 
breastwork and redoubt. Sharp, clear, and deadly in tone and 
essence it rings forth — " Fire ! " 

From redoubt to river, along the whole sweep of devouring flame, 
the forms of brave men wither as in a furnace heat. The whole front 
goes down ! For an instant the chirp of the cricket and the grass- 
hopper in the freshly cut grass, might almost be heard, then the 
groans of the suffering, then the shouts of impatient yeomen who leap 
over obstacles to pursue, until recalled to silence and to duty. 

Staggering, but reviving, grand in the glory of their manhood and 
the sublimity of their discipline, heroic in the fortitude which restores 
them to self-possession ; with a steady step in the face of fire, and 
over the bodies of the dead, the remnant dare to renew the battle. 
Again, the deadly volley, and the shattered columns, in spite of 
entreaty or command, move back to the place of starting, and the 
first shock of battle is over. 

A lifetime when it is past, is but as a moment I A moment some- 
times, is as a lifetime ! Onset, and repulse ! Three hundred lifetimes 
ended in twenty minutes. 

Putnam hastened to Bunker Hill to gather scattering parties in the 
rear, and to facilitate the passage of reinforcements across the isthmus, 
where the fire from the British shipping was maintained with destruc- 
tive energy. But the battle at last had to depend mainly upon the 
men who had toiled all night, and who had gained confidence and 
firmness by the experience of those eventful hours. Nothing could 
bring the reinforcements in time. 

The British troops rapidly re-formed their columns. Never, on 
other battle fields, did officers more gloriously evince the perfection 
of discipline, and the perfection of self-devotion. The artillery was 
pushed to the front, and much nearer to the angle made by the 
breastwork next the redoubt, and the retiring line through the open 



^-■75.] BUNKER HILL. IO7 

gap to its left. The American officers animated their men, and added 
fresh caution not to waste a single shot. The guns of Gridley and 
Callender were temporarily employed at the unprotected interval near 
the breastwork, and then withdrawn to the rear. The company of 
the latter officer became scattered and never returned to the fight. 
The remainder of the line kept up to duty, and resumed the silent 
waiting which had been so impressive before the attack began. 

The British columns again advanced, and deployed as before 
across the entire extent of the American lines. The ships of war 
redoubled their effort to clear the isthmus of advancing reinforcements. 
Shot and shell cut up the turf, and dispersed the detachments which 
had reached the summit of Bunker Hill, and the companies which 
had been posted at Charlestown to annoy the British left, were driven 
to the shelter of the redoubt. 

Charlestown had already been fired by the carcasses which fell 
through its roofs, and more than four hundred wooden houses kin- 
dling into one vast wave of smoke and flame, added impressiveness and 
terror to the scene, while a favoring breeze swept its quivering vol- 
ume away from the battle field, leaving to the American forces a dis- 
tinct and suggestive view of the returning tide of battle. 

Nearer than before, the British troops press on ! No scattering 
shots anticipate their approach this second time. It is only when a 
space of hardly five rods is left, and a swift plunge could almost fore- 
run the rifle's flash, that the word of execution impels the bullet, and 
the front rank, entire, from redoubt to river, is swept away. Again, 
again, the attempt is made to inspire the paralyzed troops, and rally 
them from retreat ; but the living tide flows back — flows back even 
to the river. 

Another twenty minutes, hardly twenty-five, and the death angel 
has gathered his battle harvest, five hundred sheaves of human hopes, 
as when the Royal George went down beneath the waters with its 
priceless values of human life. 

At the first repulse, the 38th regiment had halted under the shelter 
of a stone wall by the road which passes around the base of Breed's 
Hill, between the slope and Morton's Hill. At the second repulse, the 
same regiment supported on its left by the 5th, held a portion of its 
command in check, just under the advanced crest of the hill, and 
gradually gathered in the scattering remnants for a third assault. 

The condition of the British army is one of grave responsibilities 
and grave issues. That which had the color of a simple dispersion, and 



I08 BUNKER HILL. [1775 

punishment of half organized and half armed rebels, begins to assume 
the characteristics of a ''•forlorn Jiope^' in a most desperate struggle. 

"yi moment of the day was critical" said Burgoyne. 

" A continuous blaze of musketry incessant and destructive," says 
Stedjnan. 

The British officers pronounced it, " downright butchery to lead 
the men afresh against those lines," says Gordon. 

" Of one company not more than five, and of another not more 
than fourteen escaped," says Ramsay. 

" Whole platoons were laid upon the earth like grass by the mow 
er's scythe," says Lossing. 

" The British line totally broken, fell back with precipitation to 
the landing place," says Marshall. 

" Most of our grenadiers and light infantry, the moment they 
presented themselves, lost three-fourths, and many nine-tenths of 
their men. Some had only eight and nine men a company left, some 
only three, four, and five," is the statement of a British letter, dated 
July 5th, 1775, and cited by FrothingJiam. 

" A shower of bullets. The field of battle was covered with the 
slain," says Botta. 

" A continuous sheet of fire," says Bancroft. 

" The dead lay as thick as sheep in a fold," said Stark. 

It was just at this protracted interval, yet less than a single hour, 
that each army evinced the great qualities of their common blood. 

Clinton and Burgoyne had watched the progress of events from 
Copp's Hill, and with true gallantry and courage, the latter threw him- 
self into a boat with reinforcements, and volunteered to share the 
issue of a third advance. Four hundred marines additional to the 
1st battalion which had remained at the landing place, hurried across 
the narrow river, and these united with the 47th regiment under 
General Clinton, were ordered to flank the redoubt, and scale its face 
to the extreme left, while General Howe with the principal part of the 
grenadiers and light infantry, supported by the artillery, undertook 
the storming of the breastworks bending back from the mouth of the 
redoubt, and so commanding the entrance. 

The remnants of the 5th, 38th, 43d, and 52d regiments under 
General Pigot, were ordered to connect the two wings, and make an 
attack upon the redoubt in front. 

A demonstration was also made against the American left, more 
to occupy its attention than to force the defenses. The artillery was 



I775J BUNKER HILL. iQg 

to advance a few rods, and then swing about to the left, to sweep the 
breastwork for Howe's advance. 

The preparations were nearly complete. It only remained to bring 
the men to their duty. Knapsacks were unslung, every needless 
incumbrance was laid aside, and the troops moved forward stripped 
for fight. 

The power of discipline, the energy of wise commanders, and the 
force of every possible incentive which could animate British veterans 
of proud antecedents, and established loyalty, combined to make the 
movement as memorable as it was momentous. 

Within the American lines the preparation involved equal respon- 
sibility, but under fearful discouragement. Few of the troops had 
three rounds of ammunition left. During the second attack a part 
of the men loaded while others fired, and the expenditure of powder 
was commensurate with the results. The remaining cannon cartridges 
were economically distributed, and there was no longer any hope that 
substantial aid would come to their relief. There were less than fifty 
bayonets to the entire command, and gloomy apprehensions began 
to be entertained, but not at the expense of a firm purpose to fight 
to the last. 

During the afternoon General Ward sent forward his own regiment 
and those of Patterson and Gardner. The last named officer led three 
hundred of his men safely across the isthmus, reached Bunker Hill, 
and commenced to throw up earthworks under the direction of Gen- 
eral Putnam, but was soon ordered to the lines, and was mortally 
wounded while executing the order. Few of his men actually par- 
ticipated in the fight, the majority, after his fall, returning to Bunker 
Hill. Adjutant Febiger, a Danish officer, gathered a portion of 
Colonel Gerrish's regiment, reached the redoubt as the last action 
commenced, and did good service, but the other regiments were too 
late. 

Putnam, impressed with the critical nature of another attack, de- 
voted himself wholly to an attempt to establish another position on 
Bunker Hill for accumulation of reinforcements, and di point of resist- 
ance, in case the advanced positions should be abandoned, but he 
could accomplish nothing in the face of the activity of the shipping, 
now delivering its fire at short range. 

Within the redoubt itself, and along the slender line, all was 
resolution and attention to duty. Colonel Prescott appreciated 
thoroughly the purpose of the enemy as soon as the sudden wheel of 



no BUNKER HILL. [1775. 

the British artillery to the left, indicated their power to concentrate 
its fire upon his lines of retreat, and the reduction of the redoubt. 
The order was given to reserve every shot until the enemy should 
come within twenty yards. One single volley was delivered as the 
attack was made at the same moment upon three sides of the ill-fated 
work. For an instant the columns were checked, but in another they 
dashed forward with bayonets fixed. Those who first surmounted 
the parapet fell. Major Pitcairn was mortally wounded as he entered 
the works. Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, Majors Williams, and 
Speedlove shared his fate. A single artillery cartridge was distributed 
for a last effort, and then, intermingled with the assailants, fighting 
with clubbed guns and stones, the garrison yielded the contest, and 
each for himself, under Prescott's order, made a quick retreat. Pres- 
cott and Warren were the last to leave, and the latter, just without 
the redoubt, shot through the head, gave life to the cause he had so 
valiantly defended. 

But with the capture of the redoubt, the struggle was not ended. 
Major Jackson rallied Gardner's men on Bunker Hill, and with three 
companies of Ward's regiment and Febiger's party, an effort was made 
to cover the retreat, and a vigorous fire was for a short time maintained 
upon the advancing enemy. It saved more than half of the garrison. 

At the rail fence and clear to the river, Starks', Colt's, Reed's, and 
Chester's companies twice repulsed an attack, and by a resistance, 
prolonged as long as their powder held out, they afforded opportunity 
for the fugitives from the redoubt to make good their retreat. Then 
they also fell back, in no precipitate flight, but with a fair front, and a 
steadiness worthy of their brave resistance. 

Putnam made one more effort to halt the men at Bunker Hill, but 
without bayonets or ammunition, worn out in physical strength, and 
hopeless of a successful resistance, the retreat became general, and the 
day closed with their occupation of the field works of Prospect Hill, 
and other defenses nearest of approach. 

The British army occupied Bunker Hill, but did not pursue be- 
yond the isthmus. General Clinton advised an immediate attack 
upon Cambridge, but General Howe declined the attempt. Both 
armies were too worn out to renew battle, and Colonel Prescott's 
gallant offer to retake the position if he could have three fresh regi- 
ments, found no response from the committe of safety and council of 
war. Both armies lay on their arms all night, equally apprehensive 
of attack. 



1775] BUNKER HILL. Ill 

The losses are given as officially stated, and as adopted by Sted- 
man, and Bancroft. 

British casualties. Nineteen officers killed, and seventy wounded ; 
of rank and file, two hundred and seven killed, and seven hundred and 
fifty-eight wounded. Total casualties, 1054. 

American casualties. One hundred and forty five killed and miss- 
ing, and three hundred and four wounded. Total casualties, 449. 

Thus each army lost nearly one-third of the forces brought into 
real action. 

Thus brief is the record of a battle, which, in less than two hours 
destroyed a town, laid fifteen hundred men upon the battle field, 
equalized the relations of veterans and militia, aroused three millions 
of people to a definite struggle for National Independence, and fairly 
inaugurated the war for its accomplishment. 

Note. The prompt occupation of Prospect Hill, referred to in the text, w-as in keep- 
ing with General Putnam's purpose to resist at every point ; and the ultimate value of this 
position which he occupied, as he stated to the " Committee of Safety," "without having 
any orders from any person," was very determining in its relations to the siege. Its 
advanced flanking po3ts of Lechmere Point, Cobble Hill and Ploughed Hill, afterwards 
developed by General Washington, combined their cross fire, and thus sealed Charlestown 
Neck. A protracted halt on Bunker Hill, as appears from notes on the battle, would have 
been fatal to the whole detachment: but his occupation of Prospect Hill was eminently 
judicious. 

Note. General Washington's report to Congress states the casualties at Bunker 
Hill, by regiments. It has already appeared that the organization of the command was 
loosely and hastily effected : but the purpose was so far realized that about the required 
number of men accompanied Colonel Prescott. 

Colonel of Regiment. Killed. Wounded. Missing. 

Fryes 10 38 4 

Little 7 23 

Brewer 12 22 

Gridley 4 

Stark 15 45 

Woodbridge .. 5 

Scammon .. 2 

Bridge 17 25 

Whitcomb 5 8 2 

Ward I 6 

Gerrishe 3 5 

Reed 3 29 I 

Prescott 43 K. & M. 46 

Doolittle 6 9 

Gardner .. 7 

Patterson .. I 

Nixon 3 K. & M. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. NOTES. 

THE siege of Boston was protracted until the spring of 1776. It 
will be well, therefore, to devote a short space to the examina- 
tion of the military relations which the battle of Bunker Hill sus- 
tained to the investment of that city. It will also afford material for 
a clearer appreciation of the battle itself. 

The evacuation of Boston was made necessary by the ultimate 
American occupation of Dorchester Heights. The decision of the 
British council of war made during the month of April, in which 
Clinton, Burgoyne, and Percy concurred, and which decision affirmed 
the necessity of an immediate occupation of Dorchester Heights, was 
therefore correct ; but Howe postponed action until a peaceable occu- 
pation was impossible. 

The corresponding course of the " Committee of Safety " in that 
direction, showed a like appreciation of the strategic value of the 
position ; but their means were too limited, and the time had not 
arrived for their action. The Americans burned their harbor light- 
house quite early during the investment, and the inner harbor itself 
was unsafe, unless absolutely under the control of the British forces. 
Charlestown Heights was therefore more important for protection of 
the shipping, and afforded a better base for active operations than did 
Boston itself. It was therefore sound military policy for the British 
army to seize the positions named as soon as the first attempt was 
made to invest the city. 

The ostensible theory of the crown was to reconcile the colonies ; 
but the actual policy and the physical demonstrations repelled, and 
did not conciliate. Military acts which were done easily by force, and 
which should have remained undone, were done ! Military acts which 
were sound upon the basis of anticipated resistance were not done. 
Threats and blows toward those supposed to be incapable of defense 



THE 
BATTLE OF BREEDS HILL, 



BU]Via:R HILL. 



Compilad nnd Drairn-Tjr Col. Carrbi-ton. 



l^^i^^ British 
I 1 American 



Scale of 20 Rods. 
20 40 CO 




112* 



I775-] BUNKER HILL. 



113 



were freely expended. Operations of war, as against a competent 
and skillful adversary, were ignored. 

Inasmuch as the British authorities assumed that their force was 
adequate for any military purpose, when opposed to the Provincial 
militia, the battle of Bunker Hill in all its phases must be judged 
critically as a military demonstration. 

The occupation of Charlestown Heights, which had been pro- 
nounced necessary, was also assumed to he feasible, and without risk 
to Boston itself. It was undertaken with the purpose announced by 
General Gage in advance, that he would burn Charlestown if its citi- 
zens committed overt acts of hostility. To say nothing of the value 
of the town to a British garrison for Bunker Hill, its destruction had 
no value as a military measure. It was one of those wanton acts 
which treated men, women, and children, as parts of an openly hostile 
force, and the town itself as part of a hostile country. It expressed 
vengeance, not the spirit of negotiation. Its destruction violated 
every element which bore in the direction of restored British suprem- 
acy, and had no apology consistent with a sincere desire for the 
honorable pacification of aroused passions. 

A still greater mistake was made in the conduct of the occupation 
itself; and its mere statement shows how daring was that pre-occu- 
pation by the Americans, and how utterly the British commander 
failed to appreciate the character of the men with whom he was 
waging war. It may very well be suggested that General Howe had 
largely imbibed his impressions of the real state of affairs from General 
Gage, whose ill-judged conduct had precipitated, if it had not largely 
induced, the conflict. 

The mistake is thus stated. Irrespective of inexcusable delay 
after the movement had been pronounced necessary, the method 
adopted was only an armed expression of contempt for the opposing 
militia, entirely unbecoming any wise commander. The law of mili- 
tary action requires the use of adequate force for a proposed end, but 
does not imply or warrant a needless waste of life or property. 

General Clinton, when advised of the action of Colonel Prescott, 

promptly suggested the proper counter movement. Precisely as the 

fire of the shipping cut off reinforcements for the Americans on the 

seventeenth of April, so would a prompt occupation of the isthmus, 

under the guns of the fleet, have enabled the British commander to 

have seized Bunker Hill sunimit in the rear of the American works, and 

vould have placed those works at his mercy. A similar landing along 
8 



114 BUNKER HILL. [i775. 

the Mystic river behind the slender defenses, would have accomplished 
the same result. The advance as made, had the single element of 
supposed invincibility, as against a timid, unorganized, and ill-armed 
adversary. As against a mere mob, it would have carried moral 
weight, — would have been just the thing. Assertion of authority 
then, is not merely to vanquish force, but to restore public con- 
fidence in law. Its very momentum, when put in motion, generally 
does the work. As against a detachment out of nearly twenty thou- 
sand men who represented public sentiment itself, and would make 
no terms while arms were used to assert prerogative, it was unmilitary, 
mere waste — madness. It had physical courage, without the moral 
sanction which is so essential to highest military success. 

The movement wrongly begun, was badly managed. It was 
CUnton's own suggestion, made at the moment of his gallant enlist- 
ment in the enterprise, and when the risk seemed extra hazardous, 
that secured the degree of success actually attained. He advised 
concentration of the assault upon the redoubt, because it commanded 
the other defenses. Even this movement would have been of doubt- 
ful success, if the Americans had been supplied with ammunition — if 
two half-barrels of the Connecticut powder then at Cambridge, could 
have been poured through the gun-barrels of the earnest defenders. 

The delay of the movement was equally faulty. The force as- 
signed to the attack was, after it had landed, deemed insufficient, and 
re-inforcements were obtained. One half of the force that first landed, 
could have passed along the shore of the Mystic river unobstructed, 
and could have turned the American left long before Colonel Starks' 
command came upon the field. When the British troops were lei- 
surely dining, the question of sending re-inforcements had been only a 
little while decided in the American camp. 

The British general, with a good military training, and as will more 
fully appear hereafter, with sound strategical conceptions as to army 
operations, and of undoubted physical courage, was seldom ready at 
the right time, invariably waited for reinforcements, and never improved 
success. 

His army fortified Bunker Hill, but besides the loss or disabling 
of more than a thousand men, to demonstrate the invincibility of his 
troops, he had actually thrown away all the prestige of their past 
reputation, and enfeebled the power of his own will, as well as th' 
capacity of the troops, for offensive measures against the American 
army. 



I775-] BUNKER HILL. IIJ 

It is of interest to the reader to notice the characters who figured 
in this action, that they may see how far its lesson made an impres- 
sion upon their future miHtary operations in America. 

General Chnton proved his capacity to apprehend the situation, to 
devise and execute a purpose. General Burgoyne saw the whole bat- 
tle, and knew that Provincials would fight. Lord Percy afterward 
commanded a division at Long Island, White Plains, Brandywine, 
and in other important actions. Lord Rawdon, then a lieutenant, 
who received in his arms the body of his own captain (Harris of the 
5th infantry), as he was shot from the parapet of the redoubt, was 
afterwards to win his laurels at Camden and Hobkirk's Hill. 

If the battle be examined with regard to the original occupation 
of the heights by the American forces, some additional elements are 
exposed. It is known that after due consultation, Colonel Gridley 
deemed best to fortify Breed's Hill ; and at the same time, it was the 
intention to establish a second position upon Bunker Hill, as soon as 
re-inforcements should come upon the ground. The spirit of the 
order was the occupation of the Charlestown Heights. At that time 
the local distinctions afterwards recognized did not obtain, and Breed's 
Hill was known as a pasture, a dependent slope, if not essentially a 
part of Bunker Hill, which represents the summit of the peninsula. 
It was impossible for Prescott not to anticipate the arrival of re-inforce- 
ments in time to hold the summit also ; and in that view, he fortified 
the proper position to prevent a permanent lodgment of the British 
troops. 

If he had occupied Bunker Hill proper, the British forces if wisely 
led, would have gained Breed's Hill without loss, — would have secured 
a safe position for accumulating their forces, and an equally good 
position for a battery to play against the summit. 

It is profitless to go back and inquire whether the Americans were 
justified in their offensive movement, in view of the crude organization 
of their army, and the scanty supply of powder then in store. The 
danger that the British garrison would assail their incomplete intrench- 
ments, was in fact averted by the expression of conscious power which 
the American advance and resistance indicated. Its moral effect was 
as great as if their large numbers represented similar courage, similar 
capacity, and the military resources to back them. The committee 
of safety and the council of war, seem to have apprehended the situa- 
tion, and by the application of proper courage and that good sense 
(which largely underlies all military success) to have struck a blow 



Il6 BUNKER HILL. [i775. 

which in fact intimidated the British commander, and dissuaded him 
from any further tilts with provincial militia. 

It made a square issue between the country and the British army. 
It was no longer an issue between citizens and the state. Franklin 
stated truly, when advised of the facts, — " The king has lost his col- 
onies." English statesmen made the same assertion. 

It is true that the American army, then encamped about Boston, 
was at no point fully prepared to meet veteran troops. The hesita- 
tion of the British army to force their defenses, however, was one of 
the strongest elements of that defense ; while assumption of the 
offensive was not only the best employment of the half idle and 
impatient militia, but the best method of insuring success. 

Only disciplined men can patiently stand fire under exposure. 
Habit renders the casualties but the necessary incidents to duty. 
Raw troops, however, must be pushed forward ; and in the enthu- 
siasm of an advance, the casualties are lost sight of, and thus militia 
sometimes equal the most brilliant efforts of veterans in the line of 
daring adventure. 

Men thus pushed forward, rarely know exactly when they are 
defeated, and take a victory by surprise. If they halt, they recognize 
danger, feel its power, and defeat is certain. It was thus that the 
Americans were enabled to realize from the offensive a result beyond 
the real scope of their military training; and by the memory of Lex- 
ington they were led to rightly estimate both the offensive and defens- 
ive value of protecting earth-works, however inartificial and defective. 
The individual was thus enabled to do his best. 

The company organizations were so crude, that the men of differ- 
ent companies were intermingled, and the pressure of imperative 
necessity became the substitute for organization and discipline. They 
had few officers, these for the most part inexperienced, and each man 
acted for himself, under the general direction of Prescott and his chief 
associates. The file-firing of regular troops could not have surpassed 
the intense vigor of that actually delivered. 

The result was the best possible end of the conflict. The impa- 
tience of the two armies to have a fight was gratified ; the British army 
was practically shut up in Boston, and the American army, as they 
now realized the necessity for more thorough training, and the accu- 
mulation of military supplies, secured opportunities to perfect their 
defenses, and thereby compel the evacuation of Boston. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS. 

NO expedition during the American Revolution had less elements 
of permanent value than those which were undertaken against 
Canada during the year 1775. Great results were anticipated, but 
none were realized. The obstacles were too substantial, and failure 
was inevitable. Wonderful endurance and great physical courage 
were manifested, and these were accompanied by a prodigious amount 
of faith, but there was neither ability nor opportunity for works com- 
mensurate with the faith. Certain Acts of Parliament, known as the 
Canadian Acts, were as offensive to Canadians as other legislation was 
to Americans; but the former were not pressed to the extremity of 
armed resistance. The people themselves having no harmony of re- 
ligious or political views, were equally divided in language and race. 

Neither did the Canadians invite the aid of the colonies. The 
hypothesis that Canada would blend her destiny with that of New 
England, and would unite in resistance to the crown, certainly involved 
some identity of interest as well as of action. But the characters of 
the two people were too unlike to be unified by simple opposition to 
English legislation, and Canadians had no antecedents such as would 
prompt a hearty sympathy with New England and its controlling 
moral sentiment. Neither was there such a neighborly relation as 
admitted of prompt and adequate aid from one to the other, in 
emergencies calling for a combined effort. 

As a base of operations for a British army moving upon the col- 
onies, Canada had the single advantage of being less distant from 
England than an Atlantic base, and many supplies could be procured 
without the expense and delay of their transportation across the 
Atlantic ; but between Canada and the American colonies there was 
an actual wilderness. 

Hence a British offensive movement from Canada involved con- 



Il8 THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN. [1775. 

stant waste of men and materials, a deep line through an uninhabited 
or hostile region, and such a constant backing, as was both inconsist- 
ent with the resources of the base, and with a corresponding support 
of armies resting upon the sea coast. 

The British government was not ready for operations so extensive 
and so exhaustive of men and treasure ; neither did it realize the 
necessity for that expenditure. There were two alternatives, one 
illustrated by General Carleton's plan, viz., to hold the forts of Lake 
Champlain, as advanced, defensive positions ; and the other, that of 
Burgoyne, to strike through the country and depend upon support 
from the opposite base. 

The true defense of the colonies from such expeditions, depended 
upon the prompt seizure and occupation of the frontier posts. An 
American advance upon Canada, was not only through a country 
strategically bad, but the diversion of forces for that purpose en- 
dangered the general issue, and entrusted its interests to the guar- 
dianship of an army already insufficient to meet the pressing demands 
of the crisis. 

The occupation of New York in 1775, by an adequate British 
force, would have infinitely outweighed all possible benefit from the 
complete conquest of Canada. At the very time when Washington 
could hardly hold the British garrison of Boston in check, — when he 
had an average of but nine rounds of ammunition per man, he was 
required to spare companies, ammunition, and supplies for a venture, 
profitless at best, — with the certainty that reinforcements could not 
be supplied as fast as the enemy could draw veteran regiments from 
Great Britain and Ireland, to defend or recover Canadian soil. 

In giving a rapid outline of this first attempt of the colonies to 
enlarge the theatre of active operations, it should be noticed that the 
initiative had been taken before General Washington had been elected 
commander-in-chief, and that Congress itself precipitated the final 
movement. 

A passing thought is noted, as historic characters now come into 
view. 

The crater of passion casts out every kind of element that has 
been seething and boiling under pressure. So the impulse from Lex- 
ington and Concord brought to the surface some elements of great 
variety of value and endurance. Arnold, then living at New Haven, 
and commanding the company still known as the " Governor's Guards," 
was so heated, that he could not wait for orders or preparation ; but 



1775] THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN. II9 

after taking ammunition by force, started with forty of his men for 
Cambridge on the third day after those skirmishes occurred. He 
rushed for Ticonderoga without men, as soon as he could handle a 
commission. He was one of the heroes of Quebec. 

Lee was another man, who with hardly less ambition, eccentricity, 
and lack of moral force, had 'every volcanic symptom, — with more of 
military knowledge, and sufficient worldly wisdom to be careful that 
Congress made up the loss of income which his patriotism would 
involve. What Arnold was to the northern expedition, Lee fore-prom- 
ised for a more rational, and a truly legitimate expedition to the 
southern colonies, when they were afterwards threatened by Clinton 
and Parker. 

This digression purposely associates with two prominent early 
military movements, the two men who started forth at the outset as 
meteoric lights, challenging place as stars of the first magnitude, and 
going out in darkness. 

The two expeditions to Canada only anticipated the fate of their 
leaders. Both expeditions are associated with other and related 
operations which give character to the campaign of 1776, — the first of 
the war. 

The facts are as follows : 

Arnold arrived at Cambridge, and immediately proposed to the 
Committee of Safet}', that he should be sent to capture Ticonderoga. 
He was promptly commissioned as colonel, was supplied with money, 
powder, lead, and ten horses, and was authorized to enlist not to 
exceed four hundred men for the enterprise. Learning that a sim- 
ilar expedition had already started, he entrusted his recruiting to 
parties selected for the purpose, and joined the other enterprise at 
Castleton, its place of rendezvous. Here he found Ethan Allen in 
command, and after a vain effort to assert authority by virtue of his 
commission, he followed its destinies as a volunteer. Upon reaching 
the foot of Lake Cham plain, it was found that boats could not be 
procured for the whole force, and Allen, who took the lead with less 
than ninety men, crossed over to the fort, surprised the small gar- 
rison by night, and on the morning of the tenth day of May took 
command of Ticonderoga. Nearly two hundred cannon of all sorts 
were included among the trophies of the capture. The original 
inventory of trophies in the handwriting of Arnold, is now in the 
possession of Dr. Robert Addison Emmett, of New York. Seth 
Warner, a volunteer at the battle of Bunker Hill, and afterwards dis- 



I20 THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN. [i775- 

tinguished in active service, was associated with Allen in this enter- 
prise. On the morning of the twelfth of May, Warner embarked a 
small force in boats, and captured the fort at Crown Point, which had 
been left with only a nominal garrison to protect the public property. 

At this juncture, Arnold reasserted his right to command, but the 
colony of Massachusetts recognized the prior claims of Allen. Hav- 
ing been joined by fifty recruits whom his agents had enlisted, he 
embarked this force upon a schooner belonging to Captain Skene, 
placed cannon on board, and captured St. John's with its nominal 
garrison, and a king's sloop then lying in the river near the fort. 

Allen, who had started with one hundred and fifty men in bateaux 
upon the same errand, was outstripped by the schooner, and met 
Arnold, as he returned from the conquest. An attempt to occupy 
St. John's permanently, was given up as soon as advised that adequate 
forces had been ordered from Canada to maintain the post. 

Arnold's force gradually increased to one hundred and fifty men. 
With these he manned a small fleet, and assumed command of this 
miniature navy as well as of Crown Point. Protests against his 
assumption of so large authority, brought a committee from the Con- 
necticut Provincial Assembly ; and Massachusetts decided that the 
conquest belonged to Connecticut, so that Arnold was not rightfully in 
command. The latter colony at once forwarded four hundred men to 
garrison the two posts. Arnold discharged his men, and returned to 
Cambridge, highly offended. Before leaving Crown Point in June, he 
wrote to the Continental Congress stating that General Carleton's 
force in Canada was less than six hundred men, asking for the com- 
mand of two thousand troops for the capture of the whole of Canada, 
and assumed responsibility for success. He had formerly traded with 
citizens of Quebec, was familiar with the city, and claimed to have 
assurance of hearty support if he could have a small nucleus for fur- 
ther operations. On the second day of June, Allen made a proposi- 
tion to the Provincial Congress of New York, embodying a similar 
undertaking. 

Allen and Warner also visited Congress, and requested authority 
to raise new regiments. This authority was not given, but a recom- 
mendation was made to the Provincial Congress of New York, that 
the " Green Mountain boys," so styled, should be recognized as reg- 
ular forces, with the privilege of electing their own officers. 

A formal expedition against Montreal was also authorized, and 
Generals Schuyler and Montgomery were assigned to its command. 



1775] THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN. 121 

The force to be employed consisted of three thousand New York and 
New England troops, which were ordered to rendezvous at Ticon- 
deroga during the month of August. Allen and Warner joined this 
command. 

During the same month a committee from Congress visited Cam- 
bridge, and persuaded General Washington to send a second army to 
Canada, via the Kennebec river, having for its objective the capture 
of Quebec. Gardner, a town on the Kennebec, was made the base 
of departure; and skillful carpenters were sent forward to prepare two 
hundred bateaux for the use of the troops. 

Arnold prominently urged the movement, earnestly solicited, and 
finally received the command, with the rank of colonel in the Conti- 
nental army. Ten companies of New England troops under Lieu- 
tenant-colonels Enos and Christopher Green, and Majors Meigs and 
Bigelow, and three companies of riflemen, one from Virginia, and 
two from Pennsylvania, under the command of captain, afterwards 
General Daniel Morgan, composed this army of invasion. The aggre- 
gate force was eleven hundred men, furnished with rations for forty- 
five days.- Aaron Burr, then but nineteen years of age, accompanied 
the expedition. 



CHAPTER XX. 

EXPEDITIONS TO QUEBEC AND MONTREAL. THEIR VALUE. 

ON the seventeenth day of September, 1775, Arnold's command 
marched from Cambridge to Bedford ; sailed from Newport on 
the nineteenth, and on the twentieth, entered the Kennebec river, and 
landed at Gardner, Maine. 

A small scouting party was sent forward to blaze the trees, and 
thus mark out a route to Lake Megantic, at the source of the Chau- 
diere river; and another party was dispatched to Dead river to select 
the best point for transferring the bateaux from the Kennebec. A 
glance at the map, " Outline of the Atlantic coast," will indicate the 
route pursued. 

Morgan's corps of riflemen was assigned to the advance, and 
started on the twenty-third day of September. The rest of the com- 
mand embraced three divisions, which marched at a day's interval 
between them, each having charge of its own support. Lieutenant- 
colonel Enos with three companies commanded the rear division. 

The progress of the army was impeded by a swift current, and 
from the third day it became necessary for men to wade in deep 
water and force the boats along by main strength. Upon reaching 
Norridgewock Falls, the real difficulties of the march began. Seven 
days were consumed in carrying the boats and provisions around the 
falls, a distance of only a mile and a half. Precipitous rocks bounded 
the river on either side, and the transfer was not completed without 
injury to boats as well as provisions. The swift current of the river 
was confined within closer banks as they advanced : the eddies and 
exposed rocks rendered it necessary almost daily to drag or carry the 
boats along the shore, and on the tenth of October, when the army 
reached the divide between the Kennebec and Dead rivers, it was 
found that the force had been reduced by desertion and sickness to 
nine hundred and fifty effective men. 



1775] EXPEDITIONS TO QUEBEC AND MONTREAL. 123 

On the thirteenth of October, Arnold wrote to the commander of 
the expedition from Ticonderoga. giving his plans, and also sent an 
Indian messenger to his correspondents at Quebec, with report of 
his purpose and progress. This messenger betrayed his trust. 

The march of fifteen miles across to Dead river was one of severe 
trial. Three shallow ponds which were choked with fallen trees, 
many ravines, quagmires, and swamps, lay in the way ; the mud was 
often knee deep,^the water was up to the arm-pits ; and even when 
oxen were used for hauling, the men were required to render aid 
and extricate the loaded boats from the mire. 

October fifteenth, the boats were launched into Dead river, a com- 
paratively still stream, but broken by shallows, falls, and ripples, so 
that in a distance of eighty-three miles, the boats had to be carried 
seventeen times, with constant loss of supplies and injury to the boats. 
Men deserted daily, some froze to death, others who were sick were 
left behind in charge of one or two convalescents, and still the army 
moved on. 

October twenty-second, rain fell in torrents. 

October twenty-third, continued rain raised the river nearly eight 

feet seven boats were overturned and their contents lost. Rations 

for only twelve days remained on hand, and the army was still thirty 
miles from Lake Megantic. 

A council of war was held. Orders were sent to Lieutenant-colo- 
nels Green and Enos to forward every able bodied man for whom 
rations for fifteen days could be made up, and to send all others back 
to Norridgewock Falls. Enos, short of provisions, as he afterwards 
claimed, marched his division of three companies back to Cambridge. 

Suddenly rain changed to snow! The ponds froze over, and the 
ice had to be broken with the butts of muskets to effect a passage for 
the boats. 

The barges had been hauled one hundred and eighty miles, and 
had been carried forty miles. The men began to go without shoes. 
Clothing was in rags ; their limbs were torn by briars ; provisions 
became scarce ; their dogs were eaten for food as well as all their cat- 
tle ; fish, plants, and roots made up their chief diet. Blankets not 
worn out, were continually wet or frozen, and hemlock boughs sup- 
plied the demand for shelter and bedding. Marvellous was the 
endurance of those men ; and as if in his element, Arnold's courage 
never abated, his confidence in success never failed him. It was 
indeed a great ordeal, but a great triumph would compensate for the 



124 EXPEDITIONS TO QUEBEC AND MONTREAL. [1775. 

suffering, if it only secured the surprise of Quebec and the conquest 
of Canada. 

For three days the army rested near Mount Bigelow. A quaint 
tradition is cited by Lossing, which asserts, " that this officer whose 
name is still identified with the mountain, visited its top to behold the 
towers of Quebec." 

Lake Megantic was reached, and another inventory of supplies was 
taken. Less than three days' rations remained. Starvation seemed 
to be the inevitable destiny of the entire command. 

October twenty-seventh, Arnold started with five boats, some 
dug-out canoes, and less than seventy men, to seek the nearest French 
settlements for the purchase of provisions. The government had fur- 
nished him with a thousand dollars before his departure, so that he 
felt confident of success among the French provincials. The Chau- 
di^re river flowed with impetuous velocity, three of the boats were 
dashed in pieces upon rocks, and the party were in the utmost peril. 

October thirtieth, they reached Sertigan, seventy miles from Lake 
Megantic, were kindly received, purchased flour and cattle, and sent 
them back to the army in charge of some Canadians and Indians. In 
a few days, the troops, having lost all their boats, gathered by small 
detachments at Sertigan, and the army, reunited, was within twenty- 
five miles of Quebec. For thirty-two days of that march, no human 
being had been met with in the wilderness, and the trail made by 
the troops was obliterated as soon as made. Retreat had become 
worse than to advance. 

November ninth, the remnants of the expedition reached Point 
Levi, opposite Quebec, and there established their base of operations 
for the conquest of Canada. But the garrison of Quebec, small as it 
was, had been forewarned; the outworks were undergoing repair, and 
all boats had been removed to the other side of the river. An imme- 
diate advance just at that time, might have secured the capture of the 
city. The garrison, or such officers as had been entrusted with the 
news of Arnold's expedition, had no faith in his ability to complete 
his march, and the people were so apprehensive that resistance would 
involve the ruin of the city, that the opportunity was ripe for an im- 
mediate and bold assault. But Arnold had to build, capture, or pur- 
chase boats before he could advance to conquest. His resolution was 
still equal to the emergency, and the men were put at work. 

As if to test his endurance to the utmost, a furious tempest of 
wind, rain, and sleet set in, and the army was again in peril. He 



1775] EXPEDITIONS TO QUEBEC AND MONTREAL. 125 

mi""ht overcome the terrors of the wilderness, but the tempest was 
his master! 

The expedition to Montreal was being organized at Ticonderoga, 
vvhen the attention of the reader was invited to Arnold's journey 
through the wilderness. 

General Schuyler's ill health greatly retarded operations, and he 
soon found that the strength of the army which was hastily gathering 
at that post was only in mere numbers and the physical capacity of 
individual men. There was no discipline, no respect for officers, but 
a perfect independence of thought, judgment, and action, with no 
time for proper preparation and instruction. Unless the advance 
could be nearly simultaneous with that of Arnold, both expeditions 
would lose the objective in view. 

It is just here that some attention may be given to the theory 
which led General Washington to authorize these demonstrations 
against Canada. 

He believed that the occupation of Montreal and Quebec, while 
they were almost destitute of regular troops, and the season of the 
year precluded reinforcements from England, would afford the best 
opportunity for testing the people of Canada, and would also furnish 
them a basis for the assertion of independence, if they were ripe in sen- 
timent for such a movement. His well-conceived circular addresses 
which were largely distributed, as well as the policy which he enjoined 
upon the officers and men of both expeditions, were eminently wise 
and inspiring. He judged the Canadian opponents of British policy 
by the expression of feeling which pervaded the colonies, and assumed 
that very many would gladly avail themselves of the opportunity 
which the presence of colonial troops would afford for throwing off the 
yoke of the mother country. It seemed clear that General Carleton, 
having no fears for Quebec, would concentrate at Montreal all effect- 
ive forces for the recovery of Ticonderoga and Crown Point. Upon 
the supposition that Carleton's troops did not exceed seven or eight 
hundred regulars, and as many provincials, he decided that an army 
of three thousand men would be adequate for operations from Lake 
Champlain to Montreal. This estimate was a correct one. Popular 
demonstrations had indeed been made in the portion of Canada lying 
south from Montreal, which indicated sympathy with the American 
movement. This expression of feeling, however, was rather for the 



126 EXPEDITIONS TO QUEBEC ATSID MONTREAL. [1775. 

purpose of keeping on friendly terms with the American troops who 
threatened the border, than to indicate their readiness to take up 
arms for themselves as a people. 

Arnold had freely declared his opinions, and claimed to have pos- 
itive knowledge, that the provincials desired to act in full concert with 
the American forces. The occupation of Montreal was therefore 
regarded as both practicable and wise ; and it was near enough to the 
Sorel river and Lake Champlain to be well supported, so long as the 
British army was not augmented along the Atlantic coast. 

There was still another consideration. The navigable waters of 
the St. Lawrence exposed Montreal, which was on the north side of 
the river, to naval attack ; and the strategical character of Quebec was 
so positive, as to make the occupation of any part of Canada very 
hazardous, so long as that fortress was left for a base and rendezvous 
of British armies and fleets. Thus the capture of Quebec, as well as 
of Montreal, was necessary to any substantial control of Canada itself. 
The concurrence of Washington in the proposed expedition of Arnold, 
was therefore predicated upon the possibility of striking quickly, and 
by surprise, before a substantial defense could be interposed, and did 
not provide for the contingency of a formal siege. No artillery was 
furnished, because not within the scope of the proposed duty, and its 
transportation would have been impossible. 

Upon the assumption that Congress was rightly advised of the sen- 
timents of the Canadian people, the expedition was rightly planned. 
As a matter of history, its signal failure repressed the public avowal 
of Canadian sympathy with the American Revolution, and demon- 
strated the bad policy of attempting such distant enterprises as were 
not essential to colonial defense proper. 

Still another element entered into the calculations of the Ameri^ 
can Congress and affected its action. That body early in June, dis- 
claimed all purpose to operate against Canada. 

Bancroft states, that the invasion of Canada was not determined 
upon until " the proclamation of martial law by the British governor, 
his denunciation of the American borderers, and the incitement of 
savages to raids against New England and New York, had made that 
invasion a substantial act of self-defense." 

The letters of Washington to Schuyler, Arnold, Wooster, Mont- 
gomery, and to Congress, show clearly that he estimated the difficul- 



I775-] EXPEDITIONS TO QUEBEC AND MONTREAL. 127 

ties that attended both expeditions, and the contingencies which 
awaited their execution. 

Washington wrote earnestly on the fifth of October, " that if Carle- 
ton is not driven from St. John's, so as to be obliged to throw him- 
self into Quebec, it must fall into our hands, as it is left without a 
regular soldier, as the captain of a brig from Quebec to Boston says. 
Many of the inhabitants are most favorably disposed to the American 
cause, and that there is there the largest stock of ammunition ever 
collected in America." 

A second letter of the same date states that " Arnold expected to 
reach Quebec in twenty days from September twenty-sixth, and that 
Montgomery must keep up such appearances as to fix Carlctoii, and 
prevent the force of Canada from being turned on Arnold," but, " if 
penetration into Canada be given up, Arnold must also know it in 
time for retreat." And again, " This detachment," Arnold's, " was 
to take possession of Quebec if possible ; but at any rate to make a 
diversion in favor of General Schuyler." 

The narrative will now follow the second expedition in its course. 

In spite of bad health, Schuyler worked vigorously to hasten the 
organization of his army. 

The Green Mountain boys reorganized on the twenty-seventh of 
July, and elected the gallant Seth Warner as their lieutenant-colonel, 
in place of Ethan Allen. Boats were built with great rapidity, and 
yet, as late as the sixth day of August, the maximum force that was 
v.'illing to cross tlie border did not exceed twelve hundred men, and 
the supply of powder was insufficient even for these. Washington 
then wrote to Schuyler : "In the article of powder we are in danger 
of suffering equally with you." 

Meanwhile, Major John Brown, a discreet and brave officer, had 
been sent to Canada to learn the condition and disposition of the 
British troops. On his return about the middle of August, he reported 
the number of regulars in Canada to be about seven hundred men ; 
that nearly half this number was at St. John's, and that the Canadian 
militia were disaffected towards their officers, who had been purposely 
selected from the old French nobility of the frontier. 

On the seventeenth day of August, Montgomery arrived at 
Ticonderoga. 

Upon receiving a letter from Washington that " not a moment of 
time was to be lost," Schuyler suspended his negotiations with cer- 



128 EXPEDITIONS TO QUEBEC AND MONTREAL [1775. 

tain Indian tribes whom he had met in council at Albany, and joined 
the army. The first objective point of importance was the reduction 
of St. John's, already well garrisoned, and greatly strengthened since 
the visit of Arnold in the spring. 

Montgomery started with a little more than a thousand men, but 
was so retarded by storms as not to reach Isle La Motte until Sep- 
tember third. On the fourth Schuyler joined him, and they advanced 
to Isle Aux Noix. On the sixth they embarked for St. John's. The 
enterprise, undertaken without artillery, failed, as did a second attempt 
of a similar force on the tenth. 

Schuyler's ill health compelled his return to Ticonderoga, but with 
infinite resolution, system, and patience, he pushed forward supplies to 
Montgomery, who assumed the active command with a force aug- 
mented to about two thousand men. Week after week passed by, 
and little progress was made in the reduction of the fort. The diffi- 
culties of his position were mainly those of discipline. All wanted a 
voice, and few recognized the fact that in a regiment of five hundred 
men, there could not be five hundred colonels. The single question 
of the location of a battery was made to hinge upon what the men, 
not the commander, deemed best. An unauthorized and unfortunate 
enterprise occurred just at this moment, still more to embarrass the 
army. 

Ethan Allen was endeavoring to recruit Canadian volunteers near 
Chambly. After partial success, and without consulting Montgom- 
ery, he resolved to surprise Montreal as he had captured Ticonderoga. 
He failed, was taken prisoner by General Prescott and sent to Eng- 
land. His hasty enterprise, undertaken with inadequate forces, com- 
promised many Canadians, and repelled others who had been ready 
to join his command. 

On the twenty-sixth of October, General Washington wrote to 
Schuyler the following consolatory words : " Colonel Allen's misfor- 
tune will, I hope, teach a lesson of prudence and subordination to 
others who may be too ambitious to outshine their general officers, 
and regardless of order and duty, rush into enterprises which have 
unfavorable effects on the public, and are destructive to themselves." 

Justice to Allen requires the statement that Major Brown had 
pledged his aid in the enterprise, and to furnish two hundred men 
Brown had assured him that Montreal was practically defenseless 
Allen crossed the St. Lawrence from Longuenil, September twenty- 
fourth, upon the supposition that Brown had crossed the river higher 



1775] EXPEDITIONS TO QUEBEC AND MONTREAL. 1 29 

up, and was waiting for his arrival. Major Brown must have known 
that such an enterprise needed Montgomery's sanction, and was 
unwise ; but his failure to support Allen, compelled the latter to fight 
against overwhelming numbers. General Carleton also collected 
nearly a thousand Provincial militia, but their desertion was so imme- 
diate that he was soon left with only a nominal command of less than 
three hundred men. At this juncture he wrote to General Howe 
that " the Americans had poisoned the minds of the Canadians." 

On the eighteenth day of October, Major Brown, aided by many 
citizens, then organized as a battalion under James Livingston of New 
York, who had resided at Chambly, and was very popular with the 
people, captured the fort at that place, sent the prisoners to Connecti- 
cut, and turned over to the American army the trophies, which 
included nineteen cannon, and most valuable of all, one hundred and 
twenty barrels (six tons) of powder. 

General Wooster arrived just at this time, approved of Mont- 
gomery's general plans, aided him to advance his batteries to a com- 
manding position, and thereby made the investment of St. John's 
complete. The garrison had no hope except from Canada. 

General Carleton had by this time again collected a mixed and 
unreliable force of nearly eight hundred men, and made an attempt 
to cross the St. Lawrence at Montreal, but was thrust back by War- 
ner's Green Mountain boys, and a portion of the second New York 
regiment. On the third day of November the garrison of St. John's, 
consisting of nearly five hundred regulars, more than half the British 
regular force then in Canada, and a hundred Canadians, became 
prisoners of war, among them Andre, — and this siege of fifty days 
ended. 

As an evidence of the peculiar state of the regiments at that time, 
it is to be noticed that one of them mutinied because Montgomery 
allowed the prisoners to retain their extra suit of clothing, instead of 
treating it as plunder. 

On the twelfth of November, Montgomery took possession of 
Montreal, and the expedition of the left zone of operations attained 
its objective. 

The British flotilla was also captured, together with General Pres- 
cott, the captor of Allen, but General Carleton escaped under very 
favoring circumstances, and thus was enabled to participate in tlie 
defense of Quebec. 
9 



CHAPTER XXL 

THE ASSAULT UPON QUEBEC. 

" 'TT^HE drums beat to arms, and the city was thoroughly aroused.'' 

I It was hardly daylight on the morning of November ninth, 
1775, when Arnold's men appeared upon the river shore, just opposite 
the citadel of Quebec. His daring spirit was moved to an immediate 
advance. That instant of time was one of those which contain vast 
possibilities, and Arnold was a man peculiarly prompt to seize oppor- 
tunities for daring adventure. 

He resolved to cross at all hazards, with numbers however small, 
if canoes or any other floating fabric could be applied to the move- 
ment of men ; but it was just then, as already stated, that the Storm 
King held mastery by day and by night for three successive days, and 
even Arnold must obey and wait. 

During this interval there occurred substantial changes in the 
character and condition of the garrison of Quebec, 

Colonel Allen McLean, who had been operating with General 
Carleton in the western zone, had abandoned it upon the successful 
advancement of Montgomery's army to Montreal, and retreated in 
safety to Quebec, reaching that fortress with one hundred and seventy 
" Royal Scotch," on the twelfth day of November. 

On the fifth, one hundred carpenters arrived from Newfound- 
land. The deputy-governor, Cramahe, had in fact commenced to 
repair the defenses as early as September, and the arrival of Arnold 
was at the last moment of possible success. Two vessels of war, the 
Lizard and the Hunter, lay in the harbor, and the crews of merchant 
vessels were also impressed into the service. 

Arnold, unapprised of the reinforcement of the garrison, took 
advantage of his enforced delay, and secured thirty birch-bark canoes 
for the use of his troops. On the night of the thirteenth of Novem- 



I775J THE ASSAULT UPON QUEBEC. I31 

ber, by making three trips for the purpose, he crossed the river with 
seven hundred and fifty men. Daylight revealed his movements, and 
prevented his return to Point Levi for the last detachment of one 
hundred and fifty men, and all the ladders which had been prepared 
for storming purposes. 

The landing had been made at Wolfe's cave, a deep notch i^i the 
bank up the river just below Sillery, and indelibly associated with the 
name of that brave soldier who captured Quebec in 1759. Was the 
name suggestive ? That was indeed a little army which Arnold was 
about to hurl against the parapets, where Wolfe " died happf in victory. 

They climbed the steep ascent undisturbed, took their position 
about half a mile in front of St. Ursula bastion, between the gates of 
St. John and St. Louis, aroused the garrison by loud huzzahs, and sent 
forward a formal flag with the demand for immediate surrender. 

At that very moment, the army of Arnold was but poorly pre- 
pared for meeting an enemy. Over one hundred of their muskets 
were unserviceable, many cartridges were ruined, and much powder 
was spoiled. A careful inspection disclosed the fact that the sound 
ammunition only averaged five rounds per man. 

The flag elicited no reply; and a second flag, accompanied by 
threats of terrible things unless the surrender should be immediate 
and complete, was fired upon. 

It was entirely unnecessary for McLean's Royal Scotch to make a 
sortie upon the American army. Their steadfast hold upon the city, 
not only repressed any efforts of disaffected citizens to open the gates 
to that arm}' ; but was a warning to Arnold that his victory must be 
won by storming the fortress itself. 

It is historically true, that Morgan, Febiger and other officers of 
equal merit, painfully realized the contrast with those expectations 
which had inspired their departure from Cambridge, and had sustained 
them in the perils of the wilderness. 

Arnold now learned, for the first time, of the re-inforcements 
which had reached Quebec ; and was also advised, by personal 
acquaintances, that a sortie from the city would soon be made, and 
that general Carleton had escaped from Montreal and was on his way 
to the city. 

For two or three days the formalities of a blockading force were 
kept up, guards were posted upon the roads leading to Lorette, St. 
Foy and Three Rivers, thus cutting off all country supplies of wood 
or meat which were intended for the garrison ; but on the nineteenth 



132 THE ASSAULT UPON QUEBEC. [1775. 

Arnold retired to Point Aux Trembles, to await the arrival of 
Montgomery. 

On that very day, Washington sent a communication to Congress, 
in which the following words occur: 

" It is likely that General Carleton will, with what force he can 
collect, after the surrender of the rest of Canada, throw himself into 
Quebec, and there make his last effort." 

Carleton was at Aux Trembles in the morning, barely missed 
Arnold, and entered Quebec during the afternoon of the nineteenth. 
His first official act was to require all persons who refused to aid 
in defense of the city, to leave it within four days. Upon removal 
of these dangerous elements, his available force consisted of at least 
three hundred regulars, three hundred and thirty Anglo-Canadian 
militia, five hundred and forty-three French Canadians, four hundred 
and eighty-five seamen and marines, and one hundred and twenty 
artificers, fit for duty. 

The sole dependence of Arnold was now upon Montgomery, and 
he sent Captain Ogden with an urgent request, that he would come 
to his aid with artillery and at least two thousand men. 

That officer had indeed occupied Montreal, which was an open 
cit3% but by reason of the expiration of terms of enlistments and the 
unwillingness of the troops to serve any longer, so far from home, he 
was left with only about eight hundred men as the month of Novem- 
ber drew to its close. Even the Green Mountain boys had returned 
home, greatly to his disgust. The loss in numbers, however, did not 
represent the real state of his army. Officers and men were alike 
fractious, dictatorial and self-willed. They claimed the right to do 
just as they pleased, and to obey such orders only as their judgment 
approved. 

General Schuyler's letter books, and orderly book, and the letters 
of Montgomery written during that campaign, are very extraordinary 
exhibitions of the characters of the two men, of their appreciation of 
the issues of the day, and of their wise and unremitting efforts to 
secure an exact and thorough army discipline. The aspiration for 
national liberty had evoked a sense of personal liberty, which was 
eminently destructive of all real liberty. 

The American army at Montreal, at Ticonderoga and at Cam- 
bridge, was so intractable and so short-sighted, as very nearly to fulfill 
Milton's apothegm, " License they mean, when they cry Liberty ! " 

The effort of Montgomery to provide humanely for prisoners of 



.775] THE ASSAULT UPON QUEBEC. 1 33 

war, was not only treated with contempt, but was made the excuse 
for insubordination and outrage. On one occasion he tendered his 
resignation ; but canceled it when due apology was made. Schuyler 
had trouble in the same direction, and officers refused to take clothing 
and lood to suffering prisoners until he made his authority stringent. 

Another difficulty grew out of the refusal of troops to serve under 
generals from other colonies than their own. Colonies had their dis- 
tinctive military codes, which limited the obligation of the men. To 
serve in the continental army involved some abnegation of self, and 
the surrender of the individual will to that of authority. 

Montgomery could not, at that time, go to the support of Arnold, 
without leaving a competent officer in command. It seemed as if the 
armies at Ticonderoga and Montreal were about to melt away entire- 
ly ; and both generals were ready to retire from the service, when 
Washington addressed them a letter, quite characteristic of himself 
and of the crisis. 

" God knows," wrote Washington, " there is not a difficulty that 
you both (Schuyler and Montgomery) complain of, which I have not, 
in an eminent degree, experienced, that I am not every day experi- 
encing ; but we must bear up against them and make the best of 
mankind as they are, since we cannot have them as we wish. Let 
me therefore conjure you and Mr. Montgomery to lay aside such 
thoughts (of leaving the service) ; thoughts injurious to yourselves and 
extremely so to your country, which calls aloud for gentlemen of your 
abilities." 

Late in November, General Wooster arrived at Montreal. With 
a patriotism characteristic of the man, and especially complimented 
by Washington, this officer waived his rank in the Connecticut army, 
and accepted continental assignment, which was below that of Mont- 
gomery by one day's date of commission. He took command of the 
Montreal district, and Montgomery with about three hundred men 
and a few pieces of artillery, started for the relief of Arnold and the 
capture of Quebec. A sufficient supply of clothing which had been 
captured upon the first occupation of the city, was taken on board the 
vessels for Arnold's command. 

Montgomery landed at Point Aux Trembles, on or about the first 
day of December, and swelled the combined army to a force of nearly 
one thousand men. This included the detachment originally left at 
Point Levi, which had subsequently crossed the river with safety. 

The strongest fortress in America defended by two hundred heavy 



134 THE ASSAULT UPON QUEBEC. [1775. 

cannon, and a garrison of nearly or quite two thousand effective men, 
was to be subjected to the assaults of this handful of men. 

The advance was made during a driving snow storm, through drifts 
ten feet high ; and yet the army was quartered in houses of the suburb 
of St. Roche, on the Charles river, before dark, December fifth. 

December sixth, Montgomery demanded the surrender of the city. 
This communication eliciting no response, another was sent. This 
contained exaggerated statements of his force, and threatened dire 
results, if resistance should be prolonged. No reply was made. 

December ninth, a battery of six small guns and two mortars was 
established about seven hundred yards from St. John's gate. The 
ground was too hard for earthworks, and snow with water poured 
over it and frozen, supplied the filling, which with gabions and fas- 
cines was made to answer for cover to the battery. The small caliber 
of the guns rendered them useless, and on the sixteenth of December 
it was determined to resort to assault, as the only means of gaining 
access to Quebec. 

At this juncture, three of Arnold's captains refused to serve under 
him any longer. Their time of service would expire at the end of the 
month, and there was every indication that open mutiny would re- 
place the harmony which had thus far prevailed. An earnest appeal 
from Montgomery restored them to duty. 

The weather had become so cold that men could not handle their 
arms except for a few minutes at a time, and the month was drawing 
to its end. On Christmas, the officers held a council, and resolved to 
make an assault as soon as the weather would permit. The next 
night was one of intense cold even for that latitude, and great suffer- 
ing ensued. Succeeding moderation of temperature induced imme- 
diate preparation for offensive action ; but it was not until the night 
of the thirtieth, when but one day of legal service remained for a 
large portion of the troops,that the preparations were complete. 

The army was divided into four divisions. The Canadians about 
two hundred in number, under Colonel Livingston, of Chambly, and 
Major Brown with his own companies, were to demonstrate in front 
of St, John and St. Louis gates, and at Cape Diamond bastion, while 
Montgomery and Arnold were to make bona fide attacks through the 
lower town. The signal for these attacks was to be a discharge of 
rockets at Cape Diamond, 

Montgomery commanded the New York militia and a part of the 
Eastern. He was to advance from the south and west, directly 



1775] THE ASSAULT UPON QUEBEC. I35 

under Cape Diamond, while Arnold from the north and west, with 
Lamb's artillery, Morgan's riflemen, and other troops, was expected to 
pass along the head of the stone jetty, and meet Montgomery at 
Mountain street, when an attempt would be made upon the city by 
the rear, at Prescott gate, 

Montgomery moved his men to Wolfe's cave, and at least two 
miles up the river, and then followed the narrow passage which is left 
between Cape Diamond and the river. His course was almost directly 
north-east, and in the face of drifting snow, which soon changed to fine 
hail, rendering it impossible to recognize his men at the distance of a 
few feet, and equally impossible to communicate orders except by 
messengers. Men's breathing soon covered the face with ice, the 
single trail became hard and slippery after a few had led the way, and 
the march was along a ledge where a single careless step would pre- 
cipitate a man to an abyss on the right. 

Unexpectedly, and half an hour too soon, the rocket signal put 
the garrison on the alert. Lanterns flashed on the parapet, and 
Montgomery with a mere handful of men had just passed under Cape 
Diamond, while his principal force, with the ladders, still struggled 
through the snow half a mile in the rear. It was a moment of intense 
interest ! 

The first barrier of timber and pickets extending from the slate rock 
upon which Cape Diamond rested, to the river precipice, had been left 
to its intrinsic excellence as an obstruction, and was without a guard. 

Hatchets and saws made quick work ! Sending a messenger to 
the rear to hurry men forward, Montgomery with his aid, McPherson, 
and parts of Cheeseman's and Mott's companies, pushed through this 
barrier, and advanced upon the second, which consisted of a log-house, 
loop-holed for muskets, and defended by two pieces of cannon. 

The pathway now descended and approached the foot of King's 
Yard. Only three or four men could march abreast, yet Montgomery, 
as soon as sixty men were collected, advanced to force the defenses. 
A master of a transport with a few seamen, and not more than thirty- 
eight militia, manned the block-house. The forlorn hope was already 
within a hundred feet of the barrier. Montgomery shouted, " Men 
of New York, you will not fear to follow where your general leads : 
push on, Quebec is ours ! " Suddenly the lighted matches sparkled 
like fire-flies in the gloom ; a whirl of grape-shot swept the narrow 
pathway, and Montgomery, McPherson, Cheeseman, and ten others 
were instantly killed I 



136 THE ASSAULT UPON QUEBEC. [1775. 

In vain, Captain Mott urged the survivors to renew the advance. 
A continuous fire from the loop-holes of the block-house and repeated 
discharges of grape, were followed by the descent of fire-balls from the 
heights to light up the scene of conflict, and as daylight began to 
appear, the whole detachment could be seen in full retreat. 

Montgomery lay stiff and cold in death ; but his memory, honored 
by the garrison which rescued his body, and buried it with the honors 
of war, is ever a theme of praise ; and that perpetual tribute is the 
spontaneous offering of foes and friends alike. 

Arnold moved on his errand with equal promptness, and under 
equally trying risks. The ice had gorged, and had been forced upon 
the shore by the heavy tides, so that his men also were confined to a 
narrow passage along the rock. The north-east storm beat with un- 
broken force upon their left flank, and the eddies of wind which curled 
about the cliff, lifted great drifts in their path. 

Arnold led the advance with merely five picked men. Morgan's 
riflemen and Lamb's artillery followed, the latter dragging a field- 
piece on a sled. It was soon abandoned. 

Already they had passed the stone jetty ; had passed the Palacfe 
gate, and were pushing forward into the narrow street of Sault au 
Matelot, where, under a projecting rock in a narrow passage, a barrier 
had been established and was strongly supported. 

The advance had been so far made, and as yet no report of fire- 
arms gave notice that Colonel Livingston had made his demonstration 
before St. John's gate, to occupy the garrison, and divert their atten- 
tion from the assault upon the Lower town. But in its place, the 
beat of drums, and the roar of cannon, gave warning of the hot wel- 
come which awaited the assailants. 

A storm of grape and musketry received Arnold's advance ! At 
the first discharge his right knee was shattered by a musket ball, and 
he was carried back to St. Roche. Morgan and Lamb passed on, 
planted ladders, and the first barrier was gained. 

At the end of the same street, and not far from the anticipated 
union with Montgomery's column, a second barrier, supported by a 
well defended stone house, was in the way. Once it was surmounted 
by Morgan, but only to learn that a strong force was posted in its 
rear. Seizing houses for cover, and answering back the fire from other 
houses across the street, the fight continued for nearly four hours. 
Ignorant of the localities, but determined not to recede, Morgan 
fought on. Lamb was wounded, nearly sixty of his men had fallen, 



I775-] THE ASSAULT UPON QUEBEC. 1 37 

and still the expected command of Dearborn did not come to his sup- 
port. A well conceived sortie from the Palace gate had been made 
under General Carleton's orders, and Dearborn's company, divided 
into two detachments, were already prisoners of war. 

Hopeless of success, unsupported, destitute of ammunition, and 
without bayonets, apprised of the fate of Montgomery and his com- 
panions, Morgan also surrendered his command, and entered Quebec, 
but as a prisoner of war. Thus failed the second movement as the 
first failed ; and four hundred and twenty-six officers and men, one 
half of the entire American force, were with him prisoners of war. 

They were captives, but let it be recorded to the perpetual mem- 
ory of General Carleton, that these captives were treated with soldierly 
respect. When his officers complained of his kindness toward rebels, 
his answer was characteristic, and more and more to be valued as 
England and America enjoy the fruits of comity and peace. 

" Since we have tried in vain to make them acknowledge us as 
brothers, let us at least send them away disposed to regard us as first 
cousins." 

Arnold withdrew to a distance of three miles from the town, 
intrenched himself as well as he could, confined his operations to 
shutting the city off from supplies, and his share in the campaign of 
1775 closed. 

The invasion of Canada came to a full stop. The invasion of the 
colonies was to follow its abandonment. Of the brave men who took 
part in those exciting events, many had a future history ; and their 
after conduct will bear testimony of the value of the experience which 
so thoroughly tested their patriotism and valor. 

Morgan was General Morgan, of Morgan's riflemen. 

Meigs and Febiger are associated with the forlorn hope of Stony 
Point. 

Greene defended Red Bank on the Delaware. 

Thayer was heroic at Fort Mifflin. 

Lamb fought at Montgomery and Yorktown. 

Oswald is identified with Monmouth. 

Porterfield was killed in the battle of Camden. 

Many ol these began their training at Bunker Hill, and, through 
the wiiderness and before Quebec, continued their education in the 
art 01 war. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

CAMPAIGN OF 1775.— BRIEF MENTION. 

THE campaign of 1775 was characterized by greater offensive 
activity on the part of the colonists than of the British troops. 
The defensive returned the offensive. The occupation of Charlestown 
Heights was supplemented by the invasion of Canada. The impulse 
which surrounded Boston with the militia of New England necessarily 
made that camp the head-quarters of the American army, and the 
capture of Boston its primary objective. 

At all other sea-port cities there was disaffection of the people, 
and partial assertion of force ; but there were no British garrisons to 
support the British governors, and few occasions for open rupture. 
The policy of Congress still comprehended the possibility of an 
amicable settlement of the difficulties with the mother country. 

The fact is also to be noticed, that the militia from Northern New 
Erigland were peculiarly concerned in the defense of their own border, 
because the forts upon Lake Champlain, its navigable waters, and the 
presence of British troops in Canada, afforded the only then existing 
opportunity for British offensive movements. There was no external 
force which could be employed to disturb the investment of Boston, 
and none which was disposable for occupation of Atlantic ports. It 
was therefore a wise strategic movement, to take the control of Lake 
Champlain, to hold its forts for defensive purposes, and so demon- 
strate, in force, as to ward off British attack. An adequate army of 
invasion from Canada, if in secure possession of Ticonderoga and 
Crown Point, supported by armed vessels, would be a constraint upon 
New York, the Green Mountain country, and New Hampshire. 

These elements dictated the military movements of 1775. The 
few minor operations of the year, including that at Great Bridge, 
Virginia, in December, were only significant of an increasing sentiment 
of hostility to any compromise. On the other hand, wherever there 










^^ 



1 o^* 







l^l-l-^-^s. 




1775] CAMPAIGN OF 1 775. I39 

were no expressions of force, and no committal of overt-acts, there was 
evidence afforded through many citizens, that they wished to avoid 
such acts and constrain some settlement with Great Britain. 

It needed just such a protracted suspension, or withholding of 
open hostilities, over the country at large ; and just such a display of 
force about Boston, to prepare the colonies for real war, and at the 
same time develop an army and test both officers and men. The 
army was organized at Cambridge. Washington was so doubtful of 
some of the appointments of general officers that he withheld for a 
time the delivery of commissions which had been entrusted to his 
charge when he left Philadelphia to assume command. 

The character and composition of the army, or, the armies, — the 
various and distinctive systems adopted, and the jealousies and 
antagonisms which prevailed, have been illustrated by incidents of the 
northern campaign. 

They were infinitely provoking and provokingly constant ! Gen- 
eral Schuyler affrmed that " if Job had been a general, in his situation, 
his memory had not been so famous for patience." Washington 
assured him that " he," Schuyler, " only had, upon a very limited 
scale, a sample of his own perpetual trials." 

No sooner had the troops assembled than a set repugnance was 
manifested to all proper instruction in the details of Minor Tactics. 
" They had been trained to have their own way too long," said Wash- 
ington. Guard duty was odious ! Superiority by virtue of rank, was 
denied ! The abuse of places of trust, and their prostitution for selfish 
ends, was constant. Profanity, vulgarity, and all the vices of an 
undisciplined mass became frightful, as soon as any immediate danger 
passed by. 

The good, the faithful and the pure were hardly less restless under 
the new restraint ; and few appreciated the vital value of some 
absolutely supreme control. The public moneys and public property 
were held to belong to everybody, because Congress represented every- 
body. Commands were considered despotic orders, and exact details 
were only another form for slavery. 

Such was the state of things when Washington assumed command 
at Cambridge. 

Even officers of high position, whether graded above or below 
their own expectations, found time to indulge in petty neglect of plain 
instructions, and in turn to usurp authority, in defiance of discipline 
and the paramount interests of the colonies at large. 



I40 CAMPAIGN OF 1775. [1775. 

Wasliington gave the army work in perfecting earth-works, build- 
ing redoubts, and poHcing the camp, — enforced the observance of the 
Sabbath, court-martialed officers, and tried soldiers for swearing, 
gambling, fraud, and lewdness ; introduced a thorough system of 
guard and picket duty, and made the nights subservient to proper 
rest, in the place of dissipation and revelry. Good order, discipline, 
was the first purpose of the commander-in-chief. 

These statements fall far below a fair review of the situation as 
given by Washington himself. 

The logistics of war became his next care. The army was deficient 
in every element of supply. The men who held their colonial obliga- 
tions to be supreme, came and went, just as their engagements would 
permit, and the comfort of their families required. Desertion was 
considered as nothing, or at the worst but venial, and there were 
times when the American army before Boston, through nine miles of 
investment, was less in numbers than the British garrison within the 
city. 

The deficiency in the number of men was not so conspicuous as 
in the matter of powder, lead, arms, tents, horses, carts, tools, and 
medical stores. Ordinary provisions were abundant. The country 
about Boston fed the men generously ; but it was difficult to convince 
the same men that all provisions must go into a general commis- 
sariat, and be issued to all alike, and that stores must be accumulated, 
and neither expended lavishly, nor sold at a bargain as soon as a sur- 
plus was on hand. 

Such items as cordage, iron, horse-shoes, lumber, fire-wood, and 
every possible article that could be used by an army for field or 
frontier service, were included in his inventory of essential stores ; and 
in his own expenditure of the most trivial item of public property, he 
kept a detailed and exact account. 

Of the single article of powder, he once stated that, " his chief 
supply was furnished by the enemy," as during one period, the armed 
vessels which patrolled the coast captured more powder than Con- 
gress had been able to furnish in several months. 

On the twenty-ninth of November, Captain John Manly, who was 
the most prominent officer of this hastily improvised navy, captured a 
British store-ship containing a large mortar, several brass cannon, two 
thousand muskets, one hundred thousand flints, thirty thousand shot, 
thirty tons of musket shot, eleven mortar beds, and all necessary 
implements for artillery and intrenching service. 



I775J CAMPAIGN OF 1775. I4I 

The strategical value of the operations during 1775, was limited 
by defective discipline, bad logistics, and the changeable character of 
the army. Schuyler and Montgomery, who deservedly shared his 
confidence and commanded his respect, performed their work fully 
up to the limit of the means furnished. 

The feeble results realized from the invasion of Canada, do not 
impair the proposition, that its direction from head-quarters showed 
a clear conception of the strategical relations of the points involved, 
and the proper methods by which to attain success. 

The deep line of operations which left no track through the 
wilderness would have been a memorable folly as an independent 
movement. When it attempted to strike the capital of Canada, which 
was at the same time the base of operations and of supplies for the 
entire British provinces, at a time when its last garrison was far 
advanced towards Lake Champlain, it had method. 

When taken in connection with the American movement on the 
left, which had for its purpose the destruction or capture of those 
advanced troops, it became a bold enterprise of a thoroughly scientific 
and well related value. 

When it had the supposed assurance that the people of Canada 
were ready, and only needed the nucleus for organization and prac- 
tical revolution against a common adversary, it combined sound strat- 
egy with the wisest military policy. 

When it contemplated the fact that the principal military stores 
of North America were at Quebec, and that its possession substan- 
tially controlled the St. Lawrence, overawed all Canada, and com- 
pelled England to employ a great army to recover its possession, if 
recoverable at all, it becomes memorable for its conception and its 
illustration of the science of war. 

The following is an extract from Washington's Orderly book: 
" November fifth. As the commander-in-chief has been apprised of a 
design formed for the observance of that ridiculous and childish cus- 
tom of burning the effigy of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his 
surprise that there should be officers and soldiers in this army, so void 
of common sense as not to see the impropriety of such a step at this 
juncture, at a time when we are soliciting, and have really obtained, 
the friendship and alliance of the people of Canada, whom we ought 
to consider as brethren embarked in the same cause, the defense of 
the general liberty of America. At such a juncture and in such cir- 
cumstances to be insulting their religion, is so monstrous as not to be 



142 CAMPAIGN OF 1 775. [1775, 

suffered or excused ; indeed, instead of offering the most remote insult 
it is our duty to address public thanks to those our brethren, as to 
them we are so much indebted for every late happy success over the 
common enemy in Canada." 

The closing events of tJie year were full of discouraging features. 

As early as September there was no money, and but little clothing. 
Economy in the use of powder was more than balanced by its poor 
quality and its waste through bad management and inadequate store- 
houses for its protection. Fire-wood was scarce, and the troops whose 
time was soon to expire were unwilling to work in advance for the 
comfort of those who were to succeed them. A large number of the 
Connecticut troops had been enlisted for six months, and their time 
would expire November thirteenth. 

Washington was determined to make a decisive movement while 
the army was at its best estate. The British had advanced their 
works beyond Charlestown Neck, upon the main land. As a counter- 
movement, with the hope that it would be resisted, Washington put 
his army in readiness to resist an attack, and commenced the thorough 
fortification of Ploughed Hill and Cobble Hill, and also increased the 
strength of works at Lechmere Point, hoping to elicit an attack from 
the enemy. 

The British troops, however, made no counter demonstration, and 
after twenty-four hours of preparation, these redoubts were capable 
of defense against the whole British army. He also entertained a 
purpose to assault Boston itself and to burn the city if it seemed to 
be a military necessity. Lee opposed the movement as impossible, 
and the council of war concurred in the postponement of such an 
enterprise. 

Meanwhile the citizens of sea-coast towns began to be anxious for 
their own safety. A British armed transport cannonaded Stonington. 
and other vessels threatened New London and Norwich. All these 
towns begged Washington to send them troops. Governor Trumbull, 
of Connecticut, whose extraordinary comprehension of the military 
as well as the civil issues of the day, made him a firm supporter of 
Washington's policy, ever reliable and ever just, inquired his opinion 
upon this very matter. 

Washington wrote : " The most important operations of the cam- 
paign cannot be made to depend upon the piratical expeditions of two 
or three men-of-war privateers." 

Gage had been ordered home, and left October tenth. General 



1775.] CAMPAIGN OF 1 775. I43 

Howe assumed command over all the Atlantic Colonies from Nova 
Scotia to West Florida inclusive. 

Offensive proclamations, bad in policy, fruitless for good, and 
involving the immediate crushing out of all sympathy from those who 
were still loyal to the crown, marked his advent to command. He 
threatened with military execution any who should leave the city 
without his written consent, enjoined all the citizens to arm, and 
placed Washington under the necessity of taking active measures 
against all " who were suffered to stalk at large, doing all the mis- 
chief in their power." Up to this time the officers of the crown and 
neutral citizens had not been interfered with by the American author- 
ities. Acting under his orders. Admiral Graves determined to give 
greater efficiency to his small fleet, and Lieutenant Mowatt, under 
general instructions to burn all towns that fitted out or sheltered 
privateers, began his work by the destruction of Falmouth, now Port- 
land, Maine. 

An American privateer, soon after sent by Washington to the St. 
Lawrence river, to cut off two brigantines which had left England 
with supplies for Quebec, plundered St. John Island. Washington 
sent back the citizen-prisoners, and restored all their private effects, 
denouncing the movement as a violation of the principles of all civ- 
ilized warfare. 

Crowded by these multiplying demands upon his resources, and 
equally conscious that there would soon be neither army nor supplies, 
equal to the emergency, he made an independent appeal to Con- 
gress, covering the whole ground of his complaints and his requisi- 
tions. 

He wanted money, — a thoroughly organized commissariat, — a 
permanent artillery establishment, — more adequate control over all 
troops, — a longer term of enlistment, — an enlargement of the rules 
and articles of war, and power to enforce his will. He also asked for 
a separate organization of the Navy, and that it be placed upon a 
sound footing, as to men and vessels. 

Congress acted upon these recommendations. On the fourth of 
October, a committee, consisting of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas 
Lynch, of South Carolina, and Benjamin Harrison, of Virginia, started 
for Washington's camp, with three hundred thousand dollars in Con- 
tinental money, and after a patient consideration of his views, advised 
the adoption of his recommendations by Congress. A council of the 
New England Governors was called to meet this committee. 



144 CAMPAIGN OF 1775. [1775 

At this interview, a new organization of the army was determined 
upon, fixing the force to be employed before Boston at twenty-three, 
thousand, three hundred and seventy-two, officers and men. 

Washington submitted to this committee his plan for attacking 
Boston. It was approved, and Congress soon after authorized him to 
burn the city if necessary to the prosecution of military operations 
against the British army. 

October thirteenth ; Congress authorized the building and equip- 
ment of one cruiser of ten and one of fourteen guns. 

October thirtieth ; one vessel of twenty and one of twenty-six 
guns was authorized. A naval committee was appointed, composed 
of such men as Silas Deane, John Langdon, Christopher Gadsden, 
Stephen Hopkins, Joseph Hewes, Richard Henry Lee, and John 
Adams. 

November twenty-eighth ; a code of regulations was adopted for 
the navy, and on the thirteenth of December the construction of 
thirteen vessels of war was authorized. As some of these vessels are 
necessarily noticed in the course of the narrative, their names, them- 
selves memorial of the crisis, are given. 

"Ordered to be built at Philadelphia, the Washington, 32 guns; 
Randolph, 32; Effingham, 28, and Delaware, 24; at Portsmouth, the 
Raleigh, 32; at Boston, the Hancock, 32, and the Boston, 28; at 
Providence, the Warren, 32. and the Providence, 28 ; at Annapolis, 
the Virginia, 28 ; at New London, the Trumbull, 28 ; at Poughkeepsie, 
the Congress, 28, and the Montgomery, 24 guns. 

Among the officers commissioned December twenty-second, 
Nicholas Biddle appears in the list of captains, and John Paul Jones 
among the lieutenants. 

As the year approached its close, the British leveled their advanced 
works on Charlestown Neck, and concentrated their right wing in a 
strong redoubt upon Bunker Hill, while their left wing at Boston 
Neck was more thoroughly fortified against attack. 

Congress now intimated to Washington that it might be well to 
" attack on the first favorable occasion and before the arrival of rein- 
forcements." 

Washington repHed that he "must keep his powder for closer 
work than cannon distance." 

November nineteenth, Henry Knox was commissioned as Colonel 
vice Gridley,— too old for active service ; two lieutenant-colonels and 
two majors, as well as twelve companies of artillery, were authorized, 



1775-1 CAMPAIGN OF 1 775. I45 

and thus the American artillery, as well as the navy, was put upon a 
substantial basis, with Knox as its chief. 

The year closed, with the prospect that the army would be imme- 
diately replaced by raw troops ; and in spite of the advances made 
toward a substantial paper organization, the period was one of the 
most perilous of the war. 

Note. The fate of the American navy is worthy of record. 

*Washington, 32, destroyed by the British in the Delaware T778 

Randolph, 32, blown up in action with the Yarmouth, 64 ly^S 

*Effingham, 28, destroyed by the British in the Delaware 1778 

Delaware, 24, captured by the British in the Delaware lyyy 

Raleigh, 32, captured by the Experiment 50, and Unicorn, 22 lyyS 

Hancock, 32, taken by Rainbow, 44, and Victor, 16 i777 

Boston, 28, captured at Charleston 1780 

Warren, 32, burned in the Penobscot by the Americans I77g 

Providence, 28, captured at Charleston 1 7S0 

*Virginia, 28, taken by British fleet near Cape Henry 177S 

Trumbull, 28, taken by Isis, 32, and General Monk, 18 1781 

* Congress, 28, burned in the Hudson to avoid capture 1777 

*Montgomery, 24, " " " " " " " i-j^-j 

Andrea Doria, 14, burned in the Delaware to avoid capture 1777 

The Alliance, 32, (afterwards built and identified with La Fayette, was sold after the 

war, and converted into an Indiaman. 

The Confederacy, 32, was taken, off Virginia, by a ship of the line 1781 

Queen of France, 18, captured at Charleston 1780 

* Wever -went to sea. (Reference is made to Cooper's naval history, for tlie fate of the other vessels, 
not incidentally mentioned in connection with the British occupation of the Atlantic ports.) 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

CAMPAIGN OF 1776.— BOSTON EVACUATED.— CONCURRENT EVENTS. 

THE year 1776 enlarged the theatre of operations. The demon- 
stration before Boston attained its objective ; and the city was 
evacuated by the British troops. At all other points of active service 
the Americans were driven to the defensive; and it was not until the 
month of December, of that year, that the offensive return, at Trenton, 
imparted a new character to the struggle and interrupted the general 
success of the royal forces. 

On the thirtieth day of December, Admiral Shuldham brought 
reinforcements to General Hov/e and at the same time took command 
of all naval forces, vice Graves, relieved. 

The troops in garrison were kept under the most rigid discipline. 
General Howe exacted the most formal observance of all military 
ceremony, and issued orders, sharply reprimanding some soldiers, who 
had been careless in minute details of personal neatness and outfit. 
An order of January thirteenth particularly calls those to account, 
"whose hair was not smooth, but badly powdered ; who had no frills 
to their shirts, whose linen was dirty, whose leggins hung in a slovenly 
manner about their knees, and other unsoldier-like neglects," — 
" which must be immediately remedied." 

Amusements were also provided for the entertainment of the 
troops, a theatre was opened, and a sense of perfect security pervaded 
all ranks. 

The condition and style of doing things, in the adversary army, 
was quite in contrast with all this nursing process, so good in itself — • 
so inefficient for real work at the time. 

For many weeks it had been a matter of the greatest concern with 
Washington, how to keep up appearances of military preparation, 
while all things were in extreme confusion. He had to demonstrate, 
as if urgent to attack the city at the first moment, while the extra- 



I776.J CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. I47 

ordinary operation was going on, of disbanding one army and creating 
another in its place, directly in front of an enemy. 

Enough has been said to indicate the difficulties of that operation. 

Washington, as well as Howe, had ideas respecting military dis- 
cipline, and he, also, issued orders upon the habits, personal bearing 
and want of neatness among the men, closing on one occasion thus 
emphatically, " Cards and games of chance are prohibited. At this 
time of public distress, men may find enough to do, in the service of 
their God and country, without abandoning themselves to vice and 
immorality." " It may not be amiss for the troops to know, that 
if any man in action shall presume to skulk, hide himself, or retreat 
from the enemy without the orders of his commanding officer, he will 
be instantly shot down as an example of cowardice ; cozvards Jiaving 
too frequently disconcerted the best formed troops by their dastardly 
behavior^ 

Meanwhile, General Greene kept his little army well in hand. On 
the fourth of January, he wrote, from Prospect Hill, — "The night 
after the old troops went off I could not have mustered seven hun- 
dred men, notwithstanding the returns of the new enlisted troops 
amounted to nineteen hundred and upward. I am strong enough to 
defend myself against all the force in Boston. Our situation has been 
critical. Had the enemy been fully acquainted with our situation, I 
cannot pretend to say what might have been the consequences." 

Washington wrote to Congress January first, leaving the last word 
blank, lest the letter should miscarry. " It is not perhaps in the 
power of history to furnish a case like ours ; to maintain a post within 
musket shot of the enemy, within that distance of twenty old Brit- 
ish regiments, without ." 

The winter was memorable for its mildness. 

" Give me powder or ice,'' was Washington's ejaculation, when 
writing to a friend. It was his intention as soon as the river froze 
over to march directly to Boston, across the ice. The presence of 
ships of war prevented any attempt by the use of small boats while 
the river remained open. There had been " one single freeze, and 
some pretty strong ice," and he suddenly proposed to the council that 
the opportunity be seized at once to cross over and take or burn 
Boston. On the twenty-sixth of February, he wrote to Joseph Reed, 
saying, — " Behold, though we have been waiting all the year for this 
favorable event, the enterprise was thought too hazardous. I did not 
think so, and I am sure yet that the enterprise, if it had been under- 



I4S CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. [1776. 

taken with resolution, must have succeeded ; ivitJioiit it any zvould fail, 
and I am preparing to take post on Dorchester Heights, to try if the 
enemy will be so kind as to come out to us." 

" What I have said respecting the determination in council, and 
the possessing of Dorchester Heights, is spoken wider the roseT 

A great improvement had been made in the ordnance department, 
through the great business capacity of Colonel Knox. He made a 
journey to Fort George during the preceding December, and by the 
latter part of February, had hauled, upon sleds over the snow, more 
than fifty pieces of artillery from that fort to Cambridge. This had 
enabled him to make the armament at Lechmere Point very formida- 
ble, and by the addition of several half-moon batteries between that 
point and Roxbury, it was possible to concentrate nearly every mortar 
which the army had upon the city itself. 

During the first week in January, Washington was advised that 
General Clinton, relying upon the new troops which arrived with 
Admiral Shuldham, was to be detailed with an independent command 
for some remote expedition, or at least beyond the waters of New 
England. 

Believing that New York must be the immediate objective of such 
a movement, he ordered General Lee, then upon detached service in 
Connecticut, " to take such volunteers as he could quickly assemble 
on his march, and put the city of New York in the best posture of 
defense, which the season and circumstances would admit of." Lee 
had already written to the commander-in-chief, urging " the imme- 
diate occupation of that city, the suppression or expulsion of certain 
tories from Long Island," and that " not to crush the serpents before 
their rattles are grown would be ruinous." 

The control over disaffected citizens on Long Island had already 
been desired by the New York convention, and Lord Sterling, then at 
Elizabethtown with his regiment, was ready to cooperate with any 
other forces that might be available for the purpose, as " none could 
be spared from Cambridge." 

Lee entered New York with two regiments from Connecticut, 
amounting to nearly fifteen hundred men, on the same day that Clin- 
ton cast anchor near Sandy Hook. Notwithstanding the assurances 
of that officer that he called to consult with Governor Tryon, and 
that he was imperatively ordered to the south, fortifications were 
immediately begun at New York and Brooklyn Heights. This was 
timely, and a matter of military obligation. 



1776.] CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. I49 

It must be noted in this connection, that General Lee had secured 
troops from Connecticut, and placed them upon a continental basis of 
service, when he was instructed only to assemble volunteers for a 
special duty, and thereby deliberately exceeded his authority. One 
of these regiments had been disbanded by order of Congress ; and 
its reassembling as a regiment of the continental army, although 
countenanced by the authorities of the colony, was a breach of military 
subordination on the part of Lee. Neither did he hesitate as to the 
style of language in which he spoke of Congress itself. He was 
equally unjust to the leading men of the New York convention. The 
exact condition of Manhattan Island must be stated in this connec- 
tion, as some writers persistently claim that New York failed in duty 
at this juncture. The British fleet controlled the adjoining waters. It 
could destroy the city; but the city had neither the numbers nor the 
guns to make any substantial resistance. There was a general under- 
standing that each party should attend to its own business ; that the 
officers of the crown would keep within the technical line of their 
duty, and that the citizens would not interfere. Congress had no 
troops to spare, and there was a general suspension of public arming, 
except to keep up the armies already in the field. This was of itself 
a great undertaking. The precipitation upon Congress, or upon special 
localities, of exacting issues, was therefore unwise. The disaffected 
citizens of New York were not forgotten ; neither were the patriotic 
leaders who responded promptly in 1775. 

The movement of Clinton was a fortunate opportunity for bringing 
this condition of armed neutrality to an end, and it was accomplished 
peaceably and at the right time. 

It is to be admitted, however, that Lee asserted a very high prerog- 
ative in this his first independent command, and that it called forth 
criticism from Washington as well as Congress. A committee of that 
body met him at New York and accommodated the occupation to the 
judgment of all well disposed citizens. His denunciation of the 
" accursed Provincial Congress of New York " was characteristic of 
Lee's temperament, his erratic career, and his subordination of all 
things to the wishes of Charles Lee, but it was neither politic nor 
becoming a great commander. 

On New Years day, Norfolk, Virginia, was bombarded and burned 
under the direction of Lord Dunmore. This was one of a series of 
acts perpetrated by the colonial governors, which induced a second 
series of southern demonstrations in behalf of independence, very 



150 CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. [177& 

similar to those which attended their attempt to disarm the people 
during the spring months of 1775- 

Sparks embodies the matter thus clearly. " These expeditions 
were undertaken at the suggestion of the colonial governors and zealous 
partisans, whose hopes and wishes betrayed them into a deplorable 
ignorance of the state of the country and character of the people." 
Lord Dartmouth himself planned this expedition, and sent instructions 
to Lord Howe under date of October twenty-second, 1775, directing 
him, " to gain possession of some respectable post to the southward, 
from which to make sudden and unexpected attacks upon sea-coast 
towns during open winter." Clinton had orders " to destroy any 
towns " that refused submission. Lord Dunmore protested against 
sending seven regiments from Ireland to North Carolina upon the 
solicitation of Governor Martin of that colony, while he was living in 
the very hot bed of rebellion itself, and almost defenseless. 

Lord Howe himself advised that New York should be the first 
objective of attack, and the permanent base of future army movements. 

After these essential diversions to contemporaneous matters, which 
had their quickening element to inspire Washington to offensive 
measures, the narrative takes up the closing scenes of the siege of 
Boston. 

The month of February was drawing near its close. Washington 
determined to delay no longer to test his strength against the gar- 
rison of Boston. He collected forty-five bateaux, each capable of 
transporting eighty men, and built two floating batteries of great 
strength and light draught of water. Fascines, gabions, carts, bales 
of hay, intrenching tools, two thousand bandages for wounds, and all 
other contingent supplies that might be needed were gathered, and 
placed under the guard of picked men. 

General Thomas Mifflin, quartermaster-general, who had originally 
accompanied him from Philadelphia as an aid-de-camp, was thoroughly 
aroused to the importance of the impending movement. He shared 
the confidence of Washington. 

The movement was carried through with that inflexibility of pur- 
pose which marked Washington's career during crises of imminent 
peril. It seemed as if the very fact of his submission of a military 
movement to a council, awakened questions as to its feasibility. 
yomini, in connection with his statement, that Napoleon never seemed 
to provide for a retreat, adds, that " when Napoleon was present no 
one thought of such a provision." 



1776.] CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. I51 

The great acts of Washington's career were performed when he 
was clothed with ample authority by Congress, or the emergency 
forced him to make his own will supreme. This was the reason which 
led Cono-ress at last to emancipate him from the constraint of councils. 
If he doubted, others doubted ; if he was persistent, he inspired the 
courage and nerve which secured results. He was in such a mood 
on the first day of March, 1775. He had a plan, a secret, and he 
kept it secret until the hour for execution. 

Just after sunset of that New England spring evening, from Lech- 
mere Point, past Cobble Hill, and through the long range of encir- 
cling batteries, clear to Roxbury lines on the right, every mortar and 
cannon which could take the range opened their fire upon the quiet 
city. It was a test of the location, range, and power of the adversary's 
fire. That fire was returned with spirit, and when morning dawned 
the American camp resumed its quiet, the men were kept within their 
lines, and only behind the head-quarters at Cambridge was there 
ceaseless activity, where Putnam, Thomas, Knox, and Mifflin were 
"putting the house in order for moving day." 

On the night of the third of March, the bombardment was 
renewed, with equal vigor, and as promptly answered ; and again the 
camp was still and patient. One shot had reached Prospect Hill ; 
but no appreciable damage accrued to the American works. Some 
houses had been penetrated in Boston, and six soldiers were wounded 
in one guard-barrack. Places of safety began to be hunted out ; and 
artificial obstructions were arranged for a cover from the random shot 
and shell ; but no special parade was ordered, no detail was moved 
forth, to silence the offensive batteries, no scheme was put on foot, to 
break up the investment. No excited commander tendered his ser- 
vices, to lead a forlorn hope against Cambridge, to seize and try for 
treason the arch-commander of the defiant Colonists. Bunker Hill 
was in sight ! Red uniforms were conspicuous in the sun-light ; but 
these had no promptings to an assault upon earth-works, which 
screened twenty thousand men and were the work of months. 

The fourth of March closed, and the night was bright, mild and 
hazy. The moon was at its full. It was a good night for rest. 
Surely the Americans cannot afford such waste of powder ! They 
impoverish themselves : but Boston is safe ! 

But on the night of the fourth of March, and through all its hours, 
from " candle-lighting time," to the clear light of another day, the same 
incessant thunder rolled along, over camps and city ; the same quick 



152 CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. [1776. 

flashes showed that fire was all along the line, and still, both camps 
and city dragged through the night, waiting for the day-light to test 
the work of the night, as day-light had done before. 

Two strong redoubts capped Dorchester Heights ! 

" If the Americans retain possession of the heights," said Admiral 
Shuldham, " I cannot keep a ship in the harbor." Howe wrote to 
Lord Dartmouth, " It must have been the employment of at least 
twelve thousand men." " They were raised," wrote an officer, " with 
an expedition equal to that of the Genii, belonging to Aladdin's 
lamp." 

" The rebels have done more in one night than my whole army 
would have done in a month," said Lord Howe. 

" Perhaps," said Heath, " there never was as much work done in 
so short a space." 

The works were very simple of construction. The earth was frozen 
to the depth of eighteen inches. But hurdles, fascines, and bundles 
of branches, and abatis, cut from apple orchards, had been supplied 
in great quantities, and large bales of compressed hay, which were 
proof against any ordinary cannon ball, had also been furnished, so 
that the heaping up and arranging of these, under the direction of 
Rufus Putnam, according to a plan thoroughly digested, was but easy 
work for a class of soldiers peculiarly handy with the material em- 
ployed. On the tops, there were barrels, filled with stones, having 
for their ultimate purpose — to be rolled down hill, and thus discon- 
cert the advance of any regulars from Boston. The manner of doing 
this work was also very simple. 

Eight hundred soldiers marched very quietly out of Roxbury, 
after dark, on the previous evening, and placed themselves, a part 
between Boston and Dorchester Heights, and a part at the east end 
of the peninsula, opposite Castle Island. Men with tools, and a work- 
ing party of twelve hundred soldiers under General Thomas, followed 
the advance. Then three hundred carts, loaded with the proper 
material, followed. 

To thwart curiosity, and prevent impertinent interference with 
the work which Washington had ordered to be done, some of these 
large bundles of hay had been placed in a long row along the most 
exposed part of the way, so that carts passed to and fro all night be- 
hind this cover, and the moon itself was unable to betray the secret, 
even if some sentry at Boston Neck had accidentally allowed his 
eyes to turn away from the rival exhibition of shot and shell practice. 



1776.] CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. 1 53 

There was a north wind that night which took all the sound of the 
rolling carts into the country below Boston. This was also very 
matter of fact, but of real service. 

During this time, Generals Greene and Sullivan were standing in 
front of four thousand men near Fort Number Two, as indicated on the 
map, with bateaux and floating batteries manned for crossing to Bos- 
ton, if the garrison should move out and interfere with the order of 
the day. The incessant firing all night seems to have been but play- 
ing a trick upon the garrison. It was of course z. feint. 

The silent movement of the two thousand men, and of the three 
hundred carts was not as at Bunker Hill, a forlorn hope affair. It was 
not hurried nor expensive of strength and patience. Reliefs came 
and went, and the system, order, and success that marked each hour, 
could not have been better realized by daylight. An eminent his- 
torian explains this movement in a {&\v words, and tells it all. 

** One unexpected combination concerted with faultless ability, and 
suddenly executed, had in a few hours made General Howe's position 
at Boston untenable." This was " Grand Strategy." 

General Howe immediately detailed Lord Percy with twenty-four 
hundred men to dislodge the Americans from Dorchester Heights. 
The command moved by boats to Castle Island first, for the purpose 
of making a night attack. During the afternoon a storm came up 
from the south, increasing to a gale ; rain poured in torrents all night ; 
some of the boats were driven on shore and the project was abandoned. 

By the tenth of March the Americans had fortified Nook's Hill, 
and this drove the British troops from Boston Neck. Eight hundred 
shot and shell were thrown into the city during that night. 

On the morning of the seventeenth of March, the British troops 
embarked in one hundred and twenty crowded transports for Halifdx, 
the total force including seamen of the fleet being not quite eleven 
thousand men. It is proper to say that historians differ as to the 
damage done to private property by the retiring garrison. Distinc- 
tions of property are always lost sight of in war. This evil attaches 
to its skirts and follows its track. General Howe issued an order for- 
bidding plunder, and he is entitled to this credit. Washington did 
not give him time to watch its execution, but took charge of the city 
himself as soon as possible. 

Five thousand troops under Ward entered as the last boats left. 

General Putnam was placed in command, and on the twentieth 
Washington entered at the head of the whole army. 



154 CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. [1776. 

t 

For ten days the British fleet was weather bound in Nantasket 
Roads, then bore away for Hahfax. Valuable stores were left be- 
hind, including two hundred and fifty cannon, half of them serviceable, 
and these were still farther increased by the capture of store-vessels 
which entered the harbor without knowledge of the evacuation of the 
city. 

The siege of Boston was at an end. Less than thirty lives had 
been lost during the investment, and New England was freed from 
the presence of British troops. 

Note. A manuscript narrative of the experience of Mr. Edward Stow during the 
siege of Boston, besides portrait sketches of the British commanders, relates his attending 
upon a performance of the play, " Boston Besieged," at Faneuil Hall, in company with his 
mother, upon the invitation of Lieutenant Haley of the British Fourth regiment. During 
the play, composed by General Burgoyne, and on the night of March 3d, " one cannon ball 
from the American batteries whizzed directly over the roof," "' another struck Dr. Cooper's 
Meeting House." It was the first demonstration that the city was in real danger. Mr. 
Stow was then but a boy, but states, that he remembers perfectly well that " General Bur- 
goyne suddenly came upon the stage, and ordered the officers to their posts," and that him- 
self and mother were indebted to the kindness of a sentry, who met them near the Liberty 
tree, for a safe escort home. Several of the officers were his mother's guests, Colonel Cleve- 
land among the number. On one occasion he accompanied one of the officers to the Neck 
where the British artillery made a test of the Ro.xbury lines. The author acknowledges the 
courtesy of Mr. A. S. Barnes for the perusal of the manuscript, which abounds with inci- 
dents of interest. 



^n3^uled.an^^Jh3nnir(hl.(ar/v^i»v. 







CHAPTER XXIV. 

WASHINGTON AT NEW YORK.— APRIL TO JULY, 1776. 

THE British troops evacuated Boston on the seventeenth of 
March, 1776, but did not leave Nantasket Roads until ten days 
afterward. 

Washington had reason to believe that General Howe would make 
New York his immediate objective. His movement to Halifax was 
such a grave military error, that its apology must be derived from the 
fact that his fleet transported more than a thousand loyalists, and a 
large quantity of their personal effects. 

The British government, however, had not held on to Boston so 
long, without some suspicion that it was attaching a false value to that 
occupation. It was treating a post as vitally important, which had 
no strategic value whatever in determining the result of the war. As 
soon as it became impossible to break up the investment, the base 
should have been changed to one which had real offensive value. 
Failure in an immaterial issue only gave to that failure a gravity far 
beyond the importance of the issue itself, impaired their own strength, 
and developed an adversary army of permanent resistance. 

During the fall of 1775, Lord Dartmouth, as appears from the 
British archives, expressly advised that Boston should be evacuated, 
and that Newport or New York, or both, should be occupied by 
strong armies well supported by a competent naval force. This was 
not a random suggestion, but it appears from one of his letters, that 
he considered Newport as the key to an absolute control of all the 
New England colonies. This matter has been adverted to under the 
topic, '' Base of operations," and is again mentioned in connection 
with the events which immediately followed the enforced evacuation 
of Boston. 

Within twenty-four hours after General Howe embarked his com- 
mand, Washington began to plan for the future. 



156 WASHINGTON AT NEW YORK. [1776. 

On the eighteenth day of March, and before the main army had 
entered Boston, General Heath was ordered to march to New York 
with five regiments of infantry, and a portion of the field artillery. 

On the twenty-seventh, when the British fleet actually put to sea 
and left the coast, he ordered the whole army to the south, with the 
exception of five regiments, which were left as a garrison command, 
under Major General Ward, On the same day General Sullivan 
marched. Another division marched on the first of April ; and on 
the fourth of April, General Spencer left, with the last brigade. 
General Washington started for New York that evening. 

Owing to the badness of the roads, which threatened to delay the 
troops, and the great number of small inlets from Long Island Sound 
which had to be crossed, or avoided by a march through Connecticut, 
Washington requested Governor Trumbull to reinforce the New York 
garrison with two thousand men from western Connecticut, and also 
requested the commanding officer at New York to apply to the Pro- 
vincial convention, or Committee of Safety of New Jersey, to furnish 
a thousand men for the same purpose. As an apology for this addi- 
tional expense, he wrote to Congress — ■" Past experience, and the 
lines in Boston and on Boston Neck, point out the propriety and sug- 
gest the necessity of keeping our enemies from gaining possession 
and making a lodgment. 

Before leaving Cambridge, he had perfected his arrangements for 
the movement of the army, so that v^essels should meet the regiments 
at Norwich, Connecticut, and thereby save one hundred and thirty- 
seven miles of land travel ; had written to General Lee, who had been 
assigned to the command of Canada and then to the Southern Depart- 
ment, that he must not take south with him the guard which had 
been detailed from regiments, to escort him to New York: had pre- 
pared detailed instructions for Colonel Mififiin, Quarter-master Gen- 
eral, under which he was to procure barracks, forage, quarters and 
supplies for the army, by the time of its arrival at New York : had 
ordered two companies of artillery, with shot and shell, to report to 
General Thomas, then ordered to Canada, vice Lee, ordered south : 
had so digested an ithicrary for the marching divisions and brigades 
that they would not crowd one upon another during their march : 
had instructed Arnold, recently promoted, that shot and shell might 
be made at a furnace not far from Montreal: had proposed a new 
and more complete system for keeping the pay accounts of officers 
and men : had corresponded with the governors of all the New Eng- 



1776.] WASHINGTON AT NEW YORK. 1 57 

land States, upon the necessities and possible contingencies of the 
crisis, and had provided for the anticipated incursions of small bodies 
of the enemy upon the exposed towns of the New England coast. 

Such were some of the branches of Logistics which underwent 
review, and left him free to go to his new head-quarters, with all ante- 
cedent details in process of execution. One of his last acts was to 
inquire into an alleged instance of an officer carrying on trade in sup- 
plies while holding a commission in the army. 

All the acts referred to are particularly noteworthy at this early 
stage of the army organization, before field operations had been prop- 
erly commenced. 

Washington's journey to New York was made via Providence, 
Norwich and New London, for the purpose of inspecting and expe- 
diting the embarkation of the troops. His first act, after arrival at 
his destination, was to detail four battalions as a reinforcement to 
the army in Canada, sending them by water to Albany, " to ease the 
men of fatigue." He also sent five hundred barrels of provisions to 
Schuyler's command. Brigadier General Thompson, with Colonels 
Greaton, Patterson, Bond and Poor, accompanied the division, which 
sailed from New York April twenty-second. 

An immediate communication to the New York Committee of 
Safety laid down the law that further correspondence with the enemy 
must cease : that " we must consider ourselves in a state of peace, or 
war, with Great Britain," and enforced his views, with emphasis. 

Late at night on the twenty-fifth, Washington received an order 
from Congress to send six battalions to Canada, in addition to four 
already sent, and requested him to report, at once, whether addi- 
tional regiments could be spared for that purpose. General Sullivan 
accompanied this division, and with him were such men as Stark, 
Reed, Wayne and Irvine. Washington declared that " there was 
danger by this division of forces, that neither army,— that sent to 
Canada, and that kept at New York, — would be sufficient, because 
Great Britain would both attempt to relieve Canada and capture New 
York, both being of the greatest importance to them " if they have 
men.'' 

On the twenty-eighth of April, the whole army at New York 
amounted to ten thousand two hundred and thirty-five men, of 
whom eight thousand three hundred and one were present, and fit 
for duty. 

The Orderly Book at this time rebukes certain disorderly conduct 



158 WASHINGTON AT NEW YORK. [1776. 

of the soldiers, in these memorable words. " Men are not to carve 
out remedies for themselves. If they are injured in any respect, there 
are legal modes to obtain relief, and just complaints will always be 
attended to and redressed." 

Rhode Island called for troops to protect her ports, and two regi- 
ments of her militia were taken into continental pay. 

During the month of May, advices were received that Great Britain 
had made a contract with various European States, for certain mili- 
tary contingents : — that the sentiment in Canada had been changed 
to that of antipathy, and that continual disaster was attending all 
military operations in that Department. On the twenty fourth of 
May Washington wrote to Schuyler : " We expect a very bloody 
summer at New York and Canada, as it is there, I presume, that the 
great efforts of the enemy will be aimed, and I am sorry to say that 
we are not either in men or arms prepared for it." 

General Putnam was placed in command at New York, and Gen- 
eral Greene took charge of the defenses on Brooklyn Heights and of 
their completion. 

June first, Congress resolved that six thousand additional militia 
should be employed from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connec- 
ticut, and New York, to reinforce the army in Canada, and that two 
thousand Indians should be hired for the same field of service. 

Three commissioners, Messrs. Franklin, Chase, and Carroll, had been 
appointed by Congress February fifteenth, with instructions to visit 
Canada, and learn the actual condition of the army and the temper 
of the people. These gentlemen accompanied by Rev. John Carroll, 
afterward archbishop of Baltimore, arrived at Montreal on the twenty- 
ninth day of April, and reported that " negligence, mismanagement, 
and a combination of unlucky incidents had produced a confusion and 
disorder that it was now too late to remedy." The ill health of Dr. 
Franklin compelled his immediate return ; the others remained until 
the army began to evacuate Canada. 

To the proposition to hire Indians, General Schuyler replied that, 
" if this number, two thousand, can be prevented from joining the 
enemy it is more than can be expected. They have but one maxim 
in their alliances with the whites, which is to adhere to the strongest 
side, where they are paid most liberally and run the least risk." 

The commissioners wrote from Montreal, giving a most terrific 
picture of the condition of the troops, " who were thoroughly dis- 
organized, half-starved, and visited by the scourge of the small pox." 



1776.] WASHINGTON AT NEW YORK. 1 59 

General Wooster was recalled as too old, inefficient, and ill-suited to 
the command. 

General Thomas died of the small pox on the second day of June, 
and was succeeded in command by General Sullivan. This officer had 
already written letters to General Washington, " clearly indicating 
that he was aiming at the command of Canada," but he failed to advise 
the commander-in-chief of the actual extremity to which the army 
had been reduced. These letters, although marked personal, were 
forwarded to Congress with the following comment. 

" He (Sullivan) is active, spirited and zealously attached to the 
cause. He has his wants and his foibles. The latter are manifested 
in his little tincture of vanity which now and then leads him into 
embarrassments. His wants are common to us all. He wants 
experience to move on a large scale ; for the limited and contracted 
knowledge which any of us have in military matters stands in very 
little stead, and is quickly overbalanced by sound judgment and some 
acquaintance with men and books, especially when accompanied by 
an enterprising genius, which I must do General Sullivan the justice 
to say, I think he possesses. Congress will therefore determine upon 
the propriety of continuing him in Canada, or sending another as they 
shall see fit." 

Gates was immediately sent to take command of the troops of the 
United Colonies in Canada, with power to appoint his own staff and 
a department staff, and a large discretion over officers as well as troops, 
and over their appointment, discipline, and removal for cause. To 
General Schuyler, still in command of the northern department below 
Canada, was entrusted the responsibility of making a treaty with the 
Six Nations, and the earliest possible completion of Fort Stanwix. 

On the third of June, Congress resolved to reinforce the army at 
New York by thirteen thousand eight hundred militia from Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware, and Maryland. 

By the twenty-ninth of June, forty British ships were reported as 
having been sighted off Sandy Hook. The crisis which had already 
visited Canada was on the wing for New York. 

Washington in connection with Putnam had previously laid out 
the fortifications which bore his name, had critically inspected the 
progress of all defenses about New York, and entered so closely into 
calculations of their value as to lay down the following instructions for 
officers and men. 

" Not to throw away fire ; fire first with ball and shot," — " that the 



l6o WASHINGTON AT NEW YORK. [1776. 

brigadiers should order a circle to be marked round the several re- 
doubts, by which their ofificers are to be directed in giving orders for 
the first discharge." " Small brush to be set up to mark the line more 
distinctly, and make it more familiar to the men, who are by no means 
to be ordered to fire before the enemy arrive at the circle." 

Such are some of the leading military features of Washington's 
career while at New York during the early summer of 1776. 

The colony felt confidence in his capacity and judgment, and with 
the exception of certain special localities, the people were meeting his 
demand for means and supplies with as much promptness and cheer- 
fulness as could have been expected. 

Throughout the colonies there was a rapid gravitation toward a 
permanent union and the assertion of national independence. 

That Declaration was made on the Fourth of July, 1776. It was 
a birthday of momentous peril. From Canada to the Carolinas, the 
armies and fleets of Great Britain were about to strike together, and 
still the people faced the responsibility squarely. 

Within a icw weeks at furthest, the blow would reach New York, 
and yet, before it fell, the other fields of operation were to be heard 
from, and their impressions were to give character to the struggle. 

The narrative will now take up the history of operations within 
the two extreme zones of active war, and then resume the history of 
the expedition against New York. 

Note. It has not been deemed necessary to enter into the details of General I.ee's 
brief administration while at New York, en rotite, to the South. The visit of Sir H&nry 
Clinton, ostensibly to visit Governor Tryon, inspired fears that he would bombard the city. 
Lee threatened summary destruction to the prisoners and property of loyalists, if a gun were 
fired. He was energetic, self-willed and efficient ; but forever bore with impatience the 
yoke of responsibility to Congress for his official acts. 



CHAPTER XXV. 

AMERICAN ARMY DRIVEN FROM CANADA. 

FIVE thousand men perished by disease or the casualties of 
battle during the last two months of the campaign for the con- 
quest of Canada, which commenced in 1775 and ended early in the 
summer of 1776. 

Arnold's expedition reached Quebec. Montgomery also reached 
Quebec. At the end of their assault, the remnant of both commands 
was less than five hundred effective men. Up to March first, 1776, 
including all reinforcements, the number never exceeded seven hun- 
dred able-bodied men, present at one time for duty. 

During the month of March the army increased to about seven- 
teen hundred effective men. The detached guards, upon Orleans 
Island, at Point Levi and on both sides of the river, left but a small 
force to protect earth-works, to say nothing of the absurdity of any 
assault upon Quebec. 

Small-pox broke out in the camp. Many enlistments were to 
expire April fifteenth, and no rational reason could be urged upon 
the dispirited men to induce their reenlistment. 

Supplies became scarce, and continental money had no value. 

Arnold made proclamation on the fourth of March, that paper money 

then put in circulation, would be redeemed in four months, and that 

those who refused to take it should be treated as enemies. Already 

every promise of sympathy from the people had vanished, and when 

General Wooster arrived to take command on the first of April, he 

found that the army itself was fast melting away. That there had 

been much kind feeling toward the colonies on the part of very many 

Canadians is manifest from the success which attended the efforts of 

Colonels Livingston and Allen and Major Brown to organize Canadian 

battalions as soon as Montgomery appeared in force before St. John. 

Ramsey writing in 1793, particularly notices the fact that the Ameri- 
II 



1 62 .AMERICAN ARMY DRIVEN FROM CANADA. [1776. 

can express messengers freely passed between Montreal and Quebec 
without molestation, every where receiving kind treatment ; and that 
a Mr. Price actually advanced five thousand dollars in specie to relieve 
the embarrassments of the officers who could not purchase supplies 
with continental money. This was a large amount when it is con- 
sidered that Congress was able to send but a little over sixteen thou- 
sand dollars, at a time when a hundred thousand was actually needed. 
On the second day of April General Wooster examined the Brit- 
ish works and declared his purpose to begin active work. A few 
small cannon and two small mortars, then in position, were vigorously 
exercised to see what they could do : but their light metal was simply 
insignificant and made no impression upon the parapets of Quebec. 

During this time, scattered all the way from Albany on the Hud- 
son river to Montreal, .there could have been found companies of 
the regiments which Congress had sent to Canada, and which Wash- 
ington and the colonies could so poorly spare at such a crisis. 

On the day of Wooster's sham cannonading, Arnold's horse fell 
with him and bruised his wounded limb, so that he was confined to the 
bed, and to his reflections upon the progress of the campaign thus 
far realized. As soon as able to move he retired to Montreal on leave 
of absence. 

As spring approached and the ice broke up, the ground thawed, 
and it became simply impossible to move troops over the intermediate 
country to their support, and the river was not sufficiently open for 
transportation purposes. On the first of May, General Thomas, a 
man of culture, wisdom and courage, assumed command of the troops, 
then amounting to hardly nineteen hundred men, of whom less than 
a thousand, including officers, were fit for duty. Among those really 
effective, not less than three hundred claimed a discharge, their term 
of legal service having expired. The previous separation of the army 
into detachments, for the sake of blockading Quebec and cutting off 
supplies from the country, involved the constant use of three ferries, 
so that it was impossible upon any short notice to rally more than 
three hundred men to resist an attack, and even the medical appoint- 
ments could not be kept up to their best efficiency. 

At the time of his arrival the army was increased to the nominal 
strength, all told, of about three thousand men ; but this accession 
was simply a contribution to the grave, a stimulus to the growing dis- 
like of the provincials, and the assurance of a more speedy expendi- 
ture of supplies and an ultimate retreat. 



1776.] AMERICAN ARMY DRIVEN FROM CANADA. 163 

The ice was moving rapidly. Reinforcements were known to 
have left England and Ireland, and there was no possibility of sub- 
stantial, offensive activity. 

A fire-ship was prepared and floated toward the shipping then in 
the channel, but it did no harm, and the men in charge had a narrow 
escape from capture. The supply of powder had been reduced to 
one hundred and fifty barrels, and the store of provisions on hand was 
barely sufficient for six days of economical use. 

A council of war was held, and an immediate retreat to the Three 
Rivers was decided upon as the only means of saving the army from 
starvation or capture. 

Orders were issued for the embarkation of the sick and the artillery 
except one gun ; and orders were also sent to Orleans Island, Point Levi, 
and other points where detachments were stationed, in order to make 
the utmost expedition before the garrison should learn of the design. 
On the very next day, during the confusion incident to the emer- 
gency, the frigate Surprise, the Isis, 54, and the sloop of war Martin, 
arrived with two companies of the Twenty-ninth regiment, which were 
promptly landed as well as a considerable force of marines. 

General Carleton did not wait for these new forces to rest, but 
sallying forth at one o'clock in the afternoon with nearly a thousand 
men and six pieces of artillery, he made a vigorous attack upon the 
American position. One piece of artillery, and about three hundred 
men constituted the resisting force then available, and General Thomas 
wisely retreated, and in order, but with necessary precipitation. 

Nearly a hundred prisoners, beside the sick in hospital, his stores, 
baggage, and artillery were captured, and with these, nearly two tons 
of powder, and five hundred muskets, which had arrived that ver}^ 
morning from General Schuyler. Some of the sick, many of them 
still suffering with the small-pox, dragged themselves along, thoroughly 
desperate in their purpose to work their way homeward rather than 
remain as captives, and the retrograde movement was not interrupted 
until the army reached Deschambault, about fifty-eight miles toward 
Montreal. The command made no halt during the march, and the 
night was one of fearful terrors to the hungry and weary command, 
staggering through woods, streams, and swamps, with everything to 
discourage, and nothing to hope for except to escape from the con- 
quest of Canada. 

Dr. Gordon writing from Roxbury, July nineteenth of that year, 
says, " Their condition could not be expressed in words." 



164 AMERICAN ARMY DRIVEN FROM CANADA [1776. 

The army rested a few days at Deschambault. A council of war 
decided that there could be no safety short of Sorel. The British 
fleet had followed fast after them, and were even then at anchor 
at Jacques Cartier, only nine miles below their camp. This fleet had 
been largely increased. On the eighth of May, the Niger ship of war 
arrived from Halifax, convoying three transports and bringing the 
Forty-seventh regiment, and on the tenth the Triton arrived with 
other transports loaded with veterans and the European contingent. 

General Thomas proceeded directly to Sorel, where he found four 
regiments awaiting orders. Additional battalions arrived in a few 
days. Here he was taken down with the small-pox, and died on the 
second June. 

On the first of June, General Reidesel arrived with Brunswick 
troops, and Burgoyne with troops from Ireland. These reinforce- 
ments swelled the command of General Carleton to nine thousand 
nine hundred and eighty-four effective men, and preparations were 
made to take the offensive in force, and expel the American troops 
from Canada. 

General Sullivan arrived at Sorel on the sixth of June, and assumed 
command. His words were to the point. " I can reduce the army 
to order, and put a new face upon our affairs here." ' 

To Washington he wrote, — " I am determined to hold the most 
important posts, so long as one stone is left upon another." He did 
not appreciate the position, neither did Congress. 

A single minor operation of this disastrous campaign is worthy of 
mention at this stage of the narrative. 

There is a narrow pass in the St. Lawrence river above Perrot 
Island, nearly forty-three miles above Montreal, and a projecting 
point called the Cedars. 

Sir John Johnson, who had previously stirred up Indian aggression 
upon New York settlements, had received a British commission as 
Colonel, and was engaged in exciting the Indians of the north-west, 
and from Detroit eastward, to offensive movements against the 
American forces then in Canada. 

Colonel Bedell of New Hampshire, who had been associated with 
Colonel Livingston and Major Brown in the capture of Chambly, 
during 1775, had been assigned to post command at the Cedars with a 
garrison force of three hundred and ninety troops and two field pieces. 

On the fifteenth of May a hostile force consisting of forty regulars 
of the Eighth regiment from Detroit, one hundred Canadians, and 



1776.] AMERICAN ARMY DRIVEN FROM CANADA. 165 

five hundred savages under Colonel Beadle and Captain Foster, but 
without artillery, descended from the lakes and approached the fort. 

Colonel Bedell hastened to Montreal for reinforcements, leaving 
Major Butterfield in command. 

Major Sherburne started for the fort the next day with one hun- 
dred and forty men, and was soon followed by General Arnold with a 
still larger detachment. The facts as stated by Gordon, Stedman, 
Marshall, Bancroft, and other writers, British and American, do not 
substantially differ from the finding of the standing committee upon 
Indian affairs which was reported to Congress, and adopted by that 
body on the tenth of July, 1776, except as to the extent of injury 
done by the Indians. Congress received an exaggerated report of the 
matter. A brother of General Sullivan, who was one of the prisoners, 
wrote shortly after the so-called massacre that " Captain Foster treated 
them well after the surrender, or to the utmost of his ability." 

The transaction is memorable as one of the incidents attending the 
evacuation of Canada, and more particularly as the occasion of a 
formal notice to Generals Howe and Burgoyne on the part of Con- 
gress, that the Americans would measure out exact and literal retal- 
iation for any departure from the rules and usages of honorable war- 
fare. Major Butterfield having plenty of ammunition and provisions 
for nearly thirty days, without permitting his officers to sally out and 
attack the enemy as they desired to do, surrendered his whole com- 
mand upon the simple condition that they should be prisoners to the 
British forces and not to the Indians, and that their baggage should 
not be plundered. 

On the day following, Major Sherburne, who brought reinforce- 
ments, was attacked as he approached the fort, and fought with great 
courage for nearly an hour, but finally surrendered, when hotly pressed 
by superior numbers, and upon advices of the fate of the garrison. 
A cartel of exchange was enforced, coupled with the condition that 
" they would not in words, writing or signs, give the least informa- 
tion to government enemies, or to their adherents now in arms, in the 
least prejudice to his majesty's service," thus practically doubling the 
exchange, and this was made the condition of their exemption from 
Indian outrage. 

Captain Foster stated in the preamble to the cartel, that he " found 
from their threats and menaces that the inevitable consequences oi 
savage custom, to put prisoners to death, would ensue;" hence the 
stipulations made. 



1 66 AMERICAN ARMY DRLVEN FROM CANADA. [1776. 

The British took a strong position at Vaudreuil and Perrot Island. 
Arnold, with seven hundred men, made an attempt to dislodge them 
and rescue the prisoners, but the British commander so positivel)^ 
threatened to turn the prisoners over to the Indians in case of attack, 
that Arnold himself signed the proposed cartel, withdrew from St. 
Anne to La Chine and then returned to Montreal. It was an illus- 
tration of the far reaching effects of the cowardice or incompetency of 
a single post commander. 

The narrative left General Sullivan at Sorel, and General Carle- 
ton on the eve of aggressive action. 

The rendezvous appointed for the advancing British troops was 
at Three Rivers, about equally distant from Montreal and Quebec, 
and General Fraser had taken command of that station. 

Burgoyne, Riedesel and Phillips had started by land and water, 
to concentrate the army at that point. 

General Nesbit was near Three Rivers, on transports, under con- 
voy. Gordon puts the British effective force at thirteen thousand 
men. but he makes no allowance for the percentage of non-effectives, 
clerks and detachments, which reduce an army within twenty-four 
hours after a regular muster. Few of the battalions sent to America 
were full, and any estimate of forces based merely upon the number of 
battalions, is invariably an error. 

At this stage of affairs. General Sullivan having a force of about 
five thousand men at Sorel, called a council of war and resolved to 
occupy and hold Three Rivers. He was under the impression that 
the British force at that post was less than seven hundred men, 
probably not more than five hundred for duty. 

Colonel St. Clair was already at Nicholet with nearly eight hun- 
dred men. Colonels Wayne, Maxwell and Irvine, with sufficient force 
to make an aggregate of two thousand men, were sent down the river 
and through Lake St. Peter to join him. The command of the expe- 
dition was assigned to General Thompson. 

Chief Justice Marshall, in his life of Washington, supplies a fact in 
this connection which reconciles other historical accounts, and shows 
that during the four days which intervened between the death of 
General Thomas and the arrival of General Sullivan, General Thomp- 
son was in command, and that he sent St. Clair to Nicholet for the pur- 
pose of surprising the British post at Three Rivers. General Thomp- 
son, under the order of General Sullivan, whom he must have advised 
of the state of affairs, on his arrival, reached Nicholet, a little after 



1776.] AMERICAN ARMY DRIVEN FROM CANADA. 167 

midnight, or early in the morning, of the seventh of June. He kept 
his command under cover during the day, and crossed the St. Law- 
rence early in the evening of the seventh, landing at Point Du Lac. 
Their movement was not a secret. If it had been, the result would 
have been fully as disastrous. With morning light they found them- 
selves flanked by a swamp and compelled to march along the river. 
This exposed them to the fire of the shipping which they had safely 
passed under cover of the night, to the fire of artillery which had 
been landed on the beach by General Fraser, to conflict with a force 
three times their number, and to a class of risks never contemplated 
in their detail " to take and occupy Three Rivers." 

Where Wayne went there was a fight, always. That was his 
business. 

Bancroft thus sums up the scene : " The short darkness of that 
latitude was soon over; as day began to appear, the Americans, who 
were marching under the bank of the river, were cannonaded from the 
ships; undismayed they took their way through a thickly wooded 
swamp, above their knees in mud and water ; and after a most weari- 
some struggle of four hours reached an open piece of ground, where 
they endeavored to form. Wayne began the attack and forced the 
party to run ; his companions then pressed forward in column against 
the breast-works, which covered the main body of the enemy. They 
displayed undisputed gallantry ; but being outnumbered three to one, 
were compelled to retire." 

The battle was soon over. One hundred and fifty prisoners were 
left in the hands of the British troops, including General Thompson 
and Colonel Irvine. 

The men, scattered and disheartened, found their boats, and Three 
Rivers was not taken. 

Sullivan wrote — " I now think only of a glorious death, or a vic- 
tory obtained against superior numbers." 

The Congressional commission had already advised that Canada 
be abandoned. Congress, however, voted to sustain the offensive and 
was still legislating to maintain that army as late as July eighth. Sul- 
livan's officers finally advised retreat. 

The British fleet came up the river under a favorable wind on the 
fourteenth of June, and when they were within one hour's sail of Sorel, 
Sullivan broke up his camp and started for St. John's. 

Arnold held on to Montreal with three hundred men until the fleet 



l68 AMERICAN ARMY DRIVEN FROM CANADA. [1776. 

was within twelve miles of the city, and then crossed to La Prairie, 
without interruption. 

Sergeant Lamb, of the Royal Welsh Fusileers, then a private sol- 
dier, published his diary of the events of that campaign. He says — 
"The sufiferings of the Americans were indeed great, obliged to drag 
their batteries up the rapids of the Sorel, by mere strength, often to 
their middle in water, and encumbered with great numbers laboring 
under that dreadful disease, the small-pox, which is so fatal in Amer- 
ica. It was said that two regiments, at one time, had not a single 
man in health, another had only six, and a fourth only forty, and two 
more were nearly in the same condition. While the Americans were 
retreating, they were daily annoyed by the remonstrances of the 
inhabitants of Canada, who had either joined or befriended them. 
Many of the Canadians had taken a decided part in their favor, ren- 
dered them essential services, and thereby incurred the heavy penal- 
ties annexed to the crime of supporting rebellion. These, though 
Congress had assured them but a few months before, that, ' they 
would never abandon them to the fury of their common enemies ' 
were from the necessity of the case, left exposed to the resentment of 
their rulers." 

On the seventeenth, says Bancroft, " all that was left of the in- 
vading army met at St. John's." 

" On the eighteenth, the emaciated, half-naked men, broken in 
strength and in discipline, too weak to have beaten off an assault 
from the enemy, as pitiable a spectacle as could be seen, removed to 
Isle Aux Noix, where Sullivan proposed to await express orders from 
Schuyler." This island was low, badly supplied with water, and so 
unhealthy, that Sullivan retired to Isle La Motte, where he received 
orders from General Schuyler to retire to Crown Point, which post he 
reached during July. 

Colonel Trumbull visited the post, and thus states the condi- 
tion of the troops. " I did not look into a tent or hut in which I did 
not find either a dead or dying man." " I wept till I had no more 
power to weep," said a physician who attended the troops. 

" Everything about them, their clothes, their blankets, the air, 
the very ground they trod on, was infected with the pestilence." 
" More than thirty new graves were made every day." 

Sergeant Lamb's statement was not exaggerated. The official 
muster rolls showed that on account of sickness or inoculation, there 
were single regiments without a man fit for duty. 



1776] AMERICAN ARMY DRIVEN FROM CANADA. 169 

Canada was free from the pressure of American troops. Burgoyne 
re-occupied St. John's. Gates had superseded Sullivan, and he was 
promised additional troops to the nuniber of six thousand men, viz., 
three from Massachusetts, fifteen hundred from Connecticut, seven 
hundred and fifty from New Hampshire, and seven hundred and 
fifty from New York ; but none entered Canada. The death of Mont- 
gomery was the pivot event of the entire campaign. 

His plan contemplated the establishment of strong posts at Jacques 
Cartier, the Narrows, and at Montreal, and the occupation of the plains 
of Abraham by ten thousand men. More than this number was 
actually assigned to operations in Canada, but if all had reached 
Quebec, they could not have been maintained at that number, unless 
all other operations were sacrificed. 

A committee of Congress gave good reasons for the failure of the 
invasion, viz., undertaken too late in t lie fall ^ — enlistments too short and 
the consequent haste \\'\\\z\\ forced i)n)nature expeditions for fear there 
would be no men to undertake them — zvant of specie, and the small- 
pox. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

BRITISH PREPARATIONS. CLINTON'S EXPEDITION UNFOLDED. 

IT will give interest to the narrative to introduce to the reader 
those British regiments which were assigned to duty in America, 
early in the year 1776, so that they, as well as the American officers 
who figured early in the war, maybe recognized as acquaintances when 
the battle issues shall bringr them face to face. 



STATIONED IN BOSTON. 



17th Dragoons . Preston's. 



4th Foot 


. Hodgsin's. 


5th " 


. Percy's. 


loth " 


. . Sandford's. 


22d 


. Gage's. 


23d 


. Howe's. 


35th " 


. F. H. Campbell's 


38th " 


. Pigot's. 


40th " 


. Hamihon's. 



43d Foot . 


. Cary's. 


44th " . 


. Abercrombie's 


45th " . 


. Haviland's. 


47th " . 


. Carleton's. 


49th " . 


. Maitland's. 


52d " . 


. Clavering's. 


63d " . 


. T. Grant's. 


64th " . 


. Pomeroy's. 


65th " . 


. Armstrong's. 



A detachment of the 65th regiment was then at Halifax. 

Five companies of the Royal Artillery were also stationed at Boston. 



THEN IN CANADA. 

26th Foot, 



Lord W. Gordon's. 



7th Foot . . . Berlier's. 
8th " ... Armstrong's. 

This regiment was in charge of the upper, or western parts of Canada, including 
Niagara and Detroit. One company of Royal Artillery was at Quebec, one at Mon- 
treal, and one ''invalid" company at Newfoundland. McLean's regiment was par- 
tially organized in Canada, and its service has already been noticed. 



AT ST. AUGUSTINE. 
One company of Royal Artillery, and part of the 14th Foot, Cunningham's, 
other companies were with Lord Dunmore in Virginia, or at Halifax. 



The 



ON THEIR PASSAGE FROM IRELAND TO BOSTON. 
17th Foot . . Monkton's. 46th Foot . . . Vaughan's. 

27th "... Massey's, 53d " ... James Grant's. 




^^ C\} Con!f)i/ciJ (inJdmivn h- Col. Caninfflon 



170* 



1776.] BRITISH PREPARATIONS. I/I 

READY TO SAIL FROM CORK TO AMERICA. 

15th Foot . . . Cavans'. 42d Foot .. . . Lord Murray's. 

33d " . . Cornwallis'. 54th " ... Frederick's. 

37th " . . Coote's. 57th " ... Irwin's. 

ORDERED FOR BOSTON. 

i6th Dragoons, Burgoyne's, and one thousand of the King's Guards, to be drafted 
from three regiments, to be commanded by Colonel Matthews. 

The 29th Foot, destined for Quebec, were ordered to sail so as to arrive as early 
as the navigation of the St. Lawrence would permit. It has been already noticed 
how that regiment obeyed the order to the very letter. 

ORDERED TO BE IN READINESS FOR EMBARKATION TO SAIL FROM IRELAND 
TO QUEBEC IN APRIL, 1776. 



9th Foot . . 


. Ligonier's. 


20th " . . 


. Parker's. 


24th " . . 


. Taylor's. 



34th Foot . 


. Lord Cavendish's, 


33d " . 


. Elphinstone's. 


62d " . 


. Jones. 



The two Highland battalions, viz., Lord John Murray's and 
Fraser's, were to consist each of one thousand men. The marching 
regiments for the American service were to consist of twelve com- 
panies of fifty-six rank and file, each company, while two companies 
of each battalion were to remain in Great Britain and Ireland for 
recruiting purposes. 

It will be seen that each battalion sent to America only six com- 
panies, instead of eight, two battalions forming the regiment. The 
use of the term battalion in connection with the British army, will 
therefore be construed nominally as half a regiment ; while the Ameri- 
can regiments had but one battalion, and the terms are, ordinarily, con- 
vertible expressions when referring to the latter army. 

The nominal colonel of a British regiment then, as since, may also 
be a general officer, and the American reader will do well to bear this 
in mind, since Percy, Grant, Cornwallis, Pigot, and many colonels 
already named, are scarcely known to popular history, except by their 
high rank, which was in the nature of a brevet. 

The recruits for the regiments ordered to America were especially 
enlisted to be discharged at the end of three years, or at the end of 
the war, at the option of the king. 

During the winter of 1775-6, the British government entered into 
treaties with the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, the Duke of Brunswick, 
and the hereditary prince of Hesse Cassel, ruling the principality of 
Hanau, by which men were hired to do military service in America. 
This was done by arbitrary impressment. The force thus furnished 
amounted to seventeen thousand and three hundred men. 



172 BRITISH PREPARATIONS. [1776. 

The prince of Waldeck also tendered a regiment which was 
accepted, and with other troops from that state was sent forth under 
the command of the veteran Baron Riedesel. 

There never was a doubt among miUtary men as to the bad mih- 
tary policy of this arrangement. The men were paid by their own 
state, but the state was paid a much larger rate by Great Britain, so 
that it was a speculation entirely; but it robbed the English crown 
of prestige, maddened the colonists, and was unworthy of a great 
nation which was still claiming from the colonies the allegiance due 
to paternal authority. 

These treaties were stubbornly opposed in both houses of parlia- 
ment. A few extracts from the debate will illustrate the principles 
laid down under the title "statesmanship in war." 

" An army of foreigners is now to be introduced into the British 
dominion, not to protect them from invasion, not to deliver them 
from the ravages of an hostile army, but to assist one half of the 
inhabitants in massacring the other," said the duke of Richmond, 
adding: "Unprovided with a sufficient number of troops for the 
cruel purpose designed, or unable to prevail upon the natives of this 
country (England) to lend their hands to such a sanguinary business, 
ministers have applied to those foreign princes who trade in human 
blood, and have hired armies of mercenaries for the work of destruc- 
tion.'' " The colonies themselves, after our example, will apply to 
strangers for assistance." 

The bill passed the Commons by a vote of 242 to 88, and the 
House of Lords by a vote of 100 to 32. A protest was made in strong 
words, one single sentence of which will illustrate the folly of the 
policy, and its bearings upon the future. " We have reason to appre- 
hend that when the colonies come to understand that Great Britain is 
forming alliances and hiring foreign troops for their destruction, they 
may think that they are well justified by the example in endeavoring 
to avail themselves of the like assistance, and that France, Spain, and 
Prussia, or other powers of Europe may think they have as good right 
as Hesse, Brunswick, and Hanau to interfere in our domestic quarrels. 

Lord Inham declared, that, " the landgrave of Hesse had his pro- 
totype in Sancho Panza, who said that if he were a prince he should 
wish all his subjects to be blackamoors, so that he could turn them 
into money by selling them ; that Hesse and Brunswick rendered 
Germany vile and dishonored in the eyes of Europe, — a nursery of 
men for those who have most money." 



1776.] BRITISH PREPARATIONS. 1/3 

The King wrote personal letters to Catharine of Russia, asking for 
twenty thousand men. She replied " that there were other means of 
settling the dispute in America, than by force of arms," and declined 
to furnish any, although the application was made for a much less 
force, subsequently to the first refusal. 

The States-General of Holland were also requested by the king 
to dispose of their Scotch brigade, for service in America; but the 
proposition was declined and strict neutrality was maintained. 

During the war that followed, Brunswick furnished a total of seven 
thousand and twenty-three men, " amounting," says Bancroft, " to 
more than one-sixth of the able-bodied men of the principality." 

The Hessian force originally designated at four thousand men, was 
ultimately increased to twelve thousand, besides three corps of artil- 
lery, three hundred chasseurs and three hundred dragoons. 

Lieutenant Generals De Heister and Knyphausen commanded 
these troops, the former having senior command. Among the 
Colonels, Donop, Rahl, Wurmb-Minigerode and Loos were better 
known than others, in their connection with the wars. 

If Great Britain had drafted from England and Wales, a quota 
of troops, proportionally equal to the drain made upon the industry 
of Hanau and Hesse Cassel, through those treaties, she would have 
raised an army of more than four hundred thousand men. 

It is the affirmation of history that Hesse Cassel, Brunswick and 
Hanau matured bitter fruit by their sale of men, and that it did not 

pay- 
According to the estimate laid before parliament, there would 
be. including the foreign mercenaries, about fifty-five thousand men 
for American service without counting Canadians, Indians and other 
Loyalists, who were estimated at four thousand more ; and that the 
greatest possible allowance for possible deficiencies could not reduce 
the number below forty thousand. 

These troops were put in motion with commendable activity. Sir 
Peter Parker and Earl Cornwallis were ready to sail from Cork by the 
twentieth of January, but were detained until the thirteenth of Feb- 
ruary, through technicalities as to the authority of the king ; and legis- 
lation was deemed necessary by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 
before he would permit the departure of the expedition. 

The squadron consisted of forty-three vessels and more than 
twenty-five hundred troops; but it had not left the Irish Channel 
before a severe storm drove many of the ships to Cork, Plymouth, 



174 BRITISH PREPARATIONS. [1776. 

Portsmouth and other harbors for refuge. The larger portion was 
speedily collected and sailed for Cape Fear river, North Carolina. 

Meanwhile, the loyal governors of Virginia and North Carolina 
were doing their part in the preparation for active operations under 
instructions from the king. In the former colony. Lord Dunmore had 
already armed slaves and thus held out the threat of a servile war ; 
but the influence of Lee and Henry and other men of strong will, 
and their self-sacrifice and wide-spread popularity, kept him under 
some restraint, since he had not the force for a boldly offensive action. 

Governor Martin, of North Carolina, had promised the king to 
raise ten thousand men and that number of arms had been ordered to 
the colony. Upon receiving positive assurance that the regular troops, 
applied for during the fall of 1775, had been detailed, and ordered 
to sail for Wilmington, he began to assert vice-regal powers. Not 
daring to trust himself away from Wilmington and the ship which was 
both his head-quarters and home, he appointed one Donald McDonald 
to the office of Brigadier General, gave Donald McLeod the next 
position, and sent them out with thirteen other Scotchmen, to raise an 
army for the king. They induced him to believe that at least four 
thousand men could be put under arms before the arrival of regular 
troops. A force of nearly eighteen hundred men was gathered, and 
on the twenty-seventh of February they attacked the Wilmington 
and Newbern minute-men and the militia of Craven, Johnson, Dobbs 
and Wake counties, who were under the command of Colonel Caswell, 
afterward Brigadier General, and Colonel Lillington, at Moore's Creek 
Bridge. 

The result of this hot skirmish was quickly determined. McDonald 
was taken prisoner; McLeod, Campbell and several other leaders were 
killed, and the whole command was dispersed. Thirteen wagons, 
three hundred and fifty muskets, nearly fifteen hundred country rifles 
and two medicine chests, just from England, were among the trophies 
which the colonists bore away in triumph. A box of gold of the value 
of fifteen thousand pounds sterling, which was the chief reliance of 
McDonald in his work of recruiting, was another acquisition of the day. 

This event happened quite opportunely for the Americans. Gen- 
eral Lee had been ordered to the Southern department, and it was 
known that General Clinton intended to attack the coast at some 
eligible point. During the few weeks following the affair at Moore's 
Creek Bridge, nearly nine thousand citizens of the colony organized 
in behalf of the common cause of colonial independence. 



I776.J BRITISH PREPARATIONS. 175 

It is worthy of note that North Carolina ever after was conspic- 
uously faithful to her obligations, and no local organization gained any 
considerable headway against the national sentiment of the people. 

Colonel Moore was in command of the Continental regulars, and 
the advent of Clinton was anticipated without apprehension. The 
colonists were ready. 

On the third of May, Sir Peter Parker and Earl Cornwallis entered 
Cape Fear river with twenty transports. 

General Clinton had already reached Wilmington. After leaving" 
New York, he first entered Chesapeake Bay to have a conference with 
Governor Dunmore. 

During the month of April, beginning with the eighteenth, when 
the Ann and Isabella arrived with a part of the Seventeenth regiment, 
thirteen transports had reached Cape Fear river in advance of the 
flag-ship. 

The united forces of Clinton, General Vaughan, and Earl Cornwallis 
were too large to be of special service upon the North Carolina coast, 
and Charleston was finally adopted as objective of attack. Before his 
departure, Clinton, acting under instructions from the king, issued 
from on board the Pallas transport, a formal proclamation of an un- 
popular nature, denouncing persistent rebels, conventions and con- 
gresses ; offering pardon to all penitents except Colonel Howe, of the 
continental army, and Mr. Cornelius Harnet, and closed his duties at 
Wilmington by sending Cornwallis on shore with nine hundred men, 
to lay waste Brunswick. Colonel Howe's house and mills were burned, 
and some injury was done to the town of a profitless nature, only 
aggravating the people, and the army took sail for Charleston harbor. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA. PREPARATIONS FOR 

DEFENSE. 

A QUAINT old map bearing date August 31st, 1776, was found in 
London during the year 1875. Eleven companion maps were 
found with it in a rude atlas called " The North American Pilot," 
which the tremulous old man who guarded the street book-stand said, 
" ought to be worth a shilling." His judgment was respected, and a 
shilling bought the relic ! 

Those maps proved to be the record of official work done by Gas- 
coine, Fisher, Blamer, and other officers and pilots in his majesty 
George the Third's service, for the special information of officers, 
soldiers, and seamen who should have occasion to perform military 
duty anywhere upon the coast of North America. 

The special map which bore the date already given, was " An 
exact plan of Charleston and harbor ; From an Actual Survey, with 
the Attack of Fort Sullivan on the 28th of June, 1776, by his Majesty's 
Squadron commanded by Sir Peter Parker." 

The soundings and bearings are profusely indicated, as they were 
tested during June, 1776, for the use of the fleet which subsequently 
made the attack, and with due allowance for an extraordinary per- 
spective view of the city, which seems to have puzzled the ingenuity 
of the draughtsman himself, the chart is excellent and very complete. 

In the attempt to throw ourselves more than a century into the 
past, to study its facts and their lessons, it is certainly but just that 
we include the topography of places as it was then viewed by con- 
temporaries, so that we may seem to stand by their side as the scenes 
and actors pass by. 

On the right of the harbor entrance to Charleston, there was then, 
as now, a low sandy island called Sullivan Island. Marshes, thickets, 
and trees abounded. 



1776.] THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 1 77 

Northward, near by, but up the coast a short distance, there was 
then, as now, a larger island called Long Island. To the left of the 
harbor entrance, there was then, as now, a large island of several 
thousand acres, with Cummins Point and Fort Johnson defined, and 
this was James Island. 

Upon Sullivan Island a fort had been begun, and was " unfinished," 
according to the quaint old map ; but on either side of it was a small 
redoubt, and near the entrance of the fort was a " mark-tree," to guide 
pilots as they made the port. Just across the intervening water and 
marsh, a little more than a mile, was another redoubt at Mt. Pleasant, 
(Haddrell's point), and close by two houses, marked Jonathan Scott's, 
and Mr. Poang's, was " The American Army." 

The channel mark shows seven feet of water at low tide, between 
Sullivan Island and the " American Army." At the north end of this 
island there appear to be some earth-works, and these are occupied 
according to the map, by fifteen hundred Provincials, '' intrenched ^ to 
oppose the landing of Clinton's army. 

On Long Island appears " British forces, fifteen hundred men 
under General Clinton, landed June the ninth," which were to attack 
Fort Sullivan by land. Between Long Island and the main land there 
is indicated deep water, and between Long Island and Sullivan 
Island the water varies from eighteen inches to seven feet at low tide. 

The deepest water of the harbor entrance is in the north channel 
close by SuUivan Island, and very near to the " unfinished " fort, and 
thirteen feet of water is indicated. 

" On the bar, the low water at neap tides is twelve and a half, and 
high water is seventeen and a half feet. At spring tides, low water is 
eleven and a half, and high water is nineteen feet.'' All other chan- 
nels range from five to nine feet of water, so that ships had to go 
near where the fort was built if they were bound to Charleston, and 
for this reason Colonel Moultrie built the fort at that point. Such is 
a brief suggestion of the attack upon Fort Sullivan, and of the cause 
of its failure. 

It is obvious that there is no depth of water which will give to a 
naval force a choice of position or room to wear on or off at will ; that 
a landing which can not be made through the marshes of the main 
land, must be made upon Sullivan Island, so as to control the bridge 
of the Americans if possible ; that the small channels with seven feet 
of water must require boats for a passage, and that there must be some 
solid landing place, or there can be no efficient landing at all under fire. 
12 



178 THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA. [1776. 

The historical antecedents of Fort SuUivan and its defenders 
require sonne attention, and then a narrative of the attack and defense 
will test the accuracy of the quaint old map. 

The attack upon Fort Sullivan was but four days after Congress 
had solemnly asserted that " all persons abiding within any of the 
United Colonies, and deriving protection from its laws, owed allegiance 
to the said law," and charged the guilt of treason upon "all members 
of any of the United Colonies who should be adherent to the king of 
Great Britain, giving to him aid and comfort." 

Its issue was as expressive as that of Bunker Hill, of the stubborn- 
ness of the defensive, and it afforded an example well calculated to 
inspire the troops which were then at New York awaiting an attack in 
force. The people of South Carolian were ripe for just such a deed 
of valor, and deserved success. 

It will be remembered that during April, 1775, a secret committee 
of citizens took the colonial muskets and cutlasses from the public 
magazine for the use of the patriots. This act was followed by seizure 
of powder, and a wide-spread effective organization of the militia. 

Thomas Corbett, one of the committee, and acting by its authority, 
took possession of a mail package just from England, and obtained 
from it the private dispatches which announced the purpose of the 
British ministry to subdue the colonies by force of arms. 

These dispatches were addressed to Governor Dunmore, of Vir- 
ginia, Governor Martin, of North Carolina, Governor Campbell, of 
South Carolina, Governor Wright, of Georgia, and Governor Tonyne, 
of Augustine. These dispatches were sent to Congress, and had a 
positive effect upon their action, but they were especially influential 
in stirring up the people of Charleston to prepare for the worst. 

A dispatch had previously been found upon a vessel captured in 
northern waters, dated at Whitehall, December twenty-third, 1775, 
stating that seven regiments were in readiness to proceed to the 
Southern colonies, and that they would in the first place proceed to 
North Carolina, thence to Virginia or South Carolina as circumstances 
should point out. 

A letter from Governor Wright himself, addressed to General 
Gage, and requesting " that a detachment of troops be sent to awe 
the people," was also intercepted, and another was substituted with 
a counterfeit of his signature, saying that " the people were again come 
to some order, and there would be no occasion for him to send troops." 

The excitement attending the news from Lexington did not sub- 



1776.] THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 179 

side, but seemed to decide the people of South Carolina to make 
it the occasion for permanent resistance to British supremacy. Two 
regiments of foot and one of rangers were organized. The field 
officers of the First regiment were, Colonel Christopher Gadsden, 
Lieutenant-colonel Isaac Huger, and Major Owen Roberts ; and of 
the Second regiment, Colonel William Moultrie, Lieutenant-colonel 
Isaac Motte, and Major Alexander Mcintosh. Among the captains 
were Charles C. and Thomas Pinckney, Francis Marion, Peter and 
Daniel Horry, William and Benjamin Collett, Francis Huger, and 
Charles Motte. William Thompson was elected colonel, and James 
Mayson was elected lieutenant-colonel of the Rangers. 

A council of safety was appointed by the Provincial Congress, 
June sixteenth, 1775, consisting of Henry Laurens, Charles Pinckney, 
Rawlins Lowndes, Thomas Ferguson, Arthur Middleton, Thomas 
Heywood Jr., Thomas Bee, John Huger, James Parsons, William H. 
Drayton, Benjamin Elliott, and William Williams. 

During the month of July, seventeen thousand pounds of powder 
was taken from a brig near Augustine, and by the twentieth of Au- 
gust more than thirty thousand pounds had been accumulated in the 
storehouses of Charleston and Dorchester. The militia of Georgia 
had secured nearly an equal amount. 

After midnight of the fourth of September, James Island was 
occupied, induding Fort Johnson, under the direction of Henry 
Laurens, President of the Provincial Congress, and Colonel Gadsden's 
regiment became its garrison. 

Colonel Moultrie occupied Sullivan's Island, and during the 
month of November, a regiment of artillery was organized, and the 
work of fortifying all prominent points of the city and adjacent islands 
was systematically commenced. Haddrell's Point, was occupied for 
this purpose on the seventeenth of December. During January, 1776, 
Colonel Moultrie began to build a fascine battery on Sullivan's Island, 
and on the fifteenth, the discipline of the troops had become so well 
advanced that every company had its designated rendezvous in case 
of alarm, and nearly seventy guns were in position. Moultrie states 
in his memoirs, that " everybody supposed that two small armed 
ships could take Charleston," but he never believed that tJicy could 
not sink ships, as well as Frenchmen or Spaniards could do it. This 
impression however, had its good effect. The men were drilled in the 
exercise of extinguishing fires, planting ladders and whatever might 
be required in case the city was shelled and set on fire. Governor 



rSo THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA. [177&. 

Campbell, successor to Governor Wright, had by this time become a 
resident upon the sloop of war Lamar, as the Governors of Virginia 
and North Carolina had already made ships of war their place of 
refuge, and thus declared their distrust of the people and inability to 
conciliate or govern them. 

The council of safety ordered the detachment on Sullivan's Island 
"to fire upon ships, boats or other vessels which should attempt to 
pass, approach, or land troops on the island." Moultrie describes the 
island, as " quite a wilderness and a thick, deep swamp where the fort 
stands, with live oak, myrtle and palmetto trees. 

On the second of March he began to build a large fort capable of 
containing one thousand men. Two regiments of riflemen were also 
authorized, and these were officered, respectively, by Colonels Isaac 
Huger and Thomas Sumter. 

South Carolina thus boldly led the way to general independence 
by asserting her own, under John Rutledge as President, with Henry 
Laurens as Vice President, and William H. Drayton as Chief Justice. 
An army and navy were created ; Privy Council and Assembly were 
elected, and the issue of six hundred thousand dollars of paper money 
was authorized, as well as the issue of coin : and the first Republic of 
the New World began its life. 

Laurens, as well as Moultrie, Huger, Pickens and Warren, already 
commissioned in the colonial militia regiments, had served with credit 
in the old Cherokee war of 1 760-1. 

Massachusetts had begun the year with substantial freedom. 
South Carolina put all the machinery of a nation into operation with 
the opening spring. 

By the twenty-sixth of April one hundred heavy guns were in 
position. 

On the thirty-first day of May a large British fleet had been re- 
ported as within twenty miles of the harbor's mouth, and on the first 
day of June the squadron of Admiral Parker began to appear within 
view from Haddrell's Point. 

The month of June, 1776, was an important period in the life of 
the young Republic of South Carolina. 

The men who toiled, endured, and fought out an issue which 
secured the inviolability of her soil for nearly three years of the national 
struggle, were men who had entered upon military service with a real 
purpose to make themselves acquainted with the art of war. Their 
long period of preparation and drill was destined to bear its natural 



1776] THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA. igi 

fruit and to confer perpetual honor upon those who had so early 
anticipated, appreciated and prepared for the struggle. 

The militia about Boston had been suddenly summoned to become 
soldiers and to meet all the demands which military service exacts of 
disciplined troops, without the antecedent preparation for so formi- 
dable a responsibility, and this at the very outset of the war, before 
experience had demonstrated the importance of system, obedience 
and self-sacrifice, if physical force were to be employed to advantage, 
against the thorough veterans of Great Britain. 

The orders and familiar instructions which had been given as 
guides to Moultrie's, Gadsden's and Thompson's regiments, bore the 
impress of careful thought ; and there was a deliberate steadiness, in 
the preparation for invasion, which was nowhere surpassed in colonial 
experience. The material was quite homogeneous and the men who 
were selected as officers, were so selected, as it was claimed, for the 
very purpose of getting the best men for their respective trusts. The 
contest was so largely dependent upon her own citizens in the first 
place, that there was very little of jealousy, or the clashing of personal 
ambition at the time, and the lessons of more than a year of national 
struggle were not lost sight of in the hour of peril. 

President Rutledge, afterwards Chief Justice of the United States, 
was endowed with a rare faculty of judging men and issues by practi- 
cal tests, and his sagacity, nerve and inflexible will, more than the 
valor of Moultrie and his companions, secured the victory achieved. 
It was through his deliberate and unchanging purpose, that Moultrie 
was enabled to achieve. 

The month of June was full of that type of painstaking and cheer- 
ful waiting which gave to Bunker Hill its possibility and its history. 

General Armstrong arrived from the north late in April, assisted 
with his counsel, and was practically, if not formally, in command of 
the South Carolina troops upon the arrival of the British fleet. 

On the first day of June, 1776, the city of Charleston was full of 
life and labor. Colonel Pinckney's regiment was prompt to take the 
places assigned to the companies upon an alarm. Negroes were on 
duty with the fire-engines, bringing fire-hooks, axes, and all things 
before provided for an emergency; the batteries were manned, and 
additional defenses were begun. Traverses were made in the princi- 
pal streets, and light works were thrown up at every point which 
afforded a ready landing from boats. 

The lead sash, then so common, were taken from churches and 



1 82 THE REPUBLIC OP^ SOUTH CAROLINA. [1776. 

houses to be run into bullets, while in response to swift messengers 
sent into the country, the minute-men began to assemble and go to 
the places which were to be partially under their charge. Ware- 
houses and other buildings along the river front were demolished, and 
their sites and materials were used to establish additional defenses. 
Wherever any necessary work was to be done, however humble, ser- 
geants were sent with a guard detail, and the duty was performed with 
expedition and system. 

On James Island, Colonel Gadsden, then the commanding officer 
at Charleston, had established a well arranged camp, with tents and 
all necessary protection for the ordinary garrison of five hundred men. 

That force was now increased, and a battery was established 
directly opposite the city for the use of the artillery companies which 
reported to him in case the shipping should pass Fort Johnson in 
safety. 

Colonel Moultrie was rapidly completing the exposed faces of 
Fort Sullivan, and new works were begun along the coast east of 
Mount Pleasant, to command the shore opposite to Sullivan and 
Long Islands. Sumter's and Thompson's regiments had reported to 
Moultrie for duty. June third, he notified President Rutledge that a 
tender, which had been in company with two large ships and a 
schooner, was taking soundings from near the post of his advanced 
guard all along Long Island. 

June fourth. General Charles Lee arrived, and on the ninth was 
placed in general command. He had kept pace with Clinton from 
Boston to New York, thence to Virginia and North Carolina, and 
arrived at Charleston just as that officer was approaching its coast to 
join in the effort to capture and occupy its harbor defenses. 

Lee was in his element, that of independent command, only re- 
strained by the authority of President Rutledge, who was as resolute 
as Washington himself when convinced pf duty. Lee made imme- 
diate inspection of all preparations, and was tireless in his work. He 
insisted from the first that Fort Sullivan would be a mere " slaughter 
pen," and must be abandoned. This opinion he maintained until the 
fort had actually repelled the enemy ; and only Moultrie's persistency 
and faith, backed by the president, prevented the abandonment of 
that position and the inevitable loss of the city. 

Moultrie says in his memoirs, " I never was uneasy on not having 
a retreat, because I never imagined that the enemy could force me to 
that necessity. " Notwithstanding Aloultrie's faith in the sufficiency 



1776] THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 183 

of his defense, Lee never rested easy urrtil a large force had been 
employed to begin a second bridge to Sullivan Island ; the first, which 
had been made of floating hogsheads with plank stretches, having 
proved capable of sustaining less than two hundred men at a time. 

Lee brought great reputation ; equal, said Moultrie, in its en- 
couragement of the troops, to a reinforcement of a thousand men. 
He adds, " The officers could not at first reconcile themselves to his 
hasty and rough manners, but he taught us to think lightly of the 
enemy, and gave a spur to all our actions." 

Lee had fears that Colonel Moultrie's " good temper and easy 
nature " interfered with proper discipline, and repeatedly calls atten- 
tion to this matter in letters written to him before the battle. His own 
orders to the troops indicate a sound appreciation of all that consti- 
tuted a good soldier, and his experience before Boston had prepared 
him to find a body of militia of the same character as those which 
first invested that city. A few extracts from his official papers illus- 
trate his views. " Soldiers running at random wherever their folly 
directs, is an absolute abomination not to be tolerated." " When you 
issue any orders, do not suffer them to be trifled with." " Let your 
orders be as few as possible ; but let them be punctually obeyed." 
" Do not tease men with superfluous duties or labor, but enforce what- 
ever is necessary for the honor and safety of your garrison." " Post 
a commissioned officer at the beach to prevent the monstrous dis- 
orders I complain of." " If you expend your ammunition without 
beating off the enemy, spike your guns, and retreat with all the order 
possible." " Never fire without a moral certainty of hitting. One 
hundred and fifty yards is the maximum for muskets, and four hun- 
dred for cannon." " Distant firing encourages the enemy, and adds 
to the pernicious persuasion of the American soldiers that they are no 
match for their antagonist at close fighting. It makes them cowards, 
is childish, vicious, and scandalous." 

Lee was vigilant, by night and day, and as soon as he understood 
exactly what was expected to be done through his authority, he dis- 
charged his duty promptly and efficiently, and was one of the first to 
congratulate Colonel Moultrie upon his final success. 

June seventh, a flag from Admiral Parker was fired upon by an 
ignorant sentry, but Moultrie apologized for the oversight on the fol- 
lowing day. General Clinton, in return, sent a proclamation to the 
colonists similar in character to that issued at Wilmington. 

June eighth. Colonels Thompson's and Sumter's regiments were 



1 84 THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA. [1776. 

ordered to Long Island to dislodge the British troops who were effect- 
ing a landing; but this impracticable order of General Lee was modi- 
fied, and they took position upon the northeast end of Sullivan Island. 

June tenth, the British fleet came over the bar, except two ves- 
sels. On the eleventh, the North Carolina and Virginia Continental 
troops arrived, increasing the American forces to six thousand men, 
of whom twenty-five hundred were regulars. On the twelfth the 
British fleet made a demonstration as if to attack, but were driven off 
by a heavy squall of wind. On the fifteenth General Lee placed Gen- 
eral Armstrong's command at Haddrell's Point and ordered Moultrie 
to report to him as his immediate commanding officer. On the 
twenty-third the fleet made movement preparatory to an attack, but 
a contrary wind defeated their purpose. On the twenty-fourth the 
Muhlenburg regiment arrived from Virginia well equipped and in a 
high state of discipline. 

On the twenty-fifth Clinton made a vain effort to reach the main 
land. On the twenty-sixth the Experiment, 50, also crossed the bar. 
On the twenty-seventh, Lee sent scouting parties in boats, along the 
coast, and an effort was made under his orders, to remove the buoys 
which had been established by the surveying parties sent from the 
fleet. The enemy made no movement that was not watched, and four 
miles of earth-works had been completed along the shore. 

Thus four weeks of preparation passed by. 

The American forces gained confidence, numbers and discipline : 
while the British fleet and army had just reached the positions v/hich 
were necessary for offensive action. 

Horry's and Clark's regiments were on the island or at Haddrell's 
Point, while Isaac Motte and Francis Marion, were comrades of Moul- 
trie in the hour of final danger. 

It was the eve of battle. Admiral Parker had drilled his marines 
and seamen in the motions of climbing the parapet of the fort and 
entering the embrasures, and he was confident that two rounds of fire 
would prepare the way for an assault ; while Clinton, too heedless of 
warnings as to the depth of intervening water, had his army in hand 
as he confidently hoped,, for occupation and victory. 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

CLINTON'S EXPEDITION. ATTACK ON FORT MOULTRIE. 

FORT Moultrie was laid out for four bastions, but on the twenty- 
eighth day of June,jL7^5j ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ north faces of the main ii 
work were nearly open, and only the two bastions on the channel 
front had been sufficiently advanced to receive guns. The soft and 
spongy but tough palmetto trees which abounded on Sullivan Island, 
had been dove-tailed together in a series of connecting pens, and these 
were filled with sand, so that the parapet was sixteen feet in thickness, 
and sufficiently high to protect the gunners and garrison. Thirty-one 
guns were in position. Only twenty-one could have a combined fire 
at the same time, and the ammunition on hand at the commence- 
ment of the action of that date did not average thirty rounds to the 
piece. 

It was evident very early in the morning, that an immediate assault 
was impending. Colonel Moultrie visited the advance guard, which 
was on the northern extremity of the island three miles from Sullivan, 
very soon after the break of day. He found that Colonel Thompson 
had completed the light breastworks which were to face the channel 
between Sullivan Island and General Clinton's camp, and that one 
eighteen and one six pounder gun had been well located for resisting 
a landing by the British troops. In the myrtle bushes near the 
beach, and well covered by some drifted sand hills, there had been 
secreted a company of expert riflemen. Three hundred " good shots " 
from Thompson's own regiment, supported by nearly as many from 
Colonel Clark's North Carolina regiment, two hundred of Horry's 
men, and the " Raccoon Rifles," made up the entire command, and 
their officers manifested full confidence in their ability to resist any 
attack. 

Moultrie had just finished his inspection of these preparations 
when the movement of the troops from the opposite beach to their 



1 86 CLINTON'S EXPEDITION. [1776. 

boats and floating batteries, warned him that the time had come for 
him to be at his own post of danger. Motte, his second in command, 
and Marion who had been his Heutenant in the old Cherokee war, were 
anxiously awaiting his arrival. Already the flag-ship of Commodore 
Parker was flying signals for Clinton's army to cross Breach inlet to 
Sullivan Island, and attack the main fort in the rear, and the ships 
had shaken out top-sails in readiness to advance to their own proper 
position in the channel nearest the fort. 

Moultrie was on horseback. He says, " I hurried back to the fort 
as soon as possible. When I got there I found that the ships were 
already under sail. I immediately ordered the long roll to beat, and 
officers and men to their posts, when the ships came sailing up, as if in 
confidence of victory. We had scarcely manned our guns. They 
were soon abreast of the fort, let go their anchors, and began their 
attack most furiously." 

The fort was designed for a thousand men, but was occupied by 
Moultrie's own regiment only, and part of one artillery company, 
making a total of four hundred and thirty-five, including officers and 
men. 

General Armstrong was in command of a force of fifteen hundred 
men, and a portion of the artillery regiment at Haddrell's Point, and 
General Lee took up his head-quarters for the day at that post. The 
First regular South Carolina regiment, under Colonel Gadsden, still 
occupied Fort Johnson, on James Island, and a force of nearly, or 
quite twenty-five hundred men was properly disposed for the pro- 
tection of the city itself, and its earthworks and batteries. A large 
force of negroes was briskly at work endeavoring to complete some 
additional works ; and another body had charge of'the fire-engines 
and other fire-apparatus, as when the first alarm four weeks before 
had called the city to arms. 

The quaint old map referred to, so accurate in its description of 
the harbor, and in all chief respects in full harmony with official 
reports, is erroneous as to Clinton's force, which consisted of over 
twenty-one hundred foot, light infantry, and grenadiers, and nearly 
seven hundred seamen, making a total of nearly three thousand men. 
But the old map thus correctly represents the location of the advanc- 
ing vessels. 

The Solebay, 28, Captain Thomas Symonds, led the van of the 
first division ; the Experiment, 50, Captain Alexander Scott ; the 
Bristol, 50, flag-ship of Sir Peter Parker, Captain John Morris ; and 



1776.] CLINTON'S EXPEDITION. 18/ 

the Active, 28, Captain William Williams followed. A second division 
of three light frigates ; the Sphynx, 20, Captain Anthony Hunt ; the 
Actaeon, 28, Captain Christopher Atkins ; and the Syren, 28, Captain 
Tobias Furneaux, moved on a course further to the south, with orders 
to pass the line of battle ships, and gain a position westward of the 
fort, so as to sweep its open side with an enfilading fire, and give their 
larboard broadsides to the redoubts and earthworks on Haddrell's 
Point. The Thunder Bomb, mortar ship, 8, Captain James Reid 
commander, took its position south-east by south from the salient 
angle of the east bastion, with Colonel James, throwing shells, and 
covered by the Friendship, 22, Captain Charles Hope. The Ranger, 
sloop, Captain Roger Willis, and the St. Lawrence schooner, 8, Lieu- 
tenant J. N. Graves, lay off Breach inlet, which separated Sullivan and 
Long Island, to act in concert with the small boats which were to 
land the troops of Clinton. 

The plan of attack was well conceived, and was sustained with a 
persistent gallantry nowhere surpassed in naval annals. 

It was nearly eleven o'clock when the first division advanced under 
easy sail, and disregarding the first few shots delivered from the fort, 
let go their anchors and opened fire. The Thunder Bomb was already 
at work, and the roar of guns from the northward, brought notice to 
the quickened garrison that this double effort to win their post was at 
its issue. That garrison, under the order of Moultrie, " mind the 
commodore," " mind the fifty gun-ships," wasted few shots upon the 
frigates, but steadily, and as rapidly as the supply of powder would 
give them chance, swept the quarter decks of the heavy vessels, from 
about noon until sunset. 

The first broadside firing from the fleet embedded balls in the pal- 
metto logs ; but scattered no splinters, displaced no material and 
afforded no hopeful sign of the anticipated victory. Moultrie writes, 
" The Thunder Bomb had the bed of her mortar soon disabled, she 
threw her shells in good direction, and most of them fell within the 
fort ; but we had a morass in the middle that swallowed them up 
instantly, and those that fell in the sand, in and about the fort, were 
immediately buried, so that very few bursted among us." 

In the midst of the action the flag ship swung round, with her 
stern to the fort. Every available gun was trained upon the ship and 
with terrible effect. Captain Moore lost an arm and was carried below. 
•' At one time," says Edmund Burke, then editor of the Annual 
Register, " the quarter deck of the Bristol was cleared of every per- 



l88 CLINTON'S EXPEDITION. [1776. 

son but the Commodore, who stood alone, — a spectacle of intrepidity 
and firmness which have seldom been equaled, never exceeded." 

Until the position of the ship was shifted, there was every proba- 
bility that she would be sunk at anchor. 

It was just then that the fire from the fort began to slacken, for 
want of powder ; but within an hour it was resumed with increased 
vigor. Rutledge had not forgotten Moultrie, neither had he lost faith 
in his capacity and skill. The following note, written in pencil, con- 
veyed his sympathy with the successful resistance thus far sustained. 

"Dear Sir, 

I send you 500 pounds of powder. You know our collection is not very great. 
I should think you may be supplied from Haddrell's Point. Honor and Victory, 
my good sir, to you, and our worthy countrymen with you. Yours, 

J. Rutledge." 

" P. S. Do not make too free with your cannon." 

" Cool and do mischief." 

This wise postscript was a caution against that rapid firing so 
common with unskilled gunners who over-heat their pieces, endanger 
the lives of their comrades, and impair the accuracy of the aim and 
ranges. It was now three o'clock in the afternoon. The firing, to 
the northward, which began at the time of the naval attack, had ceased. 
Clinton had loaded his boats and attempted to cross to Sullivan island. 
The men could not wade through the deep water: and the loaded 
boats could do nothing upon intermediate shoals, with a depth of less 
than eighteen inches. The withering fire of the American riflemen 
who were under close cover, rendered every vigorous effort to force 
the army to the shore, a sure delivery of the command to entire 
destruction. 

William Falconer, writing on the thirteenth of July from Long 
Island, where Clinton remained until his departure for New York, 
says, " If the ships could have silenced the battery, the army was to 
have made an attack on the back of the island, where they had about 
one thousand men entrenched up to their eyes. They would have 
killed half of us before we could have made our landing good." 

General Clinton made two attempts, and finding that it was equally 
impossible to reach Sullivan island or the main land, on account of 
the marshes, he very wisely saved his troops from further effort. 

The second division of the squadron, under top-sails only, sailed 
smoothly by the flag-ship, and by the Solebay, while the broadsides 
of those ships were first testing the palmetto fort. The quaint old 



1776.] CLINTON'S EXPEDITION. 1 89 

map, locates them a little time after that, thus — " A — ground.'" They 
had run upon the " middle ground shoal," near where Fort Sumter 
was afterward built. " These three frigates were to have gone to 
the westzvard of the fort'' '' Acteeon scuttled and set on fire on the 
2gthr 

Lee crossed to Sullivan Island during the fight, to inquire into the 
condition of the fort, and returned with the conviction that the defense 
would be successful. Moultrie says, " we opened our temporary gate, 
to admit General Lee. Several of the officers as well as myself were 
smoking our pipes and giving orders ; but we laid them, down when 
he came in." 

The day was memorable for its incidents. Captain Scott of the 
Experiment, as well as Captain Morris, lost an arm. Forty were killed 
and seventy-one were wounded on the Bristol ; her hull was struck 
seventy times, the masts and rigging suffered severely, and a half hour 
of additional exposure would have been fatal. The Experiment had 
twenty-three killed and fifty-six wounded. The vessels slipped their 
cables at dark, and retired nearly three miles from the scene of conflict. 

Within the fort, behind the palmetto logs and sand, where the 
people in shirt sleeves were handling cannon, there were heroic deeds 
performed well worthy of record with those of the battle deck. " At 
one time," says Moultrie, " three or four of the men-of-war broadsides 
struck the fort at the same instant, which gave the merlons such a 
tremble that I was apprehensive that a {c\w more such would tumble 
them down." " Our flag was shot away! Our friends gave up all for 
lost ! Sergeant Jasper perceiving that the flag (blue, with a silver 
crescent in the dexter corner, corresponding with the cap ornament 
of the South Carolina troops) had fallen without the fort, jumped 
through one of the embrasures and brought it up through heavy fire, 
fixed it upon a sponge staff, and planted it upon the ramparts again." 
Twelve men were killed, and twenty-four were wounded, nearly every 
casualty having occurred from shot which entered the large embra- 
sures of the fort. When Sergeant McDonald received his mortal 
wound, addressing the soldiers who were carrying him to the doctor, 
he begged them " never to give up, they were fighting for liberty." 
His words are to be remembered with those of another of the same 
blood, " England expects every man will do his duty." 

With the next morning, there came a clearer view of the result 
of the battle. The Actaeon was burned by her crew as they abandoned 
her. The Sphynx had fouled with the Syren and lost her bowsprit. 



190 CAMPAIGN OF 1 776. [17; 

Both vessels went off with the tide and joined the first division, and 
the flag-ship which was also disabled for further offensive operations. 

The British troops lingered on Long Island for nearly three weeks. 
Falconer thus describes his own condition under date of July thir- 
teenth. " We have been encamped on this island for nearly a month 
past, and have lived upon nothing but salt pork and pease. We sleep 
upon the sea-shore, nothing to shelter us from the violent rains but 
our coats and miserable paltry blankets. There is nothing that grows 
upon this island, it being but a mere sand bank, but a few bushes 
which harbor millions of mosquitoes. Our killed and wounded num- 
ber between two and three hundred, and numbers die daily of their 
wounds." 

General Clinton, with his command, left under the convoy of the 
Solebay frigate, and reached Staten Island on the first of August. 
Useless differences arose between that officer and Commodore Parker. 
Each did his duty gallantly and well. Neither had the right to blame 
the other for the alternations of deep and shoal water, which rendered 
impossible the success of either. 

South Carolina and the American Congress united their testi- 
monials of gratitude and honor to the men who achieved the victory, 
and after more than a century of national life, the American Repub- 
lic reaffirms the tribute which was given by the Palmetto State ; and 
the fort on Sullivan Island is only to be remembered as FoRT 
Moultrie ! 



i 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

THE TWO ARMIES IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1776. 

THE month of July, 1776, began with the saddest show for a vast 
expenditure of men and money that could oppress a people just 
entering upon a great war. The story of the expedition to Canada 
was a tragedy of woe which carried mourning to many households, 
and demanded great wisdom, endurance, and faith, if the costly sacri- 
fice was to be converted into hopeful promise for the future. 

The lesson was one which had for its text the primary importance 
of thorough discipline as the chief requisite of well applied physical 
force, and most impressively declared a fact, that the casualties of the 
battle-field are but few, when compared with the waste which belongs 
to bad logistics. 

Individual courage was not wanting. Capacity, self-sacrifice, and 
great daring were well supplied ; but these elements had not been 
sufficiently combined, systematized and concentrated, at the expense 
of all individual choice and preferment. It was hard to make it under- 
stood that even veteran soldiers are like obedient cJiildren, at the same 
time strong and weak. They obey, but expect a complete outfit of 
food, clothing, and all the essential elements of success. Improvidence 
in expenditure will necessarily result where there is a lavish supply, 
which costs the individual nothing; but with fresh troops who have 
not learned to husband everything, even short intervals for rest, the 
dependence upon authority is constant and absolute, even in minute 
matters which would be absurd in civil life. 

These remarks furnish a brief epitome of the experiences of the 
American army up to July, 1776. The fireside mourning over the 
Canadian sacrifice had not so depressed the people, however, that 
hope was laid aside. The impending contest at New York began to 
absorb attention, and awakened fresh energy and will. It was at such 
an hour, when the consciousness of great disaster was lost sight of in 



192 THE TWO ARMIES IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1 776. [1776. 

the demand for a still greater effort, that the reverberations from Fort 
Moultrie reaffirmed the lesson, that the individual soldier was fully- 
equal to duty, if his personal independence could be once merged in 
the national independence just asserted. 

To acfcomplish this essential condition of success, was the task 
which had to devolve upon some adequate responsible authority, and 
the American Congress laid this burden upon the commander-in-chief 
of its armies. 

The British government had placed its share of the issue in the 
hands of Admiral and General Howe, tacking on to their instructions, 
however, the contingency of concurrent operations from Canada also. 

A brief statement of the relations of both armies will be the intro- 
duction to the skirmishes which made up the battle of Long Island. 

General Howe's fleet of transports sailed from Halifax June tenth, 
under strong convoy, made offing at Sandy Hook on the twenty- 
ninth, and on the second day of July dropped anchor. On the fifth, 
this fleet of one hundred and twenty-seven square-rigged vessels, be- 
sides smaller crafts, effected the landing of General Howe's army on 
Staten Island. A portion of the Scotch brigade, three companies 
each of the forty-second and seventy-first regiments joined the squad- 
ron off Nantucket, having made for Boston, direct from England, and 
the total force amounted to about nine thousand two hundred men, 
under Generals Howe, Pigot, Grant, and Jones. During the voyage, 
two of the transports carrying the Scotch brigade were captured by 
American armed vessels after a short engagement, and taken into 
Boston. Lieutenant colonel Campbell of the seventy-first, with six- 
teen other officers, and four hundred and fifty men were reported by 
General Howe as among the missing then taken captive, including 
General William Erskine. General Howe himself reached Sandy 
Hook on the twenty-fifth of June, in the fast sailing frigate Grey- 
hound, and held a secret conference with Governor Tryon on board 
the ship. As the result of this interview, he determined to land his 
entire force at Gravesend, and the fleet actually took position in the 
Gravesend cove on the first of July for that purpose. The key to his 
change of purpose is found in some letters sent to Lord Germaine by 
a dispatch vessel, July seventh. He wrote as follows : " I had been 
informed during the night of a strong pass upon a ridge of craggy 
heights, covered with wood, that lay in the route the army must have 
taken, only two miles from the point of the enemy's encampment, and 
seven from Gravesend, which the rebels would undoubtedly have 



i 



17/6.] THE TWO ARMIES IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1 776. 1 93 

occupied before the king's troops could get up to it ; and from the 
minutest description, judging an attack upon this post so strong by 
nature, and so near the front of the enemy's works, to be too hazard- 
ous an attempt before the arrival of the troops with Commodore 
Hotham, daily expected, I declined the undertaking." " I propose 
waiting for the English fleet or the arrival of Lieutenant-general 
Clinton, in readiness to proceed, unless by some unexpected change 
of circumstances in the meanwhile, it should be found expedient to 
act with the present force." " In case Lieutenant-general Clinton's 
southern operations should prevent his joining the army here, I am 
apprehensive the possession of Rhode Island, though of the most 
important nature, must be deferred until the arrival of the second 
embarkation from Europe, unless General Carleton should penetrate 
early into this province, which may enable me to spare a corps ade- 
quate to that service " ; " But, as I must esteem an impression upon 
the enemy's principal force collected in this quarter, to be the first 
object of my attentions, I shall hold it steadily in view, without losing 
sight of these which comparatively may be esteemed collateral." 
These quotations show that the very best possible strategical move- 
ments had been selected by the British Cabinet and its advisers, for 
the prosecution of the war. The adequate force was not supplied. 
Th° fate of Clinton's expedition southward was unknown at date of 
the dispatch of General Howe. 

It will be seen that four armies were to act with substantial unity 
of time, and so widely apart that the American army could not give 
alternate attention to any two of the four. Three of these operations, 
those at Newport, New York, and southward, were supported by 
fleets ; the third was to descend from Canada with the moral support 
which the failure of the American invasion conferred upon the veteran 
legions of the British army. 

One signal restraint upon a general plan of operations, otherwise 
excellent, was the monstrous under-estimate of the courage, numbers 
and purposes of the American people, which stuck so fast to the min- 
istry that it was with the greatest difficulty that Yorktown itself could 
make the error intelligible. Admiral Howe arrived July twelfth with 
an admirably equipped squadron and nearly one hundred and fifty 
transports loaded with troops. On the same day, two men-of-war, 
the Phoenix, 40 guns, and the Rose, 20 guns, safely passed the bat- 
teries at Paulus Hook and Greenwich, and thus early interrupted 
Washington's communication with Albany, and the northern army. 
13 



194 'fHE TWO ARMIES IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1 776. [1776, 

On the next day a flag was sent to the American head-quarters for 
the purpose of opening negotiations for a settlement of the issues 
between the mother country and the colonies. Admiral Howe had 
been deputized to act jointly with his brother, as commissioners, in 
this behalf. The proposition was so weak that it had no favor what- 
ever. General Washington described their errand, in a letter to Gen- 
eral Schuyler, in these terms, " Commissioners to dispense pardon to 
repenting sinners." 

Much unreasonable censure has been cast upon General Howe 
and his brother, for their reluctance to address Washington in his 
official character, as if it implied discourtesy on their part, or the fear 
that they would waive some legal rights of the crown, by the most 
ready access to the American authorities. It is only necessary to 
cite the American war of 1 861-5, when the same reluctance of the 
United States to address the Confederate officers by their title, em- 
barrassed the exchange of prisoners, as in 1776, while it had not the 
weight of a feather in determining the real status of the parties, or 
the battle issues themselves. Adjutant-general Patterson, of the 
British army had an interview with Washington, on the twentieth 
day of July ; mutual courtesies were exchanged, but no business was 
done, as there was no real basis of compromise in the instructions of 
Lord Howe. 

Admiral Howe says of Colonel Patterson's interview : "It was 
more polite than interesting ; however, it induced me to change my 
superscription of the address upon the letter, which had been George 
Washington, Esqr., for the attainment of an end so desirable ; — refer- 
ring to the effort to secure the exchange of General Prescott, who had 
been taken prisoner at Montreal, and of the officers and men of the 
seventy-first regiment, just captured at sea. 

Congress had its own Declaration of Independence engrossed upon 
parchment on the nineteenth of July, for the signature of members, 
and freely disseminated Lord Howe's proposition throughout the 
colonies, so little did they regard it as having a single element of value 
in the interests of peace. There was another good reason for the free 
publication of the document. Rumors of a sensational character 
were as thick and absurd as in more modern times. General Rober- 
deau notified Washington, on the nineteenth of August, in all serious- 
ness, that a " post-rider had told with great confidence that General 
Howe had proposed to retire with the fleet and army, and was willing 
to settle the present dispute on any terms asked by Washington : that 



1776] THE TWO ARMIES IN JULY AND AUGUST, I776. 195 

this came from an officer who was ready to swear to it, but as it might 
have a tendency to lull the inhabitants, he made it the subject of an 
express." 

This was based upon another rumor that England and France 
were at war. General Washington was compelled to publish an order 
rebuking the recklessness of gossip-mongers. This was more impor- 
tant, since many of those who opposed the war on account of business 
relations with the British civil authorities, were most active in words, 
while lacking courage to take up arms on either side. 

On the first day of August, Generals Clinton and Cornwallis reached 
Staten Island with their united command. On the twelfth Commo- 
dore Hotham arrived, having convoyed a fleet of transports which 
landed twenty-six hundred British troops and eight thousand four 
hundred Hessians, and a supply of camp equipage for the entire army. 
On the fifteenth Sir Peter Parker arrived with twenty-four sail from 
the south. 

Admiral Howe made one more effort to press the proposition of 
the British Cabinet to a favorable consideration by the American 
Congress, but without effect. His high character and sincere desire 
for peace are ever to be honored, no less than his real merit as a 
naval commander. 

The American preparations were far less perfect, but equally 
earnest with those of the British army. 

The Declaration of Independence, made on the fourth day of July, 
was favorably adopted by Maryland on the sixth, on the ground that 
" the king had violated his compact," and the people were without a 
government ; thus starting out upon the original basis of all govern- 
ment, as heretofore discussed. Pennsylvania and New Jersey followed 
on the eighth and New York on the ninth. Other colonies rapidly 
accepted the action of Congress and entered upon a more systematic 
organization of the militia. 

On the ninth of July, Massachusetts was engaged in hurrying three 
additional regiments to the Northern army, then having its head- 
quarters at Crown Point, and Congress ordered fifteen hundred addi- 
tional troops to be raised for the same destination. On the nine- 
teenth, Washington ordered three of the eastern regiments to join 
the northern army. 

Crown Point was soon abandoned, in accordance with the recom- 
mendations of a board of officers convened July seventh, acting upon 
the advice of General Gates, but contrary to the judgment of Wash- 



ig6 THE TWO ARMIES IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1 776. [1776. 

ington ; and Ticonderoga alone of the northern posts, remained in the 
occupation of the American army. The evacuation of Crown Point is 
mentioned in this connection as only one of the annoying elements of 
the crisis, when each detached officer seemed ready to exercise the 
prerogative of a commander-in-chief. There were sanitary considera- 
tions to be regarded, on account of the remains of the scourge of the 
small-pox, but General Carleton deemed its possession of such military 
importance that he soon occupied it for his head-quarters. 

The defense of Brooklyn Heights was decided to be essential to 
the most efficient prosecution of the war. To give value to this 
decision, it was necessary to provide for all possible demonstrations 
which lay within the reach of the British naval forces. From Brook- 
lyn to Kings Bridge the distance was nearly fifteen miles, with the 
navigable waters of the Hudson, East river and Harlem creek, to be 
watched, and their shores to be amply guarded. The battery on 
Paulus Hook, then an island, was on the New Jersey shore, making 
two ferries for communication vvith Brooklyn, and the entire force of 
the regular artillery regiment of Colonel Knox was reported at only 
five hundred and eighty-five men. 

The official army return for the third of August, 1776, gives the 
strength of the American army as follows. Commissioned officers and 
staff, twelve hundred and twenty-five ; non-commissioned officers, 
fifteen hundred and two ; present for duty, ten thousand five hundred 
and fourteen ; sick, present and absent, three thousand six hundred 
and seventy-eight ; on furlough, ninety-seven ; on command, two 
thousand nine hundred and forty-six, making a total of seventeen 
thousand two hundred and twenty-five men. Less than one-third 
of this force had served from the beginning of the war, and the arms 
were not only insufficient in numbers, but many of those treated as 
serviceable would have been condemned, upon inspection for issue to 
regular troops. The crudeness of the army organization, and the 
short terms of service engendered neglect of such as they had, and 
the army had not learned that a gun must be kept in order, even if 
the soldier goes barefoot. The artillery was of various patterns and 
caliber, second hand and neglected, or hastily fabricated, and the men, 
who were excellent riflemen, knew very little about the range or 
management of field or siege pieces. It was just then that the 
American army was to renew the contest, no longer trusting in num- 
bers, but against superior forces fully equipped. 

Two days after the muster of the army above referred to, Gov- 



1776.] THE TWO ARMIES IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1 776. 197 

ernor Trumbull of Connecticut assured Washington that " he did not 
greatly dread what the enemy could do, trusting Heaven to support 
us, knowing our cause to be righteous." On the seventh, Washin<T- 
ton sent him a copy of his " Return," with the laconic suggestion, that 
" to trust in the justice of our cause without our own utmost exertions, 
would be tempting Providence." Trumbull responded in his usual 
practical way, and although five regiments had already been sent for- 
ward, he very soon called out nine regiments more, and sent them, 
averaging three hundred and fifty men each, in time to be present 
when the British troops subsequently landed in Westchester county. 

Two regiments, including Colonel Prescott's, were detailed as the 
garrison of Governor's Island. The works upon Brooklyn Heights 
had been begun by General Lee, but prosecuted under the personal 
direction of General Greene, who had explored the country thoroughly, 
and knew the range of each piece as well as the character of the 
approaches to the works. He was a soldier by choice, subordinate at 
all times, and ambitious to attain excellence for himself and profi- 
ciency in his men. A redoubt of seven guns crowned the heights. 
The exposed point of Red Hook, which was a combination of marsh 
and thicket and solid land, was supplied with five guns, and the in- 
trenchments, more than half a mile in length, were protected by 
abattis and four redoubts, which mounted twenty guns. Greene 
occupied these redoubts and lines with two regiments of Long Island 
militia, and six Continental regiments, none of which exceeded four 
hundred men for duty. The lines extended from Wallabout Bay, the 
present navy yard, to the creek then setting in from Gowanus Bay, 
and some adjoining marshes, which were impassable at high tide, and 
at all times miry, and difficult of approach. 

The Pennsylvania rifle battalion. Colonel Atlee, Smallwood's 
Maryland, and Haslet's Delaware, which had just joined the army 
from the south, were added to the garrison, and were placed in Stir- 
ling's brigade on the morning of the twenty-seventh, before the attack 
was made. 

The total nominal strength of the American army about New 
York on the twenty-sixth of August, including the sick, non-effectives 
of all kinds, and those without arms, was a little over twenty-seven 
thousand men. The Connecticut regiments which last joined, brought 
such arms as they could provide for themselves, and were but so many 
citizens, with nominal organization, but neither discipline nor experi- 
ence in military drill. 



198 THE TWO ARMIES IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1 776. 1776.] 

t 

On the fifteenth of August, Greene, " then confined to his bed with 
a raging fever," wrote to Washington that " he hoped through the 
assistance of Providence to be able to ride before an attack should be 
made, but felt great anxiety as to the result." 

Such was the relative state of readiness with which the British and 
American armies awaited conflict. Repeated storms and high winds 
postponed the landing of the former troops, and the latter army was 
accumulating in numbers, but anticipating the coming issue with the 
conviction that the ordeal would be one of surpassing trial and danger. 



CHAPTER XXX. 

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.— PREPARATIONS. 

THE British coitimander-in-chief determined to attack the Amer- 
ican works on Brooklyn Heights and thereby secure a land- 
footing for operations against the city of New York, which was directly 
across East River and less than three-fourths of a mile distant. 

The defense of Fort Moultrie had indicated the kind of resistance 
which provincial troops could oppose to an attack by naval forces, 
and the advance had to be made across Long Island, unless a com- 
bined movement should be attempted through Long Island Sound 
and up the Hudson river, to occupy the country north of Manhattan, 
or New York, island. The latter plan would enclose the American 
army, as the British army was caught at Boston ; while the occupation 
of the heights of Brooklyn would be a counterpart to the American 
possession of Dorchester Heights during the previous June. 

The movement was well devised, well supported and faithfully 
executed. In determining the force actually employed in the attack, 
reference is made to the report of Admiral Howe, who states, that 
" on the twenty-second of August the whole force then destined for 
this service, consisting of about fifteen thousand men, was landed 
before noon : and that on the twenty-fifth, an additional corps of Hes- 
sian troops under General De Heister, with their artillery and baggage, 
were conveyed to Gravesend Bay." This made the effective force 
twenty thousand men, leaving at least four thousand upon Staten 
Island, besides the sick. The latter force included one brigade of 
Hessian troops. On the twenty-seventh day of August, General 
Howe made official report of the rank and file of his army, as twenty- 
six thousand two hundred and forty-seven men, exclusive of the bat- 
talion of royalists under Brigadier-general De Lancey. In quoting 
the Returns of General Howe which were laid before the House 
of Commons, General Clinton says, that " he (Howe) had 24,464 



200 BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS. [1776. 

effectives fit for duty; — a total of 26,980, officers not included, who, 
when added, amount to 31,625 men." Sir George Collier, who was 
present at the landing of the army, says, that " the army with Howe 
on Long Island amounted to upwards of twenty thousand besides 
those who remained on Staten Island." 

The admirable logistics exhibited in the whole movement requires 
fuller detail of narrative than would be desirable in a more general 
history. 

The British army proper consisted of an advance corps, a reserve, 
and seven brigades, constituted as follows : 

TJie advance corps : — Four battalions of light infantry and the 
light dragoons. The reserve : — four battalions of grenadiers, with 
the 33d and 42d regiments of foot. 

First Brigade: the 44th, 15th, 27th and 45th regiments. 

Second Brigade: the 5th, 28th, 55th and 49th regiments. 

Third Brigade : the loth, 37th, 38th and 52d regiments. 

Fourth Brigade: the 17th, 40th, 46th and 55th regiments. 

Fifth Brigade : the 22d, 43d, 54th and 63d regiments. 

Sixth Brigade: the 23d, 44th, 57th and 64th regiments. 

Seventh Brigade: the 71st Highland regiment, New York com- 
panies and the Royal Artillery. 

Colonel Donop's corps embraced the Hessian grenadiers and chas- 
seurs ; and General De Heister's command consisted of two brigades. 

Some of these regiments are at once to be recognized as among 
those which were largely depleted in the action on Breed's Hill ; but 
the number of battalions which landed, confirms the estimate given 
by Admiral Howe and Sir George Collier. 

The debarkation was signally perfect. More than four hundred 
transports were within the arms of Sandy Hook. Ten line-of-battle 
ships and twenty frigates were their escort and protection. Seventy- 
five flat boats, eleven bateaux and two gallej's, all built for the pur- 
pose, in ten distinct, well-ordered divisions, simultaneously touched 
the beach and landed the reserves and advance corps, four thousand 
strong, near the present site of Fort Hamilton, and within two hours 
after the signal had been set. Five thousand additional troops were 
landed with equal celerity and order, a little further down the bay. 
The transports came up in their designated succession to deliver the 
regiments to the long line of waiting boats, and before twelve o'clock 
of the twenty-second of June, fifteen thousand men, with artillery, 
baggage and stores, had been placed on shore, without mishap or 



1776.] BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.— PREPARATIONS. 20I 

delay. On the twenty-fifth, the division of General De Heister was 
transported to Gravesend cove, and made their landing with equal 
skill. 

On the twenty-sixth, a naval diversion was attempted up New 
York Bay, to alarm the posts on Governor's Island and Red Hook, and 
induce the belief that an attack was to be made upon the city itself. 
It so far succeeded as to delay the movement of reinforcements then 
under orders for Brooklyn ; but a strong north-east wind compelled 
the fleet to drop down the bay and come to anchor. The Roebuck 
alone reached Red Hook, but accomplished no mischief, and soon 
dropped out of fire. 

General Cornwallis, with the reserves, ten battalions of light in- 
fantry, and Donop's corps of Hessians, had been advanced to the 
vicinity of Flatbush immediately after landing on the twenty-second, 
to learn whether the pass through the hills at that point had been 
occupied by the Americans. Upon finding that it had been so occu- 
pied, and that a redoubt and intrenchments had been interposed in 
his way, his command was not pushed to an attack, but encamped in 
front of Flatbush. The main army occupied a line extending from 
the coast through Gravesend to Flatlands, and active preparations 
were at once made for an immediate advance. 

The long range of hills extending from the Narrows to Jamaica 
was known to have four passes available for the movement of troops 
with artillery. The most direct road was that along the bay, cutting 
through the hills just back of Red Lion, where Martense's Lane joins 
the usual thoroughfare, at the edge of the present Greenwood cem- 
etery. A second was directly in front of Flatbush, and this road led 
directly to the American intrenchments. The third was by the road 
from Flatbush to Bedford. The fourth, which extended as far as 
Flushing, crossed the Bedford and Jamaica road nearly three miles 
east from the first named town. Reference to the map, " Battle of 
Long Island," which is built upon the United States Coast Survey 
Chart, will indicate the respective relations of these roads to an 
advance upon the American position. The disposition of the British 
army is to be particularly noticed for its exact comprehension of the 
situation, and the assurance of success which that disposition secured. 

During the morning of the twenty-second, at the time of the first 
landing, Colonel Hand's American regiment had deployed along the 
coast for the purpose of checking the movement, if attempted only by 
a moderate force ; but the regiment fell back to Prospect Hill as soon 



202 BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS. [1776. 

as advised of its real character. It does not appear from the official 
archives, or other responsible authority, that he advised the com- 
manding general of the landing of the additional corps on the same 
day, nor that any adequate vidette system was employed to secure 
an intelligent impression as to the ultimate design of the British 
army. 

On the twenty-sixth, General De Heister occupied Flatbush, and 
thereby greatly strengthened the conviction that an advance would be 
made in force from that point, but during the evening. Earl Cornwallis 
withdrew his own command, and joined General Clinton at Flatlands. 

Shortly after nine o'clock, General Clinton with the light dragoons, 
two battalions of light infantry, the reserve under Cornwallis, (except 
the forty-second regiment which had been detached to the left of 
General Heister,) and the portion of the seventy-first regiment which 
escaped capture at sea, with fourteen pieces of artillery, moved 
through New Lots, near the present East New York, and before 
three o'clock in the morning, arrived within half a mile of the pass 
which he intended to force. A narrow causeway built through a marsh, 
and known as Shoemaker's bridge, which only admitted of the passage 
of a single column at a time, was passed without interruption, and a halt 
was then ordered for re-formation of the command. 

Lord Percy followed with the main army, which consisted of the 
Guards, the Second, Third, and Fifth brigades, and ten field pieces. 
The Forty-ninth regiment, with four medium twelve-pounders, and 
the baggage brought up the rear. Percy joined Clinton at least a half 
hour before daybreak. A small American patrol was captured, the 
pass was occupied, the heights were reached, and the troops were 
allowed an interval for rest and refreshments, preparatory to a further 
advance. 

There was now open before this powerful column, a clear and 
direct route to Brooklyn Heights by the rear of all advanced posts. 
Thus far, the British right wing had profitably employed the hours 
and realized its immediate objective, without loss or alarm to the 
enemy. An immediate advance upon the American intrenchments 
would have been successful, but costly in life. This was not the 
original purpose, and the success already realized was more than 
should have been anticipated. 

During this time. General De Heister, under instructions, only 
demonstrated toward the American force which held the Flatbush 
pass, and Colonel Miles of the American army, who was posted toward 



I776-] BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS. 203 

the Bedford road, and Colonel Wyllis, who was posted across that 
road, seem to have had no intimation that a British force had already 
turned their flank, and was advancing between their own position and 
the American lines. 

Occasional firing took place about Flatbush, but no more than 
was incident to antagonistic forces occupying positions within short 
range. They seem to have regarded the Flatbush pass as seriously 
threatened, and the heavy force in front gave color to this opinion. 
General Grant's command could be seen from Prospect Hill, and the 
comparative passivity of Heister's division would have suggested that 
he was withholding attack, in order to give General Grant an oppor- 
tunity to advance by the harbor road. 

General Grant also moved late in the evening with the Fourth and 
Sixth brigades, and reached Red Lion just before midnight. His 
advance was promptly checked by a lively fire from a detachment of 
militia properly posted before the pass. This skirmishing was main- 
tained until early dawn. He advanced slowly, without crowding the 
American pickets, yet pressed firmly on, as if assured of abundant 
support. 

Washington had been advised of the landing effected on the 
twenty-second, and that " Colonel Hand had fallen back to Prospect 
Hill, burning wheat and such other property as might be of immedi- 
ate use to the British troops." Six regiments were sent to reinforce 
the garrison on the heights. These regiments ranged in number from 
three hundred to four hundred men. Orders were sent to General 
Heath, then at the north end of Manhattan island, to be prepared to 
forward additional troops, and five regiments from the city force were 
placed in readiness to cross East river, as soon as it should be clearly 
determined whether General Howe was making a final movement to 
cover a positive attack upon New York, or really designed to make 
the occupation of Brooklyn Heights his single immediate objective. 
The absence of General Greene became a matter of serious concern. 
In a letter to Congress, dated the twenty-third, Washington says, 
" I have been obliged to appoint General Sullivan to the command 
on the island, owing to General Greene's indisposition." 

When Colonel Hand fell back to Flatbush on the twenty-second, 
and gave notice of the first landing, the small picket force at that pass 
was increased, by order of General Sullivan. In a letter to Washing- 
ton, written on the twenty-third, he says, " This afternoon the enemy 
formed, and attempted to pass the road by Bedford. A smart fire 



204 BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS. [1776. 

ensued between them and the riflemen. The officer sent off for a 
reinforcement which I ordered immediately. A number of musketry 
came up to the assistance of the riflemen, whose fire, with that of the 
field pieces, caused a retreat of the enemy. I have ordered a party 
out for prisoners to-night. We have driven them a mile from, their 
former station. These things argue well for us, and I hope are so 
many preludes to a general victory." This confidence of General 
Sullivan was hardly less unfounded than his faith in the success of 
operations in Canada, and, as in that case, he was immediately super- 
seded. 

On the next day General Putnam was assigned to the command. 
On the twenty-sixth, Washington wrote to that officer, to " stop the 
scattering, unmeaning and wasteful firing, which prevents the possi- 
bility of distinguishing between a real and false alarm, which prevents 
deserters from approaching our lines, and must continue so long as 
every soldier conceives himself at liberty to fire when, and at what he 
pleases." " Guards are to be particularly instructed in their duty." 
" A brigadier of the day is to remain constantly upon the lines, that he 
may be upon the spot, to coinmand and see that orders are executed." 
"Skulkers must be shot down on the spot." "The distinction 
between a well regulated army and a mob, is the good order and dis- 
cipline of the former, and the licentiousness and disorderly behavior 
of the latter." " The men not on duty, are to be compelled to 
remain at, or near their respective camps, or quarters, that they may 
turn out at a moment's warning: nothing being more probable than 
that the enemy will allow little time enough to prepare for the attack." 
" Your best men should at all hazards prevent the enemy passing the 
woods and approaching your works." 

On the twenty-sixth Washington reported to Congress, that, " the 
fleet had fallen down to the Narrows, that the tents had been struck 
on Staten Island, and he was led to believe that the main army had 
landed upon Long Island and would make their grand push there." 

The force on Long Island at the time of the battle, was not quite 
eight thousand men, inclusive of Stirling's brigade, which crossed the 
river in the morning. During the subsequent debates upon this battle 
in the British House of Commons, and the examination of witnesses 
who had participated in the action, Cornwallis testified, " It was re- 
ported that they (the Americans) had six or eight thousand men on 
Long Island." General Howe, on the other hand, reported the Ameri- 
can force which occupied the woods alone at ten thousand men. This 



1776.] BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. — PREPARATIONS. 205 

was nearly one-half of the effective force of the whole American army 
about New York. While the exact number may not be ascertained, 
it is best to settle upon some final standard, so that an approximate 
estimate can have its place in history. That standard must be the 
official returns, with only those qualifications which equally valuable 
contemporaneous judgment will warrant. The " ration returns " then 
made, vindicate the above judgment of the force at the post. The 
disposition of the American advance posts before Brooklyn was of the 
feeblest kind, in view of the impending advance of the British army. 

Johnson's New Jersey, and Handshaw's Massachusetts regiments 
were established at Prospect Hill. Colonel Hand's was also there ; 
Miles' Pennsylvania rifles, and Wyllis' Connecticut were at or near the 
Bedford pass. Three field pieces, and one howitzer were in the 
redoubt and intrenchments before Flatbush. General Sullivan's re- 
port contains the following : *' Lord Stirling commanded the main 
body without the lines. I was to have commanded under General 
Putnam within the lines. I was uneasy about a road, through which 
I had often foretold that the enemy would come, but could not per- 
suade others to be of my opinion. I went to the hill near Flatbush to 
reconnoiter, and with a picket of four hundred men was surrounded 
by the enemy, who had advanced by the very road I had foretold, and 
which I had paid horsemen fifty dollars for patrolling by night, while 
I had the command, as I had no foot for the purpose." " I often 
urged, both by word and writing, that the enemy would first try Long 
Island ; and then New York, which was completely commanded by it, 
would fall of course. In this I was unhappy enough to differ from 
almost every officer in the army, till the event proved my conjectures 
were just." General Sullivan was second in command. Lord Stirling 
was at the fort, until awakened at three o'clock on the morning of 
the twenty-seventh, and assigned to duty on the extreme right. The 
standing order of Washington required a general officer to be always 
on the lines. General Sullivan, in the absence of all other officers, and 
as so recently responsible for the whole command, docs not success- 
fully limit his responsibility to that of fighting well the little escort to 
his reconnoitering trip. 

General Putnam already advanced in years, and wholly unac- 
quainted with the outposts, seems to have left undisturbed the exist- 
ing picket arrangements when he took command. It has been seen 
that Washington had ordered the careful observation and guard of 
all approaches. As General Sullivan claim:;d that he always expected 



206 BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.— PREPARATIONS. [1776. 

the British advance to be made upon Brooklyn, he must as a soldier 
be held to certain implied presumptions which he alone could, and 
never did, adequately explain. 

The simple facts are that the Jamaica road was overlooked. The 
force at all outside posts up to the attack upon the pickets at Red Lion, 
on the harbor road, was but a little over three thousand men ; and 
when that attack was made it was assumed to be conclusive of the 
purpose of General Howe to make that route his line of operations 
against the American works. There is no other hypothesis which 
would warrant the exposure of troops on that road, subject as they 
would be to lose their line of retreat, if General De Heister should 
advance upon the centre. He was in fact nearer the fort than Red 
Lion was. 

The British army was prepared to fulfill its duty. The American 
army, without Greene, failed to understand the position, and was not 
ready for duty. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. 

THE twenty-seventh day of August, 1776, was a day of struggle 
from its first hour. 

The narrative brought General Grant into conflict with the pickets 
of the American outposts on New York Bay, just about midnight of 
the twenty-sixth. The picket was commanded by Major Burd, of the 
Pennsylvania flying camp. This camp, it will be remembered, was 
established by authority of Congress for the concentration of ten 
thousand men who were to be placed under instruction, as an ultimate 
reserve. The exigency hurried many of these regiments to New York 
before they had in fact been fully organized. 

The picket at Red Lion held firmly to their post, supported by a 
portion of Huntington's Connecticut regiment, and aided by the early 
presence of General Parsons, who had just before received the appoint- 
ment as brigadier-general. He was a lawyer, without military ante- 
cedents, and had been with the army but a few weeks. 

Major Burd was captured during the pressure of General Grant's 
advance guard upon the picket line. Messengers were dispatched to 
head-quarters, and at three o'clock General Putnam sent General 
Lord Stirling to the relief of the picket, with orders " to stop the 
advance of the enemy." Colonel Atlee, of the Pennsylvania mus- 
keteer battalion, was pushed forward to the crest of the hill by which 
the British must approach, and a portion of three companies uniting 
with the original advance guard, maintained such vigorous skirmishing 
just back of Red Lion, as to check the advance of the enemy until 
quite late in the morning. Nearly midway between the American 
lines and Red Lion, a well developed ridge extended from the general 
line of hills across the traveled road, nearly to the shore of the New 
York Bay. The ground in front, to the south- vvest, was low and 
marshy at places, while an orchard occupied the slight upland imme- 



208 BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. ^ [1776. 

diately in front of this ridge, which General Stirling selected as his 
point of resistance. In order to check the British advance, and give 
time for the formation of the troops then rapidly approaching from 
Brooklyn, Colonel Atlee promptly concentrated his regiment and the 
retiring picket guard upon the side of the main hills, so as to have a 
superior position from which to open fire upon the British columns, 
then preparing to descend from the summit near the pass to the low 
ground and orchard which they must cross in order to attack Stirling. 
This movement of Colonel Atlee to high ground which was well 
wooded and adapted to his design, was made under a fire of grape 
shot, with the loss, according to his report, of but one man. 

It is necessary to state in this connection that the reports of Stir- 
ling, Atlee, and other officers, written on the night of the twenty- 
seventh, and on the twenty-eighth, while they were prisoners, are 
necessarily meager in detail, and have value simply for the facts within 
their immediate personal knowledge. Those facts only are here em- 
bodied which are consistent with the record as gathered from addi- 
tional sources. Statements and omissions are therefore alike to be 
regarded, in order to make the narrative as full as the f^cts will war- 
rant, and military orders themselves are to be largely inferred from 
acts done. Each claims for himself sufficient credit for good conduct, 
while none assume responsibility for neglect. 

Colonel Atlee had barely reached the wooded slope referred to, 
when General Grant moved the twenty-third, forty-fourth, and a part 
of the seventeenth British foot to the right, up the hill, overlapping 
Atlee's command, and having as their evident purpose to flank him first, 
then to crowd him back upon Stirling, and so flank the entire command. 
Stirling had already formed his line. It consisted of Smallwood's 
Maryland battalion, Haslet's Delaware battalion, their colonels being 
absent as members of court-martial in New York, and a part of 
Kiechline's rifle battalion, just then coming upon the ground. Cap- 
tain Carpenter with two pieces of artillery was already in sight, and 
soon after joined the brigade. Stirling sent Captain Stedman with 
two Delaware companies to support Colonel Atlee, with orders to take 
distance still more to the left, and prevent the enemy from gaining 
higher ground for their flank movement. General Parsons was also 
placed on the left with so much of Huntington's regiment as was on 
the ground. Two vigorous attacks were made upon Atlee without 
success. Both were repulsed with considerable loss, as the character 
of the crround and the intervening woods gave confidence and effi- 



1776.] BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. 209 

ciency to the American troops. After the second repulse, Colonel 
Atlee made a quick advance to force a good position which the British 
held, but was forced back by a heavy fire from a superior force. His 
Lieutenant-colonel, Caleb Parry, was killed, as well as Lieutenant- 
colonel Grant, of the fortieth British foot. The British loss in killed 
and wounded during these attacks was a little over sixty officers and 
men, including Lieutenant Colonel Monckton of the forty-first, dan- 
gerously wounded. 

The British centre and left had now formed in two lines for an 
advance upon Stirling ; their left having been relieved from pressure, 
moved on in a single line as originally deployed. Captain Carpenter's 
guns were promptly moved nearer the hill-side to command the road, 
and a spirited action was maintained, at arms' length, for nearly two 
hours, with considerable loss on both sides, and little advantage to 
either. The distance to the American lines was much less than three 
miles, the disparity in force was not sufficient to warrant the sacrifice 
and risk of assault, and the general plan of the combined British 
movement, rendered such an attempt unnecessary. It was enough 
for the British left wing to be able to hold Stirling fast where 
he was. 

The sound of firing had already been heard in the direction of 
Flatbush. Shortly before eleven o'clock it was heard to the rear of 
Stirling, and the real issue of the day approached its solution. Stir- 
ling retreated hastily, but in order ; and was soon confronted with fresh 
columns which were rapidly advancing toward the road which ran 
from the Upper Mill, to Flatbush. Orders were given for the men to 
seek their own safety, by crossing the marsh to the Yellow Mill, or 
otherwise, each for himself. The tide was already coming in, and 
promptness alone could save any of the command. Atlee and Par- 
sons fell back, along the hill, skirmishing as they retired. The ammu- 
nition wagon of Huntington's regiment had joined the detachment, 
but the increasing volume of fire gave imperative warning no longer 
to delay retreat. Parsons, with a few men, attempted to cross the 
Flatbush road and retreat toward Hell Gate. His men scattered and 
he entered the works in the morning, having escaped through the 
thick woods. Atlee found himself in danger of capture by a Hessian 
detachment, and turning to the right surrendered to the forty-second 
Highland regiment, which was on De Heister's left, and had advanced 
over Prospect Hill. 

General Stirling, with four hundred men of Smallwood's Maryland 
M 



2l£) -BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. [17761 

■battalion, faced his new opponent, and made a grasp to control the 
road which led into South Brooklyn and thereby cover the causeway 
at the Upper Mill. This would at least have secured a retreat for the 
other troops. It was too late. Cornwallis had already occupied the 
Cortelyou house, and held fast to his position with constantly increas- 
ing forces. An attempt was then made to force a passage to fort 
-Box, the redoubt at the nearest point on the American lines, but this 
was foiled by the skillful interposition of a force of grenadiers and 
two guns. 

,. Finding this avenue of escape closed, and that the army of Grant 
was fast approaching, Stirling moved rapidly into the woods to the 
fright, up the slope of the hill, only to be confronted by a Hessian 
column which had crossed over from Prospect Hill. He surrendered 
lo General De Heister in person. 

Thus closed the operations of the right wing. It was marked by 
great courage, pertinacity and presence of mind, and the disposition 
of Stirling's brigade was such as to meet every requirement that could 
be expected of a force hardly exceeding seventeen hundred men. 
, . A single detachment of prisoners had been taken. Lieutenant 
Ragg and twenty men, of the second regiment of Marines, as desig- 
nated in General Howe's official report, although not named on the 
Roster of the army as landed, mistook the well equipped south- 
ern troops for Hessians, and fell into their hands as subjects of 
exchange. 

The retreat was a trying one, but without considerable loss, except 
that of the battle-field and of prisoners. Exaggerated reports were 
current at that period, as to the number of men drowned, or suffo- 
cated, while crossing the head of Gowanus Bay. Many of the men 
abandoned their arms and equipments and swam the narrow belt of 
deep water, but no reasonable construction of official or personal in- 
formation will place the number of drowned men at more than seven, 
and Colonel Haslet mentions only one. The Maryland and Dela- 
ware regiments fought like veteran troops, and maintained their repu- 
tation on subsequent battle-fields. A loss, in killed, wounded and 
missing, of two hundred and fifty-nine, tells the whole story ; and in 
the last struggle to force the lines of Earl Cornwallis, the Maryland 
troops made repeated assaults under a heavy fire, with commendable 
spirit and coolness. 

While General Grant's division was thus actively engaged, the 
division of General Heister was contentedwith an active cannonading 



1776.] BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND, 211 

of the American redoubt and intrenchments, where General Sullivan 
was really and necessarily in command, before Flatbush. 

Generals Howe, Clinton, Percy and Cornwallis, after resting their 
troops on the Jamaica road near Bedford, still undiscovered by the 
Americans, began their advance again at half-past eight o'clock in the 
morning. The light infantry and light dragoons passed beyond 
Bedford and bore to the left, and south, directly across the Flatbush 
road. The alarm had been already given. A detachment of the 
Guards and one grenadier company with three pieces of artillery soon 
joined them and commenced a spirited attack upon the alarmed 
troops who were rapidly retiring from Prospect Hill. The Thirty-third 
foot and another detachment of grenadiers pushed across the 
Heights under the very fire of the American lines to cut off Stirling's 
retreat and unite with General Grant. The Second grenadiers, and 
the detachment of the Seventy-first, followed, in time to defeat Stir- 
ling's last effort to escape. As soon as General Clinton's guns opened 
fire, De Heister, thus notified that the time had come for his action, 
ordered Colonel Donop with the Yagers to advance in open order, 
using only the bayonet, and put his whole command in quick motion 
to support this impetuous onset. Several light field pieces, charged 
with grape, were sent in advance to clear the way. The American 
arm)^ was between two fires. Single positions were held for a few 
moments with obstinacy and gallantry, but in a few moments more, 
the crushing force of two fronts, enveloped each party in turn, and 
the whole command broke up into small detachments, seeking per- 
sonal safety in flight or hiding places. 

The British loss, as officially stated, including Hessians and Ma- 
rines, was five officers killed and twenty-one wounded and missing; 
fifty-eight non-commissioned officers and men killed, and three hun- 
dred and sixteen wounded and missing. 

The British return of American prisoners made a total of one 
thousand and ninety-seven, including sixty-seven wounded officers 
and men. 

Upon this list there are reported Generals Sullivan, Woodhull 
and Stirling. General Woodhull, with more than two hundred militia, 
was captured on the twenty-eighth, near Jamaica, as elsewhere stated, 
but appear on the return referred to. 

Upon a muster of the two Pennsylvania rifle battalions, and 
Colonel Atlee's musketeer battalion, the day after the battle, " after- 
wards carefully compared with the accounts which came by a flag of 



212 BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND, [1776. 

truce," their total of killed, wounded and missing, added up two hun- 
dred and seventy-seven. 

Upon a revision of the whole returns it appeared that the casualties 
of Stirling's brigade were one-half, and those of the Maryland battalion 
were one-fourth of the aggregate losses of the entire day. 

The American casualties, exclusive of the Long Island militia, 
were, as nearly as can be ascertained, nine hundred and seventy officers 
and men, and the British casualties foot up just four hundred. 

The battle of Long Island had to be fought. If the protracted 
resistance of Breed's Hill, and the successful defense of Fort Moultrie, 
created an undue estimate of the capacity of militia and raw troops 
when covered by breast-works, and thereby engendered a false con- 
fidence that the works on Brooklyn Heights could be also held against 
a well equipped veteran army, it certainly demonstrated that no re- 
sistance at all could be kept up, without complete discipline. The 
defense was doomed to be a failure from the first, independent of the 
cooperation of a naval force. The sole value of the advance posts 
and of careful pickets, lay in the assurance of prolonged resistance, 
and not in a finally successful resistance. The ultimate course of 
General Howe, that of regular approaches, was inevitable, and the 
result was almost certain. Washington was wise in his purpose " to 
make the acquisition as costly as possible to his adversary." He 
needed time to increase and discipline his army. Occupation and the 
stimulus of action alone could do this. 

The people of the country demanded that New York should be 
held to the last possible moment. 

Jay's proposition to burn and abandon it without a show of resist- 
ance was not the way to make the army strong for future endeavor. 
Its immediate abandonment would have involved the demoralization 
of the entire army, and would have been in marked contrast with his 
efforts to restore Boston to herself. The resistance so widened the 
breach between the parties at issue and made the necessity more 
pressing for the development of resources equal to the increased 
gravity of the struggle. General Howe checked his troops, as they 
acted under the impulse of success, and were ready to assault the 
American works. In this much criticised delay he was right. A 
repulse would have been ruin. Washington crossed the river with 
three regiments after the battle began, so that he could have met an 
assault with nearly as many men as could have been brought to the 
attack and thoroughly handled : but with characteristic resting after 



1776.] BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. 213 

an exertion, and habitual under-estimate of the sagacity and wakeful- 
ness of his adversary, Howe failed to improve his suceess. His 
enemy escaped ; other battle-fields were to illustrate the capacity 
and military genius of the opposing General in chief, and other 
neglects to improve success were to wrest from his, General Howe's, 
hands, every substantial benefit which so often fell within their 
grasp. 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

RETREAT FROM LONG ISLAND. 

THE British army sat down before Brooklyn, opened lines of 
approach, erected adequate works to resist any sortie from the 
garrison, and awaited the operations of the pick and shovel. 

Within the American lines, a critical examination of every defens- 
ive appliance or position was made by Washington in person. He 
had organized a strong detachment for the relief of Stirling at the 
time that officer made his earnest effort to gain the position occupied 
by Cornwallis at the Cortelyou house ; but the swift movement of the 
British grenadiers across the face of the intrenchments, within full 
view of the garrison, rendered any reinforcement to Stirling simply 
impossible. 

The night was spent by the men in strengthening the defenses, 
and in readiness to resist any attack. The officers and men who had 
disappeared during the day were among the best of the army. Of 
the general officers that remained, the Commander-in-chief alone in- 
spired confidence. He spent the night in visiting the guard, and at 
early dawn of the twenty-eighth, he was again in the trenches, per- 
sonally attentive to all details, and cheering the men by strong and 
hopeful words. General Mifflin arrived before noon with the well 
drilled regiments of Glover, Massachusetts, and of Shee and Magaw, 
Pennsylvania. The enthusiasm which greeted their arrival was an 
involuntary tribute of respect for those well equipped troops, who had 
been sneered at as fair weather soldiers, so " proud of fine arms and 
fine feathers." The garrison was now fully nine thousand strong. 
Rain began to fall heavily. " A northeaster " set in, and the after- 
noon was one of extreme discomfort and trial. The trenches through 
the I'jw ground, filled with water, cooking was impossible, the troops 
were without tents or other shelter, the supply of blankets was inade- 
qii.ite for half the command, and the ammunition itself was greatly 




\Briirsh 



ai-/2S finer. 



N Cbm/ukde/idDn 



•>,14* 



1776] RETREAT FROiM LONG ISLAND. 21 5 

injured for want of proper protection. General Washington took 
neither rest nor sleep, but spent his entire time, by night and day, as 
actively on duty as if he were the sole picket upon whom the safety 
of all depended. Such little skirmishing fire as was practicable was 
encouraged, so that the British troops were kept under the impression 
that it was useless to risk small detachments outside of their own 
guard lines. This was compensated by their overrunning adjacent 
parts of the island. General WoodhuU with more than two hundred 
militia were captured during the day, near Jamaica, by Delancy's pro- 
vincial loyalists, who had crossed over from Staten Island, and took 
lively interest in all operations in small villages which were occupied 
by " revolutionists.'' 

The rain was so incessant, and accompanied by a wind so violent, 
that the British troops kept within their tents, and their works made 
slow progress toward completion. During the entire night of the 
twenty-eighth, as during the previous night, Washington and his 
aids, made the entire sentry rounds with periodic exactness, attending 
to matters requiring notice, and imparting to the guard the confidence 
which such attentions alone could secure. The twenty-ninth was 
another day of clouds and storms. The British, however, improved 
every cessation of heavy rain, to prosecute work upon their trenches, 
which had been started at a distance of six hundred yards from Fort 
Putnam, the present Washington Park. If they had worked during 
the hours when the American troops stood in water unprotected, 
silently waiting upon the movements of the investing army, they could 
have opened fire by the evening of that day. More than once in 
subsequent campaigns. General Howe suspended movements at crit- 
ical times because of rain, when his adversary, less comfortably pro- 
vided for and protected, treated the rain as no obstacle in the way 
of impending possible duty. 

It is just here, as one instance, that the voluminous discussions as 
to lines of policy and action have beclouded the narrative of the war 
for American independence ; and the opinions of councils of war, of 
general officers, of committees of public safety and of Congress, have 
been confused and made to declare irreconcilable inconsistencies, as 
if the retreat from Long Island and New York had no intrinsic neces- 
sity, but was the accident of majority opinions. The American and 
British archives and biography are full of contemporaneous letters and 
humble data, which it would require volumes to quote, but which 
have but one possible conclusion, — that Washington of his own 



2l6 RETREAT FROM LONG ISLAND. [1776. 

judgment, and acting upon the same philosophy which made the 
defense of Brooklyn necessary in the first instance, resolved to evacu- 
ate the Heights in due time without a decisive battle. 

Washington's policy was to postpone all issues which had a deter- 
mining character, and were beyond mastery by his army, to wear out 
the offensive by avoiding its strokes, and thereby to gain the vantage 
ground for turning upon it, when thus worn out or over-confident, and 
off its guard. The necessities of the American cause called for Grand 
Strategy, and improved Logistics rather than Grand 7 actios, because ; 
his army was unequal to the latter, and largely dependent for its suc- 
cess upon the wisdom with which its undoubted courage could be 
made available in the interest of the new nation. The retreat from; 
Brooklyn was characteristic of this policy. The men were kept up to 
duty as if any hour would command their utmost energies in self-de-- 
fense ; but he had his own plan to develop, and this he did not sub- 
mit to his aids or his officers, until it was matured and nearly ripe for 
execution. How well he kept his own counsel will be seen by his 
action. 

The following order was sent to General Heath, then command- 
ing officer at Kings' Bridge, through General Mifflin, very early on the 
morning of the twenty-ninth of August. 

Long Island, August 29TH, 1776. 
" Dear General — We have many battalions from New Jersey which are com- 
ing over this evening to relieve others here. You will please therefore to order every 
flat bottomed boat and other craft at your post, fit for transporting troops, down to 
New York as soon as possible. They must be manned by some of Colonel Hutchin- 
son's men and sent without the least delay, I write by the order of the General. 

I am affectionately Yours, 
"To Maj, Gen'l Heath." Mifflin." 

Commissary-general Trumbull also bore an order to Assistant' 
Quarter-master Hughes, by which he was instructed " to impress 
every kind of craft, on either side of New York, that could be kept 
afloat, and had either oars or sails, or could be furnished with them, 
and to have them all in the East river by dark." 

After these officers had started upon their missions, Washington 
continued his watchfulness and visitations to all parts of the camp, 
summoning a council of officers, however, to an early evening inter- 
view. He submitted his plan to that council, and with this result : 
" At a council of war held at Long Island, August 29th, 1776, Pres- 
ent : His Excellency General Washington; Major Generals Putnam, 



1776.] RETREAT FROM LONG ISLAND. 21/ 

Spencer, Brigadier Generals Mifflin, McDoiigall, Parsons, Scott, 
Wadszvorth, Fellozvs. 

It was submitted to the consideration of the council, whether, under 
all circumstances, it is not eligible to leave Long Island, and its depen- 
dencies and remove to Nezv York. Unanimously agreed in the 
affirmative. General Putnam, Saml. H. Parsons, Thos. Spencer, Jno. 
Morin Scott, Thos. Mifflin, James Wadsvvorth, Alex. McDougall." 

Eight reasons were also assigned for this action. 

The date of the council shows that its action was not the origin 
of the retreat. General Heath acted with such promptness, that 
although more than fourteen miles from Brooklyn when he received 
the order for transportation, he properly conceived its import, and so 
faithfully executed it, as did Quarter-master Hughes also, that the 
boats reached the foot of Brooklyn Heights just at dark that after- 
noon. 

At about eight o'clock the regiments were put under arms, as if to 
make a sally upon the British lines. General McDougall was stationed 
at the shore to regulate the embarkation. Colonel Glover's regiment, 
which had been recruited at Marblehead and other sea-coast towns 
of Massachusetts, was very appropriately distributed in the boats to 
act as seamen, and General Mifflin with the three regiments which he 
had brought over on the previous day, and those of Hand and Small- 
wood, were designated as the new guard and garrison of the intrencti- 
ments and redoubts. As the latter occupied the works the old guard 
passed directly to the heights, and the regiments last recruited, and 
least drilled, took the lead in crossing the river. 

From about nine o'clock until nearly midnight, through wind and 
rain, — company by company, — sometimes grasping hands to keep 
companionship in the dense gloom, — speechless and silent, so that no 
sound should alarm the enemy, — feeling their way down the steep 
steps then leading to Fulton ferry, and feeling their way as they were 
passed into the waiting water-craft, these drenched and weary men 
took passage for New York. The wind and tide were so violent that 
even the seamen soldiers of Massachusetts could not spread a close 
reefed sail upon a single vessel ; and the larger vessels, upon which 
so much depended, would have been swept to the ocean if once en- 
trusted to the current. For three hours, all the boats that could be 
thus propelled, had to depend upon muffled oars. The difficulties 
of such a trip, on such a night, can be realized better by a moment's 
reflection. There is no record of the size of the waves, or of narrow 



2l8 RETREAT FROM LONG ISLAND. [1776 

escapes from upset, no intimation that there was competition in entering 
the boats and rivalry in choice of place — that each boat-load was 
landed hastily and that the boats themselves were leaky and unsafe ; 
but any person who proposes to himself an imaginary transit over 
the East river under their circumstances, can supply the data he may 
need to appreciate the process. 

General McDougall himself doubted whether nine thousand men 
could be thus transferred before morning and advised its postpone- 
ment until another night, but there was to be no cessation of the task 
until its proper work was done. 

It was about midnight, just as tiie tide turned, that the north-east 
wind which had steadily prevailed for more than three days, and had 
kept the British fleet in the lower bay, spent its strength, — the water 
became smooth, the sky was clear, and the boats " loaded to the 
water's edge," and guided safely, began to make productive trips. A 
south-west wind sprang up by one o'clock. Everything that could 
carry sail now took its part in the movement, and with more than 
four-fold celerity, the transfer of troops continued. It was in the 
midst of this prosperous undertaking that there occurred one of those 
unexpected incidents which for a time threatened the rear of the 
army with destruction. Washington sent Colonel Scammel to General 
Mifflin to hasten all the troops forward. The covering party was put 
in motion, but returned promptly to their places; and the error was 
not discovered by the British sentries. Reference was made to this 
affair under the subject of " Retreats." Irving states that Washing- 
ton calmly replied to Mifflin, who cited orders, '* It is a dreadful mis- 
take. Unless the troops can regain the lines before their absence is 
discovered by the enemy, the most disastrous consequences are to be 
apprehended." One soldier wrote, "when the order came, it was so 
much sooner than we expected, that a rumor went through the bat- 
talion that the British Dragoons were at our heels, and some of the 
men halted, kneeled down, and prepared to resist a charge." A heavy 
sea-fog, driven in from the Atlantic, hung above Long Island and the 
lower bay, while the peninsula of New York was uncovered. This 
increased the danger of panic, but also prevented discovery of the 
misadventure. 

The military stores and all guns which were not too heavy to be 
hauled through the mud, were safely placed on the transports, and 
with the last boat-load, Mifflin, and last of all, Washington, took 
passage. 



17^6.] RETREAT FROM LONG ISLAND. 219 

On the day following the troops and stores were also removed 
from Governor's Island in safety, and the evacuation was complete. 

" Whoever will attend to all the details of this retreat," says Botta, 
'* will easily believe that no military operation was ever conducted by 
frreat captains with more ability and prudence, or under more favor- 
able auspices." 

General Howe states in his official report, that on the twenty- 
ninth, at night, the rebels evacuated their intrenchments and Red 
Hook, with the utmost silence. At daybreak of the thirtieth their 
flight was discovered, the pickets of the line took possession, and 
those most advanced reached the shore opposite to New York as 
their rear guard was going over, and fired some shot among them." 

Prompt action as soon as General Howe had notice of the retreat, 
would have secured the capture of Washington himself. Stedman, 
after stating that General Howe was advised very early that the 
retreat was in progress, and delayed for some time before giving the 
order to Lord Percy to advance upon the works, thus wonderfully 
philosophizes upon the event : " In reviewing the actions of men, the 
historian is often at a loss to conjecture the secret causes which 
gave them birth. It cannot be denied that the American army lay 
almost entirely at the will of the English. That they were therefore 
suffered to retire in safety has by some been attributed to the reluc- 
tance of the commander-in-chief to shed the blood of a people so 
nearly allied to that source from whence he derived all his authority 
and power. We are rather inclined to adopt this idea and to suppose 
motives of mistaken policy, than to leave ground for an imagination 
that the escape of the Americans resulted from any want of exertion 
on the part of Sir William Howe, or deficiency in the military science. 

In the range of " historical and military criticism " which the 
author has adopted, it is his purpose to furnish a correct record, and 
leave the facts to the interpretation which the principles stated will 
evolve. It is however but justice to General Howe's military knowl- 
edge to state, that the element of character heretofore unfolded, was 
the cause of his failure at Brooklyn. He was wanting in details^ 
sluggish when instant action was vital, and could not improve success. 
The strategical features of his operations on Long Island were admira- 
ble ; and the American army was saved, through equally admirable 
Logistics. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

THE AMERICAN ARMY RETIRES FROM NEW YORK. 

THE retreat of Washington from Long Island saved his army. 
When the " forty-eight sleepless hours," during which he had 
been constantly in the saddle, or equally active on foot, had passed 
away, that army was indeed in New York, but under circumstances 
of hardly less peril than before. -^ 

'*The militia," said Washington, " are dismayed, intractable, and 
impatient to return home. Great numbers have gone off, in some 
instances, almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies 
at a time," and adds, " when their example has infected another part 
of the army, when their want of discipline and refusal of almost every 
kind of restraint and government, have produced a like conduct, but 
too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that order and 
subordination so necessary to the well doing of an army, and which 
had been inculcated before as well as the nature of our military estab- 
lishment would admit of, our condition is still more alarming, and 
with the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of con- 
fidence with the generality of the troops." 

He made an urgent appeal to Congress to establish a regular army, 
or to enlist men for the war, and laid before them the difficulties of 
the situation, and the impending necessity of retiring from New York 
itself. He put the plain question, whether, in that event, the town 
should be left standing for British winter-quarters. 

"The number of men present fit for duty, on the second day of 
September, was under twenty thousand." An order was issued on 
the same day, " for a new arrangement of the troops, in order that 
they might act with union and firmness." Three grand divisions wer( 
organized. 

General Putnam's division, consisting of the brigades of General^ 
Parsons, Scott, Clinton, Fellows and Silliman, was assigned to duty ii 
the city and its vicinity. 



f776] THE AMERICAN ARMY RETIRES FROM NEW YORK. 221 

The center division, under General Spencer during General Greene's 
illness, was ordered to be in readiness to march immediately to Har- 
lem, to prevent the enemy's landing on the island. It consisted of 
the brigades of Nixon, Heard, McDougall, Wadsworth, Douglas, and 
Chester. 

General Heath, with the brigades of General Mifflin and General 
George Clinton, were ordered to Kings Bridge and its vicinity. Colonel 
Haslet's regiment was assigned to Mifflin's brigade. 

September third, Congress resolved that " two of the North Caro- 
lina battalions be ordered to march with all expedition under General 
Moore, to reinforce the army at New York, that one continental bat- 
talion be ordered from Rhode Island to New York, and that the 
States north of Virginia be recommended to send all the aid in their 
power." 

On the same day, Putnam, writing from Bloomingdale, declares, 
" there are so many places where the enemy can land in superior 
force, that he advises the fortification of Mount Washington, Harlem 
Heights, and the Jersey shore, and to take all measures requisite to 
defend the passage of the North river." He adds, " I know that this 
doctrine gives up York to destruction, but what are ten or twenty 
towns to the grand object. If Howe gets to Albany, our north- 
western army must quit Ticonderoga or fall a sacrifice. Burgoyne 
need never come from Canada." 

September fourth. General Washington reprimanded such " dia- 
bolical practices as robbing orchards, gardens, and straggling without 
arms or purpose, and advises that the roll be called three times a day, 
to keep the men to duty." 

September fifth, General Greene urged a general and speedy re- 
treat from New York, and that a council be convened to take action 
upon that question. 

September eighth, Washington reported the militia of Connecticut 
then with him, " as reduced from six to two thousand men, and in ? 
few days their number was but nominal, twenty or thirty to some 
regiments," so that " they were discharged with a recommendation to 
Governor Trumbull that it was about time to begin dealing with de- 
serters." On the same day he reported to Congress that a council 
which he had convened on the sixth was opposed to retiring from 
New York, although they acknowledged that it " would not be tenable 
if attacked with artillery," and adds significantly, that " some to whom 
the opinion of Congress was known, were not a little influenced in 



222 THE AMERICAN ARMY RETIRES FROM NEW YORK. [1776. 

their opinions, as they were led to suspect that Congress wished it 
to be retained at all hazards." 

Washington realized daily that it was useless labor and expense to 
line the rivers of New York with field-works, which would require a 
garrison of thousands, so long as the rivers themselves were under the 
control of a large naval force and a veteran army. 

That army had already extended its right wing as far as Flushing 
and Hell Gate, with posts at Bushwick, Newtown, and Astoria. Mon- 
tressor and Buchanan islands, now Ward's and Randall's, had been 
abandoned by the Americans and occupied by the British. Several 
frigates had passed between Governor's Island and the peninsula known 
as Red Hook, and smaller vessels took position at the head of Wall- 
about Bay, and Newtown inlet, where they 'found depth of water, and 
immunity from the fire of the American guns. 

The entire East river front of New York island was thus exposed 
to incursions which could be made more quickly than troops could be 
concentrated for resistance. Appeals to the northern States were 
indeed favorably entertained, and Massachusetts made a draft of 
one-fifth of her able-bodied male population, certain exposed localities 
and certain classes of persons alone excepted ; and on the fourteenth, 
Congress authorized a total of eighty-five regiments to be enlisted for 
a term of five years. These were apportioned to the respective States. 
All this was of little immediate value to the army. Application had 
been made to Washington for troops to garrison Fort Montgomery, 
on the Hudson river, but none could be spared ; and the elaborate 
works erected at King's Bridge, and thence southward to Harlem 
Plains, were of no practical value to the army which occupied the 
lower part of the island. 

In Washington's letter of the eighth of September the following 
words occurred : " Men of discernment will see that by such works 
and preparations we have delayed the operations of the campaign till 
it is too late to effect any capital incursions into the country. It is 
now obvious that they, (the British army) mean to enclose us on the 
island of New York, by taking post in my rear, while the shipping 
secures the front, and thus oblige us to fight them on their own terms, 
or surrender at discretion." " Every measure is to be formed with 
some apprehension that all our troops will not do their duty. On 
our side, the war should be defensive : it has even been called a war 
of posts; we should on all occasions avoid a general action, and never 
be drawn into a necessity to put anything to risk. Persuaded that 



1776.] THE AMERICAN ARMY RETIRES FROM NEW YORK. 223 

it would be presumptuous to draw out our young troops into open 
ground against their superiors in numbers and discipline, I have never 
spared the spade and pickaxe, but I have not found that readiness to 
defend, even strong posts, at all hazards, which is necessary to derive 
the greatest benefit from them. I am sensible that a retreating army 
is encircled with difficulties ; that declining an engagement subjects a 
general to reproach: but when the fate of America may be at stake 
on the issue, we should protract the war, if possible. That the enemy 
mean to winter in New York, there can be no doubt ; that they can 
drive us out, is equally clear : nothing seems to remain, but to deter- 
mine the time of their taking possession." 

The following is the journal entry upon receipt of the letter 
referred to : 

"Tuesday, September 10, 1776. 

A letter of the eighth from General Washington, with sundry 
papers inclosed, was read : whereupon. 

Resolved, That the president inform General Washington, it was 
by no means the sense of Congress, in their resolve of the 3d instant, 
respecting New York, that the army or any part of it should remain 
in that city a moment longer than he shall think it proper for the 
public service that troops be continued there." 

The resolution referred to embraced this clause: " That General 
Washington be acquainted that Congress would have special care 
taken, in case he should find it necessary to quit New York, that no 
damage be done to the said city by his troops, on their leaving it : 
the Congress having no doubt of being able to recover the same, 
though the enemy should for a time have possession of it." 

During the two weeks which succeeded the retreat from Brooklyn, 
the army was rapidly fading away, while raw recruits were gathering 
to supply the vacant files, as during the first week of the year, before 
Boston. The comparative inactivity of the British troops was made 
the occasion of new propositions for settlement of the difficulty be- 
tween the two countries. General Sullivan was sent to Congress as 
bearer of Lord Howe's message. John Adams, Edward Eldridge and 
Dr. Franklin were elected as a committee to meet Lord Howe and state 
the position which the United States assumed. Franklin urged, that 
a recognition of American Independence, to be followed by a treaty 
of alliance and friendship, would be for the best interests of both 
nations. Lord Howe, thoroughly anxious to secure an honorable end 
to the conflict, was so limited by his instructions that submission was 



224 THE AMERICAN ARMY RETIRES FROM NEW YORK. [1776. 

the indispensable element to success in his mission. The interview- 
only re-asserted the impossibility of compromise. 

By the tenth of September, Washington began the removal of 
valuable stores, preparatory to ultimate retreat from the city. On 
the eleventh Generals Greene, Nixon, Mifflin, Beall, Parsons, Wads- 
worth and Scott united in a request for a new council, for the pur- 
pose of re-considering their former action. On the twelfth, the coun- 
cil met. The vote is thus recorded. To reconsider : Generals Beall, 
Scott, Fellows, WadszvortJi, Nixon, McDougall, Parsons, Mifflin, Greetie 
and Put7iam. 

To adhere : Generals Spencer, Clinton, Heath. The council also 
decided that eight thousand men should be left for the defense of 
Mount Washington and its dependencies. A brief examination of 
the " Returns of the army " " in the service of the United States of 
America, in and near the city of New York," at that time, will have 
value in this connection. The weakest and strongest regiments of 
several brigades are selected as types of the general condition of the 
army, and the figures indicate the rank and file only. 

In Parsons' brigade, the regiments of Huntington and Tyler are 
placed side by side, Huntington's regiment. Total 348. Sick 169. 
Tyler s regiment. Total, 567. Sick, 147. The former regiment had 
seen service : the latter was new. In Silliman's brigade. Hininaiis 
regiment. Total 237. Sick, 179. Thompson' s regiment. Total 416. 
Sick 243. 

In Mifflin's brigade, composed of the regiments of Hand, Shee, 
Magaw, At lee. Miles, Ward, H7itehinsoji, and Haslet: already famil- 
iarly known. Atlee's regiment. Total 243. Sick 60. Shee's regi- 
ment. Total 499. Sick 142. 

In McDougall's brigade. McDougall's regiment. Total, 42S. 
Sick, 108. Smallwood's, Total 584. Sick 161. 

The columns, headed " wanted to complete," and " alterations 
since last return " have been used elsewhere, as the basis for estimate 
of the loss incurred in the skirmishes on Long Island. 

The foregoing statement is impartial and indicates the condition 
of the army which was preparing to leave New York. 

The Council had decided to retreat, just when the strong arm of 
force was ready to drive them out. 

There was hardly time to do the work with decorum, to say little 
of military order. 

On the thirteenth of September several frigates entered East 



1776-] THE AMERICAN ARMY RETIRES FROM NEW YORK. 22$ 

river and commanded the works near the foot of Thirteenth street, 
and the whole army was engaged in removing stores and heavy 
artillery. General Putnam was detailed with a command of four 
thousand men to cover the retreat, while the remaining divisions 
moved to King's Bridge and Mount Washington. 

On Saturday the fourteenth of September, while at his head-quar- 
ters at the house of Robert Murray, Washington noticed that " about 
sunset six more vessels, one or two of them men-of-war, passed up 
the East river to the station occupied by others on the previous day." 
" In a half an hour" he " received two expresses, one from Colonel 
Sargent at Horn's Hook (Hell Gate), giving an account, that the 
enemy, to the amount of three or four thousand, had marched to the 
river and were embarking for Montressor's Island, where numbers of 
them were then encamped " — the other, from General Mifflin " that 
uncommon and formidable movements were discovered among the 
enemy." " These having been confirmed by the scouts sent out by 
himself," Washington " proceeded to Harlem, where it was sup- 
posed, or at Morrisania opposite to it, the principal attempt to land 
would be made." His head-quarters were then transferred to the 
house of Roger Morris very nearly at the centre of the theatre of 
operations. 

The night passed without an attempt at landing. Early the 
next morning three ships of war passed up the Hudson and took a 
position near Bloomingdale, thus " putting a total stop to the removal, 
by water, of any more provisions " and other stores. About eleven 
o'clock the ships in the East river began a heavy cannonading. 

The British divisions v/hich had been designated as the force 
which was to land, under cover of this squadron, had already em- 
barked upon flat-boats, barges, and galleys, at the head of Newtown 
inlet, and were carried with a favoring tide directly to Kipp's Bay, 
where they disembarked. 

The light infantry, British reserve, Hessian chasseurs, and gren- 
adiers, constituted the first division under the command of General 
Clinton, having with him Generals Cornwallis, Vaughan, and Leslie, 
and Colonel Donop. 

" At the first sound of the firing," writes Washington, " I rode 
with all possible dispatch towards the place of landing, when to my 
surprise and mortification, I found the troops that had been posted 
in the lines, retreating with the utmost precipitation ; and those 
ordered to support them, Parsons and Fellows' brigades, flying in every 
15 



226 THE AMERICAN ARMY RETIRES FROM NEW YORK. [1776, 

direction and in the utmost confusion, notwithstanding the efforts of 
their generals to form them. I used every means in my power to 
rally and get them in order, but my attempts were fruitless and in- 
effectual, and on the appearance of a small party of the enemy, not 
more than sixty or seventy in number, their disorder increased, and 
they ran away without firing a shot." 

The indignation of Washington at this " disgraceful and dastardly 
conduct," carried him directly among the fugitives nearest the enemy, 
and exposed him to death or capture. More than once afterwards, a 
similar daring rallied fugitives, but the panic on this occasion was 
wild, unreasoning, and impossible of control. Its story has been 
draped with high colored fiction, until a credulous man's faith in one 
half of the camp rumors which stole into history, would convict the 
American commander of lunacy. That with drawn sword, impetuous 
command, and fearless exposure of his person, Washington did his 
best to retrieve the disaster, is undoubtedly true, so that he seemed, 
in the strong figure of General Greene, to seek death rather than life. 
All beyond this, so thoroughly examined by Mr. Bancroft, is foolish 
tradition or contemporaneous camp gossip. A court of inquiry which 
reported October twenty-sixth, failed to fix responsibility for the 
panic. It appeared from the testimony, however, that General Par- 
sons rallied a portion of the troops under Washington's own eye ; but 
that almost immediately they got hold of some field rumor and ran in 
every direction. 

Finding all efforts to check the retreat to be fruitless, Washington 
hastened back to Harlem Heights, put the army in condition to meet 
the enemy, sent out reconnoitering parties in all directions, and 
devoted himself to restoration of order and the exigencies of the hour. 
While confident that his new position was almost impregnable, a 
single paragraph in his report to Congress, which in his haste was 
unsigned and forwarded by his secretary, will indicate his greatest 
apprehension for the future, " We are now encamped with the main 
body of the army upon the heights of Harlem, where I should hope 
the enemy would meet with a retreat in case of an attack, if the gen- 
erality of our troops would behave with tolerable bravery ; but experi- 
ence, to my great affliction, has convinced me that this is a matter to 
be wished, rather than expected." 

The disaster was the more humiliating, since the roster of the 
army shows that Parsons' brigade was composed of the regiments of 
Huntington, Prescott, Ward, Wyllis, Durkee, and Tyler, some of 



1776] THE AMERICAN ARMY RETIRES FROM NEW YORK. 22/ 

which had behaved well under previous fire, and their returns showed 
"present" at the previous muster, " fit for duty, or on command, an 
aggregate of one thousand nine hundred and thirty-six, exclusive of 
officers commissioned and non-commissioned and musicians." It is 
another illustration of the strange pivot events that occur in all mili- 
tary enterprises. 

General Putnam's command was greatly endangered by this mis- 
conduct. Colonel Donop's Hessians moved directly for the city, but 
by the timely occupation of the road nearest the Hudson river, Put- 
nam extricated his division without substantial loss. 

The heavy cannon and a large quantity of provisions, camp kettles, 
tents, and other essentials to the comfort of the army, were sacrificed 
by the energetic action of Clinton, who almost invariably realized the 
best fruits of success. 

The British army at once marched to the heights of Inclenburg, or 
Murray's Hill, and a subsequent debarkation of troops was advanced 
so far northward as to make a chain of posts across the island from 
Bloomingdale to Horn's Hook, near Hell Gate. General Howe estab- 
lished his own head-quarters at the Beekman mansion, not far from 
those just vacated by General Washington on Murray Hill.* 

Before four o'clock in the afternoon, the American flag disappeared 
from Fort George, and New York was in the hands of the British 
army. 

* At the Murray house, Captain Nathan Hale, of Knowlton's Connecticut Rangers, 
received his instructions from Washington to visit Long Island and obtain accurate knowl- 
edge of the movements of the British army. At the Beekman house on the twenty-second 
day of September he was executed as a spy. 

Lossing adds, " Hale was hanged upon an apple tree in Rutger's orchard near the pres- 
ent intersection of East Broadway and Market Streets." 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 

HARLEM HEIGHTS AND VICINITY, 1776. 

THE American army spent its first night on Harlem Heights. 
A period of fifteen hours of labor was followed by many hours' 
exposure under rain, without tents, with limited rations, no utensils 
for cooking, and the consciousness that many comforts had been 
sacrificed by a needless panic. 

On the following day a spirited skirmish revived their spirits, and 
evinced the value of courage and promptness in action. 

The official accounts of this affair which were made up by the two 
generals-in-chief, while the facts were fresh in mind, are combined so 
as to indicate their respective appreciation of the real issue. They 
confirm the opinion that reports of officers, as to facts not within 
their personal knowledge, are second rate testimony; that very humble 
data are often very material to the appreciation of an issue ; that the 
principal features of an engagement are necessarily the objectives of 
an official report, and that these may lack accuracy througli the mis- 
direction which a single error of fact may impart. 

General Howe says, " On the i6th in the morning, a large party 
of the enemy having passed under cover of the woods, near to the 
advanced posts of the army, the Second and Third battalions of light 
infantry, supported by the Forty-second infantry, pushed forward and 
drove them back to their intrenchments, from whence the enem.y, 
observing they were not in force, attacked them with near three 
thousand men, which occasioned the march of the reserve with two 
field pieces, a battalion of Hessian grenadiers, and the company of 
chasseurs and field pieces, repulsed the enemy with considerable loss, 
and obliged them to retire within their works. From the accounts of 
deserters it is agreed that they had not less than three hundred killed 
and wounded, and among them a colonel and major killed. We had 



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17/6.] HARLEM HEIGHTS AND VICINITY, 1 776. 229 

eight officers wounded, fourteen men killed, and about seventy 
wounded." 

Washington thus reports to Congress : " About the time of the 
post's departure with my letter of the i6th, the enemy appeared in 
several large bodies upon the plains about two and a half miles from 
hence. I rode down to our advanced post to put matters in a proper 
situation if they should attempt to come on. When I arrived I heard 
a firing, which I was informed was between a party of our rangers 
under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Knowlton, and an advance 
party of the enemy. Our men came in and told me that the body 
of the enemy who kept themselves concealed, consisted of about 
three hundred men, as near as they could guess. I immediately 
ordered three companies of Colonel Weedon's Virginia regiment, 
under Major Leitch, and Colonel Knowlton with his rangers, to try 
and get in the rear, while a disposition was making as if to attack 
them in front, and thereby draw their attention that way. This took 
effect as I wished on the part of the enemy. On the appearance of 
our party in front, they immediately ran down hill, took possession 
of some fences and bushes, and a smart firing began, but at too great 
a distance to do much execution on either side." 

"The parties under Colonel Knowlton and Major Leitch unluckily 
began their attack too soon, as it was rather in flank than in rear. In 
a short time Major Leitch was brought off wounded, having received 
three balls in his side, and in a short time Colonel Knowlton got a 
wound which proved mortal. The men continued the engagement 
with the greatest resolution. Finding that they wanted a support, I 
advanced part of Colonel Griffiths, and Colonel Richardson's Mary- 
land regiments, who were nearest the scene of action. These troops 
charged the enemy with great intrepidity, and drove them from the 
wood into the plain, and were pushing them from thence, having 
silenced their fire in a great measure, when I judged it prudent to 
order a retreat, fearing the enemy, as I have since found was really 
the case, were sending a large body to support their party. We had 
about forty wounded, the number of slain is very inconsiderable. By 
a sergeant, who deserted from the enemy and came in, I find that 
their party was greater than I imagined. It consisted of the Second 
battalion of light infantry, a battalion of the Royal Highlanders, the 
Forty-second regiment, and three companies of the Hessian riflemen 
under the command of Brigadier-general Leslie. The deserter reports 
that their loss in wounded and missing was eighty-nine, and eight 



230 HARLEM HEIGHTS AND VICINITY, 1776. [1776 

killed. In the latter, his account is too small, as our people discovered 
and buried double that number. This affair, I am in hopes, will be 
attended with many salutary consequences, as it seems to have greatly 
inspirited the whole of our troops." 

It appears that both generals were nearly correct as to the forces 
ultimately brought into the field by the adversary. General Howe's 
attention was not called to the matter until the skirmish between 
small picket detachments of the two armies had induced Washington 
to advance with reinforcements, and this was taken to be an original 
advance in force. The English deserter, a sergeant, with professional 
exactness, gave an accurate account of the condition of things as he 
obtained it on the field ; and the American deserters, terrified under 
fire, as naturally over-estimated their danger, and the consequence of 
the skirmish. The fall of Knovvlton and Leitch was known to them, 
and after the loss of the two commanding officers they abandoned 
their companies. The sergeant's statement of the British casualties 
was also substantially correct, and Washington's presence at the scene 
of action enabled him to test it. General Howe's ignorance of the 
origin of the skirmish also lent color to the deserter's exaggeration 
of American losses, and gave to the whole the character of a deliberate 
assault upon his front, instead of the collision of advance guards sup- 
ported by reinforcements as occasion required. Another version 
illustrates the difficulty of getting facts amid the excitements of a 
campaign. 

General Greene, in a letter to Governor Cooke bearing date the 
seventeenth, states, that " on the previous day about a thousand of the 
enemy attacked the advance post, and that by the spirited conduct 
of General Putnam and Colonel Reed, Adjutant-general, our people 
advanced upon the plain ground without cover, attacked them and 
drove them back ; that his excellency ordered a timely retreat, having 
discovered or concluded, that the enemy would send a large reinforce- 
ment, as their main army lay so near by." 

In connection with this letter there is a third history of the trans- 
action, which indicates very strikingly that the American officers were 
beginning to see the importance of having no more panics. Adjutant- 
general Reed wrote to his wife that " General Putnam, General Greene, 
Mr. Tilghman and others were in it." The excitement incident to actu- 
ally chasing a party of British troops, had a very happy effect in re- 
storing the confidence of the men. Reed had his horse shot, and while 
attempting to stop a runaway soldier, " the rascal presented his piece 



1776.] HARLEM HEIGHTS AND VICINITY, 1776. 23 1 

and snapped it at him, at about a rod's distance." Seizing a musket 
from a soldier, the Adjutant-general snapped it, also, but it missed 
fire. He then " cut the coward over the head and hand with his sword, 
and the man was promptly tried and sentenced to death." He says, 
" I suppose many persons will think it was rash and imprudent for .so 
many officers of our rank to go into such an action, but it was really 
to animate the troops who were quite dispirited and would not go into 
danger unless their officers led the way." 

Colonel Knowlton was greatly mourned. His gallantry at Breed's 
Hill identified him with the first battle of the war, and he seems to 
have been as nearly fire-proof and panic-proof as any man in the 
service. 

For four weeks the American army maintained its position. While 
occasional skirmishing took place, the periodical home-sickness broke 
out again, with contagious virulence. Desertions, and the expirations 
of short enlistments, seemed to defy all attempts at thorough discipline. 
Orders were so frequently overruled or modified, that Washington 
was compelled to publish the following on the seventeenth of Septem- 
ber : " The loss of the enemy yesterday would undoubtedly have 
been much greater if the orders of the Commander-in-chief had not 
in some instances been contradicted by inferior officers, who however 
well they may mean, ought not to presume to direct. It is therefore 
ordered that no officer commanding a party, and having received orders 
from the Commander-in chief, depart from them without counter 
orders from the same authority; and as many may otherwise err, 
through ignorance, the army is now acquainted that the general's 
orders are delivered by the Adjutant-general, or one of his aid-de- 
camps, Mr. Tilghman or Colonel Moylan, the Quarter-master General. 

Brigade majors were required to report twice, daily, of the loca- 
tion and condition of their command; plundering and desertions were 
punished, the organizations of the medical staff, upon the basis of 
examination of candidates, was pushed forward, and the minutest 
details which conduced to the discipline, comfort or safety of the 
troops, entered into the routine of work which laid its own burden 
upon the Commander-in-chief. 

The State of Massachusetts sent General Lincoln in command of 
her drafted men ; General Greene, was placed in command across the 
Hudson river, in New Jersey, Generals Sullivan and Stirling were at 
once exchanged, and the armies were at comparative rest. 

On the fifth of October the Army Return was made up by Adju- 



232 HARLEM HEIGHTS AND VICINITY, 1 776. [1776. 

tant-general Joseph Reed with the following exhibit ; Total of rank 
and file, twent}'-five thousand seven hundred and thirty-five men, of 
whom eight thousand and seventy-five were sick or on furlough: 
wanting to complete the regiments eleven thousand two hundred and 
seventy-one. A foot-note states that " General Lincoln's Massachu- 
setts Militia, computed at four thousand men, are so scattered and igno- 
rant of the forms of returns, that none can be got." The fourteen 
brigades nominally comprised forty-four regiments. Major Backus' 
light horse numbered one hundred and fifty-eight, and Colonel 
Knox's artillery numbered five hundred and eighty rank and file, in- 
cluding sick and those on furlough. 

On the eighth of October the army in New Jersey under General 
Moore, exhibited a total of six thousand five hundred and forty-eight 
officers and men, stationed at the Amboys, Woodbridge, Elizabeth- 
town, Newark and Fort Constitution, afterward Fort Lee. On the 
ninth, the Phoenix and Roebuck safely passed the forts and went up 
to Dobbs Ferry and took possession of two vessels belonging to the 
Americans. On the tenth General Greene reported his " surgeons, as 
without the least particle of medicine," that " the regimental surgeons 
embezzle the public stores committed to their care so that the regi- 
mental sick suffer," and that " they should have the benefit of the 
general hospital." 

On the eleventh, Adjutant-general Reed, in a letter to his wife, 
expressed his purpose to resign. He was disgusted with the pre- 
dominating leveling spirit, — the equality between officers and 
men, and says, " Either no discipline can be established, or he who 
attempts it must become odious and detestable, a position which no 
one will choose. Yesterday morning a captain of horse who attends 
the General, from Connecticut, was seen shaving one of his men on the 
parade near the house. I have expressed myself of and to some peo- 
ple here, with such freedom, after the affair of the fifteenth, that I 
believe many of these wish me away. My idea is shortly this, that if 
France or some other power does not interfere, or some feuds arise 
among the enemy's troops, we shall not be able to stand them till 
spring." 

Notwithstanding all that has been said and reiterated as to the 
looseness of discipline, the prime difficulty was not with the rank and 
file. In a report made to the Maryland Council of Safety, by Colonel 
Smallvvood, he properly st^es what was still the chief bane of the 
army — " could our officers be brought to a proper sense of their duty 



1776] HARLEM HEIGHTS AND VICINITY, 1 776. 



-00 



and dignity, and the weight of the army, the enemy might be checked 
in their course ; for this you may rely upon, however their parade 
may indicate the contrary, yet it is a fact, they are as much afraid 
and cautious of us, as we can be any of us of them. Their officers 
alone give the superiority. Our Commander-in-chief is an excellent 
man, and it would be happy for the United States if there was as much 
propriety in every department below him. It is not owing to any 
want of precaution in him that discipline is not exacted with more 
rigor. Much must depend, respecting this, on the superior officers 
next under him in command, and here there seems to be a total 
ignorance of and inattention to that system, so necessary to render an 
army formidable." 

At this time General Howe himself notified Lord Germaine " that 
he no longer expected to finish the compaign until spring, that the 
provincials would not join the English army in any considerable 
numbers, that additional foreign troops should be hired, and that at 
least eight men of war should be sent from England by the February 
ensuing." 

Such are a few of the incidents which attach to the four weeks of 
interrupted military action while the American army remained at 
Harlem Heights. 

The location was admirable to resist an advance from New York 
itself. Three lines of intrenchments extended across the narrow 
neck of land, hardly half a mile wide, between the Hudson and Har- 
lem rivers. These intrenchments were embraced within less than a 
mile, from near one huncrcd and forty-fifth street northward ; and 
just within the upper line, was the house of Colonel Morris, occupied 
by Washington. Fort Washington was still a mile beyond. On the 
east side of the Harlem river, and as far as Frog's Neck, detached 
redoubts and earthworks, called alarm posts, were established, so 
that the whole front, from the Hudson to Long Island Sound was 
under guard. 

October eleventh was designated by Washington for his personal 
inspection of the troops at their alarm posts. It was timely, and 
within twenty-four hours of the advance of the British army. 



CHAPTER XXXV. 

OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK, WHITE PLAINS, CHATTERTON HIIL. 

ON the twelfth day of October, 1776, General Howe began the 
execution of his plan to cut off Washington's army from New 
England and upper New York, and fasten it to its own lines, for future 
capture. Unwilling to attempt the costly enterprise of storming the 
craggy and broken heights, where the whole country was defensive 
by small parties against superior force, and to force so many succes- 
sive lines of earthworks and redoubts, he resolved to move from the 
coast of Long Island Sound, across to the Hudson river where his 
ships were lying, and also to occupy the entire rear of the American 
army by this movement. It was a repetition of the movements which 
gained Brooklyn Heights and New York City. It would also put him 
in water communication with New York and Staten Island. 

The Guards, Light Infantry, Reserve, and Donop's Hessian corps, 
were embarked upon large vessels, and were transferred from the city 
to Frog's Neck, (once known as Throckmorton's, or Throck's Neck) on 
the same day, in safety. As soon as the landing had been effected, it 
was found that the tide swept behind the Neck and detached it from 
the main land, so that even at low tide it would be impossible to trans- 
fer the artillery without a bridge. Colonel Hand's American Rifles 
had already taken up the planks of the bridge which had been built 
to the Neck ; and the causeway which led to the channel was covered 
by earthworks and the additional regiments of Colonel Graham and 
Colonel Prescott. Colonel Pepperill was also within supporting 
distance. One three pounder, under direction of Lieutenant Bryant, 
and a six pounder, in charge of Lieutenant Jackson, of the artillery, 
were trained upon the beach. General Howe placed the troops in 
camp, and awaited reinforcements. 

Lord Percy had been left at McGowan's Pass, with three brigades 



I776-] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 



-OD 



to cover New York, and the troops at Flushing were ordered to cross 
at once. By reference to the map, " Operations near New York," the 
position of the army will be understood. 

On the sixteenth and seventeenth, the Frst, Second, and Sixth 
brigades, and the Third Hessian battalion joined from Flushing, and 
on the eighteenth, the combined commands, including also the gren- 
adiers, were transferred to Pell's Point, thereby turning the position at 
Westchester, and landing near the mouth of Hutchinson river. This 
entire country, rough and broken as it was, was also divided, where- 
ever cultivated, by stone walls or fences, as in later times, so that 
when the army advanced toward New Rochelle, skirmishing became 
frequent. Colonel Glover with his regiment made so persistent a re- 
sistance with a force of seven hundred and fifty men behind one of 
these walls, as to check the advance guard until it was strongly 
reinforced, and earned for himself honorable mention in orders. 

On the twenty-first, General Howe advanced his right and centre 
two miles beyond New Rochelle, where he remained in camp until 
the twenty-fifth, waiting for still additional reinforcements. General 
De Heister was left for the same length of time at the camping-ground 
which Howe had first occupied. During the same week, General 
Knyphausen arrived from Europe with the Second division of Hes- 
sians, the regiment of Waldeckers, one thousand strong, the Sixth 
foot, and the Third light dragoons. 

These troops were promptly transferred from Staten Island, and 
landed at Myer's Point on the twenty-second, taking post near New 
Rochelle. This position secured the base of General Howe's further 
advance ; and, as will be seen by reference to the map, afforded the 
proper starting point for General Knyphausen's subsequent movement 
against Fort Washington. 

As soon as General Knyphausen was established, General De 
Heister moved forward to overtake General Howe, and the army en- 
camped within four miles of White Plains, their fixed objective. On 
the morning of the twenty-eighth, the army advanced within about a 
mile of the court-house and village. It had thus moved parallel with 
the river Bronx, over a distance of at least thirty miles of rough 
country, and was now ready to wheel to the left, cross to the Hudson, 
and cut off VV'ashington's retreat, while at the same time excluding 
supplies for his army from Connecticut on the east. By this date the 
ships of war had pushed up the Hudson as far as Tarry town, and 
from White Plains there was a good road across to that village. 



236 OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. [1776. 

It had been a difficult and embarrassing march from the first. The 
Bronx was narrow, but ran along a steep range of hills, thickly wooded, 
and as thickly set with undergrowth, thorn bushes, and briars. A 
brief rain storm easily made the stream impassable. There were no 
roads of even surface, and the American riflemen, now in their element, 
hung upon the left flank, and watched for opportunity to do mischief. 
A steady movement in column was impossible, and the officers had 
to depend entirely upon countrymen for information as to the char- 
acter of the country and the location of the roads. Very much had 
been expected of the regiment of cavalry which had just arrived. 
They were at first a source of terror to new troops. Washington had 
instructed the men that in a country where stone fences, crags, and 
ravines were so numerous, the American riflemen needed no better 
opportunity to pick off the riders and supply the army with horses. A 
reward of one hundred dollars was offered any soldier who would bring 
in an armed trooper and his horse. The facts confirmed his judg- 
ment, and the cavalry were of very little service during that campaign. 
On the twenty-second, General Stirling sent Colonel Haslet out 
with a scouting party, which crossed the Bronx, attacked the Queen's 
Rangers, a royalist corps under Major Rogers, captured thirty-six, 
left as many on the field, and carried away sixty muskets. Colonel 
Hand's regiment also had a skirmish with the Hessian Yagers, near 
Mamaroneck, with considerable success and credit. Their entire march 
had been subject to such annoyances and interruptions. 

While the British army thus advanced upon its mission, the 
American army had abandoned New York Island, leaving a small 
garrison at Fort Washington, still holding fast to King's Bridge. As 
soon as the British movement became general and well defined, and 
the main army reached the northern shore of Long Island Sound, 
Washington transferred his headquarters to Valentine's Hill, ordered 
all needed supplies to be forwarded to White Plains, and pushed his 
own army along the west bank of the Bronx, division by division, 
establishing earthworks at every promment point, and making a 
chain of small posts throughout the whole distance. His object was 
to crowd the British army toward the coast, and use the shorter 
interior line, which was at his service, to thwart the plans of General 
Howe, and place himself in a position to fight his army on favorable 
ground of his own selection, and at advantage. Time was now an 
element of real value. Howe gained a fair start on the twelfth of the 
month, but lost five days at Frog's Neck, and four days more near 



1776.] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 237 

New Rochelle. Washington already had a depot of Connecticut 
suppHes at White Plains, and prolonged his left toward that point 
with (Treat vigor, as soon as he found that Howe would not attack 
from the east, as he had already declined to attack from the south. 

On the twelfth, when first advised of the landing upon Frog's Neck, 
General Greene, then at Fort Lee, asked authority to cross with the 
brigades of Nixon, Clinton and Roberdeau, and take part in the com- 
ing issue. On the sixteenth Washington called a council of war. 
The record is given literally, to correct erroneous impressions as to the 
participants in proceedings which had important bearings upon future 
operations and responsibility therefor. 

" PROCEEDINGS OF A COUNCIL OF GENERAL OFFICERS." 

" At a council of war held at the head-quarters of General Lee, 
October i6th, 1776: Present, His Excellency, General Washington. 
Major Generals Lcc, Putnam, Heath, Spencer, Sullivan, Brigadier 
Generals Lord Stirluig, Mifflin, McDongall, Parsons, Nixon, Wads- 
zvortJi, Scott, Fi-llozvs, Clinton, and Lincoln. Colonel Knox, command- 
ing artillery." 

" The General read sundry letters from the convention and particu- 
lar members, of the turbulence of the disaffected in the upper part of 
the State : and also sundry accounts of deserters showing the enemy's 
intention to surround us." 

"After much consideration and debate the following question 
was stated ; whether, (it having appeared that the obstructions in the 
North river have proved insufficient and that the enemy's whole force 
were in our rear, on Frog's Point) it is now deemed possible in our 
situation to prevent the enemy cutting off the communications with 
the country and compelling us to fight them at discretion." 

" Agreed ; with but one dissenting voice (viz.. General Clinton) tha.t 
it is not possible to prevent the communication " being cut off? " and 
that one of the consequences mentioned in the question must certainly 
follow." 

" Agreed ; that Fort Washington be retained as long as possible." 

Lee joined on the fourteenth, only two days before the council, 
and was assigned to the command of the grand division at Kings- 
bridge, with instructions to assume no direction in affairs, or active 
duty, until he should become acquainted with the existing arrange- 
ments and relations of that post. 



238 OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. [1776. 

Just before crossing the river to report for duty he wrote the fol- 
lowing letter to General Gates : 

Fort Constitution, October 14, 1776. 
" My Dear Gates — I write this scroll in a hurry. Colonel Wood will describe 
the position of our army, which in my breast I do not approve. Inter nos, the Con- 
gress seem to stumble every step. I do not mean one or two cattle, but the whole 
stable. I have been very free in delivering my opinion to 'em. In my opinion Gen- 
eral Washington is much to blame in not menacing 'em with resignation, unless they 
refrain from unhinging the army by their absurd interference. * * * 

The familiarity between these officers, it will be remembered, 
was entirely consistent with their intimacy before the war, and that 
both had been officers in the British army. This letter, however, in 
connection with subsequent correspondence, will have special value 
in determining the military subordination and personal discipline of 
the two men. 

Several embarrassments attended the American movement at 
first. The conspiracy referred to, before the council, Tryon county 
and vicinity, was deemed of sufficient importance for a detail to watch 
the disaffected districts, but a more serious matter was the want of 
flour. Washington at once importuned Governor Trumbull of Con- 
necticut, whose resources seemed as exhaustless as his patriotism and 
wisdom, to send a supply to White Plains, and it was sent. 

On the twenty-second of October, while General Howe, for the 
second time, was " awaiting reinforcements," two miles above New 
Rochelle, General Heath's advance division made a night march, 
reached Chatterton Hill at daylight, and in the afternoon were 
engaged in strengthening the defenses at White Plains. General 
Sullivan's division arrived the next night, and General Lord Stirling 
immediately after. On the twenty-third Washington established his 
head-quarters at the same place. On the twenty-sixth Lee's Grand 
Division joined Washington, and the entire American army was await- 
ing General Howe's advance, behind rapidly augmenting breastworks, 
on eligible ground for defense. 

Washington's position was not intrinsically the best for final de- 
fense ; but he had selected an iiltiuiate position, which fulfilled all the 
conditions of a possible retreat from the first. His left was protected 
by low ground, only accessible with difficulty. His right was met by 
a bend of the river Bronx, and while one line of earthworks was in 
front of and controlled the upper Connecticut road, the two successive 
lines to the rear were upon a gradual ascent very capable of vigorous 



1776.] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 239 

defense. He also controlled the roads that led westward to the 
Hudson river. Somewhat advanced, and hardly a mile to the south- 
west, Chatterton's Hill was occupied by Haslet's regiment, supported 
by General McDougall's brigade, which contained two of the most 
rehable regiments in the army. Behind the interior line of the Amer- 
ican encampment was still higher ground, entirely commanding the 
passes through tne hill by the Peekskill and upper Tarrytown roads. 

General Lee criticised the position taken by the army on his arrival, 
but the strategic considerations which seem to have induced Wash- 
ington to have taken his ground, in confidence that he had a secure 
ultimate defense in case of failure to maintain the first, were sound, 
and realized his purpose. It is to be especially noted that Wash- 
ington, superior in numbers to his adversary, was in a situation and 
in one of his moods when he courted battle, and adopted the best 
course to invite attack. 

On the twenty-eighth of October the armies thus confronted each 
other. 

It will be noticed that a direct advance upon Washington's lines 
would subject General Howe's army to an attack upon their left 
flank or rear, unless the force on Chatterton's Hill should be first dis- 
lodged. And yet the difficulties of a descent from the hill would have 
weakened such a movement, and made it fruitless, if he had concen- 
trated his army and broken Washington's centre. General Clinton 
would undoubtedly have made the attack. General Howe placed 
General Leslie in command of a division, with orders to dislodge the 
Americans and occupy Chatterton's Hill. This divided his force, and 
left the main body passive spectators of the movement. The division 
consisted of the second British brigade, Donop's Hessian grenadiers, 
the Hessian regiment Lossberg, and Colonel Rahl's Hessians, making 
a total force, according to General Howe's oflficial report, of four thou- 
sand men, or very nearly one-third of the army. At the time of this 
detail, General Howe's army was superior in numbers to that in his im- 
mediate front, because of the occupation of the hill by the American 
extreme right. 

The troops crossed the river Bronx with some difficulty, and then 
had to climb a difficult ascent. The British superiority in artillery 
was more than compensated by the American position, and artillery 
was of little practical value. Captain Alexander Hamilton served two 
light guns at the centre, and as the British brigade crossed the Bronx 
and ascended the hill he delivered effective fire ; and Smallwood's 
regiment supported by Ritzema's, made two successful charges down 



240 OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. [177b. 

the hill and checked the advance. To spectators at White Plains, it 
appeared as if a final and complete repulse had been achieved. At 
this crisis, Colonel Rahl, by a sudden and well pressed movement to 
the left, reached and turned the American right flank and stood upon 
the summit, while Donop boldly charged up the face of the hill to 
the left of the British brigade. The American troops overwhelmed 
by this attack, fell back to a second position on the right of the army, 
and General Leslie could not pursue without throwing himself in the 
rear of Washington, or at least exposing himself to be entirely cut off 
from General Howe. 

Haslet's Delaware, and Smallwood's Maryland had again con- 
firrped their reputation, and with Brooks' Massachusetts, Webb's 
Connecticut, and Ritzema's New York had fought with commendable 
spirit, and as long as consistent with safety for themselves and the 
American right wing. General Putnam had been sent to their sup- 
port as soon as the affair appeared doubtful, but was too late to 
redeem the contest. 

Colonel Haslet afterwards wrote, that Jie was first assigned to the 
command of Chatterton's Hill with his own regiment and a force of 
militia ; that the latter fled, and that three companies of Smallwood's 
Maryland also retreated precipitately ; that General McDougall's com- 
mand supported him, and was so dangerously placed in his rear, that 
he was in danger from their fire ; that upon his advice General 
McDougall changed his position. Much is assumed by this officer, 
which is not supported by other authority. Colonel Graham, who 
commanded the regiment of New York militia, was tried before a 
court martial for unnecessarily abandoning two stone fences where he 
had been placed by Colonel Reed. The position would have had 
value if properly supported. The evidence was conclusive as to his 
personal bravery, although some of his officers failed him, and that 
his retreat was in pretty good order, and was directed by superior 
authority. Captain Hamilton also brought off his guns in safety. 

Colonel Smaltwood was wounded, and forty-six of his regiment 
were also among the killed and wounded. The total loss was reported 
at ninety, but Dr. Bird, who visited the hospitals, stated that it was 
not less than one hundred and twenty. Marshall says, " between three 
and four hundred." General Howe " estimated the American loss at 
two hundred and fifty." The returns and contemporaneous letters 
fix the loss at one hundred and thirty. General Howe's report at the 
close of the year mentions no prisoners as taken between the twelfth 



1776] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 2dl 

and the sixteenth of Nov^ember ; but under the caption " White 
Plains," enumerates four officers and thirty-five privates. As this 
number were taken early on the march, it does not enter into the 
casualties at Chatterton's Hill, 

The loss of the British brigade was officially reported by Gen- 
eral Leslie as one hundred and fifty-four. Lieutenant-colonel Carr, 
of the Thirty-fifth, Captain Goar of the Forty-ninth, and Dcmin"- of 
the Twenty-eighth regiments were among the killed. The Hessian 
loss increased the total casualties of the command to two hundred 
and thirty-one. 

The heaviest portion of this loss was incurred in the attempt to 
scale the cliff, just after crossing the river. 

On the twenty-ninth the armies rested. General Howe, " waited 
for reinforcements." Washington removed his sick to better quarters 
and prepared to move to his selected ultimate place of resistance. On 
the thirtieth, Lord Percy arrived with the third brigade and two bat- 
talions of the fourth brigade, and the next day was designated for an 
assault in force. The day was stormy, and for twenty hours the rain 
and wind suspended the movement. Batteries were planted, however, 
for a subsequent advance, " zvcatJicr permitting^ 

During that night Washington retired nearly five miles, to North 
Castle Heights, from which he could not be dislodged by the entire 
British force, and the "Battle of White Plains," had been fought at 
Chatterton Hill. 

The Court-house at White Plains was subsequently burned by 
lawless Americans, for which the British troops were in no way re- 
sponsible. Washington burned his excess of forage, and stores that 
could not be removed, and in a prompt order thus denounced the 
burning of the public buildings : 

" It is with the utmost astonishment and abhorrence, the general 
is informed, that some base and cowardly wretches have, last night 
(November 5th) set fire to the Court house and other buildings which 
the enemy left. The army may rely on it, that they shall be brought 
to justice, and meet with the punishment they deserve." 

The horrors of civil war began to develop fruit. The soldiers 
plundered towns, and the British took without discrimination of per- 
sons, what they wanted. Citizens became alarmed, and infinite issues 
were involved in the integrity and faithfulness of Congress and its 
defenders. 



16 



CHAPTER XXXVI. 

OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. WHITE PLAINS TO FORT WASH- 
INGTON. 

ON the second day of November General Knyphausen broke up 
his camp near New Rochelle, and at evening encamped at the 
north end of New York Island. On the fifth General Howe left 
White Plains, and during the afternoon of the sixth encamped at 
Dobbs Ferry, on the east bank of the Hudson river. Thus the army 
abandoned the temporary base at New Rochelle. 

General Howe drew his supplies from vessels which were already 
at Dobbs Ferry, while the Hessian commander had direct water- 
communication with New York city, by Harlem creek. By the 
fourteenth General Knyphausen had accumulated a large number of 
flat-boats and barges for the more rapid transportation of his troops 
toward Fort Washington. Reference is had to maps entitled '' Opera- 
tions near New York," and " Capture of Fort Washington." 

The barracks at Fort Independence had been burned by Colonel 
Lasher, at three o'clock on the morning of the twenty-eighth of Octo- 
ber, and three hundred stands of arms, out of repair, five tons of bar 
iron, spears, shot, shell, and numerous additional valuable stores, had 
been abandoned, in the hurried retreat to Kingsbridge. General 
Greene crossed over and gathered as many as he could procure 
wagons for, and intended to have used the lumber of the barracks, but 
for their premature and improvident destruction. On the sixth, 
Washington informed Congress of these different movements, and that 
" he expected the enemy to lead their forces against Fort Washington, 
and invest it," — and that " Howe would probably make a descent 
into New Jersey.'' A council of war, that day convened, unanimously 
agreed, " that, if the enemy retreated toward New York it would be 
proper to throw a body of troops into New Jersey, immediately : " — 
that the troops raised on either side of the Hudson river should 



1776.] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 243 

occupy the side where they had been enHsted, and that a force of three 
thousand men would be necessary for the erection and defense of posts 
and passes in the Highlands, which included Peekskill, and all moun- 
tain spurs which commanded the river. 

General Washington wrote to Governor Livingston that General 
Howe "must undertake something on account of his reputation, 
that he would probably go to New Jersey, and then urged that 
the militia be in readiness to supply the places of those whose term 
would soon expire." To Greene he wrote in the same terms on the 
seventh ; adding, " they can have no capital object in view unless it is 
Philadelphia." It was then known that General Carleton retired from 
Crown Point on Saturday the second of November, so that there was 
no danger of a British movement up the Hudson. On the eighth he 
wrote to General Greene, " The late passage of the three vessels up 
the North river is so plain a proof of the inefficiency of all the ob- 
structions we have thrown into it," referring to sunken vessels with 
submarine abati, designed by General Putnam, " that I can not but 
think it will fully justify a change in the disposition which has been 
made. If we can not prevent vessels passing up, and the enemy are 
possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it 
answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit can not be 
had ? I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent to haz- 
ard the men and stores at Mount Washington ; but as you are on the 
spot, leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount 
Washington as you judge best ; and, so far, revoking the order given 
Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last." 

General Greene was also ordered to remove all stores not necessary 
for defense, adding, " if the inhabitants will not drive off their stock, 
destroy it, with hay, grain, etc., since the enemy would take it without 
distinction or satisfaction." 

General Greene had anticipated a movement into New Jersey late 
in October. It was evident that there must be an end to the pursuit 
of Washington's army by General Howe, and he was well assured that 
that pursuit would end at White Plains. 

On the twenty-ninth of October, he sketched an itinerary which is 
of value as giving a measure of distance by which to appreciate the 
subsequent movements, as reported at their occurrence. It is as 
follows : 

"From Fort Lee to Hackensack bridge, nine miles ; water carriage 
from this place. 



244 OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. [1776. 

** From Hackensack to Equacanaugh, five miles ; water carriage 
from this place. 

"From Equacanaugh to Springfield, sixteen miles ; to a landing at 
Newark. 

" From Springfield to Boundbrook, nineteen miles ; seven miles to 
a landing at Brunswick. 

" From Boundbrook to Princeton, twenty miles ; twelve miles land 
carriage to Delaware river. 

" From Princeton to Trenton, twelve miles ; water carriage to 
Philadelphia." 

His estimates for stores of flour, pork, hay, and grain, including 
allowance for supplying troops passing and repassing from the differ- 
ent States, is given as an index of his forethought in the line of 
logistics. 

" Two thousand men at Fort Lee for five months ; at Hackensack 
a supply for the general hospital — the troops to have fresh provisions; 
at Equacanaugh, for the troops at Newark and Elizabethtown, and 
to subsist the main army in passing to Philadelphia ; at Springfield a 
week's provisions for twenty thousand men on their way to Philadel- 
phia ; at Boundbrook the same ; at Princeton the same ; at Trenton 
to subsist twenty thousand men for three months." The period at 
which this forecast of the future was made is worthy of notice. 

November ninth. President Hancock notified Washington of the 
restoration of a money allowance upon reenlistment, and of the pas- 
sage of a resolution that the American army might be enlisted for 
three years or during the war. 

At this time more than one-half t\\e. enlistments of the army were 
on the extreme limit of their service, and reports of its condition were 
freely circulated in New York. The militia of that State, then at 
Fort Washington, upon the pledge of General Howe that " he would 
guarantee to them the blessing of peace and a secure enjoyment of 
their liberties and properties, as well as a free and general pardon," 
were determined not to reenlist, and became fractious and insubordi- 
nate. Governor Livingston notified Washington, under date of 
November ninth, that he had received his letter above referred to, 
and that in case of an apprehended invasion he would call out the 
men to repel it. 

On the same date with Livingston's letter, Greene admitted the 
failure of the river obstructions to do their work, adding, " but upon 
the whole I cannot help thinking the garrison is of advantage, and I 



1776.] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 



245 



cannot conceive the garrison to be in any great danger ; the men can be 
brought off at anytime, but the stores may not be so easily removed; 
yet I think they can be got off in spite of them, if matters grow des- 
perate. I was over there last evening; the enemy seems to be dis- 
posing matters to besiege the place, but Colonel Magaw thinks it will 
take them till December expires before they can carry it." 

On the same date Washington ordered the first division to cross 
the Hudson at Peekskill; the second to cross the day following. 

A brief epitome of the details in logistics which occupied the 
attention of the American commander-in-chief during the last four 
hours before he followed these divisions into New Jersey, is pregnant 
with military and historical suggestions. 

To General Lee he commits certain trusts ; " that all tools not in 
use be got together and delivered to the quartermaster-general ; that 
the commanding officer of artillery fix convenient places for the unin- 
terrupted manufacture of musket cartridges ; that no troops be 
suffered to leave camp until army accoutrements and tents are ac- 
counted for, or delivered upon proper receipt ; that the contingency 
of an attack, in case the threatened movement to New Jersey be but 
a feint, be provided for ; and that all stores and baggage not for imme- 
diate use, be sent northward of the Croton river ; that in case of 
change of post, all hay be destroyed, so that the enem}^ can not get 
it ; that supernumerary officers of regiments greatly reduced be dis- 
charged, or annexed to some brigade ; that provisions and forage be 
laid in for winter quarters ; that it is important to remember in delib- 
eration, that the militia of Massachusetts stand released from their 
contract on the seventeenth instant, and the Connecticut militia are 
not engaged for any fixed period." 

The closing paragraph of this remarkable order, thus briefly out- 
lined, is material to an appreciation of the future course of the officer 
intrusted with these duties. It is given with official exactness, is 
placed in Italics, and reads as follows : 

" If the eiiony should roiwvc the zuholc or the greatest part of their 
force to the west side of the Hudson river, I have no doubt of your 
folloiving zvith all possible dispatch, leaving the militia and invalids to 
cover the frontiers of Connecticut, etc., in case of need. 

" Given at headquarters, near the White Plains, the loth day of 
November, lyj^. 

" George Washington." 
" To Major-general Lee.'* 



246 OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. [1776. 

Washington wrote to Governor Livingston in substance, that the 
bounties offered by New York would deter enhstments in States not 
giving bounties, because, *' troops embarked in the same cause and 
doing the same duties, will not long act together with harmony for 
different pays." 

To Colonel Knox he made a suggestion as to a partition of the 
artillery among different commands, unless Howe should throw his 
whole force into the Jerseys, and bend his course to Philadelphia, 
adding this paragraph : — 

" It is unnecessary to add that if the army of the enemy should 
wholly or pretty generally throw themselves across the North river. 
General Lee is to follow.". To General Mifflin : " that as enlistments are 
to expire, many will not reenlist, hence tents and stores delivered, are 
to be collected and safely deposited ; tents to be repaired against 
another season, intrenching tools to be collected or placed where 
General Lee should direct, and magazines of forage be provided." 

To Governor Trumbull he sent a particular letter of detail, closing, 
" In case the enemy should make a pretty general remove to the 
Jerseys, that part of the army under General Lee will more than 
probably follow; notice of which I nozv givcT 

To Ezekiel Cheevers, commissary of military stores : 

" As the army, (at least part of it) is near the period of dissolu- 
tion," — army and other stores issued to continental troops or militia 
are to be recovered; unserviceable arms that can not be repaired by 
the armorers of the army, are to be packed and sent to the Board of 
War, other stores to be put in a safe place near the winter quarters of 
the troops ; and, " it is unnecessary to add, that the troops of Gen- 
eral Lee will also cross the Hudson river if it should be necessary, in 
consequence of their throwing their force over." 

One general order reads like so many ordersof later date, that it is 
referred to in connection with the historical statement, that the or- 
ganization and support of the American armies in the war of 1861-65, 
was substantially based upon legislation which reproduced the system 
adopted during the war of 1775-178 1. The order is as follows: 
" Colonels to examine the baggage of troops under marching orders ; 
tents and spare arms to go first in the wagons, then the proper bag- 
gage of the regiment ; no chairs, tables, heavy chests or other per- 
sonal baggage, to be put in, as it will certainly be thrown off and left ; 
no officer of any rank to meddle with a wagon or cart appropriated for 
any other regiment or public use ; that no discharged men be allowed 



1776.] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 247 

to carry away arms, camp kettles, utensils, or any other public stores ; 
recruiting officers so detailed, to proceed with their duty ; no boys 
or old men to be enlisted, and if so, to be returned on the hands 
of the officer, with no allowance for any expense he may be at." 

On November twelfth, at Peekskill, just before crossing the river, 
Washington having spent the previous day in a visit to the Highlands 
in the vicinity of West Point, specifically instructed General Heath 
that "his division and the troops at Forts Constitution, Montgomery, 
and Independence, as well as Colonel Lasher's regiment, were under 
his command for the security of the above posts, the passes through 
the Highlands from this place, and on the west side of the river." 
General Heath at once convened a council of war and divided his 
troops in accordance with the tenor of Washington's orders. By the 
fourteenth all the troops of the army belonging to States which lay 
south of the Hudson river, excepting Smallwood's, already on its 
march, had been safely moved across the river, and Washington him- 
self reached General Greene's headquarters that morning. At this 
time a fleet of nearly three hundred sail lay at Sandy Hook with a 
large number of British troops on board, and their destination was 
suspected to be Rhode Island, Philadelphia, or South Carolina. 

On the twelfth. General Greene had written, " I expect General 
Howe will endeavor to possess himself of Mount Washington, but 
very much doubt whether he will succeed in the attempt." 

When Washington arrived at Fort Lee, the British army had 
already removed from Dobbs Ferry to Kingsbridge. In his report 
of this fact to Congress, the following sentence directly follows the 
announcement : " It seems to be generally believed, on all hands, that 
the investing of Fort Washington is one object they have in view." " I 
propose to stay in the neighborhood a few days ; in which time I expect 
the design of the enemy will be more disclosed, and their incursions 
made in this quarter, or their investiture of Fort Washington if they 
are intended." This letter regards the anticipated investment very 
calmly. Washington established his headquarters at Hackensack 
bridge, nearly nine miles from Fort Lee. The garrison of Fort Wash- 
ington had been previously reinforced from the flying camp and on 
the fifteenth it numbered nearly three thousand men. Washington's 
personal report placed the garrison at about two thousand. His 
estimate was too low, for at the close of the year, a revised hst of the 
prisoners taken on the sixteenth, was made up and settled upon, as the 
basis of exchange, at two thousand six hundred and thirty-four. 



248 OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. [1776. 

The fort was commanded by Colonel Magaw, of Pennsylvania. 
He was a man of courage and capacity. Colonels Rawlings, Cadwal- 
lader and Baxter were his chief associates, and to each was entrusted 
a command bearing upon the defense of the fort. Major Otho H. 
Williams with a Maryland rifle battalion, was also attached to Raw- 
lings' command. 

Fort Washington was a hastily built, open earthwork, and accord- 
ing to Graydon, " without a ditch of any consequence, and with no 
exterior defenses that could entitle it to the name of a fortress in any 
degree capable of sustaining a siege." There was no well within the 
fort proper, so that water was procurable only from the Hudson river, 
nearly three hundred feet below. 

Southward, within less than two miles, were the interior lines of 
the old defenses which were built when Washington's army was on 
Harlem Heights. Colonel Cadwallader was stationed there. East- 
ward was a ridge called Laurel Hill, a part of Fordham Heights, and 
at its north end was a slight defense afterwards known as Fort George. 
Opposite, on the prolongation of the Mount Washington ridge, was a 
fort subsequently known as Fort Tryon. Between these somewhat 
commanding positions there was a deep and rocky ravine through 
which ran the old Albany road. The river ridge, with a slight inter- 
ruption near Tubby Hook, continued as far as Spuyten Devil Creek, 
where light earthworks had been built, known as " Cock Hill Fort." 
Still northward, across the creek on Tetard's Hill, was Fort Independ- 
ence. From the point where the Albany road left the pass and turned 
towards the Harlem river was a valley, and much marshy land ; but 
across the Harlem river, opposite Fort George, and as far as Williams, 
or Dykeman's bridge, the ground was high again, and the British had 
erected two redoubts to cover the landing of Generals Matthews and 
Cornwallis. General Howe thus gave his opinion of Fort Washington : 
" The importance of this post, which with Fort Lee on the opposite 
shore of Jersey kept the enemy in command of the North river, 
while it barred the communication with New York, by land, made 
the possession of it absolutely necessary." This is the identical argu- 
ment used by General Greene for its " retention to the last possible 
moment." 

In Washington's report of November sixteenth occurs this para- 
graph . " Early this morning, Colonel Magaw posted his troops, partly 
in the lines thrown up by our army on our first coming thither from 
New York, and partly on a commanding hill lying north of Mount 



1776.] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 249 

Washington, tJie lines being all to the southzvard.'" The paragraph 
now placed in italics, has significance, as the facts indicated enabled 
the British, who operated from the north and east, to enter the open 
sides ; and in fact, practically, to disregard the greater portion of the 
nominal lines of defense. 

Directly eastward of the redoubt itself, there was no defense, other 
than that assured by the steepness and roughness of the ascent. The 
fort was first built, in order to command the Hudson river; and the 
principal portion of the lines, immediately northward, had a river 
front, but was nearly open toward the rear. 

During the afternoon of the fifteenth, the British arrangements 
having been perfected for an assault on the following day. Adjutant- 
general Patterson was sent to the fort with a peremptory demand for 
its surrender, with the alternative " to be put to the sivordy In reply, 
Colonel Magaw declared that " he would defend the post to the last 
extremity," very generously qualifying a portion of General Howe's 
ultimatum, as follows, — " I think it rather a mistake, than a settled 
purpose of General Howe to act a part so unworthy of himself and 
the British nation." 

Greene ordered Magaw to " defend the place until hearing from 
him again " — ordered General Heard's brigade to hasten up — sent 
the despatch from Colonel Magaw to Washington, then at Hacken- 
sack, and crossed over to the fort. 

Washington immediately returned to Fort Lee, and started across 
the river to determine the condition of the garrison himself. He 
says: — "I had partly crossed the North river when I met General 
Putnam and General Greene, who were just returning from thence, and 
they informed me that the troops were in high spirits and would 
make a good defense, and it being late at night, I returned." 

The attack upon Fort Washington was admirably planned and 
admirably executed. " The Pearl was stationed in the North river," 
says General Howe, " to cover the march of the Hessian troops and 
flank the American lines." On the night of the fourteenth, thirty 
flat-boats under the command of Captains Wilkinson and Molly, 
passed up the Hudson, eluded the vigilance of General Greene and 
Colonel Magaw, entered Spuyten Devil Creek and thus reached King's- 
Bridge. 

Three distinct assaults were ordered, and a fourth movement, 
which was at first intended as a feint, was converted into a spirited 
attack, at a critical moment. The marginal notes on the map, indi- 



250 OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. [1776. 

eating the troops assigned to each column, are from General Howe's 
" Orderly Book." 

From the north, along the ridge, scattering the little guard at 
Cock Hill Fort, Colonel Rahl, on the right, moved steadily upon Fort 
Tryon, crowding Colonel Rawlings back by weight of numbers, nearly 
to the fort itself. General Knyphausen with the left of the Hessian 
column took the side of the ridge even down to the ravine, and after 
considerable loss while fighting his way through woods and over rocks 
against a spirited resistance, joined Colonel Rahl near the fort. 

Lord Percy advanced from the south, and was checked for a little 
while by Cadwallader, who having too small a force to defend the 
entire lines, was then compelled to fall back to the interior or north- 
ern line of works, which had no guns in position as support to his 
resistance. 

At this advance the division of Matthews and Cornwallis, which 
had been in readiness, landed, although under heavy fire, pushed back 
the resisting force, and moved over Laurel Hill to take the works in 
the centre. As soon as advised that Lord Percy had carried the 
advance-work to the south, General Howe ordered Colonel Sterling 
to land and cooperate with Matthew's division. At this poinr of de- 
barkation there were light earthworks also, which were stubbornly 
held by the Americans. Cadwallader, seeing that the success of this 
movement would interpose a force in his rear, sent a detachment to 
assist in opposing the landing ; but upon failure to check it, the de- 
tachment too rapidly retreated, losing one hundred and seventy men 
as prisoners. Colonel Magaw also sent a detachment from the fort 
for the same purpose, when he saw the boats approaching the landing. 
The whole weight of the British left and centre was now con- 
verged upon a direct assault up the steep ascent in front of the fort 
itself. It was made under heavy fire, but with unwavering steadiness 
and speedy success. All the British divisions were thus within the 
exterior lines, and the garrison was crowded into a space designed for 
only a thousand men. Surrender or rescue was inevitable. Magaw 
asked for five hours' parley. A half hour only was given, and the sur- 
render ensued soon after; but Washington had been notified of the 
demand. Washington says, " I sent a billet to Colonel Magaw direct- 
ing him to hold out, and I would endeavor this evening to bring off 
the garrison if the fortress could not be maintained, as I did not 
expect it could, the enemy being possessed of the adjacent ground." 
Rawlings and Williams were wounded on the left, and Colonel 



1776.] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 2$ I 

Baxter fell on Laurel Hill. Colonel Miller, of the Fifth Pennsylvania 
battalion, was also killed. 

The American loss in killed and wounded did not exceed one 
hundred and thirty. 

The British regiments lost in killed, wounded, and missing, one 
hundred and twenty-eight, and the Hessian troops, three hundred 
and twenty-six. Among the regiments engaged, the following were 
conspicuous in subsequent stages of the war: viz., those of Rahl, 
Donop, Losberg, Stein, Nessembach, and Dittforth. 

On the seventeenth, an additional number of flat boats was sent 
up the North river by Admiral Howe, and on the eighteenth Corn- 
walHs crossed over nearly opposite Yonkers, at a point not sufficiently 
watched and defended, with six thousand men. Fort Lee was aban- 
doned, the American army falling behind the Hackensack, and then to 
Aquackanonck. 

Two officers, one quartermaster, three surgeons, and ninety-nine 
privates were taken prisoners at Fort Lee. 

The loss in public stores by the capture of these forts, including 
those taken at Valentine's Hill and left on the march, was a serious 
one to the American army, and embraced besides shot, shell, twenty- 
eight hundred muskets, and four hundred thousand cartridges, at least 
one hundred and sixty-one cannon, ranging from three to thirty-two 
pounders, and several hundred tents. 

On the capture of Fort Lee, General Greene wrote to Governor 
Cooke of Rhode Island under date of December first, that " the enemy's 
publication of the cannon and stores then taken is a grave falsehood ; 
not an article of military stores was left there, or nothing worth men- 
tioning. The evacuation of Fort Lee was determined upon several 
days before the enemy landed above, and happily all the most valu- 
able stores were over." 

General Washington's report of the twenty-first of November, the 
day after its capture, says, " we lost the whole of the cannon that 
were in the fort, except two twelve pounders and a great deal of bag- 
gage, between two and three hundred tents, and other stores in the 
quartermaster's department. The loss was inevitable. As many of 
the stores had been removed as circumstances and time would admit 
of. The ammunition (of Fort Lee) had been happily got away." 

This apparent discrepancy of statement is given for the following 
reasons. 

It indicates the purpose of the author to rely in the first instance 



252 OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. [1776. 

upon official Reports, Muster Rolls, and Returns, and to reconcile 
conflicts by the use of contemporary papers and letters, and the appli- 
cation of governing principles ; and because, as seen by references to 
operations at Brooklyn, Harlem, and Chatterton Hill, the tendency 
of individuals to throw responsibility upon others when there was any 
misadventure, was as common then, as at all other periods of human his- 
tory from the day that the forbidden fruit was eaten in the region of 
Paradise. It must be remembered, however, that the reports of com- 
manding officers are very often but summaries of general results ; and 
that only exceptional cases of merit or demerit attach to such reports. 
It would be impossible to name everybody, and the nearer that attempt 
is made, the more there will remain to be dissatisfied. Greene had, 
in fact, removed the general stores and a portion of those of the Fort 
proper ; but the report of General Washington corroborates that of 
General Howe. General Greene was smarting under malicious criti- 
cisms, and his strong language was erroneous in the letter, but just in 
its general substance. 

General Washington himself is not without some inconsistencies 
of statement as to the capture of Fort Washington, and these are 
important elements of justice in stating the matter exactly as it trans- 
pired. It was then that the first distinct insubordination of General 
Lee had its expression, and calumny seems to have been the current 
news of the crisis. No event during the war had called forth more 
partisan discussion. It shows the importance of giving full credit to 
real courage and general wisdom, and the folly of aggravating a 
disaster or mistake of judgment into a charge of weakness or 
incompetency. 

In a letter to his brother, Washington says, " what adds to my 
mortification is, that this post after the last ships went past it, was 
held contrary to my wishes and opinions, as 1 conceived it to be a 
hazardous one. ... I did not care to give an absolute order for 
withdrawing the garrison till I could get round and see the situation 
of things, and then it became too late, as the fort was invested. . . . 
I had given it as my opinion to General Greene, under whose care it 
was, that it would be best to evacuate the place ; but as the order 
was discretionary, and his opinion differed from mine, it unhappily 
was delayed too long to my great grief." 

Washington was not an entirely exceptional man, but a great man. 
He must be dealt with by his merits. The facts are simply these. 
Putnam, who built the post, and had great faith that he was to close 



1776.] OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK. 25^ 

the river ; Greene commanding on the Jersey side, who was anxious 
to have no more retreats ; and Colonel Magaw, the brave post com- 
mander, must have satisfied Washington that he could, as he wrote on 
the seventh, *' take some risk to hold it." 

His letter written after his arrival, showed his intention to watch 
the British movements ; and the investment had not thoi been made. 
It is to be inferred from his own letter that he could have withdrawn 
the garrison. His army, only three thousand men, was inadequate to 
reinforce it, without sacrificing all field movements and shutting him- 
self up for capture. He was not prepared to take responsibility after 
the decided action of his general officers and Congress, and the drift 
of public sentiment was in a direction that would have made its early 
evacuation a greater disaster than its defense. Its loss quickened the 
action of Congress, and ultimately secured to Washington independ- 
ence of action ; but there is no occasion for converting this episode of 
the war into a harsh judgment of either Greene or Washington. The 
ordeal was one which would have tried any commander. Governor 
Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut had Jiis opinion, and his conscience 
and wisdom inspired many key-notes to the conduct of the war. He 
wrote to the American commander-in-chief as follows: " The loss of 
Fort Washington with so many of our brave men, is indeed a most 
unfortunate event. But though we are to consider and improve like 
disappointments, yet we are by no means to despair, — we are in this 
way to be prepared for help and deliverance." 



CHAPTER XXXVII. 

PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. FORT WASHINGTON TO TRENTON. 

1776. 

GENERAL HOWE matured a plan of operations which clearly 
indicated that he comprehended the gravity of the undertak- 
ing which the British government had assumed. It had so much of 
true value that it would be difficult to improve it after more than a 
century of modern military experience. That plan proposed : that 
an army of ten thousand men should be established at Newport, 
Rhode Island, of which force at least three-fourths should act offen- 
sively against the New England States, particularly Boston and vicin- 
ity ; — that twenty thousand men should be placed at New York, of 
which seventeen thousand men should be available for field service ; 
^that ten thousand men should cooperate with this army, south- 
ward ; and that ten thousand men should be sent to the Southern 
States. The New Jersey contingent was added, in order that an 
adequate force from the New York command might be directed up the 
Hudson river, to cooperate with troops having their own base on the 
St. Lawrence. This requisition for troops was sent to the British 
government. It bears upon its face, its significance ; and much of 
General Howe's indecision and carefulness of movement must be 
attributed to some maturing conviction of the character of the contest 
which had been driven into his mind during his career from Boston 
to Fort Lee. The modern reader must be impressed with the belief 
that such a force, so disposed, would have fulfilled all the strategic ele- 
ments required for a vigorous prosecution of the war. It is certainly 
true that the necessity for such a requisition for troops must have 
restrained the British General in chief in his operations in New Jersey. 
The elaborate controversy between Howe and Clinton does not 
impair his judgment in this respect ; and while constitutional tempera- 
ment and certain vagaries of personal habit slipped in at nearly every 




254* 



17/6.] PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. 255 

crisis to rob him of the best fruits of skillful preparation, this single 
scheme for quickening the war to a conclusion, must go upon record 
to his credit as a soldier. It was in substance the cabinet policy; but 
indicated an appreciation of the means required to carry out that 
policy. A rapid summary of events up to the battle of Trenton is 
important in this connection so that the closing operations of 1776 
may have their appreciative value in an estimate of the character and 
operations which entered into the permanent history of the struggle. 
General Clinton sailed from New York December first and landed 
at Newport, Rhode Island, on the ninth, with a little over three thou- 
sand men. This was the squadron which had so long demonstrated 
near Sandy Hook, creating doubts in the mind of Washington as to 
its ultimate destination. 

Major General Prescott and Lieutenant General Percy accom- 
panied Clinton. Sir Peter Parker commanded the naval forces. The 
effect of this movement was to suspend for a time the movement of 
Massachusetts troops. Six thousand men were nearly ready to march 
to General Washington's support, under General Lincoln, in place of 
troops whose terms of service had expired. 

The NortJiern American army had at that time two Major-generals 
on duty, each claiming command, but amicably settling the differ- 
ence so far as surface manifestations were apparent. General Gates 
had joined Schuyler, and by the retreat from Canada, lost his distinct- 
ive department. He preferred to retain command of the troops 
which he brought back ; but this was incompatible with the situation, 
which was handled by Schuyler with great integrity, patriotism and 
energy. Congress settled the matter by declaring that " they had no 
design to invest General Gates with a superior command to General 
Schuyler, while the troops should be on this side of Canada." Schuy- 
ler actively engaged in fitting out a fleet for the control of Lake 
Champlain, which was placed under the command of Arnold. This 
fleet was equipped, made a good fight with that of General Carleton, 
but was either captured or withdrawn to the south under the guns of 
Fort Ticonderoga. All operations in that department were suspended 
when General Carleton withdrew from Crown Point and returned to 
Canada. On the ninth day of November General Gates made an 
official report of the troops serving in the northern Department, show- 
ing a force of seven thousand three hundred and forty-five " effective 
rank and file," present for duty and on command, and three thousand 
nine hundred and sixty-one sick, present and absent. The terms of 



256 PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. [1776. 

enlistment of many regiments were to expire between that date and 
the ninth of January ensuing, so that after General Gates joined 
Washington with a portion of the Northern army, there remained for 
duty at Ticonderoga, Mount Independence and Fort George, on the 
first of December, only two thousand three hundred and eighty-four 
men. General Lee still commanded a grand division at North Castle 
Heights. This force numbered on the sixteenth of November, when 
the assault was made upon Fort Washington, seven thousand five 
hundred and fifty-four " effective rank and file present for duty and 
on command," His report of November twenty-fourth, shows the 
somewhat larger force, of seven thousand eight hundred and twenty- 
four men. The enlistments of a great majority of these troops were 
however close to their limit, and he ultimately crossed the river with 
less than thirty-four hundred effective men. 

The division of General Heath with headquarters at Peekskill, and 
commanding the North river defenses, was also reported on November 
twenty-fourth, as numbering, effective rank and file, present, and on 
command, four thousand and sixteen men. The army of Washington 
was mustered at Newark on the twenty-third day of November, and 
amounted to five thousand four hundred and ten men for duty. 

Colonel Bradley's brigade which was to go out of service December 
first, had but sixty men present. The largest brigade, that of General 
Beall, twelve hundred strong, also had but a week to serve. The en- 
listments of only twenty-four hundred and one men extended beyond 
January first, next ensuing. On the first of December a general 
return of the army was made at Trenton, with the following result. 
The command consisted of four brigades, including sixteen regiments, 
and numbered with officers and staff, four thousand three hundred 
and thirty-four, of whom one thousand and twenty-nine were sick, and 
two-thirds of the sick were absent. 

The foregoing official data are substituted for general statements 
as to the condition of the American army. The army movements 
were as follows. The American army, compelled to abandon the space 
between the Hackensack and Passaic, crossed the latter river at 
Aquackanonck on the twenty-first day of November, burned the 
bridge after a brief skirmish, and followed the right bank of the Pas- 
saic river to Newark, reaching that city on the twenty-third, and New 
Brunswick on the twenty-ninth. Here also a vigorous skirmish took 
place with the columns of Cornwallis, which had orders " to go no 
farthery Washington moved on to Princeton, and then to Trenton, 



r776.] PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. 257 

where he arrived on the third of December. He immediately obtained 
boats from Philadelphia, and for a stretch of seventy miles above that 
city, secured everything that could float, and on the fifth, having re- 
moved all heavy military stores, thus reported to Congress his action. 

"As nothing but necessity obliged me to retire before the enemy, 
and leave so much of Jersey unprotected, I conceive it my duty, and 
it corresponds with my inclination to make head against them so soon 
as there shall be the least probability of doing it zvith propriety. That 
the country might in some measure be covered, I left two brigades, 
consisting of five Virginia regiments, and that of Delaware which had 
just arrived, containing in the whole about twelve hundred men fit for 
duty, under the command of Lord Stirling and General Stephen at 
Princeton, until the baggage and stores could cross the Delaware, or 
the troops under their respective commanders should be forced from 
thence. I shall now march back to Princeton, and then govern my- 
self by circumstances and the movements of General Lee." Wash- 
ington also stated that if the troops confidently expected (Lee's) had 
joined him, he should have made a stand both at Hackensack and 
Brunswick, and that " at any event the enemy's progress would have 
been retarded." Upon advancing toward Princeton, he met Stirling 
retreating before superior forces, and fell back to Trenton, and on the 
eighth he was over the Delaware. 

On the twelfth, he heard that Lee was in Jersey with over four 
thousand effective troops ; but neither his own staff, nor a messenger 
sent by Congress, succeeded for some time in finding out the location 
and movements of that officer, although his letters invariably assumed 
great importance for his successive plans and positions. 

An order had been sent to General Schuyler on November twenty- 
sixth, to forward all the Jersey and Pennsylvania troops then in his 
department to Washington. By the thirteenth of December, the 
British columns which had crossed the Hudson with Cornwallis, or 
joined from New York, were concentrated at Brunswick. 

General Howe's •' first design extended no further than to get and 
keep possession of East Jersey. Lord Cornwallis had orders " not to 
advance beyond Brunswick" ; " but on the sixth," continues General 
Howe, " I joined his lordship with the Fourth brigade of British, under 
command of Major-general Grant." On the seventh, Cornwallis 
marched with his corps, except the Guards, who were left at Brunswick, 
to Princeton, which the Americans had quitted on the same day. Corn- 
wallis delayed seventeen hours at Princeton, and was a whole day in 
17 



258 TLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. [1776. 

marching twelve miles more to Trenton. This corps marched in two 
divisions, one of which reached Trenton just as the American rear- 
guard had crossed ; the other led by Cornwallis in person, broke off at 
Maidenhead and marched to Coryell's ferry, in some expectation of 
finding boats there and in the neighborhood, sufficient to pass the 
river; but the enemy had taken the precaution to destroy, or to secure 
on the south side, all the boats that could possibly be employed for that 
purpose. Cornwallis remained at Pennington until the fourteenth, 
when the cantonments having been arranged, the British army was 
placed in winter quarters," " the weather," as stated by General Howe, 
"having become too severe to keep the field." 

Such were the relative positions of the retreating American army 
and the British army which followed its march. It was hardly a pur- 
suit, in the proper military sense. General Howe, however, compli- 
mented Cornwallis in general orders as follows : " I cannot too much 
commend Lord Cornwallis' good service during this campaign: and 
particularly the ability and conduct he displayed in the pursuit of the 
enemy from Fort Lee to Trenton, a distance exceeding eighty miles, 
in which he was well supported by the ardor of his troops, who cheer- 
fully quitted their tents and heavy baggage, as impediments to their 
march." 

In a careful estimate of probabilities, it is difficult to determine 
how Washington's army could have been saved, if General Howe had 
not limited Cornwallis by exact orders. If the latter had left Bruns- 
wick and followed closely upon Washington's retreat, the capture of 
the American army, or its utter dispersion, would have been simply a 
matter of course. 

A memorable episode of the war, which largely affected the cam- 
paign under notice, and had its sequel in subsequent events, must be 
considered in this connection. On the fourteenth of December the 
armies were on opposite sides of the Delaware river, as already stated. 
On the previous day at a country house, three miles from his com- 
mand, General Lee, who was second in command of the American 
armies, was leisurely resting after finishing a letter hereafter cited, 
when he was surprised and made prisoner of war by Lieutenant Colo- 
nel Harcourt, who was on a scout to find out that which puzzled Con- 
gress and its general in chief, — the location of General Lee. He found 
General Lee at Baskingridge, the best possible location from which 
easily to have joined Washington. Lee's division accompanied by 
General Sullivan, had marched to Vealtown, only about eight miles, 



I776.J PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. 259 

on the previous day. He left Chatham and rode at least three miles 
outside of the left flank and to the rear of his army, and spent the night 
at White's Tavern. He was not at breakfast until ten, when he was 
summarily ordered out of his house and taken away in morning dis- 
habille, without hat, boots or cloak, upon the horse of Major Wilkin- 
son, then picketed before the house. Major Wilkinson escaped. 

From orders already cited it appears that General Washington, 
before undertaking his original movement southward, gave the neces- 
sary instructions that the main army then at North Castle Heights 
would soon follow. The necessities of the crisis compelled him to 
advance in person, toward Philadelphia, and occupy the field of 
greatest danger. The relations of General Lee as a subordinate of- 
ficer, and the gravity of the issue, give significance to papers of which 
a few only are cited. The letter referred to was written in the pres- 
ence of Major Wilkinson, a messenger from General Gates, and was 
not folded when the capture was effected. A former letter of Lee to 
General Gates, their relations before the war, and the flattering 
advance by Congress of thirty thousand dollars to General Lee to 
enable him to transfer his English property to America, force them- 
selves to notice in connection with this paper. The expletives are 

omitted. 

Baskenridge, December 13, 1776. 

" My Dear Gates. — The ingenious manceuver of Fort Washington has com- 
pletely unhinged the goodly fabric we had been building. There never was so ■ 

a stroke : — enfre nous, a certain great man is deficient. He has thrown me into 

a situation where I have my choice of difficulties. If I stay in this province, I risk 
myself and army : and if I do not stay, the province is lost forever : . . . our 
councils have been weak to the last degree. As to what relates to yourself, if you 
think you can be in time to aid the General, I would have you by all means go. 
You will at least save j'our army." 

The above letter was not written by the American General-in- 
chief as might be supposed, neither was Lee's situation, however im- 
portant in his own judgment, the pivot of the struggle. As he was 
under positive orders, his safety was in obedience : and there was a 
commander-in-chief who based all his actions, at that very moment, 
upon such obedience, and Lee knew it. 

On the twentieth of November the following official order, signed 
by Grayson, of Washington's staff, was sent to General Lee; " His 
excellency thinks it would be advisable in you to remove the troops 
under your command to this side of the North river and there await 
further orders." 



26o PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. [1776. 

On the twenty-first Washington wrote, " Unless some new event 
should occur or some more cogent reason present itself, I would have 
you move over by the easiest and best passage. I am sensible that 
your numbers will not be large and that perhaps it will not be agree- 
able to the troops. You will doubtless represent to them that in 
duty and gratitude, their service is due where the enemy make the 
greatest impression, or seem to do so." 

Washington wrote on the twent3'-fourth of November, to urge 
" the propriety of sending frequent expresses to advise of your 
approaches," — on the twenty-seventh — " my letters were so full and 
explicit as to the necessity of your marching as early as possible, that 
it is unnecessary to add more on that head. I confess I expected you 
would have been sooner in motion ; " — " the force here, when joined by 
yours, will not be adequate to any great opposition ; " — on the first of 
December, " the enemy are advancing and have got as far as Wood- 
bridge and Amboy, and from information not to be doubted, mean to 
push to Philadelphia. I must entreat you to hasten your march as 
soon as possible, or your arrival may be too late to answer any valu- 
able purpose ; " on the third, "just now favored with your letter of the 
thirtieth ultimo. Having wrote you fully both yesterday and to-day 
of my situation, it is unnecessary to add much at this time. You will 
readily agree that I have sufficient cause for my anxiety, and to wish 
for your arrival as early as possible. . . . The sooner you can 
join me with your division the sooner the service will be benefited. 
As to bringing any of the troops under General Heath I can not con- 
sent to it ; — " I would have you give me frequent advices of your 
pipproach. Upon proper information in this instance, much may 
depend ;" — on the tenth of December, — " when my situation is directly 
opposite to what you suppose it to be, and when General Howe is 
pressing forward with the whole of his army, except the troops that 
were lately embarked . . I can not but entreat you, and this too by 
the advice of all the general officers with me, to march and join me 
with all your force, with all possible expedition. The utmost exer- 
tions that can be made will not more than save Philadelphia.. With- 
out the aid of your force I think there is but little if any prospect 
of doing it." On the eleventh of December, — " Nothing less than 
our utmost exertions will be sufficient to prevent General Howe from 
possessing it," meaning Philadelphia. " I must therefore entreat you 
to push on with every possible succor you can bring. Your aid may 
give a more favorable complexion to our affairs. You know the im- 



17-6-] PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. 261 

portance of the city of Philadelphia and the fatal consequences that 
must attend the loss of it." 

On the twenty-first, with Washington's orders before him, Lee 
wrote to James Bowdoin, President of the Massachusetts Council. 
" Before the unfortunate affair at Fort Washington it was my opinion 
that the two armies, that on the east and that on the west side of the 
North river, must rest, each on its own bottom : that the idea of 
detaching and reinforcing from one side to the other on every motion 
of the enemy was chimerical ; but to harbor such a thought in our 
present circumstances is absolute insanity. Should the enemy alter 
the present direction of their operations, I should never entertain the 
thought of being succored from the western army. We must there- 
fore depend upon ourselves;" and again: "Affairs appear in so im- 
portant a crisis that I think even the resolves of the Congress must no 
longer nicely weigh with us. There are times when we must commit 
treason against the laws of the State, for the salvation of the State. 
The present crisis demands this brave, virtuous kind of treason. For 
my own part (and I flatter myself my way of thinking is congenial 
with that of Mr. Bowdoin) I will stake my head and reputation on 
the measure." 

Lee had written November twenty-fourth : " I have received your 
orders, and shall endeavor to put them in execution ; but question 
much whether I shall be able to carry with me any considerable 
numbers. I sent Heath orders to transport two thousand men across 
the river; but that great man intrenched himself within the letter of 
his instructions and refused to part with a single file, though I under- 
took to replace them with a part of my own." Lee in fact wrote 
insultingly to Heath, who was as independent in command as him- 
self, and even went to his post by virtue of rank, although only a guest, 
ordered two of Heath's regiments to join him, usurping authority, 
and only receded from his position when he realized the nature of his 
offense, and after being constrained to receipt for the troops, as 
"ordered away by myself, at this writing, commanding officer in the 
post." 

He wrote to Heath on the twenty-sixth : " The commander in 
chief is now separated from us ; I of course command on this side the 
water; for the future I will and must be obeyed." In the letter of 
the thirteenth, acknowledged by Washington, he wrote ; " You com- 
plain of my not being in motion sooner. I do assure you that I have 
done all in my power, and shall explain my difficulties when we 



262 PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. [1776. 

both have leisure. . . The day after to-morrow we shall pass the 
river. I do wish you would bind rne as little as possible, 
detached generals can not have too great latitude, unless they are 
very incompetent indeed"; on the fourth, "the northern army has 
already advanced nearer Morristown than I am. Shall put myself at 
their head to-morrow. We shall upon the whole compose an army 
of five thousand good troops in spirits." On the eighth of December 
he wrote from Chatham to Washington : " I am certainly shocked to 
hear that your force is so inadequate to the necessity of your situa- 
tion. ... It will be difficult, I am afraid, to join you, but can 
not I do more service by attacking their rear ? " 

On the same day he wrote this reply to Richard Henry Lee and 
Benjamin Rush, a comviittce from Congress sent to hunt him up : "My 
corps that passed the North river will amount (for we are considerably 
diminished) to twenty-seven hundred ; in fact our army may be esti- 
mated at four thousand. If I was not taught to think that the army 
with General Washington had been considerably reinforced, I should 
immediately join him ; but as I am assured he is very strong, I should 
imagine that we can make a better impression by beating up and 
harassing their detached parties in the rear, for which purpose a good 
post at Chatham seems the best calculated." 

On the ninth he wrote to Heath : " I think we shall be strong 
enough without you. I am in hopes here to reconquer, if I may so 
express myself, the Jerseys. It was really in the hands of the enemy 
before my arrival." 

The following letter, dated at Morristown. December eleventh, 
indorsed ^' From General Lee,'' is added, " We have three tJionsand 
men here at prese?it, but they are so ill-shod that we have been obliged to 
halt these two days for want of shoes. Seven regiments of Gates' corps 
are on their march, but zvhere they actually are is not certain. General 
Lee has sent two officers this day, one to inform him where the Dela- 
ware can be crossed above Trenton, the other to examine the road 
toward Burlington, as General Lee thinks he can without great risk 
cross the great Brunswick road at night, and by a forced night march 
make the ferry below Burlington. Boats should be sent from Phila- 
delphia to meet him. But this scheme he only proposes if the head of 
the enemy's column actually pass the river. The militia in this part of 
the province seem sanguine. If they could be sure of the army rematn- 
vtg amongst tJiem, I believe they zvould raise a considerable number. 

The italicized portions indicate the discrepancy with letters imme- 



'776] PLANS AND COUNTER PLANS. 263 

diately preceding, as declaratory of his settled purpose to act inde- 
pendently, and leave to Washington the responsibility for the loss of 
Philadelphia, or other disasters. Letters to Reed, Greene, Heath, 
Trumbull, and others are similar, or even worse in spirit, and while 
tedious, portions of them are essential elements to a correct judgment 
of this officer's conduct. Washington had provided boats, and acqui- 
esced in Lee's suggestion not to cramp him by defining his exact route, 
so that Washington, by Lee's secrecy, was wholly in the dark as to 
every detail of his progress, and incurred repeated risks through the 
expectation of seeing his troops arrive with promptness. 

The capture of Lee was characterized by Washington thus mildly, 
" It was by his own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect 
any good that he was taken." General Sullivan succeeded Lee in 
command, and with Gates of the Northern army, who brought about 
six hundred men, moved promptly to the Delaware, crossed the river 
at Phillipsburg, and joined Washington. The army was reorganized 
on the twentieth for further service. General Howe had returned to 
New York on the thirteenth. The British cantonments embraced 
Burlington, Bordentown, Trenton, Brunswick, and other small places. 
Colonel Donop, acting brigadier, was stationed at Bordentown. 

It will be seen that in one of the most critical periods of the war, 
when the commander-in-chief himself was on trial, the man who next 
commanded public confidence because of his military training, failed 
him ; simply because Washington with the modesty of a true desire to 
attain excellence in his profession, would not pass final judgment and 
enforce his own will in disobedience to the will of Congress. Congress 
itself began to realize however, that a deliberative civil body was not 
the best commander-in-chief for field service, and that it would have 
to trust the men who did the fighting. It adjourned on the twelfth of 
December quite precipitately, and at the same time, " Resolved: that 
until Congress shall otherwise order, General Washington be possessed 
of full power to order and direct all things relative to the department 
and to the operations of war." 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

WASHINGTON RETURNS THE OFFENSIVE. TRENTON HIS FIRST 

OBJECTIVE. 1776. 

ON the eleventh of December Washington learned that the Brit- 
ish troops were repairing bridges below Trenton and had also 
rebuilt one which had been destroyed by the Americans at Crosswicks. 
While it seemed that this work was preparatory to an attempt to 
move down the river and cross it at a point nearer to Philadelphia, he 
regarded even such a movement as likely to expose the British post- 
detachments to attack, and began to make his plans accordingly. 
His army had increased to nearly six thousand effectives, rank and file. 
General Maxwell had been very faithful in collecting boats to secure 
the anticipated crossing of General Lee's command, and was familiar 
with the country, so that he was selected to command at Morristown, 
which was regarded as a valuable position for a permanent post. 
Meanwhile it was a rendezvous for troops coming from the north, and 
a considerable militia force was already assembling at that place. 

To guard against surprise he divided the river-front into sections, 
under competent commanders. These orders were issued on the 
twelfth and thirteenth of December. The system adopted is worthy of 
notice. Besides light earthworks opposite ferries and exposed places 
easy for landing, and intermediate sentries, small guard posts were 
established at short intervals, and " constant patrols were ordered to 
pass." Points were assigned for a rendezvous in case of a sudden 
crossing where the force detailed was not capable of resistance. The 
troops were to have rations for three days always on hand, and all 
boats were to be protected and kept in good order. 

General Ewing was to guard the river from Bordentown Ferry to 
Yardley's Mills where he lapped on to General Dickinson's section. 
Four brigades, each with artillery, under Stirling, Mercer, Stephens 
and De Fermoy, were posted from Yardley's to Coryell Ferry, in such 



1776.] WASHINGTON RETURNS THE OFFENSIVE. 265 

manner as to guard every suspicious part of the river and to afford 
assistance to each other in case of attack. Colonel Cadwallader was 
posted above and below the Neshaminy river, as far as Dunks Ferry, 
at which place Colonel Nixon was posted with the third battalion of 
Philadelphia. An order was issued the same day, " requiring all able 
bodied men in that city, not conscientiously scrupulous about bear- 
ing arms, to report in the State House yard the next day with their 
arms and equipments : — that all persons who have arms and accou- 
terments which they can not or do not mean to employ in defense of 
America, are hereby ordered to deliver them to Mr. Robert Towers, 
who will pay for the same ; and that those who are convicted of secret- 
ing any arms or accouterments will be severely punished." 

On the fourteenth, when advised that General Howe had actually 
returned to New York, and that the British army was definitely 
entering winter quarters, he felt the necessity and entertained a plan, 
for immediate offensive action. He exhausted appeals to Governors 
and State committees for fresh troops, and resolved to keep his army 
active while its short term of service held out. His determination, 
" to face about and meet the enemy " had only been postponed 
through Lee's disobedience. 

On the fourteenth he wrote to Governor Trumbull, " The troops 
that came down from Ticonderoga with Arnold and Gates, may in 
conjunction with my present force, and that under General Lee, enable 
us to attempt a stroke upon the forces of the enemy, who lay a good 
deal scattered, and to all appearance, in a state of security. A lucky 
blow in this quarter would be fatal to them, and would most certainly 
raise the spirits of the people which are quite sunk by our late mis- 
fortunes." On the same date he wrote to Gates, " If we can draw 
our forces together, I trust under the smiles of Providence we may yet 
effect an important stroke, or at least prevent General Howe from 
executing his plans. I have wrote to General Arnold to go to the 
eastward " (Rhode Island) " on account of the intelligence from that 
quarter." 

The closing paragraph carries with it the correction of a statement 
made in Hughes' History of England, that Ar/io/d proposed to Wash- 
ington the capture of Trenton. Hughes quotes Adolphus, and Adol- 
phus had it " from private information, source unknown." 

Washington wrote to Heath on the same day, " If we can collect 
our force speedily, I should hope we may effect something of import- 



266 WASHINGTON RETURNS THE OFFENSIVE. [1776. 

ance, or at least give such a turn to our affairs as to make them assume 
a more pleasing aspect than they now have." 

On the twentieth he wrote sternly to Congress, " that ten days 
more will put an end to the existence of this army. This is not a 
time to stand upon expense. Our funds are not the only object of 
consideration. If any good officers offer to raise men upon continental 
pay and establishment, in this quarter, I shall encourage them to do 
so, and regiment them when they have done it. If Congress disap- 
prove of the proceeding, they will please signify it, as I mean it for the 
best. It may be thought I am going a good deal out of the line of 
my duty to adopt these measures, or to advise thus freely. A char- 
acter to lose, an estate to forfeit, the inestimable blessing of liberty at 
stake, and a life devoted, must be my excuse." This letter, which is 
long and full of important details, seems to start Washington on a 
career of greater independence of action, and with corresponding 
advantage to his army and its work. He had already ordered the 
recruiting of three battalions of artillery : and as Congress was then 
at Baltimore, more than one hundred and thirty miles distant, he pro- 
ceeded directly to work, under the Resolution which they adopted 
before adjournment. Major Sheldon, of Connecticut, who had the 
only mounted men then with the army, was also commissioned by 
him as lieutenant-colonel, to complete a battalion of six troops, and 
was furnished with fourteen thousand dollars for the purpose. 

In order to learn the exact disposition of the British forces, a scout 
was sent out. On the twentieth, Washington settled upon his plans, 
and directed the three regiments from Ticonderoga to halt at Morris- 
town, where he understood there were already eight hundred militia 
collected, " in order to inspirit the inhabitants, and as far as possible 
cover that part of the country." He adds, " I shall send General 
Maxwell this day to take the command of them, and if it can be done, 
to harass and annoy the enemy in their quarters, and cut off their 
convoys." 

On the twenty-first. Adjutant-general Reed, then at Bristol, re- 
ported, " Pomeroy, whom I sent by your order to go to Amboy, and 
on through the Jerseys, and round by Princeton to you, returned to 
Burlington yesterday." After reporting fully as to Pomeroy's visit to 
Cranberry, Brunswick, Princeton, and elsewhere, he adds, " In Bur- 
lington county he found them," the Hessians, " scattered through all 
the farmers' houses, eight, ten, twelve, and fifteen in a house, and 
rambling over the whole country. 



1776.] WASHINGTON RETURNS THE OFFENSIVE. 267 

" Colonel Griffin has advanced up the Jerseys with six hundred 
men as far as Mount Holly, within seven miles of their headquarters 
at the Black Horse. The spirits of the militia are high, they are all 
for supporting him. We can either give him a strong reinforcement, 
or make a separate attack. . . . Some enterprise must be under- 
taken in our present circumstances, or we must give up the cause, 
. . . will it not be possible my Dear General for your troops, or 
such part of them as can act with advantage, to make a diversion or 
something more at or about Trenton. ... If we could possess 
ourselves again of New Jersey, or any considerable part of it, the 
effect would be greater than if we had never left it. Delay with us 
is now equal to a defeat. It is determined to make all possible pre- 
paration to-day, and no event happening to change our measures, the 
main body /icrc- will cross the river to-morrow morning, and attack 
their post between this and the Black Horse." Colonel Reed was 
then with Cadwallader. On the same day the army return was made 
up showing a total often thousand one hundred and six men, and of 
these, only four thousand seven hundred and seven rank and file were 
present for duty. To this should be added four regiments which 
arrived from the northern army, twelve hundred men ; also Cadwall- 
ader's Pennsylvania militia, eighteen hundred men, and Sullivan's 
division, late Lee's, three thousand men. The total force, deducting 
the sick of the added commands, numbered nearly or quite nine 
thousand men, but this was the entire force for all purposes what- 
ever. 

On the following day Washington thus disclosed to the Adjutant- 
general in confidence, his own matured plans. 

"Camp above Trenton Falls, zyi December, 1776. 
Dear Sir :— The bearer is down to know whether your plan was attennptecl last 
night, and if not, to inform you that Christmas day at night, one hour before day, is 
the time fixed upon for our attempt at Trenton. For Heaven's sake keep this to 
yourself, as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us ; our numbers, sorry am I to 
say, being less than I had any conception of; but necessity, dire necessity, will, nay 
must, justify my attack. Prepare, and in concert with Griffin, attack as many of the 
posts as you can with a prospect of success ; the more we can attack at the same 
instant, the more confusion we shall spread, and greater good will result from it. 
If I had not been fully convinced before of the enemy's design, I have now ample 
testimony of their intention to attack Philadelphia, as soon as the ice will afford the 
means of conveyance. As the colonels of the Continental regiments might kick up 
some dust about command, unless Cadwallader is considered by them in the light 
of a brigadier, which I wish him to be, I desired General Gates who is unwell, an! 



208 WASHINGTON RETURNS THE OFFENSIVE. [1776. 

applied for leave to go to Philadelphia, to endeavor, if his health would permit him, to 
call and stay two or three days at Bristol on his way. I shall not be particular. 

We could not ripen matters for our attack before the time mentioned in the first 
part of this letter, so much out of sorts, and so much in want of everything are the 
troops under Sullivan, etc. Let me know by a careful express the plan you are to 
pursue." 

" I am dear sir, your obedient servant, 

"George Washington." 

" P. S. I have ordered our men to be furnished with three days' cooked rations, 
with which and their blankets they are to march ; for if we are successful, which 
heaven grant, and the circumstances favor, we may push on. I shall direct every 
ferry and ford to be well guarded, and not a soul suffered to pass without an officer's 
going down with a permit ; do the same with you." 

" To Joseph Reed, Esqr., or in his absence, 

" To John Cadwallader, Esqr., only, at Bristol." 

The countersign for the day written by Washington himself, was 
"Victory or Death." 

The letter of Adj'utant-general Reed supphes the gap, which Mr. 
Sparks refers to, in foot-note of "Writings of Washington, vol. iv — 
page 242," where he says, " The//^r;^ mentioned at the beginning of 
the letter, is not explained." 

In a letter of Robert Morris to Congress, written on the twenty- 
sixth, when he heard of the success of the movement, he writes, " This 
manoeuver of the General had been determined upon several days ago, 
but he kept it secret as the nature of the service would admit.'' 

Washington was as capable of keeping his own counsels as was 
Frederick the Great, and there is no responsible authority for credit- 
ing any other man with the plan to capture the garrison of Trenton. 
Others saw the exposed condition of the enemy : but Washington 
acted upon his own motion. The British troops in New Jersey were 
so disposed as if no enemy was within striking distance. And yet 
every effort to cross the Delaware, or even to procure boats for that 
purpose, was met by the fact that the entire opposite shore for miles, 
was under vigilant watch. This alertness to anticipate a British 
advance, carried with it the contingency of incursions from so keen a 
rear-guard : and Colonel Rahl, the post commander at Trenton, had 
been one of the most active officers where hard fighting had been 
experienced, from the twenty-second day of August, when he landed 
upon Long Island. As the American army controlled all the boats 
on the river, they had the means of passage at all times ready at hand. 
From a letter written by General Howe to Lord Germaine it appears 



1776.] WASHINGTON RETURNS THE OFFENSIVE. 269 

that he understood exactly the condition of Washington's army, and 
that after the first of January it would become a skeleton. This fact 
exposed one of those military pauses, when a force having capacity to 
do, must do at once, or never. The obligation upon Washington as a 
soldier was imperative, and as already seen, he realized the fact. 
General Howe and the officers of the corps of observation along the 
Delaware ignored tJie American army, and rested, anticipating an easy 
march to Philadelphia. It was just when they should have seen that 
the last week of the year was the most hopeful for Washington and 
the most critical for their river posts. Already the militia had demon- 
strated toward Mount Holly and challenged Colonel Donop at Bor- 
dentown ; but they had positive orders not to be drawn into an en- 
gagement, and to retire upon the approach of the Hessians. 

Several small stations had been threatened near Trenton itself, and 
Washington had publicly made known his purpose to measure out the 
treatment of prisoners, and carry on war, by the gauge which the British 
general-in-chief should adopt. If the weather allowed the Americans 
to keep the field, it furnished the more potential reason why the bet- 
ter equipped British army should bring boats from New York, and 
overwhelm the dissolving ranks of the enemy, by a quick onset. 

General Grant, commanding at Brunswick, wrote on the twenty- 
fourth, " It is perfectly certain there are no more rebel troops in Jer- 
sey: they only send over small parties of twenty or thirty men. On 
the last Sunday Washington told his assembled generals that, " the 
British are weak at Trenton and Princeton. I wish the Hessians to 
be on the guard against sudden attack ; but at the same time I give 
my opinion that nothing of the kind will be undertaken." 

The closing paragraph destroyed the benefit of the previous state- 
ment, which showed that his military forecast of an exposure to attack 
was sound, and that he knew that Washington appreciated the oppor- 
tunity. 

Note. Compare above with first sentence of General Grant's report of the affair at 
Trenton, viz., " On the twenty-fifth, in the evening a party of the enemy attacked an out- 
guard from the post of Trenton. . . which party was beaten back. Washington certainly 
ordered no detail across the river to put the Hessians on their guard and defeat his sur- 
prise. Either General Grant took up some confused report and therefrom builds an argu- 
ment to show that Colonel Rahl had timely warning ; or the attack was from some random 
party, not in force, nor under responsible authority. It is easier to presume General Grant 
to have been misinformed than to define the occurrence. See Washington's instructions, 
page 268. 



CHAPTER XXXIX. 

HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTON. 1776. 

ON the twenty-fifth day of December, 1776, the regiments of 
Anspach, Knyphausen, and Rahl, with fifty chasseurs, and 
twenty hght dragoons, making a total effective force of not quite 
fifteen hundred and fifty men, constituted the garrison at Trenton. 
The command had six pieces of artillery, including two in front of 
Colonel Rahl's quarters ; but contrary to the previous advice of Colo- 
nel Donop, there were neither field works nor defense of any kind be- 
fore the ferry or at any of the approaches to the town. One such work 
on the summit, at the fork of King and Queen's streets, and one on 
Front street, would have seriously endangered the American move- 
ment, especially under the circumstances of severe weather, which 
almost disarmed the assailants. It is well known that rumors of an 
impending offensive return by Washington had reached Colonel Rahl, 
and that a small picket guard had been stationed on the old Pen- 
nington road, half a mile beyond the head of King street, and another 
was in position, equally advanced upon the river road leading to the 
next upper, or McConkey's ferry, past the houses of Rutherford and 
General Dickinson. 

It was Christmas day, a holiday in great favor with the troops 
which composed the garrison. It is profitless for the author's purpose 
to enter into details of the manner in which that garrison observed 
that holiday, and spent the night which closed its enjoyment. It is 
enough to state that military negligence was absolute, and that it cost 
the commander his life. That negligence lasted through the night, 
and prevailed up to eight o'clock in the morning. It appears that 
the usual morning parade-routine had been observed, and the men 
had returned to their barracks. These barracks, now cleft by a street, 
were still standing in 1875, and showed that they afforded a good de- 
fensive position, if promptly occupied and firmly held. The disposi- 




270* 



1776.] HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTON. 27 1 

tion of the American army for the attack was eminently bold and 
judicious. Grififin was expected still to occupy the attention of Donop, 
as if the demonstrations across the river were but the feverish action 
of local militia. A small centre column, under General James Ewing, 
of Pennsylvania, whose brigade reported but five hundred and forty- 
seven rank and file for duty, was to cross just below Trenton, to occupy 
the bridge across the Assanpink, and thus sever communication with 
Donop's corps at Bordentown. Still further down the river, as a con- 
straint upon the possible movement of that corps to the support of 
Colonel Rahl, the right wing under Colonel John Cadwallader, not yet 
promoted, was ordered to cross at Bristol, below Bordentown, with 
view to a direct attack upon Donop from the south, and thus cooperate 
with the militia in that quarter. General Washington reserved for 
himself the conduct of the left wing, consisting of twenty-four hundred 
men, which was to cross nine miles above Trenton, at McConkey's 
ferry. Learning that Maidenhead was almost without garrison, except 
a troop of dragoons, it was the purpose of the American commander 
also to include that sub-post within his raid. 

It was also expected that General Putnam would cross from Phil- 
adelphia early on the twenty-sixth, with at least a thousand men. 
The plan embraced the entire deliverance of the left bank of the 
Delaware. 

i^^he right wing landed a portion of its troops ; but on account of 
the ice could not land the artillery, and returned to Bristol. Cad- 
wallader expressed his great regret in his report to Washington, 
remarking, " I imagine the badness of the night must have prevented 
you from passing over as you intended." 

It was not until four o'clock that Cadwallader succeeded in regain- 
ing Bristol ; and Moylan, who then started to join Washington, found 
the storm so violent that he abandoned his purpose, believing that 
that officer could not possibly effect a crossing. The centre column 
failed to effect a landing for the same reason. 

Reference is made to maps, '"Operations in New Jersey," " Opera- 
tions near Philadelphia," "Trenton and Vicinity," and " Battle of 
Trenton." The narrative will now adopt official elements without 
formal detail of the fragments embodied. 

The left wing of the army under Washington, accompanied by 
Greene and Sullivan as division commanders, formed evening parade 
under cover of the high ground just back of McConkey's Ferry, now 
known as Taylorville. It was designed to move as soon as darkness 



272 HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTON. [1776. 

set in, so as to complete the crossing at midnight, and enter Trenton 
as early as five o'clock on the morning of the twenty-sixth. 

It was such a night as cost Montgomery and Arnold their fearful 
experience under the rock of Quebec. It was cold, snowy, and tem- 
pestuous. A few days of milder weather had opened the ice ; now it 
was again rapidly freezing, checking the current and skirting the shore. 

The scanty protection of blankets was as nothing to protect men 
in such a conflict. There were young volunteers from Philadelphia in 
that command, going forth for the first time to study war. There 
were nearly ragged and shoeless veterans there, who had faced such 
storms, and the fiercer storms of war before. Stark, of Breed's Hill, 
was there. Glover, the man of Marblehead, a hero of the Long Island 
retreat, and Webb and Scott, and William Washington and James 
Monroe were there. Brain and courage, nerve and faith were there. 
Washington's countersign of the twenty-third, " Victory or Death,'' 
was in the inner chambers of many souls, guarding manhood, quicken- 
ing conscience and defying nature. This was all because the path of 
duty was so well defined. The order to embark and cross over, had 
been given. It was short, and made no allusion to the swift current, 
the cold or snow. These were almost negative facts, circumstances 
of delay and discomfort, but could not set aside duty. Those men 
had been retreating, and had rested on the bank of the Delaware, 
almost hopeless of better times. They were now faced upon their 
late pursuers. The " man of retreats," and temporary positions, was 
in his fighting mood, and men went with him, counting no impedi- 
ments and sternly in earnest. 

" As severe a night as I ever saw," wrote Thomas Rodney ; — " the 
frost was sharp, the current difificult to stem, the ice increasing, the 
wind high and at eleven it began to snow." 

The landing of the artillery was not effected until three o'clock, 
but the army did not march until four. Retreat could not be made 
without discovery, annoyance, and consequent disheartening of his 
troops, and late as it was, the advance was ordered. The snow ceased, 
but sleet and hail came fiercely from the northeast, as the march 
began. 

A mile and a quarter from the landing brought them to ^Bear 
Tavern, where they reached the direct river road to Trenton. Three 
miles and a half more brought them to Birmingham. Sullivan here 
notified Washington by a messenger that the men reported their 
" arms to be wet." " Tell your General," said Washington, " to use the 



I77fi-J HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTON. 273 

bayonet and penetrate into the town. The town must be taken. 
I am resolved to take it," 

Here the army divided, Sulhvan's division moved at once by the 
river road, toward Trenton, then only four and a half miles distant. 
Washington with Greene, took direction to the left, crossed over to 
the old Scotch road, and entered the Pennington road one mile from 
town. This route was about equally distant with the other from the 
points aimed at by the respective divisions. Washington's division, 
as he says, " arrived at the enemy's advanced post exactly at eight 
o'clock ; and three minutes after, I found from the fire on the lower 
road, that that division had also got up." The pickets on both roads 
behaved well, but were quickly swept away by the force which already 
hastened to its achievement. 

Washington moved directly to the junction of King and Queen 
streets. The flying pickets had -already given the alarm, and the 
Hessians were beginning to rally within sight, as he rode in advance. 

Under his direction Colonel Knox placed Forrest's battery of six 
guns in position so as to command both streets, which there diverged 
at a very acute angle ; Queen street running southward to the Assan- 
pink, and King street inclining east of south, to the crossing of Second 
and Front streets, by which Sullivan must approach. Colonel Rahl 
occupied the large frame house of Stacy Potts, near where Perry street 
joins King street. He promptly put himself at the head of a hastily 
gathered detachment for the purpose of advancing up King street to 
its summit, but Captain Forrest's battery of six guns had already 
opened fire. The regiment of Knyphausen attempted to form in open 
ground between Queen street and the Assanpink, while a third detach- 
ment, completely demoralized, moved rapidly toward the Princeton 
road to escape in that direction. This last detachment was met by 
Colonel Pland's rifle battalion which had been deployed to Washing- 
ton's left, as a guard upon that possible line of retreat, as well as to 
watch the approaches from Princeton. Scott's and Lawson's Virginia 
battalions had been thrown still further to the left, thus completely 
closing the gap between Hand and the Assanpink river. 

While Rahl was gathering his own companies as rapidly as possi- 
ble, the two guns at his headquarters had been partially manned and 
were ready to deliver fire; when captain Washington, with lieutenant 
James Monroe and an active party, rushed upon the gunners and 
brought away the pieces, before a sufficiently strong infantry support 
could be brought up for their protection. Rahl moved his companies 



274 HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTON. [1776 

as soon as formed, and joined Knyphausen's regiment, but almost 
immediately moved back for the cover which the buildings afforded. 
Galloway, Stedman, and some other early writers, have alleged 
that the Hessians returned to load wagons and carry off their accumu- 
lated plunder. It is difficult to regard such statements as other than 
traditional fables. Individuals may have tried to save their effects, 
but there was very little time to spare for that business, and Colonel 
Rahl was too strict a soldier to have permitted it at such a moment. 

Captain Forrest's guns swept the open ground as well as the streets, 
and the adjoining orchard was equally untenable, hopelessly exposing 
the men to a fire which could not be returned. Two of the guns 
which were afterwards taken, seem to have been cut off from the 
reach of the Hessians when they were themselves drifted eastward 
from their magazine and barracks by the American control of both 
King and Queen streets ; and two guns with the Knyphausen regiment 
were of little service. General Sullivan's division entered the town 
through Front and Second streets. Colonel Stark who led the column, 
moved directly to the Assanpink bridge, to cut off retreat toward 
Bordentown, but the chasseurs, the light horse and a considera- 
ble infantry force, at least two hundred men, had already crossed the 
bridge in retreat upon that post. St. Clair took possession of the 
foot of Queen street, and as Stark swung round and moved up the 
Assanpink, the Hessians were literally between two fires, while the 
additional enfilading fire upon the streets closed their left, and the 
Assanpink closed their right. 

For a short time small parties of Hessians who had been unable to 
join their companies, kept up a fruitless scattering fire from houses 
where they had taken refuge ; but the fall of Colonel Rahl while 
urging his men to assault the summit where Washington controlled 
the action, and the advance of Sullivan's division which shut up all 
avenues of escape to Bordentown, forced the Hessians out of the 
town to the open field and orchard, where the whole command sur- 
rendered. 

The American casualties were two killed and three wounded, cap- 
tain Washington and Monroe being amone the latter. Several were 
badly frozen ; in two instances resulting fatally. The Hessian casual- 
ties were given by General Howe as forty men killed and wounded 
besides officers; and nine hundred and eighteen prisoners were taken, 
of whom thirty were officers. Subsequently, a lieutenant-colonel, a 
deputy-adjutant-general, and scattering members of the Hessian corps 



I776.J HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTON. 275 

were taken, making the total number of prisoners, as reported by 
Washington on the twenty-eighth of December, at about one thousand." 
The trophies of war were six bronze guns, four sets of colors, over a 
thousand stand of arms, twelve drums, many blankets and other gar- 
rison supplies. General Howe says, " This misfortune seems to have 
proceeded from Colonel Rahl's quitting the post and advancing to the 
attack, instead of defending the village." The fact is overlooked that 
Washington's position at the head of King and Queen streets with 
artillery, which commanded both streets, afforded a very poor oppor- 
tunity for the surprised Hessians. The more men they gathered in 
those narrow streets, the better it was for American artillery practice. 
Rahl followed the instincts of a soldier, and as he had not the force 
to assault the enemy, and dispossess them of their commanding 
positions, he sought ground where he could form his command 
and fight as he could get opportunity. The movement of Wash- 
ington which threw Hand, Scott, and Lawson to the left, together 
with his superiority in artillery, and the pressure of Sullivan's 
division from the rear through Second street, forced Colonel Rahl to 
his fate. His mistakes had been made before the alarm of battle 
recalled him to duty ; and then he did all that time and Washington 
permitted. The disparity in casualties is accounted for by the facts 
stated. The American artillery had its play at will beyond musket 
range and upon higher ground, with little chance for the Hessians to 
render fire in return. A few skillfully handled guns determined the 
action. Washington on this occasion evinced the force of individual 
will applied, under extreme necessity, to a determining issue. The 
battle occupied less than one hour. Its fruit was like the grain of 
mustard seed which developed a tree under whose branches a thou- 
sand might take shelter. He marched back to Newtown ivitli prisoners 
of ivar, reaching his headquarters the same night ; a new experience 
for the American army. This countermarch was attended with great 
hardships and suffering. The entire distance marched by the troops 
which left Newtown with Washington, was nearly thirty miles, before 
they again reached their camp, and more than a thousand men were 
practically disabled for duty through frozen limbs and broken down 
energies. 

General Gates did not participate in the action, having gone to 
Baltimore to meet Congress of his own volition without invitation, 
and without advising with Washington. Major Wilkinson of his staff 
was indeed sent to report the fact to the general-in-chief, and so re- 



2/6 HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTOX. [1776. 

ported while Washington was superintending the crossing of the troops 
during the evening of the twenty-fifth. General Putnam made no 
demonstration, through apprehension that if he left Philadelphia there- 
would be an uprising of royalists inhis rear. Colonel Griffin, who had 
recrossed the Delaware after his first skirmish with Colonel Donop 
did not return to the Jersey bank to cooperate on the evening of the 
twenty-fifth, so that the entire attack vv^as limited to the operations of 
the extreme left wing. 

The Hessian troops were marched through the streets of Phila- 
delphia to prove to the people that the dreaded European veterans 
were no longer invincible, and the effect upon that city and the States 
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey was of lasting value to the American 
cause. 

Colonel Donop did not wait for an assault upon his post. In his 
skirmish with Griffin he had employed nearly his whole garrison, con- 
sisting of two thousand men, with little advantage ; and upon the 
arrival of the fragments of Rahl's command, he abandoned the post 
altogether, with the stores, his sick and wounded, and marched with 
haste to Princeton via Crosswick's and AUentown, and started on the 
next day for South Amboy. 

On the twenty seventh, Cadwallader crossed over from Bristol 
with eighteen hundred men, and reached Bordentown the next day, 
not indeed knowing that Washington had recrossed the river. Gen- 
erals Ewing and Mifflin followed successively with five hundred and 
eight hundred men, but Mount Holly and Black Horse had already 
been abandoned by the Hessians. 

While the Continental troops who participated in the battle of 
Trenton rested, Washington perfected his means for further offensive 
movements. He learned from a letter of Colonel De Hart, written 
from Morristown on the twenty-seventh, the gratifying news that the 
three regiments of Greaton, Bond, and Porter, woul3"~extend their 
terms of service two weeks. That officer also reported that only five 
or six hundred Highlanders remained at Elizabethtown, and that the 
outposts at Boundbrook and in that vicinity had been withdrawn to 
Brunswick. Generals McDougall and Maxwell, then at Morristown, 
were instructed " to collect as large a body of militia as possible, and 
assure them that nothing is wanting but for them to lend a hand and 
drive the enemy from the whole province of New Jersey." On the 
twenty-eighth he wrote to Maxwell, " As I am about to enter the 
Jerseys with a considerable force immediately, for the purpose of 



I77f).l HESSIANS SURPRISED AT TRENTON. 277 

attempting a recovery of that country from the enemy, and as a 
diversion from your quarter may greatly facilitate this event by dis- 
tracting and dividing their troops, I must request that you will collect 
all the force in your power together, and annoy and distress them by 
every means which prudence can suggest." To General Heath he 
wrote, " I would have you advance as rapidly as the season will admit 
with the eastern militia, by the way of the Hackensack, and proceed 
downwards until you hear from me. I think a fair opportunity is 
ofifered of driving the enemy entirely from, or at least to, the extremity 
of the province of Jersey." 

On the thirtieth Washington, having again crossed to Trenton, 
was able to announce that the continental regiments of the eastern 
governments had agreed to remain six weeks longer in the service, 
upon receipt of a bounty of ten dollars; and earnest messages were 
sent out in all directions, to eminent citizens as well as officers, to make 
use of the success of Trenton as a stimulus to recruit for the army 
and hasten the concentration of the militia. The responses were of 
the most encouraging nature ; but the great fact remained, that the 
ordeal of the conversion of raw material into soldiers would have to 
be gone through again after a few weeks, and every hour was to be 
improved to get the largest possible results out of the service of the 
four thousand of old troops who had consented to remain for that 
short period. The success on the twenty-fifth aroused great expec- 
tations, and Congress shared in the confidence which the people 
extended to the Commander-in-chief of its armies. 

Note. Major Wilkinson thus describes the delivery of General Gates' letter to General 
Washington, at McConkey's Ferry, after dusk, December 26th. I found him alone, with 
his whip in his hand, prepared to mount his horse. When I presented the letter of General 
Gates to him, before receiving it, he exclaimed with solemnity, ' What a time is this to hand 
me letters ! ! Where is he?' ^ttswer. ' I left him this morning in Philadelphia.' What was 
he doing there .' ' I understood him, that he was on his way to Congress.' He earnestly 
repeated : ' On his way to Congress,' then broke the seal, and I made my bow and joined 
General St. Clair, on the bank of the river. This incident is given in connection with 
another statement of the same officer, that General Gates said it was his intention to pro- 
pose to Congress that General Washington should retire to the south of the Susquehanna. 
TJiis explains his failure to join Washington. The success at Trenton was not anticipated 
by General Gates. 

Note. Rahl, or Rail. Dr. Frederick Kapp, of Berlin, in a letter to Adjutant-general 
William Stryker. of Trenton, New Jersey, May, 1776, says, "Rail is correct." In modern 
usage, the silent /i, their only silent letter, is dropped by German scholars. Hence Bancroft 
adopts Rail. As Washington, Sparks, Irving and general history have retained the /i, the 
name is retained as most familiar at the period of the war. It is immaterial, as the pro- 
nunciation, in either case, would be as if the name were spelled in English, /?ar/. Dr 
Bailey Myers, a German scholar of repute, and Professor Green, in his German element in 
the Rev. War., retain Rahl. 



CHAPTER XL. 

MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS. WASHINGTON CLOTHED WITH THE 
POWERS OF DICTATOR. OPINIONS OF TRENTON. 1776. 

WPIILE the land operations of the British and American armies 
were thus constant during the latter part of the year 1776, 
the Americans made considerable progress in the building of the ships 
of war which had been previously authorized. 

The Columbus and Hamden were at Providence nearly ready for 
sea on the second of November, but were soon shut up with the 
Warren and some smaller vessels, by the British occupation of New- 
port. The Alfred had sailed and had already captured several valua- 
ble prizes. The New Hampshire, Raleigh, Randolph, Congress, Dela- 
ware, Montgomery and several other frigates were nearly finished but 
needed cannon. Thirteen had been launched, and two ships of the 
line and five additional frigates were on the stocks by the twenty-first 
of December. At that date Robert Morris sent to the American 
Commissioners at Paris a statement of the condition of public affairs, 
and then apologized for the apparently slow progress made in fitting 
out vessels to prey-upon British commerce, by stating the want of 
heavy guns. Besides the Alfred, however, the Reprisal, Andrew 
Doria and Lexington were at sea, as v/ell as the sloops Providence, 
Hornet, Fly, Independence and Sachem, and the schooners Wasp, 
Musquito and Georgia-Packet. Privateering however monopolized 
the chief interest in naval warfare, because it was lucrative ; and it 
was with difficulty that suitable crews could be obtained, for other 
vessels of all kinds had captured, according to the official list, three 
hundred and forty-two, had retaken forty-four and burned five. 

In aid of their operations at home the Americans already began to 
count upon foreign assistance. Correspondence had been opened with 
agents at Paris looking to the enlistment of France in the war; and 
the prizes of the American privateers had found special favor in the 




C'c/mf/i/er/ a/tdMuir///;//C'o/. earrhiqton 



17-6] MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS. —OPINIONS OF TRENTON. 279 

ports of that country and of Spain, by a skillful avoidance of any 
public act that would offend Great Britain. 

The proclamation which General Howe published when his army 
entered the Jerseys had received its death-blow when Trenton was 
taken ; and Congress silenced the still existing anxiety for some kind 
of a compromise by an unequivocal course which left no alternative 
but the issue of battle. 

The British army was theoretically in Winter quarters. The gar- 
rison of Rhode Island made no demonstrations which corresponded 
to the force at disposal, and Massachusetts had so far recovered 
from the alarm incident to its first arrival as to turn her atten- 
tion to a fresh support of the national army. The middle and south- 
ern States were also active in the organization of fresh battalions. 
New foundries were established, and an attempt was made to secure 
a complete field outfit for the army, on the new establishment of 
eighty-eight battalions. One hundred thousand small arms and two 
hundred bronze cannon were solicited of France, by way of purchase, 
and, more needed than almost anything else, a gold loan was also 
earnestly urged. As the certainty of another campaign became appa- 
rent, so the mind of Washington was tasked to provide for its support. 

The British government found itself compelled to increase its own 
army and multiply the stores for garrison, siege and field service. 
Great difficulties attended the second effort to obtain troops from the 
small German States, the entire number of recruits and reinforce- 
ments secured, being only three thousand and six hundred men. The 
Brunswick and Hanau recruits, and four companies of Hanau Yagers 
were sent to Canada ; but the residue came to General Howe. The 
reinforcements from Great Britain and Ireland, however, which sailed 
for America before January 1st, 1777, embraced three thousand two 
hundred and fifty-two men for New York and nearly eight hundred 
for Canada. General Howe increased his requisition for troops to 
twenty thousand men, and declared it as his opinion that it would be 
impossible to organize the Canadian army so as to reach Albany before 
August or September of the year 1777. His prediction was subse- 
quently confirmed by experience. 

The cabinet contemplated that a very considerable Indian force 
could be made auxiliary to the regular troops; but neither Howe 
nor Carleton had confidence in the measure. As a question of mili- 
tary policy, it was ruinous to the supremacy of the crown to employ 
savages against the colonists. 



28o MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS. — OPINIONS OF TRENTON. [1776. 

On the part of the Americans, in anticipation of another northern 
campaign, large bateaux were built to support a boom and chain at 
Ticonderoga. Mount Washington was ordered to be fortified, and 
Fort Stanwix was ordered to be put in thorough order to anticipate 
Indian aggression in conjunction with an invasion from the north. 
For the time being it seemed as if the American people would heartily 
facilitate the organization of the army up to the demands of the crisis. 

As early as December seventh a citizen of Pennsylvania publicly 
proposed a Dictator for that State, to serve for three or six months, 
and propounded this question, " Has not the want of a suitable per- 
son, entrusted with such powers in time of war, ended in the ruin of 
several of the most flourishing Republics of antiquity ? " 

At last Congress realized the condition of the army and the neces- 
sity for some controlling master spirit in the conduct of the war, and 
supplemented its action of the twelfth of December by a more positive 
declaration on the twenty-seventh, clothing Washington, for the period 
of six months, with enlarged authority, of which the following extracts 
indicate the tenor, " Full, ample and complete powers to raise and 
collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any 
and all of the United States, sixteen battalions of infantry in addition 
to those already voted by Congress ; to appoint officers for the said 
battalions: to raise officers and equip three thousand light horse, three 
regiments of artillery and a corps of engineers, and to establish their 
pay ; — to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he 
shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions and in 
such places as he shall deem proper : to displace and appoint all offi- 
cers under the rank of Brigadier-general, and to fill up all vacancies 
in every other department of the American army; to take, wherever 
he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the army, if the in- 
habitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same, and 
to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take the continental cur- 
rency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American cause." 

These large grants of power were made when "affairs were in such 
a condition that the very existence of civil liberty depended," as Con- 
gress stated, " on the right execution of military powers," and when 
" the vigorous decisive conduct of these being impossible to distant, 
numerous and deliberative bodies," it was '* confident of the wisdom, 
vigor, and uprightness of General Washington." It was under the 
burden of this responsibility that Washington rested when he closed 
the year 1776 in camp near Trenton. 



1776] MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS.— OPINIONS OF TRENTON. 28 1 

It is a matter of interest to bear in mind a few of the contempo- 
raneous criticisms which the affair at Trenton called forth from British 
and European authorities. 

" All our hopes were blasted by the unhappy affair at Trenton," said 
Lord Germaine. " It has excited not less astonishment in the British 
and auxiliary quarters than it has done joy in those of the Americans. 
The Hessians will be no longer terrible, and the spirits of the Ameri- 
cans will rise amazingly,'' wrote Gordon, quoting from the Annual 
Register of Burke. " Thus ended a campaign glorious to the fame 
of Washington,'' is the tribute of Hughes. Stedman charges all the 
fault upon General Howe and his assignment of foreign troops to the 
posts on the Delaware. " The fact is," wrote Burke, " from the suc- 
cesses of the preceding campaign, and the vast superiority which they 
perceived in themselves in army actions, the ' Hessians' had held the 
Americans in too great contempt, both as men and as soldiers, and 
were too apt to attribute those advantages to some extraordinary 
personal virtue and excellence, which were in reality derived from the 
concurrence of a number of other and very different causes; from 
miHtary skill, experience and discipline ; from the superior excellence 
of their small arms, artillery, and other engines, furniture and supplies 
necessary for war, and still more particularly to a better supply and a 
more dextrous and effective use of the bayonet." 

Walter in his " History of England on Christian Principles," says 
of the whole campaign : '• The same want of energy which prevented 
Sir William Howe from making the most of the hour of success, also 
prevented him from maintaining the strict discipline which is necessary 
to keep a victorious soldiery from insulting and injuring the inhabitants 
of a country which they regard as their conquest, so that though the 
prudent care and pains taken by General Clinton and Lord Percy 
hindered the people of Rhode Island from having any occasion to 
complain of the conduct of the troops under their command, all the 
inhabitants of the portion of Jersey and of the districts on which the 
forces under the immediate management of General Howe were can- 
toned, soon became bitter enemies to England from exasperation at 
the injuries inflicted on them, not only by the Hessians, but by the 
British soldiers ; and that the Americans were inspirited by Trenton 
with the hope that courage might compensate for their inferiority in 
the knowledge of the art of war." 

Lord Mahon, in his History of England, says, " the posts that were 
on this occasion the most exposed had been left the weakest manned, 



282 MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS. — OPINIONS OF TRENTON. [1776. 

and undefended by a single intrenchment or redoubt," and adds, 
"whoever may have the earHest devised this scheme, the merit of its 
details and execution belongs entirely to Washington." Knight briefly 
notices the action, adding, " Washington went back to secure his 
prisoners, and again crossed the Delaware, the outposts of the British 
being abandoned without a struggle by panic-stricken fugitives." 

A London writer discourses as follows: " As the capture of the 
Hessians and the manoeuvers against the British took place after the 
surprise of General Lee, we find that Lee is not the only efficient man 
in the American service. We find also that the mere moving through 
a province is not subduing it. Perhaps the small scale of our maps 
deceives us ; and as the word America takes up no more room than 
the word Yorkshire, we seem to think the territory they represent 
much of the same bigness, though Charleston is as far from Boston 
as London is from Venice. It is a bad rule to think the fate of 
America is to be decided by the transient possession of a few villages 
and hamlets. Our danger increases as we penetrate the country, in 
proportion to our distance from our fleet and our dispensary." 

The Abb6 Raynal, writing in his curious little book, " The Revo- 
lution in America," published in 1787, thus philosophizes. " The 
effect of strong passions, and of great dangers, is often to astonish the 
mind and to throw it into that kind of torpor that deprives it of the 
use of its powers; by degrees it recovers itself; all its faculties, sus- 
pended for a moment, display themselves with redoubled vigor ; every 
spring of action is awakened, and it feels its powers rise at once to a 
level with the difficulty it has to encounter. In a great multitude 
there are always some who feel this immediate effect, which rapidly 
communicates itself to others. Such a revolution took place among 
the Confederates. It caused armed men to issue from all quarters." 

Botta writes at fever heat of that entire winter's campaign. 
" Thus by an army almost reduced to extremity, Philadelphia was 
saved, Pennsylvania protected, New Jersey nearly recovered, and a 
victorious and powerful enemy laid under the necessity of quitting 
all thoughts of acting offensively in order to defend itself. Achieve- 
ments so astonishing acquired an immense glory for the Captain Gen- 
eral of the United States. All nations shared in the surprise of the 
Americans. All equally admired and applauded the prudence, the 
constancy and the noble intrepidity of General Washington. An 
unanimous voice proclaimed him the savior of his country; all' ex- 
tolled him, as equal to the most celebrated commanders of antiquity. 



1776.] MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS.— OPINIONS OF TRENTON. 283 

His name was in the mouth of all. All proclaimed him the Fabius 
of America. He was celebrated by the pens of the most distinguished 
writers. The most illustrious personages of Europe lavished upon 
him their praises and their congratulations." Washington thus 
answered the voice of Congress. " Instead of thinking myself freed 
from all civil obligations, I shall constantly bear in mind that, as the 
sword was the last resort for the preservation of our liberty, so it ought 
to be the first thing laid aside when those liberties are finally estab- 
lished." " I shall instantly set about making the most necessary reforms 
in the army." 

It was a source of inspiration to the people, an assurance of the 
wisdom of their chief Captain, and an earnest appeal to the courage 
and endurance of the army, as well as a comfort to Washington him- 
self, that his first offensive movement had been favored with success : 
but at midnight of the thirty-first of December, 1776, he realized the 
solemnity of the hour, when in the face of this single brilliant fact, 
the peril of his army and of the cause which commanded his " life 
devotion," were again extreme and oppressive. 



CHAPTER XLI. 

FROM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. THE ASSANPINK AND 
PRINCETON. 1777. 

ON the first day of January, 1777, the American General in chief 
was at Trenton, New Jersey. The Assanpink or Trenton river 
is a small stream just east of the town. At that time the banks were 
abrupt, and the adjoining hill was generally thickly wooded, but with 
occasional clearings and cultivated tracts toward Bordentown. The 
stream itself, quite inconsiderable in the summer months, was much 
swollen after rains or melting snow, and a bridge was necessary a little 
above the point where it emptied into the Delaware river. The road 
to Bordentown crossed this bridge. 

Washington received advices that Lord Cornwallis, who had been 
on the eve of sailing for England, had resumed the command of a 
division and was on his route from Brunswick, to attack him at Tren- 
ton. Instead of falling back and uniting the forces then at Borden- 
town and Crosswicks for a march down the Delaware toward Phila- 
delphia, he ordered the troops then under the command of Generals 
Mifflin and Cadwallader, the latter just promoted, to join him. Du- 
ring the night of the first and the following morning these troops, three 
thousand six hundred in number, arrived at Trenton, thereby swelling 
the nominal force of Washington's army to five thousand men. 

The main body of this army was established along the east bank 
of the Assanpink for a space of two miles, in successive lines, so as to 
give all the concentration of resistance which their numbers and posi- 
tion would warrant. Guards were established at all points which 
offered facility for fording, and several pieces of artillery were planted 
at the bridge and supported by some of the steadiest of the continen- 
tal troops. 

An advance guard from General De Fermoy's brigade, was with 
two pieces of artillery established on rising ground well flanked by 



1777.1 FKOM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. 285 

woods, a little more than a mile in advance of Trenton. Colonel 
Hand's riflemen were pushed forward as far as " Five Mile creek," 
and a small supporting party occupied quite a defensible position at 
Shebakonk creek, where heavy timber and uneven ground afforded a 
good position for irregular troops. 

The weather had relaxed its severity, as is usual in America at the 
mid-winter season, and the frozen roads had been partially thawed, 
so that the movement of troops having artillery and baggage wagons 
was necessarily slow. The Delaware was filled with floating ice, large 
masses were banked up in its curves, and retreat to the west bank 
was impracticable in the face of an advancing enemy. It was also 
argued by Washington that all that had been gained in the way of 
moral support to the people of New Jersey would be sacrificed by an 
attempt to withdraw to the southward. It was not indeed impossible 
that the British troops would ultimately cross the river and move 
upon Philadelphia, whatever course he might adopt, and he resolved 
to do his best to save the army, and leave that city to the contin- 
gencies of the campaign. 

General Cornwallis left Brunswick with the reserve, which was a 
part of his old command, the VValdeckers, Colonel Donop's Hessians, 
and the former garrisons of the adjacent posts, two regiments of 
Highlanders, and Kohler's heavy artillery, making a total strength of 
a little over seven thousand men. Cornwallis led the advance in per- 
son, followed by the main army, leaving, however, three companies 
of light dragoons, and the Seventeenth, Fortieth, and Fifty-fifth regi- 
ments of foot at Princeton ; and General Leslie with a small brigade 
as rear guard, was still at Maidenhead when the leading battalions 
entered Trenton. The advance was met shortly after it left Maiden- 
head by Colonel Hand's riflemen, who kept up a lively skirmish fire 
as they slowly fell back, and at Shebakonk this resistance was suflfi- 
ciently spirited to require Cornwallis to push another regiment with 
artillery to the front. Upon coming up to the position where the 
guns had been placed, an additional delay was interposed to his 
advance by General Greene. He promptly opened fire for the express 
purpose of keeping the enemy from reaching Trenton in time to make 
an attack before night. 

Washington visited the detachment when Greene took command 
and then returned to the bridge, to be prepared to cover the troops 
as they retired to the lines closely pressed by the British column. It 
was about four o'clock in the afternoon, nearly sunset in America in 



286 FROM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. [1777 

the latitude of Trenton, but Cornwallis at once threw skirmishing, 
detachments along the river to feel the fords and practicable crossings, 
and opened fire with artillery, near the bridge and above the town. 
At all points he found wooded ascents, an active adversary, and the 
determination to give battle if he should attempt to force a crossing. 

He sent a strong column down Queen street, and made three 
separate efforts to force the bridge-passage, but the fire was so con- 
stant and direct that further attempt was abandoned. 

The British army had made a trying march, and orders were sent 
to Princeton to forward the light dragoons as well as the Seventeenth 
and Fifty-fifth regiments, and General Leslie was ordered up from 
Maidenhead to be prepared for morning work. The armies were 
separated less than a mile, and the picket guards were within hail, 
from side to side. Under existing circumstances Cornwallis wisely 
declined a night attack ; but his reconnoissance should have been so 
complete that he could have made an attack when the American army 
commenced its movement. He should have anticipated the possi- 
bility of an attack upon his own communications and base. The can- 
nonading was kept up until dark, the camp fires were lighted on both 
sides of the Assanpink, and the armies awaited the issues of another 
day. 

During the afternoon the hazy weather gave way to a clear sky, 
and after sunset the night became cold, freezing the ground hard, and 
making travel more easy, Washington had matured a plan of escape 
from his hazardous position, whereby he might avoid a battle with 
superior and well drilled troops, without the loss of prestige and the 
inevitable disaster which would follow a retreat from his adversary, so 
soon after the success at Trenton. He was now satisfied that the 
army of Cornwallis had gathered up its principal columns for the pro- 
posed attack. He had learned from reconnoissances ordered during 
the latter part of December, both the character of the roads and the 
most expeditious routes to Brunswick. He also sent a small party to 
learn whether the British troops had any detachments on the old 
Quaker road, to the east of the Assanpink, and was assured that the 
path was clear. Colonel Donop afterwards stated that he advised 
Cornwallis to send a division by the old road east of the creek, which 
would have accomplished, as against Washington, the very movement 
which Ewing attempted before the attack upon Trenton ; but his 
advice was not followed. 

Washington also assumed from reports of the original force at 



I777-] FROM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. 287 

Brunswick that its great magazines of stores and supplies must have 
been left under small guard, and believed that by a quick dash he 
might capture or destroy them. It was a bold strategic movement. 
and a fit companion-enterprise to his first return of the offensive at 
Trenton. A council of war was convened for the consideration of the 
movement. It was promptly endorsed by the officers consulted, and 
was speedily carried into effect. No time was lost. The baggage 
wagons which had been posted in the rear on the Bordentown road, 
were started for Burlington under a small guard as soon as it was 
dark. The fires were plied with dry rails from fences and fallen trees, 
and shortly after one o'clock the army was in motion with all the light 
artillery that could be taken along. The weather had been so mild 
for a few days that many of the blankets had been packed in the bag- 
gage wagons, when the army first moved across the Assanpink, and 
the night was sufficiently cold to cause much suffering; but the letters 
of officers written after arrival at Morristown, show that the march 
was silent, orderly, and almost entirely without halts. The route 
was made somewhat longer by following a new trail where the stumps 
had not been removed, until the old Quaker road was reached, when 
the advance was made with much more celerity and compactness of 
movement. 

The picket guards who were left on post, had been furnished with 
ample supplies of fuel for the night, and they kept up their regular 
round of challenge, replenished their fires, and did not decamp and 
follow the* army until nearly morning. A small working party was 
also engaged in throwing up light field-works before the bridge, and 
at one point up the stream, to give greater assurance of watchfulness 
and preparation for an attack. 

Just before leaving camp, Washington sent a messenger to Gen- 
eral Putnam, advising him of his movements, and instructing him to 
send up troops to occupy Crosswicks, and he also thereby secured the 
safety of his baggage train which had started down the river. 

The vanguard of the American army reached Stony Brook about 
sunrise, Washington there re-formed his columns, sending General 
Mercer to the left, by the Quaker road, and intended to advance di- 
rectly to the village itself, by a lower road, under cover of rising ground, 
and thus expedite his proposed movement upon Brunswick. Gen- 
eral Mercer, upon wheeling out of column, passed a thick woods and 
orchard near the Friends' meeting house, and moved up the creek for 
the purpose of destroying the bridges and thus delaying pursuit from 



288 FROM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. [1777. 

Trenton, as well as to cut off fugitives from Princeton. His force was 
composed of the remnants of Haslett's and Smallwood's regiments, 
the seventh Virginia and a few volunteers, making a total however of 
less than four hundred men. He was rapidly approaching the Trenton 
road, when he found his command suddenly confronted by the seven- 
teenth British foot, which was rapidly crowding for a commanding 
position directly to his right toward Princeton. This regiment had 
received the order of Cornwallis to join him, had already crossed the 
Stony creek bridge by the old road, and had reached the summit of 
Millett's Hill when Colonel Mawhood first noticed the small com- 
mand of Mercer as they passed in front of the orchard near the house 
of William Clark. 

The American army however was not in sight and the column of 
Mercer did not largely exceed Mawhood's own force. Without any 
hesitation he recrossed Stony Brook and found himself within five 
hundred yards of their advance guard. General Mercer moved north- 
ward toward the same elevated ground which Mawhood recognized 
as commanding the situation, and having reached it first, then advanced 
to the cover of a zigzag rail fence which crossed the hill, and delivered 
fire. The British returned but one volley, and instantly made a 
steady, impetuous charge with the bayonet. The onset was too solid 
and the defense too nominal for Mercer's command to withstand the 
attack. They fell back in confusion and took refuge in Clark's orchard 
and other high ground near the Friends' meeting house. As soon as 
the firing began, Washington pushed additional troops to the summit 
on the left of his advancing column, and this force, although furnished 
with two guns, was also assailed by Mawhood's with such vigor that 
several companies gave way, and it appeared as if they were to follow 
the fate of the troops first engaged. 

Captain Neal of the artillery had already fallen, and the British 
attack was directed to the capture of Captain Moulder's guns, which 
from their position were beginning to tell upon their column with 
effect. Washington, as previously at Kipp's bay, spurred his horse 
through the scattering militia to the front, and maintained his place 
for a few minutes in a position of extreme personal danger, directly 
in the line of fire of the opposing troops. The men, inspired by his 
example, rallied promptly to his support. 

As a matter of fact the British troops reached the crest of the hill 
in the pursuit of Mercer's flying column before it came to the knowl- 
edcre of Colonel Mawhood that he was entering the lists against the 



1777.] FROM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. 289 

entire American army. Its extended column was then in full view 
moving toward the town where the Fortieth and Fifty-fifth were sta- 
tioned. The latter regiment had been in readiness to march for Tren- 
ton when the action began, and make an effort to support the Seven- 
teenth ; but Colonel Hand had wheeled out of the main column and 
taken his position with the troops which Washington had first sent 
to the support of Mercer, and Colonel Hitchcock with equal prompt- 
ness turned the left of Mawhood and cut him off from Princeton as 
well as from assistance. Generals Stirling and St. Clair, and Colonels 
Poor, Patterson and Reed were also advancing upon the Fifty-fifth, 
and the only avenue of retreat was toward Trenton, Abandoning 
his cannon, the British commander, already receiving the fire of more 
than four times his own force, threw his men across Stony Creek 
at all practicable places, mostly by the bridge, and took refuge at 
Maidenhead, where General Leslie's column still halted. The Fifty- 
fifth, closely pressed by weight of numbers, and these constantly 
augmented, took a position on the high sloping ground immediately 
south of Nassau Hall, Princeton College, where a ravine separated 
them from the Americans, and where a small force could make a suc- 
cessful resistance to a much larger force of infantry. The American 
artillery was promptly brought to bear upon their ranks. Several 
regiments passed clear of the hill and gained the main street in front 
of the college. The doors of the building were soon forced and that 
regiment with the Fortieth attempted to escape to New Bruns- 
wick, one by the Kingston and the other by the Rocky Hill route. 

The entire action consumed less time than its recital. The Brit- 
ish loss was heavy, exceeding one hundred men in killed and wounded, 
while two hundred and thirty were taken prisoners, including four- 
teen officers. Captain William Leslie, son of the Earl of Levin, 
was among the killed, and was buried with every becoming token 
of respect. 

The American loss in rank and file was greatly less than the lirit- 
ish, but the efforts of the officers to check them at the crisis of the 
panic cost valuable lives. General Mercer, who had already gained 
much credit as an officer, and served with Washington in the old 
Indian war of 1756-1766, was mortally wounded while endeavoring 
to rally his men near Clark's house, and Colonels Haslet and Potter, 
Major Morris, and Captains Fleming, Shippen, and Neil were among 
the killed. General Mercer, a native of Scotland, was an assistant sur- 
geon at the battle of Culloden, a physician of high attainment at Fred- 
IQ 



290 FROM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. [i777. 

ericksburg, Virginia, when the American war called him to arms, and 
he was held in high estimation by all who knew him, as an officer of 
great judgment and promise. 

A detachment was immediately sent to destroy the bridge over 
Stony Creek, and the army advanced to Kingston, only about three 
miles beyond Princeton, on the other side of Millstone river. 

Upon reaching that town, Washington hastily consulted his gen- 
eral officers as to further movements. General Greene had started 
his column up the Millstone, on the supposition that it was of first 
importance to reach some strong position where a decided resistance 
could be offered to pursuit. The men were cold, hungry, and nearly 
worn out. The greater part of the command had been on constant 
duty from the time they left Bordentown and Crosswicks. Many 
were barefooted, and no time had been allowed for the distribution 
of rations since breaking camp opposite Trenton. Before the main 
■column had crossed the Millstone, the sound of renewed firing at 
Princeton gave warning that the troops at Maidenhead were already 
in pursuit. The possibility of striking the stores at Brunswick de- 
pended therefore upon being able to do it with no delay of resistance, 
as a defense, however brief, would compel a general action with the 
approaching British army. The latter had " mounted troops," while 
the Americans were practically without any. The fugitive detach- 
ments of the Fortieth and Fifty-fifth would certainly put the Brunswick 
garrison on the alert. 

Farther pursuit of these troops was therefore abandoned, and the 
army moved directly and promptly from Kingston, up the east bank 
of the Millstone, and the next day secured a strong position at 
Pluckemin, when the troops obtained refreshment and partial rest. 

While these events transpired, Cornwallis had realized the con- 
sequences of under-estimating the mental resources and executive 
ability of his adversary. The American lines had been deserted while 
he was resting for a triumph. The camp fires still burned as day 
dawned, but there were no pickets on post, and the bridge head was 
without defenders. The opinion expressed by Sir William Erskine 
the night before, which is well accredited, that Washington would not 
abide attack but withdraw his forces, was confirmed, and the report of 
artillery in the direction of Princeton and Brunswick, showed that 
while Cornwallis was indeed on the Delaware, his adversary was be- 
tween him and his base, and his very depot of supplies was in peril. 
The light dragoons were hurried to the rear, and the whole army 



1777] FROM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. 29 1 

followed with all possible expedition. The distance was but ten 
miles, while Washington had marched very nearly sixteen ; and the 
British vanguard approached the Stony Creek bridge as the American 
rear guard was completing its destruction. There was nearly an hour's 
delay at this point before artillery could be placed across the creek ; 
but some of the regiments were forced over, regardless of ice and 
water, to quicken pursuit. There was additional delay at Kingston, 
as the bridge over the Millstone had also been destroyed, and the 
British army apparently unconscious, or neglecting to examine the 
trail of the Americans' retreat, precipitately hastened to Brunswick, 
where they found the public stores were in safety, but the army of 
Washington was not there awaiting capture. 

Cornwallis also found upon his arrival at Brunswick late on the 
same night, that the retreating troops had aroused great terror in the 
small garrison, and General Matthews had already commanded the 
removal of baggage and warlike stores. Seventy thousand dollars in 
gold was at the post for payment of the troops, and this money was 
promptly returned to New York. 

The condition of the American army during a rest of two 
days at Pluckemin was one of great suffering, and it is difficult to 
understand how a defense could have been maintained if Cornwallis 
had immediately made an attack. On the fifth, Washington found 
time to send a report to Congress, and to make up dispatches to 
Putnam and Heath. He instructs the former to send on the army 
baggage, to march to Crosswicks, to " give out your strength to be 
twice as great as it is, to keep out spies, to put horsemen in the dress 
of the country, and keep them going backwards and forwards for that 
purpose, and to act with great circumspection, so as to not meet with 
a surprise." 

He ordered General Heath to collect boats for the contingency of 
the detail of part of his force into New Jersey, and instructed him that 
it had been determined in council that he should move down toward 
New York with a considerable force, as if with a design upon that 
city. 

On the seventh the American army reached Morristown, where 
log huts were erected and winter quarters were established. His own 
headquarters during that winter were at the old Freeman Tavern, on 
the north side of the public square. On the seventh additional orders 
were sent to General Heath, to General Lincoln, who had arrived at 
Teekskill with four thousand New England militia, and to other 



292 FROM TKINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. [i777. 

officers, north and south, in anticipation of ulterior movements. A 
single letter to General Heath, which was subsequently written, after 
hearing that the latter officer had demanded the surrender of Fort 
Independence in very strong language, and followed up his demand 
by withdrawing his force, will illustrate the directness with which 
Washington began to deal with injudicious subordinates. 

General Heath was before Fort Independence on the eighteenth of 
January, 1777. General Lincoln advanced by the Hudson river road. 
General Scott by White Plains, and Generals Wooster and Parsons 
from New Rochelle and East Chester. A few prisoners were taken at 
Valentine's Hill, and the garrison of nearly two thousand Hessians 
were allowed " twenty minutes in which to surrender or abide the 
consequences." After nearly ten days of delay about King's Bridge, 
with his half organized militia force, without barracks and under cir- 
cumstances of peculiar exposure, a sally from the garrison created a 
panic in one regiment at an advance post, and the entire army soon 
withdrew. 

As a demonstration toward New York it undoubtedly had a great 
effect upon General Howe's movements, and the plan itself was well 
conceived, well initiated. The divisions arrived at King's Bridge with 
remarkable concert of time; but there they stopped, and the chief 
objective was not realized. 

Washington thus wrote, on the third of February : " This letter is 
additional to my public one of this date. It is to hint to you, and I 
do it with concern, that your conduct is censured (and by men of sense 
and judgment who have been with you on the expedition to Fort 
Independence) as being fraught with too much caution : by which the 
army has been disappointed and in some degree disgraced. Your 
summons, as you did not attempt to fulfill your threats, was not only 
idle but farcical, and will not fail of turning the laugh exceedingly 
upon us." 

During the winter and spring, skirmishes were frequent, and often 
with marked benefit to the American troops. Washington issued a 
counter proclamation to that which General Howe had promulged 
during the original retreat through New Jersey, and all offensive 
operations on the part of the British forces were suspended. 

Mr. Botta thus justly sums up the relations of the contending armies. 
'* Washington having received a few fresh battalions, and his little 
army having recovered from their fatigues, soon entered the field anew 
and scoured the whole country as far as the Raritan. He even crossed 



1777-] FROM PRINCETON TO MORRISTOWN. 293 

this river and penetrated into the county of Essex, made himself 
master of Newark, of EHzabethtown, and finally of Woodbrido-e ; so 
that he commanded the entire coast of New Jersey in front of Staten 
Island. lie so judiciously selected his positions and fortified them 
so formidably, that the royalists shrunk from all attempts to dislod^-e 
him from any of them. Thus the British army, after having overrun 
victoriously the whole of New Jersey quite to the Delaware, and caused 
even the city of Philadelphia to tremble for its safety, found itself now 
restricted to the two only posts of Brunswick and Amboy, which more- 
over could have no communication with New York except by sea. 
Thus, by an army almost reduced to extremity, Philadelphia was 
saved, Pennsylvania protected, New Jersey nearly recovered, and a 
victorious and powerful army laid under the necessity of quitting- all 
thoughts of acting offensively, in order to defend itself." 



CHAPTER XLII. 

MINOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY, 1777, 

THE operations of the year 1777, comprised a second invasion of 
New Jersey, for the purpose of drawing the American army into 
a decisive battle, a series of operations in execution of the original 
purpose of the British cabinet to gain control of Lake Champlain 
and the Hudson river, and the occupation of Philadelphia. 

Spirited skirmishing, brief incursions, and some brilliant feats of 
minor adventure characterized both armies ; but all battles proper 
are referable to one of the three systems of endeavor above indicated. 

A brief outline of minor facts will give clearness to the subsequent 
battle details. 

The headquarters of Washington remained at Morristown until 
the twenty-fourth of May. 

On the twenty-first of January two thousand British troops were 
withdrawn from Rhode Island to reinforce General Howe at New 
York. Generals Spencer and Arnold, then in command of about four 
thousand American troops at Providence, were instructed to prepare a 
plan for the capture of Newport ; but they failed to secure adequate mil- 
itia support, and it was abandoned. General Parsons, then on recruit- 
ing service in Connecticut, was advised by Washington to make a de- 
scent upon Long Island during February, but was unable to raise the 
necessary force until they were needed for general defense. During the 
same month General Knox was dispatched to Massachusetts to enlist 
a battalion of artillery, and during this trip advised the selection of 
Springfield, Massachusetts, as the best place in New England, for the 
establishment of a laboratory and cannon foundry. General Schuyler 
was instructed to draw from the Nezv England States the entire force 
required to resist the anticipated advance of Carleton from Canada ; 
because " troops of extreme sections could not be favorably combined." 
General Maxwell was stationed at Elizabethtown to watch tories and 



1777] MINOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY. 295 

the movements of the British. The exchange of General Lee and his 
status, whether to be regarded as a prisoner of war, or British deserter, 
was discussed. Orders were issued repressing the plundering done 
by the American militia; a protest was sent to General Howe ao-ainst 
similar outrages perpetrated by Hessian and British troops, and the 
usual difficulties of recruiting, equipping, and sustaining the American 
army were experienced. 

During the month of March a ship arrived at Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, from France, with twelve thousand fusees, one thousand 
barrels of powder, blankets and other military stores, and a second 
ship reached Philadelphia with eleven thousand more of similar arms. 
Congress assigned five thousand of the new arms to Massachusetts, 
three thousand to Connecticut, and two thousand to New Hampshire. 
On the second of the month, Washington sent to Robert Morris the 
following cast of the British plans : '> General Howe can not, by the 
best intelligence I have been able to get, have less than ten thousand 
men in New Jersey, and on board of transports at Amboy. Our 
number does not exceed four thousand. His are well disciplined, 
well officered, and well supplied ; ours, raw militia, badly officered, 
and under no government." 

" His numbers can not be in a short time augmented, ours must be 
very considerably, and by such troops as we can have some reliance 
upon, or the game is at an end. His situation with respect to horses 
and forage is bad, very bad, I believe, but will it be better? No, on 
the contrary worse, and therefore if no other, to shift quarters. Gen- 
eral Howe's informants are too numerous, and too well acquainted 
with all these circumstances, to suffer him to remain in ignorance of 
them. With what propriety then can he miss so favorable an 
opportunity of striking a capital stroke against a city from whence 
we derive so many advantages, the carrying of which would give such 
eclat to his arms, and strike such a damp to ours? Nor is his diffi- 
culty of moving so great as is imagined. All the heavy baggage of 
the army, their salt provisions, flour, and stores might go round by 
water, while their superior numbers would enable them to make a 
sweep of the horses for many miles around them, not already taken 
off by us." This letter foreshadows the final action of General Howe, 
and while it was Washington's opinion that the movement of troops 
would be overland, its statement, in view of the course finally adopted 
by General Howe, is given in this connection, and the elaborate docu- 
mentary matter which affords a detailed index to the passing phases 



296 MINOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY. fiyTy. 

of opinion which preceded the battle of Brandyvvine, and the capture 
of Philadelphia, is omitted. 

The same month of March developed the fruits of the promotions 
made by Congress. Stirling, Mifflin, Stephen, St. Clair, and Lincoln 
were made major-generals, and Arnold zvas omitted. He tendered his 
resignation, highly offended. Poor, Glover, Patterson, Learned, Var- 
num, Huntington, George Clinton, Wayne, De Haas, Hand, Reed, 
Weedon, Muhlenburg, Woodford, Scott, Nash, Conway, and Cad- 
wallader were appointed brigadier-generals. The last named officer 
had been appointed to that grade by Pennsylvania, just after the bat- 
tle of Trenton, and declined the appointment of Congress. As most 
of these officers appear in the subsequent narrative, their names 
are given. Their order of appointment gave infinite trouble, and 
their assignment to duty gave additional occasion for jealousy and 
conflict. 

General Wooster had already resigned and was in command of the 
Connecticut militia. St. Clair acted as adjutant-general after Reed re- 
signed, and on the thirtieth. of March, Washington appointed Colonel 
Timothy Pickering to that office. General George Clinton had been 
assigned by Congress to the command of the forts in the Highlands. 
General McDougall succeeded General Heath at Peekskill, and on the 
twenty-second a British fleet ascended the Hudson, effected a landing, 
and destroyed the valuable stores at that place. General Sullivan 
was so sensitive as to the so-called separate commands of other 
officers, as to call forth the following rebuke from Washington, " Why 
these unreasonable, these unjustifiable suspicions, which can answer 
no other end than to poison your own happiness and add vexations 
to that of others, I know of but one separate command properly so 
called, and that is the northern department, and General Sullivan, 
General St. Clair, or any other general officer at Ticonderoga will be 
considered in no other light, while there is a superior officer in the 
department, than if he were placed at Chatham, Baskenridge or 
Princeton. I shall quit with an earnest expostulation that you will 
not suffer yourself to be teased with evils that only exist in the ima- 
gination, and with slights that have no existence at all, keeping in 
mind that if there are several distinct armies to be formed, there are 
several gentlemen before you in point of rank who have a right to 
claim preference," 

General Greene was sent to lay before Congress the necessities of 
the army, and the month of March closed with an earnest appeal to 



1777] MIKOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY. 297 

the governors, committees of safety, and Congress, to furnish troops 
and supplies for the impending summer campaign. 

On the third of April, General Washington corrected a popular 
impression as to judging British forces by the number of regiments 
reported, placing a very correct judgment upon the strength of the 
Hessian troops, but under-estimating the average of the British regi- 
ments. He wrote to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island, " The Hes- 
sian regiments, when they came out complete, did not exceed six; 
hundred men each, and the British two hundred and fifty each." The 
basis upon which the British army was recruited for service in America 
has been previously stated, as drawn from official sources. 

On the twenty-fifth of April two thousand British troops under 
Governor Tyron landed near Fairfield, Connecticut, and moved upon 
Danbury, to destroy public stores at that point collected. Generals 
Silliman and Wooster of the Connecticut militia, and General Arnold, 
then on his way to visit Congress, distinguished themselves by their 
gallant conduct. Arnold threw up a breastwork near Ridgefield and 
fought with great spirit, having two horses shot under him before the 
British retired. General Wooster was mortally wounded. The stores 
however, including sixteen hundred tents, were destroyed. Arnold 
was immediately promoted: but did not obtain the lineal rank which 
he claimed to belong to him and was still dissatisfied. Early in May, 
Greene was sent to inspect and put in good order the posts in the 
Highlands. The troops under Washington's immediate command 
were at that time organized in five divisions of two brigades each 
under Major-generals Greene, Stephen, Sullivan, Lincoln and Stir- 
ling, and included forty-three regiments from New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia, commanded by Briga- 
diers Muhlenburgh, Weedon, Woodford, Scott, Smallwood, Deborre, 
Wayne, DeHaas, Conway and Maxwell. Colonel Hand was also ap- 
pointed Brigadier-general. The artillery was still commanded by Gen- 
eral Knox. The force for duty was nearly eight thousand men. The 
New York and Eastern regiments were near Peekskill or at Ticon- 
deroga. 

On the twenty-third of May, Colonel Meigs crossed to Long Island 
from Guilford, Connecticut, and at Sag Harbor, Long Island, effected 
the destruction of twelve brigs and sloops, one of these carrying twelve 
guns, and a large quantity of British stores, the troops having been 
withdrawn to New York two days before. This exploit involved 
ninety miles of transportation, most of the route in whale boats, and 



298 MINOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY. [1777. 

the command safely returned in twenty-five liours. On the twenty-ninth 
of May, General Washington moved his headquarters to Middlebrook. 

On the seventh of June Arnold was placed in command of Phila- 
delphia, to act with General Mifflin in anticipation of General Howe's 
anticipated movements in that direction, and on the thirtieth General 
Howe marched from Brunswick toward Princeton. His command in- 
cluded two more regiments, which had joined from Newport, and with 
the Hessians amounted to the splendid force of nearly seventeen 
thousand men. Orders had been given for the army to march at 
eleven o'clock of the evening of the twelfth, thereby hoping to cut 
off Sullivan's brigade, which was at Princeton. After the march began, 
Cornwallis with the right column was directed to Jiillsborough and 
De Heister to Middlebrook, turning off from the Princeton road, and 
the line was definitely prolonged to Somerset court-house, as mdicated 
on the map. 

In a subsequent letter of July fifth, addressed by that officer to 
Lord George Germaine, he says that his " only object was to bring 
the American army to a general action." The British army rested 
its left on Millstone river, while its right held fast to Brunswick, hav- 
ing the Raritan in front. Two redoubts were also erected in the horse- 
shoe of the river bend before his centre, and also, near Brunswick. 
The subsequent controversies between Generals Howe and Clinton 
do not entirely warrant the criticism by General Clinton of this posi- 
tion, as it was naturally assumed by General Howe that Washington 
would not rest passively in his trenches while the British army had 
control of the line of communication with Philadelphia. In " Letters 
to a Nobleman " General Howe is very severely criticised for moving 
to Somerset court-house, where an unfordable river parted the armies, 
and it is claimed that if Howe had moved toward Philadelphia, Wash- 
ington would have given him battle. It was however then, as ever, 
inconsistent with Washington's purpose to risk his army for any city 
whatever. 

The New Jersey militia were posted on Lowland Hill, near Flem- 
ington, to which place Sullivan had retired from Princeton as soon as 
he observed the movement of General Howe to cut him off from the 
main army. Orders were sent to forward from Peekskill all the con- 
tinental troops, except one thousand effective men, under Generals 
Parsons, McDougall and Glover, and these troops were to march in 
three divisions, at one day's interval, the first two columns to bring 
two pieces of artillery each. 



1777] MINOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY. 299 

On the twentieth Washington received a message that Burgoyne 
was approaching St. John's and that a detachment of regular troops, 
Canadians and Indians were to penetrate by the Mohawk valley. 
General Putnam was ordered at the same date to hold four Massa- 
chusetts regiments, then at Peekskill, in readiness to go up the river at 
a moment's notice, and to procure sloops from Albany and keep thein 
for that purpose. 

Washington and Congress alike erred in their opinion as to the 
subsequent operations of the British army ; for both alike anticipated 
that the army of Canada, then more than thirteen thousand strong, 
would come down to New York by sea, and participate in the advance 
upon Philadelphia. As a matter of military judgment their views as 
to the propriety of his march proved to be correct, as the proposed 
combined movement of Clinton from New York and of Burgoyne from 
Canada actually failed because inadequate forces were furnished for its 
execution. Washington wrote to Schuyler on the twentieth, upon 
receiving intimation of Burgoyne's preparations, expressing his "con- 
fidence in the strength of Ticonderoga and the facility with which 
Putnam's troops could be sent to its support, if threatened," adding, 
"he certainly will never leave the garrison of Ticonderoga in his rear: 
and if he invests it to any purpose, he will not have a sufficient num- 
ber left to send one body to Oswego, and another to cut off the com- 
munications between Fort Edward and Fort George." General St. 
Clair wrote, not to send reinforcements until they were needed, for 
" they would consume the supplies." Meanwhile Washington 
strengthened the right wing of his position at Middlebrook by re- 
doubts, ordered Arnold to watch Trenton and the upper ferries, and 
rested under the belief that Howe would not advance toward the 
Delaware and attempt a crossing, while his own army was in the rear. 
He argued thus ; " Had they designed for the Delaware, on the first 
instance, they would probably have made a secret, rapid march of it, 
and not halted as they have done, to awaken our attention and give 
us time to prepare for obstructing them. Instead of this they havj 
only advanced to a position necessary to facilitate an attack upon our 
right, which is the part they have the greatest likelihood of injuring 
us in : and added to this consideration they have come out as light 
as possible, leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats and bridges at 
Brunswick, which plainly contradicts the idea of pushing for the 
Delaware." 

On the morning of the nineteenth. General Howe suddenly 



300 MINOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY. [1777- 

abandoned his position and retired to Brunswick. Maxwell v/as at 
once sent forward to take a position between Brunswick and Amboy, 
so as to cut off detached parties or baggage, and General Greene was 
sent with three brigades to follow the river, observe the crossing, and 
attack their rear as soon as they should leave post. The entire 
American army was put in readiness to support the movement. 

General Howe started on the twenty-second early in the morning. 
Morgan and Wayne drove the Hessian rear-guard forward upon the 
main body after a spirited action. It had been Greene's intention to 
have Maxwell strike the column near Piscataway, while he should 
hold them under fire. The messenger sent to Maxwell with the order 
was captured or lost, and he received his orders at last only after the 
Hessian corps had joined the advanced troops. Stirling then joined 
Maxwell, and Greene carried the pursuit as far as Piscataway. 

Washington promptly advanced the army to Quibbletown, now New 
Market, upon the counsel of his officers, that the retreat was genuine ; 
yet not without suspicion that the whole was a skillfully developed 
feint for the purpose of drawing him from his stronghold. General 
Stirling's command was stationed in advance at Metuchen. 

Few events of that war involved more sharp discussion than the 
advance and sudden retreat of General Howe. The anonymous 
" Letters to a Nobleman," " Galloway's Reflections," " Howe's Nar- 
rative," and other documents of the kind, still have freshness and in.- 
terest ; but none of them settle the controversy. Howe occupied a 
position in which he could neither attack nor be attacked. Neither 
army was in danger from the other. His forte was in the field proper, 
and his purpose was to entice Washington's army into a position where 
the advantages would be with himself. If he had marched on the 
north side of the river, Washington would have given him a fight. 
The chief fact indicated by his course, and that is supported by his 
own defense, was the appreciation he began to entertain of the char- 
acter of Washington, and he would not engage at all under risks. 
He claimed that his force was inferior in numbers to that of Wash- 
ington ; but his advocates as well as critics are obliged to accept the 
facts as already recorded. 

Stedman, who served in the British general staff under Howe, 
Clinton and Cornwallis, and whose volumes are among the most inter- 
esting which were published at the close of the war, takes occasion, 
while reviewing the New Jersey campaign of 1777, to pass judgment 
upon the relative strength of the armies from the commencement of 



1777.] MINOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY. 30I 

operations on Long Island, up to the first of July, 1777. As that 
period is under brief notice, his estimate is given for permanent 
reference. 

"British and Rebel Force in 1776." 

Dates. British. Rebels. 

August .... 24,000 16,000 

November .... 26,600 4.50° 

December .... 27,700 3,300 

In 1777. 

March .... 27,000 4,500 

June .... 30,000 8,000 

On the twenty-sixth, General Howe put his entire army in motion 
to resume the offensive, and advanced to Scotch Plains and Westfield. 

Cornwallis marched via Woodbridge, with the right wing of the 
army, at seven in the morning, while General Howe in person led the 
left wing by Metuchen Meeting House, intending to connect with the 
rear of the right column at that point, and then swing upon the left 
of the American main army. Cornwallis with the extreme right, was 
to gain the passes to Middlebrook. A third body of troops with four 
battalions and six pieces of artillery were sent to Bonhamton, to 
demonstrate toward the American right wing. Cornwallis had hardly 
passed through Woodbridge, when he was confronted by Stirling's 
division. A spirited skirmish ensued, which was to the benefit of 
Cornwallis, whose artillery were of a more effective caliber ; and he 
crowded the retiring division as far as Westfield, and the present 
Plainfield, capturing three brass guns, and inflicting a loss in killed, 
wounded and prisoners, of nearly two hundred men, with a loss to his 
own command of not more than seventy. 

Maxwell, who had been stationed near the Raritan, on the line of 
the original retreat of General Howe, retired without loss. Wash- 
ington quickly comprehended the purpose of his adversary, and 
recovered the passes to his old post before Cornwallis who had been 
delayed so long by Stirling could accomplish his purpose, which was 
to seize them while General Howe should threaten Washington's 
front. On the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, the division of Corn- 
wallis left Westfield, passed through Sampton unopposed, and joined 
General Howe, who had effected nothing of value by his movement. 

On the thirtieth the British army crossed to Staten Island, and 
the military career of General Howe in New Jersey ended. 



302 MINOR EVENTS, JANUARY TO JULY. [1777. 

The immediate activity of the shipping at New York now satisfied 
Washington that a diversion would be made up the Hudson to draw 
him in that direction, and that operations toward Philadelphia would 
be made by sea. Letters from General St. Clair stated positively, 
that Burgoyne had advanced with view to attack Ticonderoga and its 
dependent posts. Orders were at once sent to Putnam to place Var- 
num and Parsons' brigades at Peekskill to observe the river, in the 
place of Nixon's which had been hurried to Albany, and the expedi- 
tion from Canada was at last on its marcJi. 

The narrative will follow the order indicated at the opening of 
the chapter, and take under notice the " Operations of Burgoyne's 
Campaign." 




/7>M///M a/id J?/Y/n'// //} <^/ f/7r/7/t^^o/' . 



CHAPTER XLIII. 

BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN OPENED. 1777. 

ON the twenty-second day of August, 1776, Lord George Ger- 
maine handed to Captain Le Maitre, an aid-de-camp of Gen- 
eral Carleton, then commanding in Canada, a letter, to be dehvered 
by him to General Carleton upon his arrival at Quebec. The aid-de- 
camp found it impossible to make the passage on account of ice in the 
St. Lawrence, and returned the dispatch to Lord Germaine, at the 
palace of Whitehall, London. 

On the twenty-sixth of March, 1777, the letter was again sent, 
accompanied by the instructions, that it was his Majesty's pleasure 
that General Carleton should return to Quebec as soon as he should 
have driven the American's forces from Canada, taking with him such 
part of his army as in his judgment and discretion appeared sufficient 
for the defense of the Province ; and that Lieutenant-general Bur- 
goyne or such other suitable officer as General Carleton should think 
most proper, be detached with the remainder of the troops, — " to pro- 
ceed with all possible expedition to join General Howe and put him- 
self under his command."' 

Lord Germaine maintained, that '• with a view of quelling the 
rebellion as soon as possible, it had become highly necessary that the 
most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected : that the 
king had designated three thousand men as the force to be left in 
Canada, and that the remainder of the army should be employed in 
two expeditions : the one under the command of Lieutenant-general 
Burgoyne, who was to force his way to Albany ; and the other under 
Lieutenant-colonel St; Leger, who was to make a diversion on the 
Mohawk river. 

It was explicitly stated, also, that the plan under consideration 
" could not be advantageously executed without the assistance of 



304 BURGOYNE'S campaign opened. [1777. 

Canadians and Indians." It was " left to the influence of General 
Carleton among those bodies of men, to assure a good and sufficient 
number, for the purpose in view." 

Lieutenant-general Burgoyne was ordered to proceed to Quebec 
forthwith, in order to carry out the wishes of the crown with the 
utmost dispatch. The instructions above referred to, were so explicit 
as to indicate the number of men, and even the particular detachments, 
which should be respectively assigned to the enjoined operations. 
The statement of the details thus made, will have interest during the 
course of the narrative. The force detained for the defense of Canada 
was to consist of 

"The 8th Regt., deducting 100 for the expedition to the Mohawk . 460 men 



Battalion companies of the 34th ; deducting 100 for the exped 

to the Mohawk . 

BattaUon companies of the 29th and 31st regiments 
Eleven additional companies from Great Britain 
Detachments from the two brigades 
Detachments from the German troops 
Royal Highland emigrants ..... 
Total 



tion 



348 
896 
6r6 
300 
650 
500 



. 3770 

This assignment of troops for the protection of Canada expressly 
and justly presumed, that the operations in progress in different parts 
of America would confine the attention of its people to their own 
necessities, and that the force thus designated would be ample for 
local defense. The assignment of troops to the moving columns was 
equally exact. 

General Burgoyne's command was thus stated : 

The grenadiers and light infantry of the army : (except of the 8th 
regiment and the 24th regiment) : as the advanced corps, under the 
command of Brigadier-general Fraser 1 568 men 

First brigade : battalion companies of the 9th, 21st, and 47th regiments ; 

deducting a detachment from each corps to remain in Canada . 1194 " 

Second brigade : battalion companies of the 20th, 53d, and 62d regi- 
ments ; deducting 50 from each corps to remain as above . . 1194 " 

All the German troops except the Hanau Chasseurs, and a detach- 
ment of 650 3217 " 

The artillery, except such parts as shall be necessary for Canada 

Total 7173 " 

This command was " to be associated with as many Canadians and 
Indians as might be thought necessary for the service," and when so 
organized, it was '* to proceed with all expedition to Albany, and be 



1777.] BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN OPENED 305 

placed under the command of Sir William Howe." The force which 
was carefully assigned to the command of Lieutenant-colonel St. 
Leger, was tJius stated : 

Detachment from the 8th regiment 100 men 

Detachment from the 34th regiment 100 " 

Sir John Johnson's regiment of New York I33 " 

Hanau Chasseurs 342 

Total 675 " 

To this force, there was also " to be added a sufficient number of 
Canadians and Indians " ; the same " to proceed to Albany, and never 
to lose view of their intended junction with Sir William Howe as their 
principal object." , 

The foregoing instructions are the voice from Whitehall Palace. 
They read like orders from a corps commander, who can judge from 
his daily returns, exactly of the force in hand for immediate u^e. 

Lieutenant-general Burgoyne left London, March twenty-seventh, 
and reached Quebec on the sixth day of May. He notified General 
Sir William Howe immediately of his strict instructions, and ex- 
pressed a wish that he had sufficient latitude of movement to warrant 
a diversion towards Connecticut. From the first inception of the 
enterprise, it was declared to be of necessity that Albany should be 
the objective of the march, "after the capture of the American posts 
which lay upon Lake Champlain." General Carleton entered into the 
outfit of the expedition with as much zeal and energy as if it had been 
to his individual credit to assure success. Burgoyne afterward testi- 
fied that " he could not have done more for his brother." 

The inherent difficulties of the movement were in many respects 
similar to those which affected the American expedition to Canada. 
These must be briefly stated in order to secure a fair opinion of the 
capacity and wisdom of the lieutenant-general commanding. 

The Canadian tvoo^s, estimated for dit two thousand men, could 
not be enlisted. Less than two hundred reported for duty. The 
pioneers who were to make and repair roads, carry provisions, and do 
much of the practical part of the logistics of the march, were not only 
greatly deficient in numbers, but still more wanting in willingness to 
work, and fitness for the duty required of them. Neither money nor 
constraint could secure the requisite numbers of carts and horses for 
the outfit. The weather was unpropitious and the roads were almost 
impassable. Reference is made to map entitled " Burgoyne's Saratoga 
Campaign," as the first of the series designed to illustrate its progress. 
20 



3o6 burgoyne's campaign opened. [1777 

The preliminary camp was established on the Boquet river, on the 
western shore of Lake Champlain, and the troops reached that station 
as early as the twentieth day of June. The Indians, who had been 
looked upon as valuable auxiliaries, were yet to be secured. In re- 
sponse to a well circulated appeal, addressed to various tribes, about 
four hundred Iroquois, Algonquins Abenaquies, and Ottowas, met 
General Burgoyne in conference on the twenty-first day of June, at 
his headquarters. In view of the odium which was cast upon this 
officer by an unwise proclamation at that time issued, it is proper to 
say, that in his address to the warriors who agreed to take up the 
hatchet for the king, he expressly stated the " necessity of restraint 
of their passions, and that they must be und^r control, in accordance 
with the religion, laws of warfare, principles and policy which belonged 
to Great Britain," — " positively forbidding bloodshed, when not op- 
posed in arms," — declaring " aged men, women, children, and prisoners, 
sacred from the knife, even in the time of conflict," and otherwise 
instructing the savages, that " the war must not be made as when they 
went forth alone, but under the absolute will and control of the army 
of the king." 

His proclamation to the Americans, as well as the address to the 
Indian chiefs, assumed all that could possibly be asserted as to the 
guilt of rebellion ; and while extremely pompous and extravagant in 
language, preshadowed the extreme vengeance of savage auxiliaries 
if resistance should be prolonged. It was extremely unprofessional, 
and more in harmony with the abstract political dogmas of the crown 
than with Burgoyne's own character. Its much ridiculed assertion 
of personal title, and of royal prerogative, was quite in harmony with 
his instructions, and somewhat offensive for its vanity, while it lacked 
the wisdom which a better knowledge of his opponents soon inculcated. 
It aroused sensible men to a more stubborn resistance, and was more 
effective than appeals of Congress, to induce the people of New Eng- 
land to take up arms for border defense. They knew well from ex- 
perience just what a war with savages meant, and they were inclined 
to class the British troops who employed them, in the same list of 
enemies with the savages themselves. 

Washington issued a counter-proclamation. One paragraph is 
worthy a space in all records of that war: and is peculiarly expressive 
of the character, consistency and faith of the man, while it affords an 
index of his firmness in the path of duty. It reads as follows: 

" Harassed as we are by unrelenting persecution, obliged by every 



1777] BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN OPENED. 307 

tie to repel violence by force, urged by self-preservation to exert the 
strength which Providence has given us to defend our natural rights 
against the aggressor, we appeal to the hearts of all mankind for the 
justice of our course ; its event we leave to Him who speaks the fate 
of nations, in humble confidence, that as His omniscient eye taketh 
note even of a sparrow that falleth to the ground, so He will not with- 
draw His countenance from a people who humbly array themselves 
under His banner, in defense of the noblest principles with which He 
has adorned humanity." 

The army advanced to Crown Point, rested three days, and moved 
forward on the thirtieth. The British light infantry and grenadiers, 
with the twenty-fourth British foot, some Canadians and Indians, 
with ten pieces of artillery, marched down the west shore and took 
post within four miles of Ticonderoga. The German reserve, Bruns- 
wick chasseurs, light infantry and grenadiers followed the east shore ; 
and General Burgoyne accompanied the fleet. 

On the first of July the investment began. General Burgoyne's 
muster of that date gave his force, rank and file, as follows : 

British Regulars ......... 3724 men 

German " ......... 3016 " 

Artillery " ......... 473 " 

7213 " 

Canadians and Provincials about 250 " 

Indians about 400 " 

Total about 7S63 men. 

As early as the twenty-eighth of February, one month before he 
left England, General Burgoyne embodied his views in a letter to 
Lord George Germaine. The document is a model paper in its an- 
ticipation of the contingencies of the proposed service; and while the 
general ideas of that letter were incorporated into his ultimate instruc- 
tions, he was not allowed the full regular force which he deemed 
necessary for the undertaking, and his auxiliaries from Canada and 
from Indian tribes were too few to be of much practical value, while 
they burdened him with an element which did more harm than good, 
at times of real crisis. His proposed diversion into New England 
was predicated upon support from the troops then at Newport, Rhode 
Island, and the assurance that there would be adequate and prompt 
support from the army at New York. He had, on one occasion, 
advised that the northern movement should be limited to the occupa- 



3o8 burgoyne's campaign opened. [1777. 

tion and firm possession of the posts on Lake Champlain, and tliat the 
troops whicli were destined to cooperate with General Howe should go 
from Quebec to New York, or Newport, by sea, and thus secure the 
earliest possible field service in the campaign of 1777. It has been 
shown in another connection that General Howe himself expressed 
the opinion, in a letter to Lord Germaine, that a movement from 
Canada down the Hudson river could not be supposed to be of prac- 
tical benefit before Septemper. General Burgoyne encountered the 
difficulties which he, alone, anticipated, and many trials which should 
have been spared him ; and yet he was face to face with the American 
army, within thirty-two miles of Albany, by the middle of August. 

He was before Ticonderoga the first of July, with the forces already 
indicated. 

He was harshly censured for taking with him an alleged excess of 
heavy guns. But these were distributed on ships, or placed in the 
captured posts, so that the artillery of his moving column did not 
average two pieces to a battalion, twenty-six guns in all, and ten of 
these were formed into a special park under General Phillips, to be 
used wherever needed, so as to secure a greater combined effect, as 
with modern batteries. Four howitzers and two light twenty-fours, 
constituted his heavy ordnance, and the remainder were light threes 
and sixes. This complement of artillery was the lowest which the 
regulations of the service admitted : and there was no reason for him 
to doubt that he would be furnished with adequate transportation, 
until the failure of Canadian allies and of proper support, had placed 
him where there was no remedy for meagre resources but in the des- 
perate conflict of battle against superior numbers. 

The advance to Ticonderoga was followed up with vigor. The 
old French posts on the heights, north of the fort, had been partially 
repaired and strengthened by new intrenchments ; and one block- 
house had been erected on a hill which commanded the northern 
extremity of Lake George. On the second day of July these works 
were abandoned and the wooden defenses were burned by the Ameri- 
cans. General Phillips promptly occupied the hill, giving it the name 
of Mount Hope. 

On Mount Independence opposite Ticonderoga there was a star 
fort, which commanded the water passage, and at the foot of the hill 
batteries had been established. These were well supplied with heavy 
guns. 

General Riedesel encamped just north of this position, and the 



1777] BURGOVNE'S CAMPAIGN OPENED. 309 

ships of war were anchored across the lake just within range of the 
American batteries. At the head of Lake Champlain, South river, so 
called, ending in Wood creek, and in fact a narrow lake, unites with 
Lake George ; and the intervening tongue of land, called Sugar Loaf 
Hill, is seven hundred feet above the line of the lake, and commands 
Ticonderoga. Its steep ascent had been regarded by the Americans 
as impracticable of occupation ; but on the fourth of July, Lieuten- 
ant Twiss, commanding the British Engineers, reconnoitered the 
summit and reported that it commanded a direct practicable range 
of fire upon both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, at a distance 
of not more than fifteen hundred yards from the latter, which was the 
more distant post. It also commanded the bridge of communication 
vvhich connected the American posts. 

This bridge had a double purpose; one for communication, and 
the other to prevent the passage of ships into South river. It was 
supported by twenty-two sunken pieces of large timber at nearly 
equal distances. Between the piers were separate floats, fifty feet long 
and twelve feet wide, strongly fastened together by chains and rivets, 
and well secured to the piers. Before the bridge was a boom, also 
made of heavy timbers, carefully united by clinched bolts and double 
chains of inch and a half iron. Upon the report of Lieutenant Twiss, 
a pioneer corps and a force of sappers were put to work, and by the 
morning of the fifth a British force crowned the summit of Sugar 
Loaf Hill, which was promptly dignified by its occupants with the 
name of " Fort Dcfianccy A practicable path had been made for the 
carriage of guns, which were dismounted for the purpose, and the 
battery was soon in its new position. 

While these arrangements had been in progress for the complete 
isolation and control of Ticonderoga, the garrison of the post was not 
indifferent to passing events. Its exact condition is worthy of notice, 
in order to appreciate the erroneous impression which Congress. 
General Washington and the American people entertained, upon 
hearing of its evacuation by General St. Clair, without battle. In 
proportion as its defense was desired and expected, just to that degree 
did the public judgment impute fault to both the immediate and 
remote commander ; so that General Schuyler as well as General St. 
Clair suffered seriously through this inevitable disaster. 

The Northern Department, necessarily so isolated from other 
fields of operation, was habitually a browsing place for aspirants after 
independent command, and this disposition was strengthened by the 



310 BURGOYNE'S campaign opened. [1777. 

natural tendency to repose its defense in the hands of the New 
England militia who were most intimately related to that defense. 

On the twenty-fifth of March, General Schuyler had been relieved 
from the command by General Gates, but was reinstated in May, 
after fairly presenting his case before Congress. He returned to his 
headquarters at Albany on the third of June and at once tendered to 
General Gates the command of Ticonderoga, as the most exposed 
and most honorable post within the department. That officer 
declined the command. It was his purpose to obtain the command 
of the department itself, and his correspondence is impregnated with 
the spirit of jealous aspiration. While urging that Albany should 
not be retained as headquarters, he wrote, " If General Schuyler is 
solely to possess all powers, all the intelligence, and that particular 
favorite, the military chest, and constantly reside in Albany, I can 
not, with any peace of mind, serve at Ticonderoga." 

At this period the valley of the Mohawk and its relations to 
Indian operations, based upon British support through the lake port 
of Oswego, invested Albany with peculiar value as a centre of control. 
In determining the wisdom of Schuyler and Burgoyne in their subse- 
quent career, it must not be forgotten that the St. Leger expedition 
from Canada, also had Albany as its objective, via Oswego, Fort 
Schuyler (Stanwix), and the Mohawk Valley, and that both the Brit- 
ish armies were to be watched by Schuyler ; while Burgoyne not only 
had positive orders to make Albany the objective of his march, but he 
was held to a faithful concert of action with St. Leger, in order that 
both expeditions should realize their common objective. The drift 
of such action was to incline Burgoyne to march down the west bank 
of the Hudson, and it was equally vital to the American cause that 
the department commander should have ready access to both lines 
of operation which thus converged upon Albany. 

Gates had accomplished nothing of real value in the preparation 
of the lake posts for defense during the two months he had been in 
command of the department, and was still at Albany when Schuyler 
returned. He had made a requisition upon Washington for tents, and 
when the commander-in-chief replied, " As the northern troops are 
hutted, the tents must be used for southern troops until a supply can 
be obtained," he answered, " Refusing this army what you have not 
in your power is one thing ; but saying that this army has not the 
same necessities as the southern army is another. I can assure your 
excellency the service of the northern army requires tents as much 



I777-] BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN OPENED. 3II 

as any service I ever saw." To Mr. Lovell, of the New England 
delegation, he wrote, " Either I am exceedingly dull, or unreasonably 
jealous, if I do not discover by the style and tenor of the letters from 
Morristown, how little I have to expect from thence. Generals are 
like parsons, they are all for christening their own child first ; but let 
an impartial moderating power decide between us, and do not suffer 
southern prejudice to weigh heavier in the balance than the northern." 
In connection with this outcropping of an appeal to sectional feeling 
which was the exact counterpart of that exhibited by Lee while he was 
at New Castle Heights, it is only necessary to say that Washington 
used the term souther )i only as comparing the operations of two geo- 
graphical departments, and not in any personal sense. He stated a 
military fact, without argument, and the conduct of Gates is self- 
interpreting. 

On the ninth of June, Gates took leave of absence and left the 
department, 

Schuyler ordered all forts to be put in condition for service, 
appealed to the States to forward their militia, and on the twentieth 
proceeded to inspect the imperiled posts for himself. Generals St. 
Clair, De Rochefermoy, Poor and Patterson were then at Ticon- 
deroga. The garrison of that post and of Mount Independence com- 
bined amounted to only twenty-five hundred and forty-six conti- 
nental troops, including artisans, and about nine hundred militia. A 
council of general officers concurred in the opinion that the troops 
were inadequate to protracted defense, but that the posts should be 
maintained, if possible, until the arrival of reinforcements, or until the 
stores and troops could be safely withdrawn. It was considered im- 
practicable to fortify Sugar Loaf Hill. The troops could not well be 
spared, it is true ; but the possibility of its occupation by a hostile 
force was not considered a serious question of fact. 

During this trip General Schuyler found the condition of the troops 
to be beyond his worst apprehensions. The clothing was nearly 
worn out, military supplies other than pork and flour had not accu- 
mulated as anticipated, the number of bayonets did not exceed a few 
hundred, and there was very little to encourage the expectations 
which the country entertained as to the ultimate strength of Ticon- 
deroga as a real fortress. 

General Schuyler returned to Albany to hasten forward additional 
troops. General St. Clair, still hopeful of his ability to resist assault. 



312 BURGOYNE S CAMPAIGN OPENED. [1777. 

wrote to him on the last of June, " should the enemy attack us, they 
will go back faster than they came." 

Schuyler's own aid-de-camp, Major Henry B. Livingston, who 
remained at Ticonderoga sick, when he left, wrote in a similar strain. 
General Schuyler was less sanguine, and wrote to Colonel Varick on 
the first of July : 

" The insufficiency of tlie garrison at Ticonderoga, the imperfect 
state of the fortifications, and the want of discipline in the troops, 
give me great cause to apprehend that we shall lose that fortress, but 
as a reinforcement is coming up from Peekskill, with which I shall 
move up, I am in hopes that the enemy will be prevented from any 
farther progress." 

The departure of General Schuyler from Ticonderoga without 
effectual provision for the contingency of its abandonment, or waiting 
to test its capacity for defense, was the subject of grave criticism, and 
resulted in a Court of Inquiry. That court consisted of Major-gen- 
eral Lincoln, Brigadier-generals Nixon, George Clinton (the only one 
from Schuyler's State), Wayne and Muhlenburg, and Colonels John 
Greaton, Francis Johnson, Rufus Putnam, Mordecai Gist, William 
Russell, William Grayson, Walter Stewart, and R. J. Meigs, with 
John Lawrens as Judge Advocate ; and found *' that Major-general 
Philip Schuyler was not guilty of neglect of duty, and is acquitted 
with the highest honor." 

The fall of Ticonderoga was peculiarly aggravating to this officer, 
as he had sent sloops to Peekskill for the troops which, as before 
noticed, had been ordered by Washington to his aid, and on the fifth 
he wrote to Congress, " If they do not arrive by to-morrow, I shall go 
on without them, and do the best I can with the militia." He 
marched on the seventh with all the militia he could assemble, but 
the activity of Burgoyne had anticipated the movement, and the 
British troops were again in possession of all posts on Lake Champlain. 



§ ' ^M^^^^^/f. 







Pitt^ford. 
'toil 
\:j{utland. 



Manchester. 



Benni/ifJfon. 



Albany- »d 



OompilBd cDfdJ?rau7tdy Co/.CiirriJi{}ton. 



•M-2.* 



CHAPTER XLIV. 

FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. 1777. 

ON the morning of July fifth, 1777, the British occupation of 
Sugar Loaf Hill gave warning to the garrison of Ticonderoga 
that it lay at the mercy of the enemy. Previous to that occupation, 
the British had been drawn closely about the fort, and the garrison 
looked forward to an assault, with real courage and hope. It was ver}' 
evident, however, on the fifth, that the post must fall without the 
credit of real resistance. A council of war fully considered the con- 
dition of affairs, and resolved that " retreat ought to be undertaken as 
soon as possible, and that we shall be fortunate to effect it." The 
possibility of maintaining the post on Mount Independence was more 
than counterbalanced by the certainty that the British would control 
South river, and cut off all supplies from New England and New 
York. General Riedesel had already swung his left wing to the rear, 
and eastward of the latter post, and the south face of Mount Inde- 
pendence alone remained open to American forces. 

It was not until after dark that the army was notified of the deter- 
mination of its officers. The invalids, ammunition, and a large quan- 
tity of commissary stores were placed upon two hundred and twenty 
bateaux, then lying in South river below the bridge, and these were 
started for Skenesborough under Colonel Long, then post commander 
of Ticonderoga. 

Lights were extinguished at the usual hour, and occasional firing 
was maintained from the summit of Mount Independence, upon the 
new works upon Sugar Loaf Hill, to keep up the appearance of the 
usual garrison habits and activities, and to indicate a purpose to con- 
test the supremacy of the so-called Fort Defiance. 

The retreat began at three o'clock of the morning of July sixth, 
and the arrangements for its execution were eminently judicious. 



314 FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. [i777- 

Tlie heavy guns had been spiked, but the trunnions were not knocked 
off, lest the cHck of the sledges should be borne on the night air to 
the watchful enemy, and give warning of the attempt to escape. The 
night was still, and a partial moon dimly lighted the mountain sum- 
mits, while the shadows deepened under Mount Independence, just 
where the bridge was waiting to perform its last office for its builders. 
The British guns made no response to the firing of the Americans, and 
as soon as Colonel Long's command, with the American flotilla, had 
started on its way. General St. Clair took up his march for Castleton. 
No other evidence is required to show the skill with which these 
troops began their disheartening retreat, than the single fact that the 
entire garrison safely crossed the bridge. At this most critical 
moment, when the last detachment was clear of the fort, and the 
troops on Mount Independence had descended its southern slope, the 
house which had been occupied by General De Fermoy (signed De 
Rochefermoy) was fired in contravention of orders, and the whole 
scene was illuminated for the information of the besiegers. 

The most active measures were at once taken in pursuit. Day- 
light was just coming on. General Phillips pushed General Fraser 
with a flying column after the retiring Americans, left the Sixty-second 
British regiment as a garrison, and embarked his own division upon 
ships to accompany Burgoyne in pursuit of the American shipping. 
General Riedesel placed the Brunswick regiment of Prince Frederick 
in garrison on Mount Independence, and followed General Fraser 
with three battalions to give him support in the pursuit. Commodore 
Lutwidge, with a party of seamen, soon cut a passage through the 
bridge, and Burgoyne, with the Inflexible and Royal George frigates 
and the swiftest of the gun-boats, was moving up South river before 
nine o'clock. This floating column, constituting the right wing of the 
British army, reached Skenesborough only two hours later than the 
Americans, and at once began the attack. A brief resistance was 
made near the falls where Wood creek enters into South river. The 
British destroyed all that the Americans did not burn, including all 
the supplies which had been saved with so much care. The Ninth, 
Twentieth, and Twenty-first British regiments were landed, ascended 
the mountains, and made a detour to turn a small fort which had been 
built to command the passage at Wood creek, but it was abandoned 
by the Americans without resistance. Mills, storehouses, and other 
valuable property which had been accumulated at this station were 
soon destroyed. 



I777-] FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. 315 

By reference to the map, " Burgoyne's Saratoga Campaign," it 
will be seen that the right wing of the British army had thus gained 
an advance upon General St. Clair, as Castleton was nearly thirty 
miles south-east from Ticonderoga, and nearly twelve miles north-east 
from Skenesborough. so that General Burgoyne followed the base of 
the triangle of which Castleton was the apex, and made a quick trip 
by water, while St. Clair made a tedious march over land, through an 
almost pathless wilderness. 

Colonel Long landed his battalion about three o'clock in the after- 
noon, and upon the approach of the British ships, marched directly to 
Fort Ann, a distance of eleven miles to the south. Lieutenant Colo- 
nel Hill and Major Forbes, of the British Ninth regiment, followed and 
spent the night bivouacked in the woods within three miles of that 
post. General Schuyler was then at Fort Edward, about thirteen 
miles further to the south, on the Hudson river. 

He promptly sent a reinforcement to Fort Ann, and early in the 
morning of the seventh Colonel Long advanced to a ravine three miles 
north of the fort, where Colonel Hill had spent the night, and attacked 
his command. Major Forbes thus describes the attack, in evidence 
laid before the House of Commons, page 61 of official documents, 
relating to Burgoyne's expedition. 

" At half past ten in the morning, they attacked us in front with 
a heavy and well directed fire. A large body of them passed up the 
creek to our left and fired from a thick wood across the creek on the 
left flank of the regiment ; then they began to recross the creek and 
attack us in the rear. We then found it necessary to change our 
ground to prevent the regiment being surrounded. We took post on 
the top of a high hill to our right. As soon as we had taken post, 
the enemy made a very vigorous attack and they certainly would have 
forced us, had it not been for some Indians that arrived and gave the 
Indian whoop." 

General Powell had been dispatched by General Burgoyne with 
two regiments, as well as the Indian auxiliaries, to the support of 
Lieutenant Colonel Hill, and the American troops retreated under 
the pressure of superior numbers, burned Fort Ann, and then retired 
to Fort Edward. 

General Phillips, who had accompanied the British right wing as 
far as Skenesborough, returned to Ticonderoga and commenced the 
removal of artillery, ammunition and provisions to Fort George, with 
all other heavy baggage which could be more readily moved by water 



3l6 FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. [1777. 

transportation ; while General Burgoyne established his headquarters 
at Skenesborough to await the movements of the left wing, to rest 
his troops and organize for a further advance. 

The British left wing followed the American line of retreat. Colo- 
nel Francis, commanding the American rear-guard, left Mount Inde- 
pendence about four o'clock on the morning of the sixth. St. Clair 
moved through the forests with such expedition that his advance 
reached Hubbardton quite early in the afternoon. Leaving Colonel 
Warner with one hundred and fifty men, to collect stragglers and 
await the arrival of Colonel Francis, he hastened forward and reached 
Castleton, six miles further south, the same night. 

General Fraser marched seventeen miles on the sixth and halted, 
General Riedesel being at that time only three miles in his rear. " At 
the earliest day-light, or a little before," he promptly renewed the 
pursuit. Colonel Francis had joined Colonel Warner on the previous 
evening and their entire force, together with the regiment of Colonel 
Hale, which also came up from the rear, amounted to nearly thirteen 
hundred men. They resolved to await General Fraser's approach 
and give battle. The American troops occupied a plateau between 
Castleton creek and one of its dependent forks which offered an eligible 
site for defense. General Fraser's command descended a long slope 
to the creek and were compelled to ascend directly upon the plateau, 
in order to meet the Americans on equal terms. The latter did not 
await the attack, but upon the alarm of the pickets met them promptly 
and with vigor. A sharp skirmish ensued. Colonel Hale, himself an 
invalid, (subsequently acquitted of the charge of cowardice) with his 
poorly disciplined regiment, abandoned the field precipitately, and 
fled in the direction of Castleton ; so that the whole burden of the 
fight devolved upon Colonels Francis and Warner, who were left with 
a force of not more than nine hundred men. The command of Gen- 
eral Fraser is officially reported at eight hundred and fifty-eight. The 
Americans, hotly pressed as they were, took prompt advantage of 
falling timber and all other obstructions which gave effect to individual 
skill with the rifle, and Stedman thus compliments their good conduct : 
" The Americans maintained their post with great resolution and 
bravery. The reinforcements (Riedesel's), did not arrive so soon as 
expected, and victory was for a long time doubtful." 

The advance of Fraser was as spirited as the unexpected resist- 
ance was obstinate. He entered the action with the confidence that 
his supports were close at hand, and very nearly paid the penalty 



I777-] FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. 317 

which subsequently fell upon Baum at Bennington. The Earl Bal- 
carras, who was slightly wounded during the engagement, was ad- 
vanced on the right to occupy the Castleton road and cut off the 
retreat. The stubborn resistance of the Americans exposed his 
detachment to be cut off, when at the critical moment, General Rie- 
desel moved over the hill and came on rapidly with three battalions, 
music playing, and amid loud cheers of his men. This new force pro- 
longed itself upon Eraser's left, ascended the plateau with fixed bay- 
onets, turned the American right, and compelled its immediate 
retreat. Some fled to Rutland, others over the mountains to Pitts- 
ford, and about two hundred were taken prisoners. Colonel Francis 
was killed. Colonel Warner retired to Rutland with a remnant of his 
force, and joined General St. Clair two days after with eighty men. 
The latter officer heard the firing and promptly sent orders to two 
militia regiments which were between Castleton and Hubbardton to 
return to that place to support Colonel Warner, but instead of obedi- 
ence to the order, they only quickened their march to Castleton. St. 
Clair had previously sent an order to Colonel Warner, that " if he 
found the enemy pursuing him too hotly and in force, he must join 
him at Rutland." This place was selected as the rendezvous, having 
just heard of Burgoyne's occupation of Skenesborough, " because 
Rutland was at nearly equal distances from both places." This order 
did not reach Colonel Warner. The defection of Hale had forced him 
to so close a fight that it ended only in the dispersion of his command. 
The only alternative was its capture. 

The British casualties amounted to one hundred and eighty-three 
in killed and wounded, including Major Grant, who led the first 
attack. The Brunswickers lost but twenty-two men, as the action was 
closed almost as soon as they gained the American right, and their 
prompt advance carried with it the impression that a still larger force 
was engaged in the pursuit of the American army. The Americans 
lost in killed forty officers and men, and the total casualties including 
wounded and prisoners was about three hundred and sixty. The 
entire dispersion of the command gave currency to exaggerated esti- 
mates of the numbers engaged and of the losses incurred ; but the 
capture of Colonel Hale's regiment during its retreat, swelled the 
number of prisoners, so that the report of General Burgoyne is recon- 
cilable with the facts, when the entire skirmish near Hubbardton is 
taken into the account. This fact also reconciles all conflicts which 
have entered into previous reports of the battle. 



3l8 FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. [1777. 

On the tenth of July, General Burgoyne issued a general order, 
beginning as follows: "The rebels evacuated Ticonderoga on the 
sixth, having been forced into the measure by the pressure of our 
arm}'. On one side of the lake they ran as far as Skenesborough ; 
on the other side as far as Hubbardton. They left behind all their 
artillery, provisions, and baggage." (Burgoyne's report of the stores 
captured at Ticonderoga included 349,760 pounds of flour, and 
143,830 pounds of salt provisions.) He also summoned the people 
of certain designated townships to return to their allegiance, making 
" Colonel Skene " the representative of the Crown in their behalf, fix- 
ing the fifteenth of the month as the day for such submission, 
" under pain of military execution on failure to pay obedience to such 
order." 

On the thirteenth, General Schuyler, then at Fort Edward, issued 
a counter proclamation, declaring " all to be traitors who should in 
any way assist, give comfort to, or hold correspondence with, or take 
protection from the enemy ; commanded all officers, civil and military, 
to apprehend or cause to be apprehended such offenders, and closed 
with the demand, that the militia of the townships to which General 
Burgoyne's circular was addressed, who had not marched, should do so 
without delay, and join his army or some detachment thereof." 

On the tenth. General Schuyler began a systematic effort to obtain 
control of all live stock and and staple supplies which belonged to the 
country threatened by Burgoyne, and attempted to make the entire 
route from Skenesborough to Fort Edward as nearly impassable as 
human skill could do it. Large trees were felled along all trails or 
natural roads, creeks were choked with timber and branches, so as to 
make them overflow and deepen the marshes, all bridges were 
destroyed, some small streams were diverted in their course so as to 
impair travel ; and such was the success of this laborious undertaking 
that General Burgoyne found himself compelled to build forty new 
bridges, besides the repair of old crossings, and in one instance to lay 
a timber causeway of two miles before he could move his column. 

The correspondence of Schuyler with Washington during this 
period was full of hope, and the confidence was mutual and unabated, 
notwithstanding the retreat from Ticonderoga was a real disaster, and 
full of discouragement at the time of its occurrence. Subsequently 
a Court of Inquiry and Congress itself affirmed the propriety of that 
retreat. 

A single fact is mentioned by Chief Justice Marshall, which deserves 



1777-] FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. 319 

a place in this connection, inasmuch as all kinds of political and social 
gossip about the Generals of the war of 1776- [781, have been made 
pivot points for judgment of military conduct. Marshall thus records 
the fact referred to. " In this gloomy state of things it is impossible 
that any officer could have used more diligence or judgment than was 
displayed by Schuyler." 

Chief Justice Kent and Daniel Webster have also left on record 
the most positive tribute to the unselfish patriotism, wonderful energy 
and executive ability of this officer ; the latter using the following 
somewhat enthusiastic language : " I was brought up with New 
England prejudices against him; but I consider him as second only 
to Washington in the services he rendered to the country in the war 
of the Revolution." These services, however, embraced his wise 
management as superintendent of the Indian affairs of the north, as 
well as the more limited sphere of his military duty, which are to be 
judged by their own merits." 

Washington seemed almost to anticipate the affair at Bennington, 
while all others were disheartened. On the twenty-second of July, 
he wrote to Schuyler : " Though our affairs have for some days past 
worn a dark and gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and 
happy change. I trust General Burgoyne's army will meet sooner or 
later an important check, and as I have suggested before (letter of 
July 1 5th) that the success he has had will precipitate his ruin. From 
your accounts he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which 
of all others is most favorable to us : I mean acting in detachments. 
This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our part and 
expose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut 
one of them off, though it should not exceed four, five or six hundred 
men, it would inspirit the people and do away much of this present 
anxiety. In such an event they would lose sight of past misfortunes ; 
and, urged at the same time by a regard for their own security, they 
would fly to arms and afford every aid in their power." 

On the thirtieth of July, Burgoyne reached Fort Edward. General 
Schuyler had withdrawn the garrison from Fort George, after destroy- 
ing the fort ; and having first retired to Saratoga, afterwards established 
his camp at Stillwater, near the mouth of the Mohawk river. Colonel 
Warner was at Manchester recruiting his command and watching for 
an opportunity to assail Burgoyne's rear. Glover and Nixon had 
joined with less than a thousand men. Two thousand militia from 
Massachusetts, sent to supply the places of others whose term of 



32C FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. [i777 

service had nearly expired, returned home in a body, and the harvest 
season was so exacting in its demands that it seemed as if no large 
force could be permanently maintained. Upon Schuyler's urgent 
request that an active general officer be sent to cooperate in raising 
troops, Arnold was selected ; but the critical condition of the main 
army, growing out of the uncertainty of General Howe's movements, 
rendered it impossible for Washington to spare any considerable force 
for the northern department. 

Burgoyne himself had been greatly embarrassed during the last 
two weeks of July by the increasing burdens under which his small 
army labored. He urged upon General Carleton that a portion of 
the three thousand regular troops still in Canada should be detailed 
as garrison for Ticonderoga, but that officer had no latitude in his 
instructions from the crown, and did not feel at liberty to accede to 
the request. General Riedesel, who had made some demonstrations 
into the New Hampshire Grants, (Vermont), conceived the impression 
that the people were quite friendly to the British cause, and initiated 
apian to procure horses and mount his dragoons, who were still doing 
infantry duty. 

On the twenty-ninth of July, General Phillips succeeded in reach- 
ing Fort George with the first consignment of military stores, and the 
practical difficulties of the great separation of the army from its base 
began to unfold their lessons. 

The small garrison at Castleton and Skenesborough had been 
withdrawn when General Riedesel joined Burgoyne, so that the only 
remaining communication with Ticonderoga was through Lake 
George ; and the garrison of the former place was less than the strength 
of a full battalion. The expedition of St. Leger had reached Oswego, 
but no definite information had been received as to its progress or 
prospects. 

The detention of General Riedesel at Castleton had been pro- 
tracted on account of the wounded men who could not be removed 
from Bennington to Ticonderoga after the battle at the former place. 
All efforts to organize a New England battalion of Royalists 
dragged slowly, and the Indian auxiliaries began to become un- 
manageable, so that at the end of one month after the occupation of 
Ticonderoga, the British army was but entering upon the serious 
duties of the campaign, and the American army was in no suitable 
condition to resist its progress. The practical success thus far realized, 
had however inured to the benefit of the royal troops. Both armies 



I777-] FROM TICONDEROGA TO FORT EDWARD. 32 1 

watched with soHcitude the movements of General Howe. General 
Schuyler took advantage of the reduced garrison at Ticonderoga to 
dispatch General Lincoln into New England for the purpose of rais- 
ing troops to make an attempt to regain that post and cut off Bur- 
goyne's communications with Canada, and then once more re- 
organized his camp, upon the islands a little below the mouth of the 
Mohawk river, and continued his importunate requisitions for rein- 
forcements. Such, substantially, was the condition of the northern 
campaign on the first of August, i///. 

British Effective Force. 

Note. From " Original returns in the British Record Office." Date, June 3d, 1777. 

Jersey. New York. 

British Artillery 385 British Infantry 1513 

" Cavalr}' 710 " Artillery 20 

" Infantry 8361 Hessian Infantry 177S 

Hessian " 3300 

Anspach " 1043 3. 311 



13,799 
Staten Island. Rhode Island. 

British Infantry 515 British Infantry 1064 

" Artillery ii Hessian " 1496 

Waldeck Infantiy 330 British Artillery 71 

856 2631 
Paulus Hook. 

British Infantry 360 Total of the army 20,957 

Foreign Troops in America. 

Hessian 12,777 

Anspach 1.293 

Waldeck 679 



Total 14.749 

21 



CHAPTER XLV. 

FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. 1777. 

THE month of August, 1777, developed and concluded the expe- 
dition of Colonel St. Leger to the valley of the Mohawk river, 
and with equal exactness terminated the operations of Burgoyne on 
the eastern bank of the Hudson. 

St. Leger ascended the River St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, 
ascended the Oswego and Oneida rivers to Oneida lake, crossed that 
lake, and found himself on Fish creek, within a few miles of Fort 
Stanwix, (Schuyler) near the present city of Rome, on the Mohawk 
river. It is to be noticed that with the exception of the short port- 
age between Fish creek and the Mohawk, there was water communi- 
cation for light boats and bateaux from Oswego to Albany. The 
intervening streams were all subject to the fluctuations of wet and dry 
seasons, but the burden of military transportation was greatly light- 
ened by the character of the route adopted for the invasion of New 
York from the west. 

The character of the settlers in that region, particularly in Tryon 
county, had fostered loyal sentiments, and the diversities of interest 
among the various Indian tribes involved a constant uncertainty as to 
the integrity of their conduct, no matter what might be the terms of a 
contract into which they could be enticed by high sounding promises 
and presents. 

Notwithstanding the protracted negotiations and repeated inter- 
views of General Schuyler with the Six Nations, the Oneidas alone 
remained neutral in the campaign under notice. 

Fort Schuyler, at the bend of the Mohawk river from a southerly 
to an easterly course, was commanded by Colonel Peter Gansevoort, 
as early as April, 1777. He found that it was actually untenable 
against any enemy whatever. Although in doubt whether to pro- 
vide for resistance to artillery, he went to work with such industry, 




i 









^ • ^/''// 



F^ 



■^-LT^-^ir' i^-'^^ «^:^i.' 



A-.J}Jvanced Corps of Gen: fnizer, 
wh ich was al tacked al ilie cru'k 

TS.MlladiofJInterlcans b\ aJftiiii-< 
ofceniei-ofLine.OObO. 

CPosi/ioiis iahen bylrazer'sCarfts. 

in Jeployrnent, io resist attach. 
D. Earl ol liolcarras dehiched, fo 

coverjiighi Jtiriff ofJiriligJi . Imn . 

I. Gen! Iieidcsel with Jiifiijuard,^ 

SrtinswicJiCliasseurs.supporlin_ii 
Left Wing. 

t • Jlincrican position, afU'rarrii "/ 
ot Jicidesel. 

(j.lxctrcat of Jl)iierica»s. 

W^ IS rdi.ih position, alter tlieailwn. 

I. Jfviise used as JFospilal . 









l'iif/ij>l/iYZ fi'ulMm»n. 6%' ^///. ^a/y7/r<//e>fe: 

33i* 



I777-] FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. 323 

that when the test was made, it proved fully adequate to withstand 
the fire of the light ordnance which accompanied the column of St. 
Leger in August of that year. 

On the twenty-ninth of May, Colonel Marinas Willett was ordered 
to report with his regiment for duty at the same post, and to aid in 
putting the fort in a thoroughly defensive condition. He reached 
Fort Schuyler in July. On the second of August five bateaux arrived 
with sufficient stores to increase the rations and small-arm ammuni- 
tion to a supply for six weeks. The garrison then numbered seven 
hundred and fifty men. Lieutenant Mellon, of Colonel Wesson's 
Massachusetts regiment, with two hundred men, accompanied the 
bateaux as their escort, and joined the garrison. On the same day, 
and within an hour after the landing of this timely invoice of sup- 
plies, Lieutenant Bird of the British Eighth regiment approached the 
fort, and established a position for St. Leger's advanced guard ; and 
on the third of August his army began the investment. 

The advance of St. Leger was conspicuous for its excellent adjust- 
ments. This was largely due to the presence of those who had skill 
in frontier Indian warfare. The entire force was so disposed by single 
files and the wise distribution of the Indian auxiliaries, as to make a 
surprise impossible, and afford the best possible opportunity for their 
peculiar style of skirmishing warfare, in case of an attack. Stone's 
Life of Brant very clearly represents this movement, and Lossing repro- 
duces it with, full details of the antecedent Indian operations in 
central New York. 

Colonel Daniel Clark, son-in-law of Sir William Johnson ; Colonel 
John Butler, afterward conspicuous at the massacre of Wyoming; 
Joseph Brant, a full blooded Mohawk, son of an Onondaga chief; and 
Sir John Johnson, a son of Sir William Johnson, who succeeded to 
the title in 1774, were associated with St. Leger in command of this 
composite army of regulars, Hessian-chasseurs, Royal-greens, Can- 
adians, axe-men, and non-combatants, who, as well as the Indians, 
proved an ultimate incumbrance and curse to the expedition. The 
investment was immediate. A proclamation of St. Leger, was fol- 
lowed by an appeal from General Nicholas Herkimer to the militia 
of Tryon county, and on the sixth he passed three scouts into the 
fort, with notice that he was at Oriskany, near the present village of 
Whitesborough, with eight hundred men advancing to its relief. He 
also requested that three guns might be fired to give notice of the 
safe arrival of his couriers. Colonel Willett, as had been suggested by 



324 FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. [1777. 

General Herkimer, promptly sallied forth with two hundred and fifty 
men, portions of Gansevoort's, and of Wesson's regiments, and one 
iron three pounder, to make a diversion in favor of the advancing 
militia. St. Leger had been advised of this movement of the militia, 
and was so engaged in preparation to attack it in the woods, and had 
so large a fatigue detail at work upon the intrenchments, as to have 
entirely ignored the possibility of offensive action on the part of the 
garrison. The sortie was therefore successful in the capture of much 
camp plunder, such as blankets, arms, flags, and clothing, a few pris- 
oners, St. Leger's desk and papers, and the destruction of two sections 
of the intrenchments; but failed to unite with General Herkimer. 
That officer, overborne in his judgment by the impetuosity of younger 
officers, who mistook his caution in approaching the Indian camp for 
cowardice, allowed his march to be crowded too rapidly, and while 
crossing a ravine near Oriskany creek, he fell into an ambuscade which 
involved great slaughter. General Herkimer himself was severely 
wounded, and the total American casualties were not less than one 
hundred and sixty killed, besides more than two hundred wounded, 
and some prisoners. The Indian loss in killed and wounded was 
nearly eighty, including several valuable warriors, and the field was 
abandoned by the assailants. Colonel St. Leger made no official report 
of his loss, except that of his Indian allies. The fight continued for 
several hours, only suspended for a short time by a thunder storm, 
and stands on record as one of the most fiercely contested conflicts 
of the war. 

On the afternoon of the seventh, St. Leger demanded the surren- 
der of the post, under threat of giving over its garrison to the ven- 
geance of the Indians. A bold defiance was the sole response;. He 
also wrote to Burgoyne on the eleventh, that •' he was secure of the 
fort and would soon join him at Albany." On the tenth Colonel 
Willett, afterwards active at Monmouth and in subsequent Indian wars, 
and Lieutenant Stockwell, smuggled themselves through the lines, 
and reached Fort Dayton (now Herkimer) safely, to arouse the militia 
to fresh efforts in behalf of the post. General Schuyler had already 
ordered General Learned's Massachusetts brigade on this duty, desig- 
nating Fort Dayton as the rendezvous for the relief of Fort Schuy'er. 
Colonel Willett went directly to Albany, and returned in company 
with Arnold and the first New York regiment ; but while the troops 
were yet forty miles distant from Fort Dayton, St. Leger, alarmed by 
reports of Arnold's march and rumors of a disaster to Burgoyne's army. 



1777] FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. 325 

precipitately abandoned his intrenchments and fled to Oswego, leav- 
ing a portion of his artillery, baggage and camp equipage on the field. 
In his official report, dated at Oswego, August twenty-seventh, St. 
Leger explained his retreat by charges of treachery and exaggerated 
reports of Arnold's force, closing with the suggestive statement that 
his own men '* are in a most deplorable situation from the plunder of 
the savages." 

Thus ended the British advance upon Albany, by the Mohawk 
valley. The moral effect of its failure was as encouraging to the 
American army, as the tidings of its advent, coupled with the suc- 
cesses of Burgoyne, had been depressing ; and the animation of the 
army was fully shared by the people. 

General Washington wrote as follows to General Schuyler, on the 
twenty-first of August, when advised of the battle of Oriskany and of 
his detail of General Arnold to the relief of Fort Schuyler : "I am 
pleased with the account you transmit of the situation of matters 
upon the Mohawk river. If the militia keep up their spirits after the 
late severe skirmish, I am confident they will, with the assistance of 
the reinforcements under General Arnold, be enabled to raise the 
siege of Fort Schuyler, which will be a most important matter just at 
this time." 

At the time when St. Leger established his camp before Fort 
Schuyler, General Burgoyne began to realize the difficulties which 
attended the supply of his army. He had received altogether, a re- 
inforcement of nearly a thousand Indians, but the murder of Miss 
Jane McCrea and repeated violations of the usages of civilized war- 
fare, as well as the additional mouths to feed, increased the discom- 
fort and embarrassment of his position. The reports of German offi- 
cers to their sovereigns, abound in descriptions of the horrors of this 
warfare. One wrote, that " to prevent desertions it was announced 
in orders that the savages would scalp runaways." Schloozer states, 
that " on the third of August, they, the Indians, brought in twenty 
scalps and as many captives." It is clear that there was no respon- 
sibility on the part of Burgoyne for the murder of Miss McCrea, or 
other personal violence, and a careful sifting of all accessible reports as 
clearly shows that most of the outrages reported at the time were 
exaggerations of a style of warfare which was under as good control 
as possible under any commander. The Indians could not be civil- 
ized instantly, nor be readily made to acquiesce in the limit of rations 
which was assigned to regular troops, and all their demands were of 



326 PORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. [1777. 

the most imperative kind. Burgoyne thus states his own views upon 
this subject, " I had been taught to look upon the remote tribes which 
joined me at Skenesborough, as more warlike : — but, with equal 
depravity in general principles, their only preeminence consisted in 
ferocity." He also experienced difficulty in managing Indian agents, 
and thus expresses a sentiment which will be appreciated by all of- 
ficers who have engaged in frontier Indian service, where interpreters 
and intermediate civil agents are employed. " The interpreters, from 
the first, regarded with a jealous eye a system which took out of their 
hands the distribution of Indian necessaries and presents; but when 
they found the plunder of the country, as well as that of the govern- 
ment, was controlled, the profligacy of many was employed to promote 
dissension, revolt and desertion. Although I differed totally with St. 
Luc, "then in general charge of the Indian auxiliaries," in opinion 
upon the efficiency of these allies, I invariably took his advice in the 
management of them, even to an indulgence of their most capricious 
fancies, when they did not involve the dishonor of the King's cause 
and the disgrace of humanity." " He certainly knew that the In- 
dians pined after a renewal of their accustomed horrors and that 
they were become as impatient of his control as of any other : though 
the pride and interest of authority and the affection he bore his old 
associates induced him to cover the real causes, under various pre- 
tenses of discontent with which I was daily tormented." 

At a council held August fourth, it appeared that the tribes with 
which St. Luc was immediately connected and for which he inter- 
preted, were determined to go home. Burgoyne thus writes to Lord 
Germaine, " I was convinced that a cordial reconciliation with the 
Indians was only to be effected by a renunciation of all my former 
prohibitions and indulgence in blood and rapine." Many of the 
Indians did in fact leave the next day, and many others before the 
expedition to Bennington was planned, so that the loss of valuable 
scouts and skirmishers was greatly felt during operations in the forests 
on the line of that march. An additional statement of General Bur- 
goyne is properly recorded to his permanent credit. 

" The Indian principle of war is at once odious and unavailing, 
and if encouraged, I will venture to pronounce, its consequences will 
be severely repented by the present age, and universally abhorred by 
posterity." 

This statement was made before the House of Commons, but that 
it was not an after-thought, is clearly seen from the statement made 



I 



I777-] FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. 327 

by Burgoyne to St. Luc, in the presence of the Earl of Harrington : 
" I would rather lose every Indian, than connive at their enormities." 
St. Luc was angry because Burgoyne insisted that a British officer 
should accompany all Indian forays, and take account of their pro- 
ceedings and their plunder ; and several parties were brought into his 
camp as prisoners, who affirmed that they had been treated with 
proper clemency. It was not until this rule was enforced that St. 
Luc stirred up the Indians to desertion and outrage. He is not a 
competent witness in the case. 

The following entry appears upon Burgoyne's record, " August 
fifth. Victualling of the army out this day, and from difficulties of 
the roads and transports, no provisions came in this nio-ht. Sixth 
August. At ten o'clock this morning, not quite enough provisions 
for the consumption of two days." 

In this emergency advantage was taken of the statement of Philip 
Skene, whose cooperation brought mischief only to the expedition, 
and of others supported by scouts sent out by General Riedesel, that 
a large depot of commissary supplies had been accumulated at Ben- 
nington for the American army, and an expedition was organized for 
the threefold purpose of securing these supplies, procuring thirteen 
hundred horses for mounting Riedesel's dragoons and Peter's corps, 
and two hundred for general army use, and of making a demonstra- 
tion in the Connecticut river valley. On the ninth, carefully written 
instructions were prepared for Lieutenant-colonel Baume, who was 
intrusted with the command of the expedition, and these were so 
judiciously framed as to anticipate all possible contingencies of the 
march. They took into view the fact that Colonel Warner was still at 
Manchester, and the possibility that Arnold's main army, at that time 
suggested for a proposed movement to Burgoyne's rear, might attempt 
to intercept his return march. In view of the exceptions taken to the 
assignment of German troops to this expedition, it is in evidence 
that even General Fraser, who considered the Germans as sloiv, de- 
clined to suggest to General Burgoyne the substitution of other troops, 
although asked to do so by Adjutant-general Kingston, " if he thought 
other troops should be detailed," remarking " the Germans are not a 
very active people, but it may do." This matter was especially sub- 
mitted to General Fraser, " because the scouts and guides were 
attached to his, the advanced corps, and it was thought that he might 
know more of the nature of the country." There was no declared 
difference of opinion among the general officers as to the value and 



328 FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. [1777. 

wisdom of the expedition itself. It was to comprehend Arlington, 
lying between Manchester and Bennington, and as wide a scope of 
country as would afford opportunity to overawe the people and secure 
supplies, and was allowed a margin of two weeks time, with adequate 
instructions in case the main army should advance towards Albany 
before its return. 

Burgoyne thus states the case : " It was soon found that in the 
situation of the transport-service at that time, the army could barely 
be victualed from day to day, and that there was no prospect of 
establishing a magazine in due time for pursuing present advantages. 
The idea of the expedition to Bennington originated upon this diffi- 
culty, combined with the intelligence reported by General Riedesel, 
and with all I had otherwise received. I knew that Bennington was 
the great deposit of corn, flour, and store cattle, that it was only 
guarded by militia, and every day's account tended to confirm the 
persuasion of the loyalty of one description of inhabitants and the 
panic of the other. Those who knew the country best were the most 
sanguine in this persuasion. The German troops employed were of 
the best I had of that nation. The number of British was small, but 
it was the select light corps of the army, composed of chosen men 
from all the regiments, and commanded by Captain Fraser, one of the 
most distinguished officers in his line of service that I ever met with." 

An additional statement is necessary at this stage of the narra- 
tive, to show exactly the status of the British army, in the matter of 
Logistics. 

Fort Edward was sixteen miles from Fort George. Only one haul 
could be made each day. Six miles below Fort Edward were rapids 
which required a transfer of all stores to boats below ; and the un- 
loaded boats had to be hauled back against a strong current. The 
horses from Canada came by land from St. John's to Ticonderoga, 
through a country then hardly less than a desert, and the whole 
number of carts and horses at that time received, was barely enough 
to keep the army in supplies. 

As early as May thirtieth, while at Montreal, an order was issued 
that blanket-coats, leggings, and all clothing but summer wear should 
be left behind, and before leaving Skenesborough the officers were 
ordered to send all their personal baggage to Ticonderoga, except a 
soldier's common tent and a cloak-bag. 

The roads, bridges, quagmires, and rocks were constant causes 
of delay in hauling stores. Heavy rains set in. Ten and twelve oxen 



I777J FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. 



329 



were often required to haul a single bateaux, and only fifty head had 
been procured for the entire army use. There was no remedy but 
patience, no honorable retreat, no alternative but to make the most 
of the present, and press toward Albany and the anticipated union 
with General Howe and St. Leger. 

On the fourteenth of August, a bridge of rafts was thrown across 
the river at Saratoga, wliere the vanguard of the British army had 
been established, to be in position for an advance upon Albany as 
soon as the supplies should be realized from the expedition then on 
the move. Lieutenant-colonel Breyman's corps was posted at Batten- 
kill, to be in readiness to render support to that of Lieutenant-colonel 
Baume if it became necessary. 

Lieutenant-colonel Baume himself marched, on the eleventh, with 
two hundred dismounted dragoons of the regiment of Riedesel, Cap- 
tain Eraser's marksmen, Peter's Provincials, the Canadian volunteers, 
and something over one hundred Indians, making, as stated by Bur- 
goyne, a total strength of about five hundred men. 

He halted at Batten-kill to await orders, where General Burgoyne 
inspected the command ; and he expressed himself satisfied with the 
force placed at his disposal. In a note from his camp» he adds this 
postscript : " The reinforcement of fifty chasseurs which your ex- 
cellency was pleased to order, joined me last night at eleven 
o'clock." 

After marching sixteen miles, he reached Cambridge at four o'clock 
in the afternoon of the thirteenth, and reported a skirmish with forty 
or fifty rebels who were guarding cattle ; and stated that the enemy 
were reported to be eighteen hundred strong at Bennington. He also 
stated that " the savages would destroy or drive away all horses for 
which he did not pay the money," and asked authority to purchase 
the horses thus taken by the savages, " otherwise they will ruin all 
they meet with, and neither officers nor interpreters can control them." 
This express started from Cambridge at four o'clock of the morning 
of the fourteenth. The letter closed, " Your excellency may depend 
on hearing how I proceed at Bennington, and of my success there. 
I will be particularly careful on my approach to that place to be fully 
mformed of their strength and position, and take the precautions 
necessary to fulfill both the orders and instructions of your excellency." 
Burgoyne replied, August fourteenth at seven at night, instructing 
fully as to the items of the dispatch received, adding, " should you find 
the enemy too strongly posted at Bennington, I wish you to take a 



330 FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. [1777. 

post where you can maintain yourself till you receive an answer from 
me, and I will either support you in force, or withdraw you." 

On the fourteenth at nine o'clock, he reported from Sancoick (Van 
Schaick's Mills) of a skirmish, the capture of flour, salt, etc., that " five 
prisoners agree that from fifteen to eighteen hundred men are at Ben- 
nington, but are supposed to leave on our approach," adding, " I will 
proceed so far to-day as to fall on the enemy to-morrow early, and 
make such disposition as I think necessary from the intelligence I 
receive. People are flocking in hourly, but want to be armed ; the 
savages can not be controlled. They ruin and take everything they 
please." Postscript. "Beg your excellency to pardon the hurry 
of this letter, as it is wrote on the head of a barrel.'' 

This was the last dispatch from Baume, and no reinforcements were 
called for, neither was there intimation that they would be required. 
Careful examination fails to find the data upon which many historians 
make the statement. The record of this message made at head- 
quarters is as follows: " 15th August, express arrived from Sancoick 
at five o'clock in the morning. Corps de reserve ordered to march." 

General Burgoyne promptly and wisely started Breyman's force 
of five hundred men to the support of Baume as soon as advised that 
the " secret expedition " had been discovered by the enemy, and 
that the American force was probably greater than he had before 
anticipated." 

Colonel Breyman received his orders at eight o'clock on the morn- 
ing of the fifteenth, and marched at nine, with one battalion of chas- 
seurs, one of grenadiers, one rifle company and two pieces of cannon. 
" Each soldier carried forty rounds of ammunition in his pouch, and 
on account of the scarcity of transportation, two boxes of ammunition 
were placed upon the artillery carts." This command met with con- 
stant disaster. A heavy rain continued during the day, so that the 
troops made but a half English mile an hour : the guns had to be 
hauled up hills, alternately ; one artillery cart was overturned ; a tim- 
brel was broken up and its ammunition wasted ; the guide lost his way, 
and at night the detachment was still seven miles from Cambridge. 
Lieutenant Hanneman was sent forward to inform Lieutenant-colonel 
Baume of the approach of reinforcements. 

Breyman reached Van Schaick's mill at half past four o'clock in 
the afternoon, where he met Colonel Skene, who notified him that 
Baume was two miles in advance. He pushed on to his support with 
no intimation that any engagement had taken place. " At the bridge, 



1777] FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. 33 1 

a force of men was met, some in jackets and some in shirts, whom 
Skene declared to be royah'sts, but they proved to be rebels, attempt- 
ing to gain high ground to his left." " A vigorous attack was made, 
with varying success and lasting until nearly eight o'clock. The am- 
munition was expended, the horses had been killed. Lieutenant 
Spangenburg and many others were wounded, and the American 
forces were constantly adding to their numbers. The guns were 
abandoned. The troops reached Cambridge at twelve o'clock and 
regained camp on the morning of the seventeenth." Such is the 
melancholy summary of Breyman's report, closing. " could I have 
saved my cannon I would with pleasure have sacrificed my life to 
have effected it." 

General Stark had returned to New Hampshire some time after 
the battle of Trenton, on a recruiting expedition, and resigned his 
commission upon hearing that Congress had promoted junior officers 
over his head. The appeal of his native State was not to be resisted 
when the invasion of Burgoyne took place ; and he accepted a com- 
mand, upon condition that he should not be compelled to join the 
main army. 

General Lincoln visited Manchester, where recruits were assem- 
bling, with an order from General Schuyler for Stark to report for 
duty ; but could not induce him to swerve from his purpose. He was 
at Bennington on the night of the thirfteth, when advised that a body 
of Indians had reached Cambridge. Colonel Gregg was at once sent 
with two hundred men to oppose their advance. During the night 
an express messenger brought word that a large force of British troops 
was on the march, of which the Indians constituted only the van- 
guard. He immediately sent to Colonel Warner, then at Manchester, 
an appeal for aid, aroused the militia, and made preparations to meet 
the enemy. 

On the fourteenth Lieutenant-colonel Baume advanced to within 
four miles of Bennington. The Americans, unprepared for battle, 
retired before his advance, and encamped on the Bennington road, 
(see map). General Burgoyne in his report states that " Lieutenant- 
colonel Baume sacrificed his command by violation of orders, in con- 
tinuing his advance when met by superior numbers, and by too widely 
scattering his force. The embarrassment of Baume was two-fold. His 
force was not homogeneous ; and his adversary was too strong. He 
followed orders quite literally in holding his dragoons together and 
using the Provincials and other irregular troops as pickets, but the 



332 FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. [1777. 

latter were a mile from his own position and there was no possibility 
of concert of action in defense. 

He occupied a commanding hill quite thickly wooded at a bend of 
the Walloomscoick, and at once intrenched his position. On the 
fifteenth, the rain which retarded the march of Breyman suspended 
active operations, except skirmishing ; but Colonel Warner made the 
march from Manchester, and Colonel Symonds arrived at Bennington 
with a detachment of Berkshire militia, so that on the morning of the 
sixteenth the force of General Stark amounted to nearly or quite two 
thousand men. Colonel Warner's regiment halted at Bennington to 
rest from their march and dry their arms and equipments, while Stark 
so distributed the regiments of his own brigade and the militia, as to 
be ready in the morrTmg for the assault, which, after conference with 
his officers, he had already arranged. Riedesel's dragoons with a part 
of the rangers occupied the summit already referred to ; while one 
company advanced down the slope, to cover the chasseurs, who were 
near the foot of the hill where a small creek enters the Walloomscoick. 
One company of grenadiers, with a portion of the rangers, occupied a 
position behind the bridge, on the road to Bennington, and the Cana- 
dians with a detachment of Royalist Americans, took possession of 
houses south of the bridge, and a slight elevation lower down, near 
the ford, where a trench was hastily dug for partial protection. A 
second detachment of grenadiers and royalists occupied the extreme 
British right, in open ground to the northwest, at the foot of the hill 
near the Saratoga road. A portion of the Indian scouts took posi- 
tion on the opposite side of the road, on their first arrival, but they 
fled on the fourteenth, as soon as the Americans were found to be in 
force. The remainder who encamped in the woods to the rear, of 
Baume, broke away between the advancing columns of Nichols and 
Herrick as soon as the battle began on the sixteenth. 

General Stark reserved for himself the direct attack up the steepest 
part of the hill, and held his men in hand until the other troops took 
their assigned positions. Nichols struck the British left. Herrick 
took their extreme right, in the rear. Stickney cut off the detach- 
ments at the bridge from union with Baume ;and Hubbard with equal 
spirit attacked the positions held in advance of the bridge. These 
attacks were made with great promptness and the utmost vigor. 
Hubbard drove the American volunteers and Canadians across the 
river at the first charge, where they were met by Stickney. The 
Rangers alone retired in good order ; but Herrick and Nichols having 



[777-] FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. 333 

completed their flank movement and driven in all opposing detach- 
ments, united at the summit and participated with Stark in storm- 
ing the breastworks where Baume made a persistent stand and offered 
real fight. The battle, which began about three o'clock, was soon 
over, and many of the militia were engaged- in collecting the trophies 
of the action, when Lieutenant-colonel Breyman's command reached 
the bridge and attempted to regain the heights. His guns opened 
fire upon the scattered Americans, and this was the first intimation 
that they received that the victory was still to be won. The oppor- 
tune arrival of Colonel Warner's regiment, fresh and in good order, 
checked the advancing column, and a vigorous action was maintained 
until the ammunition of the British artillery gave out, and the day 
closed. 

The American trophies included four brass field pieces, twelve 
brass drums, two hundred and fifty dragoon swords and several hun- 
dred stand of arms. 

The British casualties are variously stated. Dawson in his " l^attles 
of the United States by Sea and Land," which is compiled with remark- 
able faithfulness and judgment, adopts Gordon's statement and places 
the number of killed at two hundred and seven, and the prisoners at 
seven hundred. Irving states the prisoners at five hundred and fifty- 
four ; Bancroft at six hundred and ninety-two, and Lossing at nine 
hundred and thirty-four, including the killed and wounded, and one 
hundred and fifty tories. This last element must be fully considered, 
in view of General Burgoyne's official report that" many armed royal- 
ists joined the command on the march." It is the only way by which 
to reconcile the disproportion of casualties to the actual British force 
which was detailed to Lieutenant-colonel Baume's command. 

The Americans lost about forty killed and as many wounded. 
The killed of the British force must have been mainly from the 
Canadians and royalists who fled and were shot down by eager pur- 
suers, as nearly four hundred Hessians were among the prisoners cap- 
tured. Reports of the capture of arms, largely in access of the British 
force, are predicated upon the idea that these arms were taken with the 
expedition for distribution to royalists. The secret nature of the ex- 
pedition at the start, and the fact that it was with great difficulty that 
arms were obtained for six hundred of these recruits, the maximum 
ever secured by the army, renders such reports untrustworthy. 

Thus this battle added its trophies to the gallant fight of Oriskany 
and the successful defense of Fort Schuyler. General Stark was 



334 FORT SCHUYLER, ORISKANY AND BENNINGTON. [i777- 

promptly promoted by Congress. These events seemed to be the 
ripe fruit of Washington's prophetic forecast. The miUtia began at 
once to hasten to the camp of Schuyler. That officer had been 
superseded by General Gates, under the direction of the American 
Congress ; but the latter did not arrive to assume command until 
August nineteenth, just in time to gather laurels already maturing for 
any discreet commander of the reviving army of the North. General 
Schuyler received him with courtesy, permitted no mortification at 
this sudden removal from command to chill his enthusiastic support 
and earnest cooperation in securing men and supplies for the prose- 
cution of the campaign ; and although not invited by his successor to 
a council of war which was convened to determine the exact condition 
of the department, and the necessary measures which its interests 
demanded, was as loyal to the demands upon his honor and his zeal 
as if he had been supreme in command, and was about to put on a 
crown of victory. 



CHAPTER XLVI. 

BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. 

GENERAL GATES took command of the Northern Depart- 
ment August nineteenth, 1777. Congress clothed him with 
large powers, and conceded to his demand all for which General 
Schuyler had in vain made requisitions. His communications were 
also made direct to Congress, over the head of the commander-in- 
chief; and to such an extent was this practiced, that his ultimate 
report of the surrender of General Burgoyne entirely ignored the 
position of Washington, as if Gates already occupied his place. It is 
not proposed in this connection or elsewhere, to enter into the details 
of his systematic efforts to attain the general command ; but, as in the 
case of General Lee and other officers, to notice occasional military 
facts and documents which determine the qualifications of officers in 
respect of subordination, discipline and military conduct. 

His accession to command was signalized by an extraordinary 
letter addressed to General Burgoyne, containing the following para- 
graph : " The miserable fate of Miss McCrea was peculiarly aggravated 
by her being dressed to receive her promised husband, but met her 
murderer employed by you.'' " Upward of one hundred men, women, 
and children have perished by the hands of ruffians to whom it is 
asserted you have paid the priee of bloods 

Burgoyne replied, •* I would not be conscious of the acts you pre- 
sume to impute to me for the whole continent of America ; though 
the wealth of worlds was in its bowels, and a paradise upon its sur- 
face." The letter of Gates received passing applause. The reply of 
Burgoyne still honors his name. 

The army daily increased in numbers. Congress directed that 
Morgan's riflemen, then thoroughly organized, should be sent to the 
Northern Department, and after nearly three weeks of delay. Gates 
advanced his command from Schuyler's old camp on the islands of the 



336 BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. [1777. 

Mohawk, to a position about four miles north of Stillwater, and twenty- 
four from Albany, on the west or right bank of the Hudson river. 

A narrow meadow skirted the river at the point which Kosciusko, 
then an engineer in the American service, had selected for the camp. 
The headquarters were established on the first hill west from the 
river. The breastworks proper took the general form of a half circle 
three-quarters of a mile in extent, projected towards the north. Sev- 
eral redoubts were established to command the front and the river 
meadows ; and the old Neilson barn, built of heavy logs, was fortified 
at the nearest approach of the enemy. Light earthworks also rested 
upon the meadow itself, covering both the old road and the bridge of 
boats which established communication with the opposite shore of 
the Hudson. Still farther to the left on the adjoining hill eastward, 
additional earthworks were commenced but they were never entirely 
completed. The position itself was well protected by its elevation and 
steep face. Bemis' Heights was to the north and west. Freeman's 
farm-house occupied a cultivated tract of limited extent nearly north 
of the American left, and between the middle and south ravine, 
which here cut through from the hills to the river. Mill creek and 
its branches swept through the forests lying between the American 
position and that which the British army occupied on the seventeenth 
day of August. The south ravine was behind and south of the 
American camp, and the north ravine, which was the deepest, was 
nearly in front and south of the British position. The middle ravine 
was between the American camp and Freeman's farm. Reference is 
made to the maps, " Battle of Freeman's Farm," " Battle of Bemis' 
Heights," for a general review of the respective positions of the two 
armies. The two maps alike reproduce the portion of country which 
was com.mon to the military movements from September seventeenth 
to the eighth of October. 

General Poor's brigade, consisting of the New Hampshire regi- 
ments of Cilley, Scammel, and Hale ; Van Cortland's and Henry Liv- 
ingston's New York regiments; Cook's and Latimer's Connecticut 
militia; Morgan's rifle corps, and Major Dearborn's light infantry 
composed the left wing under Arnold, resting on the heights nearly a 
mile from the river. General Learned's brigade, Bailey's, Wesson's, 
and Jackson's Massachusetts regiments, and-James Livingston's New 
York regiments occupied the adjoining fortified plateau to the left 
near the Neilson barn. The main body under the immediate com- 
mand of General Gates, and composed chiefly of Nixon's, Patterson's 



1777] BATTLE OF FREEMAN S FARM. 337 

and Glover's brigades, formed the right wing upon the bluff, reaching 
across the low ground to the river. General Stark joined with his 
brigade of militia, but they did not remain long after their short time 
of service expired. Whipple's, Patterson's, Warner's, Fellows', Bailey's 
Wolcott's, Brickell's, and Ten Broeck's brigades also joined the 
army. The works were all well advanced by the fifteenth of Sep- 
tember. 

On the twentieth of August, Burgoyne wrote to Lord Germaine, 
that Fort Stanwix held out stubbornly in spite of St. Leger's victory 
(over Herkimer), — that he had accumulated but about four hundred 
loyalists, not half of them armed, the rest triiiiincrs merely actuated 
by interest — that he was afraid the expectations of Sir John Johnson 
as to the rising of the country would fail, — that the great bulk of the 
people is undoubtedly with the Congress in principle and in zeal, and 
that " their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that 
are not to be equaled ; " adding, " wherever the king's forces point, 
militia to the amount of three or four thousand assemble in twenty- 
four hours, and bring their subsistence with them, and the alarm over, 
they return to their farms." "The Piampshire Grants, in particular, 
a country unpeopled and almost unknown in the last war, now abounds 
in the most active and rebellious men of the continent, and hangs 
like a gathering storm on my left." 

Of his correspondence with Sir William Howe he reports that he 
" knew that two of his messengers had been hanged, while only one 
letter had been received ; " that " Sir William Howe informed him that 
his intention was for Pennsylvania, that Washington had dispatched 
twenty-five hundred men to Albany, that Putnam was in the High- 
lands with four thousand men, but that Sir Henry Clinton remained 
in the neighborhood of New York and would act as circumstances 
might direct." Almost immediately after this dispatch was sent, he 
received the news of the, retreat of St. Leger and that the American 
army was relieved from that pressure upon its left flank and rear. 

The utmost effort was made to secure supplies ; and by the twelfth 
of September, provisions had been procured for thirty days' issue. 
The bridge of rafts had drifted away by a rise of the Hudson ; a new 
bridge of boats had been built, and on the thirteenth and fourteenth 
of September the entire army crossed the Hudson and encamped on 
the plain of Saratoga. It is proper to state in this connection that 
his crossing of the Hudson river, v/as not only in the direct line of 
general instructions, but it had the concurrence of his officers, and was 

> 

\ 
\ 
) 



338 BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. [i777- 

regarded as the only method of meeting the responsibihty which 
devolved upon the army. 

On the fifteenth the army moved to Dovegat (now Coveville) ; 
on the sixteenth repaired bridges, reconnoitered the country and 
made a still further advance, and on the seventeenth encamped upon 
advantageous ground within four miles of the American army, near 
Snoods' House, as indicated on the map entitled " Battle of Free- 
man's Farm." On the eighteenth skirmishing was active between 
the two armies. On the nineteenth, after careful reconnoitering of 
the great ravine and other avenues of approach to the American lines, 
the British army advanced to the attack. An approximate idea of 
the succeeding movements can be secured. 

Major-general the Marquis de Chastellux who served under the 
Count de Rochambeau, revisited America in 1780-81, and 82, and after 
an entertainment at General Schuyler's mansion, " visited the ground 
where the actions of the nineteenth of September and of the seventh 
of October happened." He says, " I avoid the wox^ field of battle, 
for these engagements were in the woods, and on ground so intersected 
and covered, that it is impossible either to conceive or discover the 
smallest resemblance between it and the plans given to the public by 
General Burgoyne." 

Whether " the depth of the snow through which he waded," or 
his " upset in a great heap of snow while traveling in a sledge," had 
any thing to do with the difficulty in tracing the route of Burgoyne 
or not, the genial traveler does not indicate. These maps however 
do set forth with substantial distinctness the general positions of the 
two armies; and with some modifications and enlargement of detail, 
are the best guides from which to obtain a fair conception of the 
engagements referred to. It is not unseldom the case that a single 
error in the starting point, will even confuse one who participated 
actively in field operations, if it be only through approaching the 
position from a contrary direction ; and in reports of nearly all battles, 
the movements made by different corps must be examined, in order 
to understand the actual relations of the principal parties engaged. 

The advance of General Burgoyne will be taken from his own 
initiative, sustained by the evidence of officers of his staff and his divis- 
ion commanders ; and these will be coinbined with the report of 
Adjutant-general Wilkinson, of General Gates' staff, and other Ameri- 
can officers, so as to gain as accurate an estimate of the battle referred 
to as may be gained by such analysis. 



1777] BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. 339 

Six companies of the Forty-seventh British regiment guarded the 
bateaux which were at the river bank, in the rear of the camp. Two 
companies of this regiment remained behind on Diamond Island, Lake 
George. When the army left Fort Edward, " General Fraser's corps, 
sustained by Lieutenant-colonel Breyman's made a circuit, in order to 
pass the ravine commodiously without quitting the heights ; and after- 
wards to cover the march of the line to the right. 

The Canadians were in advance and were speedily driven back, 
but rallied upon Fraser's approach. The American volunteers and 
Indians were also employed on the flanks, and tp the front. The 
British and German grenadiers and the Twenty-fourth regiment moved 
steadily along the height, until they were required to change direc- 
tion to the left, which brought them directly in contact with the 
American troops, who having been repulsed by General Fraser, shortly 
after engaged the British centre. General Burgoyne says of this par- 
ticular movement : " In the meantime the enemy, not acquainted with 
the combination of the march, had moved in great force out of their 
intrenchments, with a view of turning the line upon our right, and 
being checked by the disposition of Brigadier-general Fraser, counter- 
marched, in order to direct their great effort to the left of the British." 
" From the nature of the country, efforts of this sort, however near, 
may be effected without possibility of their being discovered." 

The centre column, led by Burgoyne in person, '• passed the ravine 
in a direct line south, and formed in line of battle as soon as they 
gained the summit (out of the ravine) at the first opening of the wood 
to the right, to give time to Fraser's corps to make the desired circuit, 
and to enable the left wing and artillery, which, under the command 
of Major-generals Phillips and Riedesel, kept the great road and 
meadows near the river, and had bridges to repair, to be equally 
ready to proceed." The latter corps, upon reaching the position, 
changed direction and marched nearly due west, to connect with the 
left of the British centre, which had engaged the enemy before their 
arrival. " All columns moved at signal guns, a little after one o'clock 
in the afternoon. A few cannon shot soon dislodged the Americans 
from a house where the Canadians had been attacked," and " Brigadier- 
general Fraser's corps arrived with such precision in point of time, as 
to be found upon a very advantageous height on the right of the 
British centre as soon as the action began." This position has been 
already adverted to. The American troops made their first advance 
upon General Fraser's corps ; but by three o'clock, or soon after, the 



340 BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. [i777. 

whole action concentrated near Freeman's Farm, from which position 
the British army made a determined advance for the purpose of turn- 
ing the American left. The Twentieth, Sixty-second, and Twenty- 
first regiments advanced directly from their original place of formation, 
leaving the Ninth in reserve. The British grenadiers and the Twenty- 
fourth were brought to their support after this advance to Freeman's 
Farm ; and the light infantry which had been on Burgoyne's right, also 
came into action on the left of the grenadiers, thus connecting with 
the Ninth regiment when it subsequently advanced. Major Forbes of 
the Ninth, who commanded the pickets, states that " he was attacked 
with great vigor from behind rail fences and a house, by a body of 
riflemen and light infantry" ; that "the Americans attempted to turn 
the left of the Sixty-second, when the Twentieth was advanced to its 
support." The Americans pressed forward also upon the right of the 
British column, until the advance of the British light infantry, and the 
movement of the grenadiers of Fraser's command to the left, com- 
pelled them to fall back and take their final position on good ground, 
between Freeman's Farm and Chatfield's house. Earl Balcarras, in 
his evidence upon this part of the battle, says, " The enemy behaved 
with great obstinacy and courage." The Earl of Harrington says 
that " the British line was formed with the utmost regularity, that 
different attempts were made by the General's orders to charge the 
enemy with bayonets, and all failed but the last, when the British 
troops finally drove them from the field, and that the action was dis- 
puted very obstinately by the enemy." During this time the rifle- 
men and other parts of Breyman's corps were left on the heights to 
protect the extreme right from being turned. 

Major-general Phillips and Major Humphreys, with four pieces of 
artillery, arrived from the extreme left in advance of General Riedesel, 
and led the Twentieth again to the front, " restoring the action," (says 
Burgoyne) " in a point which was critically pressed by a great superi- 
ority of fire." General Riedesel brought up the Jagers, Specht's com- 
mand, and his Brunswickers, only in time to engage in the final charge, 
which was just as night came on, and both armies gave up the contest. 
The Earl Balcarras occupied Freeman's Farm with the light infantry 
and fortified the position. Colonel Breyman threw up works to the 
right and rear, to protect the right wing, and the remainder of the army 
was prolonged to the river, behind Mill creek, Hanau's corps occupy- 
ing the meadow near the river bank. The whole line was at once 
fortified, and five redoubts were established on detached hills having 



1777] BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. 34I 

commanding positions. The British regiments of the centre which 
had been held under fire for the entire afternoon, went into action 
with eleven hundred men, and lost in killed and wounded more than 
half their force. 

The Twentieth and Sixty-second were almost destroyed. Colonel 
Anstruther and Major Hamage, and many other officers, were either 
killed or wounded, and Adjutant-general Kingston states, that " the 
survivors did not probably exceed fifty, besides four or five officers." 
Captain Jones, commanding four guns, had thirty-six men killed or 
wounded, out of a total of forty-eight. The fight over these guns 
was desperate. 

Such is the summary of the British reports of this action ; and 
they clearly vindicate the excellence of the order of battle which 
Burgoyne adopted and the skill with which his force was handled in 
the midst of woods and where there were few tracts of open ground 
for manoeuvering troops. Early in the day, upon the advice of Arnold, 
Gates had directed him to send Morgan's riflemen and Dearborn's 
light infantry to oppose the advance of the British right. This was 
the force encountered by Major Forbes and afterwards by Earl Bal- 
carras. Its temporary success was turned into a repulse by the sup- 
port which Major Forbes received, and Morgan fell back (" counter- 
marched," says Burgoyne) with the loss of Captain Swearigen and 
twenty men and with his corps so greatly disorganized that he thought 
it was " ruined." The regiments of Scammel and Cilley were ordered 
to Morgan's support, and Arnold pushed a strong column to the attack, 
from his division. The firm resistance of General Eraser required 
additional troops. Arnold finally pushed his entire division to the 
front and then it was that the attack shifted and fell upon the centre, 
commanded by Burgoyne in person. 

Sergeant Lamb says, in his Journal, " Here the conflict was dread- 
ful; for four hours a constant blaze of fire was kept up, and both 
armies seemed to be determined on death or victory." Arnold 
finally brought his whole division into action and other reinforce- 
ments came up until at least three thousand American troops were 
engaged. 

The American casualties were sixty-five killed, two hundred and 
eighteen wounded and thirty-eight missing. The British army was 
unable to resume tiie fight ; and the American army awaited the 
arrival of ammunition before venturing to advance again upon the 
enemy. General Gates reported this action to Congress in brief terms, 



342 



BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. [i777. 



declining " to discriminate in praise of the officers, as they all deserve 
the honor and applause of Congress." The names of Lieutenant- 
colonels Colburn and Adams, who were killed, are however specifically 
mentioned. 

To what extent General Arnold accompanied the successive por- 
tions of his division which bore the brunt of this day's fight, is not 
clearly or uniformly defined by historians. That contemporaneous 
history gave his division credit, is nowhere questioned : and that he 
was a listless observer or remained in camp regardless of the fact that 
he was responsible for the entire left wing, which was then assailed, is 
perfectly inconsistent with his nature and the position he occupied. 
Wilkinson, Adjutant-general of Gates, and by virtue thereof "/W;;z<^ 
facie " good authority as to the acts of Gates, makes the remarkable 
statement, that " not a single general officer was on the field of battle, 
the nineteenth of September until evening," and states the execution 
of this wonderful military exploit, that " the battle was fought by the 
general concert and zealous cooperation of the corps engaged, and 
sustained more by individual courage than military discipline." 
Bancroft states that " Arnold was not on the field," and adds " so 
witnesses Wilkinson, whom Marshall knew personally and believed." 
But Marshall says, " Reinforcements were continually brought up, 
and, about four o'clock, Arnold,, with nine Continental regiments and 
Morgan's corps, was completely engaged with the whole right wing of 
the British army. The conflict was extremely severe and only ter- 
minated with the day." 

Gordon says, " Arnold's division was out in the action, but he 
himself did not lead them ; he remained in the camp the whole time." 
This statement is not inconsistent with the fact that Arnold regulated 
the resistance before his lines, although a curious intimation concern- 
ing a man like Arnold. There was little disposition on the part of his- 
torians who wrote just after the war, to do Arnold justice for real 
merit ; but Stedman, equally good authority with Gordon in most 
respects, says, " The enemy were led to the battle by General Arnold, 
who distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner," Dawson, who 
has few superiors in the careful examination of American history, and 
Lossing, who has devoted his life to this class of specialties, and 
Tomes, concur with Marshall ; while Colonel Varick, writing imme- 
diately from the camp, and Neilson,and Hall and many other writers, 
give to Arnold not merely the credit of superintending the field opera- 
tions of his division, but of leading them in person. It is difficult to 



1777] BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. 343 

understand how the withdrawal of troops from Fraser's front, and 
their transfer to the British centre, with the consequent movements 
described by General Burgoyne, which required such rapid and ex- 
haustive employment of the whole force wnichhe brought into action, 
could have taken place undirected, and with no strong will to hold the 
troops to the attack and defense. It is material that other facts be 
considered in order to appreciate the value of Wilkinson's statement. 
He was a young man about twenty years of age, restless, migratory in 
the camp, and like a boy in his eagerness to see everything every- 
where. He exercised his functions as assistant Adjutant-general, as 
if he were the duplicate of his chief, and repeatedly gave orders as if 
ihe tzuo /)c-rsons m3.dQ the general commanding. The unprofessional 
reader of history would take the statement that " General Gates 
ordered out Morgan's corps on the morning of the nineteenth," to 
meany//j-/ t//at. But when it is understood, as appears from Arnold's 
report, that General Gates ordered Arnold to send out Morgans corps, 
there is involved a negation of the absence of Arnold during the 
attack upon his lines. Arnold also, in his objections to the transfer 
of Morgan from his command, and neither Gates nor Wilkinson dis- 
sent from his statement, thus addresses General Gates : " On the i^th 
inst., when advice was received that the enemy were approaching, I 
took the liberty to give it as my opinion, that we ought to march out 
and attack them. You desired me to send Colonel Morgan and the 
light infantry, and support them. I obeyed your orders, and before 
the action was over, I found it necessary to send out the whole of my 
division to support the attack." 

General Arnold was complaining that " he had been informed that 
in the returns transmitted to Congress of the killed and wounded in 
the action, the troops were mentioned as a detachment from the army." 
He also says : " I observe it is mentioned in the orders of the day, 
that Colonel Morgan's corps, not being in any brigade or division ol 
this army," (just then withdrawn) " are to make returns and reports 
only to headquarters, from whence they are alone to receive orders ; 
although it is notorious to the whole army, they have been in and 
done duty with my division for some time past." " I have ever sup- 
posed that a Major-general's command of four thousand men was a 
proper division, and no detachment, when composed of whole brigades, 
forming one wing of the army ; and that the general and troops, if 
guilty of misconduct or cowardly behavior in time of action, were 
justly chargeable as a division." " Had my division behaved ill, the 



344 BATTLE OF FREEMAN S FARM. [1777. 

other divisions of the army would have thought it extremely hard to 
have been amenable for their conduct." 

Wilkinson also says, " This battle tvas perfectly accidental''' (see 
Burgoyne's carefully conceived advance,) that " neither of the generals 
meditated an attack at the time, and but for Lieutenant-colonel Col- 
burn's report it would not have taken place." He states that this 
officer was "sent across the Hudson river to observe the move- 
ments of the enemy by climbing forest trees or other practicable 
means," that on " his making his communications to the General, 
that the enemy had taken up their camp, he immediately ordered 
Colonel Morgan," (as if it were a direct personal order) " to advance 
with his corps." When the firing began, and Major Wilkinson 
wanted to see what was going on, and General Gates answered, 
" It is your duty, sir, to await orders," he " made an excuse to visit 
the picket on the left for intelligence, put spurs to his horse, and, 
directed by the sound, entered the woods." It would be idle to fol- 
low his extraordinary personal experiences through the woods, as 
related in his memoirs. The most eventful elements of his early 
career are embodied in data, gathered by him on such unofficial, 
voluntary excursions. 

It is a fact that General Gates did not pass under fire, neither was 
it necessary for him to do so ; but the whole conduct of that officer, and 
of his Adjutant-general, savors of the disgust with which in an earlier 
war, King Saul heard the shouts that " Saul had slain his thousands, 
but David his tens of thousands." Arnold must stand credited with 
personal valor and a gallant defense of the left wing of the American 
army on the nineteenth day of September, 1777. 

There is no method of determining the details of his conduct, and 
the student of history must unite with Sparks and Irving and Mar- 
shall in the general sentiment that Morgan only, of American officers, 
can compete with Arnold for the brightest laurels of the Saratoga 
campaign. 



.1-FArt 



j_>^ ^t. ± -^ ^ L t t 




3U* 



CHAPTER XLVII. 

BEMIS' HEIGHTS. BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER. 1777. 

ON the twenty-first of September, a letter from Sir Henry Clin- 
ton, written in cypher on the twelfth, advised General Bur- 
goyne of his intention to attack the Hudson river posts in about ten 
days. No other message was received from New York during the 
month ; and on the third of October the ration-issue was largely 
reduced. On the seventh, the condition of the army was such as to 
compel energetic measures for its deliverance. The paramount 
object of the campaign was kept in view, for it was evident that a 
sudden retreat would set free the rapidly increasing American army, 
for operations against Clinton. There was no difference of opinion 
among the British generals as to the duty of immediate action, and 
two alternatives were considered ; either to make a bold offensive 
movement and force a passage through, or past. Gates' army ; or, to 
so dislodge and cripple him, as to make a secure retreat practicable. 
To rest in camp was to starve, or perish by the sword. The troops 
selected for the proposed movement consisted of fifteen hundred 
regulars, to be commanded by Burgoyne in person, accompanied by 
Generals Phillips, Riedesel and Fraser. Generals Hamilton and Specht 
were ordered to hold the intrenchments and redoubts ; and the 
defense of the river meadow, with the magazine and hospital, was 
intrusted to General De Gall. Two howitzers, two twelve, and six 
six-pounder guns were attached to the command. 

The column was tormed and deployed within three-quarters of a 
mile of the American left, upon high and quite open ground, sur- 
rounded by woods ; and Captain Eraser's rangers, the Indians and 
Provincials, were ordered to make their way through by-paths of the 
forest, to attempt a demonstration to the rear of the American army. 
These light troops had hardly started, when a sudden and rapid 



34^ BEMIS' HEIGHTS.— BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER. [1777- 

attack was made upon the left of the line, already formed for imme- 
diate advance. The British grenadiers under Major Ackland met the 
attack with great resolution ; but the increasing numbers of the enemy 
gradually bore them back. Before any portion of the German troops 
on the right and to the centre, could be withdrawn to support the 
yielding grenadiers, the centre was assailed, and then the right ; so 
that the entire line was actively engaged almost as soon as the action 
commenced. 

The fragments of the Twentieth and the Sixty- second, with a small 
body of light infantry, were all that could be brought forward, until 
Earl Balcarras was withdrawn from the extreme right, and General 
Fraser took a position to cover the impending retreat of the whole 
force. While thus engaged in strengthening the left and securing 
some steadiness to the yielding centre, that officer was mortally 
wounded. A general retreat was ordered. Sir Francis Clarke, who 
bore the message, was also fatally wounded. Six guns were at once 
abandoned the horses and most of the men having been killed ; and 
as the troops entered their old lines, "the works were stormed with 
great fury by the Americans, who rushed on, under a severe fire of 
grape shot and small arms." The intrenchments occupied the night 
before and regained by Earl Balcarras, successfully resisted assault ; 
but the attacking force swept by them and successfully stormed those 
which Lieutenant-colonel Breyman occupied. He was killed, and his 
troops broke in confusion to the rear. Such is the British history of 
the action. 

General Gates had detailed Colonel Brooks with three hundred 
men to move around the British right and annoy their outposts. 
Morgan had already skirmished with a small Canadian force which 
threatened the American pickets on the comparatively clear ground 
between the middle and north ravine, and an officer was sent to deter- 
mine the strength and disposition of the British forces which had been 
reported as in line of battle threatening the left wing of the American 
army. When the aid-de-camp reached the hill, near Chatfield's house, 
he found that the ridge was already held by an advanced detachment 
from the British column, and that Mungen's house was occupied by 
officers who had been sent forward to reconnoiter the country near 
the American lines. 

At this time the American army occupied substantially the same 
position as on the nineteenth of September. An altercation between 
Arnold and Gates, owing to the removal of a portion of the division 



I777-] BEMIS' HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE's SURRENDER. 347 

of the latter without giving him notice, and other vexatious questions 
which had their prime root in the unabated confidence of Arnold in 
Schuyler, had driven him, in one of his passionate outbursts, to ask leave 
to goto headquarters and join Washington. Gates readily granted this 
request, and General Lincoln, who arrived on the twenty-ninth, was at 
once placed in command of Arnold's division. Arnold, however, 
quickly repented his passionate outburst and lingered with the army, 
having the general sympathy of the officers, but still venting his anger 
in daily imprudence. On the seventh of October as the battle came 
on, he was like a war-horse gnawing his curb and panting for the fray. 

Gates sent Morgan to the left to gain high ground on the British 
right. Poor's brigade, made up of Scammel's, Hale's, and Cilley's 
New Hampshire regiments, was ordered to cross the hill by Chatfield's 
house and attack the British left. 

Major Dearborn was placed in readiness to advance to Morgan's 
right, and the Connecticut regiments of Cook and Latimer, and Van 
Courtland's and Henry Livingston's New York, were to support Poor. 
Learned's brigade, recently under Arnold's command, was also placed 
in readiness to follow immediately; and General Tenbrouck was held 
in reserve to give support as needed. The formation was made under 
cover of the woods, and as already indicated by the British report of 
the action, the counter assault was a practical surprise to the troops 
assailed. The composition and positions of the British corps are cor- 
rectly indicated on the map, " Battle of Bemis' Heights." The brig- 
ades of Poor and Learned crossed Mill creek, reserved their fire, and 
moved up the slope with steadiness and in good order. The first fire 
delivered by the British troops was aimed too high and did little mis- 
chief. The Americans without hesitation rushed upon the guns. 

Again and again these pieces were alternately controlled by the 
opposing forces, until at last the British left wing, overwhelmed by 
numbers, gave way. Major Ackland was wounded, and Major Williams 
was taken prisoner. Morgan had already gained the right flank, and 
was actively engaged. Dearborn was in front, and the Connecticut 
regiments filled the interval still further to the right. The whole line 
was under the pressure of a wildly impetuous assault. The German 
troops in the centre broke. The Royal artillery, losing their horses 
and half their men, abandoned their guns, and the Earl Balcarras with 
his light infantry became the chief dependence of General Phraser, who 
was trying to rally the grenadiers and establish behind the left wing 
a second line, as cover for the general retreat then ordered. 



348 BEMIS' HEIGHTS.— BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER. [1777. 

At this stage of the battle, Arnold, no longer under self-control, 
burst from the camp, and like a meteor rode to the front of Learned's 
brigade, which had been so recently under his command, and dashed 
into the fight. He was cheered as he rode past, and like a whirlwind 
the regiments went with him upon the broken British lines. Fraser 
fell mortally wounded in this assault, and swiftly behind the half crazy 
volunteer came Tenbroeck, with a force nearly double that of the 
whole British line. That line was now in full retreat. Phillips and 
Riedesel, as well as Burgoyne, who took command in person, ex- 
hibited marvellous courage in an hour so perilous, and withdrew the 
troops with creditable self-possession and skill, but nothing could stop 
Arnold. Wherever he found troops he assumed command; and by 
the magnetism of his will and passion, he became supreme in daring 
endeavor. With a part of the brigades of Patterson and Glover, he 
assaulted the intrenchments of Earl Balcarras, but was repulsed. To 
the right of the Earl Balcarras, the Canadians and Royalists were 
posted under cover of two stockade redoubts. Arnold here again met 
Learned's brigade, took the lead, and with a single charge cleared 
these works, leaving the left of Breyman's position entirely exposed. 
Without waiting for the result of the further attack at this point, he 
rode directly in front of Breyman's intrenchments, under fire, and 
meeting the regiments of Wesson and Livingston and Morgan's rifle 
corps, which had made the entire compass of the British right, he 
ordered them forward, and then riding on with a portion of Brooks' 
regiment which joined at that moment, he turned the intrenchments 
of Breyman, entered the sally port and was shot, with his horse, as the 
victory was achieved. 

" It is a curious fact, that an officer who really had no command in 
the army was the leader of one of the most spirited and important 
battles of the Revolution." Thus writes Sparks, adding, " His mad- 
ness or rashness, whatever it maybe called, resulted most fortunately 
for himself. The wound he received at the moment of rushing into 
the arms of danger and of death, added fresh lustre to his military 
glory, and was a claim to public favor and applause." 

Arnold was promptly promoted by Congress for his gallant con- 
duct. Wilkinson says, " he would not do injustice even to a traitor," 
and after describing his erratic course, substantially as stated, declar- 
ing that he was in the field exercising command, but not by order or 
permission of General Gates, makes these statements which belong to 
history, and must go to the credibility of his other testimony, " The 



I777-] BEMIS' HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER. 349 

General (Arnold) parted off to another part of the field, soon after this 
incident, (referring to his striking an officer); finding himself on our 
right, he dashed to the left through the fire of the lines and escaped 
unhurt ; he then turned to the right of the enemy, just as they gave 
way, when his leg was broke, and his horse killed under him ; but 
whether by our nre, or that of the enemy, as they fled from us, has 
never been ascertained." (?) " It is certain that he neither rendered 
service nor deserved credit on that day ; and the wound alone saved 
him from being overwhelmed by the torrent of General Gates' good 
fortune and popularity." The author gives these extracts, because 
of their connection with other quotations from this officer's memoirs, 
and to vindicate history ; without claiming the ability to determine, 
by the accepted rules of evidence at common law, just where the 
memoirs of Wilkinson divide between history and romance. Inas- 
much as many writers state that during this battle Major Wilkinson 
overtook Arnold, and ordered him to return to camp, it is proper to 
give the incident its proper place as stated by him. " When Colonel 
M. Lewis, on the evening of the 19th of September, reported the in- 
decisive progress of the action, Arnold exclaimed, with an oath, ' I 
will soon put an end to it,' clapping spurs to his horse, and galloped 
off at full speed." 

This action seems to imply a sense of responsibility for the move- 
ment of his division, at the close of its day's work. " Colonel Lewis 
observed to General Gates, you had better order him back, the action 
is going well, he may by some rash act do mischief." " I was instantly 
dispatched," says Wilkinson, " overtook, and remanded Arnold to 
camp." Up to this time Arnold's open difference with General Gates 
had not taken place and he was in full command of the exposed wing 
of the army ; and on the previous day he had been especially detailed 
by General Gates to go with fifteen hundred men and watch the ap- 
proach of the enemy. What should induce a deputy Quartermaster- 
general to interfere, when the officer second in command goes 
promptly to his division, about which there is such a report as he 
gave, is not explained. 

The battle was over. The British troops had been overwhelmed 
as by a torrent, by a force at least three times their number. Besides 
Breyman killed, and Fraser mortally wounded. Sir Francis Clarke 
had fallen. He was borne to Gates' headquarters and died that 
night. He was the nominal guest of General Gates ; although his 
death-bed scene involves a painful altercation with that officer. Major 



350 BEMIS' HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER. [1777. 

Ackland was also wounded and a prisoner of war, and with Major 
Williams he shared the same hospitality. 

Fraser was carried to the house of John Taylor near Wilbur's basin, 
and died the next morning. The American loss did not exceed one 
hundred and fifty. The British casualties equaled nearly half the 
command engaged. 

General histories have room for the solemn funeral orgies of Gen- 
eral Fraser, at sunset of the eighth, within range of the American fire ; 
the devotion of Madames Ackland and Riedesel, and the number- 
less minor events which give peculiar gravity and character to the 
termination of this campaign, and intensify its tragic experiences. 

At night General Lincoln's division relieved the well-worn troops 
and advanced to the upper fork of the north ravine. 

On the eighth, at nine o'clock in the evening, General Burgoyne 
abandoned his hospital and needless baggage and retreated, amid 
heavy rain, toward Saratoga (Schuylersville) across the Fishkill river, 
and compactly intrenched his camp. 

As he approached Saratoga he found an American force engaged 
in throwing up intrenchments, but they retired upon his advance. 
The bateaux which contained the meagre amount of remaining sup- 
plies were under constant fire from the opposite shore, where General 
Fellows was stationed with a large force, and the Fishkill was not 
crossed until the morning of the tenth. Captain Fraser's marksmen, 
the Forty-seventh regiment and Mackey's Provincials, were then 
ordered to escort a party of artificers to repair bridges and open a road 
up the west side of the river toward Fort Edward ; but " the provin- 
cials ran away ; the American army occupied the heights in force, and 
the detail was withdrawn." 

A battery of five guns had also been established at the bridge- 
head, where the British army had first crossed the river, and this was 
amply supported by American infantry. Morgan and Dearborn 
hovered about the skirts of the camp, cutting off foraging parties and 
all communications with Fort George, and all avenues of retreat were 
controlled by the American troops. The American army already 
exceeded thirteen thousand effective men, amply supplied with 
artillery, which had been received from France. This force patiently 
and without risk was pressing more and more closely upon the wast- 
ing and scantily-fed forces of Lieutenant-general Burgoyne. 

October eleventh it became necessary to land the supplies which 
remained in the bateaux, and to carry them up the hill, as a constant 




^■jycJgp'its /tqp__i__/i,oc -iJ^*>9: 



^50- 



T777] BEMIS HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER 351 

fire was opened upon any approach to the river. Scouts sent across 
the Hudson at its bend to the westward, reported that the fords were 
guarded ; a camp had been estabhshed between Fort Edward and Fort 
George, and Colonel Cochran was in possession of Fort Edward itself. 

The Americans occupied commanding positions through three- 
fourths of a circle, so that no attack upon any single position would 
afford hope for escape of the British army. Canadians, Provincials, and 
Indians had disappeared. Thirty-four hundred men only, remained 
fit for duty. Rations were reduced to a supply for three days. No 
message came from Clinton. " By day and night grape shot and rifle 
shot reached the lines." There had been no cessation of danger, and 
" the men had become so worn out, and at the same time so accus- 
tomed to the incessant firing, that a part slept while others watched," 
and the army had no interval of real rest. There had been just one 
half hour's interval of hope. 

On the afternoon of the tenth, the American vanguard reached 
the ridge between Saratoga church and the creek, and General Gates 
established his own headquarters a mile to the rear. The advance had 
been made slowly, on account of the heavy rain, and under the im- 
pression that the British army was still at Saratoga. On the morning 
of the eleventh, during a dense fog, and while the British army was 
fully prepared for an attack, General Gates ordered an immediate 
advance across Fishkill creek to be made. Without any reconnoissance 
whatever, he summoned his general officers, and informed them that 
he had received reliable intelligence that Burgoyne had started for 
Fort Edward, leaving only a rear-guard in camp. Morgan was pushed 
over the creek. Nixon's brigade followed. Glover's brigade, suc- 
ceeded by those of Patterson and Learned, were moving down the 
bank, when a British deserter fell into Nixon's hands. He gave the 
information that the entire army was in battle array immediately on 
the hill. The order was disobeyed, and then countermanded, and 
Nixon retired, but not without some loss to his own command as well 
as to Morgan's from the British artillery, which opened fire as soon as 
the retrograde march commenced. The American army had been 
placed in imminent peril. 

On the twelfth, a council of war proposed a retreat ; but the facts 
already cited and obtained from scouts, terminated the discussion. 
Information was also received that General Lincoln, before his union 
with Gates, had made a successful expedition in the vicinity of Ticon- 
deroga, had captured its outposts, several gunboats, nearly four com- 



352 BEHIS' HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE S SURRENDER. [r777- 

panics of the Fifty-third regiment, and had otherwise impaired every 
facility for retreat which depended upon the British control of Lake 
George and Lake Champlain. 

On the thirtieth, a f^ag was sent to General Gates, and by the six- 
teenth, the terms of capitulation had been adjusted, and the following 
day was assigned for their execution. During that night. Captain 
Campbell of the British army reached camp with dispatches from Sir 
Henry Clinton, announcing the capture of Forts Clinton and Mont- 
gomery, and that Generals Vaughan and Wallace had started up the 
river upon an expedition as far as Esopus (Kingston). It was too 
late to recede from the contract solemnly undertaken, and the sur- 
render took place, under circumstances of honor and courtesy, such as 
were due to the valor and persistency of the preceding struggle. 

The terms are briefly stated, — " The troops to march out with all 
the honors of war ; to have free passage to Great Britain, upon con- 
dition of not again serving during the war ; subject of course to a 
cartel of exchange ; that the army should march to Boston, be sub- 
sisted regularly, and not be delayed when transports should arrive for 
them ; ofificers to retain their baggage ; Canadians to be returned 
home, and all corps of any kind to be placed on the same footing." 
Minor items are embraced in the details, and for several days there 
was a critical difference between Gates and Burgoyne, the latter assert- 
ing that he would resort to the most desperate resistance rather than 
accept the degrading terms first offered. The final terms were reason- 
able and generous. 

On the eighth, General Putnam had written to General Gates, giv- 
ing him a statement as to his trouble in retaining militia and stating 
the presence of Clinton's army and Sir James Wallace's fleet near by, 
saying, " I can not flatter you or myself with the hope of preventing 
the enemy's advancing ; therefore prepare for the worst.'' " The 
enemy can take a fair wind, and with their flat-bottomed boats which 
have sails, can go to Albany, or Half-moon," (only sixteen miles below 
Gates' camp) " with great expedition, and I believe without any oppo- 
sition." This letter without doubt had its effect on the settlement of 
the terms of Burgoyne's surrender; as it seemed as if the original 
plan of the British campaign was at last to be consummated, and 
Gates could not afford to wait until a fresh enemy should assail his 
rear. 

The total force surrendered was five thousand seven hundred and 
sixty-three. Philip Skene who had been a burden to the army from 



I777-] BEMIS' HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER. 353 

his first affectation of influence in New England, who had been lieu- 
tenant-governor of Ticonderoga, and major, placed his name on the 
original parole, for the record of history, as if to escape undue notice 
and responsibility, as " Philip Skene, a poor follower of the British 
army." The people changed the name of his old home to Whitehall ; 
and he left America never to return. 

The American force at the time of the surrender, numbered nine 
thousand and ninety-three continental troops, and General Gates' 
return of October sixteenth made the total force, including militia, 
thirteen thousand two hundred and sixteen men present fit for 
duty. 

The sick numbered six hundred and twenty-two present, and 
seven hundred and thirty-one absent. The detached commands 
numbered three thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, and on 
furlough, one hundred and eighty, making the total strength of his 
command, eighteen thousand six hundred and twenty-four. 

General Burgoyne returned to England, and completely vindicated 
his conduct of the campaign before the House of Commons. He 
entered parliament, opposed the further prosecution of the war, and 
upon failure to obtain a military trial or assignment to duty, resigned 
his commission in the army. 

The prisoners were transferred from Cambridge and Rutland to 
Charlotteville, Virginia, and made the march of seven hundred miles 
during the winter of 1778. Baroness Riedesel accompanied her hus- 
band, and her narrative is full of touching experiences. 

After frequent changes of location, the larger portion ultimately 
became settlers, and remained in the country after the war closed. 
There is no occasion to discuss the differences between the Ameri- 
can and English authorities which practically reversed the terms of 
capitulation and prevented the return of the troops to Europe, as the 
consideration of the campaign is the only legitimate object of this 
narrative. 

General Burgoyne's campaign was characterized by a brave, skillful 
and persistent effort to execute his orders and reach the objective 
designated by his superiors. 

The evidence is conclusive that the idea of failure on the part of 
General Howe to support him from New York was never entertained 
by himself or his officers. 

Reinforcements were due in New York, during September, and 
although they did not arrive until early in October, and after a voyage 
23 



354 BEMIS' HEIGHTS. — BURGOYNE'S SURRENDER. [i7T7- 

of three months' duration, he had no occasion to doubt their prompt 
arrival and proper disposal, under the original plan of the campaign. 
His maxim was illustrated in his career. " He who obeys at the 
expense of fortune, comfort, health and life, is a soldier! he who 
obeys at the expense of honor is a slave." His independence of 
opinion in matters purely under the rule of his own conscience cost 
him his commission. He certainly obeyed orders with an unselfish 
consecration of every energy to his work. The disaster at Bennington 
was a serious check to his expedition, but the arrival of Stark at Ben- 
nington, just at that crisis, was thoroughly unpremeditated and provi- 
dential for the Americans, so that the memory of Burgoyne unjustly 
suffered by the disaster. 

He certainly followed St. Clair promptly and by the shortest 
route ; and from Fort Edward to Saratoga and in every leading move- 
ment for which he was abused, he was clearly right. Such is the 
judgment of impartial history. Burgoyne says, with very natural 
emphasis, I reasoned thus, " The expedition I commanded, was 
evidently meant, at first, to be hazarded. Circumstances might 
require that it should be devoted. A critical junction of Mr. Gates 
with Mr. Washington might possibly decide the fate of the war. The 
question of my junction with Sir Henry Clinton, or the loss of my 
retreat to Canada could only be a partial misfortune." 

Burgoyne's Saratoga Campaign, which was so redolent of inspira- 
tion for the New Republic, must stand to his individual credit as a 
Soldier. 

Note. General Washington transmitted a Major-general's commission to Benedict 
Arnold on the 20th of January, 1778, using the followijag words. " It is my earnest desire 
to have your services the ensuing campaign. I have set you down in an arrangement, and 
for a command, which I think will be agreeable to yourself, and of great advantage to the 
public." On the same date, in writing to General Lincoln who had also been wounded, he 
thus refers to Arnold. " General Arnold is restored to a violated right, and the restitution, 
I hope, will be considered by any gentleman, as an act of justice." 




U51* 



^^ Co/n/nleda/K/Dnnw.H/h/ fr/rn/f^/ii, 



CHAPTER XLVIII. 

CLINTON'S EXPEDITION UP THE HUDSON. CAPTURE OF FORTS 
CLINTON AND MONTGOMERY. 1777. 

''TT^HE operations of Sir Henry Clinton in the Highlands of the 
I Hudson, are among the concurrent events which properly fill 
up the outline of Burgoyne's Saratoga campaign. 

Forts Clinton and Montgomery crowned high points of the High- 
lands on the west bank of the Hudson river, and were separated by a 
narrow depression, through which Poplopen's creek found its way from 
the mountains to the river. Both were above the range of fire from 
ships of war and bomb-ketches; while their height and isolation 
afforded peculiar facilities for being made capable of protracted resist- 
ance to any ordinary force. Fort Montgomery was a large work, then 
unfinished, and at the date of its capture the garrison consisted of one 
company of artillery, a few regulars, and some half-armed militia, 
hastily assembled from the adjoining counties. A boom and heavy 
iron chain extended from the foot of the river-cliff to "Anthony's 
Nose," a sharp promontory on the opposite side of the Hudson. 
Colonel John Lamb commanded the post. 

Fort Clinton was on the south side of the creek, and more com- 
pactly and thoroughly built, but much smaller in extent. Its garrison 
consisted of a few regulars and raw militia, under the command of 
Brigadier-general James Clinton. The surrounding country was 
mountainous, almost pathless, and here and there slashed by deep 
and impassable defiles. 

On the east side of the river, northward nearly seven miles, and 
opposite West Point, was Fort Constitution. 

Twelve miles southward, and five miles below Fort Clinton was 
Fort Independence. General Israel Putnam was in general command 
of the Highland range of defenses, with his headquarters near Peeks- 



33^ CLINTON'S EXPEDITION UP THE HUDSON. [1777. 

kill, where a depot of supplies had been established. This post was 
also the general rendezvous for the inter-transit of troops between 
New England and the Middle States. 

The detachment sent from his command to that of Schuyler, after- 
wards Gates's, had so reduced his force that his chief dependence was 
on the militia of the immediate vicinity and of Connecticut. 

Advices had been received that an expedition had been organized 
in New York for a demonstration up the Hudson. Governor Clinton 
promptly ordered a considerable militia force to report to General 
Putnam, but that officer furloughed the men during fall harvest and 
seed time, because the New York garrison seemed to rest quietly in 
their quarters. Governor Clinton promptly changed the programme, 
allowing one-half of the militia, however, to spend a month on their 
farms, while the remainder were ordered to assemble at the mouth of 
Poplopen's creek and Peekskill. Before this modified order, however, 
could take effect, and while the entire force which had assembled for 
the defense of Forts Clinton and Montgomery was less than six hun- 
dred and fifty men, the expedition from New York was in full activ- 
ity. Stedman says, that " the enterprise was entirely spontaneous on 
the part of Sir Henry Clinton, — was conducted with more energy 
than most of the military operations that took place in America," 
and that " the ulterior view in the measure (after taking possession of 
the forts which forbade the passage of our vessels up to Albany) was 
not so much to create a diversion in favor of General Burgoyne, 
the necessity of which was not suspected, as to open a communication 
which might have been important wh jn that commander should have 
fixed himself at Albany." This statement, while substantially true, is 
put too unequivocally, in view of the whole history of operations 
from Canada as a base, as it involves the supposition that Burgoyne's 
command was considered fully equal to its proposed mission, without 
any aid from New York. The text of Burgoyne's instructions cer- 
tainly must be held to mean that his union with General Howe con- 
templated a union with whoever commanded at New York ; and 
although General Howe felt confidence in the ability of Burgoyne to 
complete his campaign after the capture of Ticonderoga, he did not, 
in fact, lose sight of the northern army. His " Narrative," states 
that he regarded the operations against Philadelphia and the occupa- 
tion of Washington's army to the fullest extent, as a very substantial 
diversion in favor of Burgoyne ; and on the thirtieth of July, when 
"off" the Delaware," he wrote as follows to General Clinton, then at 



I 



I777-] CLINTON'S EXPEDITION UP THE HUDSON. 357 

New York, " and having under his command a force of eight thousand 
five hundred men fit for duty. If you can make any diversion in favor 
of General Burgoyne's approaching Albany with security to King's 
Bridge," (which was occasionally threatened by General Putnam), " I 
need not point out the utility of such a measure." The following 
dispatch of Lord Germaine, dated the eighteenth of May, 1777, gives 
the view taken by the British cabinet, although it was not received 
by General Howe until the sixteenth of August : " Trusting, however, 
that whatever you may meditate, it will be executed in time for you 
to cooperate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada, and put 
itself under your cominand." As a matter of fact, the movement of 
General Howe so crippled General Washington, that he could not 
adequately support General Gates, and the opportune success of the 
Americans at Bennington and Fort Schuyler proved to be the best 
ally of the American army of the north. It is not to be overlooked, 
as intimated in a preliminary chapter, that much of the needless re- 
crimination that passed between Howe, Clinton, and other British 
officers, had their foundation in the difficulties of prompt communica- 
tion and real concert of action, in the great distance which separated 
their armies, and above all, in the numerical inadequacy of forces sent 
to the execution of their trust. .Without further notice of the inten- 
tions of the parties who shared the responsibility of the Saratoga 
campaign, the expedition will be followed to its end. 

On the third of October, eleven hundred British troops were 
transported from New York to Spuyten Duyvel creek, thence to 
Tarrytown, where they landed early on the morning of the fourth. A 
second division, which Commodore Hotham reports at about the same 
number, marched from King's Bridge to Tarrytown by land, reaching 
that place the same day. The third division took transports from 
New York on the fourth under convoy of the Preston frigate, the 
Mercury and the Tartar, and in the course of the same tide arrived 
off Tarrytown." On the same night, the wind favoring, and by the use 
of a large number of flat boats previously collected, the entire com- 
mand was advanced to Verplanck's Point, where it landed at or about 
the fifth. The expedition was managed with signal skill. General 
Putnam's report shows that he was entirely deceived by the manoeu- 
vers of Sir Henry Clinton. 

His own force he states at twelve hundred continental troops, and 
three hundred militia. On the afternoon of the fifth, a detachment 
from the British army embarked on forty flat boats, besides ships and 



35^ Clinton's expedition up the hudson. [1777. 

galleys, under convoy of the vessels of Sir James Wallace, and " made 
every appearance of their intention to land, both at Fort Independence 
and Peekskill." Governor Clinton was keenly watchful of every 
movement. He adjourned the legislature, then at Kingston, and 
hastened to Fort Montgomery to give his personal support to the 
garrison, and to watch the approaches by the Haverstraw road which 
passed through the mountains, and with which he was familiar. 

Sir Henry Clinton transferred his army from Verplanck's Point to 
Stony Point, early on the morning of the sixth. The demonstration 
of Sir James Wallace up the river completely masked the main move- 
ment by King's Ferry, and a heavy fog so obscured the view that 
General Putnam, who discovered a large fire at the ferry on the west 
side, supposed that a party had landed for the sole purpose of destroy- 
ing the storehouses at that point. 

Reference is made to maps " Attack on Forts Clinton and Mont- 
gomery," and " Hudson River Highlands." 

Five hundred regulars, consisting of the Fifty-second and Twenty- 
seventh regiments, and Emerick's chasseurs, with four hundred Pro- 
vincials commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, and Colonel 
Robinson of the Provincials, second in command, marched to occupy 
the pass of Dunderberg (Thunder Hill). This detachment was 
ordered " to make the detour of seven miles round this hill and 
Bear Hill, to the rear of Fort Montgomery." General Vaughan, with 
twelve hundred men, consisting of grenadiers, light infantry, the 
Twenty-sixth and Sixty-third regiments, one company of the Seventy- 
first, and one troop of dismounted dragoons, and the Hessian chas- 
seurs, covering the corps of Lieutenant-colonel Campbell until it should 
pass Dunderberg, was to halt at the point where that corps took its 
course around Bear Hill to the left, and upon its approach to Fort 
Montgomery was to move by the right to storm Fort Clinton from 
the south. General Tryon with the Seventh regiment, and the Hes- 
sian regiment of Trumbach, while cooperating with General Vaughan, 
was to occupy the pass and preserve communication with the fleet ; 
and ultimately that officer joined General Vaughan and participated 
in the final assault upon Fort Clinton. 

The approach to Fort Clinton was steep and difficult. Besides an 
advanced redoubt, large trees had been felled and distributed as 
abatis down the slope, and a heavy stone wall crossed the foot of the 
hill below the timber, extending from the Hudson to Sissipink pond 
or lake. 



I777-] Clinton's, expedition up the Hudson. 359 

On the evening of the fifth, Sunda}% Governor CUnton " sent 
Major Logan, who was well acquainted with the ground, through the 
mountains to reconnoiter. He returned at nine o'clock on Monday, 
with the information that a considerable force was between King's 
P'erry and Dunderberg ; but the numbers could not be discovered on 
account of the fog." Lieutenant Jackson marched out two miles on 
the Haverstraw road with a small party, but was compelled to retire. 
Lieutenant-colonel Bruyn with fifty continental troops, and as many 
militia under Lieutenant -colonel McLaughry, were sent to support 
Lieutenant Jackson, but they were too late to seize the pass, and fell 
back slowly, in good order, " disputing the ground inch by inch." 
Governor Clinton was the life of the defense of both posts. A dis- 
patch was sent to General Putnam asking for reinforcements, and 
Lieutenant-colonel Lamb was directed to send a six-pounder, the only 
field-piece at Fort Montgomery, with sixty men and a supporting 
party of the same strength to check the advance of Lieutenant-colonel 
Campbell, who was approaching that fort. This detachment fought 
with great spirit, but was compelled to retire, abandoning the gun 
after spiking it. A second detachment was hurried to their support, 
and a twelve-pounder was advanced to cover their retreat, which was 
accomplished with some loss, including captain Fenno, taken prisoner. 
This was about two o'clock in the afternoon, as stated in the official 
report of Governor Clinton. Tj^e attack upon the fort was maintained 
until five o'clock, when a flag was sent, demanding a surrender. This 
was refused, and the fight continued until dusk, when the works were 
stormed on all sides, and the garrison made their best efforts to 
escape. 

In Sir Henry Clinton's report he states that " after the advanced 
parties before Fort Clinton were driven into the works, Trumbach's 
regiment was posted at the stone wall to cover our retreat in case of 
misfortune," and " the works were stormed at the point of the bay- 
onet, without a shot being fired." 

He reports his " loss as not very considerable, excepting in some 
respectable officers who were killed in the attack." Lieutenant-colo- 
nel Campbell was killed in the assault upon Fort Montgomery. 
Count Grabowski, aid-de-camp of Clinton, Majors Sill and Grant, and 
Captain Stewart, were among the killed. Commodore Hotham in his 
official report, states the British loss at about forty killed, and one 
hundred and fifty wounded. The American loss was not far from 
three hundred killed, wounded, and missing. A list of two hundred 



360 CLINTON'S EXPEDITION UP TH^ HUDSON. [1777. 

and thirty-seven who were taken prisoners is given by Eager in 
his History of Orange county, New York. General James CHnton 
received a bayonet wound, but escaped to the mountains, as did the 
larger part of the garrison ; and Governor Clinton safely crossed the 
Hudson in a skiff and joined General Putnam. That officer, only the 
day before the attack upon the forts, had withdrawn Colonel Mal- 
colm's regiment from the pass of Sydham's bridge, had detailed Major 
Moffatt with two hundred men from the garrison to supply his place, 
and transferred sixty more to Anthony's Nose. But for this ill-timed 
action the American position would have been greatly strengthened. 

One hundred cannon, including sixty-seven in the forts and others 
on vessels, and very considerable quantities of powder, cartridges and 
shot were trophies of the assault. The boom, chain and chcvaux de 
/rise, which they protected, were displaced, and the frigates Mont- 
gomery and Congress, which had been ordered down the river by 
General Putnam for defense of the boom, were burned. The former 
was against the chain, without anchor or wind, and could not be 
moved. The latter had been ordered up the river by Governor Clin- 
ton on the previous day : but being poorly manned, grounded upon 
the flats. Both were burned, to forestall capture. 

General Putnam as already seen, was led to expect an attack upon 
his own immediate post. He retired to the heights behind Peekskill, 
and after consultation with General Parsons, " thought it impracticable 
to quit that position to attack the enemy." A reconnoissance was 
then made southward. It was just two days too late. His official 
report states, that on his return with General Parsons, " we were 
alarmed with a very heavy and hot firing, both of small arms and 
cannon at Fort Montgomery." " Upon which I immediately de- 
tached five hundred men to reinforce the garrison ; but before they 
could possibly cross to their assistance, the enemy, superior in num- 
bers, had possessed themselves of the fort." 

As the result of the occupation of these forts, Peekskill was aban- 
doned, then Forts Independence and Constitution ; and General Put- 
nam retreated to Fishkill. The expedition of Sir Henry Clinton was 
a success. Continental village, three miles above Peekskill, was burned 
by the British troops, and a considerable amount of public stores were 
taken or destroyed. 

General Vaughan, under escort of Sir James Wallace, went up the 
river as far as Esopus (Kingston) and burned the village. On their 
return, Forts Clinton and Montgomery were thoroughly ruined and 



1777] CLINTON S EXPEDITION UP THE HUDSON. 361 

Sir Henry Clinton retired to New York. General Putnam, rein- 
forced by militia from Connecticut, New Jersey and New York, soon 
re-occupied Peekskill ; and after the surrender of Burgoyne, additional 
Continental troops were sent from the northern army. It is only neces- 
sary to add that the presence of an intelligent commanding officer of 
reasonable military skill, or the absolute control of the posts by Gover- 
nor Clinton, would have prevented the loss of Forts Clinton and 
Montgomery. The patriotism and industry of General Putnam did 
not supply the elements which the importance of the posts required 
for their protection ; and the limited demonstrations northward which 
attended their capture, to that extent confirms the statement of Sted- 
man that the relief of Burgoyne was not a part of the plan of Sir 
Henry Clinton. The reasons why full harmony should have been 
secured between the British commanders in this military movement 
have been sufficiently indicated. 

General Howe himself was now asking for reinforcements, and the 
third feature of the main operations of 1777, that which made the 
occupation of Philadelphia its objective, now demands attention. 



CHAPTER XLIX. 

MOVEMENT ON PHILADELPHIA. FROM NEW YORK TO THE 
BRANDYWINE, 1777. 

DURING the period occupied by the march of Burgoyne from 
Ticonderoga to the place of his surrender, there had been 
other operations in progress which had equal significance in deter- 
mining the general result of the war. 

These movements were so co-related, while independent in fact, 
that those which are material to our appreciation of the campaign of 
General Howe for the acquisition of Philadelphia, must pass under 
review. The uncertainty of that officer's design was a determining 
element in the plans of General Washington. The following letter in 
the handwriting of General Howe, signed by him and directed to 
General Burgoyne, came into Washington's hands on the twenty- 
fifth of July. 

"New York, July 20, 1777. 

'• Dear Sir — I received your letter of the 14th of May from Quebec, and shall 

fully observe its contents. The expedition to B n (Boston) will take the place 

of that up the North river. If, according to my expectations, we may succeed rapidly 

in the possession of B , the enemy having- no force of consequences there, I shall, 

without loss of time, proceed to cooperate with you in the defeat of the rebel army 
opposed to you. Clinton is sufficiently strong to amuse Washington and Putnam. 
I am now making a demonstration southward, which I think will have the full effect 
in carrying our plan into execution. Success attend you. 

W. Howe." 

The British fleet had already sailed from Sandy Hook, destination 
unknown, when the above letter reached Washington for whom it 
was intended. It was a transparent device which did not deceive 
the American Commander-in-chief. General Howe, however slow to 
improve opportunities, rarely misconceived the general scope of a 
campaign, and his field operations were carefully planned and scien- 










'./'.isn||OTcn(. 



3(33* 







1777.] MOVEMENT ON PHILADELPHIA. 363 

tifically executed. His movement toward Philadelphia, by sea, was 
subjected to the strain which attends all maritime expeditions, and 
the change of its destination from the Delaware river to the Chesa- 
peake Bay was an incident clearly beyond his control. He was ex- 
pected to end the war very summarily ; and as with Burgoyne, after 
the disaster at Bennington, and with all officers who fail to do im- 
possibilities with inferior resources, he was to be made the scapegoat 
for. the failure of any enterprise which was, theoretically, within his 
power. He did not overlook New England ; but claimed that " his 
movement in that direction would draw Washington's army thither, 
where the population was dense, and the spirit of resistance was ani- 
mated." " In Connecticut, there was no object for which he could be 
tempted to risk a general action, and only two or three places upon 
the coast of the Sound could be kept in the winter." " If his rein- 
forcements had been forthcoming. New England would have had a 
share in the general operations of the campaign, while the main army 
acted to the southward." To have moved up the Hudson river, in 
force, would have imperiled New York, or " sacrificed all other opera- 
tions to a union with Burgoyne ; who was expected to force his own 
way to Albany." To enter Pennsylvania, was not only to assail the 
capital (reference is made to page 53 as to making a capital the 
objective of a campaign) but it attempted " the surest road to peace, 
the defeat of the regular rebel army." Such was the reasoning of 
General Howe, stated in his own words. 

The embarkation began early_in July, General Clinton having 
arrived at New York on the fifth ; and on the fifteenth an express 
from General Burgoyne informed General Howe of the success of that 
officer at Ticonderoga, — " that his army was in good health ; and 
that Ticonderoga would be garrisoned from Canada, which would 
leave his force complete for further operations." It has been seen 
that Carleton's instructions, construed strictly, disappointed the natu- 
ral expectations of Burgoyne. 

The expedition southward sailed from New York July fifth, 
from Sandy Hook the twenty-third, and arrived off the Delaware on 
the thirtieth. It was soon found that the Delaware River had been so 
obstructed that no landing could be effected above the confluence of 
the Delaware and Christiana Creek. 

On the sixteenth of August the squadron and transports entered 
Chesapeake Bay. It was at this time that General Howe received 
the official letter referred to in another connection, which anticipated, 



364 MOVEMENT ON PHILADELFHIA. [1777. 

that " whatever he might meditate, would be executed in time for 
him to cooperate with the northern army." 

General Howe states the chief difficulties which he encountered, 
in a single sentence. '' Almost every movement of the war in North 
America was an act of enterprise, clogged with innumerable difficulties. 
A knowledge of the country, intersected as it everywhere is by woods, 
mountains, water or morasses, can not be obtained with any degree 
of precision, necessary to foresee and guard against the obstructions 
that may occur." 

The fleet which appeared off the Delaware was given by Sir 
Andrew Snope Hammond, in his examination before a committee of 
the House of Commons, as numbering two hundred and fifty sail. 

" The navigation was intricate and hazardous, and large ships could 
pass certain places, only at particular times of the tide." In the de- 
termination of the ultimate course adopted by General Howe, it is 
necessary to consider this testimony, just as the facts impressed his 
mind at the time and affected his action. 

On the thirteenth of July, Sir Andrew Hammond reported that 
"Washington had crossed the Delaware, and was marching down to 
Wilmington from Philadelphia." This officer had been on duty upon 
the coast of Delaware and Virginia, commanding a detached squadron 
for a year and a half, short intervals excepted. His report was there- 
fore derived from personal experience, and is thus condensed : "The 
coast of Delaware from Cape Henlopen to Ready Island, is of marshy 
low lands, very full of creeks ; from Ready Island to Chester, the 
channel is so narrow as to require four miles of anchorage for the 
fleet, and the vessels must lie within cannon shot of the shore, and 
in many places within musket shot, with a tidal current of between 
three and four miles an hour to stem ; that the water-guard of 
the Americans consisted of the Province ship, the Delaware frigate, 
two xebecks, one brig, two floating batteries, besides two frigates, 
one partly manned," and added to this protection, there was the " fort 
on Mud Island, and numerous channel obstructions " ; while the ves- 
sels of the fleet, the " Cornwallis galley excepted," were illy adapted 
to force a passage against the American light craft, and the interposed 
obstructions and defenses." A rigid cross-examination of this officer 
only elicited the fact that there was depth of water at Newcastle, and 
for a short distance, a channel two miles wide ; but that the naval force 
of three frigates and two gun-ships furnished as convoy, was not ade- 
quate to meet all the contingencies which the landing would involve ; 



I777-] MOVEMENT ON PHILADELPHIA. 365 

and that the movement up the Chesapeake was a wise and proper 
measure. This opinion controlled the action of General Howe, whose 
duty involved no responsibility for the management of the fleet. 

It was a grave question, inasmuch as Newcastle was but about 
seventeen miles from the head of Elk river, by land, while the distance 
from Cape Henlopen to the head of the Elk by sea, was nearly three 
hundred and fifty miles. It is, however, certain that the opportu- 
nities of Washington for resisting a landing, and his careful recon- 
noissance of the coast, fully justified the British military and naval 
commanders in declining to imperil the army by forcing a landing 
where every advantage was in favor, of the American forces. The 
error lay in failure to provide the necessary vessels of light draught 
before leaving New York, and in neglect to obtain accurate knowledge 
of the difficulties to be encountered before entering the Delaware 
river. 

The sudden withdrawal of the fleet from the Delaware, and its 
long voyage, greatly protracted by contrary winds, completely foiled 
the calculations of Washington as to its ultimate destination. 

On the twenty-first of August, Washington submitted the con- 
dition of affairs to a council of war, which rendered the unanimous 
opinion that General Howe had most probably sailed for Charleston. 
On the twenty-second, at half past one o'clock in the afternoon. Presi- 
dent Hancock sent the following dispatch to Washington: "This 
moment an express arrived from Maryland, with an account of near 
two hundred sail of General Howe's fleet being at anchor in the 
Chesapeake Bay." 

The army of Washington had been promptly marched to Philadel- 
phia as soon as he became satisfied that the British fleet departed 
southward from Sandy Hook. The most active measures possible 
were resorted to for gathering the militia, and so to occupy the coun- 
try adjoining the Delaware as to anticipate any attempt to effect a 
landing. Upon the disappearance of the fleet, his army was removed 
to Coryell's Ferry, to be ready for a march northward, in case the fleet 
should return to New York, either for the purpose of ascending the 
North river, or of making a descent upon New England or New Jersey. 
Upon notice of Howe's arrival in the Chesapeake, the army marched 
through Philadelphia, decorated with evergreens, and with all possible 
display ; thence to Derby, Chester, and Wilmington. General Sullivan 
also joined the command, having been detained in New Jersey. On 
the twenty-second of August he had made an unsuccessful attempt 



366 MOVEMENT ON PHILADELPHIA. [i777- 

upon the British posts of Staten Island, with a portion of Smallwood's 
and Deborrc's brigades, incurring some loss and gaining no credit. 
The nominal strength of the American army which marched to meet 
the army of General Howe was fourteen thousand men, but the effect- 
ive force did not exceed eleven thousand. 

On the third of September General Maxwell, with a light infantry 
corps composed of one hundred men from each brigade, which had 
been organized after Morgan's riflemen had been sent to the Northern 
Department, approached Elk river to remove public stores; but found 
the enemy had anticipated their arrival, and after active skirmish- 
ing he retreated to White Clay creek, and then toward the main 
army. 

On the seventh the entire army advanced to Newport and took 
a position along the east bank of Red Clay creek. On the same day 
General Howe placed his vanguard within eight miles of Red Clay, 
and occupied Iron Hill. Maxwell again retreated, after another sharp 
skirmish with a body of German Yagers at the hill. The landing had 
been effected on the twenty-fifth ; the total force approximating 
eighteen thousand men. 

On the twenty-eighth the main body reached the head of Elk 
Creek (Elkton) fifty-four miles from Philadelphia, leaving General 
Knyphausen with three brigades at the landing place, — one brigade 
to keep open communication, and a detachment to destroy such ves- 
sels and stores as could not be removed. General Howe reports, 
that " on the third the Hessian and Anspach chasseurs and the Second 
battalion of light infantry who were at the head of Lord Cornwallis' 
column, fell in with a chosen corps of one thousand men (Maxwell's.) 
advantageously posted, which they defeated with the loss o( only two 
officers wounded, three men killed and nineteen wounded." 

On the sixth General Grant joined the arm}', and on the eighth 
the whole marched, at evening, z-'/« Newark, and encamped at Hokes- 
som, upon the road leading from Newport to Lancaster, at which place 
Washington had taken post, having his left to Christiana creek and 
his front covered by Red Clay creek." 

The British at once made a demonstration as if to turn Washing- 
ton's right, crowd him upon the Delaware and thus cut off his com- 
munication with Philadelphia. Reference is made to map " Opera- 
tions near Philadelphia." A council of American officers was sum- 
moned and by their unanimous advice the army marched at half past 
two o'clock on the morning of the ninth, for the Brandywine, and at 



1777] MOVEMENT ON PHILADELPHIA. 367 

ten o'clock took a new position, selected by General Greene, upon 
the east bank, on high ground just behind Chadd's Ford upon the 
Chester and Philadelphia road. 

During the afternoon of the same day Lieutenant-general Knyphau- 
sen marched to New Garden and Kennett Square, seven miles in 
front of Chadd's Ford, where Cornwallis joined him with the right 
wing, on the morning of the tenth. The right wing was thrown to 
the left and rear, in the direction of the Lancaster road, while 
Knypliausen was slightly advanced, preparatory to a direct attack 
upon the American lines. This division was not entirely composed 
of Hessians and other European continental troops, but included such 
regiments as the Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-third, Twenty-eighth, Fortieth, 
Forty-fourth, Forty-ninth and Fifty-fifth, with Ferguson's rifles, the 
Queen's rangers and two squadrons of dragoons. Generals Cornwal- 
lis, Gray, Matthews and Agnew were accompanied by General Howe, 
although Cornwallis was the immediate commander of the column. 
It is a fact, to be noted, that General Howe rarely kept out of action 
when his army had fighting to do ; but placed himself where the 
example of the General-in-chief would most inspire his troops. 

The Brandywine which is formed by the union of two inconsidera- 
ble creeks, called the North Branch and the West Branch, flows 
twenty-two miles southeasterly from their fork, joins Christiana creek 
near Wilmington, and empties into the Delaware about twenty-five 
miles below Philadelphia. Its banks, then steep, uneven and bordered 
by forests, were cut through at such places as furnished convenient 
fords for public or local travel. 

These crossings were quite frequent between Brandywine village 
and the forks of the river, Pyle's Ford was two miles below Chadd's 
Ford, and Brinton's was one mile above it. Then followed Jones', at 
a distance of two miles ; and Wistar's (Skunks) a mile further up the 
river. On the north branch was Buffington's, (now Brinton's), then 
Jeffries', six miles above Chadd's Ford, and Taylor's, still higher up, at 
the crossing of the old Lancaster road. On the west branch was 
Trimble's Ford, more than half a mile west from the fork of the river, 
and five miles or a little more above Welsh Tavern, near which the 
British army encamped. 

Reference is had to the map " Battle of Brandywine." The 
centre of the American army lay near Chadd's Ford, and embraced 
the brigades of Wayne, Weedon and Muhlenberg, with Maxwell's 
light infantiy. Major-general Greene commanding the division. Light 



368 MOVEMENT ON PHILADELPHIA. [1777. 

earthworks and a redoubt were at once laid out, and Captain Proctor 
was in command of the artillery thus put in position. 

The Pennsylvania militia under General Armstrong constituted 
the left wing, and extended through rough ground to Pyle's Ford 
below. The portion of the country was very rugged and little appre- 
hension was entertained that a crossing would be effected in that 
direction. 

In the formation of the right wing, composed of six brigades, in 
three divisions, the division of Sullivan was on the left, that of Ster- 
ling on the right, and that of Stephen in the centre. This was 
exactly right, inasmuch as Sullivan acted in the light of a modern 
corps commander and was theoretically detached from his division, so 
that Stirling, the next senior Major-general, was entitled to the right. 
The official reports of Sullivan, however, make no mention of a con- 
flict as to position, but give an adequate cause for his tardy partici- 
pation in the battle. 

If his consultation with the other general officers, hereafter 
noticed, involved a question as to where he should be relatively 
stationed, in the line, he omits to state it ; neither is it material as he 
could not bring his division, as such, into any position whatever in 
good fighting order on that occasion. The discussion of questions 
of that character, in the absence of sufficient facts to cover the whole 
battle record, only confuses the narrative, and might drop out of 
history without loss to history. The American pickets extended 
beyond Sullivan's grand division well up the river. Colonel Bland 
crossed at Jones' Ford, and Major Spear was thrown as far to the 
right as Buffington's Ford.* 

Such were the relative positions of the two armies on the night 
preceding the battle of Brandywine. 

* It is somewhat doubtful whether the ford known as Buffington's in 1777, was not 
below the forks of the Brandywine ; but it does not change responsibility for proper recon- 
noissance toward Jeffries' and Taylor's Fords. 



CHAPTER L. 

BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 

A CAREFUL survey of the positions first taken by the oppos- 
ing armies, as indicated by the map, will aid in the appreciation 
of their subsequent movements. 

It will be found that the brigades of Muhlenberg and Weedon 
were withdrawn from Chadd's Ford to form a reserve, while Wayne's 
brigade deployed to the left, in their place, and that a portion of the 
right wing actually crossed the river at Brinton's Ford, before the gen- 
eral action was precipitated by the flanking movement of General 
Howe. The American army did not rest on the passive defensive. 
General Maxwell crossed at Chadd's Ford early on the eleventh, and 
advanced to Kennett Meeting House, where by resort to trees, fences, 
and all available obstructions, he maintained an efficient skirmish with 
the vanguard of Knyphausen, and sustained himself skillfully, until 
forced back to high ground near the ford, and ultimately to the ford 
itself by the pressure of greatly superior numbers. Having been 
reinforced, he regained the heights, and at the same time Porterfield 
and Waggoner crossed and moved to his left, vigorously attacking 
Ferguson's rifles, who were engaged, with a portion of the Twenty- 
eighth British regiment, in throwing up light field-works to put two 
guns in position on tJieir right. These detachments passed up a nar- 
row, well wooded valley, and compelled a company of British troops 
supported by one hundred men from General Stirn's Hessian brigade, 
to take cover behind a stone house for protection until additional 
troops came to their aid. This movement and the pertinacity of 
Maxwell's attack compelled Knyphausen to bring two brigades and 
artillery to the front ; and a strong column was also sent toward 
Brinton's Ford, outflanking Maxwell, and cornpelling him to fall behind 
the river. At the same time the Queen's Rangers, led by Captain 
24 



570 BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. [1777. 

Wemys, of the British Fortieth regiment, swept the narrow valley on 
the right, and forced Porterfield and Waggoner to retreat, and recross 
the river. Lieutenant S. W. Werner, of the Hessian artillery, whose 
diagram, taken on the field, affords the best data for a right judgment 
as to those movements, was actively engaged in these skirmishes on 
the west bank. The American casualties during these minor move- 
ments did not exceed sixty, and those of the Hessians and British 
troops were about one hundred and thirty. 

Upon the retreat of General Maxwell, the high ground thus 
vacated was occupied by Knyphausen in force, and guns were placed 
in position to command the crossings. 

Proctor's artillery responded ; but little damage was inflicted on 
either side. The demonstrations were simply such as engaged the 
attention of the American troops, but no attempts were made to force 
a passage. 

Information reached General Washington, that Cornwallis had 
moved northward from Kennett Square, as if to seek some higher and 
unprotected crossing, and attempt a movement against his right flank. 
Knowing that Major Spear had been advanced as far up the river as 
Bufifington's Ford, and depending on General Sullivan for due notice 
of any such movement against his right flank, he resolved to strike 
Knyphausen while thus separated from Cornwallis, and make up for 
inferior numbers by overwhelming the British divisions in detail. It 
was also known that Knyphausen's column did not make its advance 
until about nine o'clock. There was good reason to believe that there 
would be ample time for this offensive movement, since Cornwallis 
could not double the forks unless by about twelve miles of marching, 
even if he should cross near Bufifington's, where Major Spear was on 
duty. 

During the morning a fog spread over the creek and through the 
woods ; and while this operated in favor of Maxwell's skirmishing 
party, it contributed its share to confuse the scouts at the upper fords, 
in their estimate of the strength of the British column which moved 
in that direction. 

It was between nine and ten o'clock in the morning that Colonel 
Bland crossed at Jones' Ford with a (ew light horse, and observed the 
movement of Cornwallis, who was then approaching Trimble's Ford 
on the west fork. He immediately notified General Sullivan. A 
report similar in substance was made by Colonel Hazen. The follow- 
ing dispatch, which is a model for clearness in all details then needed. 



1777.] BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 371 

was sent by Lieutenant-colonel Ross, and was forwarded by General 
Sullivan to the Commander-in-chief. 

" Great Valley Road, Eleven o'clock A. M. 
" Dear General. — A large body of the enemy, from every account five thousand, 
with sixteen or eighteen field-pieces, marched along this road just now. This road 
leads to Taylor's Ferry and Jeffries' Ferry on the Brandywine, and to the Great 
Valley, at the Sign of the ship, on the Lancaster road to Philadelphia. There is also 
a road from the Brandywine to Chester, by Dilworthtown. We are close in their 
rear, with about seventy men. Captain Simpson lay in ambush with twenty men 
and gave them three rounds within a small distance, in which two of his men were 
wounded ; one mortally. I believe General Howe is with this party, as Joseph Gal- 
loway is here known by the inhabitants with whom he spoke, and told them that 
General Howe v^as with them. Yours, 

"James Ross, Lieutenant-colonel." 

Washington at once ordered Sullivan to cross the Brand)'wine and 
attack this division of the British army, which it was supposed would 
attempt a crossing at some point below the fork ; while the main army 
was to cross at Chadd's Ford, and make a direct onset upon Knyp- 
hausen's division. General Greene was ordered to cross above 
Chadd's Ford, in carder to strike the left flank of the Hessian general. 
This transpired before twelve o'clock, and the advance guard of Gen- 
eral Greene was already across when the following note reached 
Washington : 

" Brenton Ford, September 11. 
" Dear General — Since I sent you the message by Major Moore, I saw Major 
Spear of the militia, who came this morning from a tavern called Martin's, at the fork 
of the Brandywine. He came from thence to Welsh's Tavern, and heard nothing of 
the enemy about the fork of the Brandywine, and is confident they are not in that 
quarter ; so that Colonel Hazen's information must be wrong. I have sent to that 
quarter to know whether there is any foundation for the report, and shall give your 
excellency the earliest in<'ormation. I am, &c., 

"John Sullivan." 

General Sullivan hastily reached conclusions not warranted by his 
informant's statements ; since the route referred to in the dispatch of 
Lieutenant-colonel Ross, led to Taylor's and Jeffries* Ferry, as stated, 
and was nearly a mile west of the fork, so that the truth of Major 
Spear's statement was no proof that those of Lieutenant-colonel Ross 
and Colonel Hazen were not also true. One grave fact enters into 
history, that the question as to where " the large body of the enemy," 
seen by Lieutenant-colonel Ross, were, was not solved, nor was the 



372 BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. [1777. 

solution adequately attempted by Major-general Sullivan, until he 
was compelled to face them hurriedly in battle. 

Sergeant Tucker is said to have made a similar report to that of 
Major Spear ; but the fact is immaterial. The orders issued for cross- 
ing the river were suspended upon receipt of General Sullivan's note, 
and General Greene's advanced detachment was withdrawn. The 
tenor of the dispatch would indicate that the main body of the enemy 
was within supporting distance of Knyphausen, Washington advanced 
Colonel Bland to the extreme right. Another dispatch came from 
General Sullivan, including one from Colonel Bland. They read as 
follows : 

" Two o'clock p. M. 
"Dear General, — Colonel Bland has this moment sent me word that the 
enem}' are in the rear of my right, coming down. There are, he says, about two 
brigades of them. He also says he saw a dust, back in the country, for above an hour. 

I am, &c., 

"John Sullivan." 

The enclosure is as follows : 

" A QUARTER PAST ONE O'CI.OCK. 

"Sir — I have discovered a party of the enemy on the heights, just on the right 

of the two widow Davis's, (see map) who live close together on the road called the 

Fork road about half a mile to the right of the Meeting House (Burmingham). 

There is a higher hill in their front. 

" Theodore Bland.' 

The column of Cornwallis which had been seen on the Lancaster 
road was at last found. In order rightly to estimate the succeeding 
battle events, some additional facts are to be noticed in connection 
with this defective reconnoissance. 

In a letter to Washington dated October twenty-fourth, General 
Sullivan says : " Upon my asking whether there were no fords higher 
up (than Buffington's) 1 was informed in presence of your excellency, 
that there was none within twelve miles ; to cross at which the enemy 
must make a long circuit through a very bad road, and that all the light 
horse in the army were ordered to the right, to watch the enemy's 
motions in that quarter. I had no orders to take any care above Buff- 
ington's Ford, nor had I light horse, or light troops for the purpose. 
I found four with Major Taylor whom I sent to Brenton's Ford, two 
of whom I sent off with Colonel Hazen to Jones' Ford ; nor did I see 
any till Major Jameson came to me the day of the battle at nine 
o'clock. On the day I came to the ford I detached the Delaware 
regiment to Buffington's ; and as soon as I saw Major Jameson, 1 



1777.] BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 373 

advised him to send an officer over to the Lancaster road, who 
returned and said that no enemy had passed that way. Major Jame- 
son said he came from the right of the army, and I might depend, 
there was no enemy there." 

It is evident, if Major Jameson's visit to the Lancaster road was 
not made quite early in the forenoon, due allowance was not made 
for the early march of Cornwallis ; and no careful examination of the 
road could have been made, or he would have confirmed the statement 
of Lieutenant-colonel Ross, which was substantially exact. When 
the question afterwards arose as to the responsibility for the unex- 
pected appearance of the British army in force, upon the American 
right flank, Washington, generously avoiding to reflect upon Sulli- 
van, who was both patriotic and brave, used the following language 
in reply to a letter from that officer who was then obtaining certifi- 
cates to use before Congress: "With respect to your other query, 
whether your being posted on the right was to guard that flank, and 
if you had neglected it, I can only observe, that the obvious, if not 
the declared purpose of your being there, implied every necessary 
precaution for the security of that flank. But it is at the same time 
to be remarked, that all the fords above Chadd's, from which we were 
taught to apprehend danger, were guarded by detachments from your 
division ; and that we were led to believe, by those whom we had 
reason to think well acquainted with the country, that no ford 
above our pickets could be passed, without making a very circuitous 
march." Washington's information, however, was obtained through 
Sullivan. 

It will appear that the movement of General Howe was as bril- 
liantly executed as it was eminently scientific, and peculiar to his 
military habit. From General Sullivan's communications, afterwards 
made to Congress, in which he claims that the movement was just 
what he anticipated, it is difficult to understand his neglect to exhaust 
reconnoissance and determine for himself, whether there was no ford 
nearer than twelve miles, and if not, whether tJiat ford was not available 
to an earnest adversary; unless it be borne in mind that after the 
battle of Long Island, when he had the misfortune to fall under cen- 
sure for similar neglect of reconnoissance, he anticipated the move- 
ments of an enemy in a similar manner, without the power to stop it. 
Another document has value, in connection with the proposed advance 
of Washington against Knyphausen. It is clearly seen that such a 
movement was in the spirit of a true soldier ; and its success, on the 



374 BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. [1777- 

basis of a supposed wide separation of the two British armies, would 
have been brilliant. 

It stimulated the enthusiasm of raw troops by offensive action, 
where terrors like those of a stolid defense are unknown, and carried 
with it the courage which a sharp offensive return almost invariably 
inspires. It was one of those rare instances in which Washington 
assumed great risks, and the sudden suspension of the movement 
saved the army. 

Additional extracts are given from the document already referred 
to, with the remark that Washington understood that the column of 
Cornwallis was still on the west bank, and as a matter of course, he 
would not have attacked Knyphausen if he suspected that two-thirds 
of the British army, fully equal to his own entire command, was 
already bearing down upon his right and rear. 

Extracts from General Sullivan's Statement. 

" It was ever my opinion that the enemy would come round on 
our right flank. This opinion I often gave to the General. I wrote 
to him that morning that it was clearly my opinion. I sent him two 
messages to the same purpose in the forenoon, and the first intelli- 
gence I received that they were actually coming that way, I instantly 
communicated to him ; after which the General sent me word to cross 
the Brandywine and attack the enemy's left," (obviously meaning 
Cornwallis, i. e. the real British left, not the left of the army imme- 
diately opposite,) " while the army crossed below me to attack the 
right. This I was preparing to do, when Major Spear came to me 
and informed me that he was from the upper country ; that he had 
come in the road where the enemy must have passed to attack our 
right, and that there was not the least appearance of them in that 
quarter ; and that General Washington had sent him out for the pur- 
pose of discovering whether the enemy were in that quarter. The 
account was confirmed by Sergeant Tucker of the light-horse, sent by 
me on purpose to make discoveries, and who had passed, as he said, 
to the Lancaster road." 

" This intelligence did by no means alter my opinion, which was 
founded, not upon any knowledge I had of the facts, but upon an 
apprehension that General Howe would take that advantage which 
any good officer in his situation would have done. I considered, 
however, that if my opinion, or the intelligence I had sent the General, 
should bring him into a plan of attacking the enemy on the advan- 



1777-.] BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 375 

tageous heights of which they were possessed, and a defeat should 
thence follow, I should be justly censured for withholding from him 
part of the intelligence I had received, and thereby brought defeat on 
our army. I therefore sat down and wrote Major Spear's account 
from his own mouth, and forwarded to his excellency by a light 
horseman, and ordered the Major to follow himself. / never made a 
comnicnt or gave any opinion in tJic uiattcr. . . . I beg Congress to 
see whether I could have been excused for withholding that opinion, 
merely because my opinion did not coincide with the declaration." 

(The opinion of General Sullivan as to the reliability of informa- 
tion received from his scouts, was just what the Commander-in-chief 
was entitled to.) Colonel Harrison, General Washington's secretary, 
wrote to President Hancock at five o'clock in the afternoon from 
Chadd's Ford, that "Sullivan, Stirling, and Stephen with their divis- 
ions had gone in pursuit of a detachment of the British army, two or 
three thousand, or more, which filed off from their left about eleven 
o'clock, and were supposed to have crossed the Brandywine at Jones' 
Ford," and adds, that " at half past four the enemy attacked Sullivan 
at the ford above, that the action was very violent, and a very severe 
cannonading had begun here (at Chadd's Ford) also." This letter 
confuses the movement ordered, upon the receipt of the message of 
Lieutenant-colonel Ross, with the general action which was in pro- 
gress when the letter was dispatched. 

The advance of General Howe began at daybreak, according to 
his report, and the entire column, after a march of seventeen miles 
from Kennett Square, crossed Jeffries' Ford by two o'clock, its van- 
guard having previously reached the vicinity of Osborne's Hill, near 
Sullivan's right. 

Its battle formation was deliberately made in three lines, and was 
so complete and adequate that the third line was not called into action 
at all. That formation was as follows : The guards were upon the 
right, and the First British grenadiers to their left near the centre, 
supported by the Hessian grenadiers in a second line. To the left of 
the Second grenadiers who held the centre, were two battalions of 
light infantry with the Hessian and Anspach chasseurs, supported by 
the Fourth brigade for a second line. The composition of this brigade 
is indicated on the map. The Third brigade was held in reserve. 

A brief summary of General Howe's report will prepare the way 
for a better understanding of the movements of the American army. 
The American position, when the British troops began the attack, was 



n^) BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. [1777- 

on commanding ground near Birmingham Meeting-house, nearly- 
parallel with Osborne's Hill, behind which the British army so delib- 
erately prepared their advance movement. " Both flanks were covered 
by very thick woods, and the artillery was advantageously disposed. 
The light infantry and chasseurs began the attack, the guards and 
grenadiers instantly advanced from the right, the whole under a heavy 
train (of fire) of artillery and musketry; but they pushed on with an 
impetuosity not to be sustained by the enemy, who falling back into 
the woods in their rear, the king's troops entered with them and pur- 
sued closely for nearly two miles. The Americans were dislodged 
from the second position, within half a mile of Dilvvorth, and just at 
dark the infantry. Second grenadiers, and Fourth brigade had a brief 
action beyond Dilworth, between the two roads which run from Dil- 
worth to Chester." " The Guards, First British grenadiers and Hes- 
sian grenadiers who attacked the American left, having in the pursuit 
got entangled in very thick woods, were no further engaged during 
the day." 

"Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, as had been previously con- 
certed, kept the enemy amused during the day with cannon, and the 
appearance of forcing the ford without intending to pass it, until the 
attack upon the enemy's right should take place." " When the gen- 
eral action began, the crossing was successfully made under the lead 
of Major-general Grant, and the American left made a rapid retreat." 

As soon as Washington learned of the approach of the British 
column. General Sullivan was ordered to bring the entire right wing 
to bear upon its advance. The position at Chadd's Ford was entrusted 
to Wayne. Greene was placed in command of Muhlenberg's and 
Weedon's brigades as a reserve, and this force was posted between 
the extremes of attack. The American formation was quite compact, 
except on the left where Sullivan dropped his own division, which was 
in great disorder, and thus " made an interval in the American line 
of half a mile," until he "rode on to consult with the other general 
officers and settle upon the location of the troops." He states in 
his report, that it was " their unanimous opinion that his division 
should be brought on to join the others, and that the whole should 
incline further to the right, to prevent our being outflanked ; " that 
" while his division was marching on, and before it was possible for 
them to form to advantage, the enemy pressed on with rapidity and 
attacked them, which threw them into some kind of confusion." 
" He took his own position in the centre, with the artillery, and ordered 



1777.] BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 37/ 

:t to play briskly, to stop the progress of the enemy and give the 
broken troops time to rally and form in the rear." 

" He sent four aid-de-camps for this purpose and went himself, 
but all in vain ; then left them to be rallied by their own officers and 
the aids, and returned to the artillery and centre." " Some rallied 
and others could not by their officers be brought to do anything but 
fly." The resistance of Stirling and Stephen was such as repeatedly 
to repulse the British attack. Conway's brigade distinguished itself by 
its valor. Hazen's, Dayton's and Ogden's regiments alone maintained 
a resolute position on the left. General Deborre, a French officer of 
thirty-five years' experience, commanded the right brigade of the entire 
line, but it gave way early in the action and the chief resistance was 
made at the centre. (This officer almost immediately resigned, so that 
he was not dealt with by a military court.) That the retreat of the 
two divisions of Stirling and Stephen, (except Deborre's brigade) was 
effected with some steadiness and repeated returns of the offensive, is 
shown by the fact that they took both artillery and baggage with 
them ; and there is abundant evidence that General Sullivan exhibited 
a personal courage which greatly overshadowed his deficiencies as 
commanding officer of a grand division. There are circumstances 
associated with the battle which indicate more clearly than the battle 
itself the difficulties of the day, and make more wonderful the rescue 
of the American army from entire destruction. 

It would be presumed from the order issued to General Sullivan 
and the position occupied by the American troops, that the three 
divisions moved, under General Sullivan's directions, directly to the 
battle-field from their camp on the river bluff; and he has been 
alternately praised and abused for the position taken. The following 
is an extract from General Sullivan's personal communication to the 
American Congress : 

" I wish Congress to consider the many disadvantages I labored 
under in that day. It is necessary in every action that the command- 
ing officer should have a perfect knowledge of the number and situa- 
tion of the enemy, the route they are pursuing, the ground he is to 
draw up his troops on, as well as that where the enemy are to be 
formed, and that he have sufficient time to view and examine the 
positions of the enemy and to draw up his troops in such a manner as 
to counteract their design, all of which were wanting." 

General Howe did not intend to grant these favors ; and this excel- 
lent programme for a sham battle, in experimental practice is not ac- 



378 BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. [1777 

ceptable to those who seek high attainment in the art of war. The 
paper continues, " We had intelligence of two brigades coming against 
us ; when it was in fact the whole strength of the British army, com- 
manded by General Howe and Lord Cornwallis. They met us unex- 
pectedly, and attacked us before wc had time to form, and upon 
ground we had never before seen. Under these disadvantages, and 
against those unequal numbers, we maintained our ground an hour and 
forty minutes; and by giving fresh opposition on every ground that 
would admit, we kept them at bay from three o'clock until after 
sunset." 

These statements are to be considered in connection with those on 
page 374, where General Sullivan claims to have expected General 
Howe's approach from that direction, and necessarily over the ground 
where the battle was fought. The occasion was one which required 
exhaustive reconnoissance and thorough anticipation of the contin- 
gencies of such an attack. Both were neglected. 

It is nowhere recorded in official documents, exactly how the 
American troops gained the battle-ground. The report of General 
Sullivan gives his views ; but neither those of La Fayette, a volunteer 
on this occasion, nor Stirling, explain this matter. 

General Sullivan, in fact, waited for further orders from Washington, 
after sending him notice that the enemy was close at hand, as if par- 
alyzed, and the divisions of Stirling and Stephen moved promptly 
without him, to the nearest good position from which they could 
resist the advancing British columns. 

The author knows full well that this statement, predicated upon 
examination of documents, regardless in the first instance of all other 
opinions, does not conform to some narratives, neither has this exam- 
ination from the first accepted any opinion which was not in harmony 
with a strictly military review of conditions and data. It is therefore 
material that additional documentary matter should receive attention. 
Mr. Sparks, in his Appendix to Vol. V., page 462, states, that *' when 
General Sullivan came up with three divisions of the army, his own, 
Stephen's and Stirling's, and began to form them into a line about 
half a mile in front of the enemy, Cornwallis commenced the attack 
before this manoeuver could be completed, and threw Sullivan's troops 
into confusion, etc." 

Washington, writing to General Sullivan under date of October 
twenty-fourth, 1777, says, " what happened on your march to the field 
of battle, — your disposition there and behavior during the action, I 



1777] BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 379 

can say nothing about ; no part till the retreat commenced having 
come under my immediate observation. I can only add, therefore, 
that the whole tenor of your conduct as far as I have had opportu- 
nities of judging has been spirited and active." This letter also con- 
tains the following allusion to the information sent by Major Spear, 
" without comment or opinion." " It was not your fault that the 
intelligence was eventually found to be erroneous." And yet ivhcn 
that dispatch was sent. General Sullivan believed it to be erroneous. In 
writing from "Camp on Perkiomy, September twenty-seventh, 1777, 
to President Hancock, General Sullivan thus shows how he reached 
the battle-field. (The Italics are not so marked in the original.) 

" I never yet pretended that my disposition in the late battle was 
perfect. I knew it was very far from it ; but this I will venture to affirm, 
that it was the best that time would allow me to make. At half-past 
two I received orders to march with my division to join with and take 
command of that and two others, to oppose the enemy who were 
coming down on the right flank of our army. I neither knew ivhere the 
enemy zvere, nor ivhat route the other txvo divisions zvere to take, and of 
course could not determine where I should form a junction zvith themy 
" I began my march in a few minutes after I received my orders, and 
had not marched a mile when I met Colonel Hazen with his regiment 
which had been stationed at a ford three miles above me, who in- 
formed me that I might depend that the principal part of the British 
army was there ; although I knew the report sent to headquarters 
made them but two brigades. As I knew Colonel Hazen to be an old 
officer and a good judge of numbers, I gave credence to his report in 
preference to the intelligence before received. While I was conversing 
with Colonel Hazen, and our troops still on the march, the enemy 
headed us in the road, (see positions of guards and Hessians on the 
map ' Battle of Brandywine,') about forty rods from our advance 
guard. I then found it necessary to turn off to the right to form, and 
so got nearer to the other divisions, tc/Z/zV/^ /at that moment discovered, 
both in the rear and to the right of the place I was then at. I ordered 
Colonel Hazen's regiment to pass a hollow way, file off to the right, 
and face, to cover the artillery. The enemy seeing this, did not press 
on, but gave me time to form my division on an advantageous height, 
in a line with the other divisions, about almost half a mile to the left." 

It thus appears that Major general Sullivan, to whom the command 
of the entire right wing of the American army from its first establish- 
ment on the east ban'-: of the Brandywine had been intrusted, arrived 



38o BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. [i777. 

only just in time to take part in the action, and that his personal valor, 
and that of three regiments, was the sole contribution of his division 
to the efficiency of the American resistance. If, as appears from 
some authorities, General Deborre was in Stirling's division, he was 
in his proper position on the right, and the entangled controversy 
whether there was a dispute between that officer and General Sullivan 
as to the command of the extreme right, is settled by the documents 
already cited, independently of the fact that there was no occasion for 
a conflict upon such a question, between a general of brigade and the 
commander-in-chief of the entire right wing. General Sullivan's time 
was spent in finding the army first, and then in finding a place where 
he could render service in person, and with such of his own division 
as he could rescue from panic and flight. 

Washington hastened with Greene's division to the support of the 
right wing ; but not in time to save it in position. It had no retreat 
but toward Dilworth, as the British right wing out flanked it to the 
left and intervened between it and Chadd's Ford. By a direct march 
nearly to Dilworth of four miles, effected in fifty minutes, and a wheel 
to the left for half a mile, he was enabled to occupy a defile and sub- 
stantial ground from which to open a passage for the retreating bat- 
talions and interpose a vigorous resistance. This was temporary, and 
the retreat was then made under cover of Greene's division. In an 
orchard beyond Dilworth, three regiments made another vigorous 
stand, and night separated the conflicting armies. 

The militia brigade of General Armstrong, on the extreme left, 
near Pyle's Ford, was not called into action, but rapidly moved in 
the direction of Chester ; and Generals Wayne and Maxwell, after a 
vigorous resistance, also took the same direction, losing the guns which 
were at the ford, and some others. 

The American army gained Chester, so that Washington's dispatch 
from that point to President Hancock was dated at twelve o'clock at 
night, September nth, 1777, and the British army remained on the 
field. There are a few minor items which belong to this record. At 
the commencement of the action a vigorous skirmish took place in 
the orchard north of the Birmingham Meeting-house. Special credit 
is also due to the corps of General Maxwell. 

The Marquis de La Fayette, who had been appointed Major-gen- 
eral by way of compliment, as claimed, but not so understood by 
Washington, served as his voluntary aid-de-camp, distinguished 
himself by his valor, was wounded in an attempt to rally troops, and 



I777-J BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 38 1 

joined Washington at Chester, Captain Louis de Fleury fought with 
such gallantry that Congress presented him with a horse in place of 
his own killed in the battle. The baron St. Ovary, who aided La 
Fayette in rallying fugitives, was taken prisoner. The skill of General 
Howe as a scientific soldier, even amidst woods and thickets, was 
again demonstrated ; and the wonderful presence of mind, aptitude 
for emergencies, and extraordinary capacity for making the most 
of raw troops, was never more thoroughly evinced by Washington in 
his public career. With all its mistakes, and the final retreat of the 
American troops, there was much of real success and real hope as the 
fruit of the Battle of Brandy wine. 



CHAPTER LI. 

OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN. 

1777- 

GENERAL WASHINGTON marched from Chester directly to 
Philadelphia to refit his army, secure ammunition and provis- 
ions, and thence to Germantown for one day of rest. 

While Congress was making an effort to collect detached Conti- 
nental troops, and rally the militia, the Commander-in-chief was in 
motion. 

On the thirteenth of September, orders were sent to Monsieur de 
Coudray to complete the defensive works on the Delaware as rapidly 
as possible ; to General Putnam to send him fifteen hundred Conti- 
nental troops forthwith ; and to General Armstrong to occupy the 
line of the Schuylkill river, and throw up occasional redoubts near the 
fords, to be occupied if necessary in crossing that river. 

The left wing of the British army had moved from Dilworth 
toward Goshen, demonstrating toward Reading, as well as toward the 
Schuylkill and Philadelphia. The right wing under Generals Grant 
and Cornwallis reached Ashtown on the twelfth, and Chester on the 
thirteenth. The failure of General Howe to move diagonally toward 
Crum creek, or Derby, thereby to make a direct route to Philadelphia, 
i^horter than that of Washington's retreat, received severe criticism 
from his enemies ; but important considerations controlled his actions. 
The wounded of both armies were on his hands, so that he was com- 
pelled to procure surgeons from General Washington to assist in their 
care ; and he states that one reason of his occupation of Wilmington, 
where he captured the Governor and considerable coin, was to provide 
better for their comfort. Inasmuch as Grant and Cornwallis were in 
the rear of Washington's army, a march to Philadelphia via German- 
town afforded a fair opportunity to cut off its retreat, while at the 



1777.] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 383 

same time threatening the city. On the fifteenth, Washington was 
again on the west side of the Schuylkill, having crossed at Swede's 
Ford, so that the halt of General Howe for a single day on the battle 
field, rendered it useless for him to make forced marches for that city 
direct. 

Washington moved out on the Lancaster road as far as the Warren 
Tavern. General Howe, watchful of these movements, advanced be- 
yond Westchester, and both armies prepared for battle. General 
Howe made a partially successful attempt to turn the American right 
wing, in order to throw it back upon the Schuylkill ; but a heavy 
storm completely ruined the ammunition of the American army, and 
was " directly in the . faces of the British troops." Washington left 
Wayne, with fifteen hundred men, in a peculiarly retired and well 
chosen position near Paoli, to be ready to fall upon the rear of Gen- 
eral Howe, and then moved to Yellow Springs, thence to Warwick, 
on French creek; and after he found that General Howe did not 
intend a movement toward Reading, crossed the river by Parker's 
Ford and encamped on the Perkiomy, September seventeenth. 

On the twentieth General Wayne was surprised, through the 
treachery of the people of the country. General Grey advanced from 
his camp near Trudruffyn at night, using only the bayonet, and 
inflicted a loss of three hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners, 
with a mere handful of casualties to his own troops. Wayne saved 
his artillery and most of his baggage. John Adams thus criticised the 
crossing of the Schuylkill ; and the criticism does more credit to his 
interest in the war, than to his judgment of military conduct. " It is 
a very injudicious movement. If he had sent one brigade of his 
regular troops to have headed the militia, he might have cut to pieces 
Howe's army in attempting to cross any of the fords. Howe will not 
attempt it." He did attempt it! "He will wait for his fleet in 
Delaware river. O ! Heaven ! grant us one great soul ! One lead- 
ing mind would extricate the best cause from that ruin which seems 
to await it ! " But Howe did notzvait for his fleet. And when Wash- 
ington crossed the Schuylkill, he knew that Grant and Cornwallis 
were detached to Chester, so that the movement against one wing of 
the British army, interrupted by the storm, was soldierly ; and the 
retreat via Parker's Ford, was for the purpose of taking the quickest 
possible offensive and to cover the fords. The disaster of Wayne 
alone impaired the value of that action. The brigade of Smallwood, 
which had been left as a support to Wayne, failed to be on time to 



384 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1777. 

render such support, although only about a mile from Paoli, and his 
misfortune drove them to a retreat in partial disorder. The succeed- 
ing manoeuvers of the armies were respectively affected by the affair 
at Paoli. The pressure was taken off the rear of Howe's army, and 
he moved on. Washington says: "They had got so far the start 
before I received certain intelligence that any considerable number 
had crossed, that I found it in vain to think of overtaking their rear 
with troops harassed as ours had been with constant marching since 
the battle of Brandywine." 

*' One thousand of his army were bare-footed," and Colonel Hamil- 
ton was sent to Philadelphia to force a contribution of shoes from the 
inhabitants. A small portion of the British left crossed at Gordon's 
Ford on the twenty-second, and the main body at Flatland Ford, near 
Valley Forge, on the twenty-third, reaching Germantown on the 
twenty-fifth. On the twenty-seventh Cornwallis entered Philadelphia. 
Colonel Sterling, of the British army, was moved across the Delaware 
to operate against its defenses, including the works at Mud Island 
and Red Bank, and the fleet of Admiral Howe was already en route 
for the same destination. 

There was no rest for either army ; and the occupation of Phila- 
delphia was attended by immediate results which showed that the 
war was nearer its close, through that occupation. 

Congress adjourned to Lancaster, and subsequently to York. 
The powers of Washington were somewhat enlarged, and a peremptory 
order was sent to Putnam, who was all the time attempting ill-con- 
sidered attempts upon the British outposts near New York, to send 
twenty-five hundred troops without delay, to reinforce W^ashington's 
army, and that he must "so use militia, that the posts in the High- 
lands might be perfectly safe." Application was also made to General 
Gates for the return of Morgan's corps ; but they were not sent to the 
headquarters of the army until after the close of the Northern Cam- 
paign. 

General Howe had been one month in marching fifty-four miles, 
from the head of the Elk to Philadelphia. His headquarters were at 
Germantown. 

This village, six miles from Philadelphia, was built upon a single 
street, the old Skippach road, nearly or quite two miles in length, 
bearing slightly west of north, as indicated on the map " Battle of Ger- 
mantown." This map, so far as the positions of the British troops are 
indicated, is compiled from that of Lieutenant Hill, assisting engineer, 



1777] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 385 

of the British Twenty-third regiment, and while indicating their modi- 
fied positions shortly after the action began,, is accepted as the best. 
The additions made afford a fair estimate of the successive stages of 
the battle. 

The street is not straight ; so that there is at no single point a 
complete range for fire throughout its entire extent. Neither is it on 
a uniform or continuous grade so that guns stationed at Mount Airy, 
or near the Street Railway station (as occupied in January, 1876,) and 
trained down the hill, could have a clear sweep unobstructed by crown- 
ing ground. In other words, troops would be at least twice under cover 
in moving through the town. From the Old School-house lane there 
is another gradual rise on the road leading to Philadelphia. Beyond 
Mount Airy, northward, is another declining slope, soon taken up by 
the ascent of Chestnut Hill, still further on. A few small alleys, or 
openings, projected east and west for a few rods from the main street, 
and several of the old buildings of the era under notice, were in very 
well preserved condition at the beginning of 1876, the Centennial year 
of American Independence. In addition to the Skippach road, the 
town was approached from the northeast by the Lime-kiln road 
which entered the village by the Market House, and by the old York 
road which entered the Philadelphia road some distance below. A 
fourth road, called the Manatawney or Ridge road, came from the 
upper Schuylkill country, and was located between that river and Wis- 
sahickon creek. 

The British camp crossed the town on the general line of School- 
house lane and the Lime-kiln road, passing the Market-house. 

The left was commanded by Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, and 
the troops in his camp, until the action came on, consisted of seven 
British and three Hessian battalions, and the mounted and dis- 
mounted chasseurs. Generals Stirn, Grey and Agnew were in this 
command, although General Stirn seems to have been subsequently 
transferred to the right of the road. This force had General Grant on 
the right, where the guards, six battalions of British troops and two 
squadrons of dragoons were encamped ; there being no distinct centre, 
other than the location of the street crossings, to the south of which, 
within half a mile, General Howe had his headquarters and personal 
guard. 

The chasseurs rested on the Schuylkill, a little advanced, as a 
picket guard ; and on the first alarm the two battalions of Minnigerode 
were detailed to their support. The first battalion of light infantry 
25 



386 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1777. 

was slightly advanced from the extreme right, and the Queen's ranger*^ 
were thrown beyond the Old York road to anticipate an attempt t(, 
turn the right. 

The Forty-ninth British regiment was pushed up Frankford creek 
after the action began, and some sharp skirmishing ensued near 
Lucan's Mill, upon Greene's advance. At the head of the street, a 
mile from the Market-house, the Second battalion of light infantry 
was posted with advanced pickets, supported by the Fortieth regiment 
which was on the slope westward, out of the main street, where it 
commanded a clear view of the country up Wissahickon creek. As 
the narrative will disclose the fact that the extreme, or rather, the 
detached wings of the American army failed to touch, or even to 
approach, the corresponding wings of the British army, it is proper to 
notice, in this connection, the fact that the British reinforcements sent 
to the left wing (where the chasseurs were advanced) were withdrawn 
when the action became general, but did not participate in the 
battle; and the Hessian grenadiers did not accompany General Grey 
when he made his subsequent advance movement into the village 
itself. The Third and Fourth brigades marched obliquely forward to 
the right, crossing before the regiments of Du Corps and Donop, which 
had been designated to support the Fourth brigade; but these regi- 
ments, General Howe states, did not participate in the action. 

General Cornwallis, early apprised of the American attack by the 
artillery firing near the Chew house, brought up two British battalions, 
one of Hessian grenadiers "on the run," and one squadron of dra- 
goons, and joined General Grey in pursuit of the column of General 
Greene after the general action was over. 

General Howe on the right, with Generals Grant and Knyphau- 
sen to his left, made their advance in a concave order, almost envelop- 
ing Generals Sullivan and Greene, who had converged toward the 
Market-house when the tide of battle turned in British favor. 

General Howe states in his Narrative that " he was not surprised :" 
— that, " the enemy's approach was discovered by our patrols and I 
had early notice of it. The line was presently under arms, and 
although it must be admitted that the outposts and light infantry in 
one quarter, were driven back, it must be equally admitted that they 
were soon effectually supported, and the enemy was repulsed at the 
only place where the smallest impression was made." 

Sir George Osborne, in his testimony before the Committee of the 
House of Commons, states, that he " received from General Howe, 



1777.] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 38/ 

who was accompanied by his aid-de-camp, only the nic^ht before, the 
order to move on with the grenadiers and light infantry of the guards 
to Major Simcoe's post, about half a mile in front of the line of infantry, 
as I might expect the enemy at daybreak next morning." This offi- 
cer adds, " The firing of the enemy on the morning of the attack began 
exactly, or near the time that Sir William Howe acquainted me the 
night before, it would do." 

Washington's camp was near Pennebeck Mill, twenty miles from 
Philadelphia. Two-thirds of his army participated in the movement 
upon Germantown. His plan was to occupy the four roads which 
more or less directly approached General Howe's position, and to make 
the march in time, first to bring all the divisions into approximate 
positions, then to give them rest, and make a combined attack at 
daybreak. 

The troops left camp at seven o'clock on the evening of the third, 
passed Metuchen Hill about nine o'clock, and all the divisions which 
accompanied Washington reached their halting places, obtained their 
rest, and made the attack on time. 

Sullivan and Wayne, with Conway in advance acting as a flanking 
corps, were to move directly over Chestnut Hill and enter the town. 

Maxwell and Nash, under Major-general Stirling, were to follow 
this column in reserve. 

General Armstrong with the Pennsylvania militia was sent down 
the Manatawny road to cross the Wissahickon creek, and fall upon 
the British left wing and rear. 

Greene and Stephen, led and flanked by McDougall's brigade, 
were to move by the lime-kiln road, enter the village at the Market- 
house, and attack the British right wing. 

Generals Smallwood and Forman with the Maryland and New 
Jersey militia were to follow the Old York road until a convenient 
opportunity should bring them upon the extreme right flank and rear 
of the enemy. 

Washington accompanied Sullivan's division. A simplification of 
the subsequent movements, by parts, will aid in reconciling conflicting 
statements. No attempt to reconcile reports exactly would aid in 
the matter ; as in all human experience a diversity of statement, ac- 
cording to the standpoint of observation, is invariable, and truth is 
found in the main features of the combined reports. 

General Conway led the way into the town, and attacked the British 
pickets who were stationed north, and not very far from the Allen 



388 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1777. 

House. This advance picket guard was promptly supported by the 
British light infantry. 

General Sullivan brought up his division next, and crowded the 
enemy beyond the Allen House. 

The FortietJi British regiment, Colonel Musgrave, moved up to the 
support of the light infantry as indicated on the map; and according 
to his report, finding that the position was already occupied by Ameri- 
can troops in force, he retired down the main street fighting, and took 
his stand east of the street at the Chew House, a stone building of 
considerable strength on a crowning site. Up to this time nothing 
had been heard from the corps of Armstrong or Greene ; and the dis- 
position of the centre had to be made independently of their coopera- 
tion, and was modified to suit the state of facts. 

Conway was thrown out to the right, on the slope west of the town, 
to protect that flank while Sullivan and Nash could sweep on in a line, 
also west of the street, towards the Market-house. The extreme 
advance of Sullivan is noted on the map, to be considered irrespective 
of intervening incidents in point of time, so as to dispose of the force 
division by division, and avoid confusion. 

Wayne was ordered by Sullivan to take the slope (as Greene did 
not occupy his designated position there) east from the main street, 
and his extreme advance is also noted ; although he was for a time 
recalled during the firing at the Chew House. One regiment from 
Wayne's brigade, and one from Sullivan's division, however, were also 
placed with Conway to protect the right flank, as the protracted delay 
of Armstrong endangered the advance. The whole movement 
through a narrow town was one of peculiar exposure. The troops of 
Sullivan and Wayne passed on " abreast," according to the report of 
the former officer. Meanwhile, Musgrave on his retreat, had thrown 
six companies of the Fortieth regiment into the Chew House, had 
barricaded the window, refused to surrender on demand, and kept up 
a vigorous fire upon the American troops near by; while Sullivan 
says that " his own advance, which had swept past the Chew House, 
was resisted constantly at every fence, wall, ditch, and hedge." Ad- 
ditional delay occurred from tearing up fences for the passage of 
horses and artillery. 

Maxzvell was next brought forward with Colonel Knox, and two 
guns, to attempt the reduction of the Chew House. Musgrave suc- 
cessfully resisted this attack, and kept them from advance to support 
the other troops for a full hour or more. 



[777-1 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 3S9 

Upon the arrival of Maxwell, Wayne, temporarily recalled as before 
stated, again moved to the front, making on the left a common advance 
with that of Sullivan which was on the right of the town. 

More than an hour certainly had passed ; the division commanders 
differing, as their minds were differently impressed, when Greene was 
heard front. 

His division shared the misapprehension which attended the dis- 
charge of artillery at the Chew House, as the deepening fog already 
confused sight and confounded sound. General Stephen s division 
moved out of column, being on the west side of the Lime-kiln road, 
without waiting for orders from General Greene, followed the noise of 
battle, and approached the village just south of the Chew House. 
Here, unfortunately, he struck the rear of Wayne's brigade, and mutual 
loss was incurred by each mistaking the other for an enemy ; and 
their part in the action was practically terminated. As Greene ad- 
vanced on the east side of the Lime-kiln road, and bore toward the 
Market-house, he was obliged to countermarch and take ground to 
the right, westward, to avoid the extension of the British right wing, 
which was already advancing to envelop the American troops. He 
cleared his division, passed inside of the enemy, and with Scott's and 
Muhlenberg's brigades approached the Market-house. Colonel Mat- 
thews, of Virginia, who led the advance, had skirmished all the way 
from Lucan's Mill, and had taken a detachment of light infantry 
prisoners. It will be seen by another reference to the map, that 
Washington, Sullivan, and Greene, were now converging upon the 
supposed British centre, and that their action was in accordance with 
the original plan of attack, crippled in its execution by the absence of 
the columns which should have been at work upon the British flanks 
and rear, and embarrassed by various incidents which had placed the 
commands of Maxwell, Stephen, and Wayne out of close communi- 
cation, and also by the dense fog which left the reserve in utter con- 
fusion as to the positions of the troops in advance. It was, however, 
united in the resistance, when Washington ordered the retreat. Sul- 
livan's division really had extra assignment of duty ; expended all its 
ammunition, and began to feel the pressure of the British left as it 
swept along their flank, while also attacking their front. His two aids- 
de-camp. Majors Sherbourne and White were killed, as well as Gen- 
eral Nash, and the column gave back, not a little disturbed in its for- 
mation by exaggerated rumors of losses elsewhere. Colonel Matthews 
also was soon enveloped ; a portion of his men were captured and his 



390 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [i777. 

prisoners were rescued. The retreat became general, and the activity 
of a powerful and almost invisible enemy quickened that retreat. 

The artillery was brought off safely and the troops of Wayne and 
Greene covered the forces as they retired through town and by the 
Lime-kiln road. 

The conduct of General Stephen was submitted to a military 
court and he was dismissed on the charge of intoxication. The col- 
lision of his division with the brigade of Wayne does not necessarily 
involve his censure, as Wayne was in an unanticipated position by 
reason of the delay in the arrival of the left wing. 

General Greene's tardiness was incident to the longer route taken, 
the check at Lucan's Mill, and the nature of the country ; and possibly 
by the sudden action of Stephen in abruptly leaving his command. 
General McDougall shared the retreat, but gained no laurels. Gen- 
eral Armstrong states in his letters to General Gates and others, that 
" we were cannonading from the heights on each side of the Wissa- 
hickon," " was called to join the General " " we proceeded some three 
miles, directed by a slow fire of cannon, until we fell in with a superior 
body of the enemy, with whom we engaged about three-quarters of 
an hour, but their grape shot and ball soon intimidated and obliged us 
to retreat, or rather file off," "loss not quite twenty." 

The affair at the Chew House was a material issue in the battle, 
only as it kept troops to the rear ; and a prompt concert of action on 
the part of all the troops on duty, according to the original order of 
the day, would probably have realized success, without the aid of Max- 
well's command. It was a diversion, which had its chief imiportance 
through the erroneous impressions it gave of the positions of the con- 
tending armies. 

It is not a correct statement that the whole army halted, to its 
prejudice, " rather than leave ^fort in its rear." 

Colonel Knox reported that " the action lasted two hours and 
forty minutes, by his watch ; " and the watch is to be credited with 
this information. 

The British army without doubt was seriously embarrassed, if not 
partially disordered by the suddenness and persistency of the advance, 
and was satisfied with the result. 

Washington regained Metuchen Hill ; and General Howe returned 
to Philadelphia. 

The British casualties were reported at five hundred and thirty- 
five, including General Agnew and Lieutenant-colonel Bird. 



I777-] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 39 1 

The American casualties were six hundred and seventy-three, 
besides prisoners, estimated at four hundred, and many missing, some 
of wliom afterwards regained camp. 

Washington's officers had been divided in opinion as to the 
prudence of this attack until additional troops could be procured ; 
but there are few operations of the war that show greater skill in 
design, and the ease with which a victory almost achieved is more 
readily lost, than the Battle of Germantown. 



CHAPTER LII. 

OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. MINOR MENTION. CLOSE OF 

CAMPAIGN, 1777. 

THE battle of Germantown which demonstrated the tireless 
activity and nerve of Washington, incited foolish expectations 
that he would soon rescue Philadelphia from British control. When- 
ever the promise of success enlivened the public spirits, there was an 
instant tendency to over-estimate the value of mere courage as against 
thorough discipline. Nothing seemed too exacting at such times ; 
and Congress had so much sympathy with clamorous aspirants for 
office, that the life of Washington is more memorable for his calm 
faith in ultimate results and the dignity of his contempt for jealousy 
and intrigue, from whatever source it emanated, than for almost any 
other quality. 

The consciousness of unselfish devotion to duty bore him up, 
when the spirit of mere ambition would have driven many leaders 
toward a dictatorship, or treason. The tidings of the surrender of 
Burgoyne reached him on the eighteenth of October, and no one in 
America more cordially congratulated General Gates and the North- 
ern army, upon the result. The secondary fruits of the personal 
honors bestowed upon that officer were however prejudicial to army 
discipline ; for they put the impressive result of that campaign in con- 
trast with the slow, so-called " Fabian policy," of the Commander-in- 
chief. This spirit of exacting criticism, and laudation of conspicuous 
deeds, which became so earnest during the winter of 1777-8 began to 
declare its temper as soon as it was understood that Washington 
only almost defeated Howe at Germantown. The thanks for that 
which was skillfully devised, soon cooled because the plan failed of 
complete fruition. 

That battle, however, satisfied the British garrison of Philadelphia 







CO.* 



I777-] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELnilA. 393 

with immediate field service. The next matter of importance was to 
obtain control of the navigable river which ran past the post. Its 
channel was obstructed ; and the American authorities regarded those 
obstructions as substantially complete. 

In a necessary notice of the closing events of 1777, the reduction 
of those posts, and the movements of the army until it went into 
winter quarters at Valley Forge, follow in natural order. 

At Billingsport in New Jersey (Byllinges Point) chcvaux dc frise 
obstructed the channel of the Delaware. Just below the mouth of the 
Schuylkill, and within cannon range, was Mud Island, upon which 
Fort Mifflin had been built. Its defenses were chiefly directed 
toward the approach from the Delaware below ; and the rear was 
provided with only a stockade and ditch, with two block houses of 
comparatively little strength. 

On the opposite shore, known as Red Bank, Fort Mercer was 
located ; and this also was mainly designed for river defense. The 
southern portion was separated from the northern section by stout 
palisades, a ditch, and a rampart, so as to have considerable strength; 
but the activity of Monseur Duplessis, engineer in charge, had been 
unequal to the complete protection of the larger area, at the time 
when the British demonstration was made for its capture. Chevaux 
de frise had also been placed in the channel between Red bank and 
Mud Island ; and several galleys and floating batteries, under the 
direction of Commander Hazlewood, were located in the stream for 
cooperation in defense. 

The acquisition of these posts, and the removal of all obstructions 
to the navigation of the river, had been resolved upon by General 
Howe ; and the arrival of Admiral Lord Howe's fleet off New Castle, 
about the sixth of October, increased the urgency of a movement to 
secure free communication between that fleet and the city. 

Washington was as decided in his purpose to maintain these posts. 
His position in the country exercised a marked restraint upon supplies 
for the garrison of Philadelphia, and his control of the river kept up 
easy communication with New Jersey. 

Colonel Christopher Greene, already noticed for courage at Bunker 
Hill and in Arnold's expedition to Quebec, was assigned to the defense 
of Fort Mercer, with a detachment of troops from Rhode Island, his 
native State. Lieutenant- colonel Smith of Baltimore, with ^Maryland 
troops, was stationed at Fort Mifflin. These garrisons were feeble in 
numbers, and well worn by extra duty ; but Washington reinforced 



394 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1777. 

them with Continental troops, so that each had a complement of four 
hundred men. A detail from Angell's Rhode Island regiment was 
sent to Fort Mercer, and a portion of Greene's Virginia regiment 
joined the garrison of Fort Mifflin. 

The land at the mouth of the Schuylkill was marshy, leaving but 
two points sufficiently solid for batteries ; and these General Howe 
occupied. Two light redoubts were then thrown up on the northern 
part of Mud Island, which was low and grown with reeds, as an offset 
to these batteries. 

The first demonstration in force was made against Fort Mercer. 
The grenadier regiments of Donop, Minnigerode, and Linsing, Win- 
bach's regiment of the line, and the infantry chasseurs, all Hessian, 
having their own guns, viz. eight three pounders and two British 
howitzers, were detailed to this attack ; while the naval forces of 
Admiral Howe were relied upon to act in concert with new batteries 
then being erected on Province Island, opposite Fort Mifflin, on the 
Pennsylvania shore. 

On the first of October, Colonel Sterling crossed the river, and 
without serious opposition occupied Billingsport ; and the Roebuck 
frigate broke through the cJicvaux dc /rise at that point, making a 
passage wide enough to admit larger ships. 

Colonel Donop crossed Cooper's Ferry, at Philadelphia, on the 
twenty-first of October, was interrupted by skirmishing parties at 
Timber creek, but early on the following morning suddenly emerged 
from the woods and demanded of the garrison the immediate sur- 
render of the post. 

Upon receiving an unequivocal defiance, he organized two assaulting 
columns for simultaneous advance against the north and south faces 
of the fort. The garrison being too few in numbers to oppose his 
whole force, in the unfinished state of the exterior works, retired to 
the interior defenses ; occupying also a curtain of the old works, which 
afforded an enfilading fire upon any storming party who should attempt 
the stockade. The withdrawal of the garrison was mistaken for want 
of confidence in resistance ; and the assault was made with spirit and 
a brilliant dash, as if success were already assured. 

That resistance was overwhelming, incessant, and deadly. Colo- 
nel Donop fell mortally wounded, and near him Lieutenant-colonel 
Minnigerode. The casualties of the assailants exceeded four hundred, 
being one-third of their number. The last attempt was made at the 
escarpment near the river, which exposed the column to fire from the 



I777-] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 395 

galleys; and in less than an hour from the first attack, the Hessians 

were in retreat. 

The British ships accomplished nothing. The Augusta 64, and 

the Merlin, frigate, grounded ; and the following day the former took 

fire from a hot shot and blew up before her whole crew could escape, 

while the Merlin was burnt to prevent her capture. 

The American casualties were fourteen killed and twenty-one 

wounded. 

Colonel Donop was carefully attended by Major Fleury, a French 

engineer in the American service, and his burial place at the south 

end of the old works is ever an object of interest to visitors. 

Colonel Greene, Lieutenant-colonel Smith, and Commodore Hazle- 

wood received testimonials from Congress for " gallant conduct." 

During the action, the batteries at the mouth of the Schuylkill 

directed their fire upon Fort Mifflin ; but with slight result. 

On the tenth of November, a deliberate attempt upon that fort 
resulted in its capture. Four thirty-two pounder guns were withdrawn 
from the Somerset ; six twenty-four pounders from the Eagle, and 
these, with one thirteen inch mortar, were added to the works which 
had been erected on Province Island, to bring a more direct fire upon 
the fort than could be secured from the batteries at the mouth of the 
Schuylkill. The following ships, some of which are familiar from their 
services at Boston, Quebec, and New York, took part in the action, 
viz., the Somerset, 68, the Isis, 50, the Roebuck, 44, the Pearl, 32, the 
Liverpool, frigate, the Cornwallis, galley, and several smaller vessels. 
The Vigilant, 16, and a hulk of light draft, carrying three eighteen 
pounders, took a position in the channel between Province Island and 
the fort, and sharp-shooters from their tops picked off the gunners 
with great precision. Commodore Hazlewood was urged to assail 
them, but so utterly failed to cooperate with the garrison, as to more 
than balance his good conduct before Red Bank. Lieutenant-colonel 
Smith, wounded early in the action, was removed to Fort Mercer. 
Major Thayer succeeded to the command. Major Fleury, the en- 
gineer who planned the works, was also wounded ; and after a loss of 
two hundred and fifty men, the remnant of the garrison, on the night 
of the fifteenth, retired to P"ort Mercer. 

The British loss was thirteen killed and twenty-four wounded. 
At dawn of the sixteenth, the grenadiers of the Royal Guards occu- 
pied the island. 

During the m.ovements preparatory to this attack. General Wash- 



39^ OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1777- 

ington ordered General Varnum's brigade to take post at Woodbury, 
near Red Bank ; and General Forman was also directed to collect as 
many of the New Jersey militia as possible for the same purpose ; but 
no attempt was made by the. British to land upon the New Jersey 
shore. 

In Washington's report of this action to Congress, he says, " The 
defense will always reflect the highest honor upon the officers and 
men of the garrison. The works were entirely beat down ; every 
piece of cannon was dismounted, and one of the enemy's ships came 
so near that she threw grenades into the fort and killed men upon 
the platforms, from her tops, before they quitted the island," 

On the eighteenth. General Cornwallis landed at Billingsport in 
force ; but although General Washington sent General Greene to take 
command of the troops in New Jersey and check his progress, the 
demonstration was so formidable that the garrison abandoned the 
works on his approach. 

The Americans, unable to save their galleys and other armed ves- 
sels, set fire to them near Gloucester Point ; and the British forces had 
at last removed the obstructions of the Delaware. 

Reference is made to the map " Philadelphia and Vicinity,'' and 
'' Operations on the Delaware." 

During this movement, the Marquis de La Fayette was intrusted 
by Greene, with a detachment of troops consisting of ten light horse, 
one hundred and fifty riflemen and a few militia. 

Colonels Armand and Launney and the Chevalier Duplessis and 
Gimat were also with him. While on a scout toward Red Bank in the 
rear of the army of Cornwallis, he fell in with a Hessian force of three 
hundred and fifty men having artillery, and drove them back upon 
their supports. After several narrow escapes he eluded pursuit, and 
joined General Greene via Haddonfield, with a loss of only one man 
killed and six wounded. On the first of December he was assigned 
to the command of the division left vacant by the dismissal of 
Stephen. 

At the same time four general officers of Washington's army, 
against eleven, voted to take advantage of the absence of General 
Cornwallis from Philadelphia to attack General Howe. 

The American army had remained near Perkiomy creek until late 
in October, when it advanced to White Marsh. General Varnum's 
Rhode Island brigade twelve hundred strong, and about a thousand 
additional troops from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia had 




39a* 



1777.] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 397 

arrived. Generals Gates and Putnam unadvisedly retained troops for 
their semi-independent commands ; and the former only grudgingly 
sent such as were peremptorily ordered. He had already taken active 
part in movements which reflected upon Washington as Commander- 
in-chief, and it required the personal visit of Colonel Hamilton, before 
he would dispatch the troops which were absolutely indispensable at 
headquarters, and as absolutely useless at Albany. The history of 
the "Conway Cabal" is omitted ; but the general fact is noteworthy, 
as it furnished to the British commander an element of strength, in 
proportion as it weakened the army and influence of Washington. 

On the fourth of December General Howe, with a force of fourteen 
thousand men and accompanied by Lieutenant-generals Cornwallis 
and Knyphausen advanced to Chestnut Hill, within three miles of the 
right of the American army, and on the fifth advanced the Second 
battalion and part of the First light infantry battalion, under Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Abercrombie, to feel the position. A sharp skirmish 
ensued, to the disadvantage of the Americans, resulting in the capture 
of General James Irvine, and a small loss to both parties. 

On the seventh, the British army left Chestnut Hill and took a 
position on Edge Hill, near the American left. General Morgan, 
only just arrived from the Northern department, with his corps, and 
the Maryland militia under Colonel Mordecai Gist, had " a sharp con- 
flict with the First battalion of light infantry, and Thirty-third regiment 
under General Cornwallis, resulting in a loss to the Americans of forty- 
four, and at least an equal loss to the British troops. Major-general 
Grey and the Queen's Rangers, the Hessian chasseurs and one brigade 
of British regulars made some impression upon the left wing, inflict- 
ing a loss of about fifty men : and both armies prepared for a general 
action, the British pickets having been advanced within half a mile of 
the American lines. 

General Howe says, in his report of December thirteenth, " Upon 
the presumption that a forward movement might tempt the enemy, 
after receiving such a reinforcement (reported afterwards of four thou- 
sand men) to give battle for the recovery of this place (Philadelphia) 
or that a vulnerable part might be found to admit of an attack upon 
their camp, the army marched out on the night of the fourth inst." 

General Washington says, " I sincerely wish that they had made 
the attack, as the issue, in all probability, from the disposition of our 
troops and the strong position of our camp, would have been fortunate 
and happy. At the same time I must add, that reason, prudence and 



3C8 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [i777- 

every principle of policy, forbade us quitting our post to attack them. 
Nothing but success would have justified the measure ; and this could 
not be expected from their position." 

On the eighth General Howe abandoned his camp and returned 
to Philadelphia, 

The army of Washington, nominally eleven thousand strong, is 
stated by Baron De Kalb to have had at that time but seven thou- 
sand effective men present for duty; so general was the sickness, 
owing to the extreme cold and the want of suitable clothing and other 
necessaries of a campaign. 

There were not wanting officers, as well as leading civilians, who 
persistently pressed an immediate attempt to recapture Philadelphia. 

Of the officers most officiously antagonistic to Washington, several 
were placed in high positions by Congress. 

On the sixth of November Wilkinson, aid-de-camp of Gates, had 
been made Brigadier-general ; and on the twenty-seventh Gates was 
made President of the Board of War. Mifflin, withdrawn from his 
duties as Quartermaster-general, but retaining his rank as Major-gen- 
eral, was also placed on the Board. 

On the twenty-eighth of December, Congress appointed Conway 
Inspector-general and Major-general, and placed him in communication 
with the Board of War, to act independently of the Commander-in- 
chief. Lee, then a prisoner at New York, through letters, united with 
Gates, Mifflin, Wayne and Conway, to oppose Washington's policy and 
dictate his action ; and more than that, there was a strong influence 
thereby exerted to compel his resignation or removal. 

On the nineteenth of December Washington went into winter 
quarters at Valley Forge, twenty-one miles from Philadelphia. On 
the same day, a detachment under General Smallvvood was sent to 
Wilmington to occupy the country south of Philadelphia to control 
supplies for that city, and to be generally useful in that quarter. 
McDougall was at Peekskill, and Putnam was on the shore of Long 
Island Sound near New York until nearly the middle of December, 
when he was ordered back to the Highlands. 

The absence of Mifflin from the army and his neglect of his duties 
as Quartermaster-general, caused the " want of two days' supply of pro- 
visions ; and thereby cost," said Washington, "an opportunity scarce- 
ly ever offered of taking an advantage of the enemy." Washington 
reported, December twcntj--third, that " two thousand eight hundred 
and ninety-eight men wcio unfit for duty, because barefoot and other- 




3!)8* 



1777-] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 399 

wise naked." " The numbers had decreased two thousand, from 
hardships and exposure in three weeks," (from the fourth of Decem- 
ber.) "Only eight thousand two hundred men were present fit for 
duty," adding, " we have not more than three months in which to 
prepare a great deal of business. If we let them slip, or waste, we 
shall be laboring under the same difficulties all next campaign as we 
have been this, to rectify mistakes and bring things to order. Mili- 
tary arrangements and movements, in consequence, like the mechan- 
ism of a clock, will be imperfect and disordered by the want of a 
part." 

To the remonstrances of the Assembly of Pennsylvania and others 
against his going into winter quarters, he says, " Gentlemen reprobate 
the going into winter quarters as much as if they thought the soldiers 
were made of sticks, or stones. I can assure those gentlemen that it 
is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a 
comfortable room, than to occupy a cold bleak hill, and sleep under 
frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they 
seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel 
superabundantly for them, and from my soul I pity their miseries 
which it is neither in my power to relieve or prevent." 

On the twenty-sixth of December, General Sullivan, who appa- 
rently kept aloof from active participation in the movements of 
intriguing officers, urged Washington to make an attempt upon Phila- 
delphia, and ' risk every consequence in an action." 

Nothing moved Washington to depart from his matured plans, 
and on the thirty-first of December, 1777, his army was still building 
huts and struggling for life at Valley Forge. 

De Kalb had been made Inspector-general the day before, vice 
Conway resigned. 

During the year thus closed, the American privateers and vessels 
had made nearly four hundred captures, and Commodore Nicholas 
Biddle had gained great credit in handling the Randolph frigate in its 
disastrous collision with the Yarmouth 64. A brief resume of the 
disposition of the American ships of war built during the struggle, will 
be found at the close of the campaign of 1781. 

The two events of the campaign of 1777, which made the p. 
foundest impression upon European States, were the surrender Oi 
Burgoyne and the battle of Gerinantown. News of the former occur- 
rence reached London on the second of December. The language of 
Fox was eminently wise : " If no better terms can be had, I would 



4CX) OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [i777. 

treat with them as allies ; nor do I fear the consequence of their inde- 
pendence." With sarcastic wit, he alleged that " the ministry had 
mistaken the extent of the colonies, and considered Massachusetts as 
including the whole." 

It was evident that the seed sown by the employment of Euro- 
pean mercenaries, as predicted by the Duke of Richmond (page 172), 
would bear unexpected fruit, and that America would find in France 
abundant aid. The previous purchase of arms had not been kept 
secret, and it was evident that only an occasion was wanting for an 
open declaration of sympathy with the United States. 

The Duke of Richmond again advocated peace, and on the terms 
of " Independence, and such an alliance or federal union as would be 
for the mutual interests of both countries." Lord North, already 
worn out in his country's service, and Burke, were solemnly impressed 
with the conviction that " peace upon any honorable terms was in 
justice due to both nations." 

The king unwisely adjourned Parliament to the twentieth of 
January. 

A ship from Boston made a quick passage to France, and the 
news from America made a profound sensation at Paris. At an inter- 
view of the American Commissioners with Count de Vergennes, Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, on the twelfth of December, that gentleman 
in speaking of the report of the battle of Germantown, just received, 
said, " Nothing has struck me so much as General Washington attack- 
ing and giving battle to General flowe's army. To bring troops, 
raised within the year, to do this, promises everything." Couriers 
were sent to Spain to solicit her cooperation, as already, without real 
sympathy with America, she had discriminated in favor of American 
privateers which took prizes to her ports. Without waiting for reply, 
on the seventeenth of December, just when Washington was about 
conducting his weary and well worn army to their winter huts, for 
partial shelter and rest ; while his own spirit was pained by the small 
jealousies which impaired the value of his services, and threatened the 
harmony of his command, there was warming up across the ocean a 
new ally and friend, and the power and prestige of France were 
about to drop into the scales for the vindication and accomplishment 
of American liberty. On that day Gerard, one of the secretaries of 
Count de Vergennes, informed Franklin and Dean by the king's order, 
that " the king in council had determined, not only to acknowledge, but 
to support American Independence." 



CHAPTER LIII. 

OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA FROM JANUARY TO JUNE, 1778. 
VALLEY FORGE. BARREN HILL. 

THE American army wintered at Valley Forge, and did not 
materially change its position until the evacuation of Philadel- 
phia in June ensuing. 

The months were full of self-sacrifice and real suffering on the part 
of the troops ; while the British army enjoyed a considerable share 
of city comfort and social entertainment. One army lived in huts, 
and depended upon forced contributions from the country people for 
their scanty food, until Washington shrank from so arbitrary an exer- 
cise of necessary authority ; while the other army had good quarters, 
abundant clothing, and such food and fuel as money could purchase 
in a restricted market. One army was drilling daily under Baron 
Steuben, to learn the rudiments of military service, so far as shoes 
and clothing could be provided ; while their comrades sat or lay down 
by burning stumps and logs to escape freezing to death. The other 
army, according to Stedman and contemporaneous historians, enli- 
vened the dull times with the dance-house, the theatre and " the game 
of faro. 

One of General Howe's inactive intervals had arrived. Philadel- 
phia, resting on a sufficient fleet, was not treated 2.'s> 2, base of opera- 
tions, but as snug and agreeable winter quarters. The chief activities 
of war were suspended. The license which an idle garrison life invari- 
ably evokes, began to arouse popular hatred ; and the conduct of 
many commissioned officers was as blameworthy as that of the troops. 

The occupation of the city, instead of a camp in the field, actually 
restricted all valuable field service ; because a sufficient garrison had 
to be retained to ward off attack. The scouting parties from Wash- 
ington's camp, even at midwinter, gave warning that he was alive and 
watchful ; while their continual success in cutting off supplies from 
26 



402 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1778. 

the country as clearly indicated that the military occupation was 
simply within its picket lines. 

General Howe stated, that he " did not attack the intrenched sit- 
uation at Valley Forge, a strong point during the severe season, 
although everything was prepared with that intention, judging it 
imprudent until the season should afford a prospfect of reaping the 
advantages that ought to have resulted from success in that measure, 
but having good information in the spring that the enemy had strength- 
ened the camp by additional works, and being certain of moving him 
from thence, when the campaign should open, he dropped thoughts 
of an attack." 

Reference is made to map " Encampment at Valley Forge," copied 
substantially from that of Sparks, for an outline of the defensive 
position of Washington. 

After the camp was occupied, it seemed as if the quasi antagonism 
to the Commander-in-chief began to fade out, month by month. It 
drew no breath from popular sympathy, and in spite of sickness, death, 
wretchedness and desertion, the soldiers were kept to duty and ac- 
quired toughness and spirit for future endeavor. A calm reliance 
upon the future, a strong will, and a straightforward method of deal- 
ing with men and measures, vindicated Washington's fitness for the 
supreme command. 

During this period a diversion into Canada was proposed with 
General La Fayette in chief command. That officer accompanied by 
General the Baron De Kalb,and about twenty French officers, went as 
far as Albany, to inspect the preparations said to have been made for 
the expedition. 

The army of General Gates had been previously withdrawn, and 
these officers found that less than a thousand effective men had been 
concentrated, and that neither clothing, provisions, nor transportation 
had been furnished. Generals Conway and Stark were also assigned 
on this duty. To the latter was intrusted the destruction of the 
British vessels at St. John's, and three thousand troops had been 
pledged for La Fayette's advance, and reported by General Gates as 
disposable. Stark could only send back the inquiry, " What am I to 
do ? " " And what troops am I expected to raise ? " He had nothing 
to do with, and this winter enterprise, initiated by the Board of War 
and approved by Congress, culminated in failure even to organize. 

La Fayette was not yet twenty-one years of age, and at first felt 
some enthusiasm in an attempt to make the conquest of Canada, the 




402* 



tyyS.] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 403 

former possession of France ; but independently of the summary 
severance of his connection with Washington, which was made with- 
out consulting the Commander-in-chief, he soon discovered the folly 
of the enterprise. 

During January a committee from Congress visited Washington at 
Valley Forge, and obtained some idea of his condition and necessities. 
On their return they recommended the adoption of his suggestions 
for the thorough reorganization of the army, both militia and regular, 
in respect of all elements of enlistment, outfit, and supply. Skirmish- 
ing was frequent as well as forays in pursuit of horses ; and yet the 
men themselves did the greater part of hauling logs for huts and fuel, 
and they were severely tasked to maintain life and love of life. 

The arrival of Baron Steuben on the twenty-seventh of February 
was a new element entirely, and it put the men at such work as stimu- 
lated their zeal and enhanced their confidence in their capacity to 
become soldiers. Officers and men alike were placed under the rigid 
training of this veteran martinet. He was the man for the hour ; 
and the effects of his stern discipline and exacting drill were of per- 
manent value. Although he volunteered his services, he soon received 
an appointment as Major-general, with this extraordinary bonus 
added, that it was given " without dissent or murmur." 

In April Conway resigned, and went to France. 

On the fourth, Congress authorized Washington to call upon 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey, for five thousand militia. 

On the ninth. General Howe received his recall to England, and 
began to arrange for his departure. 

On the tenth. La Fayette was again in camp. 

On the thirteenth, General McDougall, assisted by Kosciusko, was 
busy at West Point, to make it the point of resistance to any further 
movements up the Hudson. General Gates was placed in command 
at Fishkill on the fifteenth. On the fourteenth, instead of reinforce- 
ments of troops^ Lord North's Conciliatory Bills reached New York, and 
were published by Governor Tryon the next day. They maddened 
the British troops, incited mutiny, conciliated nobody and failed to 
modify the war. 

Officers of the American army began to make plans for the ensu- 
ing campaign. Various objectives were presented, and opinions 
greatly differed. It is proper to place them on record, so that other 
differences with the Commander-in-chief may be more readily left to 
their individual merits. 



404 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1778. 

Wayne, Patterson and Maxwell recommended Philadelphia ; 
Knox, Poor, Varnum and Muhlenberg advised New York; Greene 
advised an attack upon New York with four thousand regulars and 
the Eastern militia, under Washington in person, leaving Lee to com- 
mand in Pennsylvania, while the main army should remain at Valley 
Forge; Stirling proposed operations against both cities; while La 
Fayette, Steuben and Duportail had doubts as to any attack until 
the army should be strengthened, or the British army indicate its 
plans. This opinion was also that of General Washington. 

On the seventh of May the British ascended the Delaware and 
destroyed public stores at Bordentown. 

General Maxwell had been sent to their protection as soon as the 
expedition was under way, but his movements were retarded by 
heavy rains, and he failed to be in time to prevent the damage. A 
force under General Dickinson had been in that vicinity also, but it 
was too small to oppose the British troops. Several frigates and 
forty-four vessels, altogether, shared the fate of the stores. 

The seventh day of May, 177^, was not entirely a day of gloom for 
the American army, then encamped at Valley Forge. The breath of 
spring quickened nature, and the forest began to stir and bud for its 
next campaign. 

So the breath of Heaven bore a French frigate, La Sensible, 36 
guns, to Falmouth Harbor (Portland) Maine, and there landed from 
her deck a herald of France, and he proclaimed an armed alliance 
between his country and the United States. 

On the seventh of May, at nine o'clock, A. M., the American army 
was on parade. Drums beat and cannon were fired, as if for some 
victory. It was a day of jubilee, a rare occurrence for the times and 
place. 

The brigades were steady, but not brilliant in their formation. 
Uniforms were scarce. Many feet were bare. Many had no coats. 
Some wore coats made of the remnants of their winter blankets. 
The pomp and circumstance of war was wanting. Strongly marked 
faces, good muscle, and vigorous action were to be discovered ; but 
there was no such surpassing display of extrinsic splendor as enlivened 
Philadelphia, only eleven days later. 

There was no review by general officers, with a well appointed 
staff. Few matrons and few maidens looked on. There stood before 
each brigade its chaplain. God's ambassador was made the voice to 
explain this occasion of their expenditure of greatly needed powder. 



lyyS.] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 405 

The Treaty of Alliance was read, and in solemn silence the American 

army at Valley Forge united in Thanksgiving to Almighty God that 

he had given them one friend on earth. 

One theme was universal : and it flutters yet in the breasts of 

millions : 

" Praise God from whom all blessings flow." 

Huzzas for the king of France, for Washington and the Republic, 
with caps tossed high in air, and a rattling fire through the whole 
line, terminated the humble pageant. 

With the opening spring General Howe found himself constrained 
to send detachments for supplies and forage, which became scarce 
in proportion as Washington's army infested the country. Colonel 
Mawhood and Major Simcoe engaged a militia force under Colonel 
Holmes, at Quinton's Bridge near Salem, New Jersey, on the 
eighteenth of March, with little credit and little plunder. On 
the twenty-first of March another expedition, under Major Simcoe, 
accompanied by Colonel Mawhood, engaged the militia at Han- 
cock's Bridge, five miles south of Salem, and the incidents, as 
recorded in Simcoe's own Journal, are not to his credit. On the first 
of May Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, with Major Simcoe, engaged 
militia under General Lacey, at the Crooked Billet, in Montgomery, 
Pennsylvania, inflicting some loss, but gathering neither food nor 
forage. 

To cut off and restrict these detachments, Washington, on the 
eighteenth of May, advanced General La Fayette, with twenty-one 
hundred chosen troops and five pieces of artillery to Barren Hill, about 
half the distance toward Philadelphia. His orders gave him com- 
mand over all outposts and skirmishing detachments, contemplated the 
contingency of an early evacuation of Philadelphia by the British army, 
and with caution as to prudence in taking his positions and risking 
doubtful movements, conferred large authority and discretion in the 
execution of his instructions. 

It was practically a corps of observation, and it was the first really 
independent command of La Fayette, as a Major-general. The 
execution of his trust illustrates those peculiar traits of his character 
which had early attracted the favor of Washington, won his respect, 
and gradually deepened into an attachment almost paternal in its 
depth and endurance. The American Commander-in-chief, however 
reticent of his opinions, rarely failed to read men. He read La Fay- 
ette. With singular enthusiasm, great purity of character and pur- 



406 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1778. 

pose, unswerving fidelity to obligation, and thorough contempt for 
the mean or dishonorable, this young French gentleman, now Major- 
general, combined a quick sagacity, sound judgment and quick execu- 
tion. 

Reference is made to map " La Fayette at Barren Hill." The 
site for his camp was well selected. A steep, rocky ledge was. on the 
right toward the Schuylkill as well as to the front where his guns were 
placed. Captain McLean's light troops and fifty Indian scouts were 
just below, near the Ridge road, and pickets were still further advanced 
on the road and in the woods. To the left was a dense forest, and 
just on its edge there were several stone houses well capable of defense. 
Six hundred Pennsylvania militia under General Porter were posted 
on the Whitemarsh road. The sudden retreat of this body without 
notice or reporting their action, very nearly involved his command in 
a conflict with more than double its force. At the forks of the two 
roads there was a stone church in a burying ground which was 
inclosed by a stone fence ; and La Fayette established his headquar- 
ters close by. 

General Clinton had already relieved General Howe from the 
command at Philadelphia. Five thousand British troops were ordered 
to surprise the American camp at Barren Hill, and Generals Grant 
and Erskine were associated in the attempt. This command marched 
early on the morning of May nineteenth by the Lime-kiln and old 
York roads, and very early the next morning passed Whitemarsh, where 
it changed direction to the left toward Barren Hill, with the design 
of cutting off La Fayette's retreat by Swede's Ford. General Grey 
with two thousand men crossed the Schuylkill and marched along its 
west bank to a point about three miles below Barren Hill to be in 
readiness to act in concert with the other detachments. General 
Clinton with a third division marched by Chestnut Hill, and up the 
Manatawny road to make enclosure of La Fayette's command within 
their enveloping forces the more secure. The plan was skillfully 
conceived. While General La Fayette, as he states, was conversing 
w^ith a young lady then on her way to Philadelphia, (ostensibly to 
visit friends, but really to obtain information) he was notified that 
red uniforms had been seen in the woods, near the road from White- 
marsh to Swede's Ford, in his rear. One hundred dragoons had been 
ordered to join him. They had scarlet uniforms and his first impres- 
sion was that they were close at hand. To assure himself, he imme- 
diately sent scouts into the woods and learned the real facts. He 



1778.] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 407 

changed front immediately, occupied the church, burying ground and 
all strong points, and then " made a display of false heads of columns," 
as if preparing to advance promptly upon the enemy. General Grant 
halted his advance guard to await the arrival of the whole division, 
before engaging with the American troops. The British column then 
on the Ridge road, also halted, and waited for assurance that the 
right had really reached La Fayette's rear ; and this was to be deter- 
mined by an actual attack. 

A country road ran from the church directly under Barren Hill to 
Matson's Ford, which was very little further from Valley Forge than 
Swede's Ford. This road was entirely hidden from view by the hill. 
The British right rested at the crossing of the two principal roads to 
both fords ; and as will appear from the map, they were nearer to 
Matson's Ford than La Fayette was; but supposed that they con- 
trolled all approaches. 

General Poor was ordered to lead the retreat, and La Fayette 
brought up the rear. The troops retired in order and so promptly 
that the main body crossed the ford and occupied high and com- 
manding ground as tne British vanguard learned of the movement, 
and pressed on in pursuit. As the last troops crossed, a brisk skirmish 
ensued over the guns, which were the last to follow ; but the retreat 
was perfected and the guns were saved. 

General Washington had a distinct view of the British movement 
as it advanced, and fired alarm guns to warn La Fayette ; but the wis- 
dom, coolness, and promptness of that officer saved his command. 
The American loss was nine, and that of the British was reported as 
three. 

La Fayette relates the fact, that " fifty Indian scouts were sud- 
denly confronted by an equal number of British dragoons," and that 
" the mutual surprise was so great that both fled, with equal speed." 

The congratulations of Washington were as cordial on the return 
of La Fayette as the greeting of the British troops on their return 
was cool and impassioned. No doubt had been entertained that the 
French Marquis would become the guest of the garrison that evening, 
and this was one of the minor disappointments of this fruitless 
expedition. 

General Howe closed his official connection with the British service 
on the eleventh of May, but remained in Philadelphia until after the 
march to Barren Hill. 

Extraordinary fetes, parades, salutes, and scenic displays, formed 



408 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [1778. 

part of a demonstration in his honor before his departure. A regatta 
on the Delaware, a tournament on land, triumphal arches, decorated 
pavilions, mounted maidens in Turkish costumes, slaves in fancy habits, 
knights, esquires, heralds, and every brilliant device, made the eigh- 
teenth day of May memorable, from daybreak until dark. Balls, 
illuminations, fire-works, wax lights, flowers and fantastic drapery 
cheered the night hours, exhibiting, as described by Major Andre, " a 
coup dc ceil, beyond description, magnificent." " Among the fairest 
of the ladies was Miss Shippen, the subsequent second wife of Arnold." 
At four o'clock on the morning of the nineteenth, the twenty-four 
hours of hilarity, adulation and extravagance closed, and the army 
hastened to Barren Hill to capture La Fayette. 

On the nineteenth. General Mifflin reported at Valley Forge for 
duty. 

In a letter to Gouverneur Morris, dated May eighteenth. General 
Washington expresses his " surprise to find a certain gentleman, who 
some time ago, when a heavy cloud of darkness hung over us and our 
affairs looked gloomy, was desirous of resigning, to be now stepping 
forward in the line of the army," adding, " If he can reconcile such 
conduct to his own feelings as an officer, and a man of honor, and 
Congress have no objection to his leaving his seat in another depart- 
ment, I have nothing personally to oppose to it. Yet I must think 
that gentleman's stepping in and out, as the sun happens to beam 
forth or become obscure, is not quite the thing, nor quite just, with 
respect to those officers who take the bitter with the sweet." 

Washington was already advised that the British army was about 
to evacuate Philadelphia. Repeated discussions occurred as to the 
future action of the two armies. The American army began to feel 
the throb of hope as they realized that the pressure of a superior 
force was to be withdrawn ; and the toil, self-sacrifice and anguish of 
a wretched winter was relieved a little by the prospect of entering the 
capital, as they entered it in the autumn of 1777. 

On the following day a council of war was held, at which Major- 
generals Gates, Greene, Stirling, Mifflin, La Fayette, De Kalb, Arm- 
strong and Steuben, and Brigadier-general Knox were present, to hear 
a statement of the condition of the two armies. 

Washington under-estimated the British forces, as will be seen by 
Note. He estimated the British effective force at Philadelphia as ten 
thousand ; that at New York as four thousand ; that at Newport as 
two thousand. 



-11- ^~ 

Pnvf/o/t ^-="* " 
ff/lcv /hcRt'/reatJ* 







American. 
British. 
Hessia/(s. 
Onem Ho. ^- 




Coff//Jilec/ af!ct Bran'/t byCo/ Carnngfm 



-iOS* 



1778.] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 409 

The Continental force at Valley Forg-e, including the sick and 
those on command subject to call on emergency, he reported as eleven 
thousand eight hundred ; at Wilmington, fourteen hundred ; and on 
the Hudson, at eighteen hundred. 

The opinion was unanimous that the army should remain on the 
defensive, and await the action of the British commander. 

On the twentieth of May, General Charles Lee joined the camp, 
having been exchanged on the twenty-first of April for Major-general 
Prescott, who had been very adroitly captured at his headquarters 
five miles above Newport, Rhode Island, on the' night of the twenti- 
eth of July, 1777, by Lieutenant-colonel Barton of Providence. 
General Lee had been placed on parole as early as the twenty-fifth of 
March, and visited Philadelphia. His parole was extended so that 
he visited Valley Forge on the fifth of April, and York, where 
Congress was in session, on the ninth. 

It is also to be noticed that on the fifteenth of June, while at Val- 
ley Forge, when there was still a doubt as to the ultimate plans of 
General Clinton after the evacuation of Philadelphia, General Lee 
addressed a note to General Washington giving his " opinion that 
the enemy would either go to Newcastle, to draw the American army 
out and fight it to advantage, or go to Maryland or Delaware or some 
other independent field where they could control water communica- 
tions, and act in harmony with frontier Indian aggressions." 

A ship of war reached Philadelphia on the seventh with commis- 
sioners to represent Lord North's Conciliatory Bills, and this delayed 
Clinton's movement ; but Lee's letter to Washington could not have 
been more skillfully designed to mislead, if he had at heart the execu- 
tion by General Howe of the plan he had himself hypothetically sug- 
gested while a prisoner of war at New York. 

His letter to Washington was in harmony with his advice to Gen- 
eral Howe ; but the well known French alliance which ripened in 
January, 1778, made that movement impossible of execution by the 
British troops, and Lee sought by all means in his power to prevent 
a pursuit of their retiring army. 

A brief retrospect will explain Lee's position. 

During the month of February, 1777, he obtained permission from 
General Howe to send letters to Congress urging that commissioners 
be sent " to confer with him about confidential matters of vast interest 
to the national cause." On the twenty-first of February of the same 
year, Congress declined to send such commissioners " as altogether 



410 OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. [177S. 

improper," and " they could not perceive how a compHance with his 
request would tend to his advantage or the interest of the public." 
On the nineteenth of March, Lee wrote again. This letter was re- 
ceived on the twenty-eighth ; and on the following day Congress 
again declined the proposition. 

On the fifth of April, 1777, Lee wrote to Washington, " It is a 
most unfortunate circumstance for myself, and I think not less so for 
the public, that the Congress have not thought proper to comply with 
my request. It could not possibly have been attended with any ill 
consequences, and might have been with good ones. At least it was 
an indulgence which I thought my situation entitled me to. But I 
am unfortunate in everything, and this stroke is the severest I have 
ever experienced. God send you a different fate." 

There were not wanting officers at that time, General Greene 
included, who supposed that the visit of commissioners could do no 
harm, but the people at large approved the action of Congress. The 
time had passed for compromise. 

On the twenty-ninth, the day that Lee's second application was 
acted upon by Congress, that officer submitted a paper to the British 
commissioners which indicated his opinions, wishes and purpose. The 
original document was brought to light by George H. Moore, an emi- 
nent historical scholar, and librarian of the New York Historical Soci- 
ety, in connection with an address before that Society in 1870, and 
was officially endorsed by the British commission as " Mr. Lees plan, 
2gth March, 1777." 

A few paragraphs are cited in this connection : " It appears to me 
that by the continuance of the war, America has no chance of obtain- 
ing its ends." "As I am not only persuaded from the high opinion 
I have of the humanity and good sense of Lord and General Howe, 
that the terms of accommodation will be as moderate as their powers 
will admit ; but that their powers are more ample than their succes- 
sor would be tasked with, I think myself not only justifiable, but 
bound in conscience in furnishing all the light I can, to enable 'em to 
bring matters to a conclusion in the most commodious manner." 

" I know the most generous use will be made of it in all respects ; 
their humanity will encline 'em to have consideration for individuals 
who have acted from principle." Then followed hypothetical data as 
to the number of troops required, and these sentences: "If the 
Province of Maryland, or the greater part of it, is reduced or submits, 
and the people of Virginia are prevented or intimidated from march- 



t778.] OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA. 41I 

ing aid to the Pennsylvania army, the whole machine is divided, and a 
period put to the war ; and if it is adopted in full," (" Lee's plan,") " I 
am so confident of success that I would stake my life on the issue." 
" Apprehensions from General Carleton's army will, I am confident, 
keep the New Englanders at home, or at least confine 'em to the east 
side of the river. I would advise that four thousand men be imme- 
diately embarked in transports, one-half of which should proceed up 
the Potomac, and take post at Alexandria, the other half up Chesa- 
peake Bay, and possess themselves of Annapolis." The relations of 
various posts to the proposed movement, — the character of the " Ger- 
man population who would be apprehensive of injury to their fine 
farms," were also urged in favor of " Jus plan " for terminating the 
war on terms " of moderate accommodation." 

Washington answered the letter of General Lee, on the day it was 
received, written only three days before the evacuation of Philadel- 
phia ; and its contents indicate that he fully appreciated the manner 
in which that officer attempted to influence other officers in the regu- 
lation of army movements. 

" I have received your letter of this date and thank you, as I shall 
any officer over whom I shall have the honor to be placed, for their 
opinions and advice in matters of importance, especially when they 
proceed from the fountain of candor, and not from a captious spirit, 
or an itch for criticism, . . . and here let me again assure you 
that I shall be always happy in a free communication of your senti- 
ments upon any important subject relative to the service, and only 
beg that they may come directly to myself The custom which many 
officers have of speaking freely of things, and reprobating measures, 
which upon investigation may be found to be unavoidable, is never 
productive of good, but often of very mischievous consequences." 

The encampment at Valley Forge was about to be deserted. 
Washington and Lee were ready for the march to Monmouth. 

BurrisH Effective Force. 
Note. — From " Original Returns in the British Record Office." Date, March 26th, 

1778. 

Philadelphia New York Rhode Island 

British 13078 34S6 1610 

German 5202 3^)89 2116 

Provincial 1250 3281 44 

Total 19,530 10,456 3.770 



CHAPTER LIV. 

FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. MONMOUTH AND VICINITY, 

1778. 

THE abandonment of Philadelphia by the British army had 
become a military necessity, because too remote from the sea 
coast, unless the Army of Occupation could be so reinforced as to be 
independent of support from New York. The detail of troops required 
by General Howe had not been made. The recommendation of Gen- 
eral Amherst, military adviser of the king, "that forty thousand men 
be sent to America immediately," had been disapproved. 

It was of vital importance under such circumstances, that Sir 
Henry Clinton should reach New York with the least delay and the 
least possible embarrassment from fighting on the march. 

The moral effect of the proposed evacuation was in Washington's 
favor. The purpose of the English Cabinet to transfer all active opera- 
tions to the Southern States had not been made public ; and when 
the British army took its departure with twelve miles of baggage 
train, thoroughly cumulative of all army supplies that could be loaded 
on wagons, it made a deep impression upon the people. 

It indicated that the withdrawal of the army was no temporary 
diversion, in order to entice Washington from his stronghold to a 
combat in the field ; but it was a surrender of the field itself to his 
control. It announced that the royalists would be left to their own 
resources, and that the British army had not the strength to meet the 
contingencies of active operations, either in Pennsylvania or New 
Jersey. The embarkation of nearly three thousand citizens, with 
their merchandise and personal effects, to accompany the naval squad- 
rons, was equally suggestive. 

The cooperation of France in the resistance of the Colonies to 
British authority had been publicly announced by Congress, and the 
impending arrival of a French fleet hastened the movement. As a 



1778.] FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. 413 

matter of fact, that fleet appeared at the entrance of Dela-.vare Bay- 
almost immediately after Admiral Howe turned Cape May, for New 
York. 

The evacuation of Philadelphia began at three o'clock in the morn- 
ing, June eighteenth, and the entire army was on the New Jersey 
shore by ten o'clock. 

This movement had not been made so secretly that General Wash- 
ington had neglected to anticipate its execution. General Maxwell's 
brigade and the New Jersey militia had been ordered to destroy 
bridges, to fell trees across the roads, and to so interrupt the march as 
to give time for his own army to place itself in a favorable position 
for offensive action. A detachment under General Arnold, whose 
wound still detained him from field service, entered Philadelphia just 
as the British rear-guard left. 

Reference is made to maps, "Operations in New Jersey" and 
*' Operations near Philadelphia." 

General Clinton advanced to Haddonfield the same day. At this 
point the militia under General Maxwell made a short resistance and 
retired to Mount Holly Pass. This place was also abandoned as the 
strong British vanguard arrived : but the destruction of bridges and 
other obstructions, combined with the excessive summer heat, made 
the march of the British army peculiarly painful and exhausting. 
Clinton, with his usual promptness, crowded so closely upon the 
Americans that they did not complete the destruction of the bridge 
at Crosswicks, and the British army passed the creek on the morning 
of the twenty-fourth. 

The column of Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, with the provis- 
ion train and heavy artillery, went into camp at Imlays' Town, while 
that of Cornwallis occupied Allentown, and thereby covered the 
other division from surprise from the north. 

According to General Clinton's report, dated at New York, July 
5th, 1778, " the column of General Knyphausen consisted of the 
Seventeenth light dragoons ; Second battalion of light infantry ; 
Hessian Yagers ; First and Second British brigades; Stirn'sand Loo's 
brigades of Hessians : Pennsylvania Loyalists ; West Jersey Volun- 
teers and Maryland Loyalists. The second division consisted of the 
Sixteenth light dragoons; First and Second battalions of British 
grenadiers, the Guards, and Third, Fourth, and Fifth British brigades." 

Upon receiving advices that Washington had already crossed the 
Delaware and that General Gates with the northern army was ex- 



414 FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. [1778. 

pected to unite with Washington, thus rendering a direct march to 
New York more hazardous, General Chnton threw all his baggage 
under the escort of General Knyphausen, placed it in advance, and 
occupied the rear with the second division, in light marching order, 
under his own immediate command ; and took the Monmouth route 
to the sea. 

Washington was notified of the movement and took definite action, 
in pursuit. He had crossed the Delaware, at Coryell's Ferry, nearly 
forty miles above Philadelphia, without assurance of the real purpose 
of his adversary. Having detached Colonel Morgan with a select 
corps of six hundred men to reinforce Maxwell, he marched to Prince- 
ton with the main army, and thence to Hopewell township, five miles 
distant, where he remained until the morning of the twenty-fifth. 
On the previous day, however, he had sent a second detachment of 
fifteen hundred chosen troops under Brigadier-general Scott, to rein- 
force those already in the vicinity of the enemy and more effectually 
ftnnoy and retard their march. 

On the twenty-sixth the army moved to Kingston ; and having 
uitelligence that the enemy had been seen moving toward Monmouth 
Court-House, Washington dispatched a third detachment of one 
thousand men under General Wayne, together with the Marquis de 
La Fayette, who was assigned to take command of the entire 
advanced corps, including Maxwell's brigade and Morgan's light in- 
fantry. Orders were given to La Fayette, to " take the first fair 
opportunity to attack the rear of the enemy." 

That officer wrote from " Robin's Tavern, half past four, June 26th," 
" I have consulted the general officers of the detachment ; and the 
general opinion seems to be that I should march in the night near 
them, so as to attack the rear-guard on the march. Your excellency 
knows that by the direct road you are only three miles further from 
Monmouth than we are in this place. Some prisoners have been 
made, and deserters come in amazing fast." " I believe a happy 
blow would have the happiest effect." Again. "At five o'clock,'* 
"General Forman is firmly of the opinion that we may overtake the 
enemy. It is highly pleasant to be followed and countenanced by 
the army ; that, if we stop the enemy, and meet with some advan- 
tage, they may push it with vigor. I have no doubt but if we over- 
take them we possess a very happy chance." 

Again: " Ice Town, 26th June, 1778, at a quarter after seven." 
" Wlien I got there, " referring to previously expressed purpose to go 



I77S.] FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. 415 

to Ice Town for provisions, " I was sorry to hear that Mr. Hamil- 
ton, who had been riding all the night, had not been able to find any- 
body who could give him certain intelligence ; but by a party who 
came back, I hear the enemy are in motion, and their rear about 
one mile off the place they had occupied last night, which is seven or 
eight miles from here. I immediately put Generals Maxwell's and 
Wayne's brigades in motion, and I will fall lower down with General 
Scott's and Jackson's regiment, and some militia. I should be very 
happy if we could attack them before they halt." " If I can not over- 
take them, we could lay at some distance and attack them to-morrow 
morning. ... If we are at a convenient distance from you, I have 
nothing to fear in striking a blow, if opportunity is offered." " If you 
believe it, or if it is believed necessary or useful to the good of the service 
and the honor of General Lee, to send him down with a couple of thou- 
sand men, or any greater force, I zvill eJieer fully obey and serve him, not 
only out of duty, but out of zu hat I owe to that gentle mail s character. '' 
The Italics are not so indicated in the original. 

The following appeal had been made to General La Fayette by 
General Lee, when he found that the army was earnestly pressing 
upon the enemy : " It is my fortune and my honor that I place in 
your hands ; you are too generous to cause the loss of either." La 
Fayette says in his memoirs, " This tone succeeded better," referring 
to Lee's change of opinion, and claim to the command ; and the let- 
ter, above cited, contains the generous response. 

At evening of the twenty-sixth the whole army advanced from 
Kingston, leaving their baggage so as to be able to support the 
advance corps with promptness, and reached Cranbury early in the 
morning. On the twenty-seventh a heavy rain and intense heat sus- 
pended the march for a few hours. Finding that the advance corps 
was bearing too far to the right to be assured of prompt support from 
the main body, orders were sent to La Fayette to take ground to the 
left, toward Englishtown. This movement was also executed early on 
the morning of the twenty-seventh. 

The advance corps was at once strengthened by two additional 
brigades, as suggested by General La Fayette, and General Lee took 
command. The whole force thus detailed was about five thousand 
men. 

The main army advanced to within three miles of Englishtown, 
and within five miles of the British army. The official reports of 
General Washington show that General Lee positively declined the 



4l6 FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. [1778. 

command of this advance corps, until its large increase rendered it 
certain that it held the post of honor, and would be pushed upon the 
enemy. La Fayette was first assigned to the command after a hot 
debate in council as to the propriety of attacking Clinton's army at 
all ; and General Lee used the following language when that assign- 
ment was made with his concurrence ; that he " was well pleased to 
be freed from all responsibility for a plan which he was sure would 
fail." This statement is made important by subsequent events. 

Morgan's command was now on the British right flank, and Gen- 
eral Dickinson with between seven and eight hundred men, threat- 
ened their left. During the subsequent action, Morgan lay with his 
corps three miles south of Monmouth at Richmond's Mills (Shuman's) 
awaiting orders; only kept from participation in the battle by failure 
to receive timely instructions as to his duty in view of the general 
movement of the army to the front. It will be seen that he sent for 
instructions as soon as he heard the sound of battle. 

This battle of Monmouth has less clearness of definition than any 
other action of the Revolution. The country had not been recon- 
noitered, and very loose reports were made, even by officers who were 
on the ground, and who afterwards testified before the general court- 
martial which tried General Lee. 

On the part of the British army it was a bold and successful return 
of the offensive, at the very moment when any other policy would 
have threatened it with ruin. The pursuit of Clinton by Washington 
was fully equal to the opportunity. The limitation of its success was 
largely due to the conduct of General Charles Lee. Washington as a 
matter of fact made no rash venture, as if in chase of a disappointed 
adversary. 

He neither underrated nor despised his enemy ; but giving credit 
for courage and wisdom equal to his own, measured the forces that 
were to meet in conflict, and as usual, struck, or struck back as best 
he could. 

The American army was fully equal to that of the enemy in num- 
bers ; and although fresh from Valley Forge, was not wanting in 
energy and nerve. The supply of provisions was scanty, but the army 
was eager in the pursuit. It felt the onward spur, when the force 
which had so long kept it on the defensive, crossed the Delaware, in 
full retreat from the old theater of conflict. 

The military issue between Clinton and Washington was in some 
elements quite unequal. Clinton must regain New York. He had 



r778.] FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. 417 

nothing to hope from a battle, more than a clear path to Sandy Hook. 
His heavy baggage train restricted his operations to the repulse of 
an attack, and rendered any protracted pursuit, even of broken columns, 
a fruitless strain upon his command. 

But for Washington to have shrunk back from that retreating 
army, which he had been prompt to meet upon reasonable terms, 
would have accredited the British army with that invincibility which 
Lee affirmed of it ; would have sacrificed the impetus which the 
offensive imparted to his command, and would have made every sub- 
sequent issue of the war more hopeless or uncertain. It would have 
canceled the memory of Trenton. It would have stultified the move- 
ment which made Germantown a pledge that the American Com- 
mander-in-chief was ready at all times to seize opportunity and do 
real fighting. Every attempted vindication of the conduct of Gen- 
eral Charles Lee has one fatal defect. He knew that he could impair 
the standing of Washington only by such a limitation of his success as 
would place himself in the foreground as a wise counselor and com- 
mander. He had only to act upon his avowed opinion that American 
troops could not cope with British troops, and withdraw the former 
from a test of their mettle. La Fayette dissented from this assump- 
tion ; but Lee was in command. 

While all narratives agree that the advance of subordinate com- 
manders was prompt and orderly, however blindly conducted, and in a 
direction favorable to success, it is equally clear that General Lee 
made no adequate effort to concentrate his divisions, promulged no 
definite orders: — and in the conduct of his own mov'ements and the 
precipitate retreat, absolutely failed to control his army and keep it 
in hand. His presence inspired none, discouraged many, and abso- 
lutely left the divisions to work their own way out of confusion, as if 
there were no officer in general command. 

A careful examination of the facts seems to exclude the idea that 
Lee was guilty of any overt act of treason ; while it is equally true, 
that upon the basis of his antecedent opinion, and his expectation of 
failure, he did not make the proper effort to render that failure the least 
disastrous possible, and thus fulfill the obligations of high command. 

The division which General Lee commanded on the twenty-eighth 
of June, 1778, according to the evidence of General Wayne, consisted 
of the following troops, besides the flanking detachments of Dickin- 
son and Morgan. " In front. Colonel Butler with two hundred men ; 
Colonel Jackson with an equal number; Scott's own brigade with a 
27 



41 8 FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. [1778 

part of Woodford's, six hundred, with two pieces of artillery ; General 
Varnum appeared, about the same number, with two pieces of 
artillery : My own detachment was about one thousand, with two 
pieces of artillery ; General Scott's detachment fourteen hundred 
with two pieces of artillery ; General Maxwell's was one thousand and 
two pieces of artillery, in all five thousand, with twelve pieces of 
artillery, exclusive of the militia." General Lee claimed that this 
force, so loosely stated by General Wayne, did not exceed four thou- 
sand one hundred men ; but the force which Grayson took to the 
front was nearly eight hundred men, and although temporarily 
detached from Scott's and Varnum's brigades, it must enter the 
aggregate and be counted as if not detached. The entire force which 
Lee had at his disposal on the evening of the twenty-seventh, con- 
siderably exceeded five thousand men, although he took no steps to 
communicate with Morgan and Dickinson until especially aroused by 
Washington to action. General La Fayette accompanied General 
Lee, with his consent, as a volunteer. 

Position of the Annies. On the evening of June twenty-seventh, 
1778, the British army encamped in a strong position, with their 
" right extending about a mile and a half beyond the Monmouth 
Court House, in the parting of the roads leading to Shrewsbury and 
Middletown, and their left along the road from Allentown to Mon- 
mouth, about three miles west of the Court House." This position, 
well protected on the right and left, and partially in front, by marshy 
ground and woods, was regarded by Washington as " too strong to be 
assailed with any prospect of success." 

The general direction of the British line while thus encamped and 
when its march commenced, was south-easterly, exposing their left 
and centre to an attack from the American troops, whose offensive 
advance was from the north-west. It therefore became important for 
General Clinton to change his position and gain the Middletown road 
to the sea as quickly as possible, especially as a march of only ten or 
twelve miles would place him upon strong defensive ground beyond 
danger of successful pursuit. Lieutenant-general Knyphausen was 
under orders to move at daylight of the following day. The single 
road which was available for the proposed march, passed almost im- 
mediately into a series of bluffs where the baggage train would be 
greatly exposed to attack from skirmishing parties, and General Clin- 
ton undertook the protection of its rear by his own division of 
selected troops. 



1778.] FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. 419 

The American army was nearly three miles behind EngHshtown, 
and only five miles from the British camp ; while the skirmishing de- 
tachments of Morgan and Dickinson were already on the alert for 
strokes at the British flanks, as the army should break camp. 

Monmouth and Vicinity. The reports of Generals Washington, 
Clinton, and of many other officers who engaged in the battle of Mon- 
mouth, are so defective as to localities, that some explanation is neces- 
sary to an appreciation of the narrative. The distinctions of " right " 
and " left " are greatly confused, through the changing positions of the 
troops ; especially as the right and left of Clinton were reversed when 
he returned the offensive ; and the statement of officers that " Morgan 
was on the left " did not become true until they commenced their 
retreat. Thus, although Dickinson threatened the British left flank 
on the morning of the twenty-seventh, his demonstration was upon 
their right during their advance, later in the forenoon. 

The Ravines. The terms " ravine," " morass," " first stand," and 
"last stand," "behind the morass," and "before the morass," are 
painfully disheartening to one who takes up this battle record, and 
they will receive notice. Three ravines, or morasses, as they are 
indiscriminately named, are mentioned by American officers. Clinton 
mentions only the two which intervened between his advance from the 
Court House and Washington's main army. The ravine or morass 
behind which Washington formed the divisions of Greene and Stirling 
to cover the retreat of the fugitive brigades, is about half a mile south- 
easterly from the old Meeting House, and about two and a half miles 
from EngHshtown. 

The early skirmish which led General Dickinson to believe that the 
British army had not left Monmouth, but was advancing in force 
toward the hill, was on high ground just east of this morass, this west 
ravine, and was simply the demonstration of light troops to throw off 
the American militia, and conceal the withdrawal of their main army. 
It was on this hill that the hedge-fence, the parsonage, and the 
orchard, near which the chief fight took place, were located. A sec- 
ond ravine or morass, which will be called the middle ravine, crossed 
the road not quite a mile to the east ; and on the east side of this, the 
British camp rested for a few hours after thj battle. This high 
ground extended still farther eastward, and blended with the so-called 
" heights of Monmouth," and then dipped toward the low plain, one 
mile wide, and about three miles long, just cast of the Amboy road, 
which ran from the Court House nearly due north. This narrow 



420 FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. [1778. 

plain or valley where Clinton formed his line of attack was also marshy 
near a small pond, and along a small creek; the latter extending from 
near the Court House north-easterly, past Briar Hill; and this east 
ravine is that which Wayne, Varnum, Jackson, Scott, Grayson, and 
Oswald's artillery crossed and recrossed, and behind which they 
retired when the British line advanced in force. Just west of the 
Amboy road, and nearly parallel with it, " so as to cover both roads," 
is the high wooded ground where Lee proposed to re-form his line, 
and from which, in fact, the divisions had advanced into the plain 
without definite orders, or due regard to their mutual dependence and 
relations. 

Water Courses. Wenrock Brook, as indicated upon the State Geo- 
logical Survey of New Jersey, and recent township surveys, has been 
erroneously located by most authors. It unites with Geblard's Branch 
just beyond Englishtown as indicated on map " Operations in New 
Jersey," and map " Battle of Monmouth," and flows in the opposite 
course of that indicated by Irving, Sparks, and some others. At the 
head of the Manisquan, near Monmouth Court House, there was 
formerly marshy ground, where its small tributaries gathered their 
waters ; and on the north side of Monmouth, Geblard's Branch was 
bordered by marshy ground. The small stream, or drainage, west of 
Briar Hill, sometimes called Briar Creek, is not, as sometimes indicated, 
a branch of Charles River, emptying in to Raritan Bay, but local, and 
was crossed at the time of the battle by a causeway or bridge. A 
small fork of the Manalapan brook flowed north-easterly from the 
AUentown road, and furnished the swampy ground which protected 
the left of the British camp on the night of the twenty-seventh. 

General Features. The low plain below the slope from the Court 
House and the Amboy road, was quite open for at least a quarter of 
a mile, with woods well distributed beyond this narrow belt as far north 
as Briar Hill, to the Middletovvn road, on the edge of which Colonel 
Grayson halted his command, nearly parallel with the road upon 
which the British " column was marching.'' The summit between the 
Amboy road and the middle ravine was mostly in woods, with open 
ground near and just north-west of the Court House, where Butler 
drove back the Queen's Rangers, To the left of the British line, after 
it faced west to return the offensive, was another piece of woods out 
of which the dragoons advanced and from which a strong column 
emerged for an advance toward the Court House, to turn the Ameri- 
can right and cut off Grayson, Scott, Jackson, Maxwell, and Oswald, 



1778.] FROM PHILADELPHIA TO MONMOUTH. 42 1 

when they retired behind the east ravine and reached the summit. 
The causeway and bridges are indicated on the map ; and as late as 
January, 1876, the middle ravine was still ch.iracterized by tangled 
underbrush and briars, as reported by officers after the battle. The 
present road from Englishtown runs considerably north of the old road, 
and there is no trace of two old paths referred to by witnesses on the 
trial. The fact that all the commanders refer to the ivcst ravine, 
clearly indicates that they made common crossing at its bridge : and 
although one division marched to the left from the Meeting House, 
while other troops took the sharp turn to the right at the forks, the two 
divisions finally took two routes, for the double purpose of extending 
their front to prevent flank attacks in a general advance, and to gain 
room for the movement. 

There was difficulty in obtaining guides, and repeated halts ensued 
on that account. General Maxwell says that he advanced along a 
morass from the Meeting House, but crossed the hill finally occupied 
by General Stirling. The small creek emptying into Lules pond 
fulfills the conditions of his statement. He was informed that there 
was a second road to the north leading to Englishtown by Craig's 
Mill, and fears were expressed that the British troops would seek 
thereby to gain the American rear, but it was not attempted, and the 
entire retreat was finally made over the causeways at the middle and 
west ravines. 



CHAPTER LV. 

PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH, 1778. 

GENERAL WASHINGTON, the American Commander-in- 
chief was in earnest pursuit of the British army under Lieuten- 
ant-general Clinton, as it marched from Philadelphia, en route for 
New York. The' character of the American people and their reluc- 
tance to accept the restraints of strict authority had their effect upon 
the leader of their armies ; and his orders were sometimes so cour- 
teous, in form, that the element — " do this,'' was almost merged in a 
courteous request. 

But Charles Lee was a professional soldier, and knew what Wash- 
ington meant. He knew Washington better, when he took his final 
orders, on the twenty-eighth day of June, 1778, on the hill by Wen- 
rock Creek, about two miles east of Monmouth Court House, He 
had been in command of nearly one-half of the American army during 
that day, and for the thirty-six hours preceding. It was his first active 
command after his exchange as a prisoner of war; and both at Valley 
Forge and at Kingston he had opportunity to learn the temper and 
purposes of his commanding officer. He was not left without more 
definite instructions after he solicited the command which closed his 
military career. 

Washington s Instruetions. The following is a statement of his 
instructions, as understood by those, (other than General Lee), who 
were charged with their execution, and it is taken from the record 
of " Proceedings of a general Court Martial which convened at 
Brunswick, July fourth, 1778, for the trial of Major-general Lee." 
Soon after noon, on the twenty-seventh of June, 1778, Washington 
assembled the senior general officers who belonged to the column, 
then under marching orders. 

General Scott •' heard General Washington say, in the presence 



iryS.] PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 423 

of General Lee, the Marquis de La Fayette, General Maxwell and him- 
self, that he intended to have the enemy attacked, the next morn- 
ing, or words to that effect ; and Washington desired General Lee to 
call his general officers together that afternoon, to concert some mode 
of attack. General Lee appointed the time, at half past five ; but 
before the officers met. General Lee had rode out : — fell in with Gen- 
eral Lee that evening and told him, that I had waited 71 him, and 
asked him if he had any orders'' " He said he had none; but we 
should not be disputing about rank, or what part of the line we should 
march in." " 0)1 cross-examination^' " understood that Lee was to 
proceed on, and whenever he met the enemy, to take the earliest 
opportunity to attack them." 

General IVayjie says ; — " General Washington called upon General 
Scott, General Maxwell and myself, the twenty-seventh of June, to 
come forward to the place he and General Lee were talking, and there 
recommended us to fall upon some proper mode of attacking the 
enemy, next morning," — " did not hear General Washington i^ive any 
particular orders for the attack ; but he recommended that there 
should be no dispute in regard to rank, in case of an attack; that as 
General Maxwell was the oldest, he of right should have the p e'"er- 
ence; but as the troops that were under his command were mostly 
new levies, and therefore not the troops to bring on the attack, he 
therefore wished that the attack might be commenced by one of the 
picked corps, as it would probably give a very happy impression." 
*' General Lee appointed the generals, who were there, to meet at his 
quarters about five o'clock in the afternoon, which I understood was 
for the purpose of forming a plan of attack on the enemy, agreeable 
to the recommendation of General Washington." " At the hour 
appointed met with the Marquis de La Fayette and General Max- 
well at General Lee's quarters." " He said he had nothing further to 
recommend, than that there should be no dispute with regard to 
rank, in case of an attack, for he might order on, eitiier the right or 
the left wing, and he expected they would obey, and if they consid- 
ered themselves aggrieved, to complain afterwards ; that he had 
nothing more to say on the subject, but that the troops were to be 
held in readiness to move at a moment's warning." On cross- 
examination : — " Lee said the position of the army might render any 
previous plan invalid, or words to that effect." " I understood that 
we were to attack the enemy on their march, at all events ; and that 
General Washington would be near us to support us with the main 



424 PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

army ; — which, in its consequence, must, if we were pushed, inevi- 
tably have brought on a general action." 

General Maxzvell, " understood by what General Washington 
said to General Lee, that General Lee was to attack the rear of the 
British army as soon as he had information that the " front was in 
motion, or marched off," and he further mentioned that something 
might be done by giving them a very brisk charge, by some of the 
best troops. " General Washington mentioned something about my 
troops — that some of them were new, and in want of cartouch-boxes, 
and seemed to intimate that there were some troops fitter to make a 
charge than them," " He further recommended that we should go 
to General Lee's quarters, at six o'clock." " The orders I got there, 
were to keep in readiness to march at a moment's warning in case the 
enemy should march off," " that there should be no differences respect- 
ing rank, or which should be called to the front, right or left." 

General Lee, in his defense says, " General Washington recom- 
mended to me a conference with those gentlemen, relative to any 
plan of operations to adopt ; but as he only reeomuiended the con- 
ference, I of course thought myself at full liberty on this head," It 
is to be noticed in this connection that General Lee knew the bold 
purpose of La Fayette, and that Wayne, Duportail and others had 
strongly urged the offensive, before the council of war held at Kings- 
ton. In his defense he does not state that he was under any obliga- 
tion to adopt the plans of General La Fayette, or prosecute his policy; 
nor does he refer to Washington's instructions of the twenty-sixth. 

In Washington's immediate answer to the letter written by La 
Fayette from Icetown, he says, " General Lee's uneasiness on account 
of yesterday's transaction, rather increasing than abating, and your 
politeness in wishing to ease him of it, have induced me to detach 
him from this army, with a part of it, to reinforce or at least cover 
the several detachments at present under your command. At the 
same time that I feel for General Lee's distress of mind, I have an eye 
to your wishes and the delicacy of your situation ; and have therefore 
obtained a promise from him, that zuhen he gives you notice of his 
approach and command, he zvill request you to prosecute any plan you 
may have already concerted for the purpose of attacking or otherivise 
annoying the enemy ; this is the only expedient I could think of to 
ansiver the vieivs of both. General Lee seemed satisfied with the 
measure." Washington wrote to the President of Congress on the 
morning of the twenty-eighth : " I am here (Englishtown) pressing 



I778.J PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 425 

hard to come up with the enemy. We have a strong and select 
detachment more forward, under command of Major-general Lee, with 
orders to attack their rear if possible^ 

The question involved is this : Did General Lee have ito knowl- 
edge of the purpose of Washington in sending more than five thousand 
men to the front, with the entire army in light marching order, under 
pledge to support the advance? 

Doctor Griffiths stated upon the trial of General Lee, that " about 
one hour and a half after the action began," General Lee stated, that 
all was going as he expected ; that his advice had ever been contrary 
to a general action ; that it had been determined upon in a council of 
officers not to risk anything by an attack, notwithstanding' that he had 
that morning received positive orders from Washington to attack. 

Summary of Events. General Lee advanced to Englishtown, but 
remained inactive until Washington pressed him forward. 

General La Fayette called during the evening of the twenty- 
seventh to know if any disposition of the troops had been made for 
the next day. " Lee thought it would be better to act according to 
circumstances, and had no plans." " Between one and two o'clock," 
as stated by General Lee's aids, " Washington sent an order direct- 
ing that six or eight hundred men from Scott's and Varnum's com- 
mands should be at once sent forward to lie very near the enemy as a 
party of observation, in case of their moving off, to give the earliest 
intelligence of it ; to skirmish with them, so as to produce delay and 
give time for the rest of the troops to come up ; and directing him to 
write to Morgan to make a similar attack." This order was received 
as stated, before two o'clock A. M. Dickinson received his notice, 
and General Lee's aid-de-camp states that he sent a messenger to 
Morgan, but that officer did not actually receive any instructions until 
those given by Wayne during the battle to a messenger sent for 
orders. ' 

"At four o'clock on the morning of the twenty-eighth," says La 
Fayette, " I went to Lee's quarters to know if there was anything 
new ; the answer I received was that one brigade was already march- 
ing. As I considered myself a volunteer, I asked General Lee what 
part of the troops I was to be with ; General Lee said, if it was con- 
venient for me, to be with the selected troops. I put myself with 
them, in full expectation that these troops would act and be opposed 
to the British grenadiers." 

At five o'clock, Dickinson reported to Generals Lee and Washing- 



426 PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

ton that the enemy had commenced their march. Washington imme- 
diately sent orders to General Lee to " move forward and attack the 
enemy, unless very powerful reasons prevented," and advised General 
Lee that " the entire army had thrown aside their packs and was 
advancing to his support." 

The following remarkable statement taken from Lee's defense, is 
cited in this connection without comment. "I had no idea that his 
excellency was to move from Englishtown, where I was informed he 
was posted ; and that situation appeared to me the best calculated to 
support my corps, of any I knew of in that country." In another con- 
nection, he says, that on the march he noticed the hill where the final 
stand was made to be an excellent position. The movement of the 
troops was very loosely made ; was simply putting them on the march, 
and General Lee did not in person superintend that movement. 

Colonel Grayson " received orders about three o'clock, to put Scott's and Var- 
num's brigades in readiness to march and to give notice when they were ready." 
" Upon reporting to General Lee at Englishtown ; — was ordered to advance and 
halt three miles from the enemy, and send repeated intelligence of their movements. 
At the same time a written paper from General Washington to General Lee was 
placed in his hands directing General Lee to send out six or eight hundred men as 
a corps of observation, to give frequent information of the enemy's movements and 
to attack them incase iJiey began their march." 

" At a distance of two and a half miles from Englishtown, was ordered to march 
slow ; shortly after, to advance." This brought Grayson to the bridge over the west 
ravine; where the yfrj/ j/vrw2>/^ hereafter mentioned, took place. 

General Scott " had orders about five o'clock to follow Maxwell's brigade ; — • 
passed Englishtown ; was ordered to halt ; received an order from one of General 
Lee's aids to march in the rear of General Wayne's detachment. About this time 
there was a halt of an hour ; marched to the Meeting-house, where there was a 
second halt ; advanced a mile and then halted, when several pieces of cannon were 
fired, and some small arms, in front of the column. 

This brought Scott to the west ravine : He continues, — " Soon after I was ordered 
on, and soon took a road to the left and then an old road to the right which brought 
us into a field to the left of some of our troops that were formed where there was a 
pretty brisk firing of cannon on both sides." This was the location of the third 
skirmish hereafter mentioned. 

General Maxwell; "received orders after five o'clock, to put my brigade in 
readiness to march immediately. Ordered the brigade to be ready to march ; went 
and waited on General Lee. He seemed surprised I was not marched, and that I 
must stay until the last, and fall in the rear. I ordered my brigade to the ground I 
understood I was to march by, and found myself to be before General Wayne and 
General Scott, and halted my brigade to fall in the rear." 

(A temporary diversion made by this brigade under General Lee's 



I77S.] PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 427 

order, under apprehension that the enemy were advancing by Craig's 
Mills, far to the north, was countermanded by one of Washington's 
aids.) 

" Came back to my former position, waited a considerable time before General 
Wayne and General Scott got past me ; then I marched in the rear. There were 
three pretty ^rge halts before I got up within a mile of the Court House. The 
Marquis de La Fayette informed me that it was General Lee's wish that we should 
keep to the woods as much as possible ; that as 1 had a small party of militia horse, 
he desired I should keep these horse pretty well out upon my right." This light 
horse, La Fayette handled, as hereafter appears. " It was thereabouts that I heard 
some firing of cannon and small arms." 

This refers to the third skirinish. 

" The march was pretty rapid from that place, and I followed up General Scott 
until I got the front of my brigade in the clear ground. General Scott was about 
one hundred yards in my front." (See map.) " I did expect that General Scott would 
have moved to the right, as there was a vacancy between him and the other troops, 
but while I was riding up to him, I saw his troops turn about, and form in column, and 
General Scott coming to meet me. He told me our troops were retreating on the 
right and we must get out of that place ; that he desired his cannon to go along 
with me as there was only one place to get over that morass (the east morass) and 
he would get out of that if he could. I ordered my brigade to march back." 

General Wayne: "received orders to prepare and march. Having marched 
about a mile with a detachment, there was a halt made in front. Half an hour after 
received a message by one of General Lee's aids, to leave my detachment and come 
to the front and take command of the troops in front, that it was a post of honor. 
When I arrived there I found about six hundred rank and file, with two pieces of 
artillery from Scott's and Woodford's brigades, and General Varnum's brigade drawn 
up." " Scott's advanced up a morass, the other in rear of it." This was just at the 
close of \\\t first skirmish at the west ravine. 

" Upon notice that the enemy were advancing from the Court House, General 
Lee directed that the troops might be formed so as to cover two roads that were in 
the woods where the troops had advanced and formed." 

" Colonel Butler with his detachment, and Colonel Jackson with his detachment, 
were ordered to the front. Colonel Butler formed the advance guard and marched 
on. The troops took up again the line of march and followed him. When we 
arrived near the edge of some open ground in view of the Court House, we obsen^ed 
a body of the enemy's horse drawn up on the north-west side, ijctween us and the 
Court House. General Lee ordered the troops to halt, and by wheeling them to the 
right they were reduced to a proper front to the enemy's horSe, though then under 
cover of the woods. General Lee and myself were advancing to reconnoiter the 
enemy. In advancing a piece forward. General Lee received some message which 
stopped him. I went on to a place where I had a fair prospect from my glass of the 
enemy. Their horse seemed so much advanced from the foot that I could hardly 
perceive the movement of the foot, which induced me to send for Colonel Butler's 
detachment, and Colonel Jackson's detachment, in order to drive their horse back. 



428 PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

I then detached part of Butler's people who drove the horse into the villag-e. This 
was the second skirmish hereafter noticed. 

•' I could perceive the enemy were moving- from us in very great disorder and 
confusion. In about ten or fifteen minutes the enemy made a halt, and appeared to 
be forming in some order. This intelligence I sent by one of my volunteer aids to 
General Lee, and requested that the troops might be pushed on. It was General 
Lee's orders that I should advance with Colonel Butler's detachment and Colonel 
Jackson's detachment. Upon advancing, the enemy took up their line of march and 
began to move on. I crossed the (east) morass, about three-quarters of a mile east 
of the Court House, (north-east) near to the edge of a road leading to Middletown, 
near the road where the enemy were marching upon. 

" The whole of the enemy then in view halted. I advanced a piece (a short dis- 
tance) in front of the troops, upon a little eminence, to have a view of the position 
and of their movements. Our troops were advancing and had arrived at the edge 
of a morass rather east of the Court House. The enemy then advanced their horse, 
about three hundred, and about two hundred foot to cover them. The horse then 
made a full charge on Colonel Butler's detachment, and seemed determined upon 
gaining their right flank, in order to throw themselves in between us and our main 
body which had halted at the morass. He broke their horse by a well directed fire, 
which ran " the horse " among their foot, broke them and carried them off likewise. 
(This was the third skirmish.) We had not advanced above two hundred yards, 
before they began to open three or four pieces of artillery upon us. They inclined 
first to our right, in order to gain a piece of high ground to the right of where I lay, 
nearly in front of the Court House. I sent off Major Biles to desire our troops that 
were in view and in front of the morass to advance. Our artillery began to answer 
theirs from about a half a mile in the rear of Butler's detachment, when Major Biles 
returned, and informed me that the troops were ordered to repass the morass, and 
they were then retiring over it. I galloped up to the Marquis de La Fayette, who 
was in the rear of Livingston's or Stewart's regiment, who said he was ordered to 
recross the morass, and form near the Court House, from that to the woods. I again 
sent to General Lee, asking that troops might be brought up. Major Biles or Major 
Fishbourne returned, and informed me that the troops had been ordered to retire 
from the Court House, and that they were then retiring. About the same time one 
of General Lee's aids told me that it was not General Lee's intention to attack them 
in front, but he intended to take them, and was preparing a detachment to throw 
upon their left. I then crossed the ravine myself, and went with General Scott to 
the Court House," but " after viewing the ground about the Court House, sent off one 
of my aids to General Lee to request him that the troops might again be returned to 
the place they had left. At this time the enemy did not appear to be above two 
thousand, about a mile distant in front, moving on to gain the hill before mentioned. 
A fire was kept up of cannon between us and the enemy at this time. Major Fish- 
bourne returned and informed me that the troops were still retreating, and that 
General Lee would see me himself. Afterwards I perceived the enemy begin to 
move rapidly in a column toward the Court House. I again sent Major Lenox and 
Major Fishbourne to General Lee, requesting him at least to halt the troops to cover 
General Scott, and that the enemy were advancing, and also sent to order Colonel 
Butler to fall back, as he was in danger of being surrounded and taken." 



I77S.] PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 429 

" General Lee did not again goto the front, but fell back with the 
retreating troops, then a mile in the rear." 

Colonel Jackson " received orders from Colonel Brooks, acting Adjutant-general 
of Lee's Division, to fall in the rear of Maxwell's brigade. There was some mis- 
understanding between General Scott's detachment and General Maxwell's brigade, 
by both coming into the road at the same time, and I fell in the rear of General 
Scott's detachment. While I was there I received orders to join the advance guard 
under the command of Colonel Butler. We marched four or five miles " (from 
Englishtovvn) " when we discovered the enemy by Monmouth Court House, a party of 
horse and a party of infantr}'. Colonel Butler was ordered off, and I imagine (cor- 
rectly) to fall in between that party at the Court House and their main body. At 
this time the division under General Lee halted. Then came orders from General 
Wayne, for my detachment to immediately join Colonel Butler. Before that I had 
orders from General Lee to support Colonel Oswald with his artillery. Upon these 
orders coming from General Wayne, General Lee ordered me off immediately to 
join Colonel Butler." Colonel Jackson finally gained a position upon the left (see 
map) and thus describes it. " I did not like my position at all, as there was a morass 
in my rear, and a height that commanded the morass. I asked Lieutenant-colonel 
Smith if he did not think it best for me to cross the morass and post myself on the 
height that crow^ned it. He asked if I had any orders, I answered no. He made 
reply, " for God's sake, don't move without you have orders. I desired him, or he 
offered, to go, and see if there was any person to give me orders ; returned in a few 
minutes and told me there was no person there. I told him, I'll risk it and cross the 
morass." 

General Forman, "rode forward to discover the number and situation of the 
enemy, shortly after the enemy's horse had charged Colonel Butler's detach- 
ment; then rode in quest of General Lee, and offered to take a detachment, 
and by taking a road upon our left, to double their right flank. General Lee's 
answer was, — I know my business. A few minutes afterwards I saw the Marquis 
de La Fayette direct Colonel Livingston's and Colonel Stewart's regiments to march 
toward the enemy's left, and I was informed by the Marquis, that he was directed by 
General Lee to gain the enemy's left flank. In this time there was a cannonading 
from both parties, but principally on the part of the enemy. The Marquis did not 
gain the enemy's left flank : as I supposed, it was occasioned by a retreat that had 
been ordered to the village, I presume by General Lee, as he was present and did 
not contradict it." 

This movement, which detached the regiments of Stewart and 
Livingston from Wayne's brigade was that which is hereafter referred 
to, under notice o{ third skirmish, which induced the retreat of the 
entire Ainerican left. 

Lieutenant-colonel Oswald, "joined Scott's and Varnum's brigades with four 
pieces of artillery, June sixteenth ; at half an hour after one in the morning of the 
twenty-eighth, we were assembled in the rear of Englishtown,— marched into 
Englishtown where we were detained for a guide. The two brigades under the 



430 PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

command of Colonel Grayson, advanced toward Monmouth Court House. When 
we reached the first morass, just in front of the position afterwards taken by Lord 
Stirling, we then received intelligence that the enemy were very near us. Colonel 
Grayson and myself rode up in front upon the hill where we found General Dickin- 
son with a few militia. Colonel Grayson then advanced with his regiment where 
the militia were engaged and I followed with one piece of artillery. When we got 
in front of the hedge-row " (afterwards a point of resistance) " we saw no enemy, 
General Lee, General Wayne and some others rode off to reconnoiter the enemy. 
I received orders, as I supposed from General Lee, to join Scott and Varn urn's 
brigades upon the hill. At this bridge, (the west ravine) we had crossed and re- 
crossed two or three times, in consequence of the intelligence we had received 
being vague and uncertain. Colonels Butler's and Jackson's regiments came up 
and were advanced in our front, in the road, Scott's and Varnum's brigades following 
them." 

The subsequent movements of Colonel Oswald are embodied in 
the outline of the third skirmish, after he crossed the east morass. 

Lictdenant-colonel Brooks, acting Adjutant-general, " received the order from 
General Washington to make the detail," already noticed, " about one o'clock in the 
morning ; they began their march about six ; about seven, Wayne's and Scott's 
detachments, Maxwell's brigade and Jackson's corps followed. 1 rode forward and 
found General Lee at the Meeting House of Freehold. Intelligence of the most 
contradictory nature was momently brought General Lee. This occasioned Var- 
num's brigade and a part of Scott's to pass and repass the bridge " (west ravine) " 
several times. General Lee now said he would pay no farther regard to intelligence, 
but would march the whole command and endeavor to find the enemy, and know 
their condition for himself. For this purpose Jackson's detachment was ordered 
from the rear to join the advance corps, the command of which was about this time 
given to General Wayne. Within view of Monmouth Court House, there was a halt 
for an hour, in which interval General Lee reconnoitered the enemy, who put on 
the appearance of retiring from the Court House somewhat precipitately, and m dis- 
order. When they had retreated about a mile, on the Middletown road, they halted 
and formed on high ground. General Lee observed, that if the body now in view 
were all, or near all, that were left to cover the retreat of the main body, instead of 
pushing their rear, he would have them all prisoners ; he marched his main body to 
gain the enemy's rear, leaving General Wayne with two or three pieces of artillery 
to amuse the enemy in front, but not to push them, lest his project should be frus- 
trated. After coming into the plain, about a mile below the Court House, I observed 
the head of General Lee's column filing to the right, toward the Court House. A 
cannonading had now taken place between us and the enemy. When I came in 
the rear of Scott's detachment I perceived a very great inter\'al between that and the 
front of Maxwell's brigade. Upon General Maxwell seeing me he asked if I had any 
orders from General Lee. I told him I had not. . . General Scott came up about 
this time and observed that our troops were going off the field toward the Court 
House. He asked me whether it was the case. I told him I knew nothing of it, if it 
was so. During this time all the columns except Maxwell's were moving to the 



1778.] PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 43 1 

right. After having seen several battalions pass " (repass) " the ravine I returned to 
the point where General Maxwell was and found Generals Scott and Maxwell 
standing together. General Maxwell again asked me if I had any orders. 1 told him 
I had not," — " I rode toward the ravine to find General Lee, but finding the enemy 
were pushing that way, thought best to return and came round the ravine and found 
General Lee about a quarter of a mile this side " (west) " of the Court House. He 
said, you see our situation ; but I am determined to make the best of a bad bargain. 
The troops, in a very easy, moderate and regular way continued their march until 
they had passed the ravine," (middle ravine) " in front of Carr's House. Upon 
asking several officers who appeared to command the battalions why they left the 
ground, they said it was by General Lee's and the Marquis de La Fayette's orders." 

Immediately after, the battle of Monmouth took place ; General 
Washington in person commanding. 

Captain Stewart, of the artillery, "was on command with the Marquis de La 
Fayette. On the road to the left of Monmouth Court House, about a mile, and about 
half after ten o'clock in the day, I heard the discharge of several pieces of cannon 
and some musketry in front. I immediately unlimbered my pieces. . . . Gen- 
eral Lee came up and ordered me to limber, and be ready to march on immediately 
toward the enemy, toward Monmouth Court House ; at the same time, General Var- 
num's brigade and the Marquis's detachment obliqued to the right, leaving General 
Scott's brigade and Colonel Jackson's corps more on the left." 

Colonel Stewart of Wayne's brigade asked General Lee " where he should take 
his men," after the retreat began, and he answered, " take them to any place to save 
their lives, pointing to an orchard in front." 

Captain Mercer, aid-de-camp of General Lee, says, " I was sent by General Lee 
with an order to General Dickinson, to inform him that he intended to attack the 
enemy as soon as he was certain of their march for Middletown. About one o'clock 
in the morning we were waked up by a letter from General Washington, signed by 
Colonel Hamilton." . . . " After Colonel Grayson had marched, I was ordered 
by General Lee to write to the Marquis de La Fayette that he might immediately put 
himself at the head of Wayne's and Scott's detachments. I don't conceive that the 
troops were ready before eight o'clock or half-past eight, at which time General Lee 
set out from his quarters." ..." Subsequently," as stated in report of third 
skirmish, " the three regiments in General Wayne's detachment, Colonel Wesson's, 
Stewart's and Livingston's were ordered to the right." " The enemy were then 
marching back again to the Court House. General Lee said he believed he was mis- 
taken in their strength, but as they were returning to the Court House, there would 
be no occasion to push that column further to the left, as they were in the rear 
already." At this point, the retreat of Grayson, Scott, and Jackson had become a 
necessity. " He then ordered me to Scott, with orders for him to halt his column in 
the wood, and continue there until further orders. I asked him where I should find 
General Scott, as I had not been there when the front of the troops filed off. He 
pointed to the wood over the ravine, and told me I should find them there." I made 
what speed I could to the ravine, but my horse being very tired I was some tmie a 
going. I found great difficulty in passing it as it was very deep and miry. When I 



432 PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

got over to the other side, I found Colonel Jackson's regiment retiring over the 
ravine again. I took a transient enfilade view of the enemy ; the party nearest us 
seemed to be a brigade of artillery ; a column of the enemy appeared at a great dis- 
tance, marching toward the Court House on the right. I supposed they might be 
about, not quite, three thousand men ; their horse, very considerable, in my idea." 

This officer's testimony is immaterial except as it shows the want 
of system with which the army was handled. The testimony of La 
Fayette, Knox, and twenty-seven officers not cited, simply indicates 
one fact ; that the division was never concentrated, received no defi- 
nite orders, and handled itself. The apology for these facts will be 
found in the record of the battle. 



CHAPTER LVI. 

THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH, 1778. 

THE Battle of Monmouth was fought during the afternoon of 
June twenty-ninth, 1778, at Wenrock Creek in Monmouth 
County, New Jersey ; General Washington and General Sir Henry 
Clinton in person respectively commanding the American and British 
armies. The original purpose of the American Commander-in-chief 
has been already stated. The division of General Lee advanced too 
late in the morning to realize that purpose, and the mismanagement 
of the troops after they marched, as certainly imperiled the whole 
army. 

The criticisms of the battle of Monmouth do not appreciate that 
relation of the two columns which gave to five thousand American 
troops an immense advantage, by striking just where General Wash- 
ington expected the blow to fall, viz., upon the flank, or rear of a 
marching column, covering at least four miles of heavy road. 

The preliminary movements already adverted to in the evidence 
cited, will be again noticed for a more definite appreciation of the 
battle itself. 

The first skirmish, WKS that of Dickinson's reconnoitering party, 
on the hill just east of the west ravine, between seven and eight 
o'clock in the morning. Colonel Grayson had advanced with his 
select detachment, beyond the Freehold Meeting House, half a mile. 
General Dickinson sent a messenger to Washington and Lee with 
notice of the British retreat, as early as five o'clock in the morning. 

When Colonel Grayson approached the first ravine, he " saw firing, 
and a party of militia retreating from the enemy." 

General Dickinson was then engaged with a small flanking party 

which had been detached from the British left wing, and which he 

erroneously supposed to be the advance guard of their returning army. 

He sent for aid. Colonel Grayson crossed the bridge with one regi- 

28 



434 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

ment and one of Oswald's guns, and just as he ascended the hill, the 
British retired. General Lee arrived soon after. At this time there 
was thorough confusion of opinions as to the position and movements 
of the enemy. General Dickinson claimed that the British were 
returning from the Court House. Other informants stated that they 
were retreating towards Middletown. There was some reason for the 
persistency with which each, " with some heat " pressed their views, 
as there had been no reconnoissance, in force. General Lee, however, 
insisted that the British army had retreated. 

General Clinton states that " Lieutenant-general Knyphausen 
marched at daylight ; and that he descended into the plain at eight 
o'clock." The statements that the British had left, and that they had 
not left, were consistent with the facts as known to the different 
messengers, since General Dickinson referred to the early movement ; 
and the presence of Clinton's division near the Court House and of 
the flankers with whom he engaged, induced the mistaken opinion 
that the army itself had returned to take the offensive. As the result 
of this confusion, the brigades of Scott and Varnum and Colonel 
Durgee's regiment crossed and recrossed the west ravine several 
times, as stated by those officers. 

The presence of some controlling mind zvas 7ieeded : Troops were 
rapidly concentrating and halting, until at last General Lee pushed 
Colonels Butler and Jackson forward, each with two hundred men, 
and then went in person, to reconnoiter the position. As soon as Gen- 
eral La Fayette arrived, the whole division crossed the ravine and 
advanced toward the Court House. It had been discovered, by this 
time, after nine o'clock, that the British left wing had entirely left the 
Allentown road and was marching toward Middletown. The oppor- 
tunity for striking it on the left flank, while so greatly extended, Jiad 
been lost. 

The second skirmish, was with a small rear guard, north-west of 
the Court House, when Butler, then in advance, acting under the 
orders of General Wayne drove back the Queen's rangers. La Fayette 
with a few light horse from Maxwell's brigade, passed beyond the Court 
House into the plain, to reconnoiter, and the rear guard of the British 
army was then "a mile in advance." Wayne had taken a position on 
the left of the road leading to the Court House " having been assigned 
to the post of honor," as stated by General Lee, with orders to press 
lightly upon the British rear guard, and to hold it until a movement 
could be made to cut it off from the main column. As soon as the 



1778.] THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 435 

Queen's rangers were driven through the village, General Wayne 
hastened Colonel Butler across the east ravine, and placed his detach- 
ment, with two guns, upon a small eminence in the plain, while the 
other brigades were following the general lead of those in advance, 
until they formed an irregular line as far as Briar Hill. 

The third skinnish took place just after Butler reached the posi- 
tion last referred to, and while the troops were moving from the woods 
near the Amboy road, to the plain beyond the east ravine, under the 
general direction of General Wayne. The British light dragoons 
made a charge upon Colonel Butler which was successfully repulsed. 
Colonel Grayson was in advance with an orchard to his left ; Jackson 
about a hundred yards in his rear; then Scott somewhat detached, 
and Maxwell on the edge of the morass. Grayson was informed by a 
messenger from General Wayne, that he must hold his ground, as the 
enemy was retiring. He " hallooed to Jackson to come and form 
upon the hill, (Briar Hill) upon his left." This movement was one 
which threatened Knyphausen's column, just when it was buried in a 
long defile, and Clinton was at once aroused to activity to save the 
baggage train which he supposed the Americans were attempting to 
attack. Colonel Jackson disregarded the request of Colonel Grayson, 
because he had no artillery. Scott was then a little to the rear and 
right of Jackson. Maxwell expected Scott to move to the right, to 
join on Wayne, close the gap, and let him into the line. Wayne 
meanwhile held the regiments of Wesson, Stewart, and Livingston to 
the left of Varnum, to cover Butler with whom he advanced still fur- 
ther into the plain, and also to cover Oswald's artiller}^, which had 
drawn two additional guns from Varnum's brigade, and was exchang- 
ing shots with the artillery of the enemy. Major Mercer of General 
Lee's staff told Grayson that his place was in the rear of Wayne, who 
had no right to order him to the position he held on the left. Gen- 
eral Lee states that " he sent Major Mercer, and then a second officer, 
with express orders to General Scott to hold his position." As a 
matter of fact, Scott was under Grayson's command, and both were 
so associated with Wayne, that when he moved toward the Court 
House, as subsequently ordered, they followed his movements, and 
received no intimation that they should have done otherwise until the 
movement was actually made, and the whole army was retreating, by 
detachments, before the advance of the British army. The American 
troops had deployed quite at their own discretion. Oswald main- 
tained his guns in position until his ammunition was exhausted, and 



43^ THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

then retired behind the morass. There he met General Lee, who 
ordered him, upon obtaining ammunition, to continue firing, and this 
was done over the heads of Butler's advance detachment, and with 
great danger, according to the evidence, of doing injury to those troops. 
At this stage of the conflict, General Lee sent orders to General 
Wayne to move toward the right, nearer the Court House, where the 
enemy were threatening a movement. The regiments of Livingston 
and Stewart began the movement. This, for want of orders to the 
contrary, was considered by Grayson and Scott as a general retreat, 
and that opinion was confirmed b)' the evident pressure of the British 
left toward the Court House, while their centre and right emerged 
from the woods into the plain, thus threatening to sever the American 
line, already weakened in the centre, and cut off the regiments which 
were on the left toward Briar Hill. The artillery had not returned, 
and was playing from time to time in the rear of the morass. Gray- 
son, Scott, Jackson, and Varnum recrossed the morass, and with Max- 
well entered the wood upon the hill west of the Amboy road. It was 
not until then, that the messengers from General Lee intimated to 
General Scott that he was to remain steady on the left. They com- 
municated orders to re-form the line in the woods on the high ground, 
the right resting on the village. General Lee states that he supposed 
the houses were of stone, but when he found that the village was 
open, and the houses were of wood, he fell back before the British 
advance. General Lee says " the retreat in the first instance was con- 
trary to my intentions, contrary to my orders, contrary to my wishes." 

But the entire division was in fact retreating, quickened at this 
time by his orders ; and the left wing only saved its connection with 
the main body by a march through the woods, leaving their guns to 
the charge of Colonel Oswald, who, with his few men, brought off ten 
pieces, after taking but two into action at first. It was at this period 
that a messenger from General Morgan, " having in vain sought for 
General Lee," applied to General Wayne for instructions, and was 
informed that " he could see the condition of things for himself, and 
report the facts to General Morgan." 

Thus, before eleven o'clock or half-past eleven, the British column, 
which had been retreating by the Middletown road, had formed an 
oblique front to the rear, extending, according to the evidence of 
General Knox and Colonel Hamilton, who saw *' rio signs of any plan 
for the cooperation of the different American brigades in resistance to 
the movement" from Briar Hill to the marsh east of and near the Court 



I77S.] THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 437 

House. The British troops appeared in the edge of the woods, hardly 
a mile distant, and were variously estimated at from fifteen hundred 
to twenty-five hundred men. The force of Lee then disposable for 
attack or resistance, if properly in hand, was not less than three thou- 
sand men, besides Grayson's detachment. Wayne, during the hour 
and a half while he was in the plaiii, sent three times to urge General 
Lee to advance with the troops, and as he states, refrained from 
pressing the attack too strongly under instructions, and constantly 
expecting that General Lee would carry the left wing around the 
right of the British line to cut it off from the main body. 

General Lee's purpose, as understood by General Wayne, and as 
stated by Lee himself ■ze/^i:^ to so swing his left about the British right 
as to take tJiein, and he also states that when he notified General 
Washington, who sent to learn the progress of the army, that he was 
confident of success, he supposed the British rear-guard not to exceed 
fifteen hundred men. His estimate was correct, at the time, as his 
whole division was then pressing to the front, eager to engage the 
enemy ; but at noon the British army had realized the weakness of 
the pursuit, and gained time to turn it into a failure. General Lee, 
in his defense, ridicules the application of General Wayne for support ; 
but not in connection with his statement that he placed him at the 
post of honor, nearest the enemy, and with the largest control which 
any subordinate officer had over the movements of the picked troops 
then in front. General Lee admits that he sent no messenger to 
Washington to advise him of the retreat, and in his appeal to the 
Court Martial, states that he could appreciate the feelings of Wash- 
ington when the column rolled back upon him without previous notice 
of disaster; but that when he met Washington and exchanged words 
with him, he did not know that the men had thus disorderly fallen 
back upon the main body. 

The retreat. The British army emerged from the woods, and 
pressed toward the Court House. General La Fayette first reported 
to General Lee that the right was threatened, having previously been 
checked in his advance of the American extreme right, by General 
Lee's personal direction. General La Fayette then consulted Gen- 
eral Wayne, and placed the regiments of Livingston and Stewart in 
position to resist the British advance, which was steady, solid, and in 
good order. 

The details of the retreat of different brigades and regiments are 
not to be considered. An entirely erroneous opinion prevails as to 



438 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

their behavior. It is true that there was some confusion, through 
want of some authoritative direction of their movements; but it is to 
be noticed that there was nothing of the nature of a panic. No com- 
mander knew why he retreated, only that such were understood to be 
the orders, and that others retreated, and no troops could have rallied 
more promptly than they did, when they felt, the presence of Wash- 
ington. General Lee deserves credit for self-possession, and a real 
purpose to bring the men away in safety, when he found he could not 
handle the division. The troops had marched and countermarched 
under blind guidance, during a day of extreme heat, were falling by 
the wayside, fainting with thirst, and worn out, with no stimulus of 
hope to hold them up, and the retreat of Monmouth was the victory 
of manhood over every possible discouragement that could befall an 
earnest army in pursuit of a retiring adversary. Regiment after regi- 
ment, brigade after brigade hastened to cross the west ravine, and, to 
his credit, Lee came with the last column. At this point the broken 
detachments found the main army. Some went to its rear to rest and 
rally for a fresh advance in the evening. Some turned about and 
fought until their pursuers retired from the field. Colonel Ogden says, 
he begged General Maxwell to halt his regiment and face the enemy, 
and he did so without difficulty. The division of General Lee was 
saved by the self-possession of its officers, and the wonderful endur- 
ance of the rank and file. 

The ordeal of Valley Forge saved the arniy. The arrival of Wash- 
ington restored it. 

The Fourth Skirmish, developed the BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. It 
was as conspicuous for the promptness of the American troops to respond 
to intelligible orders, and for rigidity in position under fire, as their first 
exposure to the enemy had been ungoverned and loosely presented. 

The cannonading before noon aroused Washington to his full 
fighting capacity. The return of his aid-de-camp with the assurance 
that General Lee had overtaken the British army, and expected to 
cut off their rear-guard, was received as a vindication of his previous 
judgment and as an omen of success. The troops dropped every in- 
cumbrance and forced the march. Greene took the right at the 
Meeting House, and Stirling led the left directly toward the hill where 
he subsequently took his strong position. The vanguard under Wash- 
ington approached the bridge at the west ravine, when repeated inter- 
ruptions of his progress began to warn him that the battle waited for 
the presence of the Commander-in-chief. 



Jl 



I77S.] THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 439 

First, a mounted countryman, then a frightened fugitive fifer, told 
his story. " After a (ew paces, two or three more persons said, that 
the continentals were retreating." The whole career of Charles Lee 
was quickly brought to view. Vague and painful suspicions and more 
painful apprehensions aroused Washington to duty. Harrison and 
Fitzgerald were dispatched to find out what was the matter. They 
met Major Ogden. His explanation, strongly expletive, was simply, 
"They are flying from a shadow." Officer after officer, detachment 
after detachment, came over the bridge, all alike ambiguous in their 
replies, or ignorant of the cause of their retreat. Colonels and gen- 
erals came with broken commands, all knowing that they were retreat- 
ing, but no one able to say more than that such were the orders, and 
that " the whole British army was just behind." Washington hastened 
toward the bridge and met Ramsey and Stewart, Wayne and Varnum, 
Oswald and Livingston. Upon them he threw the burden of meeting 
the British columns, and, leading the way, he placed them on the hill. 
On the left, in the edge of the woods, he established Ramsey and 
Stewart with two guns, with the solemn assurance that he depended 
upon them to stop pursuit. On the right, back of an orchard, and 
covered by a thick hedge fence, he placed Wayne and Varnum, and 
Livingston ; and Knox and Oswald established four guns there. 
Maxwell and other generals as they arrived were ordered to the rear 
to re-form their columns, and La Fayette was intrusted with the form- 
ation of the second line, until he could give the halted troops a posi- 
tion which they might hold while he should bring up the main army 
to their support. It was such an hour as tests great captains and 
proves soldiers. 

Already, with the last retreating column, General Lee had appeared, 
and finding the troops in line, he addressed himself to a change of 
their positions and such an arrangement as he deemed best under the 
circumstances. It had been his purpose, as he states, after he passed 
Carr's House and after consultation with Wickofif, who knew the coun- 
try, to place artillery on Comb's Hill, which attracted his attention. 
Mr. Wickoff showed him that he could take fence rails and make a 
crossing of the morass and that the British army could not attack him 
without making a circuit of three or four miles to the south ; but he 
said there was no time for that, and continued his retreat. While 
demanding the reason for the existing disposition of the troops on 
the hill near the west ravine he was informed that Washington had 
located the troops himself. Regarding this as virtually superseding 



440 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

him in command, he reported to General Washington for orders, and 
was met by the peremptory demand for " an explanation of the retreat." 
General Lee seemed to have been overwhelmed by Washington's 
sternness of manner and replied, " Sir — sir." Upon repetition of the 
inquiry, he stated that " the contradictory reports as to the enemy's 
movements brought about a confusion he could not control," and 
reminded Washington that " the thing was done contrary to his 
opinion, that he was averse to an attack, or general engagement, and 
was against it in council, — that while the enemy were so superior in 
cavalry we could not oppose them." Washington then replied that 
he "should not have undertaken it unless prepared to carry it 
through," that, " whatever his opinion might have been, he expected 
his orders would have been obeyed." General Lee in explanation 
of this interview, says, "some expressions let fall by the General, 
conveyed the idea that he had adopted some new sentiments, and 
that it was his wish to bring on a general engagement. This idea 
drew forth some sentences such as related by Colonel Tilghman " 
above quoted : — " that when he set out in the morning it was with 
the conviction that it was never his intention to hazard or court a 
general engagement. What his excellency meant by saying that 
I should not have undertaken what I had no intention of going 
through with, I confess I did not then, nor do I this day, (August, 
1778) understand. The several councils of war held, on the subject 
of the operations in the Jerseys, reprobated the idea of risking a gen- 
eral engagement, as a measure highly absurd in the then circumstances 
of America (for since the time those councils were held, circumstances 
are much altered) " and adds, "But whatever may have been the 
good sense of those councils, I shall readily allow that they ought to 
have little or no weight with an officer, if subsequent orders from the 
Commander-in-chief, or even a hint communicated, had been of 
such a nature as to give reason to think that the idea had been 
discarded, and that the General had adopted a plan repugnant to 
those councils." " No letter I received, no conversation I ever held 
with him, indicated an intention, or wish, to court a general engage- 
metit ; if he had I protest solemnly that whatever 1 might have 
thought of the wisdom of the plan, I should have turned my thoughts 
solely to its execution." General Washington closed the interview by 
asking General Lee if he would take command, while he could form 
the army in the rear. Lee says, " When Washington asked me 
whether I would remain in front and retain the command or he should 



1778.] THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 44 1 

take it, I answered, that I undoubtedly would, and that he should 
see that I myself should be one of the last to leave the field. Colonel 
Hamilton flourishing his sword, immediately exclaimed, " That's right, 
my dear General, and I will stay and we will all die here, on the spot." 
Lee says : — " the position was not one to risk anything further than 
the troops which then halted on it," and ridicules what he styles 
Colonel Hamilton's " flustrated manner and phrenzy of valor," and 
adds " I answered, I am responsible to the General and to the conti- 
nent, for the troops I have been entrusted with. When I have taken 
proper measures to get the main body in a good position, I will die 
with you, on the spot, if you please." 

It is worthy of record that no witness on the trial of General Lee 
puts profane words in Washington's mouth, neither does General La 
Fayette in his memoirs, but all accounts concur, that his personal 
bearing, manner and tone of voice were expressive of that sublime 
wrath which followed his conviction that the country and the army 
were willfully imperiled by the disobedience of Charles Lee. 

Washington placed his army in position ; Greene on the right ; 
Stirling on the left, where an admirable disposition of artillery pre- 
pared him to withstand the British column, and La Fayette was 
placed in command of the second line. General Greene sent five guns 
to Combs' Hill, where they would have enfilading fire upon the British 
columns as they advanced against Wayne's line, and the battle of 
Monmouth began. 

General Clinton " marched at eight o'clock A. M. Soon after, 
some reconnoitering parties appeared on the left flank " (Dickinson's 
skirmish). "The Queen's Rangers fell in with, and dispersed some 
detachments among the woods, in the same quarter " (Butler's skir- 
mish). *' The rear-guard having descended from the heights above 
Freehold, into a plain, about three miles in length and about one in 
breadth, several columns of the enemy appeared likewise descending 
into the plain, and about ten o'clock they began cannonading our rear. 
Intelligence was at this instant brought me, that the enemy were 
discovered marching in force on both our flanks. I was convinced 
that our baggage was their object ; but it being at this juncture 
engaged in defiles, which continued for some miles, no means occurred 
of parrying the blow, but attacking the corps which harassed our 
rear, and pressing it so hard as to oblige the detachments to return 
from our flanks to its assistance. I had good information that 
Washington was up with his whole army, estimated at about twenty 



442 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

thousand ; but as I knew there were two defiles between him and the 
corps at which I meant to strike, I judged that he could not have 
passed them with a greater force than what Lord Cornwallis' division 
was well able to engage. The enemy's cavalry, commanded it is said 
by M. La Fayette, having approached within our reach, they were 
charged with great spirit by the Queen's light dragoons. They did 
not wait the shock, but fell back in confusion upon their own infantry. 
Thinking it possible that the event might draw to a general action, I 
sent for a brigade of British and the Seventeenth light dragoons from 
Lieutenant-general Knyphausen's division, and having directed them 
on the march, to take a position effectually covering our right flank, 
of which I was most jealous, I made a disposition of attack upon the 
plain ; but before I could advance, the enemy fell back and took a 
strong position on the heights above Freehold Court House. . . . 
The British grenadiers, with their left to the village of Freehold, began 
the attack with so much spirit that the enemy gave way immediately. 
The second line of the enemy, on the hill east of the west ravine, 
stood the attack with great obstinacy but were likewise completely 
routed. They then took a third position, with a marshy hollow in 
front, over which it would have been scarcely possible to have 
attacked them. However, part of the second line made a movement 
to the front, occupied some ground on the enemy's left flank and the 
light infantry and Queen's rangers turned their left. By this time our 
men were so overpowered by fatigue that I could press the affair no 
farther, especially as I was confident the end was gained for which 
the attack had been made. I ordered the light infantry to join me ; 
but a strong detachment of the enemy" (Wayne) " having possessed 
themselves of a post which would have annoyed them in their retreat, 
the Thirty-third regiment made a movement toward the enemy, 
which with a similar one made by the First grenadiers, immediately 
dispersed them. I took the position from whence the enemy had 
been first driven after they had quitted the plain, and having reposed 
the troops till ten at night to avoid the excessive heat of the day, I 
took advantage of the inooitlighf,^ to rejoin Lieutenant-general Knyp- 
hausen, who had advanced to Nut swamp near Middletown." 

The attack which was " withstood " with great obstinacy, was at 
the hedge-row where the Second battalion of British grenadiers suf- 
fered extremely, losing their gallant commander Lieutenant-colonel 
Monckton, whose body fell into the hands of the Americans. Adol- 
* No moon, after ten o'clock. 



1778.] THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 443 

phus states that " relays of grenadiers buried his body, taking turns 
during the battle, and using bayonets for shovels, mingling tears with 
the earth they cast upon his body." The grenadiers fell back after 
the third assault without rescuing the body of their leader, and the 
Americans withdrew behind the ravine. The attempt of General 
Clinton to cross in force, and turn the American left and right, in turn, 
was met by Generals Stirling and Greene with promptness; and 
General Wayne's command, which was directly in front of the bridge, 
maintained such a galling fire that the regiments referred to by 
General Clinton were promptly withdrawn. 

Upon the retreat of the British army behind the middle ravine, 
messengers were sent to Englishtown to bring a portion of the trooos 
which had been sent there for re-formation, under the direction of 
General Steuben, at the time of the first retreat. When the troops 
retired from the hedge-row. General Lee reported to General Wash- 
ington, and " requested his excellency's pleasure, how he should dis- 
pose of the troops, whether to form in front, along with the main body, 
or draw them up in the rear." He " was ordered to arrange them in 
the rear of Englishtown at three miles distance." General Steuben 
says, " I joined General Lee on horseback before a house, who said he 
was very glad of my having taken that charge upon me, for he was 
tired out." " General Maxwell's brigade, a part of General Scott's 
detachment, were formed behind the creek at Englishtown ; then three 
brigades of the line which arrived with General Patterson, and the 
second brigade of General Smallwood. The cannonading continued 
more or less briskly until past five o'clock. Half an hour after it 
ceased, Colonel Gimat arrived and brought me the order from the 
Commander-in-chief, that the enemy were retreating in confusion, and 
that I should bring him a reinforcement. I ordered General Maxwell 
to take the command of the troops I had placed behind the creek, and 

to remain there till further orders. I then marched off with the three 
brigades of the second line. As I passed through Englishtown, I 
again met General Lee, who asked me ' where I was going ; ' I 
imparted to him the order I had received from the Commander-in- 
chief, which I delivered in the very expressions of Colonel Gimat, 
that the enemy were retreating in confusion. Upon that word 
confusion, he took me up, and said they were only resting themselves ; 
but said he afterwards, ' I am sure there is some misunderstanding in 
your being to advance with these troops.' It was not until General 
Muhlenberg, who led the column, halted, and the precise orders of 



444 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. [1778. 

General Washington were repeated, that General Lee could understand 
that the cessation of firing was actually occasioned by the retreat of 
the British army, and not by the defeat of the army of Washington. 
' Then,' said he, ' you are to march,' and General Steuben marched 
with the troops." 

During the evening General Woodford's brigade was advanced on 
the right, and General Poor's on the left, for the purpose of an early 
attack upon the British army the following morning. General Clinton 
having realized every possible benefit from his return of the offensive, 
skillfully withdrew his army, and the oppressive hot weather pre- 
vented pursuit. 

The British casualties as reported by General Clinton were as fol- 
lows : Lieutenant-colonel Monckton, Captain Gore, Lieutenants 
Vaughan and Kennedy, four sergeants, and fifty-seven rank and file 
killed ; three sergeants and fifty-six rank and file died from fatigue ; 
Colonel Trelawney, Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, Major Gardner, Cap- 
tains Cathcart, Bereton, Willis, Leighton, Powell, Bellue and Ditmas, 
and Lieutenants Kelley, Paumier, Goroffe, Desborough and Gilchrist, 
seven sergeants, one hundred and forty-eight rank and file zvoiinded, 
and sixty-one rank and file missing. 

General Washington reported the American casualties as follows : 
Lieutenant-colonel Bonner, Major Dickinson, three captains, three 
lieutenants, one sergeant, eight artillery men, and fifty-two rank and 
file killed; two colonels, nine captains, six lieutenants, one ensign, 
one adjutant, nine sergeants, eleven artillery men, and one hundred 
and twenty-two rank and ^\c zuoimded ; five sergeants, one artillery 
man, and one hundred and twenty-six rank and file missing, many 
of whom who had been overcome by the heat, afterwards came up." 

The two reports indicate nearly equal casualties in the two armies. 
General Washington states that four British officers,, and forty 
privates whose wounds were too dangerous to permit their removal, 
were left on the field by General Clinton, and that the parties having 
in charge the burial of the dead, reported the British dead at four 
officers, including Lieutenant-colonel Monckton, and two hundred 
and forty-two privates. With due allowance for the usual errors in 
reports of burying parties, it is evident that the detail of General Clin- 
ton's report is defective, as it leaves many men unaccounted for, who 
were dropped from his subsequent report of the strength of his army. 

Lord Ma ho 7t says, " On the whole it was a pitched battle." 

Adolphiis says, " The affair ought to have terminated when Lee 



1778.] THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 445 

was first compelled to retire. There was no hope of making an 
advantageous assault on the enemy protected by defiles and marshes." 

Lamb says, " The conduct of Washington was highly creditable to 
his military skill." 

Stedinan states that " It was impossible to attack Washington's 
front with any prospect of success, that the judicious position which 
he took probably saved his advanced corps from total ruin." 

Gordon says, " Washington animated his forces by his gallant 
example, and by exposing his person to every danger common to the 
meanest soldier," and that " the behavior of the American troops in 
general, after recovering from the first surprise occasioned by the 
retreat, was mentioned as what could not be surpassed." 

A General Court Martial, Major-general Stirling presiding, found 
General Lee " guilty of disobedience of orders in not attacking the 
enemy on the 28th of June, agreeable to repeated instructions, of 
misbehavior before the enemy, by making an unnecessary, and in 
some few instances a disorderly retreat ; and of disrespect to the 
Commander-in-chief, in two letters dated the ist of July (29th June), 
and the 28th of June (30th June), and sentenced him to be suspended 
from command for the term of twelve months." 

(The error in the date of the first letter was corrected by General 
Lee on the 30th, when he made another misdate, as above corrected). 

The finding of the Court Martial was sustained by Congress, by 
fifteen affirming and seven dissenting votes. General Lee was not 
known then as he subsequently made himself known, and he had 
strong partisan advocates of his cause. If he had been in sympathy 
with Washington, he would have received no censure. If he had 
exercised reasonable self-control at the close of the action, he would 
have saved his commission. He contended indeed with many diffi- 
culties. He " knew few of the officers," the country was unknown, 
the guides were few, and his staff seem to have been inefficient, even 
in executing his restricted orders ; but he had earnestly solicited the 
command, and thus fatally closed his military career at Monmouth. 

His subsequent death was marked by an atrocious contempt of his 
Maker, and of religion, so that even in his will he perpetuated that 
hatred of moral responsibility and true duty which rendered his suc- 
cess while living absolutely impossible. It is but justice to the reader 
of history, that this element of Charles Lee's character should be per- 
petuated ; not only for its painful lesson, but as affording an additional 
key to the motives and conduct of his restless career. 



CHAPTER LVII. 

FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. SIEGE OF NEWPORT. 
CONCURRENT EVENTS. 

GENERAL Sir Henry Clinton reached New York the last of 
June without further detention. At that date the only con- 
siderable posts in the Northern States which remained under his 
control, were those of New York, Staten Island, and Newport, Rhode 
Island. Sir Augustine Prevost was in command at St. Augustine, 
Florida. The British Cabinet resolved to renew operations in the 
Southern States as soon as practicable, and that General Carleton 
should again occupy the posts on Lake Champlain. This was con- 
sistent with the plan suggested by General Lee, who expressed the 
opinion, in a letter to General Washington, immediately after the 
battle of Monmouth, claiming immediate trial before a general Court 
Martial, that " the campaign would close the war." 

General Clinton was hardly settled in his headquarters, when the 
post at Newport was threatened by a large American force, acting in 
concert with a French fleet. General Washington marched from 
Monmouth to Brunswick, where he rested his troops ; thence 
to Paramus and Haverstraw Bay, on the Hudson, and finally re- 
established his headquarters at White Plains on the twenty-second 
of July. 

On the eighth the Count D'Estaing made the Delaware Capes with 
the following squadron of twelve ships, and four frigates, viz., Lan- 
guedoc, 90 ; Tonnant, 80 ; Caesar, 74 ; Guerriere, 74 ; Protecteur, 74 ; 
Provence, 64; Valliant, 64; Saggitaire, 54; Chiniere, 30; L'En- 
geante, 26 ; LAlemence, 26 ; L Arimable, 26. The Chiniere was sent 
to Philadelphia with Silas Deane, one of the American commissioners 
just returned from Paris, and Monsieur Conrad A. Gerard, the first 
French Ambassador to the United States. 



1778.] FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. 447 

The remainder of the squadron having nearly four thousand troops 
on board, sailed for Sandy Hook as soon as advised of the evacuation 
of Philadelphia. 

The French fleet sailed from Toulon on the thirteenth of April, 
but on account of contrary winds, did not pass Gibraltar until the 
fifteenth of May. 

An ordinary voyage would have anticipated the departure of 
Admiral Howe from the Delaware and have imperiled both his fleet 
and the army of General Clinton. The British fleet, then at New 
York, was greatly inferior to that of the French and consisted of only 
six sixty-fours, three fiftys, two fortys and a few small frigates. 
Other ships were hastily armed, and extraordinary measures were 
taken for extreme resistance ; but the draught of water on the lower 
bar would not allow the heaviest of the French ships to enter the har- 
bor, and the chief benefits from the presence of that squadron 
were derived from the capture of vessels which approached New York 
without knowledge of their arrival. A fact in this connection illus- 
trates the uncertainty of naval movements. 

The British government ordered an additional squadron for 
America as soon as advised that France designed to cooperate actively 
with the United States in war with Great Britain. The fleet sailed 
from Portsmouth on the twentieth of May, but upon a report that 
the fleet of Count D'Estaing was bound for the West Indies the 
order was suspended; so that Admiral Byron, who was sent with 
twenty-two ships to relieve Lord Howe, recalled at his own request, 
went into Plymouth and did not sail again until the fifth of June. 
This fleet was greatly scattered by storms. Four ships reached 
Sandy Hook, separately, soon after the departure of Count D'Estaing, 
and thereby escaped capture. 

The Americans criticised the failure of the Count D'Estaing to 
engage the British fleet, but without cause. Even Stedman intimates 
that he " did not seriously intend to make an attempt against the 
harbor of New York ! " A letter to the President of Congress dated 
the twenty-sixth of August, 1778, contains the following conclusive 
statement. ' 

" The pilots procured by Colonels Laurens and Hamilton " (of 
Washington's staff) " destroyed all illusion." 

" These experienced persons unanimously declared, that it was 
impossible to carry us in. I offered, in vain, a reward of fifty thou- 
sand crowns to any one who would promise success. All refused, 



448 FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. [1778. 

and the particular soundings, which I caused to be taken, myself, too 
well demonstrated that they were right." 

Washington determined to make the capture of Newport the 
immediate objective of the campaign, while the French fleet remained 
in American waters. 

The condition of the British garrison at New York was such that 
on the twenty-ninth of July General Clinton wrote to Lord Germaine 
that he " might be compelled to evacuate the city and return to 
Halifax." On that day. the Count D'Estaing anchored near Point 
Judith, Long Island Sound, within five miles of Newport. 

Washington directed General Sullivan, then stationed at Provi- 
dence, to call in the New England militia for a combined movement 
against Newport and its defenses ; assigned Generals Greene and La 
Fayette to command divisions, and ordered the brigades of Varnum 
and Glover to join La Fayette's division. These officers served with 
Greene before Boston, and Varnum was in the original company 
which marched with Greene, at the outbreak of the war. The pro- 
posed cooperation of French troops made the assignment of La Fa- 
yette equally judicious. 

The American force which assembled at Providence was about 
ten thousand men. Reference is made to map, " Siege of Newport." 

The British garrison consisted of six thousand men under Major- 
general Pigott, and embraced the following troops ; — the Twenty- 
second, Forty-third, Fifty-fourth and Sixty-third British regiments ; 
Fanning's and Brown's Provincials ; the following regiments of 
Hessian chasseurs, viz., Huyn, Banau, Ditforth, Landgrave, Seaboth 
and Boit. Two Hessian regiments and Brown's Provincials were 
stationed on Connanicut Island ; but were withdrawn to a strongly 
intrenched camp in front of Newport, when the French fleet 
entered the harbor. On the fifth of August, two French ships 
entered the Narraganset passage, and two frigates passed in through 
the eastern, or Seaconnet Channel. 

The British frigates which had secured the garrison from attack 
up to that time, were destroyed, to prevent their capture. The 
Juno, 32 ; Lark, 32 ; Orpheus, 32 ; Cerberus 32 ; and the King- Fisher, 
16, were burned ; and the Flora, 32, and the Falcon, 18, were sunk. 

It is not to be questioned that General Sullivan unwisely detained 
the French fleet in the offing, and neglected military courtesies which 
were no less deserved than proper, while he was maturing his plans 
for operations by land. The French troops had been nearly five 



1778.] FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. 449 

months on ship-board, and their prompt landing would have averted 
subsequent disaster. 

The tenth of August was designated for the attack. The Ameri- 
can troops were to cross from Tiverton to Rhode Island at Howland's 
Ferry, and the French troops were to land on the west side, nearly 
opposite Byer's Island. On the morning of the twenty-ninth, without 
giving notice to the French commander, General Sullivan crossed from 
Tiverton, and occupied the north end of Rhode Island. The French 
had forced the middle and eastern passages on the eighth, in readi- 
ness to land on the tenth. General Sullivan had previously notified 
Count D'Estaing that he could not move earlier than the tenth, 
because of the non-arrival of militia and other troops daily expected 
in camp. Count D'Estaing was a Lieutenant-general of the French 
army, while General Sullivan was only a Major-general ; but the 
French officer gracefully declined a command, and as gracefully pro- 
posed to attach the French troops to the division of General La 
Fayette. The precipitate landing of the American troops discon- 
certed the plan of attack, but did not engender a conflict between 
the American and French commanders, as so often stated at that 
period, and currently believed. 

General Sullivan notified Count D'Estaing that " in consequence 
of the abandonment of the north end of Rhode Island by the British 
troops, when the French ships forced a passage into the harbor, he 
had occupied the position," and " had made a descent upon the island 
without waiting for the day appointed." Count D'Estaing " had been 
assured that morning, that not more than two thousand men had 
landed," and " believing that his (Sullivan's) situation required prompt 
succor," made a personal visit to General Sullivan. His own state- 
ment of the matter is highly honorable to his judgment and candor. 
In a report to the President of Congress, he says, " Knowing that 
there are moments which must be eagerly seized in war, I was cautious 
of blaming any overthrow of plans, which nevertheless astonished me, 
and w J lie J I hi fact merits in my oivn opinion only praise, although accu- 
mulated circumstances might have rendered the consequences very 
unfortunate." 

The Count D'Estaing visited General Sullivan without information 
that the British fleet at New York had been reinforced, and was on 
its way to Newport. 

On the eighth, General Washington wrote, that he " had received 

a letter from General Maxwell, dated at nine o'clock the previous 
29 



450 FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. [1778. 

morning, near Staten Island, stating that Lord Howe had sailed from 
the Hook with his fleet," adding, with peculiar forecast of the future, 
" unless the fleet may have received advices of a reinforcement on the 
coast, ... it can only be accounted for on the principle of des- 
peration, stimulated by a hope of finding you divided in your opera- 
tions against Rhode Island." The Count D'Estaing visited General 
Sullivan with no apprehension that his fleet was in danger. " Two 
of the French ships were out of the port in the Sound ; two others 
were at the north end of the west channel ; three frigates were in the 
east channel, and the eight sMps which forced the middle passage 
were between Rhode Island, thickly set with batteries, and Connani- 
cut Island. A large number of his sailors, who were suffering with 
the scurvy were on that island ; and when he visited General Sullivan, 
he left orders for the troops who were to join in the expedition to 
follow." The dissipation of the morning fog discovered Lord Howe's 
fleet approaching the entrance to the port. He "counted fourteen 
vessels with two tiers of guns, and many frigates, thirty-six in all." 

It appears that General Pigot promptly notified General Clinton 
of the arrival of the French squadron, and the timely arrival of a 
portion of Admiral Byron's fleet enabled Admiral Howe to leave New 
York on the sixth of August with eight line-of-battle ships, five fiftys, 
two forty-fours, several light frigates, three fire ships, two bombs, and 
some smaller vessels. Unfavorable winds delayed their passage. 

The scattered fleet of the Count D'Estaing was in peril of being 
cut off by detachments. The wind was from the north east, insuring to 
him the weather gauge ; and with due promptness he gathered his 
ships and passed the channels to be ready for his adversary. For 
two days the wind remained in the same quarter. As he retained the 
weather gauge, Admiral Howe wisely declined to press up to the 
shore against such an advantage in favor of the French fleet. 

A storm of unusual severity separated and dispersed both fleets, 
just as a partial change of wind had brought them upon nearly equal 
terms of conflict. 6"/'^^;/z«« styles that storm "tremendous." Gordon 
says, " a strong gale increased to a violent tempest." Marshall says, 
'* a furious storm of wind and rain came up from the north-east, which 
blew down and almost irreparably ruined all the tents ; rendered the 
arms unfit for immediate use, and damaged the ammunition, of which 
fifty rounds had just been issued. The soldiers suffered extremely, 
and several perished in the storm, which continued for three days." 

Both fleets were seriously damaged, and during their dispersion 



1778.] FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. 45 I 

over fifty miles and more of ocean, there were frequent collisions from 
the meeting of lost ships and detachments. On the thirteenth, the 
Renown, 54, (British) Captain Dawson, fell in with the Languedoc, 
84, (flag ship) quite dismantled ; but the vicinity of six other French 
ships prevented attack. During the same evening, the Tonnant, 80, 
lost her mainmast, and would have been attacked by the Preston, 50, 
Commodore Hotham, but for the presence of other French vessels. 
On the sixteenth the Isis, 50, (British) Captain Rayner, was nearly 
stripped, in action with the Caesar, 74, but the latter vessel was severely 
handled and drew off to refit. Admiral Howe himself ran the gaunt- 
let of a portion of the French fleet and barely made New York. The 
British squadron returned to that city, and the French returned to 

Newport. 

The American army, meanwhile, had made such advances toward 
Newport as the unpropitious circumstances permitted. The move- 
ment began on the fifteenth. Colonel Henry B. Livingston, with a 
detail of fifty men from each brigade, and certain independent com- 
panies which had reported for duty during the attempt to regain 
Rhode Island, formed the advance column. General Sullivan took 
position about five miles in advance of the town, at Gibb's Farm ; 
General Greene at Middletown, on the farm afterwards known as 
Randolph's; and General La Fayette at the Boiler Garden. John 
Hancock, of Massachusetts, came forward as a general officer and 
commanded the second line. Colonel West commanded the reserve. 
General Pigott had industriously perfected the defenses during the 
delay which occurred after the first arrival of the French fleet. The 
neck of land from Coddington's Cove across to Easton's Bay and the 
pond just above it, was protected by interior and exterior lines, each 
suitably broken by redoubts. 

The interior lines extended, as will appear by reference to the 
map, and as stated in General Sullivan's report, from the sea to the 
north end of the island, having a strong redoubt at the head of the 
pass between Easton's Bay and Pond. A second redoubt twenty 
rods north of the first, had a good sweep of fire toward the hill east 
of the pond. The first line, a quarter of a mile in advance of this, 
also presented a strong redoubt eastward : and from that direction the 
American approaches were made. Well arranged abatis crossed the 
neck from Irish's redoubt, commanding the fork of the east and west 
roads which extended from that point to the north end of the island. 
The distance from Castle Hill near the main entrance of the harbor 



452 FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. [1778. 

to Butt's Hill, where the Americans made their last resistance, was 
nearly fifteen miles. Between the fifteenth and the twentieth the 
Americans had established several batteries and the British were com- 
pelled to strengthen their works by redoubts in the manner already 
stated. On the twenty-third the American army was reported by 
General Sullivan in a published circular as follows : 

" The numbers of our army amount to eight thousand one hundred 
and seventy-four, rank and file, exclusive of eight hundred artillery- 
men, the whole exceedingly well officered, and a reinforcement of 
three thousand men will probably be here in a few days." 

On the twentieth the Count D'Estaing returned to port. His 
fleet was badly crippled by the storm, and some of the ships were cut 
up by the casualties of action. Generals Greene and La Fayette 
waited upon him to urge the resumption of the original plan of attack 
upon the British works ; but he had already decided to sail for Bos- 
ton, to refit. The instructions of his sovereign were explicit, for any 
case of severe injury by tempest or in action ; viz., to make the port 
of Boston. The manifest propriety of these instructions was over- 
looked by the American officers. He was upon a distant foreign 
coast, and liable at any time to meet a British fleet. It was a vital 
matter that his ships should be kept in fighting trim. The Americans 
urged, that " he could refit at Newport." It is evident that with the 
siege of Newport on his hands, Newport was wholly unsuited to that 
purpose. His officers were nearly or quite unanimous in favor of 
literal compliance with his instructions, and he sailed for Boston on 
the twenty-second of August, just a month from his departure from 
Sandy Hook. It has been claimed that the action of his officers 
originated from jealousy of his assignment to naval command, while 
a general officer of the army. There is no occasion for that criticism. 
The French naval officers were fully appreciative of any prospect of 
success against the British troops ; but no less assured, that their 
whole future depended upon the condition of their ships. 

The Count D'Estaing, in a letter to General Sullivan on the 
morning of his return, says, " I should be culpable in my duty to 
America herself if I could for a moment think of not preserving a 
squadron destined for her defense. I regretted to Colonel Fleury, 
that you should have landed on the island a day before the time 
agreed upon between us, and I should be greatly afflicted to know 
that you are in danger. To decide upon your motives is a wrong 
which I have not committed. I have refrained from censure ; and the 



1773.] FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. 453 

twelve thousand men now under your command will probably prove 
the correctness of the step, by a success which I desire as a citizen, 
and as an admirer of your bravery and talents." 

A protest was sent to him August twenty-seventh, after he had 
sailed, signed by John Sullivan, N. Greene, John Hancock, J. Glover, 
Ezek Cornell, Wm. Whipple, John Tyler, Solomon Lovell, and John 
Fitzconnel, which overtook and annoyed him, but did not change his 
purpose ; although he gave earnest assurance that he would return as 
soon as he could do so in fighting condition. 

General Sullivan issued an intemperate general order, which he 
modified two days afterwards ; but the following sentence had gone 
before the people. " The General yet hopes the event will prove 
America able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse 
to assist in obtaining." 

The departure of the fleet depressed the American army. They 
dropped from enthusiasm to its opposite extreme, and the militia 
returned home in large numbers. The public indignation was very 
bitterly expressed. 

At this period of doubt in the American camp, a courier arrived 
from General Washington with the information that Sir Henry Clin- 
ton had left New York with four thousand troops to reinforce the 
garrison of Newport, and strongly intimated the importance of secur- 
ing a timely retreat from Rhode Island. Head winds delayed the 
transports so that General Sullivan had timely notice of the move- 
ment. On the twenty-sixth, the heavy baggage and superfluous ord- 
nance were removed in safety. On the twenty-eighth, a council of 
war decided that the army should fall back to the north end of the 
island and fortify the position, until a messenger could be sent to 
Boston to learn if Count D'Estaing was ready to return to Newport. 
General La Fayette made this trip with remarkable expedition, but 
failed to move the French General to expose his fleet until it could be 
thoroughly overhauled. It is certain that if he had responded to the 
appeal, he would have encountered a superior British force and almost 
certain destruction. As an index of the spirit in which he received 
the application, it is only necessary to say, that he offered " to lead 
his troops in person to Newport, and place himself under General 
Sullivan's orders." He says, " I was anxious to demonstrate, that my 
countrymen could not be offended by a sudden expression of feeling, 
and that he who had the honor of commanding them in America, was 



454 PROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. [177S. 

and would be at all times, one of the most devoted and zealous ser- 
vants of the United States." 

It must be the judgment of history that he did his duty to France, 
America, and himself; and under the exasperating character of the 
abuse which was heaped upon him, he vindicated the confidence of 
his sovereign in his capacity and wisdom. 

By three o'clock on the morning of the twenty-ninth, the American 
army occupied Quaker Hill and Turkey Hill with their advance 
guard, and held strong intrenchments across the north end of Rhode 
Island, and a commanding position on Butt's Hill. 

Colonel Henry B. Livingston was pushed forward by the east road, 
and Colonel John Laurens by the west road, to meet the advance. 
At a council of war which was held before morning, General Greene 
urged an attack in force upon the British, so as to cut their detach- 
ments off by superior numbers, but his opinion was overruled. The 
British soon drove the Americans from Turkey and Quaker Hills, but 
not without loss, and the Americans retired within their lines. Gen- 
eral Pigott states that he " did not know of the retreat until the 
morning, when he m^ade the following disposition of troops : Gen- 
eral Prescott and a part of Brown's corps occupied the old works 
eastward, and moved up the east shore of the island ; Brigadier-gen- 
eral Smith marched the Twenty-second and Forty-third regiments, and 
the flank companies of the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fourth by the east 
road. Major-general Losberg marched wath the Hessian chasseurs, 
and the Anspach regiments of Voit and Seaboth by the west road. 
As soon as General Smith reported the Americans to be in force on 
Quaker Hill, the Fifty-fourth British, the Hessian regiment of Huger, 
and the residue of Brown's Provincial corps were sent to his support. 
Colonel Fanning's corps of Provincials were sent by the west road to 
support General Losberg, who encountered a stubborn resistance at 
Turkey Hill." At Quaker Hill General Glover distinguished himself 
by a valiant defense, as did Colonels Livingston and Laurens. The 
American casualties were thirty killed, one hundred and thirty-seven 
wounded and forty-four missing. The British casualties were thirty- 
eight killed, two hundred and ten wounded, and a few missing. Just 
at evening the Americans made an attempt to cut off some chasseurs 
who were advancing on their right ; but General Pigott states that 
" the regiments of Fanning and Huger were ordered up to their sup- 
port, and after a smart engagement, obliged them to retreat to their 
main body on Windmill Hill." 



17-8.] FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. 455 

The Americans pitched a number of tents in front of their Hnes, 
and appeared to be diligently at work upon the defenses. A retreat 
by both Bristol and Hovvland ferries had been determined upon. The 
experience and good judgment of General Glover was conspicuous on 
this occasion, as during the retreat from Long Island in 1776. Gen- 
eral La Fayette returned from Boston at eleven o'clock, and devoted 
himself, as at Brandywine, Barren Hill, and Monmouth, to the care 
of the rear guard, and " before twelve o'clock," says General Sullivan, 
*' the main army had crossed with the stores and baggage. La Fay- 
ette brought off the pickets and other parties which covered the 
retreat in excellent order; not a man was left behind, nor the smallest 
article left." 

On the morning of the thirtieth, one hundred sail of British vessels 
appeared in sight, bringing General Clinton's army to the rescue of 
the garrison. He returned promptly to New York, however, only 
deterred from a descent upon New London, by contrary winds, which 
prevented the fleet from entering the harbor. General Grey sailed 
from Newport, with the transports, to Acushnet river; landed at 
evening, and within twenty-four hours destroyed seventy vessels. 
Bedford, Fairhaven and Martha's Vineyard were also visited. These 
posts were famous for their outfit of privateers, and six armed vessels 
of from fourteen to sixteen guns, besides warehouses and public stores, 
were destroyed, and a successful levy was made upon the inhabitants 
for ten thousand sheep and three hundred oxen. Admiral Howe 
sailed for Boston, where he arrived September first ; but being unable 
to draw the Count D'Estaing into an engagement, returned to New 
York. 

The popular clamor against the French general had not subsided. 
On the fifteenth of September, the Chevalier de Saint Sauveur was 
killed at Boston, while attempting to quiet an affray between the 
French and disorderly parties at the French bakery. The Massachu- 
setts General Assembly, on the day following, ordered a monument to 
be erected to his memory, and the judgment of good citizens was 
fully alive to the disgrace which such disorder and recrimination 
inflicted on the national cause. 

The Count D'Estaing remained at Boston until November third, 
when he sailed for the West Lidies. On the first of November, how- 
ever. Admiral Byron appeared off the harbor with a large naval force, 
but was immediately driven off by a severe storm, which so disabled 
his fleet that he was compelled to go to Newport to refit. This 



456 FROM MONMOUTH TO NEW YORK. [1778. 

o^Q&Y fought the Ocean during 1778. The passage of his fleet from 
England was disastrous ; for after the dispersion of his ships on that 
voyage, he was himself, compelled to make Halifax, before he reached 
New York. 

The first active cooperation of the French navy in support of the 
United States had resulted in no victories ; but it precipitated the 
evacuation of Philadelphia, restricted the garrison of New York to 
operations within reach of the British navy, and was a pledge of prac- 
tical sympathy in the struggle. To the nations of Europe it was the 
emphatic declaration that France was ready to maintain, as well as 
acknowledge, American Independence. 




456* 



CHAPTER LVIII. 

CAMPAIGN OF 1778. JULY TO DECEMBER. 

AFTER the failure of operations against Newport, General 
Sullivan resumed his post at Providence ; General La Fayette 
occupied Bristol, and afterwards withdrew behind Warren, out of 
reach of the British shipping, and General Greene, who was still 
Quartermastef-general, went to Boston to superintend the purchase 
of supplies for the French squadron. 

Washington retained his headquarters at White Plains, until the 
latter part of September. Upon his first return to this post, after two 
years' absence, he took occasion to contrast the two periods, thus 
writing, — '* The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous, that he 
must be worse than an infidel that lacks faith ; and more than wicked, 
that has not gratitude enough to acknowledge his obligation." It is 
not too much to say of the American Commander-in-chief, that his 
wonderful self-control over a passionate natural temper, and his 
equanimity under exasperating ordeals, owe much of their strength to 
the sentiment just quoted, so that he could devote his faculties 
entirely to duty, unhampered by such personal issues as annoyed 
many of his associates. From White Plains he removed to F"ishkill, 
and on the tenth to Fredericksburg. On the twenty-seventh he 
announced the disposition of the army for the approaching period of 
winter-quarters. 

It indicates his judgment of the relative value and exposure of 
different localities and posts. " Nine brigades on the west side of 
the Hudson River, exclusive of the garrison at West Point ; one of 
which, the North Carolina brigade, will be near Smith's Clove for the 
security of that pass, and as a reinforcement to West Point in case of 
necessity ; another, the Jersey brigade, will be at Elizabethtown, to 
cover the lower part of New Jersey ; and the other seven, consisting 



45S CAMPAIGN. — JULY TO DECEMBER. [1778. 

of the Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania troops, will be 
at Middlebrook ; six brigades will be left on the east side of the river, 
and at West Point ; three of which (of the Massachusetts troops) will 
be stationed for the immediate defense of the Highlands ; one at 
West Point, in addition to the garrison already there ; and the other 
two at Fishkill and Continental village. The remaining three brigades, 
composed of the New Hampshire and Connecticut troops and Hazen's 
regiment, will be posted in the vicinity of Danbury, for the protec- 
tion of the country lying along the Sound, to cover our magazines 
lying on Connecticut river, and to aid the Highlands on any serious 
movement of the enemy that way. The park of artillery will be 
at Pluckemin ; the cavalry will be disposed of thus: Bland's regiment 
at Winchester, Virginia ; Baylis at Frederic, or Hagerstown, Mary- 
land ; and Sheldon's at Durham, Connecticut ; Lee's corps (Colonel 
Harry Lee) will be with that part of the army which is in the Jerseys, 
acting on the advanced posts." 

General Putnam was assigned to command at Danbury ; General 
McDougall in the Highlands, and general headquarters were to be 
near Middlebrook. 

The British army. No extensive field operations took place in the 
Northern States after the battle of Monmouth. The time was draw- 
ing near when the comparative rest which the Southern States realized 
after the defense of Fort Moultrie was to be replaced by the pervasive 
activities of war, and the issues of pitched battles. The army of Gen- 
eral Clinton was largely depleted by order of the British Cabinet. 
Five thousand men were ordered to the West Indies, and three thou- 
sand men to Florida. Sir Henry Clinton says in a letter of October 
eighth, addressed to Lord Germaine, " With an army so much dimin- 
ished at New York, nothing important can be done ; especially as it 
is also weakened by sending seven hundred men to Halifax, and three 
hundred to Bermuda." 

The retreat from Monmouth involved nearly eight hundred deser- 
tions, as authentically verified, and the killed, woun-ded, and miss- 
ing, and the contingent casualties of all kinds from the time the evac- 
uation of Philadelphia began, were little less than two thousand men. 
Many died from exposure to heat, and the waste was not promptly 
replaced from England. Several restricted incursions were made 
which kept the American Commander-in-chief on the watch for the 
Highland posts ; but these became less frequent, and the year 1778 
drew near its close with a material loss of prestige to the British cause, 



1778.] CAMPAIGN.— JULY TO DECEMBER. 459 

and much of confidence on the part of the United States in final 
success. 

On the twenty-seventh of September, General Grey surprised 
Colonel Baylor's light horse at Tappan, as completely as he did Gen- 
eral Wayne's command at Paoli ; and Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, 
accompanied by Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, confirmed their ante- 
cedent custom of warfare by forays which brought little plunder and 
less intrinsic credit. 

General Cornwallis, with five thousand men, made an incursion 
into New Jersey, between the Hudson and the Hackensack, and Gen- 
eral Knyphausen, with three thousand men, operated in Westchester 
county, between the Hudson and the Bronx, but with little acquisi- 
tion of provisions or other supplies. 

On the fifteenth of October, Captain Ferguson of the Seventieth 
British regiment, with three thousand regulars and the Third New 
Jersey Volunteers, made a descent upon Little Neck, New Jersey, 
where many privateers were equipped, surprised a detachment of 
Count Pulaski's brigade at night, and inflicted a " loss of fifty killed, 
none zvoHudcd," including Lieutenant-colonel the Baron de Bose, and 
Lieutenant de la Borderie. Ferguson says in his official report, " It 
being a night attack, little quarter could of course be given ; so that 
there are only five prisoners." Colonel Pulaski vigorously pursued 
the party, inflicting some loss. 

The Indian massacres in the Wyoming Valley, from July first to 
the fourth, which were to be subsequently avenged, were followed bj' 
that of Cherry Valley, November eleventh. These were frontier 
enterprises, beyond the range of the general campaign ; but they 
made impressions upon the nation, and multiplied the embarrass- 
ments of the prosecution of the war. 

On the twenty-seventh of November, Commodore Hyde Parker 
convoyed a fleet of transports to Savannah, which carried Lieutenant- 
colonel Campbell, the Seventy-first regiment, two battalions of Hes- 
sians, four battalions of Provincial troops, and a detachment of the 
Royal artiller}', making a total force of about three thousand five 
hundred men. The troops landed at Tybee Island, about fifteen 
miles from Savannah, and captured the city on the twenty-ninth of 
December. The American force, under command of General Robert 
Howe, consisted of about eight hundred men, and with militia did 
not exceed twelve hundred. (Stedman estimates it at fifteen hundred). 
Colonel Huger's and Thompson's South Carolina regiments, Colo;iel 



460 CAMPAIGN. — JULY TO DECEMBER. [1778. 

George Walton's Georgia riflemen, one hundred men, and Colonel 
Elbert's Georgia militia fought well at an advanced position near 
Tatnal's and Wright's plantations, until resistance was hopeless. 

Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, in his official report, states that he 
was guided by a negro, through a hidden path across a swamp, upon 
the American right. This movement in force, while only demonstrat- 
ing in front, insured his success. His report states the capture of 
thirty-eight officers, four hundred and fifteen non-commissioned 
officers and privates, and forty-eight piects of cannon, twenty-three 
mortars, and ninety-four barrels of powder, besides the shipping in 
the harbor, and a large quantity of provisions. His loss is given as 
one officer Captain Peter Campbell, of Skinner's light infantry, two 
privates killed, and one sergeant, and nine privates wounded, and 
states that eighty-three American dead and eleven wounded were 
found on the field. 

Thus the Southern campaign of 1779 was inaugurated with the 
closing days of 1778. 

Notwithstanding this, the condition of General Clinton at New 
York had become critical. The position of the American army 
restricted his supplies, and compelled him to depend largely upon 
England ; and on the second day of December, he again wrote 
despondently to the British Secretary of State : — " I do not complain, 
but, my lord, do not let any thing be expected of one circumstanced 
as I am." 

TJie Northern Frontier. The British garrison at Detroit had 
taken little part in active service after its detachment retired from 
" the Cedars " in 1776, but the early western settlers were constantly 
exposed to Indian incursions ; and the defense of Boonesborough, 
Harrodsburg, and Fort Logan were conspicuous for their valor. 
Daniel Boone with thirty-seven men had been captured at last by 
Indians, was taken to Chillicothe, Ohio, and thence to Detroit. He 
was taken back to Chillicothe and adopted by the Shawnee nation. 
On the sixteenth of June, 1778, he escaped and reached Boones- 
borough, one hundred and sixty miles, as he states in his narrative, 
on the twentieth. Captain Duquesne and eleven other French 
Canadians from Detroit, acting in the name of Governor Hamilton, 
and four hundred and fifty Indians, unexpectedly attacked the fort on 
the twentieth of August but were repulsed. 

A small British garrison had been placed at Kaskaskia (Randolph 
county, Illinois), but this force had been withdrawn to Detroit upon 



1778.] CAMPAIGN.— JULY TO DECEMBER. 46 1 

the American invasion of Canada in 1775, and the command of the 
post was intrusted to a Frenchman by the name of Rocheblave. 

Under the patronage of Thomas Jefferson, George Mason and 
George Wythe, of Virginia, Colonel George Rogers Clark left Williams- 
burg, Virginia, on the fourth of January, 1778, and on the fourth of 
July captured Kaskaskia. While descending the Ohio he heard of 
the alliance with France and from Kaskaskia he moved toward the 
French settlement at Vincennes (Knox county, Indiana) and there 
established himself, with the declared purpose of conquering the north- 
west. Lieutenant Governor Hamilton left Detroit on the seventh of 
October and recovered Vincennes on the seventeenth of December, 
postponing operations to recover Illinois until spring. Thus the 
extreme west began to engage in the general war. 

Miscellaneous Events. The French alliance had been an impres- 
sive sign of the American progress toward recognition among the 
nations. All efforts to compromise still failed, and the military opin- 
ions of General Amherst received no attention. 

On the nineteenth of March the constitution had been adopted, 
to take effect the twenty-ninth of November. 

Another expedition to conquer Canada was proposed, to be under 
the command of La Fayette, associated with the Count D'Estaing. 
Detroit, Niagara, Oswego, Montreal and Halifax were to be sepa- 
rate objectives of one grand movement ; but the wisdom of Washing- 
ton postponed, and afterwards induced Congress to reject the scheme. 

The year 1778 closed ; but the American Congress had no money, 
and the loose union of the States was constantly evoking sectional 
jealousies. The Commander-in-chief declared that "the States 
separately were too much engaged in their local concerns, when the 
great business of a nation, the momentous concerns of an empire, 
were at stake." 

Bancroft thus embodies his sentiment. " He who in the beginning 
of the revolution used to call Virginia his country, from this time 
never ceased his efforts, by conversation and correspondence, to train 
the statesmen of America, especially of his beloved native common- 
wealth, to the work of consolidating the Union." 

Upon visiting Philadelphia at the close of the year, he addressed 
a letter to Colonel Harrison, Speaker of the Virginia House of Dele- 
gates, which solemnly declared his apprehensions for the future. He 
urged Virginia to" send the best and ablest of her men to Congress," 
and thus continues: "They must not slumber nor sleep at home in 



462 CAMPAIGN. — JULY TO DECEMBER. [1778. 

such a time of pressing danger ; — content with the enjoyment of 
places of honor or profit in their own States while the common inter- 
ests of America are mouldering and sinking into inevitable ruin." 
. . . " If I were to draw a picture of the times and men, from 
what I have seen, heard, and in part know, I should in one word say 
that idleness, dissipation and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold 
of most of them ; that speculation, peculation and an insatiable thirst 
for riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration 
and almost of every order of men ; that party disputes and personal 
quarrels are the great business of the day ; . . . while a great and 
accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of 
credit, which in its consequences is the want of every thing, are but 
secondary considerations, if our affairs wore the most promising 
aspect ; . . . An assembly, a concert, a dinner, a supper, will not 
only take men off from acting in this business, but even from think- 
ing of it ; while a great part of the officers of our army, from absolute 
necessity, are quitting the service, and the more virtuous few, rather 
than do this, are sinking by sure degrees into beggary and want." 

His convictions were embodied in one sentence. " Our affairs are 
in a more distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition than they have 
been since the commencement of the war." 

British Effective Force. 
Note. From " Original Returns in the British Record Office." Date August 15th, 1778 

New York 15,886 Long Island 8117 

Staten Island 3.244 Rhode Island 5189 

Paulus Hook 456 With Lord Howe's Fleet 512 



19,586 1447S 

Total 34,064. 
This force reduced by detachments sent to the West Indies and Halifax, was taken up 
November, i, 1778, as follows : 

New York 9508 Paulus Hook 419 

Long Island 5630 Providence Island 225 

Staten Island 972 Rhode Island 574° 



16,170 

Total, 22,554. 



CHAPTER LIX. 

JANUARY TO JULY, 1779. POSITION OF THE ARMIES. INCIDENTS 
OF THE GENERAL CAMPAIGN. 

THE year 1779 opened without offensive actions on the part of 
either of the armies in the Northern States. The garrison of 
New York made no demonstration of importance in any direction ; 
and Washington spent the greater part of January in urging Congress 
to take active measures to recruit the army. It was not until the 
ninth of March that eighty regular battalions were authorized, and it 
was found almost impossible to obtain funds, by loan or taxation, to 
maintain the troops already on duty. 

The garrison of Philadelphia was passing through an idle experi- 
ence, similar to that of the British garrison of the previous year. 
Congress itself seemed enervated by the temporary suspension of 
active hostilities. While General Clinton was inactive at New York, 
General Washington resolved to employ a portion of the army in 
punishing the Indians who had devastated Wyoming and Cherry 
Valleys the previous year. New Jersey troops were assigned to this 
duty, but refused to march until provision was made for the support 
of their f;imilies. The State legislature provided money to pay the 
officers and men, and order was restored. The immediate elements 
of the Southern campaign postponed the expedition to Wyoming 
Valley ; but Colonel Schaick, Lieutenant-colonel Willett, and Major 
Cochran, surprised the towns of the Onondagas, in New York, and on 
the nineteenth of April destroyed the whole settlement without loss. 

The Confederate money soon depreciated so as to be worth but 
three or four cents on the dollar, and Washington was constrained 
to offer his own estate for sale to meet his actual necessities. Before 
fall the issue of two hundred millions of paper money was authorized, 
and measures were taken to obtain a loan in Europe. 

Major-general Benjamin Lincoln had arrived at Charleston on the 



464 JANUARY TO JULY. [1779. 

first of December preceding, superseding Brigadier-general Robert 
Howe, in command of the American troops. During January, Gen- 
eral Prevost captured Sunbury, and Colonel Campbell occupied 
Augusta. 

General Lincoln's command consisted of one thousand one hundred 
and twenty-one regular troops, and a force of raw militia which made the 
^ggfegate three thousand six hundred and thirty-nine. He advanced 
to Perrysburg on the east bank of the Savannah a few miles north 
of that city to prevent the crossing into South Carolina of General 
Prevost's army, then on the opposite bank, and three thousand strong, 
besides Georgia Provincials. Neither army was inclined to force a 
passage, but two companies of the Sixtieth, and one company of the 
Sixteenth British regiments made a diversion toward Beaufort, for the 
purpose of securing a footing upon Port Royal, a large island seventy- 
five miles south-west of Charleston. 

Colonel William Moultrie was sent to the rescue. He crossed to 
the island with a force of three hundred militia, one small gun, and 
nine regulars, including Captain De Trevills, and after a spirited 
skirmish repulsed the attack. 

On the fourteenth, Colonel Andrew Pickens, of South Carolina, 
and Colonel Dooley, of Georgia, with three hundred men, surprised 
Colonel Boyd's Provincials on the north side of Kettle Creek, in 
Wilkes county, Georgia. 

On the third of March, General Lincoln sent General Williamson 
with twelve hundred men up the river to take position opposite 
Augusta ; General Rutherford with nearly eight hundred men to the 
Black Swamp; and General Ashe with fifteen hundred North Carolina 
militia and some Georgia Continental troops, was sent, with orders to 
cross the river at Augusta (which the British had abandoned), and to 
move down the west side of the river. This detachment went into 
camp in the angle of Briar creek and the Savannah, thirteen miles 
above the British army. The American position was very strong by 
nature, as Briar creek was deep and broad ; but the right flank was 
left entirely exposed. General Prevost's report to Lord Germaine 
states that " while dispositions were made to keep Mr. (General) 
Lincoln in check. Major McPherson, with the first battalion of the 
Seventy-first, and some irregulars, with two field pieces, was directed 
to advance toward Briar creek bridge ; while Lieutenant-colonel Pre- 
vost with the second battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, a corps 
of light infantry commanded by Sir James Baird, and three companies 



1779-] JANUARY TO JULY. 465 

of grenadiers, made a long circuit of fifty miles, surprised the Ameri- 
can army and routed it thoroughly." 

Seven cannon and a thousand arms were captured, as well as Gen- 
eral Elbert, Colonel Mcintosh, several other officers, and nearly two 
hundred men. Nearly an equal number were supposed to have been 
lost in the action, or in flight through the swamps and the residue, 
with the exception of four or five hundred men, retired to their homes, 
and did not rejoin General Lincoln at Charleston. Governor Rut- 
ledge had been re-elected governor, and the people assembled at 
Orangeburg, with a spirit similar to that which had been aroused 
during 1776. 

On the twenty-third of April, General Lincoln again crossed the 
Savannah river, but after fruitless marching, the American army 
again retreated to Charleston. General Prevost promptly advanced 
and demanded the surrender of the city. General Pulaski gained 
credit in skirmishing before the town, and the vigorous action of 
Rutledge, Moultrie, Laurens and others, overcame the fears of many 
citizens who were ready to submit. 

On the thirteenth the British withdrew ; and on the twentieth a 
vigorous attack was made upon a post retained by them at Stono 
Ferry, which failed for want of full concert in the attack, and prompt 
support. The British troops retired to Savannah, after establishing a 
post at Port Royal. 

Congress seemed incapable of realizing the impending desolation 
which must follow a strong invasion of the Southern States, and 
Washington was powerless to furnish the aid required, so long as 
General Clinton occupied New York. 

General Greene asked permission to go to the Southern States, 
but his assignment was not authorized by Congress, although approved 
by the Commander-in-chief. The utmost that could be done was to 
authorize a portion of the regular troops, which belonged to the 
Southern Department, to return to that section for service. 

La Fayette, finding that active duty was not contemplated, sailed 
for France in the American frigate Alliance, with the best wishes of 
the people he had served so intelligently and so well. 

At the extreme west, the American forces at Kaskaskia resolved 
to anticipate the threats of Lieutenant-governor Hamilton, who was 
still at Vincennes, and had announced his purpose to reduce the 
Illinois country to submission. Colonel Clark, after great trials and 
an extraordinary march, captured Vincennes on the twenty-fourth of 
30 



466 JANUARY TO JULY. [1779. 

February; and shortly after, sixty of his men ascended the Wabash 
river, with armed boats, and captured a large supply of goods en route 
from Detroit. A thousand troops were raised by North Carolina and 
Virginia to strengthen the frontier, and under the wise support of 
Thomas Jefferson, then Governor of Virginia, that region was placed 
in a condition for defense. 

The Middle States were not without their experience in that 
class of warfare which characterized the greater part of the campaign 
of 1779. 

General Matthews left New York with two thousand troops and 
five hundred marines, late in April, anchored in Hampton Roads 
on the ninth of May, laid waste Portsmouth and Norfork, destroyed 
over a hundred vessels, and returned to New York within the month, 
having taken seventeen prizes, and at least three thousand hogsheads 
of tobacco. 

The first six months of 1779 ^'^^ ^ severe test of the endurance 
of the bankrupt Republic, and an equally severe test of the patriotism 
of the Southern States, which began to feel the pressure from rapidly 
augmenting hostile forces, while the general government was power- 
less to render them adequate aid for defense. Thus far the campaign 
had been exhaustive, without many critical issues to arouse the 
people to a passionate resistance. 

One single demonstration was made by General Clinton, which 
seemed to have in view the reduction of the Highland posts, and this 
confirmed the policy of Washington in retaining his army in such a 
position that he could quickly reach the Hudson river. On the 
thirteenth of May General Clinton ascended the river, accompanied by 
General Vaughan, under convoy of the fleet of Sir George Collier, and 
took possession of Verplanck's Point and Stony Point. The latter post 
was being fortified, but by a very small force, entirely inadequate to 
resist a naval attack. It really had little defensive value ; but the 
two posts taken together formed the lower passage to the Highlands, 
and their occupation by the British troops would be a standing menace 
to West Point. The Seventeenth British regiment, the grenadier 
companies of the Seventy-first, and artillery, under Lieutenant-colonel 
Webster, were placed at Stony Point ; a garrison of equal strength 
was left at Verplanck's, each covered by the presence of several small 
frigates and sloops of war, and General Clinton retired with the main 
body to Yonkers. 

The American army was removed from Middlebrook to Smith's 



1779-] JANUARY TO JULY. 467 

Clove early in the month. On the twenty-third, Washin^^^ton removed 
his headquarters to New Windsor, leaving General Putnam in com- 
mand. General Heath was ordered from Boston, and Ganeral Wayne 
was stationed between the Clove and Fort Montgomery, near Dunder- 
berg mountain. 

Such were the modified positions of the two armies of the northern 
zone, at the close of June, 1779. 

Bkittsh Effective Force. 

Note. From "Original Returns in the British Record Office." Date, Feb. 15th, 1779. 

New York 9i(:o Nova Scotia 301 1 

Long Island 5714 Georgia 4330 

Staten Island 1619 Bermuda 240 

Paulus Hook 3S7 Providence Island 240 

Rhode Island 5642 

7821 

Total, 30,283. 



22,462 



S.\ME, May 1st, 1779. 

New York 9123 Halifax 3677 

Long Island 6056 Georgia 4794 

Staten Island 1344 West Florida 1703 

Paulus Hook 383 Bermuda and Providence Island. . . 470 

Hoboken 264 

Rhode Island 5644 10,644 

22,814 

Total, 33, 458. 



CHAPTER LX. 

JULY TO DECEMBER, 1779. DESOLATING INCURSIONS. MINOR 

MENTION. 

AS the first of July perfected the lodgment of British troops at 
the entrance to the Highlands ; so it witnessed renewed activ- 
ity of their northern army, by detachments. On the second, at eleven 
o'clock at night, Lieutenant-colonel Banastre Tarleton, from his camp 
on the river Bronx, made report of his operations during the previous 
twenty-four hours. With seventy of the Seventeenth light dragoons, 
a part of the Legion infantry and cavalry, (Tarleton's) Queen's Rangers, 
Hessians, and some mounted Yagers, two hundred men, he passed 
North Castle Meeting House, and through Bedford to Pound-Ridge, 
to surprise Colonel Sheldon, who commanded a force of about ninety 
cavalry at that point. The British troops pursued the partially sur- 
prised Americans nearly to Salem ; burned the Presbyterian Meet- 
ing House and some dwellings, captured Sheldon's colors which had 
been accidentally left in their quarters, — some baggage of the officers, 
and a few arms ; but inflicted and received small loss. Lieutenant- 
colonel Tarleton says, " I proposed to the militia terms ; that if they 
would not fire from buildings, I would not burn. They persisted in 
firing, till the torch stopped their progress." The retreat was fol- 
lowed up by the militia, availing themselves of fences and other 
obstructions which shortened the expedition and made it unprofitable. 
On the third of July General Tryon left New York with two 
thousand six hundred men, under convoy of the fleet of Sir George 
Collier, to invade Connecticut. In the report of the latter officer to 
Mr. Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty, he states, that he " first 
sent the Renown, Thames, Otter, and two armed vessels, to block up 
New London harbor and the east entrance to the Sound, and pro- 
ceeded from New York, via Hell Gate, with his Majesty's ships 
Camilla, Scorpion, Halifax (brig) and Hussar (galley) together with 



1779] JULY TO DECEMBER, 469 

the transports, and on the fifth landed the army, in two divisions, at 
New Haven. 

On Sunday, July 4th, the day before General Tryon landed, he 
issued a proclamation which foreshadowed his purposes. A single 
extract is given, to illustrate its character : " The ungenerous and 
wanton insurrections against the sovereignty of Great Britain, into 
which this colony had been deluded by the artifices of designing men, 
for private purposes, might well justify in you every fear which con- 
scious guilt could form, respecting the intentions of the present arma- 
ment. The existence of a single habitation on your defenseless coast 
ought to be a subject of constant reproof to your ingratitude." The 
people to whom this was addressed, were preparing, so soon as the 
Sabbath should pass, to honor the day upon which his proclamation 
was dated. General Tryon reports, that " the first division, consisting 
of the Guards, Fusileers, Fifty-fourth regiment, and a detachment of 
Yagers, with four field pieces, under Brigadier-general Garth, landed 
about five o'clock (a, M.) a mile south of West Haven, and began 
their march, making a circuit of upwards of seven miles, to head off a 
creek on the western side of the town. Before noon, after the return 
of the boats, General Tryon, in person, disembarked with the Hes- 
sians, Landgraves and " King's American " regiments and two pieces 
of cannon, on the eastern side of the harbor, and instantly began the 
march of three miles, to the ferry from New Haven, east to Brentford, 
" (Branford)." The Rock battery (Fort Hale) was then occupied, 
and the armed vessels entered the Bay. " General Garth got into 
the town, not without opposition, loss and fatigue, and reported at 
half-past one, that he should begin the conflagration which he thought 
it wanted. In the morning, the first division embarked at the south- 
east part of the town, crossed the ferry, and joined the other on the 
East Haven side. In their progress on the preceding day from West 
Haven they were under continual fire ; but the rebels were every where 
repulsed. The next morning, as there was not a shot fired to molest 
the retreat, General Garth changed his design and destroyed only 
the pu'olic stores, some vessels and ordnance, excepting six field- 
pieces and an armed privateer which were brought off. The troops 
reembarked at Rock-Fort and anchored on the morning of the 
eighth off the village of Fairfield." 

The landing of General Garth was at Savin Rock. At the " West 
Haven Green," Captain James Hillhouse, with a party of students 
from Yale College and other young men of the city, made a courageous 



470 JULY TO DECEMBER. [1779. 

resistance ; throwing the British light troops back upon the main 
body. The plank had been taken from the bridge where the Milford 
turnpike crossed West River, and at this point Adjutant Campbell of 
the guards was killed, and Rev, Naphtalie Daggett, afterwards Presi- 
dent of Yale College, was made a prisoner, and suffered much per- 
sonal violence. The British troops fell back, passed up the western 
bank of the river, crossed at Thompson's bridge and entered the town 
on the old Derby road by the way of Hotchkissville, coming into 
Chapel street from the west, a little before two o'clock in the after- 
noon. General Tryon landed at Light House Point. After General 
Garth joined General Tryon in the evening, the troops found that it 
was impossible to obtain control of the Neck-bridge, and his division 
remained north of the town without crossing ; while General Tryon 
remained on the East Haven Heights. The American loss is stated 
in the Connecticut Journal of July 17th, 1779, at twenty-two killed, 
and seventeen wounded. General Tryon states his own loss at two 
officers and seven men killed ; three officers and thirty-seven men 
wounded and twenty-five missing. 

The pecuniary damage was stated by a committee of the General 
Assembly of Connecticut, appointed in October, 1779, ^^ have been 
of the cash value of twenty-four thousand eight hundred and ninety- 
three pounds, seven shillings and sixpence, besides Continental money 
which was destroyed. Several prominent citizens were taken away 
by the fleet. 

On the eighth and ninth of July, Fairfield was burned, including 
two meeting-houses, eighty-three dwelling houses and shops, two 
school-houses, the jail, and the county house ; of " the total estimated 
cash value of ;^34,559 5^. and 6d. The estimates were based upon 
the money value of 1774." 

The British loss is reported by General Tryon, as nine killed, thirty 
wounded, and five missing. General Tryon says in his report, *' I 
regret the loss of two places of public worship at Fairfield, which took 
fire unintentionally from the flakes from the buildings, and I gave 
strict orders for the preservation of that of Norwalk." Lord Ger- 
maine wrote to General Clinton, November fourth, "You will acquaint 
General Tryon and the officers that were under his care that their 
conduct has met with his majesty's approbation ; but I can not help 
lamenting with you, that the behavior of the rebels in firing from 
their houses upon the troops, rendered it necessary to make use of 
severities that are ever painful to British soldiers to inflict ; but were 



1779-] JULY TO DECEMBER. 47 1 

such as are justified by the general practices of all nations upon such 
occasions." 

Lord Germaine's statement simply indicates how utterly incapable 
he was of appreciating the character of the war, and of distinguishing 
a contest between armies, from marauding expeditions against the 
homes of a civilized people. Green Farms, near by, suffered the loss 
of the meeting-house, fourteen dwellings, thirteen barns, and a store, 
" valued in all at ^3904 lys.'' 

The fleet crossed the Sound to Huntington, Long Island, for sup- 
plies, and on the eleventh returned to the Connecticut shore, and 
anchored five miles from the bay of Norvvalk. A landing was effected 
that night by General Fraser at the Cow Pasture, " a peninsula on the 
east side of the harbor, within a mile and a half of the bridge which 
formed the communication between the east and west parts of the vil- 
lage, nearly equally divided by a salt creek." 

The second division under General Garth landed at the "old well," 
on the west side of the harbor. Sir George Collier sums up the 
operations briefly: "For the treaclierous conduct of the rebels in 
murdering the troops from windows of houses after safe-guards were 
granted them, the town of Norwalk was destroyed, with five large 
vessels, two privateer brigs on the stocks, two saw mills, considerable 
salt works, several warehouses of stores, merchandise, etc. The small 
town of Greenfield suffered the same chastisement." 

" The rebels firing from the windows and the tops of houses, occa- 
sioned the band of royal refugees to set several of these on fire, which 
communicating to others, burned the whole town, and also several 
whale boats." 

General Parsons arrived with two thousand troops, but too late to 
prevent the destruction of the town. 

On the thirteenth the expedition returned to New York. Gen- 
eral Washington was engaged on the sixth in inspecting out-posts, 
and on the seventh first learned that troops had been sent toward 
Connecticut. An express was sent to Governor Trumbull. Glover's 
brigade, then at Providence, was ordered to cooperate with the militia, 
in case the enemy should make a descent ; but the expedition had 
accomplished its mission before the orders were received. 

This incursion has been thus referred to, in order to illustrate the 
character of that warfare which only incites resistance, embitters the 
struggle, and makes submission possible, only through extermination 
and ruin. 



472 JULY TO DECEMBER. [1779. 

The British army was not furnished with the necessary reinforce- 
ments to contend in the field ; and its activities were expended in 
forays which barbarized the soldiers and made subsequent small 
reinforcements useless. 

The discussions embraced under " Statesmanship in War," and 
" Civil Wars," afford the key to this mode of warfare. The atrocities 
committed on either side, originated almost entirely in the employ- 
ment of European mercenaries, Provincials, Royal refugees, and 
Indians. The Legionary troops and American partisan corps invari- 
ably took large liberties, reciprocated personal violence, and disre- 
garded those principles of war between civilized nations, which as a 
general rule, were honorably regarded by the British and American 
regular troops. 

The invasion of Connecticut was immediately followed by a strictly 
military expedition of characteristic boldness and distinguished suc- 
cess. As early as the tenth, Washington organized an expedition 
against Stony Point, the execution of which was intrusted to General 
Wayne. The plans finally adopted were substantially those of the 
Commander-in-chief. The details laid down by him were carefully 
executed by General Wayne. 

The British garrison had been supplied with heavy guns, and 
strong defenses had been well advanced during the preceding six 
weeks of British occupation. Breastworks and batteries were built in 
advance of the fort, and two rows of abatis crossed the slope to the 
rear. The American right consisted of Colonel Febiger's regiment in 
front, followed by Colonel Webb's (Lieutenant-colonel Meigs com- 
manding), and a detachment from West Point under Major Hull. 

Colonel Butler's regiment, and two companies of North Carolina 
troops under Major Murphy, formed the left wing. Colonel Lee's 
light horse formed the reserve, and the brigade of General Muhlen- 
berg, three hundred strong, which had been so manoeuvered as not to 
lead vagrants or spies to anticipate its ultimate destination, formed the 
covering party, and took post on the opposite side of the swamp. 

The troops left Sandy Beach at midnight of the fifteenth and 
marched by single files, over mountains, through deep morasses and 
difficult defiles. At eight o'clock on the evening of the sixteenth, 
the troops were within a mile and a half of the fort ; and the columns 
of attack were rapidly formed, as previously designated in orders. A 
reconnoissance was made by Wayne, in person, and at half-past eleven 
the advance was ordered. One hundred and fifty volunteers, with 



1779-] JULY TO DECEMBER. 473 

fixed bayonets and unloaded muskets, under Lieutenant-colonel 
Fleury, led by a forlorn hope of twenty men under Lieutenant Gib- 
bon of the Sixth Pennsylvania, formed the extreme right ; and one 
hundred volunteers under Lieutenant Knox of Ninth Pennsylvania, 
led by a similar party of twenty, formed the extreme left. 

To avoid the possibility of any deserter giving warning to the 
garrison, the previous purpose of the expedition was not disclosed 
until the final formation for the attack. The following order had 
been given, " If any soldier presume to take his musket from his 
shoulder, — -attempt to fire, or begin the battle, till ordered by his 
proper officer, he shall be instantly put to death by the officer next 
him." 

The full tide made the morass more difficult of passage, and the 
advance of Major Murphy, in the centre, was somewhat delayed. 
The right column fell in with an outpost which gave the alarm. Major 
Murphy's column advanced immediately, as if it were the only attack- 
ing party, and received a heavy fire of musketry and grape shot. 
Each officer and soldier, at the suggestion of Washington, had been 
directed to fix a piece of white paper to his cap, to distinguish him 
from an enemy, and a watchword " the fort is ours " had been given 
for each detachment to shoiit aloud, as they gained the positions they 
were ordered to attack " thus to prevent confusion and mistakes." 
The troops had been carefully drafted by Washington himself. A 
reward of five hundred dollars and immediate promotion, was offered 
the first man who entered the works ; and one hundred dollars to 
each of the four, next in turn." 

General Wayne, in person, led Febiger's solid column, half platoon 
front, followed by the other troops of the right wing; and Colonel 
Butler advanced, on his left, with the second division. The abatis 
were wrenched away by the pioneer corps. Every detachment moved 
on its course as if crowded by som.e resistless, unseen power, and the 
two assaulting columns met in the centre of the works, about the 
same moment. 

General Wayne fell, while passing the abatis, wounded in the head, 
but not dangerously, by a musket ball ; and the total American loss ' '^, 

was only fifteen killed and eighty-three wounded. ^ ' 

The British casualties were one officer and nineteen men killed, 
six officers and sixty-eight men wounded, two officers and fifty-six 
men missing ; twenty-five officers and four hundred and forty-seven 
men taken prisoners. The stores, valued at 158,640 dollars, were 



474 JULY TO DECEMBER. [1779. 

divided among the troops, in proportion to the pay of the officers 
and men. 

The extraordinary and literal success of this movement, as planned, 
is due to Washington's mature preparation, and the no less remark- 
able faithfulness and skill of Wayne and his entire force. It was dis- 
tinguished by a courtesy to prisoners and an entire absence of vio- 
lence, after the surrender, which received high praise from British 
officials. 

General Clinton moved up the river to cover Verplanck's Point 
from threatened attack, and General Sterling was detailed to attempt 
the recapture of the post ; but it was abandoned by the Americans, 
as untenable, after removal of the stores, and the British troops 
resumed possession. 

A second expedition, undertaken in July, without the sanction 
of Washington, was less fortunate. General McLean of the British 
army commanding at Halifax, established a post of six hundred men, 
on the site of the present town of Castine, Maine, on Penobscot Bay. 
The State of Massachusetts organized an expedition to reduce the 
post. Nineteen armed vessels carrying three hundred guns, and 
twenty-four transports carrying about a thousand men, entered that 
bay July twenty-fifth, and landed on the twenty-eighth. It was a 
failure from that moment. The troops were too few to storm the 
works; the armed ships were too ignorantly handled by an officer of 
militia, to make an impression, and the subsequent arrival of Sir George 
Collier with a sixty-four gun ship and five frigates, insured the disper- 
sion of the American troops. 

Twenty-four transports and the following armed vessels were 
burned. Brigs: Active, 16; Defence, 16; Hazard, 16; Diligence, 
14; — The Providence (sloop) 14; was blown up. The Nancy, 16; 
and Rover, 10, (sloops) were captured ; and the Spring-Bird, 10, (sloop) 
was burned. 

On the twenty-second of July, Joseph Brandt led a party of Indians 
and disguised royalists into Orange County, New York, laying waste 
and destroying as they went, and at Minisink, ten miles west of 
Goshen, on the Neversink river, burned the church, houses and other 
property. Count Pulaski had quartered in the vicinity during the 
previous winter ; but when he was ordered south, no troops were 
ordered to take his place. Application was made to Colonels Hathorn, 
Tuston, and Major Meeker of the militia for aid. An ill-managed 
pursuit, an ambuscade, and a massacre followed. Forty-four were 



! 



I779-I JULY TO DECEMBER. 471, 

killed in the field; and of one hundred and forty-nine who engaged 
in the enterprise, only thirty returned to tell their story. 

In contrast with this expedition, and more like Wayne's assault 
of Stony Point, was Major Henry Lee's capture of Paulus Hook, 
directly opposite New York, where Jersey City now stands. The 
Hook, so called, was an island at high water, and here the British 
authorities had established an outpost of New York. A detachment 
from the Sixty-fourth British regiment, and a few Hessians occupied 
it. The Americans, four hundred in number, crossed the Hackensack, 
marched down the w^est bank of the Hudson, and stormed the works, 
using the bayonet only, not a shot having been fired. The assault 
was made at half past two o'clock on the morning of August nine- 
teenth. The American loss was twenty, and that of the British fifty, 
and one hundred and fifty-eight prisoners. The retreat was accom- 
plished with difficulty, but safely ; the march having been at least 
thirty miles, over mountains, through morasses and defiles, with their 
rear threatened by a considerable force. 

A single additional expedition is mentioned, that of General Sul- 
livan against the Seneca Indians. The command was tendered to 
General Gates on the sixth of March, when the expedition was first 
authorized by Congress. An enclosed letter tendered the command 
to General Sullivan, if General Gates declined the command, in which 
event he was to relieve General Sullivan, then at Providence. Gen- 
eral Gates, then at Boston, wrote under date of March i6th : " Last 
night I had the honor of your excellency's letter. The man who 
undertakes the Indian service should enjoy youth and strength, 
requisites I do not possess. It therefore grieves me, that your excel- 
lency should offer me command to which I am entirely unequal. In 
obedience to your command, I have forwarded your letter to General 
Sullivan, and that he may not be one moment detained, I have 
desired him to leave the command with General Glover, until I arrive 
in Providence.'' 

General Sullivan marched from Easton, Pennsylvania, to Wyoming, 
reaching the valley on the last of July, and Tioga Point, New York, 
August eighth. General James Clinton commanded the northern 
division, and joined General Sullivan on the twenty-second of August. 
The additional brigades of Generals Hand, Poor, and Maxwell, Major 
Parr's rifle corps, and Proctor's artillery were attached to the com- 
mand, making a total force of five thousand men. On the twenty- 
ninth, the battle of Chemung was fought, near the present site of 



476 JULY TO DECEMBER. [1779. 

Elmira. The American loss was seven killed ; that of the enemy, 
unknown. The towns of the " Six Nations" were laid waste. Or- 
chards, gardens, houses, cabins, clothing, provisions, and life, suffered 
indiscriminately, and the expedition, which returned in September, 
failed to put an end to Indian aggression, and equally failed to recom- 
mend Christian civilization by any contrast of its warfare with that of 
the enemies it was sent to punish. 

The numerous minor operations of the year 1779, thus briefly 
outlined, have been illustrative of the war which centered in the 
movements of large armies; and as they fill the gap between pitched 
battles, are used to illustrate the extent of the war, and the characters 
whose military record is made up of the minor, as well as more prom- 
inent, events of the campaigns. 

The year did not close however, without one conspicuous action, 
and that entailed upon the Southern States a series of struggles which 
lasted until the close of the war. 

Admiral Arbuthnot arrived at New York, August twenty-fifth, 
with reinforcements, not greatly exceeding three thousand men, and 
relieved Sir George Collier. Sir Andrew Hammond arrived with an 
additional force of fifteen hundred men from Cork, on the twenty- 
first of September. The French squadron of Count D'Estaing having 
captured St. Vincents and Granada, suddenly appeared on the coast 
of Georgia. 

Spain had joined France in war against Great Britain, and the 
whole line of British posts, from Halifax to St. Augustine, was exposed 
to such naval attacks as these two powers might attempt, to divert 
attention from their more direct operations against her West India 
possessions. These small British reinforcements did not warrant any 
attempt upon West Point, which Washington was strengthening with 
great industry ; and Sir Henry Clinton rightly apprehended an attack 
upon New York itself, by a cooperation of the French fleet with the 
American army. 

General Clinton abandoned Newport, October twenty-fifth, then 
Stony Point and Verplanck's Point, so that New England and the 
Hudson river were free from British restraint. 

The military operations for the season terminated with the siege 
of Savannah and the departure of Sir Henry CUnton from New York, 
to again attempt the capture of Charleston. 



CHAPTER LXI. 

SIEGE OF SAVANNAH. GENERAL CLINTON SAILS FOR 
CHARLESTON, 1779. 

GOVERNOR RUTLEDGE, of South Carolina, and General 
Lincoln, then stationed at Charleston, were alike convinced 
that the recovery of Savannah was the best method of protecting 
South Carolina and rescuing the State of Georgia from British con- 
trol. As early as July twentieth, Governor Wright had returned 
from England and resumed office at once. The season was approach- 
ing when the West India harbors were liable to hurricanes or sudden 
tempest, and the suspension of naval operations in those waters, after 
the French capture of Granada, afforded a plausible opportunity for an 
appeal to Count D'Estaing to employ his fleet against Savannah. 
Monsieur Plombard, the French Consul at Charleston, concurred in 
the feasibility of the movement, and messengers were at once sent to 
the French commander to urge his cooperation. He thoroughly 
approved the plan, and sailed immediately for the American coast. 
A division of two ships and three frigates was sent to Charleston to 
perfect the details of operations, and the remainder of his squadron, 
consisting of twenty ships of the line, two fiftys and eleven frigates, 
with six thousand troops, appeared off Tybee Island near Savannah, 
on the eighth of September, and on the ninth, anchored off the bar. 
The Experiment, 50, (British) Sir James Wallace commanding, and 
two store ships were captured near the harbor entrance, and the 
Ariel, 24, which had been cruising off Charleston bar, shared the 
same fate. 

Reference is made to map " Siege of Savann.ih " which is chiefly 
copied from the survey of a British officer of the garrison, and was 
engraved for Stedman in 1794. 

Several of the ships had been seen off the coast as early as the 
fourth, and the detachment which sailed for Charleston had given 



478 SIEGE OF SAVANNAH. [1779. 

still earlier warning, so that a dispatch-vessel had been sent to General 
Clinton to give notice of their presence on the coast. It does not 
appear, from the report of General Prevost, then in command at 
Savannah, that he was confident of their purpose to attack Savannah, 
until about the eighth; but from the first intimation of the appear- 
ance of French ships, he industriously applied himself to strengthen- 
ing his defenses. The smaller armed vessels then in port were moved 
up the river, and their guns and seamen were transferred to the city. 
A horse-shoe battery was at once built on the extreme right of the 
town and entrusted to the care of sailors. The Fowey, Rose, Keppel 
and Germaine were kept in service and were so stationed as to defend 
the harbor passage from a landing by boats, or to retire up the river, 
as might be deemed necessary. Captain Henry's dispatch to the Ad- 
miralty, of November eighth, states that every exertion was then 
being made to increase the fortifications of the town. The buoys 
were removed from the harbor entrance, a large number of negroes 
were impressed and put at work ; new redoubts of palmetto logs, 
inter-filled with sand, were erected ; a strong line of palisades was 
completed, and an inner line of detached, but mutually supporting 
earth-works, were added to the lines. Reliefs of troops and negroes 
were assigned to duty, so that the labor was incessant, by night as 
well as by day. Captain Moncrieff, a distinguished engineer, had 
charge of the preparations ; and every hour of protracted delay in 
making the investment was earnestly improved by the garrison in 
preparation to resist an attack. 

As the purpose of the enemy unfolded, the guns were removed 
from the " Rose," already unseaworthy, and it w^as sunken with the 
Savannah and other vessels, in the channel. The Germaine retained 
her armament and was stationed off the horse-shoe redoubt, to flank 
the lines on the right of the town. 

Lieutenant-colonel Conger was then at Sunbury with a small 
detachment, and Lieutenant-colonel Maitland was at Beaufort with a 
force of eight hundred excellent troops. Both officers were ordered 
to report at Savannah, with their commands. 

The American authorities at Charleston took hold of the enter 
prise with great zeal, and sent galleys with other small vessels to assist 
the French in landing. This fleet of small craft promptly took on 
board three thousand five hundred and twenty-four French troops 
and passed up Ossabaw inlet to Bieulien, about twelve miles from 
Savannah, where they were landed under cover of four armed galleys. 



I779-] SIEGE OF SAVANNAH. 479 

The command marched immediately to Savannah, and on the six- 
teenth the Count D'Estaing summoned the garrison "to surrender 
to the arms of the King of France." . . . General Prevost had 
decHned an unconditional surrender and invited terms. A truce of 
twenty-four hours was granted by Count D'Estaing ; and during that 
period Lieutenant colonel Maitland skillfully conducted his com- 
mand through " Walls Cut," behind the islands, and joined the garri- 
son. The surrender was then peremptorily declined. The object 
of the truce had been realized. 

At Charleston all was active. The legislature adjourned : — militia 
took the place of the regulars in the forts, and on the eighth, after 
four days' notice of the proposed movement, a considerable force 
marched for Savannah. General Lincoln left the city on the 
twelfth. 

General Prescott had not neglected the land approaches to Savan- 
nah, while especially watching the river front ; but had destroyed 
bridges, and otherwise obstructed the roads, so that the Americans 
did not join the French army until the sixteenth. 

A council of war was held ; the demand made upon the garrison 
by the Count D'Estaing, prior to the arrival of General Lincoln, was 
satisfactorily explained, and on the twenty-third the trenches were 
commenced. The difficulty of procuring animals of draught for 
hauling the heavy guns a distance of five miles, occasioned a delay 
which still further enured to the benefit of the British troops. 

On the twenty-fourth. Major Graham made a sally from the in- 
trenchments without valuable results. On the night of the twenty- 
seventh, Major McArthur made such a bold and skillful demonstration 
toward the centre of the allied forces as to occasion a firing between 
the French and American camps. On the fifth of October, at an early 
hour, fire was opened from a battery of nine mortars, and thirty-three 
pieces of heavy artillery, from the land side, and sixteen guns from the 
river, and was maintained without interruption until the eighth. The 
works were strengthened and advanced, additional guns were placed 
in position, and the effect was soon visible in the burning of houses 
and general damage to the town of Savannah, without serious injury 
to the defensive works. On the eighth. Major L' Enfant, with five 
men advanced under fire, screened themselves behind the abatis, and 
kindled the timber ; but the green wood failed to burn, and the 
attempt, however daring, was a failure. 

General Prevost sent out a flag requesting permission to send the 



48o SIEGE OF SAVANNAH. [1779. 

women and children out of the city. This was refused by both Gen- 
eral Lincoln and Count D'Estaing, and the cannonading continued. 

The French fleet had been more than a month on the coast. On 
his arrival, the Count D'Estaing stated that his time was very limited, 
and the opinion prevailed among the American officers that his delay 
before Savannah would not necessarily exceed from ten to sixteen 
days. Upon this understanding he landed his troops. The French 
West India Islands had been left suddenly without naval support; 
and the time already wasted had been sufficient for the British fleet 
at New York to be advised of the siege, and make the voyage to 
relieve the garrison. Many seamen and gunners from the French 
ships were in the trenches, and the fleet itself was seriously exposed. 
These facts, in connection with the lateness of the season, were urgent 
reasons for pressing the siege. The French commander, as at New- 
port, shrank from no conflict, but held that his fleet was his first care, 
and that his support of America must be consistent with his allegiance 
to France. The engineers reported that it would require ten days 
more to complete the trenches. It had therefore become impracti- 
cable for him to await the slow process of a regular siege, by system- 
atic approaches, and a council of war resolved to assault the British 
works without delay. The only alternative was to raise the siege. 

The force detailed for the direct assault consisted of three thou- 
sand five hundred French troops, six hundred American regulars, 
including Pulaski's corps, and two hundred and fifty Charleston militia, 
the whole force divided into two columns. General Dillon, of the Irish 
brigade in the French service, was to take the extreme left, and pass 
under and past Spring Hill, with the purpose of attacking the British 
extreme right near the horse-shoe or sailors' battery. 

The Count D'Estaing and General Lincoln were to move with the 
second division, which was to attack the Spring Hill redoubt itself 
and its flanking defenses, while the Count Pulaski was ordered to 
storm the redoubt still farther to the north on their left. 

General Huger, of South Carolina, with five hundred men of the 
First and Second brigades of militia, General Williams' brigade, and 
the Second battalion of militia, were to make f evil attacks upon the 
south and east sides of the town, with orders to improve any fair 
opportunity to push on and take the garrison in the rear ; and the 
trenches and batteries were to be occupied by American militia, as if 
the usual cannonading was to be continued. 

On the evening of the eighth, General Lincoln ordered the troops 



I779J SIEGE OF SAVANNAH. 48 1 

to place white paper on their hats for distinction from the enemy, and 
to be ready to make the assault at four o'clock the next morning, the 
ninth, which had been designated for the movement. 

The march was so delayed that it was daylight when Count 
D'Estaing, supported by General Lincoln, Colonels Laurens and 
Mcintosh, reached the foot of Spring Hill and commenced the attack. 
Under a wasting fire the French troops and the American li^ht 
infantry pressed on, heedless of the fall of men by the score at every 
step. The picked troops of the garrison had been concentrated to 
meet the assault. General Dillon pressed so far into the marsh, be- 
yond the main column, as to lose his way, so that he was not disen- 
tangled until the battle was over; and the column of General Huger 
which waded through rice fields was unable to make any practical 
advance, and retired after a loss of twenty-eight men. The Sergeant- 
major of the Charleston grenadiers had deserted during the night, after 
the order had been promulgated to the troops, and the garrison adapted 
their defense to the well understood onset which they were to resist. 

Count Pulaski promptly took his position, and by the impetus of 
his attack was carried into the face of superior numbers where he 
fought without yielding, until he was mortally wounded. The head 
of the main column not only forced the entrance to the Spring Hill 
redoubt, but climbed the palisades, and at one moment Lieutenants 
Bush and Homes, of the Second South Carolina, had planted the 
South Carolina colors by the side of the French standard, within the 
redoubt. Both officers fell, and Lieutenant Grey raised the colors 
only to receive a mortal wound. Sergeant Jasper raised one of them 
a third time, but received his death wound also. He lived to bring 
away the colors in safety. F^or fifty-five minutes the assailing column, 
crowded within a narrow space, was exposed to a constant fire from 
troops well under cover, as well as from the British grenadiers and 
Major Glazier's marines who met them ni front. 

General Moultrie says, " Our troops were so crowded in the ditch 
and upon the beam, that they could hardly raise an arm, and while 
they were in this situation, huddled up together, the British loaded 
and fired deliberately, without any danger to themselves. 

At this time the Germaine and several galleys maintained a deadly 
enfilading fire across the slope of the hill, until, overwhelmed with the 
severity of the storm, the troops withdrew to their encampments. 

With perhaps the exception of Bunker Hill, there was no action 
of the war where so great a loss was received in so brief a period. 
31 



482 SIEGE OF SAVANNAH. [t779- 

The British casualties were as follows : Captain Tawes, who com- 
manded the Spring Hill redoubt with great gallantry, Captain Simp- 
son, Lieutenant McPherson, Ensign Pollard, and thirty-six non-com- 
missioned officers and privates were killed. The wounded and missing, 
including two captains and two lieutenants, numbered sixty-three, 
and the deserters and missing fifty-two. 

The American casualties included among the killed, Majors Mott, 
Wise, and Jones, Captains Beraud, Shepherd, and Donnom, and Lieu- 
tenants Hume, Bush, Wickham, and Bailey; among the wounded and 
missing. General Pulaski (mortally), nine captains and eleven lieuten- 
ants ; non-commissioned officers, and privates killed and wounded, 
according to General Lincoln's statement, one hundred and seventy. 
General Moultrie, in his Memoirs, puts the American casualties at 
four hundred and fifty-seven, which is undoubtedly the correct 
number. 

General D'Estaing was twice wounded, and the French casualties 
amounted to fifteen officers and one hundred and sixty-eight sub- 
alterns and soldiers killed, and forty-three officers and four hundred 
and eleven subalterns and soldiers wounded. 

Lieutenant-colonel Maitland, of the British army, Major Moncrief, 
chief engineer, and Captain Henry, who had charge of the naval 
forces, distinguished themselves ; and Colonel Laurens was equally 
conspicuous for gallantry at the head of the American light infantry. 
The French withdrew their artillery, and sailed on the twenty-ninth, 
and the American army retired to Charleston. 

General Moultrie says in his Memoirs, " There can not be any 
doubt, but if the French and Americans had marched into Savannah 
when they arrived on the seventeenth, they would have carried the 
town very easily, because at that time they had only the Spring bat- 
tery completed, and no abatis round the town," and then adds, " after 
this repulse we were in a much worse situation than before. The 
Count D'Estaing departed ; the unfortunate militia of Georgia, who 
had taken the British protection could not go back to them again, but 
were obliged to seek shelter in a strange country, or live in the back- 
woods of their own. It depressed our spirits, we began to be appre- 
hensive for the safety of these two Southern States ; it also depre- 
ciated our money so low that it was scarcely worth anything." 

The result of the siege of Savannah determined the movements of 
both the northern armies. The French fleet was dispersed by a storm 
soon after it left the American coast, and four frigates fell into the 



1779-] SIEGE OF SAVANNAH, 483 

hands of the British. A portion of the fleet returned to the West 
Indies, and the Count D'Estaing returned to France. 

On the twenty-sixth of December, Sir Henry Clinton left New 
' York to the command of Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, and em- 
barked with seven thousand five hundred men for Charleston under 
convoy of five ships of the line and several frigates, Admiral Arbuth- 
not commanding the squadron. Washington had assembled a large 
force of New York and Massachusetts militia for the purpose of mak- 
ing an attack upon New York, but these were at once disbanded. 

Learning that Sir Henry Clinton was embarking a large force 
upon transports, and believing that their destination was either 
Georgia or South Carolina, he ordered the North Carolina brigade to 
march to Charleston in November, the Virginia line to march in 
December, and the remainder of the army was placed in winter 
quarters. 

One division under General Heath was stationed in the Highlands, 
the cavalrymen were sent to Connecticut, and Washington with the 
main army established his headquarters, for the second time, at 
Morristown, New Jersey. 

/ British Effective Force. 

Note. From " Original Returns in the British Record Office." Date, December ist, 

1779- 

' British .\ 13.S48 

New York and its Dependencies -l Gennan ^"rrr-.--v-»-^ . . . 10,836 

Provincial 4.072 



28,756 



Halifax and Penobscot 3,460 

Georgia 3,930 

West Florida 1,787 

Bermuda and Providence Island 636 

9-813 
Total, 38,569. 



CHAPTER LXII. 

JANUARY TO JULY, 1780. CONDITION OF THE ARMIES. 

WHILE General Clinton was once more on the ocean, to again 
attempt the capture of Charleston, the American army was 
in huts, surrounded by snow to the even depth of two feet, badly 
drifted in all defiles and undergoing a physical ordeal hardly less try- 
ing than that of Valley Forge. In order to induce Congress to make 
still more urgent efforts to bring the army up to a fair service-stand- 
ard, Washington prepared a statement of his force as it appeared on 
the muster rolls of the army. That statement included the total 
nominal force, (except from South Carolina and Georgia) with all 
independent organizations ; and upon the impossible assumption that 
every man on the original rolls was still living and in the service, the 
aggregate was only twenty-seven thousand and ninety-nine men ; this 
included invalids, drummers, fifers, in fact, the entire army. 

Two thousand and fifty one enlistments were to expire December 
thirty-first. Six thousand four hundred and twenty-six would expire 
March thirty-first. By the last of April, the total reduction by ex- 
piration of term of service would reach eight thousand one hundred 
and eighty-one; by the last of June, ten thousand one hundred and 
fifty-eight ; by the last of September, ten thousand seven hundred 
and nine, and during the year, twelve thousand one hundred and 
fifty-seven. 

The total force, enlisted for the war, was but fourteen thousand 
nine hundred and ninety-eight ; and from the numbers already 
given, there was to be made the necessary allowance for artificers, 
armorers, wagoners, quartermasters, employees and all the subordinate 
details which lessen the fighting force of an army ; as well as the 
casualties since the original mustpr. The several States furnished 
their quota for different periods and at different times ; so that there 
was a constant addition of raw levies, and the army had no opportu- 




•184 



i78o.] JANUARY TO JULY. 485 

nity to become alike disciplined and drilled, in all its parts. Such 
was the condition of the army of the United States when the second 
campaign in the Southern States began. 

At the time this statement was made, shortly before General 
Clinton sailed, the British force at New York and its dependencies 
consisted of twenty-eight thousand seven hundred and fifty-six 
effectives. 

Three thousand nine hundred and thirty men were in Georgia: 
one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven in Florida ; and at 
Penobscot, Maine, and Halifax, subject to call, there was an addi- 
tional British force of three thousand four hundred and sixty men, 
making a total force of nearly thirty-eight thousand men. 

General Clinton sailed with seven thousand five hundred and fifty 
men ; thus increasing the British force in the Southern Department 
to thirteen thousand two hundred and sixty-seven men, and leaving 
twenty-one thousand and six in and near New York. Even this 
garrison was not without apprehensions of an attack from Washing- 
ton's army. Unprecedented cold froze the bay so that teams and 
artillery could cross upon the ice. 

The British army in New York was almost in a starving and frozen 
condition. Transports were broken up for fuel and almost all country 
supplies were cut off by the extremely cold weather and the difficulty 
of sending out expeditions to hunt for food or wood. 

Notwithstanding the severe cold, Lord Stirling crossed to Staten 
Island with a force of twenty-five hundred men, but failed to sur- 
prise the posts, and a channel, which opened quite suddenly through 
the ice, put the garrison in speedy communication with the city. 

A few prisoners were taken, but the men suffered severely. On 
the twenty-fifth of the same month, Lieutenant-general Knyphau- 
sen sent a small command across the ice, at Paulus Hook, which cap- 
tured a company at Newark; while Lieutenant-colonel Buskirk 
crossed from Staten Island to the main land and captured the picket 
guard at Elizabethtown, with two majors, two captains and forty-two 
privates, In the first instance the academy was burned, and in the 
other, the town house and the church of Rev. James Caldwell, then 
Chaplain in Colonel Elias Dayton's regiment. 

On the second of February, Lieutenant-colonel Norton with four 
companies of guards, two of Hessians and one of Yagers, with some 
cavalry, and two small guns, made a march, using sleighs for the men, 
against a small American post near White Plains, in Westchester 



486 JANUARY TO JULY. [1780. 

county; burned the house of a mnn by the name of Young, which 
was the post headquarters, and captured ninety prisoners, incurring a 
loss of two killed and twenty-three wounded. Such random incur- 
sions comprised the whole active operations of the garrison of New 
York until spring. 

The American army at Morristown fought cold, nakedness and fam- 
ine. During the '' great freeze'' of January, 1780, the suffering became 
intense. Washington found that even military constraint was unable 
to collect food from a region almost depleted of supplies. His trans- 
portation was so limited that it was with difficulty that fuel could be 
hauled for camp fires, and the troops were repeatedly without meat 
for two or three days. It was at such a time that the people of New 
Jersey, whose soil was a constant battle-field from the beginning to 
the end of the war, exhibited their confidence in Washington and 
their sympathy with his troops. The patriotism of the citizens was 
of the same temper as that of the people of South Carolina. In each 
State the royalist element was bold and active. As the capture of 
Charleston subsequently developed that element and gave it organi- 
zation and boldness, so the presence of General Clinton's army in 
New York encouraged the belief that British supremacy would ulti- 
mately be restored. The American royalists therefore considered the 
property of the patriots to be legitimate plunder : and the American 
soldier who found an enemy in an old neighbor, and regarded him, at 
best, as only a spy, was quickened to acts of violence which he would 
not have committed against a British regular. 

Quite a large number of those who were disaffected to the new 
government had joined the British Provincial battalions, and with 
those of New York of this class, there was carried into General 
Clinton's returns for December, 1779, a force of four thousand 
and sixty-four men. Thus organized, and knowing the country 
thoroughly, they made successful irritating forays, and the State was 
treated as a free granary for both armies. In Washington's hour of 
trial, the self-sacrifice of heads of families, past the age of military ser- 
vice, and of the women, was practically extended to his relief. Im- 
pressive instances are numerous, and they illustrate one of the redeem- 
ing elements of a war of revolution, when surpassing trials develop 
transcendent virtues. 

The Rev. Dr. Joseph F. Tuttle, afterwards President of Wabash 
College, a son of New Jersey, and for a long time a resident of Morris 
county, devoted many years to the study of the Revolutionary his- 



1780.] JANUARY TO JULY.. 487 

tory of that State, and by personal visits to survivors of the war, at 
their own homes, accumulated a store of memorial facts which greatly 
redound to the credit of that people. Both Mr. Irving and Mr. Ban- 
croft have acknowledged their indebtedness to his valuable manu- 
scripts, and the author cites a few facts kindly furnished, to illustrate 
the condition of affairs at Morristown, the spirit of the people, and 
the state of the army at the beginning of 1780. 

The cauip. " The paths at the camp near Morristown. were marked 
with blood from the bare-footed soldiers." 

Its approaches. " The enemy never passed Short Hills. The alarm 
gun, the beacon fires, the express riders, were always ready. The 
light kindled at Short Hills, could be seen at Pompton and Basking- 
ridge ; and this was answered from Kimball mountain, Rockaway 
Heights, and Vernon, in Sussex." " The pass through to Chatham 
was as a closed gate and secure." ..;.;, t : 

Devotion of zuonien. "Mrs. Uzal Kitchelt, daughter of Daniel 
Tuttle, with husband, father, and four brothers in the service, declined 
a British protection, saying, "If the God of battles will not protect 
us we will fare with the rest." " As many as twelve soldiers at a time 
were repeatedly billeted at her house, and as with many others of 
like spirit, they contributed from slender means for army uses, without 
asking for vouchers for the articles furnished." 

Hunger appeased. " On one occasion her sister, Mrs. Keturah 
Flatt, filled a large kettle with, meat, placed it over the fire, and 
started to sift some meal for a hungry party. They eagerly 
snatched the uncooked food in her absence, and preferred the un- 
sifted meal, because there was more of it, and it was good enough 
as it was." 

Clothing. " Stockings, mittens, leggins, blankets, and all kinds of 
domestic fabric employed these earnest women." 

"The Kitchells, Smiths and Greens of Hanover; the Jacksons, 
Beeches and Winds of Rockaway and Pequannock ; the Condits, 
Fords, Johns, and Hathaways of Morristown; the Carters, Pier- 
sons, Sayers, Millers, Thompsons and Browns of Chatham ; the 
Thompsons, Drakes and Carys of Windham, were only a few, who 
from the beginning of the war counted all things as loss unless 
independence was won ; and the army was made recipients of their 
bounty." 

All this was in keeping with that spirit which comforted the army 
about Boston in 1776, which saved Virginia and the Carolinas, which 



488 JANUARY TO JULY. [1780. 

worked mightily by firesides, like unseen leaven, to maintain the 
struggle which Congress well nigh despaired of, and the army seemed 
too feeble to sustain. 

Washington says of New Jersey at that period, that " his requisi- 
tions were punctually complied with, and in many counties exceeded." 
Irving says : " Exhausted as the State was by repeated drains, 
yet, when deep snows cut off all distant supplies, Washington's army 
subsisted by it." 

Bancroft says: "Generally throughout the war, the women of 
America never grew weary of yielding up articles necessary for the 
comfort of their own households, to relieve the distresses of the soldiers. 
The women of Philadelphia rallying round the amiable Esther Reed, 
wife of the President of Pennsylvania, now made a more earnest effort ; 
they brought together large donations of clothing, and invited the 
ladies of other States to adopt a like plan. They thus assisted to keep 
alive the spirit of patriotism in the army, but their gifts could not 
meet its ever-recurring wants." 

On the eleventh of January, Quartermaster-general Green wrote, 
" Such weather never did I feel. For six or eight days it has been so 
cold that there has been no living abroad ; the snow is also very deep, 
and much drifted. We drive over the tops offences. We have been 
alternately out of meat and bread for eight or nine days past, and 
without either for three or four." 

With all this destitution of the army and local waste through New 
Jersey, the New England States and Pennsylvania were once more 
without British garrisons ; and the active anxieties of impending 
danger gave way to a lethargy which seemed almost to ignore like 
dangers which had only been transferred to other portions of one 
common country. There was scarcity of money. Practically, there 
was no money. The soldiers had not been paid for five months ; 
their families were suffering; recruiting was almost suspended; and 
the burden of the war seemed to rest more depressingly on the North- 
ern States which had respite from its active operations, than upon the 
Southern States, which, left mostly to themselves, were called to 
endure afflictions such as New Jersey had experienced during previous 
campaigns. The comparative independence of the separate States 
weakened their essential unioti, and the jealousy which Congress, 
representing the States, entertained of central authority, prevented 
that prompt confidence in the counsels of the Commander-in-chief 
which had been so reliable after the battle of Trenton, and which was 



i78o.] JANUARY TO JULY. 489 

indispensable to general success. These elements had memorable 
expressions which illustrate this crisis of the war. 

Washington thus states the first difficulty: ''Certain I am, unless 
Congress are vested with powers, by the separate States, competent 
to the great purposes of war, or assume them as a matter of right, 
and they and the States act with more energy th:in they have hitherto 
done, our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge along in the old 
way. By ill-timing in the adoption of measures ; by delays in the 
execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealousies, we incur enormous 
expenses and derive no benefit from them. One state will comply 
with a requisition of Congress; another neglects to doit: a third 
executes it by halves : and all differ in the manner, the matter, or 
so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill. While 
such a system as the present one, or rather want of one prevails, we 
shall ever be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advan- 
tage. ... I see one head gradually changing into thirteen. I 
see one army branching into thirteen, which instead of looking up to 
Congress as the supreme controlling power of the United States, are 
considering themselves as dependent upon their respective States. 
. . . Congress have already scarcely a power left but such as 
concerns foreign transactions ; for as to the army, they are at present 
little more than the medium through which its wants are conveyed to 
the States. This body never had, or at least in {ew instances, ever 
exercised powers adequate to the purposes of war. . . . In a word, 
I see the powers of Congress declining too fast for the consideration 
and respect which are due to them as the great representative body 
of America, and I am fearful of the consequences." 

Unequal pay and bounties continued to aggravate these difficulties, 
until Washington wrote to the President of Congress on the third of 
April, so plainly and unequivocally of the mutinous spirit, intense 
disgust and absolute desperation of his small, famished and depleted 
command, that a committee of three was appointed, after a hot debate, 
to consult with him as to measures of relief. Even this advisory 
committee was reluctantly conceded. M. de La Vergne wrote on 
the seventeenth of April to Count Vergennes : "It was said that 
this appointment of a committee, would be putting too much power 
in a few hands and especially in those of the Commander-in-chief; — 
that his influence was already too great ; that even his virtues afforded 
motives for alarm ; that the enthusiasm of the army, joined to the 
kind of dictatorship already confided to him, put Congress and the 



490 . JANUARY TO JULY. [1780. 

United States at his mercy ; that it was not expedient to expose a man 
of the highest virtues to such temptations." General Schuyler, then 
in Congress, John Matthews and Nathaniel Peabody were appointed 
the committee. 

In a letter to James Duane, dated May fourteenth, Washington 
says of the appointment of General Schuyler upon this committee, 
that " no man could be more useful, from his perfect knowledge of 
the resources of the country, the activity of his temper, his fruitful- 
ness of expedients and his sound military sense." 

As a result of this conference and the persistent pressure which 
the Commander-in-chief brought to bear upon Congress, it was 
determined that the soldiers' pay should be equalized and more sys- 
tematic efforts be made to recruit and maintain the army. 

The first six months of the year were peculiarly trying because 
the main army was unable to take part in the active operations of 
the Southern campaign, during the occupation of New York by a 
superior force, supported by an adequate fleet. The capture of 
Charleston, and another invasion of New Jersey, for the purpose of 
capturing the Morristown fastness, were the chief military events, but 
there were other incidents which require notice before those actions 
receive attention,. 

On the twelfth of February, Congress affirmed the action of a 
General Court Martial which sentenced Arnold, then commanding at 
Philadelphia, to be reprimanded for giving passes to disaffected 
citizens and using public transportation for private uses. The repri- 
mand was mildly administered, but Arnold was angry. His life of 
ostentatious display, wild extravagance and loose views of moral obli- 
gation had aroused public indignation ; and the charges which would 
have been comparatively unnoticed if he had observed Republican 
simplicity, were pressed somewhat sternly, because of suspicions that 
he had repeatedly used his official position for private emolument. 

General La Fayette returned from France, reached Morristown 
on the twelfth of May, was received with enthusiasm, and brought the 
welcome news that France had detailed the Count de Rochambeau 
with a large army to aid the United States, and the first division was 
already on its passage. The extraordinary tact of this officer, not a 
little' aided by the efforts of the beautiful and enthusiastic Marie 
Antoinette, had achieved this result ; and with wise appreciation of 
the difficulty of real harmony between French and Anglo-American 
troops, he succeeded in securing such instructions from Louis XVL 



i78o.] JANUARY TO JULY. 



491 



that a jar of interest or duty between the allies seemed improbable. 
" The troops were to obey Washington ; to admit the precedence of 
American officers of equal rank ; on all formal occasions to yield the 
right to the American army, and bear in mind that the whole pur- 
pose was heartily and efficiently to execute the will of the American 
Commander-in-chief." The only drawback was found in the entirely 
unprepared condition of the United States to provide for their sup- 
port, and to furnish an equivalent army force, so as to make the joint 
operations more immediately effective. 

Long before their arrival the American army had lost in numbers 
even more than anticipated by Washington, in his report already cited. 
While the call from South Carolina for aid became more and more im- 
perative he was compelled to groan in spirit and send only words of 
sympathy, instead of men to fight. On the second of April his whole 
force, on both sides of the Hudson river, consisted of only ten thousand 
four hundred rank and file and of these two thousand eight hundred 
had but four weeks to serve. Lord Rawdon took two thousand five 
hundred British and Hessians to reinforce General Clinton, but nearly 
twelve thousand remained behind ; and while this warning of the 
purpose of the British commander to strike with decisive effort at 
Charleston, aroused the alarm of Washington for the fate of the South- 
ern campaign, he could not leave the Northern States to render sub- 
stantial aid. The Alaryland division, however, the Delaware reo-i- 
ment and the First artillery, with the consent of Congress, were 
ordered South ; and the Baron De Kalb was instructed to lead the 
troops to Charleston. It is just here that one fact in the struggle for 
American Independence should have specific notice. From 1776, 
before Boston, and through the entire war, the states of Maryland 
and Delavv^are were represented on nearly every battle-field. Although 
their troops were few in numbers they were distinguished for valor, 
so that their failure in an emergency was a sign of great peril, or of 
some over-mastering superiority, or panic. 

But it was not on battle fields, north or south, that the entire 
interest of the period concentrated. The southern army was numeri- 
cally weak, and the northern army was hungry. On the twenty-fifth 
of May two Connecticut regiments mutinied, declaring that they 
would march home, " or at least gain subsistence by the point of the 
bayonet." Handbills printed in New York were secretly circulated, 
urging the soldiers to desert. " This mutiny," says Washington, 
qnite impressively, "has given infinite concern. There was no 



492 JANUARY TO JULY. [1780. 

money but continental paper, and adds, " it is evidently impracticable, 
from the immense quantity it would require, to pay them as much as 
would make up the depreciation^ '' This is a decisive moment, one 
of the most; I will go farther and scythe most important America 
has seen. The court of France has made a glorious effort for our 
deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our supineness, we 
must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind ; nor can we 
after venture to confide that our allies will persist in an attempt to 
establish what, it will appear, we want inclination or ability to assist 
them in." 

General Greene, then Quartermaster-general, thus addressed the 
Colonel of the Morristown militia : " There are no more provisions 
than to serve one regiment in the magazine. The late terrible storm, 
the depth of the snow, and the drifts in the roads prevent the little 
stock from coming forward which is in distant magazines. The roads 
must be kept open by the inhabitants, or the army can not be sub- 
sisted. Unless the good people lend their assistance to forward sup- 
plies, the army must disband. The army is stripped naked of teams 
as possible, to lessen the consumption of forage. Call to your aid the 
overseers of highways and every other order of men who can give 
dispatch to this business." 

" P. S. Give no copies of this for fear it should get to the enemy," 

General Greene resigned his place as Quartermaster-general, but 
continued to act until August, when Colonel Pickering assumed its 
duties. He desired to join the southern army. 

On the thirteenth of June, Congress, without consulting Washing- 
ton, appointed General Gates to the command of the Southern Depart- 
ment. He had spent the winter at his home in Virginia, but eagerly 
accepted this high command. His old confidant and companion 
in arms, Charles Lee, sententiously forewarned him on his departure ; 
" Take care that you do not exchange northern laurels for southern 
willows." 



CHAPTER LXIII. 

SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. SIEGE OF 
CHARLESTON. BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD. 1780. 

GENERAL CLINTON left New York December twenty-sixth, 
1779. Under fair promise, he had a voyage of only ten days 
before him. He cleared the ice of the harbor without difficulty, and 
the whole fleet got under way. For a few days the weather proved 
favorable; the admiral led the van, and kept in shore, but this gleam 
of fortune was not sufficiently permanent to give a fortunate termina- 
tion to the voyage. A succession of storms dispersed the fleet. Few 
ships arrived at Tybee, in Georgia, before the end of January. Some 
were taken, others separated, one ordnance vessel foundered, most of 
the artillery, and all the cavalry horses perished. Such is Lieutenant- 
colonel Tarleton's brief record of the voyage. In his " History of the 
Campaigns of 1780 and 178 1," he says, " The richness of the country, 
its vicinity to Georgia, and its distance from General Washington, 
pointed out the advantages and facility of its conquest. While it 
would be an unspeakable loss to the Americans, the possession of it 
would tend to secure to the crown the southern part of the continent 
which stretches beyond it." 

The British troops made Tybee Island, near Savannah, their first 
rendezvous, but were unable to leave for South Carolina until the 
tenth of February, landing on St. John's Island, thirty miles below 
Charleston, on the following day. 

The troops which accompanied General Clinton consisted of the 
following commands, and were reported at the time, at London, to be 
of the strength now indicated. The statement is given ; but so many 
round numbers indicate error. 

Light Infantry 800 Queen's Rangers 200 

Grenadiers 900 Guides and Pioneers 1 50 

Seventh Regiment .... 400 Fanning's Corps loo 



4< 4 SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. [1780. 

Twenty-third Regiment . . 400 Hessian Grenadiers 1000 

Thirty-third " ... 450 Ferguson's Corps 300 

Forty-second " ... 700 Second Hessian Regiment . . . 800 

Sixty-third " ... 400 Yagers 200 

Sixty-fourth " ... 350 British Artillery 200 

British Legion 200 

Total 7550. 

Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton states that transportation was pro- 
vided for eight thousand five hundred men ; and that is the number 
generally reported as connected with the expedition prior to rein- 
forcements received from Savannah and New York. 

Admiral Arbuthnot furnished the convoy, consisting of the Europe, 
64; Russel, 74 ; Robuste, 74 ; Defiance, 64 ; Raisonable, 64 ; Renown, 
50; Romulus, 44; Roebuck, 44 ; Blonde, 32; Perseus, 32 ; Camilla, 
20 : Raleigh, 28 ; Richmond, 32 ; Virginia, 28. 

The British troops were promptly transferred to James Island, 
then crossed Stono and Ashley rivers, and took position across the 
narrow neck between the Ashley and Cooper rivers, where they 
established themselves on the twelfth of March. It will be noticed 
by reference to map, " Siege of Charleston," that the possession of 
Wappoo Creek enabled the British troops to use small boats for 
transferring troops to the Ashley river, without entering the harbor 
from the sea. Meanwhile, the British fleet had been ordered to silence 
Fort Moultrie, and force an entrance to the inner bay. 

The garrison of the city did not exceed two thousand two hundred 
regulars and one thousand militia, when General Clinton crossed the 
Ashley ; but he delayed his advance upon the city for two weeks, so 
that the troops under General Patterson, who had been ordered to 
join him from Savannah, could arrive and make his force equal to any 
contingency of stubborn resistance by the American troops. Gov- 
ernor Rutledge had reached Charleston, having discretionary author- 
ity from th:e State to act according to his own will in all matters of 
essential concern ; and General Lincoln was in command of the gar- 
rison. It appears, from documentary data, that the retention of the 
city was principally owing to the demand of the inhabitants, since the 
neglect to anticipate an attack from the land side had prevented the 
completion of thoroughly defensive works; and it was clearly an error 
to retain the town with inadequate forces. Commodore Whipple of 
the American navy felt strong confidence, not shared by Washington, 
that he could prevent the British ships from crossing the bar ; and 



i78o.] SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. 495 

too much confidence was reposed in the capacity of Fort Moultrie to 
maintain its good record, although it had been allowed to become 
almost worthless from neglect. The few vessels at his (Whipple's) 
command, consisted of the' Briscole, nominally 44, but mounting only 
26 guns ; the Providence and Boston, each 32 guns ; the Queen of 
France, 28 ; L'Aventure and Truite, each 26 guns; the Ranger and 
General Lincoln, each 20 guns, and the Notre Dame of 14 guns. 
These were moored between Sullivan's Island and the middle ground, 
previously noticed. On the twentieth of March the British squadron 
safely crossed the bar, and the American fleet retired. With the 
exception of the Ranger, 20, the American ships were sunk in Cooper 
River, between the city and Shutes Folly ; and the guns, stores and 
men were transferred to the city defenses. The Ranger and two 
galleys were placed in Hog Island channel to keep up communications 
with the country north of Charleston. 

On the seventh of April General Woodford crossed Cooper River, 
and joined the garrison with seven hundred Virginia troops, having 
made a forced march of nearly five hundred miles in thirty days. The 
Americans still retained a post at Monk's Corner ; and the garrison 
depended wholly upon that section of the State for supplies, after the 
Neck came into the possession of British troops. General Clinton 
thoroughly understood his position, but still awaited the arrival of 
General Patterson. 

At one o'clock on the ninth, Admiral Arbuthnot weighed anchor, 
leading with the Roebuck, followed in order by the Richmond, Rom- 
ulus, Blonde, Virginia, Raleigh, Sandwich, armed ship, and the Re- 
nown, and passed Fort Moultrie with a loss of only twenty-seven men, 
without stopping for its fire, and came to anchor off Fort Johnsoi 
which had been abandoned. " The Aretus ordnance ship grounded 
and was burned. The Richmond's foretop-mast was shot away ; some 
damage was done to the masts and rigging of the other vessels, but 
their hulls suffered but slightly." 

General Lincoln had confidently expected that the proclamation 
of General Rutledge, and the great emergency which threatened the 
city, would bring a larger force to the defense, but he was disap- 
pointed. 

General Patterson marched for Charleston about the middle of 
March with twelve hundred men. He was joined by Lieutenant- 
colonel Tarleton near Port Royal. This officer had partially re- 
mounted his dragoons, and Major Cochran with the legion infantry 



496 SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. [1780. 

and Major Ferguson's riflemen, formed an additional force, to make 
the reinforcement important to General Clinton's success. 

Several skirmishes occurred as they approached Charleston, in one 
of which Colonel William Washington, with Pulaski's corps, Bland's 
light horse, and a detachment of regular cavalry, gained decided credit, 
capturing Lieutenant-colonel Hamilton of the North Carolina Pro- 
vincials and some other prisoners. Tarleton says, " the affair ended 
with equal loss to both parties." Colonel Washington was then 
attached to General Huger's command, which consisted of the cav- 
alry already named and some militia, with headquarters at Monk's 
Corner, thirty miles distant fr.om the city. Lieutenant-colonel Web- 
ster with fourteen hundred men, consisting of the Thirty-third and 
Sixty-fourth British infantry, accompanied by Tarleton's and Fergu- 
son's mounted men, marched on the thirteenth of April, surprised 
the post, and captured one hundred officers and men, four hundred 
horses, and fifty wagons loaded with arms, clothing and ammunition. 

On the twenty-ninth. Admiral Arbuthnot formed a brigade of five 
hundred seamen and marines under Captains Hudson, Order and 
Gambier, which landed at daybreak, at Mount Pleasant. This com- 
pelled the Americans to abandon their position at L'Empries Point, 
with a loss of nearly a hundred men, who were captured by the guard- 
boats of the fleet, while retiring to Charleston. 

On the fourth of May, Captains Hudson, Gambier and Knowles 
landed before daylight upon Sullivan's Island, with two hundred 
seamen and marines, and the garrison of Fort Moultrie surrendered. 

Ground had been broken on the night of the first of April, at a 
distance of eight hundred yards from the American lines, and on the 
tenth a summons was sent to General Lincoln, demanding the sur- 
render of the city. This was promptly refused, and by the nineteenth 
the second parallel was opened at a distance of only four hundred 
and fifty yards. The American detachment at Biggins' bridge, over 
the Cooper River a few miles above Charleston, was also dispersed, 
and upon the arrival of reinforcements from New York, April the 
eighteenth. Lieutenant-general Cornwallis took command upon the 
north bank of that river and closed all communication between the 
city and the country adjacent. 

On the sixth of May the third parallel was occupied and prepara- 
tions were made for an assault. 

By reference to marginal notes upon the map, the relative posi- 
tions of the American batteries will be understood. Two rows of 



i78o.] SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. 497 

abatis, a double picketed ditch and several redoubts crossed before the 
town, connecting the swamps that skirted the city on both rivers, and 
a canal was still further advanced before these, making a wet ditch. 
The third British parallel tapped this ditch and it was at once con- 
verted into a sure cover for pressing more closely upon the lines of 
abatis. 

There was no longer any hope of successful resistance. The guns 
were dismounted, the works were in ruins, and on the twelfth of May 
Major-general Leslie took possession of the city, under honorable 
terms of surrender. 

The British casualties, as reported by General Clinton, May thir- 
teenth, were seventy-six killed and one hundred and eighty-nine 
wounded. The American casualties were nearly the same. The 
schedule of prisoners reported by Deputy Adjutant-general John 
Andre made an aggregate of five thousand six hundred and eighteen 
men, which in fact included all male citizens, as the Continental 
troops, including five hundred in hospital, did not exceed two thou- 
sand men. 

The citizens, as well as the militia, were treated as prisoners 
on parole, and were allowed to return home, while the Continental 
troops and seamen were retained as prisoners of war, including the 
Lieutenant Governor and five of the council. Four hundred and five 
pieces of ordnance, large and small, were among the acquisitions of 
the capture. 

At this time Colonel Buford with three hundred and eighty Vir- 
ginia regulars and two field pieces was en rojite for Charleston, but 
upon hearing of its capture he fell back towards North Carolina, 
joined by Colonel Washington and the few of his cavalry who had 
escaped from the affair at Monk's Corner. Immediately after the 
surrender, General Clinton sent Lieutenant Conger up the Saluda to 
Ninety-six (see map of " Operations in Southern States ") and Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Tarleton with one hundred and seventy dragoons, one 
hundred mounted infantry and a three pounder gun, to pursue Colo- 
nel Buford. In a forced march of twenty-four hours he reached 
Rugely's Mills, beyond Camden, and by three o'clock of the afternoon 
overtook the Americans on the bank of the Waxhaw. A messenger 
was sent in advance, exaggerating the pursuing force, and demanding 
a surrender, which was declined ; and Tarleton pressed on so rapidly 
that he fell upon the American troops before they were prepared for 
action, threw them into disorder and committed great havoc. His 
32 



498 SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. [1780 

report gives the American casualties as one hundred and thirteen killed, 
one hundred and fifty wounded, unable to travel, and fifty-three prison- 
ers. General Clinton's report states the number of killed, at one 
hundred and sevent3^-two. The British casualties were two officers 
and three privates killed, one officer and fourteen privates wounded, 
eleven horses killed, and nineteen wounded. Colonel Tarleton ; 
says, " a report among the cavalry that they had lost their command- 
ing officer (when his horse was shot) stimulated the soldiers to a vin- 
dictive asperity, not easily restrained ; but the wounded of both 
parties were collected with all possible dispatch, were treated with 
equal humanity, were placed at the neighboring plantations and a 
meeting-house, and surgeons were sent for from Charleston and Cam- ; 
den to assist them." 

The inauguration of a bitter partisan warfare at once began ; and 
on the twentieth of June at Ramsour's Mills, in Lincoln County, 
North Carolina, a party of Whigs, distinguished by white paper on 
their hats, and a party of Tories wearing twigs of pine, had a deadly 
encounter, where acquaintances and old neighbors fought until nearly 
three hundred were killed or wounded. 

On the third of June, two days before his departure. General 
Clinton issued a proclamation, " requiring the inhabitants of the 
Province of South Carolina, including prisoners on parole, to return 
to their allegiance, or be treated as rebels to the government 
of the king." It was based on the assumption of restored suprem- 
acy; it ignored the terms of honorable surrender ; it set at naught 
all sound military policy, and quickened the energies of the 
people to fresh assertion of independence. Its key is found in the 
hasty and enthusiastic communication of General Clinton to Lord 
Germaine, which says, " The inhabitants from every quarter declare 
their allegiance to the king, and offer their services in arms. There 
are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners, or 
in arms with us." 

In following General Clinton to New York, it is to be noticed 
that the mutinous spirit which had been evoked in the American 
army through actual famine, had been misinterpreted by the British 
officers at New York, and that on the sixth of June, General Knyp- 
hausen with Generals Mathews, Tryon, and Sterling, with five thou- 
sand troops, crossed from Staten Island to Elizabethtown Point, for 
the purpose of cooperating with any movement which might favor 
the restoration of British supremacy, or afford a prospect of a sue- 



lySo.] SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. 499 

cessful attack upon Morristovvn itself. General Sterling advanced 
before daylight toward Elizabethtown, but found that the militia 
were on the alert. An American sentry fired into the advancing col- 
umn while it was only dimly distinguishable before daylight, and 
General Sterling received the shot in his thigh, which ultimately 
proved fatal. He was carried to the rear, and General Knyphausen 
took his place at the front. By this time the sun had risen, and 
the regiment of Colonel Elias Dayton began to assemble, falling 
back slowly however before the advancing British troops. A squad- 
ron of Simcoe's Queen's Rangers followed, leading the British 
and Hessian infantry. As by magic, the militia appeared. Fences, 
thickets, orchards, houses, and trees were made available for single 
riflemen, and the column suffered constant loss. Stedman says, 
" a mutinous spirit had certainly discovered itself among the 
soldiers of the American army, but arose from distress, and not 
from disaffection. The British commander experienced a grievous 
disappointment. Instead of being received in the Jerseys as friendly, 
the militia very gallantly turned out to oppose them. During 
the march from Elizabethtown to Connecticut Farms, a distance 
of only seven miles, they were annoyed by parties of militia the whole 
wa}'. When the British troops approached Springfield, a detachment 
from that army which was represented to be mutinous, was seen 
drawn up in force on the other side of the river to dispute their pas- 
sage." As Colonel Dayton fell back, he found that General Max- 
well's brigade was ready to support him, and a vigorous skirmish was 
maintained until the enemy brought artillery to the front as well as 
additional troops. The village of Connecticut Farms was burned, 
including the church and parsonage, and the wife of Chaplain Cald- 
well was killed by a bullet. Irving says, " The tragical fate of Mrs. 
Caldwell produced almost as much excitement throughout the country 
as that which had been caused in a preceding year by the massacre 
of Miss McCrea." Like that event, however sad, it could not be 
charged to the account of the British commander. 

General Knyphausen advanced within half a mile of Springfield, 
and halted, to determine the wisest plan of action. The whole coun- 
try seemed aroused. General Maxwell was on the bank of the Rah- 
way. On the short hills in the rear, Washington was posted in force. 
The smoke of beacon fires spread the progress of the alarm and 
throughout the country. When night came on, dark and rainy as it 
was, the fires still blazed with increasing numbers, and the deep boom 



500 SOUTH CAROLIxNA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. [1780. 

of the alarm guns on the mountains warned the people far and wide 
that every man who had a gun was wanted at once. Before morning 
the Hessian general attempted to regain Staten Island ; but the tide 
was out, and the whole shore was covered with deep mud, which the 
cavalry could not cross. Stedman says, that " It was determined for 
the credit of the British arms to remain some days longer in New 
Jersey, lest their precipitate retreat should be represented as a flight." 
Such considerations could hardly have controlled the actions of a 
veteran soldier like Lieutenant-general Knyphausen. As early as the 
first of June he had learned of the capture of Charleston, and that 
General Clinton was to return to New York, which was a good base 
for an advance upon Morristovvn. He therefore strengthened his 
position and awaited the arrival of his superior officer. 

Washington wrote on the tenth that " their movements were 
mysterious, and the design of the movement not easily penetrated." 
As a matter of fact, there were few movements during the war which 
bore so directly upon the safety of the American army and the gen- 
eral cause, as the operations of the British army before Springfield 
during June, 1779; and the conduct of both sides indicated some ap- 
preciation of its importance. 

Sir Henry Clinton reached Staten Island on the seventeenth, and 
a plan was at once matured to strike the camp and magazines of 
Washington at Morristovvn. Troops were embarked upon transports, 
and all suitable demonstrations were made as if an expedition against 
West Point was intended. Washington deliberately, but actively, 
put his army in motion, and advanced eleven miles toward Pompton, 
on the twenty-second, en route to the Hudson, when he discovered 
the purpose of his adversary. 

General Greene had been left in command near Springfield on the 
twenty-first of June, with Maxwell's and Stark's brigades, Lee's cavalry 
corps, and the militia. 

The British advance was made in two columns, at five o'clock on 
the morning of June twenty-third ; one by the Vauxhall, and the other 
by the Springfield road, the whole force consisting of five thousand 
infantry, besides cavalry and eighteen pieces of artillery. The British 
pressure was quite deliberate, but earnest, upon the left, on the Spring- 
field road, as if it were the main attack. The column formed near 
the Matthews house, on a small eminence where artillery could gain 
a commanding position, because just at the left of the bridge. Colonel 
Angell's Rhode Island regiment with one gun, was holding an orchard 



i78o.] SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. 50I 

which commanded the bridge over the Rahvvay and afforded some 
cover. The British guns were aimed too high at first, and did httle 
execution ; but by fording the stream, not more than twelve yards 
wide, the command turned the American position, and crowded Colonel 
Angell back to the second bridge, over a branch of the Rahvvay, where 
Colonel Shreve resisted with equal obstinacy. Colonel Angell lost one- 
fourth of his men and was compelled to fall back with Colonel Shreve 
upon the brigades of Maxwell and Stark. 

Colonel Dayton's regiment contributed to their resistance, and 
"none," says Irving, " showed more ardor in the fight than Caldwell 
the chaplain, who distributed Watts' psalms and hymn books among 
the soldiers when they were in want of wadding, with the shout 
' put Watts into them, boys.' " 

The other British Column had a still more important objective in 
view, being no other than to gain the pass leading to Chatham and 
Morristown. Major Lee's cavalry and a picket under Captain Walker 
were posted at Little's Bridge, on the Vauxhall road, and Colonel 
Ogden's regiment covered them. General Greene soon found that he 
could not afford to hold so extended a front, and concentrated his 
force at other positions eminently strong and capable of defense. 
Reference is made to map '" Battle of Springfield." The remainder 
of General Maxwell's and Stark's brigades took high ground by the 
mill, with the militia force of General Dickinson on the flanks. The 
Vauxhall bridge was contested as hotly as that at Springfield. Gen- 
eral Greene ultimately took post on the first range of hills, in the rear 
of Byram's tavern, where the roads were brought so near that succor 
might be readily given from one to the other, " and he was thus 
enabled to detach Colonel Webb's regiment. Lieutenant-colonel 
Huntington commanding, and Colonel Jackson's regiment with one 
piece of artillery, which entirely checked the advance of the enemy 
on the American left, and secured that pass." Reference is also made 
to map — "Operations in New Jersey." The map previously referred 
to designates the various British and Hessian corps engaged in the 
action. 

General Clinton's army withdrew, after burning Springfield, and 
at midnight crossed to Staten Island, removing their bridge of boats 
after the passage. 

The American casualties were one officer and twelve non-commis- 
sioned officers and privates killed. Captain Davis' detachment and 
the militia not reporting, five officers and fifty-six privates wounded 



502 



SOUTH CAROLINA AND NEW JERSEY INVADED. 



[1780. 



and nine privates missing. The British loss was not officially stated 
but was estimated by contemporary journalists as about one hundred 
and fifty. General Clinton says, " I could not think of keeping the 
field in New Jersey," and wished " to land the troops and give a camp 
of rest to an army of which many corps had had an uninterrupted 
campaign of fourteen months." It appears from this report that 
General Clinton had no immediate designs upon the Hudson River 
posts, but his operations were so conducted as to keep the American 
army on constant duty. 

New Jersey had been a scene of constant warfare for five years ; 
and it was at last relieved from the pressure. 

Washington was still imploring the States to fill their quota under 
new assignments, and the first six months of 1780 closed their battle 
record. 



British Effective Force. 

Note. — From "Original Returns in the British Record Office." Date May ist, 1780. 
New York South Carolina Nova Scotia East Florida 

British 7711 7041 2298 536 

German 7451 3018 572 

Provincials.. 2162 2788 638 



17-324 

West Florida 

British 590 

German 547 

Provincials. . . 316 



1453 



12,847 
Georgia 



3,508 
Bermudas 



Providence Island 



862 
1016 

1878 



326 .. . 

Total, 38,002. 



130 




Cofft/ii/e<i and ffrgpyn iy fffl farrln^tofi: 
502* 



I 



CHAPTER LXIV. 

FRENCH AUXILIARIES. ARNOLD'S TREASON. SOUTHERN SKIR- 
MISHES, 1780. 

LIEUTENANT-general the Count de Rochambeau, arrived at 
Newport, Rhode Island, July tenth, 1780, with nearly six thou- 
sand French troops, constituting the first division of a corps of twelve 
thousand men, which Louis XVI. had designated as aid to the United 
States in their war for national independence. Major-general the 
Marquis de Chastellux, a relative of La Fayette, accompanied the 
command. The Chevalier de Ternay commanded the convoy, which 
consisted of seven heavy ships, vi::;., two 80s, one 74, four 64s, two 
40s, a cutter, 20; hospital ship, pierced for 64 guns, a bomb ship and 
thirty-two transports. 

It was the purpose of Washington to make the capture of New 
York his immediate objective ; and a plan of operations was submitted 
to the French commander soon after his arrival at Newport ; but on 
the thirteenth of July, Admiral Graves arrived at New York with six 
ships of the line, which gave the British naval forces a superiority of 
ships and metal ; and the enterprise was postponed until the French 
second division should arrive. 

Sir Henry Clinton, in turn, proposed an expedition to Rhode 
Island, and eight thousand troops were advanced as far as Hunting- 
ton, Long Island, but a prompt movement of Washington with his 
army, and advices of the strength and position of Rochambeau, gave 
such assurance that he would meet a superior force, that the project 
was converted into a simple naval demonstration, with the double 
purpose of blockading the French squadron and cutting off the ex- 
pected second French division when it should enter the American 
waters. 

The Count de Rochambeau, with a soldier's exactness, at once 
comprehended the situation, and in his dispatch of July sixteenth, 



504 FRENCH AUXILIARIES. [1780. 

to Count de Vergennes, thus epitomizes the condition of American 
affairs: 

" Upon our arrival here, the country was in consternation, the 
paper money had fallen to sixty for one. . . I spoke to the prin- 
cipal persons of the place, and told them, as I write to General Wash- 
ington, that this was merely the advanced guard of a greater force, 
and that the king was determined to support them with his whole 
power. In twenty-four hours their spirits rose, and last night all the 
streets, houses and steeples were illuminated, in the midst of fire-works 
and the greatest rejoicings. . . You see, sir, how important it is 
to act with vigor. . . Send us troops, ships and money ; but do not 
depend upon these people, nor upon their means ; they have neither 
money nor credit ; their means of resistance are only momentary, and 
called forth when they are attacked in their homes. They then 
assemble for the moment of immediate danger and defend themselves. 
Washington commands sometimes fifteen thousand, sometimes three 
thousand men." 

The above letter would fairly represent a condensed statement 
of Washington's experience during the greater part of the entire war. 
The entire campaign of 1780, is interwoven with reports of deficiency 
in men, food, clothing and money ; and the numerous entreaties, pro- 
tests and demands, heretofore cited, are but feeble expressions of the 
patience as well as agony of spirit which characterized both the official 
and unofficial correspondence of the American Commander-in-chief. 

The last six months of 1780 was without active field operations 
in the Northern States. The French fleet was blockaded at Newport 
by a superior British naval force, and repeated consultations between 
General Washington and the Count de Rochambeau, resulted in the 
postponement of a proposed attack upon New York. 

A proclamation was published over the signature of La Fayette, 
with the sanction of Washington, announcing to the Canadians that 
the French troops would assist in expelling the British from Canada. 
The object of this paper was to divert the attention of the garrison of 
New York from the proposed attack upon that city. General Clin- 
ton, under date of August thirty-first, forwarded a copy to Lord Ger- 
maine, calling his attention to its purport ; but, as a matter of fact, the 
expedition was never seriously proposed. During the discussion of 
the project to attack New York, General Arnold was advised by 
Washington that he would be tendered a command. Still pleading 
his old wounds as an excuse from active service, he expressed a prefer- 



M 



i78o.] FRENCH AUXILIARIES. 505 

ence for 2i post-coimnand, and after repeated solicitations of himself 
and friends, he was granted his choice, and on the third of August, 
was assigned to the command of " West Point and its dependencies, in 
which all are included, from Fishkill to King's Ferry." 

A protracted clandestine and confidential correspondence had long 
been carried on between himself and Sir Henry Clinton through Major 
Andre, under the assumed names of Gustavus and John Anderson, 
and this was so disguised by commercial forms as to be intelligible 
only to the parties holding the secret. By this means General Clin- 
ton was frequently advised of the condition, movements and resources 
of the American army, and was undoubtedly greatly restrained in his 
military movements by the possession of the secret and a correspond- 
ing dependence upon Arnold to instruct him as to times and modes 
of action. Arnold's pretended preference for post duty was deliber- 
ately treasonable and base. 

On the twenty-fifth of August, General Clinton wrote to Lord 
Germaine officially as follows : " At this new epoch of the war, when a 
foreig-n force has already landed, and an addition to it is expected, 
I owe it to my country, and I must in justice say to my own fame, to 
declare to your lordship thut I become everyday more sensible of the 
utter impossibility of prosecuting the war in this country without 
reinforcements. . . . We are, by some thousands, too weak to 
subdue this rebellion." 

Lord George Germaine wrote in reply, under date of September 
twenty-seventh : " Next to the destruction of Washington's arm\% 
the gaining over officers of influence and reputation among the troops 
would be the speediest means of subduing the rebellion and restoring 
the tranquillity of America. Your commission authorizes you to avail 
yourself of such opportunities, and there can be no doubt that the 
expenses will be cheerfully submitted to." 

It is impossible to determine how far Lord Germaine's confidence 
in the ability of Arnold to execute his plan dissuaded him from send- 
ing troops to the United States; and yet such would be the natural 
effect of substituting the use of gold for the force of arms in the pro- 
secution of a costly and protracted war. The archives, then secret, 
show that he was kept advised of the entire scheme. 

On the thirtieth of August, Arnold solicited an interview with 
some responsible party in order definitely to settle upon the price of his 
honor. On the eighteenth of September he wrote, advising that 
Andre be sent up the river to the Vulture, sloop of war, then at 



5o6 FRENCH AUXILIARIES. [1780. 

anchor in Haverstraw Bay, promising " to send a person on board with 
a boat and a flag of truce. General Clinton received the letter the 
following day ; troops were embarked under the pretense of an expe- 
dition into the Chesapeake, and Andre reached the Vulture on the 
twentieth. 

On the twenty-first, about midnight, Andre landed, met Arnold, 
and accompanied him first to the Clove, and then to the house of 
Joshua Helt Smith, see map " Highlands of the Hudson." Subse- 
quent examinations failed to convict Smith of any knowledge of the 
details of the conspiracy. His antecedents were favorable to sympa- 
thy with the British army ; but the secret was too valuable to be 
intrusted to a convenient tool. The terms of purchase were soon 
settled, simply "^^/^/and a brigadier-general's commission." 

Andre crossed the Hudson, to return to New York by land, was 
captured on the twenty-third, and on the second of October was 
executed as a spy. 

America grieved over this painful necessity, but there was no 
alternative except an exchange for Arnold, who escaped by taking 
refuge on the Vulture, the twenty-fourth, and this exchange was 
declined by General Clinton. 

General Clinton wrote to Lord Germaine, " Thus ended this pro- 
posed plan, from which I had conceived such great hopes and 
imagined such great consequences." 

General Greene was at once assigned to the command made vacant 
by the treason of Arnold. The garrison was changed ; the works 
were modified and strengthened, and Washington took post with his 
main army at Prakeness, near Passaic Falls, in Ne\v Jersey. (See 
map, " Operations in New Jersey.") 

During these months of uncertain plans, depreciated credit, and 
exposed treason at the north, the south was the theatre of active war. 
For a short time there had been a superficial peace in South Carolina 
and Georgia, and Lord Cornwallis, then at Charleston, undertook to 
reduce North Carolina to submission. Lord Rawdon was placed in 
command at Camden. A considerable royalist militia force was 
enrolled, but the effort to force paroled citizens and prisoners to 
render service to the crown, gradually destroyed all confidence in 
official pledges, and developed a partisan warfare of most persistent 
daring and bitterness. The cane-brakes, rice swamps, and evergreen 
forests were hiding places and natural strongholds which an army 
could not penetrate without guides, and to which small detachments, 



i7So.] FRENCH AUXILIARIES. 507 

unable to take the field against regular troops, could retreat when 
closely pressed, with little danger from pursuit. 

A few of the principal skirmishes are briefly stated, in order to 
illustrate the style of warfare which the Southern campaign evoked, 
and which properly enter into the minor operations of war. 

On the twelfth of July, Captain Christian Houk, who, with 
thirty-five dragoons, twenty New York volunteers, and sixty royalist 
militia, was detached from the garrison at Rocky Mountain, " to col- 
lect the royal militia and push the rebels as far as he deemed conve- 
nient," " was surprised and destroyed," as Colonel Tarleton states, 
through placing his party carelessly, without pickets, or sending out 
patrols at Williamson's Plantation. "This," says Justice Johnson, 
" was the first check the British regular troops had received from the 
militia since the fall of Charleston." Among the Americans who par- 
ticipated were the brothers Adair, one of them the subsequently well 
known General John Adair. This expedition first went to the house 
of a Mrs. McClure, found her sons James and Edward in the act of 
converting her tea-pots into bullets, and took them off, as they said, to 
hang them. The plantations of Colonel Bratton and James William- 
son, who afterwards took part in the skirmish, were ravaged. Mrs. 
McClure reported the facts at Sumter's camp, where Colonel Bratton, 
Captain McClure and five of the Williamsons were on duty. With 
seventy-five men, they stole upon Houk's party, separated them 
from the picketed horses and then punished them. Captain Houk 
was among the killed. These facts illustrate the character of many 
skirmishes which the passing weeks developed. 

On the thirteenth of July, Sumter made an unsuccessful attack 
upon the British post at Rocky Mount, on the west side of the 
Catawba, thirty miles northwest from Camden, and eleven miles from 
Hanging Rock, then commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Turnbull. 
This post consisted of two log-houses, perforated for small arms, and 
a small redoubt surrounded by a ditch and abatis. Three assaults 
were made and repulsed. The American casualties included Colonel 
Reed and thirteen men killed or wounded. Tarleton gives the British 
casualties at one officer killed, one wounded, and about ten men killed 
or wounded, and says "at the last assault, the Americans penetrated 
the abatis, but were finally repulsed." 

On the first of August, Colonel Elijah Clark, of Wilkes County, 
Georgia, was followed by a Mrs. Dillard, who had just fed his com- 
mand, and informed that Major Ferguson was in close pursuit. She 



5o8 FRENCH AUXILIARIES. [1780. 

was just in time to prevent a surprise, and in the two skirmishes that 
followed nearly sixty men were killed or wounded, the dragoons leav- 
ing twenty-eight dead on the field, and the Americans losing Major 
Smith, and four men killed, and Colonels Clark and Robinson, Major 
Clark and twenty-three others wounded. 

The character of the warfare, coupled with the ill-advised policy 
of General Clinton, produced absolute disregard of the formal obliga- 
tions of surrender and parole. 

On the sixth of August, Colonel Tarleton reported to General 
Cornwallis, " that Lieutenant-colonel Lisle, who had been paroled, and 
had exchanged his parole for a certificate of a good subject, carried 
off a whole battalion of men which he raised in the districts of the 
Ennoree and Tyger, as soon as they received arms and ammunition, to 
join Colonel Sumter," adding " TJiis treachery ruined all confidence 
bctzveen the regulars and militia." 

" This reinforcement," says Colonel Tarleton, " added to his former 
numbers, inspired Colonel Sumter with a desire of signalizing him- 
self by attacking some of the British posts upon the frontier." On 
the sixth of August, at seven o'clock in the evening, he approached 
the flank of the post " of Hanging Rock," which was entrusted to 
the North Carolina refugees, under the orders of Colonel Bryan. 
They fled. " The legion charged twice with fixed bayonets to save 
their three pounder." "Colonel Sumter still persevered in his attack, 
and very probably would have succeeded, if a stratagem employed by 
Captains Stewart and McDonald of the British Legion had not dis- 
concerted his operations." This was the simple detachment of a 
small force of buglers to the flanks, who gave such signals as to indi- 
cate the approach of additional troops. It was repeatedly practiced 
during the war. Colonel Tarleton omits to state that the American 
success at one time was so promising, that, as at Bennington, they 
allowed themselves to fall into disorder by plunder of commissary and 
other supplies, and thus greatly imperiled the success achieved at 
the first onset. The conditions of the battle, for it was more than a 
skirmish, changed repeatedly during nearly four hours of conflict. 
Gordon says, " The Prince of Wales regiment which defended the 
place was nearly annihilated, and the arms and ammunition taken 
from the British who fell in the beginning, were turned against 
their associates ; that Colonel Sumter's party had not more than ten 
bullets to a m.an when the action commenced." The British loss was 
^two hundred and sixty-nine, killed, wounded and taken prisoners. 



4 



lySo.] FRENCH AUXILIARIES. 509 

The American loss was severe, but not officially reported. Colonel 
Tarleton states that " about one hundred dead and wounded Ameri- 
cans were left on the field of battle, adding significantly, " The re- 
pulses he (Colonel Sumter) received, did not discourage him, or 
injure his cause. The loss of men was easily supplied, and his reputa- 
tion for activity and courage was fully sustained by his late enterpris- 
ing conduct." Irving says — " among the partisans who were present 
in this fight, an orphan boy of Scotch-Irish descent, was Andrew Jack- 
son." That boy became a successor of Washington, as President of 
the United States. 

During these desultory operations, of which a few only are stated, 
the condition of the American army proper is to be noticed. On the 
sixth of July, the Baron De Kalb was at Buffalo Ford and Deep River. 
He left Morristown, New Jersey, on the sixteenth of April, with nearly 
fourteen hundred men, embarked at the head of Elk river on the third 
day of May, reached Petersburg early in June, entered North Carolina 
on the twentieth of June, halted at Hillsborough to rest his troops 
and secure supplies, and then advanced. General Gates reached De 
Kalb's camp on the twenty-fifth of July. He had previously written 
to General De Kalb, from Hillsborough, " Enough has already been 
lost in a vain defense of Charleston ; if more is sacrificed, the Southern 
States are undone ; and this may go nearly to undo the rest." 

General Caswell's North Carolina militia had already crossed the 
Peedee on the route for Camden in defiance of the zvishes and orders 
of General De Kalb. There was some jealousy of foreign officers, 
and General Caswell made a mistake in not reporting directly to Gen- 
eral De Kalb. That officer felt the slight, and wrote on the seventh 
of July to his wife, " Officers of European experience alone, do not 
know what it is to contend against difficulties and vexations. My 
present condition makes me doubly anxious to return to you." It 
had been his purpose to advance by Salisbury and Charlotte, through 
a fertile country where supplies would be ready at hand. Adjutant- 
general Williams urged the movement ; but General Gates decided 
differently, upon his arrival, and to the amazement of his officers 
ordered the troops to be ready to start at a moment's warning, and 
"on the twenty-seventh," says Irving, "put what he called the 
Grand Army on its march, by the shortest route to Camden, through 
a barren country which could offer no food but lean cattle, fruit and 
unripe maize." Marion was detached and sent to the interior of South 
Carolina to watch the British troops and make a report. 



5IO FRENCH AUXILIARIES. [1780. 

On the third of August, the army crossed the Peedee and united 
with the command of Lieutenant-colonel Porterfield, who had been 
dispatched to the relief of Charleston, but who with superior enter- 
prise and judgment had operated on the border, after hearing of the 
capture of that city. Neither prisoners nor medicines could be had. 
The army ate peaches for bread. Dysentery broke out in the camp ; 
many could hardly walk. " On the fourth of August, General Gates 
issued a proclamation." A portion is copied from Colonel Tarleton's 
official reports, with Italics, as given by that officer, " inviting the 
patriotic citizens of Carolina to asscnible under his auspices, to vindicate 
the rights of America ; holding out an amnesty to all who had sub- 
scribed paroles imposed upon tJicm by the rjiffian band of conquest ; 
and excepting only those zvho in the hour of devastation, had exercised 
acts of barbarism and depredation upon the persons and property of their 
fellow citizens^ 

Colonel Tarleton's troubles with American militia had not ended 
with the desertion of Lieutenant-colonel Lisle. As General Gates 
moved toward Camden, Major McArthur collected boats on the 
Peedee, upon which he placed one hundred sick, many of whom were 
from the Seventy-first British regulars, which had suffered greatly 
from the climate." " Colonel Mills, who commanded the militia of 
the Cheraw district, though a very good man," says Tarleton, in his 
report of August sixth, " had not complied with my instructions in 
forming his corps, and attended more to oaths and professions, and 
attended less "to the former conduct of those whom he admitted. 
The instant that the militia found that Major McArthur had left 
his post, and were assured that Gates would come there the next 
day, they seized their own officers, and the hundred sick, and 
carried them all prisoners into North Carolina." Colonel Mills 
escaped. 

On the seventh, Gates effected a union with Caswell's North Caro- 
lina militia, and the half-famished army advanced to Lynch's Creek. 
The British withdrew their post from Cheraw's Hill, and fell back to 
Camden. If the American column had marched by the route sug- 
gested and urged by Baron De Kalb, it would have reached Camden in 
the rear of Cheraw Hill before Lord Rawdon could have gained that 
post, and would have secured ample supplies. 

Colonel Tarleton says, " The American commander had not suffi- 
cient penetration to conceive that by a forced march up the creek, he 
could have pushed Lord Rawdon's flank, and reached Camden ; 



t78o.] FRENXH AUXILIARIES. 5 II 

which would have been an easy conquest, and a fatal blow to the 
British." This was a fact which may have given to Cornwallis more 
confidence in his subsequent attack upon Gates at Sander's Creek. 
He was too good a soldier not to notice such mistakes and profit 
by them. 

General Gates halted two days, and on the thirteenth encamped 
at Rugely's Mills, twelve miles above Camden. On the fourteenth, 
General Stevens joined the army with seven hundred Virginia 
militia. 

" On the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth," Lord Corn- 
wallis reached Camden, having left Charleston on the tenth. The 
Twenty-third, Thirty-third, and Seventy-first British regiments, the Vol- 
unteers of Ireland, and Lieutenant-colonel Hamilton's corps had also 
been collected at that post. Four companies of light infantry from 
Ninety-six joined the same day. Colonel Tarleton himself having just 
recovered from a fever, crossed the Santee River on the sixth, then 
Black River, joined Lord Rawdon on the tenth, and with him, fell back 
to Camden. 

Meanwhile a train of clothing, ammunition, and other supplies had 
left Charleston for the use of the British troops. Colonel Sumter 
made application to General Gates on the fourteenth for a detachment 
of four hundred regulars and volunteers to join his command of an 
equal number, for the purpose of capturing that train. A detail was 
made by General Gates upon hastily formed impressions that his own 
force was seven thousand men, and consisted of one hundred Maryland 
regulars, under Lieutenant-colonel Woodford, three hundred North 
Carolina militia, some artillerymen, and two brass guns. 

Colonel Sumter met the train as it slowly traveled up the west 
bank of the VVateree, and was about to cross the river within a mile 
of Camden. The surprise was complete, but the roar of cannon soon 
advised him that there was severe fighting on the other side of the 
river. During the next day he was informed by a messenger from 
Major Davis of the defeat of Gates at Sander's Creek, and at once 
hastened toward Charlotte, North Carolina, as ordered. 

On the night of the seventeenth, his command, oppressed by the 
heat, worn out by marching, and encumbered by more than one 
hundred prisoners, went into camp on the north side of Fishing creek, 
about two miles above its junction with the Catawba. 

Colonel Tarleton had already crossed the Catawba in pursuit, and 
was resting his men at Fishing creek. On the morning of the eigh- 



512 FRENCH AUXILIARIES. [1780. 

teenth, he dashed in upon the surprised Americans, cutting them off 
from their color line where the arms were stacked, inflicted a loss of 
one hundred in killed and wounded, captured three hundred prisoners, 
besides the rescue of his own men, and the train they had lost, took 
one thousand stand of arms and two cannon, and dispersed the entire 
command as with the suddenness and success of a whirlwind. 

British Effective Force. 
Note. — From " Original Returns in the British Record Office." Date, August 1st, 1780. 

Regular Troops Only. 

New York 19.115 West Florida 1,261 

South Carolina 6,589 Nova Scotia 3,524 

Georgia i,756 Bemiuda 204 

East Florida 453 Providence Island 118 



27.913 5.I07 

Total, 33,020. 

December, ist 1780. 

New York 17.729 West Florida 1,261 

On an Expedition 2274 Nova Scotia 3,167 

South Carolina 7384 Bermuda 387 

Georgia 968 Providence Island 143 

East Florida 453 



4.958 

28,808 

Total, 33,766. 
Provincial forces at close of year 8,954 



HISHHAU.DS. 




^ Compiled a»i/2^ra)0jr ty Co/. Cfrrr/'/rtrfo/f 



512* 



CHAPTER LXV. 

BATTLE OF CAMDEN. KING'S MOUNTAIN. POSITION OF 
SOUTHERN ARMIES. 

THE battle of Camden, or Sander'.s Creek, was one of the most 
suggestive of the war. The force of discipline, exact apprecia- 
tion of the adversary, quick seizure of opportunity, and the delivery 
of incessant blows upon every exposed point in turn, were illustrated 
in the conduct of Lord Cornwallis. Webster, Rawdon and Tarleton 
recognized the controlling will of the general commanding, and obeyed 
orders implicitly, confidently, and at all hazards. The British regulars 
only did their duty as usual. It was characteristic of their general 
conduct during the whole war. 

Lord Cornwallis hesitated, as he states, whether to risk an action 
against the American army, or to retire to Charleston. His scouts 
were constantly on the alert, and he formed so correct an estimate of 
the character of General Gates, and the composition and disposition 
of the American army, as to risk an attack, although he knew that it 
was superior in numbers to his own, and occupying a good position 
at Rugely's Mills. General Gates was thoroughly " sure of victory, 
and of the dispersion of the British army." It has been seen that he 
participated actively in no part of the operations near Saratoga until 
the morning of August eleventh, 1777. Confiding in numbers, and 
neglecting reconnoissance, he then imperiled his army by forcing 
several brigades across Fishkill creek, while remaining in the rear 
himself. 

He brought his worn-out, sick and hungry army to Rugely's Mills 
despite of advice and prudence, and intended at once to attack a 
strong post and veteran troops, as if the prestige of the Burgoyne 
campaign was a formidable part of his aggressive force, instead of an 
element to incite Cornwallis to a more determined resistance. He 
33 



514 BATTLE OF CAMDEN. [1780. 

had about fourteen hundred good troops well officered. The re- 
mainder were raw militia just collected, many of whom had never 
been in action, and had only just received bayonets, without instruc- 
tion in their use. They had no idea of tactical formations and move-'- 
nients, and no provision was made for a rallying point in case of dis- 
aster. General Gates seems to have been limited in capacity to the 
simple issue of an order, and to take the consequences of its mode of 
execution as " one of the uncertainties of war." He did not know that 
Cornwallis had reached Camden when he advanced, nor the weakness 
of his own force until he ordered the battle; then assumed that a 
general should never retreat under whatever circumstances, and 
lacked the wisdom to consult with other officers when uncertain as to 
the proper line of duty. 

General Gates placed in the hands of Adjutant-general Williams 
an elaborate general order, dated " Camp Clermont, 15th of August," 
directing the " Grand army to march promptly at ten o'clock that 
night." It was evident from its tenor that the general commanding 
did not even know the strength of the force that was to be handled. 
Adjutant-general Williams at once called upon the general officers, 
of whom thirteen were with the army, for exact returns of their com- 
mands. The abstract was placed before General Gates, "as he came 
from a council of officers." It showed that the total^ nominal strength, 
was only three thousand and fifty-two men. Turning to his chief of 
staff, he simply said, " Sir, the numbers are certainly below the esti- 
mate made this morning. There was no dissenting voice in the 
council where the orders have just been read ; there are enough for 
our purpose." The orders were then published in the army, without 
deliberation or consultation with anybody. 

Through the coincidence of each army attempting to surprise the 
other, they left their respective camps at the same hour, ten o'clock, 
so as to gain time to strike the adversary before daylight on the 
following morning. 

Colonel Armand with his cavalry, only sixty men, led the advance, 
although he remonstrated at the detail of mounted men as a pioneer 
corps for night service, since the profoundest silence was enjoined in 
orders. Colonel Porterfield's light infantry were ordered to march 
upon his right flank and Major Armstrong on the left flank, each in 
single file, two hundred yards from the road. 

Colonel Armand's orders were, " being thus supported, in case of 
an attack by the enemy's cavalry, in front, not only to support the 



1780.] BATTLE OF CAMDEN. 515 

shock of the enemy's horse, but to rout them ; and to consider the 
order, to stand the attacks of the enemy's cavalry, be their numbers 
what they may, as positive." Between two and three o'clock in the 
morning the advance s^uard of the British army, consisting of twenty 
Legion cavalry and as many mounted infantry, confronted, hotly 
attacked and routed Armand's detachment. Colonel Porterfield 
faithfully executed his orders and was mortally wounded in the skir- 
mish; but the prompt arrival of the light infantry, the Twenty-third 
and Thirty-third British regiments in support of their advance guard, 
compelled him to retire. The retreat of Armand's cavalry threw the 
First Maryland brigade into confusion ; and both armies, well satisfied 
with their experience of a night attack, awaited the morning and 
formed their lines for action. It was still within the power of Gen- 
eral Gates to fall back to a strong position ; but he lacked nerve and 
decision for such an hour. A prisoner who fell into the hands of the 
Americans reported the British force to be three thousand strong, 
under the immediate command of Lord Cornwallis. This fact was 
reported to General Gates. Adjutant-general Williams says, " Gen- 
eral Gates called the general officers together in the rear, asking — 
" what is to be done. " All were mute for a few moments, when the 
gallant Stevens exclaimed," " Gentlemen, is it not too late noiv to do 
anything but fight." "When the Adjutant-general went to call the 
Baron De Kalb to council, he said, " and has the General given you 
orders to retreat the army," thus indicating his opinion of the proper 
action required. '• The Baron did not however oppose the sugges- 
tion of General Stevens; and every measure that ensued was prepara- 
tory for action." Adjutant-general Williams says " that the General 
seemed disposed to await q.v^\\\?,— lie gave no order sP "Upon his 
suggesting a brisk attack by Stevens' brigade upon the British right, 
he answered, " Sir, that's right ; let it be done." " This was the last 
order the deputy Adjutant-general received." Reference is made to 
map " Battle of Camden." This battle, as far as it was a battle, on 
the part of the Americans, and not a rout, was confined to the right 
wing where the gallant De Kalb fought his small command admirably. 
He did not know that the rest of the army had fled, until, surrounded 
by overwhelming numbers, he learned the fate of the day. 

The British army had passed Sander's creek and entered upon a 
narrow belt of solid land, bordered on each side by an impassable 
swamp. The American army was flanked by the same swamps ; but 
the interval rapidly widened in the direction of Rugely's Mills, so 



5l6 BATTLE OF CAMDEN. , [1780. 

that their flanks, the left especially, became exposed in case the 
engagement was pressed and they failed to hold their original ground. 
The artillery was then placed in the centre of the front line ; and 
Major Armstrong's light infantry, which had retreated at the first 
encounter, was ordered to cover a small interval between the left wing 
and the swamp in that quarter. Frequent skirmishes during the 
night disclosed the relative positions of the armies ; and the British 
army advanced at dawn of day. 

" Lieutenant-colonel Webster commanded the right wing, con- 
sisting of three companies of light infantry, the Twenty-third and 
Thirty-third British regiments. Lord Rawdon commanded the left, 
consisting of the volunteers of Ireland, the Legion Infantry, Hamil- 
ton's corps and Bryan's refugees. Two six pounders and two three 
pounders, were to the left of the road, under Lieutenant McLeod. 
The two battalions of the Seventy-first regiment, with two six pound- 
ers, formed the second line. The Legion cavalry remained in column, 
on account of the thickness of the woods to the right of the main 
road, close to the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, with 
orders to act as opportunity offered, or necessity required." 

The Second INIaryland brigade. General Gist commanding, with 
the Delaware troops under Baron De Kalb, formed the American 
right ; the North Carolina militia formed the centre, under General 
Caswell ; and the equally untried Virginia militia, under Stevens, 
were on the left. The First Maryland brigade formed the second line, 
and the artillery under the direction of Captain Singleton, was so 
posted as to command the road. 

The morning was calm and hazy; and the smoke settled so near 
the earth, that " it was difficult," says Cornwallis, " to see the effect 
of a very heavy and well supported fire on both sides." He says, 
" Observing a movement on the American left which I supposei^ to 
be with an intention to make some alterations in their order, I 
directed Lieutenant-colonel Webster to begin the attack." The 
movement referred to, was an attempt on the part of Adjutant-general 
Williams to force the brigade of Stevens to charge upon the British 
right wing before it could fully deploy ; and to give time for their 
advance, he threw a small party of skirmishers forward, with orders 
" to take to single trees and thus annoy the enemy as much as possi- 
ble." The British right wing however was too quick and spirited for 
this movement of untried militia, who did not know how to use the 



1780.] BATTLE OF CAMDEN. $17 

bayonet just received. They came on with a steady front and loud 
cheers, instantly carrying everything before them. 

The Virginia militia threw down their loaded arms and fled. The 
North Carolina militia, with the exception of a small detachment 
under General Gregory who made a short pause, and of a part of 
Dixon's regiment who were next in line to the second Maryland 
brigade, fled also. The power of example is illustrated by Dixon's 
conduct in view of his position. " At least two-thirds of the army," 
according to Adjutant-general Williams, " fled without firing a shot." 
The First Maryland brigade two hundred yards in the rear, repeatedly 
resisted the attack upon their left, until the British right wing over- 
whelmed them by numbers and forced them to retire. It was just 
then that the British legion, which had pursued the militia until they 
were started to the rear, joined Lieutenant-colonel Webster, and made 
the decisive charge upon the First Maryland brigade. The Second 
Maryland brigade did not flinch ; but after repulsing Lord Rawdon 
twice, charged bayonet under Baron De Kalb, broke through the 
British left, wheeled upon its centre, and fought alone until the whole 
British army enveloped them in fire. Baron De Kalb fell, wounded in 
eleven places, and could hardly be convinced that the Americans were 
not the victors, so faithfully had he executed his orders, in the assur- 
ance of equal good conduct on the part of the other divisions. The 
rout was utter. General Gates was carried away with the militia, which 
he calls " a torrent," and knew nothing of the resistance so stubbornly 
maintained by the right wing of his army. 

Adjutant-general Williams says, " If in this affair the militia fled 
too soon, the regulars may be thought as blamable for remaining too 
long on the field ; especially after all hope of victory must have been 
despaired of." General Gates hurried with General Caswell to 
Charlotte, sixty miles from the field of battle, and by the twentieth 
safely reached Hillsborough, one hundred and eighty miles from 
Camden, without gathering a sufficient force of the fugitives to form 
even an escort. 

The North Carolina militia fled to their homes, or wherever they 
could find refuge. General Stevens followed the Virginians to Hills- 
borough, and back over the route they came, to attempt to rally them, 
but their term of service was short and he soon discharged them. 

General Cornwallis reports his force at two thousand two hundred 
and thirty-nine men, and his casualties sixty-eight killed ; two hundred 
and fifty-six wounded and missing. General Gates subsequently 



5l8 BATTLE OF CAMDEN. [1780. 

reported the loss of General De Kalb and five officers killed, and thirty- 
four officers wounded, including Lieutenant-colonels Woodford, 
Vaughan, Porterfield, and Du Buson, most of whom had been taken 
prisoners ; and that by the twenty-ninth seven hundred non-com- 
missioned officers and soldiers of the Maryland division had rejoined 
the army. This is a remarkable statement, greatly to the credit of 
those troops. The Delaware regiment had been almost literally 
destroyed. The Maryland troops lost between three and four hundred 
in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the original force was hardly 
fourteen hundred strong. 

General Gates undoubtedly, as stated by him, made all the effort 
within his power to check the flight ; but he had )io poivcr in action, 
and there is not a redeeming fact during his connection with the 
Southern army to show his fitness to command troops. Generals 
Smallwood and Gist secured their escape, as did the greater portion 
of Armand's cavalry. The British came into the possession of seven 
pieces of artillery, two thousand muskets, the entire baggage train, and 
prisoners to the number of nearly one thousand, according to the report 
of Cornwallis, including Generals De Kalb, Gregory, and Rutherford. 

Congress had assigned General Gates to the command of the 
Southern Department at a time when the Commander-in-chief had 
selected General Greene for the detail ; and the battle of Camden was 
an impressive commentary upon their action. It is not to be lost 
sight of that the expedition of Colonel Sumter took four hundred men 
from the army at a critical hour, and that a reasonable resistance on 
the part of the militia who were clumsily posted in the most exposed 
part of the field would have given increased value to the good conduct 
of the American right. 

On the day of Sumter's misfortunes at Fishing creek, a skirmish 
occurred at Musgrove's Mills, South Carolina, on the Ennoree River, 
in which the Americans successfully surprised Colonel Ennis, who was 
in command of a mixed force of regulars and royalists. 

On the twenty-first a skirmish occurred at Wahab's plantation. 
The house was burned, but the Americans under Colonel Davis 
secured ninety-six horses, and one hundred and twenty stand of arms, 
inflicted a loss upon the legion, who quartered there, of sixty men, 
losing about thirty. 

Early in September, Brigadier-general Patterson retired from 
Charleston on sick leave, and Lieutenant-colonel Balfour succeeded to 
the command of that post. 



1780.] BATTLE OF CAMDEN. 519 

Lieutenant-colonel Brown was stationed at Augusta, Lieutenant- 
colonel Conger at Ninety-six, and Lieutenant-colonel TurnbuU at 
Camden. General Cornwallis advanced on the twenty-second with 
the Seventh, Twenty-third, Thirty-third and Seventy-first regiments 
of infantry, the Volunteers of Ireland, Hamilton's corps, Bryan's 
Refugees, four pieces of cannon, and a detachment of cavalry, toward 
Charlotte, via Hanging Rock. In a skirmish near the Court House 
on the twenty-sixth, while entering the town, the British advance was 
actively resisted, being fired upon from behind stone fences and build- 
ings. Colonel Tarleton reports " about thirty of the enemy were 
killed and taken ; the king's troops did not come out of this skirmish 
unhurt. Major Huger and Captains Campbell and McDonald were 
wounded, and twelve non-commissioned officers and men were killed 
and wounded. The American report states their loss as " Colonel 
Francis Locke, (who fought at Ramsour's W\\\s) killed, Major Graham 
and twelve men wounded." 

It was now the purpose of General Cornwallis to take active 
measures for the invasion of North Carolina ; but the whole region, 
drained by the Pacolet, Tyger, Ennoree, and Saluda Rivers was a 
troublesome one to leave in his rear. Of the people of Mecklenburg 
County, around Charlotte, Colonel Tarleton thus gives his opinion, 
" It was evident that the counties of Mecklenburg and Rohan were 
more hostile to England than any others in America. The vigilance 
and animosity of these districts checked the exertions of the well- 
affected, and totally destroyed all communications between the king's 
troops and the loyalists in the other parts of the province. No Brit- 
ish commander could obtain any information ; the foraging parties 
were every day harassed by the inhabitants, who did not remain at 
home to receive payment for the products of their plantations, but 
generally fired from covert places to annoy the British detachments. 
Individuals, with expresses, were frequently murdered. Notwith- 
standing their checks and losses, they continued their hostilities with 
unwearied perseverance, and the British troops were so effectually 
blockaded, that very few out of a great number of messengers could 
reach Charlotte, in the beginning of October, to give intelligence of 
Ferguson's situation." These statements clearly indicate the fact that 
the British policy was developing an increased antagonism among 
the people, and that the conquest did not extend beyond garrison 
limits. This irregular warfare was bearing fruit. 

Colonel Clark threatened Augusta, and in two days inflicted con- 



520 BATTLE OF CAMDEN. [1780. 

siderable loss upon the garrison, but was repulsed, Lieutenant-colonel 
Brown, the post commander, being wounded, and Captain Johnson 
killed. Colonel Tarleton says that the British loss fell principally 
upon their Indian auxiliaries. General Cornwallis states that the 
Indians pursued and scalped many of the Americans. 

On the eighth of October the battle of King's Mountain entered 
into the operations of the campaign and did very much to offset the 
British victory at Camden. Tarleton and Ferguson operated along 
parallel belts separated by the Catawba and Broad Rivers as circum- 
stances of pursuit or scouting determined, and the latter officer who 
had hoped to cut off Colonel Clark's detachment and other border 
partisan corps, before winter, found himself compelled to take refuge 
on King's Mountain on the sixth of October, closely pursued by a 
superior force. Colonel Isaac Shelby with a force from Sullivan 
County (now in Tennessee) ; Colonel William Campbell, with men from 
Washington County, Virginia ; Colonel Benjamin Cleveland with 
men from Wilkes and Surrey Counties ; Colonel Charles McDowell, 
with men from Wilkes and Rutherford Counties, North Carolina ; 
Colonel John Sevier with men from Sullivan, reached the Cowpens, 
on Broad River on the sixth of October, and were joined the same 
evening by Colonel James Williams of South Carolina with a small 
force, the total command numbering nearly or quite sixteen hundred 
men, who had been selected for the purpose. It was an impromptu, 
unpaid army of volunteers, hastily combined for the purpose of ridding 
the country of Ferguson's corps. 

King's Mountain, about a mile long and about a hundred feet 
above the surrounding country, is one of a series of rocky summits 
extending from the south-east to the north-west, and is just within 
the boundary line of North Carolina, as indicated on the map *' Opera- 
tions in Southern States," 

Nine hundred men were selected to storm the hill in front and on 
the flanks. The detachment of the Seventy-first British regulars, 
fought with such spirit that in three bayonet charges they crowded 
their assailants to the foot of the hill. Major Ferguson was killed and 
the command devolved upon Captain Abraham De Peister, of the 
King's American regiment. After an hour of desperate struggle the 
command surrendered. 

The American casualties were Colonel Williams, Major Chromile, 
Captain Mattocks, two lieutenants, four ensigns and nineteen men 



i78o.] BATTLE OF CAMDEN. $21 

killed ; one major, three captains, three lieutenants and fifty-three 
privates wounded. 

The British casualties are characterized by a report which is so 
similar to those of Tarleton respecting " the wounded unable to 
march," that it confirms the generally accepted opinion that a delib- 
erate slaughter was made of the so-called Tory troops. The casualties 
are reported as, "Two colonels, three captains and two hundred and 
one privates killed, one hundred and twenty-seven privates wounded, 
and being unable to inarch, left on the field ; one colonel, twelve captains 
and with other officers and men, six hundred and forty-eight prisoners. 
The regulars lost, besides Major Ferguson, one captain, two lieutenants 
and fifteen privates killed ; thirty-five wounded but unable to march and 
left on the ground ; two captains and sixty-eight taken prisoners." 

Fifteen hundred muskets and other arms, with the baggage, were 
captured. Tarleton thus briefly sums up his statement : " The action 
was disputed with great bravery near an hour, when the death of the 
gallant Ferguson threw his whole corps into total confusion. No 
effort was, made after this event, to resist the enemy's barbarity or 
revenge the fall of their leader." 

Lossing and Dawson justly regard this action as one of the most 
obstinate of the war, and the associated skirmishes already briefly 
noticed, are but indicative of the intensely personal and destructive 
character of the campaign. 

" It was now evident," says Tarleton, " beyond contradiction, that 
the British general had not adopted the most eligible plan for the 
invasion of North Carolina. Winnsborough was selected for the 
winter quarters of the army, and the sick were placed at Camden, 
where " redoubts were built, to make up for the badness of the posi- 
tion." Works were also erected at Nelson's Ferry, to secure the 
communications with Charleston, and also at Ninety-six. 

" The success of the Americans at King's Mountain," says Tarle- 
ton, "and the distance of Cornwallis's army, prompted many of the 
disaffected inhabitants of South Carolina to break their parole, and to 
unite under a leader, ' Marion,' in the eastern part of the province." 
Sumter still operated on the banks of Broad River, cutting off forag- 
ing parties, and endangering the post at Ninety-six. Major Wemyss 
of the Sixty-third British regiment, and some cavalry of the legion, 
attempted to surprise him at Fish Dam Ford, on the ninth of Novem- 
ber, lost twenty-five men as prisoners, and failed in the attempt. 
Later in the month, Colonel Sumter, strongly reinforced by Colonels 



522 BATTLE OF CAMDEN. [i-So. 

Thomas and Bratton, and Majors McCall and Hammond, of South 
Carolina, marched toward Ninety-six to attempt its capture, but was 
pursued by Colonel Tarleton, and a skirmish ensued, November 
twentieth, -at Blackstock's plantations, on the Tiger River, which left 
Colonel Sumter in possession of the field. 

The skirmish is given in order to indicate the extraordinary con- 
flict in reports of this partisan warfare. American statement of their 
own loss, three killed, four wounded, among the latter General Sumter ; 
of the enemy, ninety-two killed and one hundred wounded. Tarle- 
ton's statement, Americans killed and wounded, upwards of one hun- 
dred, and fifty made prisoners. British loss, Lieutenants Gibson and 
Cope killed, four officers and forty-five non-commissioned officers and 
men killed and wounded. 

Stedman " takes the whole account of the action from Mackenzie's 
strictures on Tarleton's campaign," very justly reviewing inconsist- 
encies in Tarleton's report, which disprove his statement of casualties, 
and adds, " The wounded of the British detachment were left to the 
mercy of the enemy ; and it is but justice to General Sumter to declare 
that the strictest humanity took place upon the present occasion ; 
they were supplied with every comfort in his power. Although Tarle- 
ton was repulsed at Blackstock's Hill, the immediate effects were 
nearly the same as a victory. General Sumter being disabled by his 
wound from keeping the field, his followers dispersed, after conveying 
him to a place of safety." 

The summer and fall campaign in the Southern States had been 
one of constant activity, and as the year 1780 drew to its close there 
was no cessation of demands upon the vigilance of either army. The 
remnants of General Gates' army were being reorganized as rapidly as 
possible, and before the departure of that officer to answer before a 
Court of Inquiry ordered by Congress, as to the disaster at Camden, 
he had collected a nominal force of two thousand three hundred and 
seven men, more than half of whom were militia, and as afterwards 
stated by General Greene, " but eight hundred in the whole force 
were properly clothed and equipped." 

The post commander at Charleston, Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, 
was taking extreme measures to terrify and intimidate the people ; 
Marion had increased his partisan detachment to the strength of an 
efficient corps, and with no severity of climate such as impaired opera- 
tions at the north, the campaign of 1781 practically began when 
General Nathaniel Greene arrived to take command of the Southern 
Department on the third of December, 178 J. 



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CHAPTER LXVI. 

MINOR MENTION, 1780. EUROPEAN COALITION AGAINST 
ENGLAND. GENERAL GREENE AT THE SOUTH. 

'"T^HE year 1780 closed with the promise of still more active opera- 
I tions in the Southern Department ; but there were many 
hindrances to prevent prompt support from the North. The defeat 
of the American army at Camden was not known by General Wash- 
ington until September, and it was impossible to spare from the 
Northern army a sufficient force to cope with that of Lord Cornwallis. 

The second division of French troops, so long looked for, and 
reported as blockaded in the port of Brest, did not arrive. The 
blockade of Newport compelled the French army to remain almost 
idle, as a support to the fleet, and the American army rapidly dimin- 
ished in numbers as winter drew near. 

Occasional demonstrations were made as if to attack New York, 
but chiefly to prevent the detachment of any portion of its garrison to 
the South. A serious attack upon the city was impracticable, until 
reinforcements should arrive from France. 

During the month of October, however. La Fayette elaborated a 
plan, which was so far advanced that boats were built and placed 
upon wagons, thereby to unite the advantages of attack both by 
land and water. This plan included Fort Washington, the city of 
New York and Staten Island, as objectives of simultaneous attack, 
and proposed to make the blow as sudden as that upon Trenton in 
1776. It was abandoned for want of boats. There were few periods 
during the war when more diverse and widely separated interests 
required the attention of the American Commander-in-chief. 

Major Carleton, with a force of eight hundred troops, regulars, 
Canadians and Indians, captured Forts George and Ann in October. 
Fort Edward was saved through the sagacity of Colonel Livingston, 



524 MINOR MENTION. [1780. 

who having a garrison of only seventy-nine men, averted attack, by 
sending a letter to the commanding ofificer of Fort George (to be 
intercepted by the enemy) exaggerating his own strength and declar- 
ing his purpose to go to the rescue of that post. The British troops 
however, actually advanced to the vicinity of Saratoga, burned some 
houses, and then returned to Lake Champlain. 

An incursion from Fort Niagara into the Mohawk Valley brought 
another brief struggle with Sir John Johnson, Joseph Brandt and 
the Indians. The Oneidas, friendly to the United States, were 
expelled from their homes, the Schoharie region was desolated, and 
much wheat was destroyed. 

On the sixth of November, General Washington confided to Gen- 
eral Schuyler the fact, that some leaders in Vermont were correspond- 
ing with British officials in Canada, and directed him to concert 
measures with General Clinton to detect and thwart their plans. 
The prompt response of General Schuyler was characteristic of his 
entire career during the war : and it is but justice to say, that garbled 
documents, and sneers at his high social position and culture, have in 
some instances usurped the place of history and dishonored records 
otherwise reputable for general accuracy of statement. These move- 
ments required three additional regiments to be sent to Albany, and 
constant uneasiness prevailed along the whole northern and north- 
western frontiers. 

On the seventh of November it was known to Washington that 
the American army was "experiencing almost daily want;" while 
the " British army in New York was deriving ample supplies from a 
trade with New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, which had, by 
degrees, become so common that it was hardly thought a crime." 

General Sullivan having left the army, took his seat in Congress, 
September eleventh. In a letter of November twentieth, Washing- 
ton uses the following urgent and laconic terms, in writing to him : 
" Congress will deceive themselves, if they imagine that the army, or 
a State that is the theater of war, can rub through a second cam- 
paign, as the last. It would be as unreasonable to suppose that 
because a man had rolled a snowball till it had acquired the size of a 
horse, he might do it until it was the size of a house. Matters may 
be pushed to a certain point, beyond which we can not move them. 
Ten months' pay is now due to the army. Every department of it is 
so much indebted that we have not credit for a single expense, and 
some of the States are harassed and oppressed to a degree beyond 



i7So.] MINOR MENTION. 525 

bearing. . . To depend, under these circumstances, upon the 
resources of the country, unassisted by foreign bravery, will, I am 
confident, be to lean upon a broken reed." 

General Sullivan had advised that the French fleet should force 
its way from Newport to Boston, and the French army report at 
headquarters. This proposition had been urged at a conference held 
with the Count de Rochambeau, at Hartford, Connecticut, but it was 
not adopted. As early as October sixteenth, General Leslie left 
New York with nearly three thousand troops and landed at Ports- 
mouth, Virginia ; but afterwards re-embarked, and landed at Charles- 
ton, late in December. Colonel Rochambeau, son of Count de 
Rochambeau, left Newport on the twenty-eighth of October, ran the 
gauntlet of the British fleet during a gale, and safely reached France, 
with a formal application for additional aid of men, arms and money. 
The Chevalier de Ternay died at Newport, on the fifteenth of 
December, and was succeeded in command of the fleet, by Chevalier 
Destouches. Some ineffectual negotiations took place looking to a 
union of Spanish and French ships in a common movement on the 
American coast; but no practical results were realized, more than to 
hold the British ships fast before Newport, and thus prevent their 
operations down the Atlantic coast. Colonel Fleury, who had been 
distinguished at Fort Mifflin and Stony Point, joined the French 
army under Rochambeau. 

On the twentieth of December, General Washington wrote to 
Benjamin Franklin, Minister at the Court of Versailles, stating that 
"the campaign had been thus inactive, after a flattering prospect at 
the opening of it and vigorous struggles to make it a decisive one, 
through failure of the expected naval superiority which was the pivot 
upon which everything turned," and added: "The movements of 
Lord Cornwallis during the past month or two have been retrograde. 
What turn the late reinforcements, which have been sent to him, may 
give to his affairs, remains to be known. I have reinforced our 
Southern army, principally with horse ; but the length of the march 
is so much opposed to the measure thai every corps is in a greater 
or less degree ruined. I am happy, however, in assuring you that a 
better disposition never prevailed in the legislatures of the several 
States, than at this time. The folly of temporary expedients is seen 
into and exploded, and vigorous efforts will be used to obtain a per- 
manent army and carry on the war systematically, if the obstinacy 
of Great Britain shall compel us to continue it. We want nothing 



526 MINOR MENTION. [1780. 

but the aid of a loan to enable us to put our finances into a tolerable 
train. The country does not want resources, but we want the means 
of drawing them forth." 

It appears from this letter that Washington had reached a point 
where he felt that ultimate success was not far distant. The recon- 
struction of the army to which he refers, was a plan then pending for 
the consolidation of battalions, reducing their numbers and thereby 
settling upon something like a permanent army establishment. 

The new army was to consist of fifty regiments of foot, including 
Hazen's, specially reserved — four regiments of artillery, and one of arti- 
ficers, with the two partisan corps under Armand and Lee, and four 
other legionary corps, two-thirds horse and one-third foot. All new 
enlistments were to be for the war. The total force upon the rees- 
tablished company basis would amount to thirty-six thousand men. 
Not more than half that number were ever in the field at the same 
time, and the full complement was never recruited. Hazen's regiment, 
and the corps of Armand and Lee were recruited at large. The other 
regiments were assigned as follows : to Massachusetts and Virginia, 
eleven regiments each ; Pennsylvania, nine ; Connecticut, six ; Mary- 
land, five ; North Carolina, four ; New York, three ; New Hampshire, 
New Jersey and South Carolina, two each ; Rhode Island, Delaware 
and Georgia, one each. 

This reorganization was attended with difficulties. There were 
many who had taken commissions with the purpose of devoting their 
life to military attainment. Their entire life, (as a soldier would 
understand the expression) was involved in their military service. 
The consolidation involved sacrifices, and there was a strong party in 
Congress, " led by Samuel Adams," which as Hildreth concisely states 
the fact, " was very jealous of military power, and of everything which 
tended to give a permanent character to the army." The retirement 
of officers on partial pay was bitterly opposed by this party; and the 
jealousy of a regular army, the value of which was in Washington's 
estimation, and in fact, one of the great lessons of the war, was the 
perpetual cause of waste, disaster, and the postponement of success. 

Colonel Robert H. Harrison, former secretary to the Commander- 
in-chief had become Chief Justice of Maryland, and was succeeded in 
the staff by Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. Hand was appointed Adjutant- 
general, vice Scammel resigned. Smallwood succeeded to command 
of a division, vice De Kalb, killed in battle. Morgan was promoted as 
Brigadier-general, and sent to the Southern Department, together 



i7So.] MINOR MENTION. 527 

with General Steuben and Lee's corps, three hundred and fifty strong, 
together with Kosciusko as engineer, vice Du Portail captured at 
Charleston. 

A specie tax of six millions was imposed, and in spite of countless 
minor embarrassments the sixth annual campaign of the war drew 
near its close. 

On the twenty-eighth of November, Washington designated the 
winter quarters for the army, his own being established at New 
Windsor. The Pennsylvania line were established near Morristown ; 
the Jersey line at Pompton ; the Maryland regiment of horse at Lan- 
caster, Pennsylvania ; and Sheldon's horse at Colchester, Connecticut ; 
one New York regiment at Fort Schuyler, one at Saratoga, and the 
remainder of the line at Albany, Schenectady, and other exposed 
posts. 

In the location of troops in southern New England, where the 
French army was quartered, there was much local apprehension lest 
forage would be inadequate to the demand ; and some local feeling 
was aroused in Connecticut against the assignments made. In a 
letter to Governor Trumbull, of December seventeenth, Washington 
plainly asserted his prerogative as Commander-in-chief to direct the 
movements of the army, asserting that any local interference intrenched 
upon his prerogative and endangered the national cause. Governor 
Trumbull, as always, fully supported Washington. 

The condition of Great Britain at this period of the struggle was 
one of supreme trial. Her insular position was suggestive of inde- 
pendence ; but her maritime superiority was a source of universal 
jealousy and envy. Whatever may have been her errors of policy or 
her failure to compromise issues with foreign states, the close of 1780 
found her in practical conflict with Europe, and under apprehensions 
of invasion from France. Spain and France were united in open war, 
and their combined fleets threatened her West India possessions. 
Spain was pressing the siege of Gibraltar. Denmark and Sweden 
had already united with Catharine of Prussia to adopt the famous 
system of" Armed Neutrality," declaring that " free ships make free 
goods," and that neutrals might carry any goods or supplies wherever 
they pleased with complete immunity from search or capture. This 
was a blow at British commerce. Even in the East Indies her crown 
was one of thorns. Hyder Ali swept through the province of Madras, 
and Warren Hastings was contending, as for life, to save British 
supremacy from overthrow. 



528 MINOR MENTION. [1780. 

France sent aid to Hyder Ali as well as to America, and thereby 
was limited in her contributions to the army of Washington. 

Early in September a correspondence had been well advanced 
between the United States and Holland, looking to a commercial 
treaty between the two nations. Laurens was sent as a commissioner 
to Holland, was taken prisoner, carried to England, and confined in the 
Tower on a charge of high treason. His papers were captured, and 
as the result of a brief correspondence between the British Cabinet 
and the States-General of Holland, the British government declared 
war against that state on the second day of December. Instructions 
had been previously sent to her fleets, and immediate blows were 
struck at the Dutch colonies and Dutch commerce. 

Domestic excitements added their burden to the great external 
pressure which seemed to threaten the Island Empire. Eighty thou- 
sand volunteers had been enrolled in Ireland, in view of apprehended 
invasion from France. The agitations for parliamentary reform 
became earnest, and the independence of the Irish Parliament was 
said to be in peril. Meanwhile the British advocates of "peace with 
America at the price of recognized independence " became more 
earnest, and the crisis rendered the detachment of any considerable 
body of troops to increase the armies at New York and Charleston, 
absolutely impossible. The period was one which vindicated the 
claim of Great Britain to the admiration of the world for her wonder- 
ful capacity to withstand external force, and no less emphatically dis- 
closed the equally wonderful resources at her control. It was in exact 
keeping with the struggle which made the American Colonies uncon- 
querable by force of arms. Thus England and France alike were 
restrained from strengthening the contending armies of the New 
World. 

General Greene accepted the southern conmiand with eagerness, 
supported by the confidence of Washington. General La Fayette 
desired to accompany him ; but in view of his intimate relations to 
the French alliance, his services were deemed essential to successful 
operations at the north. 

General Greene started for the south. There was breadth of terri- 
tory sufficient to satisfy any reasonable ambition ; but he needed 
an army. He resolved to develop an army, in accordance with the 
peculiar kind of service which would be required, and his suggestion 
was approved by Washington when he first submitted his plan on the 
eighth of November, 1780. He would have that army a "flying 



i78o.] MINOR MENTION. 529 

army," lightly equipped, mobile, and as familiar as possible with the 
country in which operations were to be prosecuted. The Commander- 
in-chief addressed letters to Governor Thomas S. Lee of Maryland, 
to Governor x\bner Nash of North Carolina, and to Governor Thomas 
Jefferson of Virginia, invoking their cordial cooperation in the work 
of the new Department commander. 

The southern army, as Greene wrote to General Knox, " is shadow 
rather than substance, having only an imaginary existence." Con- 
gress could not supply troops ; but by the adding of Maryland and 
Delaware to his department, he secured the control of militia, addi- 
tional to that which he was to draw from the actual field of opera- 
tions. He was also clothed with the same powers which General 
Gates had been empowered to exercise, such as authority to draw 
upon the Southern States for troops or money and to impress subsis- 
tence or transportation, whenever unavoidable necessity should 
require it. 

On the twenty-third of November he began his journey, attended 
by General the Baron Steuben and his aids Colonel Morris and Major 
Burnet. At each State capital he urged the necessity of immediate 
action. To Governor Rodney of Delaware, he wrote : — " Do not suffer 
those States, now struggling with the enemy, to sink under their 
oppression, for want of a reasonable support." To Governor Lee, of 
Maryland: — "Unless they are soon succored and countenanced by 
a good regular force, their distresses will inevitably break their spirits, 
and they will be compelled to reconcile themselves to their misfor- 
tunes. There is no alternative but base submission, or an effectual 
prosecution of the war." Generals Gist and Smallwood were at once 
employed by these two States, upon recruiting service. General 
Greene's order of November twentieth, thus gives clearness to his 
will, — " You will please to make all your applications in writing, that 
they may appear hereafter for our justification ; that we left nothing 
unessayed to promote the public service. Let your applications be 
as pressing as our necessities are urgent; after which, if the northern 
States are lost, we shall stand justified. The greatest consequences 
depend upon your activity and zeal in the business." 

Upon reaching Virginia, he found that the State was necessarily 
absorbed in its own defense. General Leslie had taken possession 
of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and fortified both. Generals Muhlen- 
berg and VVeedon, had been sent by Washington to organize the 
militia, and upon General Greene's arrival they were organizing their 
34 



530 MINOR MENTION. [1780. 

forces to oppose any advance of General Leslie beyond the immedi- 
ate limits of the two posts which his army garrisoned. The consoli- 
dation of regiments and the reduction of their number, left several 
valuable officers out of service ; but nearly all of these, as well as 
Generals Muhlenberg and Weedon. had served under General Greene 
at the north. Among the officers thus left without commands was 
Colonel Edward Carrington. The first thing General Greene deter- 
mined upon was " to select depots, and laboratories, — posts of rest and 
communication, and to provide transportation for hospital and other 
army stores." 

Justice Johnson states that "he fixed his eye upon Colonel Car- 
rington as eminently qualified to undertake the task of combining 
and conducting the means at the Quartermaster-general's depart- 
ment ; that he obeyed the call to the office and discharged it with 
unequaled zeal and fidelity." Chief-justice Marshall confirms the 
statement. The principal depot of stores and arms was established 
at Prince Edward Court House, and General the Baron Steuben was 
charged with maintaining the supply of powder from the manufac- 
tories, and of lead from the mines in Fincastle County. He was also 
placed in command of the District of Virginia, with a special charge 
" to collect, organize, discipline and expedite the recruits for the 
Southern army." 

Before his departure for the field General Greene wrote to Gover- 
nor Jefferson, urging the immediate completion of the regiments, 
under the reduced standard, to their maximum ; and makes the fol- 
lowing points emphatic: "It is perfectly consistent, in all cases, to 
carry on war abroad, rather than at home, as well in matters of expense, 
as in humanity to the inhabitants. But this policy is rendered doubly 
necessary to Virginia, from the ease with which the enemy can pene- 
trate through North Carolina and possess themselves of all the low 
country of Virginia. . . It must be the extreme of folly to hazard 
our liberties upon so precarious a dependence," referring to the 
militia. " They are the bulwark of civil liberty if they are not 
depended upon, as a principal, but employed as an auxiliary." 
" Officers are the very sotil of an army, and you may as well attempt 
to animate a dead body into action, as to expect to employ an army 
to advantage, when the officers are not perfectly easy in their circum- 
stances, and happy in the service." 

In the sphere of Logistics which so materially affects all military 
operations, General Greene had peculiar experience, and he evinced 



i7So.] MINOR MENTION, 53 1 

great discrimination and practical judgment. In this letter to Gov- 
ernor Jefferson, he says : " The late distressing accounts from the 
Southern army claim the immediate attention of government, both 
with respect to provisions and clothing. It is impossible for men to 
remain long in the field unless they are well furnished with both 
these articles; and to expose them to the want of either, will soon 
transfer them from the field to the hospital, or lay them under the 
necessity of deserting." ..." Great pains should be takcn«to fix 
upon some place for feeding the army with live stock, and I think of 
none unless it be putting up a large quantity of beeves to stall-feed." 
. . . " The distress and suffering of the people of North and South 
Carolina deserve the most speedy support to keep alive that spirit of 
enterprise which has prevailed among them lately, so much to their 
honor. It is much easier to oppose the enemy while the tide of 
sentiment runs in our favor, than it will be to secure Virginia after 
they are overrun." 

Orders were issued to Colonel Carrington " to explore the Dan, 
Yadkin and Catawba, and make himself thoroughly acquainted with 
the streams into which they discharged themselves." This order was 
executed with great exactness, and the casual reader of general history 
who has regarded the subsequent movements of General Greene as 
accidental, will see that a previous knowledge of the country in which 
he was to operate was one element of his military success. Colonel 
Carrington accompanied General Greene to Richmond after the 
organization of his department. General Stevens executed the sur- 
vey of the Yadkin. Kosciusko, Greene's engineer-in-chief, examined 
the Catawba, and other officers visited the Dan. The result of this 
forethought materially affected the subsequent campaign. 

On the second of December, General Greene reached Charlotte, 
and immediately relieved General Gates of the command, under cir- 
cumstances which redounded to the credit of both officers. Mutual 
courtesies were exchanged, and General Gates went to his farm. The 
condition of his army was General Greene's first care. He found that 
everything was needed, and in a letter to Governor Jefferson, states 
quite clearly the facts. A few paragraphs are given : " I find the 
troops in a most wretched condition, destitute of everything necessary 
either for comfort or convenience, and may literally be said to be 
naked." " It will answer no good purpose to send men here in such 
a condition." " There must be either pride, or principle, to make a 
soklier. No man will think himself bound to fiijht the battles of a 



532 MINOR MENTION. [178a 

state that leaves him to perish for want of clothing, nor can you inspire 
a soldier with the sentiment of pride while his situation renders him 
more an object of pity than of envy. The life of a soldier in the best 
estate,is liable to innumerable hardships ; but where these are aggra- 
vated by the want of provisions and clothing, his condition becomes 
intolerable; nor can men long contend with such complicated diffi- 
culties and distress. Death, desertion, and the hospital must soon 
swallow up an army under such circumstances, and if it were possible 
for men to maintain such a wretched existence, they would have no 
spirit to face their enemies, and would inevitably disgrace themselves 
and their commander. It is impossible to presume discipline when 
troops are in want of everything ; to attempt severity will only thin 
the ranks by a more hasty desertion." 

For two months General Greene remained in camp. He antici- 
pated the necessity for axes, and even nails, and fabricated cheap 
substitutes for articles that could not be readily secured otherwise. 

On the twentieth of December, having been delayed four days by 
rains, the huts at Charlotte were abandoned, the main army reaching 
Hicks creek, a branch of the Peedee,near Cheraw Hill, on the twenty- 
sixth. General Morgan was detached, however, on the sixteenth, 
with three hundred and twenty from the Maryland line, two hundred 
Virginia militia, and Colonel Washington's horse, less than a hundred 
strong, to cross the Catawba, and " take command in that quarter, to 
act offensively or defensively, to protect the country, spirit up the peo- 
ple, annoy the enemy, coUedt provisions and forage, form magazines, 
prevent plundering, etc." ... 

Marion at once placed himself in communication with General 
Greene. In a letter to that officer, responsive to one addressed ta 
General Gates, he says, " Your letter of the 22d last month to Gen- 
eral Gates is before me. I am fully sensible your service is hard and 
sufferings great ; but how great the prize for which we contend. I' 
like your plan of frequently shifting your ground. It frequently pre-- 
vents a surprise, and perhaps the total loss of your party. Until a' 
more permanent army can be collected than is in the field at present, 
we must endeavor to keep up a partisan war, and preserve the tide of 
sentiment among the people in our favor as much as possible. Spies 
are the eyes of an army, and without them a general is always groping 
in the dark." 

Marion was then on Black River, but soon returned to his camp^ 
in the forks of Pedee and Lynch Rivers, and on the twenty-seventh of 



1780.] MINOR MENTION. 533 

December reported to General Greene the arrival of General Leslie at 
Charleston, his march to Camden, and the establishment of Colonel 
Watson at Nelson's Ferry with two hundred men. From that time 
forward the campaign was fairly in motion. With Morgan on the 
west and Marion in the eastern districts, the new commanding officer 
had carefully prepared his way to contend with the British forces in a 
manner of warfare which should suit itself to the character of his 
troops, and the country in which the war was to be carried on. It is 
very clear from the unofficial letters of General Greene to La Fayette 
and other officers, that he realized the grave responsibilities of his 
position and endeavored to anticipate the contingencies of the cam- 
paign. A reference to chapter thirty-six will show that at that early 
period of the war, he understood the importance of preparing in 
advance for an army movement; and as already indicated, much of 
his success at the south was secured by the tedious system of recon- 
noitring which he inaugurated before he marched from Virginia. 

Other troops followed slowly. The patience of Baron Steuben was 
severely tasked. On the fifteenth of December Colonel Lee marched 
with his corps, three hundred strong, and Colonel Christopher Greene 
accompanied him with four hundred men, but they did not reach the 
Peedee until the twelfth of January. 

The closing active campaign of the war for American Independence 
thus opened, and its principal military events will be considered in 
detail. 



CHAPTER LXVII. 

CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. MUTINY AT THE NORTH. 
OPERATIONS OF GENERALS GREENE AND CORNWALLIS. 
BATTLE OF COWPENS, 1781. 

THE campaign of 178 1 was the last of the American war, but in 
some respects it was less earnestly supported than were those 
of previous years. The American army could not be recruited up to 
the new standard, and the British received no considerable reinforce- 
ments from abroad. The American people seemed to consider the 
presence of the French troops as equivalent, rather than as an en- 
couragement, to extra exertion ; and a corresponding impression of 
the English crown that the south was almost conquered and would 
quite generally rally to the royal standard, had its tendency, equally 
to quiet the English authorities and prevent the shipment of troops. 

The addition of Holland to the enemies of England had its effect 
also, since it compelled England to leave American affairs almost 
entirely to the care of officers then on duty in the United States ; 
and on the other hand, the Americans could not fail to see that any 
large addition to the British army, from abroad, was impossible. In 
addition to these considerations, there was a sense of fatigue which 
affected the people on both sides of the Atlantic, as if there had been 
sufficient fighting over an issue which could have but one possible 
result, separation. The English whigs remonstrated against its con- 
tinuance, and the Cabinet itself began to realize the fact that the war 
was crippling all efforts in other directions ; while the Americans 
themselves, outside of the Southern States, largely entertained the 
conviction that the war would soon end, and therefore failed to make 
the necessary exertions to end it summarily, by supplying the neces- 
sary force, at once. Money, food and clothing, were as scarce as at 
any previous period, and protracted sacrifice, uncompensated labor 
and unpaid services, began to wear out both soldiers and people. 

















Cbnt/uieJaml/fnam^ ^ thrr//r///an 



534* 



1781.] CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. 535 

Hostilities were too inactive to arouse the north to united action : 
and the English forces at the south were too superior in numbers to 
encourage the southern people to combine for resistance, unaided by 
regular troops. It was just the time when the British Cabinet could 
have made a strong reinforcement very impressive ; provided it could 
command English sympathy ; and it was just the time that the 
American people needed the pressure of some permanent danger to 
arouse them to the offensive. 

The French army in America sustained an important relation to 
this period. It prevented General Clinton from risking the offensive, 
and to the same extent lessened the zeal of the New England people 
in the preparations for troops for the new campaign, because the 
urgency of their employment did not appear immediate and absolute. 

The active operations of the year eventually transferred La Fay- 
ette, and then Washington and Rochambeau, to the Southern depart- 
ment, where Greene had been established in December, 1780. 

On the part of the British army, Cornwallis held the chief place 
of responsible command. Phillips and Arnold made a diversion into 
Virginia to strengthen his second invasion of North Carolina, and 
Arnold ultimately made an incursion into Connecticut to suspend the 
transfer of northern American troops to the south. This latter in- 
cursion, however, was entirely ignored by Washington, who had a 
fixed objective of pursuit, and that was, to capture New York or to 
capture Cornwallis. 

It has been asserted that General Clinton was out of favor with 
the Crown and that on the contrary Cornwallis was a favorite ; that 
he obtained reinforcements which were refused to Clinton. A profit- 
less controversy subsequently took place between those officers, and 
the general facts will appear in their proper connection. A single 
statement will do much to explain the positions of these officers and 
dispose of frivolous accusations to their discredit. 

The attitude of the British Cabinet was based upon the invinci- 
bility and sufficiency of the forces sent to suppress the revolution. 
Allusion has been twice made to the neglect of the military counsels 
of General Amherst. Demands for reinforcements, strong assuran- 
ces that the forces were insufficient, repeated unsuccessful campaigns, 
each expected to close the war, the French intervention, and the 
accumulating enemies who were determined to cripple the British 
empire, compelled the Cabinet, by natural logic, to trust those who 
were mostly in harmony with its opinions and policy. 



536 CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. [1781. 

The positive assurances of General Clinton and of Cornwallis, which 
were continued until after the battle at Guilford Court House, — that 
British supremacy in the Southern States had been restored, and that 
the people were in arms for the Crown, were enough to check rein- 
forcements and contrast the condition of General Clinton, at New 
York, who was in fear of losing that post, at)d had no confidence in 
ultimate success,unless largely strengthened both in army and fleet. 

The entire history of the war, and therefore the career of the 
British commanders, is to be interpreted by similar considerations, 
which controlled their action, shaped issues, and determined cam- 
paigns. It is sufficient for the present purpose to state the matter 
thus briefly. 

The campaign of 1781 will be taken up in detail, in order that its 
military value and relations may be more distinctly separated from 
general history. It was the culminating campaign of a long war, a 
campaign where the forces on both sides were inferior to the forces 
previously engaged, and where the success of either party, analyzed 
separately, in view of all the circumstances, seemed impossible ; and 
yet a campaign, where the success of either party seemed positively 
certain, in case of a thorough, concentrated effort. 

This campaign will be considered as follows : 

I. Mutiny of the American Army. Its history and effects. 

II. The operations of General Greene at the South. 

III. Arnold's operations in Virginia. 

IV. La Fayette's operations in Virginia. 

V. Arnold's raid into Connecticut. 

VI. Washington on the Offensive. 

These operations substantially ended hostilities, and include the 
battles of Cowpens, Guilford, and Hobkirk's Hill (near Camden), the 
sieges of Ninety-six and Augusta, the battles of Eutavv Springs and 
the siege of Yorktown, as well as the minor operations before James- 
town, Petersburg, Richmond, and New London. 

I. Mutiny of the American Army. 

The war which now entered upon its seventh year, was a different 
war from that which Great Britain or the American people anticipated 
when the struggle began. The contract which George III. made with 
soldiers was considered a favor to the enlisted men, and the terms, 
" tJiree years or during the war,'' were regarded as better than a 
regular enlistment for five, seven, or more years. The term of three 
years, according to military usage, was a short term. 



I78i.] CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. 537 

A similar enlistment of American troops was made under the sup- 
position that the three }'ears was the maxhman, and that the term 
" during the war^' was simply an assurance of earlier discharge, and 
they hoped the war would not last for the full three years. 

As the year 1 78 1 opened and the prospect of a new year of struggle 
became certain, and the invasion of the Southern States began to indi- 
cate the prospect of a southern campaign, which was at all times un- 
popular with northern troops, a disaffection was developed which at 
last broke forth in open mutiny, and a peremptory demand for dis- 
charge. This irritation was aggravated by hunger, cold, and poverty. 

Marshall says: "The winter brought not much relaxation from 
toil, and none from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the 
point of starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed 
without proper clothing, to the rigors of winter; and had now served 
almost twelve months without pay." 

" This situation was common to the whole army ; and had been of 
such long continuance, that scarcely the hope of a change could be 
realized." " It was not easy to persuade the military that their breth- 
ren in civil life were unable to make greater exertions in support of 
the war, or that its burdens ought not to be more equally borne." 

On the first of January the Pennsylvania line revolted ; Captain 
Billings was killed in an attempt to suppress the mutiny ; General 
Wayne was powerless to restore order, and thirteen hundred men, 
with six guns, started to Princeton, with the declared purpose to march 
to Philadelphia, and obtain redress. They demanded clothing, the 
residue of their bounty, and full arrears of pay. A committee from 
Congress and the State authorities of Pennsylvania, at once entered 
into negotiations with the troops for terms of compromise. 

The American Commander-in-chief was then at New Windsor. 
A messenger from General Wayne informed him on the third of Janu- 
ary of the revolt, and the terms demanded. It appears from Wash- 
ington's letters that it was his impulse, at the first intimation of the 
trouble, to go in person and attempt its control. His second impres- 
sion was to reserve his influence and authority until all other means 
were exhausted. The complaint of the mutineers was but a statement 
of the condition of all the army, so far as the soldiers had served three 
years; and the suffering and failure to receive pay were absolutely 
universal. Leaving the preliminary discussion with the civil authori- 
ties who were responsible for much of the trouble, the Commander-in- 
chief appealed to the Governors of the northern States, for a force of 



538 CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. [17S1. 

militia to meet any attacks from New York, and declined to interfere 
until he found that the passion had passed and he could find troops 
who would at all hazards execute his will. It was one of the most 
difficult passages in the war, and was so handled that the Commander- 
in-chief retained his prestige and regained control of the army. 

There was a double phase to this mutiny, and General Clinton 
watched its development with interest. Eager to avail himself of the 
disaffection which communicated itself to the Jersey troops, and to 
invade New Jersey itself, he seems to have remembered the unfortu- 
nate march to Springfield in 1780, and remained in New York, watch- 
ing the conduct of Washington. 

In a letter to Lord Germaine he says, " General Washington has 
not moved a man from his army, (near West Point) as yet ; and as it 
is probable their demands are nearly the same with the Pennsylvania 
line, it is not thought likely he will. I am, however, in a situation to 
avail myself of favorable events, but to stir before they offer might 
mar all." 

General Clinton received information of the revolt as early as 
Washington, on the morning of the twenty-third, and sent messengers 
to the American army with propositions, looking to their return to 
British allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the dis- 
affection, and his agents were retained in custody. 

It is sufficient to say that a portion of the troops were discharged 
without critical examination of their enlistments, on their own oath ; 
that many promptly reenlisted, that as soon as Washington found that 
he had troops who did not share in the open mutiny, he used force 
and suppressed the disaffection, and that the soldiers themselves hung 
several agents who brought propositions from General Clinton which 
invited them to abandon their flag and join his command. The 
mutiny of the American army at the opening of the campaign of 1781, 
was a natural outbreak which human nature could not resist, and 
whatever of discredit may attach to the revolt, it will never be unas- 
sociated with the fact that while the emergency was one that over- 
whelmed every military obligation by its pressure, it did not affect 
the fealty of the soldiers to the cause for which they took up arms. 
It impaired discipline, and disregarded authority ; but it also had in 
its manifestations, many of the elements of lawful revolution, tiic 
state itself having failed in duty to its defenders. 

La Fayette thus wrote to his wife, " Human patience has its 
limits. No European army would suffer the tenth part of what the 



lySi.] CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. 539 

Americans suffer. It takes citizens to support hunger, nakedness, 
toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our 
soldiers, the hardiest and most patient that are to be found in the world." 

An appeal was at once made to the Northern States for money, 
and enough was secured to bring up three months of the arrears of 
pay. The States of Massachusetts and New Hampshire also gave 
twenty-four dollars extra, in specie, to each soldier enlisted from the 
respective States. Colonel Laurens was appointed as soecial agent to 
visit France and secure a loan, which during the year was increased 
by two other loans, as hereafter noticed. This dependence upon 
France, however, was calculated to lessen a sense of responsibility at 
home; and Count de Vergennes, under date of February fifteenth, 
when advised of the mission of Colonel Laurens, used the following 
language : " Congress relies too much on France for subsidies to main- 
tain their army. They must absolutely refrain from such exorbitant 
demands. The great expenses of the war render it impossible for 
France to meet these demands if persisted in." 

The chief difficulty, however, grew out of the individuality of the 
States, and the fact that Congress was rather advisory than authori- 
tative in its jurisdiction. A partial relief came with the adoption of 
Articles of Confederation, which took effect on the second of March, 
1 78 1, when Congress assembled under the new powers conceded by 
that instrument. Maryland yielded her assent on the preceding da\', 
and the long period of four years and four months had transpired from 
their first adoption by Congress and their submission to the States for 
acceptance. 

During these events which were threatening the very existence of 
the American army, the blockade of the French fleet was still main- 
tained with vigor. The British squadron occupied Gardiner's Bay, 
Long Island, for winter anchorage, and was thus enabled to keep a 
close watch upon all vessels entering or departing from the Sound. 

During the latter part of January, it temporarily lost its numerical 
superiority through a violent storm which sunk the Culloden, 74, dis- 
masted the Bedford, and drove the America out to sea. The interval 
was improved to dispatch several ships to the Chesapeake, to coop- 
erate with an expedition against Arnold, which will be noticed in its 
connection. 

The American army had become so reduced as hardly to exceed 
five thousand m^n for duty, and the French troops were not dispos- 
able for general service, so long as the fleet was confined to port. 



540 CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. L^78i. 

Under these discouraging circumstances, the European States did 
not lose their confidence in the ability and resources of the American 
Commander-in-chief. It would not be an unwarrantable assertion to 
say that this confidence grew out of their habitual recognition of per- 
sonal governments at home, and that they quite naturally gave him 
a corresponding credit for powers which were beyond his prerogative 
and the jurisdiction of Congress itself. His reputation as a wise com- 
mander was well established. 

Mrs. Bache, daughter of Franklin, thus cites a letter from her 
father, which is suggestive of the estimation in which he was held in 
France : " My father says, if you see General Washington, assure him 
of my very great and sincere respect, and tell him that all the old 
generals here amuse themselves in studying the accounts of his operations, 
and approve highly of Jiis conduct." It is equally certain that no ex- 
travagant estimate can be placed upon the services of General La 
Fayette, whose letters urged the supply of men and money, with the 
most pointed assurance that the American States would realize suc- 
cess, and be amply able to refund all advances which might be made 
by the King. 

The influence of Adams, Franklin and Jay at Holland, France 
and Spain was strongly marked, and characteristic of the American 
temper. 

The single intimation of Colonel Laurens, upon his arrival at Paris, 
that money was indispensable, and that France would do well to 
hold the American nation up, rather than have it left to join its re- 
sources with England against France, was another incident of the 
opening year which strongly persuaded the French minister to render 
pecuniary aid to meet the emergency. This cursory reference to the 
condition of the United States, during the early part of 1781, will 
indicate the circumstances under which the mutiny at the north took 
place and the campaign at the south opened. 

General Greene' s Southern Campaign. Reference is made to map 
" Operations in Southern States." 

It has already been stated that General Greene sent Morgan to 
the Catawba district, with three hundred and ninety continental 
troops under Lieutenant-colonel Howard, Colonel Washington's 
horse, and two companies of Virginia militia. These companies, com- 
manded by Captains Triplett and Tait were not ordinary militia ; 
but consisted for the most part of old soldiers who had served their 
terms and reenlisted as substitutes for other militia. Upon reaching 



lySi.] CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. 541 

Broad River, General Morgan was joined by General Davidson and 
Colonel Pickens, and Majors McDowell and Cunningham, with nearly 
seven hundred volunteers and militia from Georgia and the Carolinas. 
General Greene's immediate command was not far from two thou- 
sand men, mostly militia ; and his station was nearly seventy miles 
east, a little north, from Winnsborough, then the headquarters of 
Cornwallis. Morgan was on the Pacolet, a branch of Broad River, 
about fifty miles north-west of Winnsborough, having established his 
camp on the twenty-fifth of December, 1780. His position threat- 
ened not only Ninety-six, but the entire line of small posts in the rear 
of the British army. 

A British invasion of North Carolina was clearly inadmissible 
while the American troops were thus on both flanks ; and Lord Corn- 
wallis determined to strike Morgan and Greene, in turn, before their 
forces should be further increased from the militia, or the north. 
Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton was detached on the first of January, 
with the Legion and a portion of the First battalion of the Seventy- 
first British regimient, and two pieces of artillery, with orders to pur- 
sue Morgan and drive him across Broad River. 

On the twenty-seventh of December, General Greene detached 
Washington's cavalry and McCall's mounted militia, in all two hun- 
dred and fifty men, to surprise a party of loyalists twenty miles south 
of his camp. They were pursued, overtaken and for the most part 
killed. Justice Johnson says, " the killed and wounded were reported 
at one hundred and fifty, and the prisoners at forty," and adds, " such 
were the bloody sacrifices at that time ofiered up at the shrine of 
civil discord." A detachment was also sent to surprise Williams, 
(see map), a small stockade fort ; but the garrison retired without 
resistance. 

Lord Cornwallis marched up the west bank of the Catawba, leav- 
ing orders to General Leslie, then on the march from Charleston, to 
follow. Heavy rains delayed the march of the main army, encumbered 
as it was with a considerable baggage train, while Tarleton, not 
apprehensive that it would fail to support his advance, pushed for- 
ward rapidly, crowded Morgan over the Pacolet, and by crossing at 
an upper ford drove him still further back to the Cowpens, in the 
immediate vicinity of Broad River itself. 

Colonel Tarleton states that he originally " started with the 
Legion, five hundred and fifty men, (Cornwallis puts the number at 
six hundred,) the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, con- 



542 CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. [1781. 

sisting of two hundred men, and two three-pounders; but had not 
proceeded above twenty miles from Brierly Ferry, before he had 
undoubted proof that the report which occasioned the order for the 
hght troops to march was erroneous, and that Ninety-six was secure." 
Upon appHcation to CornwalHs, his baggage was forwarded under the 
escort of two hundred men from the Seventh British regiment, and 
fifty dragoons, designed as a reinforcement for Ninety-six. These 
troops were added to Tarleton's command, making the whole detach- 
ment one thousand strong, besides a few loyalists. He commenced 
his advance on the twelfth. The Ennoree and Tiger were crossed 
on the fourteenth, and advices from Cornwallis indicated that he 
would move up the east bank of Broad River so as to cut off Morgan's 
retreat. Cornwallis reached Turkey Creek, (see map) on the evening 
of the sixteenth, and there waited for General Leslie, whose force 
consisted of thirteen hundred and fifty men. 

That officer marched from Charleston directly for Camden, and 
was so delayed by swamps, high water, and other difficulties of the 
way, that the success of the whole movement devolved upon the 
action of Tarleton alone. Cornwallis himself was nearly twenty-five 
miles from Tarleton when the battle of Cowpens was fought, and 
according to Tarleton, had plenty of time to have reached Ramsour's 
Mills, which would have effectually cut off Morgan's retreat. The 
delay of General Leslie at Camden, according to Lord Cornwallis' 
statement, was, "that General Greene might be kept in suspense as 
long as possible as to the proposed movements." 

A> The battle of Cowpens was fought near Broad River, about two 
miles south of the North Carolina boundary line, on ground used 
especially for pasture, which gave name to the locality. 
^ The field of battle itself was open woodland, sloping to the front, 
and well adapted for skirmishing, while sufficiently clear of under- 
growth for the movements of mounted men. Tarleton says, " there 
could be no better." "Broad River wound around Morgan's left 
within six miles, and ran parallel with his rear," so that there was 
no possibility of escape, in case of defeat. Morgan occupied the 
summit, which was nearly a quarter of a mile from the level ground, 
and formed his regular troops at the highest point. The Maryland 
battalion, nearly three hundred strong, were on the left, and the 
companies of Virginia militia under Triplett and Tate were next in 
order, with Beaties' Georgians, about one hundred and fifty men, on 
the extreme right. Lieutenant-colonel Howard commanded this 



I78i.] CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. 543 

line. See map " Battle of Cowpens." One hundred and fifty yards 
to the front, a force of two hundred and sev^enty mihtia were posted 
under Colonel Pickens, in open order. Major Cunningham, of 
Georgia, and Major McDowell, of South Carolina, with one hundred 
and fifty picked men, were stationed still further in advance, about an 
equal distance, as skirmishers, with orders to take to trees— not to fire 
until the enemy were within fifty yards ; and then to fall back, firing 
at ivill, as they could find cover. 

Colonel Pickens had orders in like manner to reserve fire until the 
enemy came within fifty yards, and after two volleys to retire to the 
left of the regulars; but if charged by cavalry, only one man in three 
was to fire, while the others must withhold fire until a charge was 
made, or the troopers should turn back. The regulars were advised 
of these instructions and cautioned, in case of being forced from their 
own position, to retire in good order to the next hill, and be prepared 
at any time to face about and attack. In the rear of the high ground 
was a second small elevation behind which Washington's cavalry and 
Colonel McCall's mounted men were out of cannon range, and in 
reserve for timely use. Morgan has thus apologized for his choice of 
ground : " I would not have had a swamp in view of my militia on 
any consideration ; they would have made for it, and nothing could 
have detained them from it. And as to covering my wings, I knew 
my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but 
downright fighting. As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to 
cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded 
me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own 
men in the rear to shoot down those who broke from the ranks. 
When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly ; and 
I knew that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight 
to the protection of my bayonets, and keep my troops from breaking 
as Buford's regiment did. Had I crossed the river, one-half of the 
militia would immediately have abandoned me." 

The British advance was made as early as seven o'clock in the 
morning, January seventh. The troops had marched from early dawn 
and were well worn down ; but Tarleton had intimations that addi- 
tional militia were on the march to join Morgan, and he prepared to 
risk the action with equal numbers, trusting to the discipline and 
superiority of his troops for the decision of the battle. His formation 
is detailed upon the map. His advance was prompt and spirited. 
The American skirmishers fired effectively, and fell back into the first 



544 CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. [1781. 

line, and the militia aftei- one steady, deadly fire, fell back also and 
began to move across the front of the second line to take position on 
their left as ordered. 

The British troops taking the whole movement as assurance of 
easy victory advanced rapidly, with shouts, only to find themselves 
confronted by the main body, which received them without flinching. 
The British guns were then moved to the front, and fifty dragoons 
from each British extremity followed the retreating militia when the 
first line broke. But upon the resistance of the main body, the 
Seventy-first British regiment, which had been in reserve, and Tarle- 
ton, with two hundred dragoons advanced to the charge. As the 
British left ascended the hill to turn the American right, the militia 
there stationed were ordered by Morgan to swing back, thus making 
a crotchet to the rear, and to hold the position until Colonel Pickens 
could bring up the militia who were already forming for that purpose, 
while the American cavalry spurred around the left of the regulars 
and attacked the British right which had thus far followed the retreat- 
ing militia. Lieutenant-colonel Howard mistaking this change of posi- 
tion in his right for the contingent movement to the rear, ordered the 
regulars also to retreat. The British had lost many officers and they 
pressed on in some disorder. The issue of the day was at its crisis ; 
when Morgan ordered the troops to face about, deliver fire and charge 
with the bayonet. The British were within thirty yards. The effect 
was immediate and conclusive at that part of the field. Washington 
was just then engaged with the artillery endeavoring to capture the 
guns, and the British infantry and cavalry fled or surrendered. 
Nearly every gunner was killed or wounded while faithfully fighting 
by his gun. The Seventy-first regiment with Tarleton's horse were 
still on the American right wing, until Pickens' militia came up vig- 
orously attacking their flank. Being now under cross fire they also 
threw down their arms and surrendered. Tarleton escaped with forty 
horse ; after a vain dash to save the guns and restore order. Tarleton 
and Washington here met face to face, the former received a cut on 
his hand and the latter a pistol shot in his knee. 

He thus states the facts. " The militia, after a short contest 
were dislodged, and the British approached the continentals. The 
fire on both sides was well supported and produced much slaughter. 
The cavalry on the right charged the enemy's left with great gallan- 
try but were driven back by the fire of the reserve and by a charge 
of Colonel Washington's cavalry. As the contest in the front line 



rySi.] CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. 545 

seemed equally balanced, he thought the advance of the Seventy-first 
into line and a movement of the cavalry in reserve, to threaten the 
enemy's left flank, would put a victorious period to the action. No time 
was lost. The cavalry were ordered to incline to the left and to form 
a line which would embrace the whole of the enemy's right flank. 
Upon the advance of the Seventy-first, all the infantry again moved 
on. The continentals and backwoodsmen gave ground. The British 
rushed forward. An order was given to the cavalry to charge. An 
unexpected fire from the Americans who came about as they were 
retreating, stopped the British and threw them into confusion. Exer- 
tions to make them advance were useless. The cavalry which had 
not been engaged fell into disorder and an unaccountable panic ex- 
tended itself along the whole line. Neither promises nor threats 
could avail." 

The British casualties were stated by General Cornwallis at ten 
officers and ninety men killed, twenty-nine officers and five hundred 
men captured. He omits the number wounded. Morgan accounts 
for six hundred prisoners turned over to the commissary officer. The 
British army returns of February first, reports diminution from last 
return, January fifteenth, as seven hundred and eighty-four men ; 
which closely approximates the total loss. The American casualties 
were twelve killed, and sixty wounded. 

Two standards, thirty-five wagons, one hundred horses, eight hun- 
dred muskets and two cannon were among the trophies of the victory. 
Lossing states that these guns alternately changed owners, at Sara- 
toga, Camden, Cowpens, and Guilford. 

Tarleton severely criticises Lord Cornwallis for neglect to advise 
him as to his movements, and says, with some bitterness, that " as 
Ferguson's disaster made the first invasion of North Carolina, so the 
battle of Cowpens would probably make the second equally dis- 
astrous." 

He rejoined the army on the following day, and insists that a 
prompt movement made at that time, might have rescued the prison- 
ers. General Morgan carried out his plan of battle with almost entire 
success. Leaving his severely wounded under a flag of truce, and 
his cavalry to cover his retreat, he crossed Broad River that night 
with his infantry and prisoners, and forded the Catawba on the 
twenty-fourth. On the same night Cornwallis reached Ramsour's 
Mills, at the junction of the road from Cowpens with that upon 
which his army marched. Here he halted two days to burn surplus 
35 



54^ CONDITION OF SOUTHERN AFFAIRS. [17S1 

baggage and wagons, and by this delay lost his opportunity to over- 
take Morgan. The American command was only twenty miles in 
advance, and the Catawba was fordable until heavy rains on the 
twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth raised the waters, and on the 
twenty-ninth, when Cornwallis reached its bank, it could not be 
crossed. Morgan started his prisoners for Virginia on the twenty- 
fifth, and made every possible effort to rally militia and cover his 
retreat until General Greene could come to his assistance. It has 
been generally stated that Cornwallis pursued so closely upon Morgan 
that a sudden flood alone saved the latter. Morgan's letter to Greene 
dated the twenty-fifth, at his camp on the east side of the Catawba, 
settles the question of the date of his crossing the river. 

As General Leslie joined Cornwallis on the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth, there was ample time to have redeemed Cowpens ; but a 
somewhat characteristic hesitation at a critical hour, and indecision 
under pressure, lost him the precious opportunity. 

General Morgan remained but a few weeks in the service. Severe 
rheumatism settled in his limbs, and his active days soon ended. 
From Bunker Hill to Quebec, through Burgoyne's campaign, and 
wherever he was entrusted with command, he had proved his courage 
and his fertility in resources during periods of great danger; and 
Congress vied with States and citizens, in honorable testimonials to 
his valor, as the victor at Cowpens. 



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CHAPTER LXVIII. 

FROM COWPENS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. MANCEUVERS 
OF THE ARMIES. 1781. 

A MESSENGER from General Morgan reached General Greene, 
at his camp on Hick's Creek, a fork of the Great Republic, 
January twenty- fifth, 1781, and informed him of the battle of Cow- 
pens, that a large number of prisoners were to be provided for, and 
that the army of Cornwallis was in pursuit. The completeness of 
the success reported made the contrast of his inability to improve 
it, very tantalizing and painful. 

The army, including Morgan's corps, numbered only one thousand 
four hundred and twenty-six infantry, forty-seven artillerists and two 
hundred and thirty cavalry. The militia numbered four hundred. 
These numbers fluctuated greatly, since the Southern militia were 
quite like the minute men of 1775-6, who volunteered for pressing 
duty, and then returned to the ordinary pursuits of life. There was 
no money, little clothing, and constant hardship. A single extract 
from a letter written by General Greene to General Sumter, two 
days before the battle of Cowpens, contains this paragraph : " More 
than half our members arc in a manner naked ; so much so that we 
can not put them on the least kind of duty. Indeed there is a great 
number that have not a rag of clothes on them except a little piece 
of blanket, in the Indian form, around their waists." 

It was under such circumstances that this commander was sum- 
moned to save the fruits of Morgan's victory, to expel the British 
army from the Carolinas, and to vindicate the supremacy and power of 
the United States. For three days he devoted his time to putting 
this nominal army in preparation for taking the field : and on the 
twenty-eighth, accompanied by one aid, a guide and a sergeant's party 
of cavalry, he started for Morgan's command. On the night of the 
thirteenth, after a ride of over one hundred and twenty-five miles, he 



548 FROM COWPENS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. [1781. 

was with Morgan. His letters to Varnum, then in Congress, to Gist, 
Smallwood, Rutledge, Washington and others, are full of urgent 
appeals for at least five thousand infantry and six or eight hundred 
horse. 

It was an extraordinary state of affairs, when a victory seemed but 
the first step toward disaster, and when even the Commander-in-chief 
was constrained to write, " I wish I had it in my power to congratu- 
late you on the brilliant and important victory of General Morgan, 
without the alloy which the distresses of the department you com- 
mand, and apprehensions of posterior events, intermix. I lament that 
you will find it so difficult to avoid a general action ; for our misfor- 
tunes can only be completed by the dispersion of your little army, 
which will be the most probable consequence of such an event." 

It must be borne in mind that Arnold landed in Virginia on the 
fourth day of January, with sixteen hundred regular troops, so that 
General Steuben's local responsibilities were as pressing as when Gen- 
eral Greene passed through Virginia on his way to the Southern 
Department. 

A brief diversion from the immediate narrative is necessary, in 
order to indicate the exact circumstances which controlled both 
Generals Greene and Cornwallis, in their subsequent movements, and 
to correct the impression that the campaign consisted simply of a 
swift pursuit and successful retreat, and, one where ravines and floods 
alone determined the result. The spring campaign of 1781 was one of 
operations, and there was no retreat of General Greene which did 
not constitute a manoeuver, having in view an ultimate engagement, 
with the recovery of the South as the claief objective. 

A statement of Arnold's position and operations up to the first of 
February, is an essential element to be taken into view. He left 
New York on the nineteenth of December, 1780, with sixteen hundred 
men. It appears from General Clinton's letters that he did not rely 
upon that officer's discretion, and attached Lieutenant-colonels Simcoe 
and Dundas to the command, " two officers of tried ability and experi- 
ence, and possessing the entire confidence of their commander." The 
Queen's Rangers, and the Eighteenth British regiment (Scotch), re- 
spectively commanded by the officers named, formed the larger portion 
of Arnold's division. The characteristic accompaniment of the naval 
movements of the period, a gale, separated the fleet on the twenty- 
sixth and twenty-seventh of December; but on the thirty-first, with- 
out waiting for other transports still at sea, twelve hundred men were 



lySi.J FROM COWPENS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 549 

transferred to small vessels and moved up the James River. On the 
night of January third, Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe landed at Hood's 
Point with one hundred and thirty of the Queen's Rangers and the 
light infantry and grenadiers of the Eighteenth regiment, spiked the 
guns of a battery, which was abandoned by the small detachment of 
fifty men who occupied it, and on the fourth the expedition landed 
at Westover, nearly twenty-five miles below Richmond, and marched 
immediately to that city. On the afternoon of the fifth, Arnold 
entered Richmond. Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe quickly dislodged a 
force of two hundred irregulars, militia which Colonel John Nichols 
had assembled on Richmond Hill, and a few mounted men who were 
on Shrove Hill also retired as the British troops advanced. The 
Rangers, light infantry and grenadiers, proceeded promptly to West- 
ham, nearly seven miles above Richmond, and destroyed a foundry, 
laboratory and some shops, as well as the auditor's records which had 
been withdrawn from Richmond for safety, and returned to the city 
in the evening. Arnold sent to Governor Jefferson a proposal to 
compromise the terms of his incursion, and to save the buildings if 
vessels might come up the river and remove tobacco and other 
plunder. Upon its rejection, he burned so much of the city as time 
permitted, and returned to Westover on the sixth, without loss to his 
command. The expedition was a surprise, but the loss, except to 
private property and the capture of the books and papers of the coun- 
cil, was very inconsiderable. Five brass guns, three hundred stand 
of arms, found in the loft of the capitol and in a wagon, and some 
quartermaster stores, constituted the chief articles captured. Even 
the workshops and warehouses were not wholly consumed. Reference 
is had to maps " Operations in Southern States," and " Arnold at 
Richmond." 

On the eighth. Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe visited Charles City 
Court House, and, according to Tarleton's narrative, killed or wounded 
twenty militia, with a loss of one man killed and three wounded. 

General Steuben had in vain attempted to equip a sufficient force 
to anticipate the movement. Of six hundred men at Chesterfield 
Court House, he had clothing for only one hundred and fifty. The 
appearance of some militia at Manchester, however, and information 
that General Steuben was at Petersburg, led Arnold to hasten back 
to save his line of retreat, and he proceeded at once to Portsmouth 
to put it in a defensive condition. 

At this time General Leslie also received advices that General 



550 FROM COWPEXS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. [1781. 

Phillips was preparing to leave New York with additional troops for 
Virginia, so that the difficulties in the way of receiving reinforcements 
from the north increased daily, and the whole Southern army was in 
pursuit of Morgan. 

As the mind reverts to the contentions for high command which 
characterized the first years of the war, and one officer after another, 
then so ambitious, disappears from battle record, it looks as if the 
man who sat by Morgan on the banks of the Catawba on the thirtieth 
of January, 1781, must have felt as if a new generation had taken the 
place of old comrades, and that he was only waiting to pass away also. 

The hazard of delay aroused him to action. Lee was ordered to 
hasten back and join Morgan without delay. The commissary of 
supplies was ordered to remove everything from the sea coast to the 
interior. The commissaries at Hillsborough and vSalisbury were 
placed in readiness to move the prisoners into the upper counties of 
Virginia. Colonel Carrington, Quartermaster-general, was ordered to 
collect magazines on the Roanoke. Letters were written to General 
Steuben to hasten on his recruits ; to the governors of North Carolina 
and Virginia, to fill up their quotas of regulars and to call into the field 
all the militia they could arm ; to Shelby, Campbell and the other 
participants in the battle of King's Mountain, to bid them come out 
once more, to repel the threatened invasion ; to General Huger, " to 
march to Guilford Court House direct instead of to Salisbury," adding, 
" from Cornwallis' pressing disposition and the contempt he has for 
our army, we may precipitate him into some capital misfortune." 

Just then, the tidings came that a garrison had been landed at 
Wilmington, almost in the rear of the small army which he left at 
Hick's Creek. The terms of service of the Virginia militia brigade 
was about expiring and according to precedent they were to be dis- 
charged at the place where they organized. Availing himself of this 
opportunity he placed General Stevens in command, consigned to 
him the escort of the prisoners then in depot at Hillsborough and 
thereby saved a detail from his other troops. General Stevens dis- 
charged the duty and reported back promptly to meet the responsi- 
bilities of the campaign. 

The condition of Cornwallis requires passing notice. He af- 
firms that " his second invasion of North Carolina was approved 
by General Clinton : " " that the defense of the frontier of South 
Carolina, even against an inferior army, would be, from its extent, 
the nature of the climate and the disposition of the inhabitants. 



I78i.] FROM COWPENS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 55 1 

utterly impracticable, while the enemy could draw supplies from 
North Carolina and Virginia." Of the affair at Cowpens he says, 
" the disaster of the seventeenth of January can not be imputed to 
any defect in my conduct, as the detachment sent, was certainly 
superior to the force against which it was sent, and, put under the 
command of an officer of experience and tried abilities." "The pub- 
lic faith was pledged to our friends in North Carolina, and I believed 
my remaining force to be superior to that under the command of 
General Greene," but, "our hopes of success were not founded only 
upon the efforts of the corps under my immediate command, which 
did not much exceed three thousand men; but principally upon the 
most positive assurances, given by apparently credible deputies and 
emissaries, that upon the approach of a British army in North Carolina, 
a great body of the inhabitants were ready to join and to cooperate 
with it, in endeavoring to restore his Majesty's government." " All 
inducements in my power were made use of without material effect; 
and every man in the army must have been convinced that the 
accounts of our emissaries had greatly exaggerated the number of 
those who professed friendship for us :— a very inconsiderable num- 
ber could be prevailed upon to remain with us, or to exert themselves 
in any form whatever." 

It will hereafter appear that Cornwallis' movement lost sight of a 
possible dependence upon support from the British army in Virginia, 
and that his selection of the Salisbury route, for his invasion, contem- 
plated the control of the river sources, so as to force Greene eastward 
and make his destruction or capture more certain. 

When Greene took command on the Catawba, on the thirty-first 
of Januaiy, the army of Cornwallis was only eighteen miles below, 
unable to cross the river by reason of high water. Greene summoned 
the neighboring militia to turn out and guard the fords as the water 
fell. Beatie's Ford, where the army encamped, is about six miles 
above McCowan's Ford and nearer to Salisbury. On the evening of 
January thirty-first, Morgan was sent forward toward Salisbury while 
General Greene remained to bring off the militia. The river fell 
rapidly and Colonels Webster and Tarleton crossed at Beatie's Ford 
shortly after it was abandoned. General Davidson, with three hun- 
dred men, met the division of Cornwallis toward morning, February 
first, and while resisting their crossing at McCowan's Ford, was killed, 
and his men were scattered. A few rendezvoused at Tarrant's Farm 
ten miles on the road to Salisbury, but were there attacked and cut to 



552 FROM COWPENS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. [1781. 

pieces by Tarleton. By the third, Morgan had crossed the Yadkin. 
Cornwallis burned most of his remaining baggage and wagons, 
doubled teams, mounted a portion of his infantry and sent a strong 
corps under General O'Hara in pursuit. It rained all day on the 
first of February. Greene knew that within two days the water 
from the mountains would fill the Yadkin. As yet it was not so deep 
but that his cavalry crossed safely, and his forethought in having 
boats provided, enabled him to secure all his command. Many in- 
habitants followed the army, retiring in dread of Tarleton, and the 
vanguard of the British force only captured the rearmost wagons. 
A useless cannonade was maintained during the day. Cornwallis 
remained at Salisbury four days, and passed the Yadkin on the eighth. 
Greene marched on the fourth, after one day's halt, and united his 
command at Guilford Court House. 

A council of war was held which advised not to offer battle. The 
re-united army only numbered two thousand and thirty-six men, includ- 
ing fourteen hundred and twenty-six regulars. Some course of action 
was to be immediately decided upon. Colonel Carrington joined the 
command, with the report, that boats had been secured, and secreted 
along the Dan, so as to be collected on a few hours' warning. The 
British army was at Salem, only twenty-five miles from Guilford. 
This was on the tenth of February. Preparatory to the march. 
General Greene organized a light corps of seven hundred picked 
troops under Colonels Williams, Carrington, Howard, Washington 
and Lee, to cover his rear. 

Kosciusko had joined Greene, and was sent forward to throw up 
a breastwork to cover the landing of the boats, and the army com- 
menced its march. 

Cornwallis bore to the left to cross above Greene. He had no 
idea that Greene could effect a crossing at the few ferries which lay 
below the possible fording places, while by cutting him off from the 
fords above, he could follow down the river and strike his small com- 
mand as well as the army marching from the camp on the Peedee. 
But that army had already joined Greene. In a letter to Lord Ger- 
maine, of March nineteenth, he says, " I was informed that the 
American commander could not collect many flats at any of the 
ferries on the River Dan." Colonel Carrington, however, had been 
specially charged with this duty by General Greene, with the aid of 
Captain Smith, of the Maryland line ; had anticipated almost any 
contingency which should require the passage of the river ; and so 



i7Si.] FROM COWPENS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 553 

provided boats at Boyd's and Irwin's ferries, which were neighboring 
ferries, that on the fourteenth of February the whole divn'sion safely 
crossed the river, secured their boats, and were beyond reach of the 
enemy. Tarleton thus reports this affair : " The light army (Williams) 
which was the last in crossing, was so closely pursued, that scarcely 
had its rear landed when the British advance appeared on the oppo- 
site bank; and in the last twenty-four hours it is said to have marched 
forty miles. The hardships suffered by the British troops for want 
of their tents and usual baggage, in this long and rapid pursuit 
through a wild and unsettled country, were uncommonly great ; yet 
such was their ardor in the service that they submitted to them, with- 
out a bloWjto the American army,before it crossed the Roanoke."' 
Tarleton adds, " That the American army escaped without suffering 
any material injury, seems more owing to a train of fortunate inci- 
dents, judiciously improved by their commander, than to any want of 
enterprise or activity in the army that pursued. Yet the operations 
of Lord Cornwallis, during the pursuit, would probably have been 
more efficacious, had not the unfortunate affair at the Cowpens de- 
prived him of almost the whole of his light troops." 

Lord Cornwallis returned to Hillsborough and issued a proclama- 
tion, " but," says Tarleton, " the misfortunes consequent on premature 
risings had considerably thinned out the loyalists, originally more 
numerous in North Carolina than in any of the other colonies. Their 
spirits may be said to have been broken by repeated persecutions. 
Still, the zeal of some was not repressed ; and considerable numbers 
were preparing to assemble, when General Greene, reinforced with six 
hundred Virginia militia under General Stevens, took the resolution 
of again crossing the Dan, and re-entering North Carolina." Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Lee, with his legion, was detached across the river on the 
twenty-first of February, and the next day General Greene passed it 
with the rest of the army. 

Meanwhile General Greene posted a portion of his army at Hali- 
fax Court House, and made every exertion to prepare an offensive 
return. On the seventeenth, his whole force in camp consisted of 
one thousand and seventy-eight regular infantry — sixty-four artillery, 
and one hundred and seventy-six cavalry, with one hundred and 
twelve legionary infantry, so many troops had been detached in 

' " The upper Roanoke is known as the Dan ; the upper Peedee as the Yadkin ; the 
upper west branch of the Santee, first as the Congaree, and then as Broad ; the upper east 
branch, first as the Wateree, and then as Catawba." 



554 FROiM COWPENS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. [17S1. 

charge of prisoners, the baggage, and the sick. The Delaware 
troops under Kirkwood, so terribly cut up at Camden, did not 
exceed eighty men for duty. On the nineteenth, Stevens was 
ordered by Greene to engage volunteers for the service, and he 
joined within three days, with nearly eight hundred men. 

By the twenty-third the whole army was demonstrating towards 
Guilford, and Lee and Pickens hovered near the outposts of CornwalHs. 

At this time the loyalists were organizing a corps under Colonel 
Pyle upon the marshes of the Haw, and Tarleton was sent to assist 
and protect them. More than four hundred had collected a little 
north of the old Hillsborough and Salisbury road, two miles from the 
Allamance River, in Orange County, Virginia. Lee and Pickens fell in 
with this party, having been advised of their movements by two men 
whom they picked up while hunting for Tarleton. Tarleton says, 
" the loyalists were proceeding to Tarleton's encampment, unappre- 
hensive of danger, when they were met in a lane, by Lee with his legion. 
Unfortunately, mistaking the American cavalry for Tarleton's dra- 
goons they allowed themselves to be surrounded ; no quarter was 
granted ; between two and three hundred were inhumanly butchered. 
Humanity shudders at the recital, but cold and unfeeling policy 
aroused it, as the most effective means of intimidating the friends of 
royal government." 

There is no doubt that the loyalists commenced the firing as soon 
as they recognized the Maryland troops in the rear of Lee, and that 
Lee himself had hoped to pass and strike at Tarleton himself; but 
after the firing began, it was continued, until the whole party were 
killed, wounded, or driven into the woods. 

CornwalHs withdrew from Hillsborough on the following day, even 
before the expiration of the time designated in his proclamation for 
the people to report to him for duty. Stedman, then his commissary, 
intimates that the army could not be supported at that point. On 
the twenty-seventh he crossed the Haw and fixed his camp near 
Allamance Creek, one of its tributaries. Greene adopted a line of 
march nearly parallel to that of his adversary, and advanced to the 
heights between Reedy Fork and Troublesome Creek, having his 
divided headquarters near the Speedwell iron works and Boyd's 
Mill, on two streams. Greene had gained the choice of position en- 
tirely, reversing the old relations of the armies. He could give battle, 
retire as he advanced, or move into Virginia by the upper fords which 
CornwalHs had so eagerly controlled a few weeks before. It will be 



I78I.] FROM COWPENS TO GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 555 

noticed that the camp of Cornwallis, between the Haw and Deep 
rivers, was where the roads from Salisbury, Guilford and Hillsborough 
unite, and thus controlled the direct road to Wilmington, his depot 
of clothing and supplies, of which his army was already in great need. 
The light troops of both armies were actively employed, daily, and on 
the sixth of March, a skirmish at Wetzell's Mills, which was skillfully 
anticipated and supported by the whole British army, put in peril the 
whole column of Williams and Lee. 

On the eighth, commissioners finally settled upon a plan of ex- 
change of prisoners, the British having exacted paroles of the militia 
wherever they went, while charging them to the account as if captured 
in battle. Colonel Carrington and Frederick Cornwallis made an 
adjustment so that General Greene obtained some officers who would 
have otherwise been idle during the campaign, but the arrangement 
had no immediate value as to private soldiers and militia. 

In the midst of these anxieties troops began to arrive, and on the 
twelfth Greene determined to off'er battle. On the thirteenth orders 
were issued for all detachments to report at Guilford Court House, 
and on the fourteenth of March, General Greene was in readiness for 
the struggle. 



CHAPTER LXIX. 

BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 1781. 

THE American army which was formed for battle near Guilford 
Court House, March fifteenth, 1781, consisted of four thousand 
four hundred and four men ; including one thousand four hundred 
and ninety regular infantry, and one hundred and sixty-one cavalry. 
Lieutenant-colonels Lee and Campbell were sent, early in the morning, 
to feel the enemy and skirmish with its advance column. 

Cornwallis accepted the challenge, sent his baggage back to Bell's 
Mill, on Deep River, and marched toward Guilford. The cavalry, 
the light infantry of the guards, and the Yagers, composed his ad- 
vance guard. "A sharp conflict," says Tarleton, " ensued between 
the advanced parties of thq two armies. In the onset, the fire of the 
Americans was heavy, and the charge of their cavalry was spirited. 
Notwithstanding their numbers and opposition, the gallantry of the 
light infantry of the guards, assisted by the legion, made impression 
upon their centre before the Twenty-third regiment arrived to give 
support to the advanced troops. Captain Goodricks, of the guards, 
fell in this contest ; and between twenty and thirty of the guards, 
dragoons, and Yagers were killed and wounded. The king's troops 
moved on until they arrived in sight of the American army." Refer- 
ence is made to map " Battle of Guilford ; " and the narrative will 
follow the movements of the attacking force. The American first 
line was formed in the edge of woods,behind open ground, and under 
cover of fences. From this point the surface gradually ascended to 
the Court House, and was quite thickly wooded. Other hills were on 
either side, and the Court House itself stood upon a still more abrupt 
ascent. The first line consisted of North Carolina militia under Gen- 
erals Butler and Eaton, one thousand and sixty men, besides officers. 
Captain Singleton occupied the road, with two pieces of artillery. 
The right was covered by LynclVs riflemen, two hundred men ; Kirk- 




556* 



i7Si.] BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 557 

vvood's Delawares, not exceeding eighty men, and a detachment of 
cavalry under Colonel Washington. The left was covered by Camp- 
bell's riflemen and the legion infantry, about two hundred and fifty 
men, and Lee's horse. 

The American second line, about three hundred yards in the rear, 
consisted of the Virginia militia under Generals Stevens and Lawson, 
eleven hundred and twenty-three men, rank and file, posted in woods 
and on both sides of the road. Behind this line Stevens had placed a 
few veterans to keep the militia up to duty. The American third line 
was more than three hundred yards further in the rear, upon high 
ground, with the left slightly refused ; and was composed entirely 
of regulars. Kirkwood had been detached from the right, as already 
noticed, to take a position on the corresponding flank of the first line. 
General Huger was in command of the right wing, consisting of Vir- 
ginia troops, and Colonel Williams commanded the left wing, com- 
posed of Maryland troops. As this division of regulars would very 
naturally be regarded as a veteran corps, it is but proper to state 
that the Second Maryland regiment. Lieutenant-colonel Ford com- 
manding, consisted of the new levies, most of whom had never been 
in action or under fire at all ; and that fully one-half of the Virginia 
brigade was made up of similar troops. Colonel Gunby's command, 
which had been handled by Lieutenant-colonel Howard at Cowpens, 
was the only regular infantry which could be called veteran. A por- 
tion of the North Carolina militia had been forced into the service, 
under suspicion of disloyalty, as a punishment, and with here and 
there a few substitutes, and with good officers, it was a feeble force 
to resist any persistent attack of British troops. Its flanks were so 
well covered, however, that General Greene must have had faith in 
their ability to make some resistance, when thus well supported and 
so admirably disposed. General Stevens posted some of his old 
soldiers in the rear of his line to anticipate any disorder, as many of 
the Virginia militia also, were raw troops, then for the first time 
brought to the field. In thus carefully stating the battle formation 
of the American army, it is proper to notice a characteristic letter 
from General Morgan to General Greene, under date of February 
twentieth, which seems to have suggested to General Greene his 
plan of battle. " I expect Lord Cornwallis will push you until you 
are obliged to fight him, on which much will depend. You'll have, 
from what I see, a great number of militia. If they fight, you'll beat 
Cornwallis ; if not, he will beat you, and perhaps cut your regulars 



538 BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. [1781. 

to pieces. I am informed that among the mihtia will be a number 
of old soldiers. I think it would be advisable to select them from 
the militia, and put them in the midst of the regulars. Select the 
riflemen also and fight them on the flanks, under enterprising offiecrs 
ivho are aequainted zuith that kind of fighting, and put the remain- 
der of the militia in the centre with some picked troops in their rear, 
with orders to shoot dozvn the first man that runs. If anything will 
succeed, a disposition of this kind will. I hope you will not look 
upon this, as dictating ; but as my opinion, in a matter that I am 
much concerned in." 

It is also to be borne in mind that at least six hundred of the mili- 
tia were enrolled for six weeks only, including the march to the field 
and the return march for discharge, so that General Greene had little 
time to lose. The formation of the army for battle has been severely 
criticised, on the ground that the regulars were so far in the rear ; 
but the flanking bodies in the first line were fully equal in number to 
the small veteran corps of the reserve, and they were men who had 
tested their mettle thoroughly on other fields. The disposition of the 
troops seems to have so equalized the commands as to impart strength 
to all parts, and to leave the militia alo7ie, at no point. If Kirkwood's 
command had covered Singleton's guns in the centre, possibly it 
would have strengthened the line ; but might have sacrificed him, with 
the militia ; and the supports were near enough, if there had been 
any resistance at all. 

The British right wing consisted of the regiment of Bose (Hes- 
sian) and the Seventy -first British. General Leslie commanding, with 
the First battalion of guards in reserve, under Lieutenant-colonel Nor- 
ton ; and the left wing consisted of the Twenty-third and Thirty-third 
British, Lieutenant-colonel Webster commanding, with the grena- 
diers and Second battalion of the guards in reserve, under Generai 
O'Hara. The light infantry and Yagers were to the left and rear of 
the artillery, which occupied the road and exchanged fire with Single-, 
ton's guns while the British line was forming. The American line, it 
will be observed, considerably overlapped the British, thereby endan- 
gering its flanks in case of a direct advance. The British army ha(i 
marched through a defile, to their position, and had not sufficient 
room for deployment until they passed beyond a small creek which 
crossed the Salisbury road. It will be at once seen that the Ameri- 
can first line, with Stevens and Lawson behind its immediate centre, 
was a strong line, when it is considered that the entire British force 



11 



lySi.] BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 559 

was but little if any over two thousand strong, after deduction of the 
baggage guard sent to Bell's Mills. The tabular statement at close of 
this chapter indicates the condition of the army of General Cornwallis 
at different dates. 

Tarleton's dragoons were kept in column, on the road, in the rear, 
to act as opportunity should be furnished by the events of the day, 
and to cover the artillery which could advance only by the road. It 
will be seen by reference to the map, that Lord Cornwallis appreciated 
the danger that threatened his flanks, upon a simple advance against 
the centre, and as soon as the militia gave way, so that he felt the 
sharp fire of the flanking parties, the Twenty-third and Thirty-third 
regiments changed direction to the left, to let in their reserves on 
the right, while the light infantry and Yagers marched obliquely to 
the very left extreme. The right wing also took up its reserves, so 
that the combined line became co-extensive with the entire American 
front. Lieutenant O'Hara was killed at his guns, during the artillery 
firing which was maintained quite steadily during the last twenty 
minutes, before the British army entered the open ground to charge 
the militia. The advance was steady and in good order. When 
within about one hundred and forty yards of the fence the North 
Carolina militia delivered a partial volley and fled, abandoning every- 
thing. Singleton's guns necessarily retreated up the road as soon as 
left without support. A considerable portion of Eaton's brigade 
dashed behind Campbell's riflemen and took refuge in thick woods, 
on a hill (see map) and the remainder of the division fell back upon 
the second line, which opened its files for them to pass through, and 
promptly resumed a steady front toward the enemy. The British 
left wing was severely galled by the fire of Kirkwood, Lynch and 
Washington ; but finally forced them back to a corresponding posi- 
tion on the right of the second line. The British right wing was 
equally annoyed by the riflemen of Campbell, the legionary infan- 
try and Lee. The British centre had swept on at a bayonet charge 
againt the second line, and the first battalion of guards, with the regi- 
ment of Bose, wheeled to the right.to clear their flanks of these assail- 
ants. The woods were so thick, and so filled with underbrush that 
their bayonets were of little practical value. As the riflemen fell 
back the pursuit was continued up the hill so far, that these regiments 
were absolutely detached from the army and engaged in a separate 
battle until the principal action was practically ended. While the 
British army lost numbers by their absence, it is not probable that 



560 BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. [1781. 

Campbell and Lee, after their gallant conduct in the morning, would 
have let slip an opportunity to attack the British in the rear, if the 
guards and Hessians had adhered to the originial order of battle. 
The manner in which this flanking detachment sustained itself will 
be hereafter noticed. 

Meanwhile the British centre and left wing moved directly upon 
the Virginia militia, which resisted for awhile with great spirit, but 
was finally compelled to give way and seek cover behind the conti- 
nental troops, or in the woods. Kirkwood and Washington hastened 
to their original positions on the right of the reserve line as soon as 
the second line gave way. 

The British centre was embarrassed by the woods, and its advance 
became unequal. The Seventy-first dropped behind, greatly impeded 
by ravines, and, possibly and very naturally, to be ready, if needed to 
support the two regiments which had broken off from its right, and 
were actively engaged at the time. Cornwallis says, " they advanced 
upon hearing active firing upon their left and front." 

The Thirty-third, the light infantry, and Yagers pressed after 
Kirkwood and Lynch whom thej^ had opposed from the beginning of 
the action, dropping the Twenty-third behind, and this regiment, like 
the Seventy-first of the right wing was again dropped, when the 
Second battalion of the guards and the grenadiers advanced toward 
the American third line. 

Lieutenant-colonel Webster advanced directly upon the American 
regulars, and made two successive charges, which were repulsed. 
Colonel Gunby with the First Maryland regiment, supported by the 
left wing of General Huger's command, delivered a well directed fire, 
resorted to the bayonet and compelled the assailing column to cross 
a deep ravine and take refuge upon a hill to its rear. Tarleton says, 
" At this period the event of the action was doubtful, and victory 
alternately presided over either army. Webster, however, gained an 
excellent position till he could hear of the progress of the king's troops 
on his right." 

The Americans had thus repulsed and detached the British left, 
and the extreme British right was engaged with Campbell and Lee at 
a disadvantage, more than a mile to the right and rear. The Second 
battalion of the guards and the grenadiers were continuing their 
march, and without waiting for support, made an impetuous attack 
upon the left of the American reserve near the Court House. The 
Second Maryland regiment gave way almost instantly, losing the guns 



1781] BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 561 

which had been withdrawn to this line. The advance of the guards 
had not been perceived by Colonel Williams on account of an inter- 
vening clump of trees (see map) until they made their charge. Its 
effect was to threaten the entire line, take it in the rear, and force it 
towards Webster. The First Maryland wheeled to the left and used 
the bayonet. Colonel Gunby was almost immediately dismounted, 
and Lieutenant-colonel Howard took command, Tarleton and Corn- 
wallis confirm the statement of the gallant conduct of this regiment. 
Tarleton says, " The Maryland brigade, followed by Washington's 
cavalry, moving upon them before they could receive assistance, retook 
the cannon and repulsed the guards with great slaughter, the ground 
being open. Colonel Washington's dragoons killed Colonel Stewart 
and several of his men, and pursued the remainder into the woods. 
General O'Hara, though wounded, rallied the remainder of the Second 
battalion of the guards to the Twenty-third and Seventy-first, who had 
inclined from the right and left, and were now approaching open 
ground." 

To cover their advance. Lieutenant McLeod was placed with two 
guns upon a small knoll near the road, which should have been held 
by Singleton, and checked the American advance,until the arrival of 
the two British regiments last referred to exposed the Maryland regi- 
ment to the attack of a largely superior force. The American onset 
was so persistent and the moment was so critical that General Corn- 
wallis commenced this artillery fire before the guards were disengaged, 
and while they were actually exposed to its effect. When the First 
Maryland regiment wheeled upon the guards, it uncovered the Vir- 
ginia line, and Lieutenant-colonel Webster availed himself of the 
opportunity to recross the ravine and join the main body. Tarleton's 
dragoons had just returned from the support of the regiment of Bose, 
and was immediately followed by the First battalion of the guards. 
The force now concentrated near the Court House could not be 
resisted, and General Greene ordered a retreat. This retreat was 
made under cover of Colonel Greene's regiment, which from its situa- 
tion had been held fast to watch the movements of Webster after 
he occupied the hill nearly opposite, and had taken no active part 
in the operations to its left. 

The Twenty-third and Seventy-first regiments followed a short 
distance in pursuit ; but Tarleton says, " Earl Cornwallis did not 
think it advisable for the British cavalry to charge the enemy, who 
were retreating in good order." 
36 



5b2 BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. [1781. 

The contest between Campbell and the Legion light infantry, sup- 
ported by a few militia who rallied in the woods, had in the meantime 
been so spirited, that the British regiments " found men behind trees 
on all sides of them," and Tarleton says, that " when he made his 
charge, he found officers and men of both corps in the possession of 
the enemy." He had been sent in that direction on account of the 
continuous firing which had been noticed by Cornwallis ; and at the 
time he was so detached, there was no opportunity to handle his cav- 
alry to advantage at the centre. The American riflemen had their 
choice of ground, and their mode of fighting was destructive to the 
guards and Hessians, with little loss to themselves. His arrival was 
opportune, and the Americans retreated to the woods. Fortunately 
for Tarleton, Colonel Lee had abandoned the hope of resistance, more 
than to check pursuit, and had made a detour for the purpose of join- 
ing the main army at the Court House before that officer appeared. 

He lost a great opportunity, and in fact failed to reach the main 
army until the next morning. He states that if General Greene had 
known the condition of the British army, a retreat would have been 
unnecessaiy, and the victory certain. He did not reach Greene, how- 
ever, and did not so advise him. His arrival at that moment would 
have settled the issue. 

Tarleton gives it as his opinion that " if the American artillery had 
pre-occupied the small hill by the road-side, the Twenty-third and 
Seventy-first regiments could not have united with the guards ; and 
the result would have been fatal to the army of Cornwallis." He 
says, that "one-third of the British army was killed or wounded d.ur- 
ing the two hours of battle." The casualties are stated as given in 
the official Returns, made up immediately after the battle, and the 
numerous conjectures which have exaggerated the losses on both 
sides, are of little value, when the acknowledged facts and the admit- 
ted valor of the troops, who did any fighting, on either side, suffi- 
ciently indicate the desperate character of the action. 

British casualties — Royal Artillery, Lieutenant O'Hara, and one 
man killed ; four wounded. Guards — Lieutenant-colonel Stewart, 
eight sergeants, twenty-eight rank and file killed ; Captains Schmultz, 
Maynard, and Goodrick died of wounds ; Captains Lord Douglas, 
Smeaton, and Maitland, Ensign Stewart, Adjutant Colquhoun, two 
sergeants, and one hundred and forty three rank and file wounded, 
and twenty-two missing. Twenty-third regiment : Lieutenant Robin- 
son and twelve men killed ; Captain Peter, one sergeant, and forty- 



i7Si.] BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 563 

three wounded. Thirty-third regiment : Lieutenant-colonel Webster 
died of wounds ; Ensign Talbot, and ten men killed ; Lieutenants 
Salvin and Wyngand, Ensigns Kelly, Gore, and Hughes, Adjutant 
Fox, and fifty-six men, wounded; Seventy-first : Ensign Grant and 
twelve men killed, fifty-six men wounded. Regiment of Base : Cap- 
tain Wilmousky and Ensign De Trott, died of wounds ; ten men 
killed ; Lieutenants Schnoener and Graise, and si.xty-two men killed ; 
three missing. British Legion — Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton and 
thirteen men wounded ; three men killed. Total casualties reported: 
Five hundred and forty-four. General Howard who volunteered to 
accompany Cornwallis, was also wounded. 

Sergeant Lamb relates that he saw Lord Cornwallis crossing clear 
ground, where the guards suffered so severely, riding upon a dragoon 
horse, (his own having been shot,) and that he was carried directly 
toward the Americans. The trooper's saddle-bags were underneath 
the horse, embarrassing his control of the creature. Lamb "seized 
the bridle, turned the horse's head, and ran by the side until the 
Twenty-third regiment was gained." Cornwallis and Leslie were 
the only general officers of the British army who were not wounded. 

American Casualties. Virginia Regulars — One captain, two sub- 
alterns, and twenty-six men killed : four sergeants and thirty-five 
men wounded, and thirty-nine men missing. Maryland Regulars : One 
major, one subaltern, and thirteen killed ; five captains, one sergeant, 
and thirty-six men wounded ; ninety-seven missing. Delaiv are Battalion 
— seven killed ; thirteen wounded, fifteen missing. Washington's de- 
tachment of First and Third cavalry, three killed ; two captains, two 
subalterns, and four wounded (prisoners,) three missing. Lee's Corps, 
three killed ; one captain, eight m.en wounded (prisoners) ; seven 
missing. Total casualties of regulars, three hundred and twenty- 
nine. General Huger was also wounded. Stevens' Brigade — Two 
captains and nine men killed. Brigadier-general Stevens, one cap- 
tain, four subalterns, and thirty men wounded. One major, three 
subalterns, and one hundred and thirty-six men missing. Lazvsons 
Brigade — One killed. One major, two subalterns, and thirteen men 
wounded. One subaltern, eighty-six men missing. Campbell's and 
Lynch' s Rifle Regiments — Two captains and one man killed ; one cap- 
tain, one subaltern, and fourteen men wounded ; one captain, seven 
subalterns, and eighty-six missing. Total casualties of Virginia 
militia, four hundred and eight. North Carolina militia, six killed ; 
one captain, one subaltern, and three men wounded; two captains, 



564 BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. [17S1. 

nine subalterns, and five hundred and fifty-two missing. Total 
casualties of brigade, five hundred and seventy- four. Total Ameri- 
can casualties, thirteen hundred and eleven. The large number of 
missing are accounted for by both British and American authorities, 
as having fled to their homes. Two days afterward the returns of 
the Virginia Regulars showed seven hundred and fifty-two men 
present, and of the Maryland Brigade, five hundred and fifty, which 
reduced their loss, reported on the seventeenth as two hundred and 
sixty-one men, to one hundred and eighty-eight. 

General Greene retreated nearly twelve miles to the iron works on 
Troublesome Creek. Although the American army had thus fallen 
back to the rendezvous which had been selected in case of defeat, it was 
not disheartened. On the morning of the sixteenth, preparations 
were made for battle, on the conviction that Cornwallis would pur- 
sue. The resistance which had been made, aroused the remnants of 
the militia to a sense of responsibility for previous failure ; and the 
example of the First Maryland encouraged them to seek an oppor- 
tunity to redeem their credit. Surgeons were sent to Guilford, where 
they found that all possible care had been taken of their wounded by 
the British officers. 

Greene, writing on the same day, says, " the enemy gained his 
cause, but is ruined by the success of it." Tarleton regarded " the 
victory as the pledge of ultimate defeat." " The British had the 
name ; the Americans the good consequences of victory," wrote 
Ramsey. 

" Another such victory would ruin the British army," said Fox in 
the House of Commons. 

Pitt and other political leaders in Great Britain, regarded it as the 
" precursor of ruin to British supremacy in the south " ; and the cor- 
respondence of Cornwallis, official and unofficial, breathes but one 
sentiment as to the repugnance of the southern people at large to 
respect British authority. 

After providing for the badly wounded to the best of his ability, 
and leaving those who could not march to the protection of a flag of 
truce, he issued a formal proclamation of victory and a rallying call 
to the people, and immediately crossed Deep River, as if on the march 
to Salisbury. Recrossing it lower down, he moved to Ramsey's Mills. 
General Greene gathered such troops as had a reasonable time of ser- 
vice before them, and ma;-ched to Buffalo Ford, when he ordered an 
inspection of his command with view to a spirited pursuit and the 



I78r.] 



BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE. 



56: 



contingency of another battle. It became necessary to send back to 
his train for additional ammunition, lead and bullet moulds, so that 
he did not reach Ramsey's Mills until the twenty-eighth, one day 
after Cornwallis had bridged the river and moved on toward Cross 
Creek (Fayetteville) on the direct Wilmington road. 

The British army was almost destitute of clothing and other needed 
supplies. The destruction of their train during the winter had been 
a constant source of trouble, and the loss had not been compensated 
by results. Messengers were sent to Lord Rawdon, then at Camden, 
warning him that Greene would probably invade South Carolina, and 
the army, reduced to " not quite fifteen hundred men (1435) through 
sickness, desertion, and losses in battle," marched to Wilmington, 
reaching that town on the seventh of April. The messengers failed 
to reach Lord Rawdon, and General Greene entered upon his South 
Carolina campaign. 

Note. — State of the troops that marched with the army under the command of Lieuten- 
ant-General Earl Cornwallis. (Official.) 

Rank and file Present and fit for Duty. 











British. 






German. 


Provincials. 




Dates. 


^ 

Is 

■u M 

03 


c 


S 


aiS 
1" 


s 

'5: 

■3 


C 

« 

■a 


•5c2 


c = 

0) 

'bit; 

w C 


b£o 
« 

In M 




bi 


he 
> 


c 


M 

a 


C u 

u 

* s 

. 


3 



H 


January 15, 17S1. 


6 go 


167 


41 


286 


32S 


249 


237 


69 


347 


103 


451 


256 


3224 


February i, 17S1. 


690 






279 


334 




234 




345 


97 


174 


287 


2440 


March i, 1781. .. 


605 






258 


322 




212 




313 


97 


174 


232 


2213 


April I, 1781 


411 






182 


229 




161 




245 


97 


174 


224 


1723 



The force ultimately able to march to Virginia, has already been stated at 1435 men. 



CHAPTER LXX. 

SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. BATTLE OF HOBKIRKS HILL. PARTISAN 

WARFARE. 

GENERAL GREENE resolved to move directly against the mili- 
tary posts of South Carolina, irrespective of the action of Lord 
Cornwallis. He did not believe that pursuit would be attempted. 
Even in that case, he would at least relieve North Carolina from 
danger, and would occupy such a position as to be able to attack 
either Rawdon, or Cornwallis, without their possible cooperation 
against him. He moved so rapidly that he reached Rugely's Mills 
before Cornwallis knew that he had left Deep River; and it was then 
too late to intercept his march to the south. That officer had already 
determined that the most hopeful method of reducing the Southern 
States, was by occupation of Virginia, and by control of Chesapeake 
Bay and its contributory water courses. This plan involved a separa- 
tion of the south from the north, so that neither could aid the other. 
He resolved to march to Virginia, by the shortest route, and to effect 
a junction with General Phillips, who arrived in Chesapeake Bay on 
the twenty-sixth of March, with two thousand troops from. New York, 
and with instructions to report to Lord Cornwallis and act under his 

orders. 

The narrative would be incomplete without some further reference 
to this sudden abandonment of a campaign which had been so en- 
tangled and eventful, especially as the military policy of the British 
Cabinet and of General Clinton are involved in the movement. 

General Cornwallis, in his answer to General Clinton's " Narra- 
tive," thus states the case: "I could not remain at Wilmington, 
lest General Greene should succeed against Lord Rawdon, and, by 
returning to North Carolina, have it in his power to cut off every 
means of saving my small corps, except that disgraceful one of an 
embarkation, with the loss of the cavalry, and every horse in the 




%mtir 



■ British 

■ Hessians . 
Dragoons. 

3 American. 



Q J/orse. 




/± /Second BrilishLine: Center andLe/t 



^Lunu, uriii^njjtne: i^cnccrununt 
advance upon VirginiaMilitia '. 



^t I \^"/'^f' Advance ta^es up a'lReseri/cS- 



506* 



Compiled andUrawH'by ColtJarnnglon. 



1781.J SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 567 

army." . . " I was most firmly persuaded, that until Virginia was 
reduced, we could not hold the more southern provinces; and that, 
after its reduction, they would fall, without much difficulty." On 
the eighteenth of April he advised Lord Germaine, that " the great 
reinforcements sent by Virginia to General Greene, whilst General 
Arnold was in the Chesapeake, are convincing proofs that small expe- 
ditions do not frighten that powerful province." 

General Cornwallis wrote to General Clinton on the tenth of 
April : — " I can not help expressing my wishes that the Chesapeake 
may become the seat of war, even (if necessary) at the expense of 
abandoning New York. Until Virginia is in a measure subdued, our 
hold of the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious." The fol- 
lowing appreciation of the theatre of operations is included in the 
same letter. " The rivers of Virginia are advantageous to an invad- 
ing army ; but North Carolina is, of all the provinces in America, the 
most difficult to attack, (unless material assistance could be got from 
the inhabitants, the contrary of which I have sufficiently experienced) 
on account of its great extent, of the numberless rivers and creeks, 
and the total want of interior navigation." In reply. General Clinton, 
under date of May twenty-ninth, says, " Had it been possible for your 
Lordship, in your letter to me of the loth ult., to have intimated the 
probability of your intention to form a junction with General Phillips. 
I should certainly have endeavored to have stopped you, as I did 
then, and do now, consider such a move as likely to be dangerous to 
our interests in the southern colonies." In a dispatch to General 
Phillips, of April thirteenth, marked '■^secret and most private,'' z-wd. 
which Lord Cornwallis found at Petersburg after the death of Gen- 
eral Phillips, General Clinton says, " His Lordship tells me he wants 
reinforcements. I would ask — how can that be possible ? And, if it 
is, what hopes can I have, of a force sufficient to undertake any solid 
operation ? As my invitation to Lord Cornwallis to come to the 
Chesapeake, was upon a supposition that everything would be settled 
in the Carolinas, I do not think he will come." . . . "If Lord 
Cornwallis proposes anything necessary for his operations, you of 
course must adopt it, if you can ; letting me know your thoughts 
tJicreonT 

A dispatch which he received from Whitehall Palace says, " Lord 
George Germaine strongly recommends to General Clinton, either to 
remain in good humor, in full confidence to be supported as much as 
the nature of the service will admit of, or avail himself of the leave 



568 SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. [1781. 

of coming home, as no good can arise, if there is not full confidence 
between the general and the minister," and, on the sixth of June, 
Lord Germaine wrote to General Clinton, " Lord Cornwallis' opinion 
entirely coincides with mine, of the great importance of pushing the 
war on the side of Virginia, with all the force that can be spared." 

It is impracticable more than to notice these leading facts, in the 
examination of voluminous correspondence and dispatches, which 
illustrate the relations of these officers, and the policy of the crown. 
General Clinton had suggested to General Phillips, a movement up 
the Delaware, with the contingency of an attack upon Philadelphia, 
to be supported by a movement on his part, from New York ; and he 
was at the same time having difficulty with Admiral Arbuthnot, of 
whom he said : " He is more impracticable than ever, swearing to me 
(Clinton) that he knows nothing of his recall ; to others, he says he 
is going home immediately." Rumors of a French naval reinforce- 
ment prevailed, and the situation of General Clinton was doubly em- 
barrassing, by the contrast of the condition of the South with that 
which he guaranteed when Charleston was captured and Cornwallis 
was left in command. He very properly declared "a naval suprem- 
acy to be the first essential element to success in Virginia," and at 
the same time realized the uncertainty of securing that supremacy, 
so long as the fleets of Spain and France were operating in the West 
Indies, within striking distance of the American coast. Differences 
of opinion between the naval, as well as the military commanders, 
ultimately proved fatal to the campaign ; and at this time, the Cabi- 
net was almost equally divided between an assurance of easy victory 
at the South, and apprehensions of the possible fruits of the European 
coalition against Great Britain. 

General Cornwallis wrote to General Clinton, April twenty-third, 
*' My present undertaking sits heavy on my mind. I have experi- 
enced the distresses and dangers of marching some hundreds of 
miles, in a country chiefly hostile, without one active or useful friend 
— without intelligence and without communication with any part of 
the country. The situation in which I leave South Carolina, adds 
much to my anxiety ; yet I am under the necessity of adopting this 
hazardous enterprise, hastily, and with the appearance of precipita- 
tion, as I find there is no prospect of speedy reinforcements from 
Europe ; and that the return of General Greene to North Carolina, 
either with or without success, would put a junction with General 
Phillips out of my power." 



78Si.] SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 569 

Lord CornwalHs began his march from Wilmington on the 
twenty-fifth of April, having " remained eighteen days at that post, 
to refresh and refit his army." He sent orders to General Phillips to 
march and meet him at Petersburg, then took a direct route, via 
Smithfield, Lcwisburg, and Halifax Court House, as indicated on 
map "Outline of Atlantic Coast," and reached the designated ren- 
dezvous without serious interruption, on the twentieth of May. 
Meanwhile, General Phillips reached Petersburg on the eighth, died of 
sudden illness on the thirteenth, and was succeeded in command by 
General Arnold, pending the arrival of Lord CornwalHs. The opera- 
tions of the Middle Department will be considered in connection 
with General La Fayette's Virginia campaign. 

The movements of General Greene will be first followed to the 
close of active operations at the South. 

During the march to Rugely's Mills, on the sixth of April, he had 
detached Colonel Lee with orders to join Marion, and break Lord 
Rawdon's communications with Charleston. Sumter, already recov- 
ered from his wound and restored to duty, was located between 
Camden and Ninety-six; and General Pickering, with militia, was 
instructed to operate between Ninety-six and Augusta. 

On the twenty-third of April, Lee and Marion captured Fort 
Watson, a post on the Santee River, on the Charleston road, directly 
in the rear of Camden. This capture was attended by incidents 
which illustrate the minor operations of war. The fort was a simple 
stockade, upon an Indian mound forty feet high, near the Santee, 
and at the upper end of Scott's Lake. The garrison consisted of 
eighty regulars and forty royalists. The stockade was surrounded by 
fallen trees, doing service as abatis, but not firmly embedded in the 
ground. The supply of water for the garrison was from the lake. 
This was cut off. Then a trench was dug to the level of the river- 
bed, and the garrison became independent of lake and river. The 
assailants had no artillery, and the range of fire was over the heads 
of the garrison. To meet this emergency the ingenious device of a 
log crib, filled with sand, was resorted to. From its summit, the 
skilled riflemen picked off the garrison, and the fort surrendered. 

The fall of Fort Watson, and the immediate seizure of the passes 
through the hills, cut off Lord Rawdon's supply-route on the north 
side of the Santee. Colonel Watson, then en route to Camden with 
five hundred men to reinforce its garrison, was compelled to retrace 
his steps and march up the west bank. 



570 SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. [1781. 

The advance of Lee and Marion against Fort Watson had been 
made as early as the fifteenth ; and application was made to General 
Greene for one piece of artillery. The guns lost at Guilford had been 
partly replaced by two which were brought down from Oliphant's 
Mills, at the head of the Catawba, and Colonel Harrison was then on 
his march with two other pieces from the general depot at Prince 
'-Edward Court House. A gun could not be sent directly to Marion 
without passing through Camden, and there was no wagon road across 
Pine Tree Creek. Upon a report that Colonel Webster was approach- 
ing Camden, Colonel Carrington was ordered to take the artillery 
and baggage back to Rugely's Mills, and Captain Findley was to start 
from that point down the Black River road to join Marion with one 
gun, so that he might meet Watson in the fieid, if he found opportu- 
nity to do so. Greene sent his cavalry to the east bank of Pine Tree 
Creek, to anticipate any movement to cut off the escort which accom- 
panied the gun, and advanced on the nineteenth to Log Town, within 
half a mile of Camden, where he made demonstrations to the east 
and south-east of the town, but failed to draw Lord Rawdon from the 
post. His own force was too weak to venture an assault. On the 
twenty-fourth General Greene withdrew to Hobkirk Hill, and sent 
orders to Colonel Carrington to return with the artillery and supplies 
for the troops. That officer had moved the guns and baggage to 
Lynch's Creek, nearly eight miles beyond Rugely's Mills, so that he 
was unable to execute the order of recall until after nine o'clock of 
the morning of the twenty-fifth. Rations were at once distributed 
and the troops were at breakfast, when the subsequent attack was 
made upon their position by Lord Rawdon. These facts are given as 
explanation of the reported negligence and surprise of the American 
camp. On the previous day the following order had been issued : 

" Camp before Camden, North Quarter, Tuesday, April 2^tk. 
" Thf general 07'ders respecting passes are punctually to be observed. 
None are to be granted but by commandants of corps. The rolls are to 
be called at least three times a day, and all absentees reported and 
punished. Officers of every rank are to confine themselves to their re- 
spective duties. A nd every part of the army must be in readiness to 
stand at arms at a momenfs zvarmng.'" 

The battle of Hobkirk's Hill, sometimes and quite correctly called 
the battle of Camden, occurred on the following day. General Greene 
had sent orders to Marion to join him as soon as he should reduce 



I78i.] SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 57 1 

Fort Watson, and that officer started for the main army on the even- 
ing of the twenty-third. Lord Rawdon was advised of this movement, 
and resolved to attack his adversary before he could be thus reinforced. 
He had also learned from a deserter that Colonel Carrington had been 
sent to Rugely's Mills with the artillery, but had not been advised of 
his return. Reference is made to maps, " Battle of Hobkirk Hill," 
and " Operations in Southern States." 

Hobkirk's Hill is described as a narrow sand ridge of very little 
elevation, which separates the head springs of two small branches, the 
one running into the Wateree, the other into Pine Tree Creek. It 
was quite thickly wooded, quite abrupt toward Camden, sloping more 
gradually, eastward, and protected from approach on the east and 
north-east by impassable swamps. 

The country between the hill and Log Town was also covered by 
trees and thick shrubbery ; from Log Town to Camden the woods had 
been cut down, to prevent their being used to cover an advancing 
enemy. When Lord Rawdon understood General Greene's position, 
he placed the post in charge of convalescents from the general hos- 
pital, and by a detour to the east, attempted to surprise the American 
camp. Lord Rawdon had already been advised by Colonel Balfour, 
that the Commander-in-chief had directed the abandonment of Cam- 
den ; but the operations of Greene, Marion, Lee and Sumter, had 
rendered such a movement impracticable. On that account he had 
directed Colonel Watson to join him. His protracted delay, through 
the movements of the American partisan corps, left the post greatly 
exposed. Several skirmishes had already taken place near Camden, 
and Tarleton states that *' Lord Rawdon had learned from prisoners, 
that " Greene's army was not by any means so numerous as he had 
apprehended, but that considerable reinforcements were expected. 
To balance this he received the unfavorable intelligence that Marion 
had already taken such a position as rendered it impracticable for 
Colonel Watson to join him." 

The command, consisting of about nine hundred men, with fifty 
dragoons, marched at ten o'clock, and by filing close to the swamp 
on their right, gained the woods unperceived. This route of march 
also carried the British column to the left of the American front, 
which had less natural strength, and brought on an immediate skir- 
mish with the pickets, nearly a mile from the camp. These were 
commanded by Captains Benson and Morgan, of Virginia, besides 
Kirkwood's small detachment of Delaware troops. The resistance was 



572 SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. [1781. 

SO efficient as to delay the advance until the American line was 
formed. 

The Sixty-third British regiment formed the right, the New York 
volunteers the centre, and the king's Americans the left, of the first 
line. The Volunteers of Ireland on the right, and Captain Robert- 
son's detachment, formed a supporting line ; and the South Carolina 
regiment and the dragoons were still in reserve. The front was too 
narrow, and the plan of General Greene was well designed to envelop 
and crush it. The secondary diagram on the map indicates that 
plan. The American right wing consisted of General Huger's bri- 
gade, with the regiments of Lieutenant-colonels Campbell and Hawes ; 
and the left wing, under Colonel Gunby and Lieutenant-colonel Ford, 
Colonel Williams commanding. It was quite similar to the formation 
of the reserve line at the battle of Guilford. The North Carolina 
militia, consisting of about two hundred and fifty men under Colonel 
Reade, formed the reserve, but took no part in the action. The artil- 
lery, three guns, under Colonel Harrison, just arrived, was masked in 
the centre, and orders were given for the regiments on the right and 
left of the guns to open for their fire ; and then to " charge the enemy 
with the bayonet, withholding their own fire until the British line was 
broken." The regiments on the right and left of the line, were to 
left and right oblique, upon the respective flanks of the advancing 
enemy. Much confidence was felt in the assurance that Lord Raw- 
don was unadvised of the return of the artillery, and implicit reliance 
was placed upon the regiments at the centre. Colonel Washington 
was sent to double the right flank and take them in the rear." 

Lord Rawdon quickly perceived that his front was too contracted, 
and as at Guilford, the reserves were brought up to equal the front 
of the enemy. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell with the Sixty-third 
British regiment and the king's Americans pressed on firmly, notwith- 
standing the fire of the artillery, while Campbell on the right, and 
Ford on the left of the American line, were descending the hill with 
spirit, in accordance with the plan of battle. Both of the British 
wings, brought up so hurriedly to the support of the original column, 
began to give way under pressure. Ford fell, severely wounded, 
and his men hesitated in their advance. Captain Beatty on the right 
of Colonel Gunby's regiment, was mortally wounded. His own com- 
pany on the right of the regiment, began a hasty firing, and almost 
immediately after, fell back in disorder. It was the critical moment 
of the battle. The interval thus made, was filled by the British ad- 



1781.] SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 573 

vance, and Colonel Gunby made the grand mistake of retiring the 
other companies, to re-form the regiment. This movement, says 
Greene, "gave the whole regiment an idea of a retreat, which soon 
spread through the Second regiment, v;hich fell back accordingly. 
They both rallied afterwards, but it was too late. The enemy had 
gained the eminence, silenced the artillery, and obliged us to haul 
it off." 

Greene himself pulled at the drag ropes to encourage his men, 
and, " the guns were simply hauled into the bushes at the rear 
of the hill ; and overlooked by the British troops in their brief 
pursuit." 

Tarleton says, " They pursued three miles ; but the enemy's cav- 
alry being superior to the British, their dragoons could not risk much ; 
and Lord Ravvdon would not suffer the infantry to break their order 
for any benefit that might be expected from a pursuit of the 
fugitives." 

Meanwhile Colonel Washington had made a complete circuit as 
far as Log Town, capturing or parolling as he went; but the defeat 
of the American centre spoiled General Greene's well arranged plan 
of battle. Tarleton says, " a part of the enemy's cavalry, under 
Colonel Washington, either by design, or through ignorance of the 
state of the action, came round to the rear, and exacted paroles from 
some of the British officers who lay wounded in the field ; they like- 
wise carried off several wounded men." The design of General 
Greene was based upon confidence in his best troop?. 

Great discrepancies occur in the statements as to General Greene's 
force. These statements seem to have a simple solution. The returns 
of April twenty-sixth, the day after the action, show present for duty, 
eleven hundred and eighty-four men ; but contain no column of total 
numbers. The addition of the casualties makes that total fourteen 
hundred and forty-six men, which is very near Lossing's figures. 
Chief-Justice Marshall states the number of Continental troops en- 
gaged in the action to have rather exceeded twelve hundred. Ram- 
sey and Gordon, and those who adopted their figures, omit the cas- 
ualties of the day. 

The American loss included Captain Beatty, one sergeant and 
eighteen men killed. Lieutenant-colonels Ford and Campbell, Cap- 
tain J. Smith, 1st Maryland, Captain Dunholm, Virginia, Captain 
(Lieutenant) Bruff, Maryland, Lieutenant Galloway, Maryland, Lieu- 
tenant BaJl, Virginia, and one hundred and eight men, wounded, three 



574 SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. L^TSx. 

sergeants and one hundred and thirty-three men missing. Of the 
last number, some were killed, and forty-seven were known to be 
wounded, and prisoners. Total casualties, two hundred and seventy- 
one. 

The British loss was one officer and thirty-eight men killed, 
twelve officers and two hundred and seven men zvoii tided 2ind miss- 
ing. Total casualties, two hundred and fifty-eight. 

General Greene retired to Rugely's Mills, and Lord Rawdon fell 
back to Camden. 

"The victory at Hobkirk's Hill," says Stedman, "like that at 
Guilford Court House .... produced no consequence beneficial 
to the British interest." " Even in Charleston itself, many of the 
inhabitants, although awed and restrained by the presence of the 
garrison, gave signs of evident dissatisfaction. Sumter on the north- 
west frontier, and Marion, on the north-east, had kept alive the 
embers of revolt ; but they now burst forth in a flame, as soon 
as intelligence was received that General Greene had entered the 
province." 

On the seventh of May, Colonel Watson joined Lord Rawdon, 
and General Greene declined to be drawn into battle. 

On the ninth of May, such stores as could not be removed were 
destroyed, and on the tenth. Lord Rawdon evacuated Camden and 
retired to Monk's Corner. 

Fort Mott surrendered to Lee and Marion on the twelfth. This 
fort w^as a stockade defense, built around a private mansion. Mrs. 
Rebecca Mott, the owner, furnished General Marion with an East 
India bow and arrows, with which combustible missiles were shot upon 
the roof, to fire the building. 

On the eleventh of May, General Sumter occupied Orangeburg. 

On the fifteenth, Lee reduced Granby. 

On the fifth of June, Augusta surrendered, having been under 
observation, and practically under siege, from the sixteenth of April, 
when the Georgia militia under Colonels Williams, Baker and Ham- 
mond first established their camp within gun-shot of the defenses. 
Pickens, Lee and Clark afterward participated in the siege. As in 
the case of Fort Watson a log crib, filled with sand, called " a May- 
ham tower," from Lieutenant-colonel Mayham who devised it, in the 
first instance, during the siege of Fort Watson, was a prominent 
element in securing command of the defenses. The garrison was 
largely made up of Indian auxiliaries. 



I78i.] SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 575 

General Greene was before Ninety-six, as early as the twenty-first 
of May. Kosciusko planned the approaches. 

On the seventh of June, Lord Rawdon left Charleston with the 
flank companies of three regiments which had just arrived, and on the 
twenty-first the siege was raised, after the condition of the garrison 
had become critical. General Greene retired northward, was followed 
by Lord Rawdon as far as the Ennoree, and eventually retired behind 
the Tyger and Broad Rivers. Upon learning that Lord Rawdon had 
abandoned Ninety-six and divided his forces, to cover the outposts 
of Charleston, General Greene ordered his hospital and baggage, 
then at Winnsborough to be transferred to Camden, and marched 
his army to the High Hills of Santee, for rest, during the extreme 
summer heat. While operations at the extreme south were gradually 
losing magnitude and the operations could hardly be regarded as the 
movements of armies, the partisan skirmishes were constant, and bit- 
terly conducted. 

At Quinby Bridge, July seventeenth, at Monk's Corner, at Dor- 
chester on Cooper River, almost to the Charleston picket lines, and 
through the entire region so recently occupied by the British troops, 
the activities and antagonisms of local warfare were uninterrupted by 
the summer's heat, and the short repose of the main armies. 

Little quarter was given in contests between Americans, and the 
adventures of Sumter, Lee, Marion, and Wade Hampton, Horry, 
and royalist partisan leaders, would fill volumes. They definitely 
illustrate the misguided policy which attended the prosecution of the 
war. The British army was numerically unequal to the demands 
upon its service ; and the substitution of proclamations, confiscations, 
and hanging, only multiplied enemies, without securing respect or 
obedience. Colonel Balfour, the post commander at Charleston, was 
an energetic commander; but the lawless execution of Colonel 
Haynes without a trial, and other deeds of extreme severity, tarnished 
his name, and the acquiescence of Lord Rawdon in his action in that 
single case, called forth from the Duke of Richmond and other leading 
statesmen unqualified reprobation. 

The British army could not protect. The American army could 
not rescue. The frightful elements of civil war penetrated all neigh- 
borhoods. There was no such place as home. Too often in the 
extremity of the struggle there was no such thing as family. The 
bitterest foes were those within the household. The waste of war 
was slowly wearing out the ivar itself. 



3/ 



76 



SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 



[1781. 



BRITISH EFFECTIVE FORCE IN AMERICA. 



Note. From "Original Returns in the British Record Ofifice. Date May 1st, 1781. 



New York 12,257 

On an Expedition 1,782 

, " " " under General Leslie 2,278 

" " " " " Arnold. ... 1,553 

" " " " " Phillips.... 2,116 

South Carolina 7i254 



27,240 



Total 33,374- 



East Florida 438 

West Florida 1,185 

Nova Scotia 3.130 

Bermuda 366 

Providence Island 128 

Georgia 887 

6,134 










-4. 



'fef 



'<L^r- 







V//i/^(((tVA* 
















America 
^ritcshi 



_2_ — 5t- 

Afnerican. , ~ -^ — 

^ritcsh 2?rafoons. — - — 



576* 



CHAPTER LXXI. 

BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS. CLOSING EVENTS OF THE 
CAMPAIGN. 1781. 

LORD RAWDON sailed homeward to recruit his health, but 
was taken prisoner by Count de Grasse, and carried to Chesa- 
peake Bay, where Cornwallis soon shared his fortunes. Lieutenant- 
colonel Stewart succeeded to the command of the British army in the 
Southern Department, with headquarters at Orangeburg, South 
Carolina. General Greene, who had been resting his army at the 
High Hills of the Santee, had been reinforced by seven hundred con- 
tinental troops from North Carolina under General Jethro Sumner, 
and marched with very nearly two thousand six hundred men, on the 
twenty-second of August, to engage the British army. Orders had 
been sent to Lee, Marion, and Pickens to join his command. Colonel 
Stewart fell back forty miles, and established his camp at Eutaw 
Springs. See map " Battle of Eutaw Springs." This movement was 
not made under fear of attack, but to secure supplies for his army. 
He states the matter squarely, in his official report to Earl Cornwallis, 
as follows, "The army under my command being much in want of 
necessaries, and there being at the same time a convoy of provisions 
on the march from Charleston, which would have necessarily obliged 
me to make a detachment of at least four hundred men (which at the 
time I could ill afford, the army being much weakened by sickness) to 
meet the convoy at Martin's, fifty-six miles from camp, I therefore 
thought it advisable to retire by slow marches to the Eutaws, where 
I might have an opportunity of receiving my supplies, and disen- 
cumber myself from the sick, without risking my escorts, or suffer 
myself to be attacked to disadvantage, should the enemy have crossed 
the Congaree." 

On the seventh of September, General Greene encamped at Bur- 
dell's plantation, on the Santee River, seven miles from Eutaw Springs. 
37 



578 BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS. [17S1. 

On the eighth of September, the battle of Eutaw Springs was 
fought, f It was the last battle of the last Southern campaign of the 
war, and its conditions and results are therefore material elements to 
complete this narrative. Colonel Stewart learned of the position of 
General Greene's camp, as he states in his official report, from two 
deserters, about six o'clock in the morning. 

Stedman says, " Unfortunately, their report was neither credited 
nor inquired into; but they themselves were sent to prison." Sted- 
man was not present, and Colonel Stewart's report credits the desert- 
ers with information upon which, in part, he acted. Major Coffin had, 
however, been previously dispatched with one hundred and forty 
infantry and fifty cavalry, in order to gain intelligence of the enemy ; 
and he reported that they appeared in force in front, then about four 
miles from camp. Colonel Stewart adds, " Finding the enemy in 
force so near me, I determined to fight them ; as, from their numer- 
ous cavalry, it seemed to be attended with dangerous consequences, 
I immediately formed the line of battle, with the right of the arrny 
to Eutaw Branch, and its left crossin"- the road leading to Roche's 
plantation, leaving a corps on a commanding situation to cover the 
Charleston road, and to act as a reserve." 

The line was in the woods, in advance of the camp, and the tents 
were left standing. Major Majoribanks was on the extreme right, in 
a close thicket, nearly covered from sight. The Third British, known 
as the " Irish Buffs," which landed on the third of June, constituted 
the right wing proper, with the American Royalists under Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Cruger at the centre ; and the Sixty-third and Sixty- 
fourth British took position on the left. A small reserve of infantry 
with Captain Coffin's detachment, constituted the remainder of the 
British force, which did not exceed two thousand men, all told. 
" Major Sheridan with a detachment of New York volunteers took 
post in a house, to check the enemy should they attempt to pass it." 
This brick house and its garden fence, (palisaded,) proved as efficient 
a Jfomi of resistance, as did the Chew house, at the battle of Brandy- 
wine. 

General Greene advanced early in the morning, leaving his camp a 
little after four o'clock of the eighth of September. " The front was 
composed," according to his official report, "of four small battalions 
of militia, two of North, and two of South Carolina." General Marion 
commanded the right wing, and General Pickens the left wing. Colo- 
nel Malmady commanded the centre, which was composed of North 



lySi.] BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS, 579 

Carolina militia, with a small artillery detachment under Lieutenant 
Gaines, and two three-pounders, which rested on the road. " The 
second line consisted of three small brigades of continental troops, 
one of North Carolina, one of Virginia, and one of Maryland," — 
respectively under the command of General Sumner, Colonel Camp- 
bell, and Colonel Williams. Two six-pounders under Captain Brown 
were on the road. Lieutenant-colonel Washington, with his cavalry, 
and the Delaware troops (Kirkwood's) formed the body of the reserve. 
Lieutenant-colonel Lee with his legion covered the right flank, and 
Lieutenant-colonel Henderson, with the State troops, the left. The 
American force slightly exceeded twenty-three hundred men. Such 
were the relative tactical positions of the armies ; but the fighting was 
less systematic than the artificial formations. Some matter-of-fact 
elements, much less formal, preceded the struggle. A portion of the 
British army had been sent out to dig sweet potatoes, which were 
just ripe, and were much liked by the soldiers. Colonel Stewart says, 
nearly at the close of his report, " I omitted to inform your lordship, 
in its proper place, of the armies having for some time been much in 
want of bread, there being no old corn, or mills, near me. I was, 
therefore, under the necessity of sending out rooting parties, from 
each corps, under an officer, to collect potatoes every morning at day- 
break; and unfortunately, that of the flank battalions and "Buffs" 
having gone too far, in front, fell into the enemy's hands before the 
action began, which not only weakened my line, but increased their 
number of prisoners." 

The rooting party thus found the vanguard of General Greene's 
army, which they were not seeking, and left the sweet potatoes which 
they were seeking, with all possible energy ; and the pursuit of the 
rooting party, unarmed as they were, imparted vigor to the American 
advance, and increased the number of prisoners afterwards reported. 
Captain Coffin, who had been sent to the front, also had a short skir- 
mish three miles before the British camp; and left forty of his men 
in the hands of the Americans. Some of his party were killed. 

As nearly all critical events in human history have their minor 
determining issues, so this final battle of the Southern campaign of 
the war under notice, is easily brought to plain solution. 

The American army was superior in numbers, and was well-offi- 
cered. The preliminary skirmish with Coffin, and the surprise of the 
rooting party, imparted zest to their advance. It was nearly nine 
o'clock when the opposing forces met in battle, and the artillery fire 



58o BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS. [lySr. 

on either side, was limited to the range of the road. The "distribu- 
tion of the British artillery through their line," referred to by several 
historians, was simply the location of three guns in the centre of a 
small front of a few hundred yards ; and both armies fought under 
the shade of forest trees, where the American army had every advan- 
tage of position, and where individual merit had its best opportunity. 

This battle illustrates the fair average of military transactions, 
when stripped of the poetical adornments which deceive youthful 
aspirants for glory, and enthuse the people with frenzied excitement 
over victories won. 

Fighting is hard work. The beautiful formation of parade van- 
ishes in the field. The word ^'■steady,'' means just that; but the 
idea of perfect self-possession, so that depleted regiments unite again 
as fast as men fall, and the aggregate loss is simply a diminution of a 
promptly closed-iip fronts is theoretical and impossible. The morale, 
or inertia of an army, gives it physical power ; and this is made up 
of elements which must come out of fixed conditions. These condi- 
tions are, either an exact and patient training, or the impulsion which 
comes from some overwhelming passion. Concord, Lexington, and 
Bunker Hill illustrate the latter ; and both the British and Hessian 
troops almost invariably demonstrated the value of the first condition. 
The American continental army, so far as permanent, acquired like 
discipline, and their battalions suffer very little discount, when en- 
gaged under equal circumstances with their opponents. 

The battle of Eutaw Springs was well fought, until the battle, like 
that of Bennington, promised a short march to easy victory, and then 
license supplanted discipline, and vanquished victory. 

The action began between the artillery detachments, and their fire 
was maintained with much vigor, until one of the British and two of 
the American pieces were dismounted. The British left wing, " by 
an unknown mistake," says Colonel Stewart, " advanced and drove 
the militia and North Carolinians before them ; but unexpectedly 
finding the Virginia and Maryland line ready formed, and at the 
same time receiving a heavy fire, occasioned some confusion." The 
North Carolina militia, however, fired seventeen rounds before their 
retreat, and Sumner so promptly pushed the battalions of Ashe, Arm- 
strong and Blount into the gap, that the first line was restored, and 
the British in turn retreated. The reserve then came to their sup- 
port. The American second line was promptly brought up, at a 
bayonet charge, and the British left wing in turn gave way. 



I78i.] BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS. 58 1 

Colonel Henderson was wounded early in the action, and Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Wade Hampton succeeded to the command of the cavalry 
on the left flank. Washington, with Kirkwood, advanced toward the 
position occupied by Majoribanks, and Lee threatened the British 
left. The bayonet charge led by Colonel Williams shattered the 
British left wing. The troops broke into disorder and fled through 
their camp to the cover of the house already occupied by Major 
Sheridan. While the British officers were rallying their men and 
forming the line anew, and obliquely to the left, across the open 
ground behind their camp, a portion of the American troops were 
plundering the tents, drinking rum, and sacrificing the partial success 
already attained. 

The position of Major Majoribanks was such as to endanger the 
American left wing. Colonel Washington attempting in vain to dis- 
lodge him, was wounded and taken prisoner, together with nearly 
forty of his men. The thicket was too dense for the movement of 
cavalry, and the men were taken, one by one, without opportunity to 
resist. Kirkwood and Hampton made a similar attempt with persis- 
tent valor, but Majoribanks only retired to a still stronger position, 
and eventually behind the palisades of the garden. 

General Greene made every possible effort to restore his line, but 
no troops could withstand the hot fire to which they were exposed. 
The artillerymen were in open ground, and nearly every one fell upon 
the field. The house which Sheridan occupied, had windows in the 
roof, and was practically, as General Greene reports it, a three story 
house. Finding its capture impossible, and that his men were exposed 
to absolute slaughter, he abandoned the guns and retired to Burdell's 
plantation. The battle was one of great activity on both sides. The 
unarmed rooting party of course carried back with them an element 
of disorder. The British left, made up of the veteran Sixty-third and 
Sixty-fourth, had served during the war from their landing on Staten 
Island in 1779 (see page 200). They made an unauthorized plunge 
upon the American centre to capture its guns, at the beginning of the 
fight, and lost confidence by the repulse which attended the advance 
of Sumner. The bayonet charge of Williams and Campbell which 
followed, was efficient and determining. The conduct of Majoribanks 
was equally opportune, on the British right. The occupation of the 
brick house and garden, and the plunder of the British camp, taken 
together, saved Colonel Stewart's army. 

The American casualties are given by General Greene, as one 



582 BATTLE OF EUTAVV SPRINGS. [1781. 

lieutenant-colonel, six captains, five subalterns, four sergeants, and 
ninety-eight rank and file, killed ; two lieutenant-colonels, seven cap- 
tains, twenty lieutenants, twenty-four sergeants, and two hundred 
and nine rank and file wounded. Total casualties four hundred and 
eight. 

The British casualties are given by Colonel Stewart as three com- 
missioned officers, six sergeants, and seventy-six men, killed ; sixteen 
commissioned officers, twenty sergeants, and two hundred and thirty- 
two men missing. Total casualties, six hundred and ninety-three. 

On the night of the ninth. Colonel Stewart retired to Monk's 
Corner, having broken up and abandoned one thousand stand of arms 
which he threw into the river, and left seventy wounded men to the 
care of the Americans. 

Stedman says, " both armies had suffered so much that for some 
time afterwards neither of them was in a situation to undertake any- 
thing against the other," and adds, " Indeed this was the last action 
of any consequence that happened in South Carolina between the 
king's troops and the Americans. The former, from this time chiefly 
confined themselves to Charleston Neck and some posts in its neigh- 
borhood, the security of the town appearing to be their principal 
object ; and General Greene, either was not or did not think himself 
in sufficient force to attempt to reduce it." 

Tarleton says, " It is impossible to do justice to the spirit, patience 
and invincible fortitude displayed by the commanders, officers and 
soldiers during these dreadful campaigns in the two Carolinas. They 
had not only to contend with men, and these by no means deficient 
in bravery and enterprise, but they encountered and surmounted 
difficulties and fatigues from the climate and the country, which 
would appear insuperable in theory, and almost incredible in the 
relations." ..." During the greater part of the time they were 
totally destitute of bread, and the country afforded no vegetables for 
a substitute. Salt at length failed, and their only resources were 
water and the wild cattle which they found in the woods. In the last 
expedition fifty men perished through mere fatigue." . . " We 
must not, however, confine the praise entirely to the British troops ; 
as a detachment of Hessians which had been lent upon the occasion 
by General De Bose, deservedly came in for their proper share. The 
same justice requires that the Americans should not be deprived of 
their share of this fatal glory. They had the same difficulties to en- 
counter, joined to a fortune on the field generally adverse ; yet on 



1781.J BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS. 583 

the whole the campaign terminated in their favor, General Greene 
having recovered the far greater part of Georgia and the two 
Carolinas." 

On the twelfth, General Greene crossed the Santee at Nelson's 
Ferry, and on the fifteenth was at his old camp at the High Hills. 
Pickens, Marion and Hampton resumed their partisan operations, and 
Greene's army was soon reduced to less than a thousand effective 
men, with nearly six hundred wounded men from the two armies in 
his charge. 

One Hector O'Neal with a party of royalists captured Hillsborough, 
and made Governor Burke and the council prisoners, but was killed, 
during his retreat to Wilmington, by a party of militia. 

On the ninth of November, General Greene's camp was enlivened 
by official information of the surrender of Cornwallis. 

On the eighteenth the High Hills were again abandoned, and 
numerous minor operations concluded the Southern campaign of 1781. 

It was a constant struggle to secure troops, food, medicines and 
ammunition, while the garrison of Charleston had been increased to an 
effective force of nearly six thousand men ; but the armies did not 
again meet in the field. 



CHAPTER LXXII. 

LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. CONDITION OF THE TWO 

ARMIES. 

ON the twentieth of February, 1781, Congress resolved that a 
portion of the Pennsylvania line, then near Lancaster, and 
which had been engaged in the previous mutiny, should be ordered 
to the south, to constitute a part of the southern army. This was 
predicated upon the landing of a British force at Wilmington, on the 
Cape Fear River. That force, however, had been magnified beyond its 
real importance ; and the ultimate increase of the British army in Vir- 
ginia gradually modified the disposition of the detachment referred to. 
On the same day, General La Fayette was assigned to the com- 
mand of troops then assembled at Peekskill, having, as his specific 
objective of operations, a rapid march to Virginia, to capture Bene- 
dict Arnold. Owing to the temporary reduction of the British fleet 
at Newport, Rhode Island, by the storm of January twenty-second, 
before noticed, M. Destouches, then commanding, vice Admiral Ter- 
nay, deceased, agreed to send one ship of the line and two frigates to 
Chesapeake Bay, to prevent Arnold's escape. The letters of Count de 
Rochambeau show that he consented to send a detachment of French 
troops also ; but this he states, " was thought to be unnecessary and 
inexpedient as the movement was intended to be rapid ; — it being 
presumed that the continental troops and militia, in Virginia, were 
sufficient to operate against Arnold by land." This small naval 
detachment, commanded by M. De Tully, sailed from Newport on 
the ninth of February, and captured the British frigate Romulus, 
44, in Lynn Haven Bay, as well as two privateers, and eight other 
prizes ; but the L'Eveille, 64, drew too much water to ascend the 
Elizabeth River where Arnold had withdrawn his few light frigates: — 
the Surveillante grounded, and the vessels returned to Newport, on 
the twenty-fourth. It appears that the entire French fleet would 



I78i.] LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. 585 

have joined the movement, with a land force added, if Count de 
Rochambeau had received letters from General Washington in time ; 
but M. De Tully had sailed when the proposition reached the French 
headquarters. 

The division of La Fayette consisted of twelve hundred light 
infantry, made up of New England and New Jersey troops. He 
started immediately for his new command, reaching Pompton on the 
twenty-third of February, Philadelphia on the second, and Head of 
Elk on the third of March. The troops went to Annapolis by water. 
La Fayette first went in an open canoe to Elizabethtown, to accelerate 
preparations for the attack upon Arnold. During this preliminary 
examination he visited Baron Steuben, then at Yorktown, who enter- 
tained the idea that he would rally at least five thousand militia, and 
then visited General Muhlenberg, at Suffolk, and actually made a 
reconnoissance of Arnold's defenses at Portsmouth. The return of 
the French ships to Newport compelled him to return to Annapolis 
and await further instructions from Washington. 

The expedition was immediately reorganized. General Wash- 
ington visited Newport on the sixth, and held a conference with Count 
de Rochambeau, on the Admiral's ship. Pursuant to previous cor- 
respondence with Count de Rochambeau, he found that eleven hun- 
dred and forty men, under Baron de Viomenil, had already embarked, 
but a delay in the repair of one frigate had prevented earlier sailing. 
The squadron, consisting of eight ships of the line and four frigates, 
sailed on the eighth. On the tenth. Admiral Arbuthnot, then at 
Gardiner's Bay, on the north side and east end of Long Island, wrote 
to General Clinton to warn Arnold of the expedition, and at once 
sailed with an equal force, in pursuit of the French ships. On the 
sixteenth a short naval engagement occurred between the two fleets, 
off Chesapeake Bay, with well balanced results ; but the object of the 
expedition having been thwarted by the presence of the British 
squadron, M. Destouches returned to Newport on the twenty-sixth, 
after an absence of only eighteen days. 

A material modification of the plan of campaign was involved in 
these failures of the French fleet to control the Chesapeake. Under 
the original order, La Fayette was instructed " to return to the main 
army, in case Arnold quitted Virginia, or the French lost superiority 
of naval force." Washington wrote to La P'ayette on the fifth of 
April, as follows: " While we lament the miscarriage of an enterprise 
which bid so fair for success, we must console ourselves in the thought 



586 LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. [1781. 

of having done everything practicable to accomplish it. I am certain 
that the ChevaHer Destouches exerted himself to the utmost to gain 
the Chesapeake. The point upon which the whole turned, the action 
with Admiral Arbuthnot, reflects honor upon the chevalier and upon 
the marine of France. As matters have turned out, it is to be wished 
that you had not gone out of the Elk ; but I never judge of the pro- 
priety of measures by after events^ La Fayette was also instructed 
to return to Philadelphia. On the sixth, he was ordered to join Gen-, 
eral Greene ; but when Washington learned of the landing of General 
Phillips in Virginia, with reinforcements to the British army, he coun- 
termanded the order and assigned La Fayette to command in Vir- 
ginia under General Greene, to whom, as well as to Washington, he 
made his reports. General Greene thus expressed his views of this 
detail of General La Fayette, in a letter written "Ten miles from 
Guilford Court House, March eighteenth": " I am happy to hear the 
Marquis de La Fayette is coming to Virginia, though I am afraid from 
a hint in one of Baron Steuben's letters, that he will think himself in- 
jured in being superseded in the command. Could the Marquis join 
us at this moment, we should have a most glorious campaign. It 
would put Lord Cornwallis and his whole army into our hands." The 
Baron Steuben as usual, accepted Washington's orders as final; and 
by a different plan than anticipated by General Greene, the Virginia 
operations of La Fayette directly led to the final environmejit and 
capture of Lord Cornwallis. 

Many embarrassments attended the opening of this campaign. 
The troops themselves disliked their transfer to a warmer climate, 
especially when they were ordered to march to the extreme south; 
and some dissatisfaction was expressed at the assignment of Colonel 
Gimat and Major Galvan, both excellent officers, to commands in the 
corps. Desertions were frequent and the spirit of the army was almost 
mutinous. One deserter was hung, and then La Fayette changed his 
policy, and forgave and dismissed the second offender. An order was 
issued declaring that " he ivas setting out for a difficult and dangerous 
expedition ; but that lie hoped the soldiers would not abandon him ; 
but that whoever wisJied to go azvay might do so instajitly." " From 
that hour," he states in his memoirs, "all desertions ceased, and not 
one man would leave." It has already been seen that Washington 
could send no adequate reinforcements to General Greene, and it is 
well to notice the condition of the northern army from which La 
Fayette had withdrawn twelve hundred men. 



I78i.] LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. 587 

Condition of the American army. It will be remembered that the 
new army estabhshment was fixed at thirty-seven thousand men, and 
the purpose was to realize this force by the first of January, 1781. 
The requisitions had been delayed, Marshall says, " The regular force 
drawn from Pennsylvania to Georgia inclusive, at no time during this 
active and interesting campaign, amounted to three thousand effective 
men. (3f the northern troops, twelve hundred had been detached 
under the Marquis de La Fayette to the aid of Virginia. Including 
these in the estimate, the States from New Jersey to New Hampshire 
inclusive, so late as the ninth of April, had furnished only five thou- 
sand effectives. The cavalry and artillery at no time exceeded one 
thousand." " During May, the total force reached seven thousand 
men, of whom rather more than four thousand might have been 
relied on for action ; but even these had been brought into camp too 
late to acquire that discipline which is so essential to military service." 

Washington thus embodies the gloomy condition of affairs in his 
diary, commencing the first of May: " Instead of having magazines 
filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance scattered here and 
there in the different States. Instead of having our arsenals well 
supplied with military stores, they are poorly provided, and the work- 
men are leaving them. Instead of having the various articles of field 
equipage in readiness to deliver, the quartermaster-general is but even 
now applying to the States (as the dernier resort) to provide these 
things for their troops respectively. Instead of having a regular system 
of transportation upon credit, or funds in the quartermaster's hands 
to defray the contingent expenses, we have neither the one nor the 
other; and in all that business, or a great part of it, being done by 
military impressment, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, 
souring their tempers and alienating their affections. Instead of hav- 
ing the regiments completed under the new establishment, and which 
ought to have been so by the of agreeable to the requi- 
sitions of Congress, scarce any State in the service has at this time an 
eighth part of its quota in the field ; and there is little prospect that 
I can see of ever getting more than half. In a word, instead of having 
everything in readiness to take the field, we have nothing. And 
instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before 
us, we have a bewildered and gloomy prospect of a defensive one ; 
unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, land troops and 
money from our generous allies, and these at present are too contin- 
gent to build upon." "Chimney-corner patriots," abounded, and it 



588 LA Fayette's Virginia campaign. [1781. 

would be difficult to find a period of modern history where " venality,' 
"corruption," "prostitution of office for selfish ends," "abuse of 
trust," " perversion of funds from a national to a personal use," and 
" speculations upon the necessities of the times," had been more wide- 
spread and offensive than as described in unequivocal terms by Wash- 
ington during the war under notice. Every battle and every cam- 
paign was affected by such elements, and the diffusion of political 
responsibility still made the United States only a loose partnership of 
scattered and differently related partners. 

On the twentieth of February, when the Virginia campaign was 
initiated. General Washington urged General Schuyler to accept the 
head of the War Department, using these words, " Our affairs are 
brought to an awful crisis. Nothing will recover them but the vigor- 
ous exertion of men of abilities who know our wants, and the best 
means of supplying them. These qualifications, sir, without a com- 
pliment, I think you possess. Why then, the department being 
necessary, should you shrink from the duties of it ? The greater the 
chaos, the greater will be your merit in bringing forth order." Gen- 
eral Schuyler replied on the twenty-fifth of February, and declared 
his intention never to hold any office under Congress unless accom- 
panied with a restoration of military rank, and that " such inconveni- 
ences would result to themselves (Congress) from such a restoration, as 
would necessarily give umbrage to many officers." 

Generals Greene, Gates and Sullivan were considered candidates, 
but the matter was dropped, until General Lincoln received the 
appointment, October twenty-fifth, 1781. Robert Morris, whose 
wealth and energies during the entire war were devoted to the cause, 
so that he commanded credit when Congress had none, took charge 
of the Financial Bureau, and General McDougall was elected Secre- 
tary of Marine. 

The foregoing considerations have value in the present connec- 
tion ; and further reference to the condition of the American north- 
ern army will be deferred to its association with operations against 
Yorktown and New York, after General Washington assumed per- 
sonal command of all the armies in the field. 

Situation of the British army. On the fifth of April, after La 
Fayette had reached Head of Elk, General Clinton thus wrote to 
Lord Germaine : " I am preparing for every exertion within the com- 
pass of my very reduced force, which after the several large detach- 
ments sent to the southward, amounts to no more than 6275 auxiliary 



lySi.] LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. 589 

troops, 4527 British and 906 Provincials ready for the field." (Refer- 
ence is made to note at end of chapter.) A letter of General Corn- 
wallis to General Clinton dated April tenth, was noticed in chapter 
LXX. On the eleventh of April, General Clinton wrote to General 
Phillips : " The security of the Carolinas is of the greatest moment ; 
but the best consequences maybe expected from an operation up the 
Chesapeake. Let the same experiment be tried there which has 
been so unsuccessful in the south." (Italics not in the original, but 
suggestive of General Clinton's anxiety, and doubt as to the general 
campaign.) He continues, — "Virginia has been looked upon as uni- 
versally hostile, Maryland less so, but has not been tried ; but in 
Pennsylvania, on both sides of the Susquehanna, and between the 
Chesapeake and Delaware, the friends of the king's interests are said 
to be numerous. Support should be rendered to them, and means 
of proving their fidelity put into their hands. If Lord Cornwallis 
can spare such part of his forces as to effect this movement, it is 
greatly to be desired." It will be seen that the war was taking the 
direction which General Charles Lee had recommended to the Brit- 
ish commissioners at an early period, and that the views of Lord 
Cornwallis, based upon the inadequacy of the army to the conquest 
of the South, so long as Virginia was unsubdued, were beginning to 
affect General Clinton himself. 

The official report of British troops for duty, in Virginia, made up 
on the first of May, 1787 gives: under Arnold, fifteen hundred and 
fifty-three men, and under Phillips, two thousand one hundred and 
sixteen men. The army of Lord Cornwallis increased this force to a 
little over five thousand men, on the twentieth of May. Colonel 
Tarleton had received some recruits and mounted the legion upon 
blooded horses, which were quite uniformly kept by gentlemen in that 
part of Virginia. Colonel Hamilton's North Carolina Royalists also 
joined the command. In the meantime General Phillips had com- 
pleted the fortifications which Arnold began at Portsmouth ; and on 
the eighteenth of April he embarked his troops, sailed up the James 
River as far as Burwell's Ferry, and marched to Williamsburg. The 
militia fled. Colonel Simcoe pursued, and it was proposed to occupy 
Yorktown ; but the plan was abandoned for want of the necessary 
force, both to hold the post and to meet La Fayette, who was advanc- 
ing toward Richmond. " A small party passed up the Chickahominy 
in boats, and destroyed," according to Arnold's official report, " sev- 
eral armed ships, the State ship-yards, warehouses, etc., etc. " " On 



590 LA FAYETTE S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. [17S1. 

the twenty-fourth, the army sailed to City Point, and on the twenty- 
fifth marched for Petersburg, at ten o'clock in the morning." See 
map "Arnold at Petersburg." Generals Steuben and Muhlenberg 
were then at that post with about one thousand militia. A strong 
position was taken up on a hill east of Brandon, on the Appomatox 
River, which compelled the British army to make a long detour, with 
view of intercepting the American retreat. Baron Steuben promptly 
foiled this intention by falling back to Brandon, and finally re-crossed 
the river with a loss of but twenty in killed and wounded. A judi- 
cious disposition of his artillery on Baker's Hill covered his retreat. 
Arnold says, "the enemy were soon obliged to retire on the bridge, 
with the loss of one hundred men killed and wounded as we have 
since been informed ; our loss was only one killed, and ten wounded. 
The enemy took up the bridge, which prevented our pursuing them." 
He says, " four thousand hogsheads of tobacco, one ship, and a num- 
ber of small vessels on the stocks and in the river were destroyed." 

On the twenty-seventh, " General Phillips marched to Chesterfield 
Court House, burned barracks for two thousand men, three hundred 
barrels of flour, etc." On the same day Arnold marched to Osborne's, 
thirteen miles from Richmond, and " destroyed," says La Fayette in his 
report to General Greene, " some vessels that had been collected there." 
These vessels had been prepared for an expedition against Portsmouth. 
General La Fayette was then at Hanover Court House. Arnold's 
report states that " two ships, five brigantines, five sloops and one 
schooner, loaded with tobacco, cordage, fljur, etc., fell into our hands; 
four ships, five brigantines, and a number of small vessels were sunk 
and burnt. On board of the whole fleet (none of which escaped) 
were taken and destroyed about two thousand hogsheads of tobacco,'' 
" want of boats and the wind blowing hard prevented our capturing 
many of the seamen, who took to their boats and escaped to shore. 
.On the thirtieth the British army marched to Manchester and 
destroyed twelve hundred hogsheads of tobacco. The Marquis de 
La Fayette having arrived with his army at Richmond, opposite to 
Manchester, the day before, and being joined by the militia drove 
from Petersburg and Williamsburg; they were spectators of the confla- 
gration, without attempting to molest us." General La Fayette says, 
" Our regular force consisted of nine hundred men, rank and file ; 
that of the enemy of twenty-three hundred at the lowest estimate. 
The command of the water, and such a superiority of regular troops 
gave them possession of our shore. There was no crossing for us but 



I78i.] LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. 59I 

under a circuit of fifteen miles, and from the number and size of their 
boats, their passage over the river was six times quicker than ours. 
Richmond being their main object, I determined to defend this capi- 
tal, where a quantity of public stores and tobacco was contained." 
(At this time Generals Steuben and Muhlenberg were further up the 
river, not having effected a crossing.) " Six hundred men ventured 
on this side, but were timely recalled, and being charged by a few 
dragoons of Major Nelson, flew into the boats with precipitation. 
The enemy have lost some men, killed, prisoners, and deserters. 
Since the British army landed at City Point (some flour excepted at 
the Court House) no public property has been destroyed." The 
foregoing is from a letter addressed to General Greene, dated, " camp 
on Pamunky River, May 3d, 1781." 

On the first of May the British troops marched to Osborne's, em- 
barked on the second, reached Westover on the third, and on the 
seventh, when near Hog Island, received instructions from Lord 
Cornwallis to meet him at Petersburg, and reached that place on the 
ninth. Several American officers were captured by their sudden 
return. 

Movements of La Fayette. It has been seen that he reached 
Head of Elk on the third of March. " The shortest calculation was 
for the sixth." No operation of the war more clearly demonstrates 
the value of good logistics, and the facts demand notice in connection 
with this Virginia campaign. Messengers were sent in advance to 
arouse the people, and the citizens of New Jersey cheerfully aided the 
progress of his army. 

" Notwithstanding the depth of the mud and the extreme bad- 
ness of the roads, this march," says La Fayette, writing to Wash- 
ington, March 2d, 1781, " which I call rapid, (as for example they 
came in two days from Morristown to Princeton) has been performed 
with such ardor and alacrity, that agreeably to the report, only two 
men have been left behind ; and yet these two men have embarked 
at Trenton with some remains of baggage. At every place where 
the detachment have halted, they have found covering and wood 
ready for them, and there has not been the least complaint made to 
me by the inhabitants. Every third day they have drawn their pro- 
visions; the clothing has also been distributed, and having embarked 
yesterday at Trenton, they passed this city (Philadelphia) about two 
o'clock with a wind which was extremely favorable. The artillery 
consisted of one 24, six i8s, two brass 12s, one eight-inch how- 



592 LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. [1781. 

itzer, two eight-inch mortars, in all, twelve heavy pieces ; four six- 
pounders, and two small howitzers, with a sufficient quantity of am- 
munition will be at the head of the Elk this day and to-morrow, so 
that by the 4th I hope we shall be ready to sail. A quantity of 
medicines and instruments, and fifteen hundred pairs of shoes will be 
at the head of Elk before we embark." " I am also assured that we 
will have a sufficient quantity of boats to land the detachment, and 
two heavy ones will be added for the artillery, and some of the 
private armed vessels in the bay have been ordered to the head of the 
Elk. Two dispatch boats are there, and four more have been asked 
for. As a further security to our subsistence, I have got the Minis- 
ter's permission to dispose of the French flour and salt meat along 
the bay in case of necessity." The troops were promptly forwarded 
to Annapolis ; and at Baltimore, besides an advance by the merchants 
of two thousand guineas, the ladies undertook the work of furnishing 
his command with suitable clothing for summer wear. The disap- 
pointments incident to the failure of the French naval forces to con- 
voy and cover his division compelled his return to the Elk, and by 
the time the order came to move to the extreme south, the dissatis- 
faction of his troops already adverted to had taken place, and had 
been substantially settled. He had also armed several vessels, and 
proposed to make a miniature fleet for his own convoy, but " some 
vessels were run off to avoid him," and the adventure against Ports- 
mouth to capture Arnold came to an end. He " visited the Hermi- 
one frigate, however, and obtained a pledge from M, Delatouch, that 
on his return to Newport, M. Destouches would make an ofler of the 
ship L Eveille and the four frigates, to convoy twelve hundred men 
to any part of the continent which Washington might think proper." 
In this connection he adds, " These ships are too strong to be afraid 
of frigates, and too fast to be in the least concerned by the fear of a 
squadron." 

The plan of La Fayette after the failure of the design upon Ports- 
mouth was, " to take these fast vessels and go by sea to Wilmington 
or Georgetown, and take Cornwallis in his rear, or in the neighborhood 
of General Greene." The plan was eminently practicable and wise. 
La Fayette also confidentially advised General Washington that "two 
millions and a half had been given to Franklin," adding, " Marquis de 
Castries and Count de Vergennes are trying to obtain a sum more 
adequate to our wants ; this, however, the minister of finance has 
requested me not to mention, as it was as yet an uncertainty, and 



lysi.] LA Fayette's Virginia campaign. 593 

would perhaps give ill-grounded hopes' destructive of the internal 
efforts we ought to make." On the thirteenth of April, having re- 
ceived notice from General Greene that " he expected that Cornwallis 
would fall back to Wilmington, and that his own project was to carry 
the war into South Carolina," La Fayette renewed the suggestion 
that a corps of light infantry be embarked at Philadelphia, on board 
of a light squadron, which might have been upon the seat of war in a 
very short passage." On the twenty-eighth of April, he wrote from 
Hanover Court House to General Greene : " Having received intel- 
ligence that General Phillips' army were preparing for offensive opera- 
tions, I left at Baltimore everything that would impede our march — 
to follow us under a proper escort, and with about a thousand men, 
officers included, hastened toward Richmond, two hundred miles, 
which I apprehended would be a principal object with the enemy." 
This outline brings La Fayette up to the date when he reported his 
arrival near Richmond and the retreat of Generals Phillips and 
Arnold the day following. 

La Fayette had marched with great celerity, leaving his artillery 
behind, which he said " might appear a strange whim ; but it saved 
Richmond," and adds, " General Phillips had given the signal for 
attack when he learned of his (La Fayette's) unexpected arrival." 
A chain of expresses was at once established to Point Comfort. A 
detachment was sent to Williamsburg to annoy the enemy, and if 
possible prevent their establishing a permanent post. On the eighth 
of May he writes: " There is no fighting here unless you have a naval 
superiority, or an army mounted on race horses. Phillips' plan against 
Richmond has been defeated. He was going toward Portsmouth ; 
nozv it appears I have business to transact with two armies, and this 
is rather too much." La Fayette had just learned of the march of 
Lord Cornwallis northward, and was making an effort to reach Hali- 
fax and cut him off from union with Phillips. The sudden return of 
General Phillips to Brandon on the eighth, defeated that enterprise ; 
but did not divert him from his recognition of the claims of General 
Greene to be supported. He says, " Each of these armies is more 
than double the superior of me. We have no boats, few militia, and 
less arms. I will try to do for the best. Nothing can attract my 
sight from the supplies and reinforcements destined to General 
Greene's army. While I am going (marching) to get beaten by 
both armies (Phillips' and Cornwallis') or each of them separately, 
the Baron remains at Richmond, where he hurries the collection 
38 



594 LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. [^781. 

of recruits and every other requisite. I have forbidden every depart- 
ment to give me anything that may be thought useful to General 
Greene, and should a battle be expected (an event which I will try 
to keep off,) no consideration will prevent our sending to Carolina 
eight hundred recruits, who I hope may be equipped in a fortnight. 
When General Greene becomes equal to offensive operations, this 
quarter will be relieved. I have written to Wayne to hasten his 
march ; but unless I am very hard pushed, shall request him to pro- 
ceed to the southward. General Greene was on the twenty-sixth 
before Camden, but did not think himself equal to the storming the 
works." General Washington thus replied: "Your determination to 
avoid an engagement with your present force, is certainly judicious. I 
hope the Pennsylvanians have begun their march before this . . . 
General Wayne has been pressed both by Congress and the Board of 
War to make as much expedition as possible, and extraordinary 
powers are given him to enable him to procure provisions." 

On the eighteenth of May orders were received from General 
Greene, directing General La Fayette to take command in Virginia 
and to send all reports to the Commander-in-chief. It is worthy of 
record, that while General Greene was almost the only one of the 
general officers of 1776, who served actively through the war, under 
the direct orders of the Commander-in-chief, both of them, alike, and 
without disappointment reposed entire confidence in General La Fay- 
ette. The foregoing extracts from his papers, indicate the occasion 
for that confidence.' 

When La Fayette assumed command. May eighteenth, he " took 
a position, between the Pamunky and Chickahominy Rivers, which 
equally covered Richmond and other interesting points of the State, 
and sent General Nelson with militia toward Williamsburg." 

Upon the return of General Phillips to Petersburg, May ninth, he 
took position at Wilton, ten miles below Richmond. Upon applica- 
tion from North Carolina for ammunition. General Muhlenberg was 
sent with five hundred men, to escort twenty thousand cartridges over 
the Appomatox ; and to divert the enemy's attention. Colonel Gimat, 
with his battalion and four pieces of artillery, assumed their position 
so that the absence of the troops was not discovered. To Colonel 
Hamilton he wrote, on the twenty-third, thus laconically: "Both 
armies have formed their junction. Their infantry is near five to one, 
their cavalry ten to one. We have no continentals. Is it not strange 
that General Wayne's detachment " (the seven hundred Pennsyl- 



I78i.] LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. 595 

vanians) ''can not be heard of ? They are to go to Carolina; but 
should I have them for a few days, I am at liberty to keep them. 
This permission I will improve, so far as to receive one blow ; that 
being beat, I may be beat with some decency. The command of the 
waters, the superiority in cavalry and the great disproportion of our 
force gave the enemy such advantages that I durst not venture out 
and listen to my fondness for enterprise ; to speak truth, I was afraid 
of myself, as much as of the enemy. Independence has rendered me 
the more cautious, as I know my own warmth ; but if the Pennsyl- 
vanians come, Lord Cornwallis shall pay something for his victory." 

From this time, forward, the operations of the two armies were 
characterized by constant activity, each officer sustaining his repu- 
tation ; and the wearisome marchings and counter-marchings ended 
as unfortunately for Lord Cornwallis, as did his pursuit of General 
Greene, without detracting from his skill as a soldier. 

On the twenty-sixth of May Lord Cornwallis acknowledged the 
arrival of reinforcements under General Leslie, this force being carried 
into official returns, as two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight 
men, and informed General Clinton, that he "should proceed to dis- 
lodge La Fayette from Richmond." On the same day he wrote a 
second letter, as follows, " I have consented to the request of Briga- 
dier-general Arnold, to go to New York; he conceives that your 
excellency wishes him to attend you, and his present indisposition 
renders him unequal to the fatigue of service. He will represent the 
horrid enormities which are committed by our privateers in Chesa- 
peake Bay ; and I must join my earnest wish that some remedy may 
be applied to an evil which is so very prejudicial to his Majesty's 
service." 

It will be noticed that the operations of Arnold while in Virginia, 
as elsewhere, consisted of raids upon property, and involved no 
collision with Americans in force. It was known to General Clin- 
ton and publicly, that Washington's instructions to La Fayette 
expressly forbade any terms with Arnold which should exempt him 
from punishment for desertion and treason. Anxiety for the safety 
of Arnold is referred to by General Clinton in several dispatches, but 
on April nth he apologetically explained that the words used during 
the pendency of the French attack, meant " the security of him, 
(Arnold) the troops under his orders and the posts on the Elizabeth 
river, as the principal objects of your (Phillips') expedition, and no 
more than relieving them of their supposed danger." This dispatch 



596 LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. [1781. 

was opened by Lord Cornwallis after the death of General Phillips. 
A letter of March twenty-fourth closed thus : " P. S. Pray send 
Brigadier-general Arnold here by the first opportunity, if you should 
not have particular occasion for his services." This was received by 
Lord Cornwallis May twentieth. The position of Generals Phillips 
and Arnold, in view of the relations of the two officers during the 
Saratoga campaign, had been such as ioxhdide: friendship ; but the 
obligation of General Clinton to protect Arnold was peremptory. 

Upon the death of Phillips, Arnold wrote to General La Fayette, 
who declined personal correspondence with him. Arnold threatened 
to send his prisoners of war to the West Indies, but as already indi- 
cated, his retirement to New York followed the arrival of General 
Cornwallis. 

On the thirty-first of May, General Washington wrote to La 
Fayette, "Your conduct upon every occasion meets my approbation, 
but in none more than in your refusing to hold a correspondence with 
Arnold." 

It appears that an attempt had been made at first to conceal from 
La Fayette the fact of General Phillips' decease; and some direct cor- 
respondence of Arnold with London officials had disturbed General 
Clinton. When General Cornwallis reached Petersburg, he found 
that General Clinton had conceived plans for a broader range of 
operations than the mere conquest of Virginia, and thus wrote : " In 
regard to taking possession of Philadelphia, (proposed by General 
Clinton) by an incursion (even if practicable) without an intention of 
keeping or burning it, (neither of which appear to be practicable) I 
should apprehend it would do more harm than good to the cause of 
Britain. If offensive war is intended, Virginia appears to me to be 
the only province in which there is a stake. But to reduce this pro- 
vince and keep possession of the country, a considerable army would 
be necessary, for with a small force, the business would probably ter- 
minate unfavorably, though the beginning might be successful. In 
case it is tliougJit expedient and a proper army for the attempt can 
be found, I hope your Excellency will do me the justice to believe 
that I jieitJier luish nor expect to have the command of it, leaving you 
at Nezv York on the defensive. Such sentiments are so far from my 
heart that I can with great truth assure you that feiv things could 
give me greater pleasure than being relieved by your presence from a 
situation of so mucJi anxiety and responsibility ^ 

(Italics not in original manuscript, but so placed in justice to Lord 




596* 



I78i.] LA FAYETTE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. 597 

CornwalHs, as indicating an error on the part of General Clinton, who 
afterwards declared that " Lord CornwalHs tried to dupe him into a 
resignation of the general command.") 

Upon the departure of Arnold the Virginia campaign became the 
theatre of more active operations between the Marquis de La Fayette 
and Earl CornwalHs. 



CHAPTER LXXIII. 

LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 

EARL CORNWALLIS, still further reinforced from New York, 
commanded seven thousand efficient British troops, and began 
his campaign in Virginia with hope and vigor. He controlled the 
water-courses and inlets which exposed Virginia to naval attack, and 
his adversary lay within a day's march, with an army of less than 
twenty-eight hundred infantry, including militia, and with less than 
one hundred disciplined cavalry. The topographical features of the 
country peculiarly embarrassed the operations of the American troops 
as well as hindered the concentration of State militia. Many navi- 
gable rivers ran so nearly parallel that a small naval force could quickly 
shift an assailing army from section to section, and the local militia 
wherever concentrated, could not be transferred with equal celerity 
to resist incursions or meet organized troops. 

General Cornwallis appreciated his position, and endeavored to so 
avail himself of his superior force, as to strike other organized forces 
at advantage, and at the same time annihilate depots and prevent 
the accumulation of supplies, which were vital to General Greene's 
army at the south, as well as to successful operations against the 
British army in Virginia itself. The State authorities were not want- 
ing in vigor, but the pressure was as universal as the exposure. 

The time was at hand when the war determined toward one field 
of operations, and that was occupied by La Fayette and Cornwallis. 
A British ascendency there would make the severance of the south 
from the north complete ; and would leave to General Greene a barren 
triumph in the Carolinas. The time was at hand when one exhaustive 
effort was called for on the part of the American Congress and the 
Commander-in-chief of its armies. The statesmen of Virginia realized 
the emergency, and all alike looked to Washington for relief; but 
while Richard Henry Lee and other earnest men urged that dicta- 



lySi.J LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 599 

torial powers should be granted to the Commander-in-chief, as after 
the battle of Trenton, Governor Jefferson and another class, equally 
earnest, deprecated any concentration of authority which would as- 
similate the ruling element to the royal prerogative of European 
princes. All classes urged Washington to animate the struggle by 
his personal presence. Congress was destitute of authority and 
resources equal to the issue ; but when that issue finally ripened, 
Washington seized the opportunity and achieved its mastery. 

General history is full of the civil measures, so feeble and uncer- 
tain, which wrought in vain for an adequate increase of the army; 
and the long war was hastening to its end, through the earnest alliance 
of France and the wise military conduct of Washington on the one 
hand, and a marvellous want of concentrated effort on the part of 
Great Britain. 

Washington knew how and when to disregard all exposed locali- 
ties and seize determining opportunity in view of the whole theatre 
of war. Clinton failed on the other hand, in strategy, while self- 
possessed and brave in battle, and was confused by the extent of 
operations requiring attention. The British Cabinet did not appre- 
ciate the real danger which threatened the royal cause in America ; 
and the protection of their numerous colonies as well as the vindica- 
tion of their honor at sea, had become matters of superior moment. 

La Fayette and Cornwallis realized the magnitude of the campaign 
which they had undertaken ; and its details redound to their honor. 
Finding that he could not hold Richmond, General La Fayette re- 
moved the most valuable stores, and marched northward toward the 
Rappahannock to secure the speediest union with the Pennsylvania 
line under General Wayne, and then sought by all possible means to 
avoid a general engagement, while daily harassing the right flank and 
the rear of the British forces. The assembly of Virginia, quickened 
to fresh activity by the urgency of the peril, retired to Charlottesville, 
May twenty-fourth, and put forth all the proper energy within its 
power. 

Fifteen millions of Bills of Credit, realizing a nominal value of one 
dollar to forty, the declaration of martial law within twenty miles of 
an army headquarters, and appeals to the militia, were resorted to as 
extraordinary measures ; but this interposition of paper appeals and 
resolutions could not stop Cornwallis. Charlottesville had been the 
depot for the prisoners captured at Saratoga, and their rescue had 
been one of the objectives of the occupation of the upper Dan by 



600 LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA [1781. 

that officer in the previous year ; thwarted indeed by General Greene's 
well-considered movement down the Roanoke or lower Dan. These 
prisoners were now passed over the mountains to Winchester. 

Meanwhile, and by the twenty-fifth of May, General Cornwallis 
was on the march. The James River was crossed at Westover and 
his headquarters were established at Bird's plantation. By the use 
of boats, previously constructed by Arnold, and by " swimming all 
the horses but the best, the entire army, infantry, cavalry and artil- 
lery, completed the passage," as Tarleton states, " in less than three 
days." 

On the twenty-seventh the army encamped near White Oak 
Swamp. At this point information was obtained that General La 
Fayette had abandoned Richmond and crossed the Chickahominy. 
The army moved toward Bottom Bridge on that river, and the Ameri- 
cans crossed the Pamunky River. " A few days afterwards," says 
Tarleton, " an American patrol was captured and among other papers 
from the Marquis de La Fayette, to General Greene, Steuben, etc., 
one letter, addressed to Mr. Jefferson, the Governor of Virginia, was 
particularly striking. After exhorting that gentleman to turn out 
the militia, he prophetically declared that the British success in Vir- 
ginia resembled the French invasion and possession of Hanover in the 
preceding war, and was likely to have similar consequences, if the 
government and the country would exert themselves at the present 
juncture." Tarleton himself was never more thoroughly in his favor- 
ite element. His legion was splendidly mounted with the best stock 
of the country ; at the simple cost of bridles and saddles, when others 
were not found in gentlemen's stables. With two hundred and fifty 
men, all but seventy his own dragoons, he was dispatched in the be- 
ginning of June toward Charlottesville. Governor Jefferson and the 
Virginia Assembly were the objectives of pursuit. Lieutenant-colo- 
nel Simcoe, with the Yagers, and the infantry and hussars of the 
Rangers, was at the same time sent to Point of Fork, where Baron 
Steuben was then stationed in charge of the arsenal and laboratory 
previously established at that place. See map, " La Fayette in Vir- 
ginia." 

Tarleton marched between the South Anna and North Anna 
rivers at high speed, notwithstanding the summer heat, " halted at 
noon," on the third, "just long enough to refresh men and horses, 
pressed forward again in the afternoon, halted at eleven, near Louisa 
Court House, and remained on a plentiful plantation till two o'clock 



i78i.] LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 6oi 

in the tnorning, at which time he again resumed his march." " Before 
dawn, he fell in with twelve wagons that were on their journey, under 
a small guard, from the upper parts of Virginia and Maryland, with 
arms and clothing for the continental troops in South Carolina." 
These were burned, " to save time and avoid a detail for their escort." 
Several captures were made at private mansions, including Colonel 
John Simms, (a member of the Assembly) and two brothers of Gen- 
eral Nelson, and after a short halt near the residence of Dr. Walker, 
the march was resumed. Tarleton says he " imagined that a march 
of seventy miles in twenty-four hours, with the caution he had used, 
might perhaps give him the advantage of a surprise. He therefore 
approached the Rivianna, which river lies at the foot of the hill on 
which the town is situated, with all possible expedition. The cavalry 
charged through the water with very little loss and routed the detach- 
ment posted at that place." Seven members of the Legislature 
were secured. Brigadier-general Scott and a few other officers were 
captured. The casualties were trifling. "One thousand arms were 
broken up, four hundred barrels of powder and several hogsheads of 
tobacco were destroyed." 

A detachment of dragoons under Captain McLeod visited Monti- 
cello, the country seat of Jefferson, three miles from Charlottesville, 
but their approach was discovered and the Governor escaped. The 
speaker of the Assembly also escaped and that body at once assem- 
bled at Staunton, beyond the mountains. The books, papers and 
furniture of Governor Jefferson were not disturbed ; but his wines 
were freely used, or wasted, without the authority of the command- 
ing officer. 

On the twelfth of June, General Nelson was elected Governor, 
vice Mr. Jefferson, who had declined re-election in order that the 
executive office should be held by a man of military knowledge and 
experience. 

On the day of his arrival, toward evening, Tarleton started down 
the Rivianna toward Point of Fork, to cooperate with Simcoe's expe- 
dition. This expedition was quite differently conducted from that of 
Tarleton. Colonel Simcoe is often underrated, because of frequent 
ferocity in shortening fights. He killed an enemy as fast as he could, 
up to the last point of resistance ; but he was shrewd and cool, and 
managed his operations with much deliberation, even when heated by 
the ardor of battle. He approached the Baron Steuben's position so 
as to make the most plausible display of his forces, and made the 



602 LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. [1781. 

impression, as Cornwallis designed, that the main arm.y was near. 
General Steuben, having advices of his approach, removed a portion 
of the pubUc stores, although, as the river was deep, he might have 
held the defensive with success if he had known the strength 
opposed. He retired from his position, however, and all public prop- 
erty that remained at the depot was destroyed or disposed of. The 
small arms were old and undergoing repair ; but some valuable stores 
besides cannon and mortars were among the spoils. 

The position of the armies, thus early in June, 1781, is a material 
fact in the consideration of the future operations of the war. 

So far as related to the British army in Virginia, Cornwallis was 
equal to the position. He had the support of his government and an 
adequate force in hand. He shaped his plans upon the presumption 
that army headquarters at New York would hold its own, and would 
occupy the attention of the army of Washington and Rochambeau, 
which, combined as it was, did not equal the troops at General Clin- 
ton's disposal. 

It is not out of place to again refer to the military principles 
already defined, which compel wise commanders to regard the destruc- 
tion of opposing armies as more important than any ordinary guard 
duty over towns and cities. 

Cornwallis based his movements, therefore, upon the assurance 
that his army was at his own disposal for the conquest of Virginia. 
There can be no doubt of this. He followed Tarleton and Simcoe 
to Elk Hill, a plantation of Jefferson, near Byrd Creek, in the heart 
of Virginia, and thus re-united his forces. 

His march had not been made regardless of the operations of La 
Fayette, but a detachment had been sent toward Raccoon Ford as if 
his own purpose was to follow in force. It was still his plan to em- 
ploy cavalry to break up depots of supplies, by rapid movements, and 
to march with the main army against organized troops. As an indi- 
cation of his discreet military policy, an order issued to Colonel Tarle- 
ton on the ninth of June, dated " camp at Jefferson's," is quoted — 
" destroy all the enemy's stores and tobacco, between James River 
and the Dan ; and if there should be a quantity of provisions or corn 
collected at a private house, I would have you destroy it, even 
although there should be no proof of its being intended for the 
public service, leaving enough for the support of the family ; as there 
is the greatest reason to appreJiend that such provisions tvill be tilti- 
mately appropriated by the e)ieiny to the use of General Greene's army, 



I78i.] LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 603 

zvJiicJi from the present state of the Carolinas, must depend on this 
province for supplies^ (Italics not in original order, but so indicated 
as to place these instructions in association with those of Washing- 
ton to General Greene, fully as stern, on page 243.) 

Before further notice of this campaign, it should be borne in mnid 
that far away at Wethersfield, Connecticut, on the twenty-first of 
May, the day after the arrival of Cornwallis at Petersburg, Washing- 
ton and Rochambeau were in conference ; and that they deliberately 
discussed the propriety of an attack upon New York. This fact must 
be kept in mind, in order to appreciate the resulting embarrassments 
which followed the operations of Lord Cornwallis, under the demands 
of Clinton for help at headquarters. 

During the march of Lord Cornwallis to Byrd Creek, La Fayette 
effected a junction with General Wayne, near Raccoon Ford on the 
Rapidan. This was on the seventh. By reference to the map it 
will be seen that La Fayette was nearly north from the camp of 
Cornwallis, By a prompt march to Charlottesville he could effect a 
union with Baron Steuben, who was not far distant southward, and 
then move eastward toward the British army, reserving to himself a 
retreat at will, while still threatening their rear. Tarleton thus states 
the movement : " The Marquis de La Fayette, who had previously 
practiced defensive manoeuvers with skill and security, being now 
reinforced by General Wayne and about eight hundred continentals, 
and some detachments of militia, followed the British as they pro- 
ceeded down James River. This design being judiciously arranged 
and executed with extreme caution, allowed opportunity for the junc- 
tion of Baron Steuben, confined the small detachments of the king's 
troops, and both saved the property and animated the drooping 
spirits of the Virginians." 

On the thirteenth, Tarleton reported to Cornwallis his own move- 
ments. This letter was intercepted by La Fayette's scouts, and as 
promptly published for warning to the people. On the fourteenth, 
Cornwallis notified Tarleton that he proposed to move the next day 
to Westham, near Richmond. Tarleton says: "While the royal 
army marched, the rear and left flank were covered by the British 
Legion and the Seventy-sixth regiment on horseback ; and on its 
arrival at Richmond, Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe with his corps was 
posted at Westham, and his own (Tarleton's) corps at Meadow 
Bridge. During these operations the Marquis de La Fayette con- 
tinued to advance his light troops to harass the patrols. On the 



604 LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. [1781. 

eighteenth, he (Tarleton) made a forced march to intercept General 
Muhlenberg's detachment, who evaded the blow by an early retreat, 
and the British Legion returned to the royal army." 

La Fayette thus reports this occurrence to General Greene, from 
" Mr. Tyre's plantation, twenty miles from Williamsburg, June twenty- 
seventh, 1781 : " " On the eighteenth, the British army moved toward 
us with a design, as I apprehend, to strike at a detached corps com- 
manded by General Muhlenberg. Upon this, the light infantry and 
Pennsylvanians marched, under General Wayne, when the enemy 
returned into town. The day following I was joined by General 
Steuben's corps, and on the night of the twentieth, Richmond was 
evacuated." Cornwallis thus left Richmond on the twentieth, and 
directed his course by Bottom Bridge and New Kent Court House 
for Williamsburg. " At the time the royal army quitted New Kent, 
the main body of the Americans approached within twelve miles of 
that place," says Tarleton, " which circumstance nearly occasioned 
Earl Cornwallis to countermarch ; but upon reflection, he pursued 
his design of moving to Williamsburg, where he arrived on the 
fifteenth of June." 

Within six miles of Williamsburg the next morning, a sharp skir- 
mish ensued. The Queen's Rangers (Simcoe) had marched down the 
Chickahominy, guarding the British rear and right flank. They were 
closely pressed by the American advance guard under Colonel Butler, 
supported by Wayne. La Fayette says, " the whole British army 
came out to save Simcoe." Tarleton had marched to Burwell's 
Ferry on the James River, and says, " Before the horses were un- 
bridled, the sound of musketry and cannon announced the commence- 
ment of an action at the outpost, and Lord Chewton soon afterwards 
delivered Earl Cornwallis' orders for the cavalry and mounted infantry 
to repair with expedition to the army, who were already moving to 
the relief of Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe. The loss in this affair was 
nearly equal, upwards of thirty being killed and wounded on each 
side. The Americans retreated to their army at Tyre's plantation, 
and the king's troops returned in the evening to Williamsburg, where 
they found some recruits for the guards who had arrived during their 
absence." I'his last paragraph shows that La Fayette correctly sup- 
posed that the main army turned to meet his attack, and he thus 
closes his report : " The post they now occupy is strong, under the 
protection of their shipping, <5/// upwards of one Jiundred miles froui 
the Point of York:' Under date of June 30th, Lord Cornwallis re- 



X7Si.] LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 605 

ports his loss at three officers and thirty privates killed and wounded, 
and that " three American officers and twenty-eight privates were 
taken prisoners." But a new element had entered into the campaign. 
On the twenty-sixth, Ensign Amiel placed in his hands dispatches 
from General Clinton, the first dated June nth, already fifteen days 
old. Besides an estimate that " the continentals under La Fayette 
could not exceed one thousand, and that the Pennsylvania line under 
Wayne were so disconcerted that their officers were afraid to trust 
them with ammunition," (this however may have since altered), he 
says, " The detachments I have made from this army into the Chesa- 
peake, since General Leslie's expedition in October last, inclusive, have 
amounted to seven thousand seven hundred and seventy-four effect- 
ives ; and at the time your lordship made the junction with the corps 
there were under Major-general Phillips' orders five thousand three 
hundred and four; a force I should have hoped would be sufficient of 
itself to have carried on operations in any of the southern provinces 
of America ; where, as appears from intercepted letters of Washington 
and La Fayette, they are in no situation to stand even against a 
division of that army. ... By the intercepted letters enclosed to 
your lordship, you will observe that I am threatened with a siege of 
this post. My present effective force is only ten thousand nine hundred 
and thirty-one. It is probable that the enemy may collect for such 
an object, at least twenty thousand, besides reinforcements to the 
French, (which from pretty good authority I have reason to expect), 
and the numerous militia of the five neighboring provinces. Thus 
circumstanced, I am persuaded your lordship will be of opinion that 
the sooner I concentrate my forces the better." 

The following corps were therefore to be forwarded to New York 
in succession as they could be spared, " two battalions of light infantry, 
Forty-third regiment. Seventy-sixth or Eightieth regiment, two bat- 
talions of Anspach, Queen's Rangers, cavalry and infantry, the 
remains of the Seventeenth light dragoons, and such proportion of 
the artillery as could be spared, particularly men." A second dis- 
patch by the same messenger, dated June 15th, says, " I request you 
will immediately embark a part of the troops stated in the letter 
inclosed, beginning with the light infantry, and send them to me with 
all possible dispatch. ... I do not think it advisable to leave 
more troops in that unhealthy climate at this season of the year than 
what are absolutely wanted for a defensive, and desultory water 
excursions." 



6o6 LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. [1781 

Lord Cornwallis was thus assured that cooperation from New York, 
via Philadelphia, as previously proposed, or otherwise, was improbable, 
and with the proposed reduction of his army the conquest of Virginia 
became impossible. The question of retaining any army at all in 
Virginia was at once a practical one. On the thirtieth, he replied 
from Williamsburg, " Your excellency being charged with the weight 
of the whole American war, your opinions of course are less partial, 
and are directed to all parts ; upon viewing York, I was clearly of 
opinion that it far exceeds our power, consistent with your plans, to 
make safe defensive posts there and at Gloucester, both of which 
would be necessary for the protection of shipping. . . . As mag- 
azines, etc., may be destroyed by occasional expeditions from New 
York, and there is little chance of establishing a post capable of giving 
effectual protection to ships of war, I submit to your excellency's 
consideration, whether it is worth while to hold a sickly defensive 
post (Portsmouth) in this Bay, which will always be exposed to a 
sudden French attack, and which experience makes no diversion in 
favor of the southern army." While these dispatches were being 
exchanged, a cipher dispatch from General Clinton of June twenty- 
eighth, received by Lord Cornwallis July eighth, again avowed a pur- 
pose of making a rapid movement to seize the stores, etc., collected 
at Philadelphia, and afterward to use the force so employed to rein- 
force New York, urging embarkation of the troops before mentioned, 
and offering to " return whatever may have been too great a propor- 
tion of, the moment the expedition is over." On the date of receipt. 
Lord Cornwallis replied, that " the troops were ready to embark, and 
deprecated the detention of defensive posts in the country, which can 
not have the slightest influence on the war in Carolina, and which 
gives us some acres of an unhealthy swamp, and forever liable to 
become a prey to a foreign enemy with a temporary superiority at 
sea. . . . Desultory expeditions in the Chesapeake may be 
undertaken from New York with as much ease and more safety, 
whenever there is reason to suppose that our naval force is likely to 
be superior for two or three months." The letter cited, also describes 
the attack of La Fayette at Jamestown which will be noticed. 

The position assumed by Cornwallis in his correspondence was 
verified by his ultimate capture. He desired to have the Virginia 
army equal to a conquest of the State, and able to support itself, or 
as the alternative, to abandon the passive occupation of posts which 
could draw no adequate resources from the country around, and 



lySi.] I,A FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 607 

could be assured of no security by sea. Sufficient has been said to 
indicate the uncertainty of his future operations and the embarrass- 
ments which followed them. These continued until reinforcements, 
three thousand men, although not one-third of the number expected, 
arrived at New York and General Clinton as late as July eleventh, (not 
received until the twentieth,) " authorized him to disembark the troops 
then at Portsmouth and ready to sail for New York." Meanwhile the 
condition of things changed. He had been compelled to act upon 
the supposition that the depletion of his command would end the 
Virginia campaign. The embarkation of troops was to be made 
from Portsmouth. 

During this time the American army had followed closely upon 
the retiring army of Lord Cornwallis. 

La Fayette thus wrote to Washington on the twenty-eighth of 
June : " The enemy have been so kind as to retire before us. Twice 
I gave them a chance of fighting (taking care not to engage them 
farther than I pleased) but they continued their retrograde motions. 
Our numbers are. I think, exaggerated to them, and our seeming 
boldness confirms the opinion. I thought at first, Lord Cornwallis 
wanted to get me as low down as possible, and use his cavalry to 
advantage. His lordship had (exclusive of the reinforcements from 
Portsmouth, said to be six hundred) four thousand men, eight hun- 
dred of whom were dragoons, or mounted "infantry." Our force is 
almost his, but only one thousand five hundred regulars, and fifty 
dragoons. One little action more particularly marks the retreat of 
the enemy. From the place whence he first began to retire to Wil- 
liamsburg, is upwards of one hundred miles. The old arms at the 
Point of Fork have been taken out of the water. The cannon was 
thrown into the river undamaged, when they marched back to Rich- 
mond ; so that his lordship did us no harm, of consequence, but lost 
an immense part of his former conquests and did not make any in 
this State. General Greene only demanded of me, to hold my ground 
in Virginia. I don't know but what we shall, in our turn, become the 
pursuing enemy." 

The movement of Lord Cornwallis to Portsmouth, nominally 
begun on the fourth of July, was delayed until the ninth, the fourth 
and fifth being occupied in the removal of the heavy baggage. Gen- 
eral La Fayette advanced to Green Spring, within a few miles of James- 
town, and sent light parties in advance, to attack the British rear 
guard. The Queen's Rangers crossed James River on the fourth. 



6o8 LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. [1781. 

but the main army still remained on the north side. The British 
position had natural strength. The right was covered by ponds and 
swamps, and before the centre and left, the ground was so low and 
miry, that it could be crossed only by narrow causeways. Tarleton 
says, " he hired a negro and a dragoon, and charged them to feign 
desertion, and give false intelligence, and to represent, that the body 
of the king's troops had crossed James River ; and he supposed it 
" most probable that La Fayette acted upon this false intelligence, 
rather than through X.00 great ardor" adding, ''for it is the only instance 
of this officer s committing himself during a very difficult campaign!' 
Tarleton's opinion is correct, with this qualification, that in view 
of the narrow and difficult approaches to the British camp, the 
American advance pressed on too hotly, while the admirable reti- 
cence of the British troops induced the supporting parties also to 
cross the causeways, only to find themselves confronted by at least 
thrice their numbers. Some discredit has been cast upon General 
Wayne for this exposure of the American army, but the force of the 
enemy was simply underestimated. His self-possession and daring 
were never more conspicuous, and the Pennsylvania troops under his 
command fought on equal terms with the best troops of Cornwallis. 
The American army, except the militia under Baron Steuben, left 
camp about three o'clock, and reached the British front about five, on 
the afternoon of the sixth. A {&\v dragoons and the rifle detachments 
of Majors Call and Willis crossed the causeway first, and took cover 
in a wood near the Williamsburg road. Armand's and Mercer's cav- 
alry, with McPherson followed. Captain Savage with two guns and 
two battalions of light infantry under Major Galvan and Major Willis, 
(of Connecticut,) came next, and these troops were supported by 
General Wayne's Pennsylvania brigade. The pickets were attacked 
vigorously and driven in, although promptly supported by the Yagers. 
The two guns and the battalions of Willis and Galvan came to their 
support. Lieutenant-colonel Mercer and Major McPherson, respect- 
ively, took command of the riflemen on the right and left, while the 
cavalry advanced upon the British horse which formed in a field to 
the rear of the picket. Tarleton, then acting under the immediate 
orders of Cornwallis, says, " the British cavalry supported the pickets 
on the left, in order to contain the enemy within the woods and to 
prevent their seeing the main army. Upon the first cannon-shot 
from the enemy the British army formed and advanced, when the 
dragoons fell through the intervals made for them by the infantry." 



1781.] LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 609 

The British right consisted of the Twenty-third, Thirty-third, and 
Seventy-first regiments, (Yorke's brigade vice Webster, killed at Guil- 
ford,) the Guards, Hessians, two battalions of light infantry and three 
guns, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Yorke, and were opposite 
the position of Major McPherson. The British left consisted of the 
Forty-third, Twenty-sixth and Eightieth regiments, with light com- 
panies, supported for a second line, by Tarleton's legion and two guns, 
all under Lieutenant-colonel Dundas, and confronted Mercer, whose 
riflemen were partially covered by an opportune ditch and a rail fence, 
supported by the two small battalions of continentals. 

After brief opposition the first line gave way. The American left 
had already retired. Wayne anticipated the advancing columns by a 
bold bayonet charge, immediately supported by La Fayette, who had 
finally crossed the causeway ; and such was the vigor of the conflict 
that the American army extricated its front, and retired unpursued 
to its camp. La Fayette had his horse shot and was conspicuous for 
personal daring, in the thickest of the fight. 

The American casualties so far as reported, were one hundred and 
eighteen men killed, wounded and missing. The British casualties 
were seventy-five. 

La Fayette withdrew to Malvern Hill to rest his troops, and Corn- 
wallis hastened his departure for Suffolk and Portsmouth. Tarletoa 
claims that Cornwallis could have destroyed La Fayette's army by a 
vigorous pursuit that night, or the following morning; but he fails to 
harmonize such a project with obedience to General Clinton's orders, 
and does not strengthen his reflection upon his commanding officer 
by stating the fact that the troops did not go to New York, at last. 
Lord Cornwallis obeyed orders ; and could not read the future as 
Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton interpreted the past. 

The following order received July twelfth by the Orpheus frigate, 
certainly must have convinced Lord Cornwallis that he would have 
committed a fatal error if he had followed the advice of Tarleton : 

"New York, July ist, 1781. 
" My Lord : For reasons which I think it unnecessary to mention to you by this 
opportunity, I request that whatever troops, etc. your Lordship may have embarked 
for this place, may sail forty-eight hours after the departure from the Chesapeake 
of the frigate which carries this letter ; and which has orders to return whenever 
your Lordship signifies to the captain of her, that the troops, etc. are all on board 
and ready to proceed on the intended service. 

" I have the honor to be, etc., 

"H. Clinton." 
39 



6lO LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. [1781. 

This order needs no comment. 

On the ninth of July, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton left Cobliam 
with orders to ravage the country as far as New Haven, in Bedford 
county, to destroy a depot of supplies supposed to be at Prince 
Edward Court House, to intercept any British prisoners or American 
light troops, returning to the northward from Greene's army; and 
then to retire at his leisure to Suffolk. This expedition was gone 
fifteen days, marched four hundred miles, and is thus described by 
Tarleton : " The stores destroyed, either of a public or private nature, 
were not in quantity or value, equivalent to the damage sustained in 
the skirmishes on the route, and the loss of men and horses by the 
excessive heat of the climate. The stores which were the principal 
object of the expedition had been conveyed from Prince Edward 
Court House and all that quarter of the country, to Hillsborough 
and General Greene's army, upwards of a month before the British 
hght troops began their movement." Reference is again made to 
map, which is compiled from a recent military map of Virginia, 
prepared by the United States Engineer Corps, and that which 
accompanies Tarleton's narrative. 

During this incursion, Cornwallis, having forwarded to Portsmouth 
such troops as were designed for New York, awaited the return of 
Tarleton at Suffolk. 

On the twentieth of July, at one o'clock A. M., Brigadier-major 
Bowers placed in the hands of General Cornwallis a dispatch in cipher 
from Sir Henry Clinton, dated July nth, 1781. The following is an 
extract : " If you have not already passed the James River, you will 
continue on the Williamsburg neck until the frigate arrives with my 
dispatches by Captain Stapleton. If you have passed and find it 
expedient to recover that station you will please do it, and keep pos- 
session until you hear from me. Whatever troops may have been 
embarked by you for this place are likewise to remain until further 
orders ; and if they should have been sailed, and within your call, you 
will be pleased to stop them." This dispatch is cited to show author- 
ity for detention of the troops. The entire files of dispatches between 
Generals Clinton and Cornwallis support the movement actually made 
by Lord Cornwallis to Yorktown, and it was absolutely his only policy, 
in view of the fact that General Clinton refused to entertain his pro- 
position to abandon Virginia wholly, so long as it was not to be held 
in force aggressively. In justice to both, it is not too much to say in 
homely phrase that each had his hands full of responsibility, while 



. t/U:. 



I78i.] LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 6ll 

there was but one hand full of resources to meet the demand. New 
York or Yorktown, Clinton or CornvvalHs had to suffer. Cornwallis 
the man of field duty, exposure and trial, was the victim of these 
inadequate resources. In this the final disaster, he lost no honor, and 
in his fate, England, then struggling with the civilized world, lost no 

glory. 

On the first of August, Cornwallis proceeded by water to York- 
town, the main body of the army following, and executing the move- 
ment by the fourth. On the sixth, Tarleton sailed to Hampton, 
threw his horses into deep water near shore, landed without loss, and 
joined Cornwallis on the seventh. General O'Hara's division 
remained at Portsmouth to destroy the works, and on the twenty- 
second the British army was concentrated at Yorktown and Glou- 
cester Point, just across the river. 

On the thirteenth of August, General La Fayette established his 
headquarters in the forks of the Pamunky and Mattaponey rivers, 
from which place he detached light troops to the rear of Gloucester 
to anticipate any attempt of his adversary to march north, and Gen- 
eral Wayne was sent across the James River, demonstrating beyond 
Suffolk and near Portsmouth, for the purpose of anticipating an 
attempt of Cornwallis to retreat into North Carolina. He gives as 
an additional reason for this policy, the belief, that in case the prom- 
ised fleet of Count de Grasse should arrive, he would thus be able to 
cooperate more promptly, and if not, that he would be so situated as 
to occupy Portsmouth, and prevent the escape of Cornwallis by sea 
in case that officer should attempt to return to that post and embark 
for New York. 

Repeated skirmishes took place. While the British army was 
fortifying the two posts, Simcoe was actively engaged with La 
Fayette's light troops in front of Gloucester, and Tarleton made 
repeated excursions toward Williamsburg, where the American 
advance guard was established. 

These movements were made with extreme caution. On the 
eighth of August, La Fayette wrote to Washington, " We shall act 
agreeably to circumstances, but avoid drawing ourselves into a false 
movement, which, if cavalry had the command of the rivers, would give 
the enemy the advantage of us. His lordship plays so well, that no 
blunder can be hoped from him, to recover a bad step of ours. . . . 
Should a fleet come in at this moment our affairs would take a very 
happy turn." 



6l2 LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. [1781. 

On the twenty-first he again wrote, " We have hitherto occupied 
the forks of York River, thereby looking both ways. Some miHtia 
have prevented the enemy's parties from remaining any time at or 
near WilHamsburg, and false accounts have given them some alarm. 
Another body of militia under Colonel Ennis has kept them pretty 
close in Gloucester town and foraged in their vicinity. ... In 
the present state of affairs, my dear general, I hope you zvill come your- 
self to Virginia. Lord Cornwallis must be attacked with prettj^ great 
apparatus ; but when a French fleet takes possession of the bay and 
rivers, and we form a land force superior to his, that army must 
sooner or later be forced to surrender, as we may get what reinforce- 
inents we please. I heartily thank you for having ordered me to 
remain in Virginia ; it is to your goodness that I am indebted for the 
most beautiful prospect which I may ever behold." 

On the thirtieth, the Count de Grasse arrived in Chesapeake Bay 
with twenty-six ships of the line, besides frigates and transports. The 
British frigate Guadaloupe, 28, which had started with dispatches for 
New York, was forced to return to Yorktown, and the Loyalist, 20, 
stationed in the bay, was captured. 

On the third of September the Count de St. Simon landed at James- 
town Island with three thousand two hundred French troops and was 
joined by La Fayette at Green Spring on the same day. On the 
fifth the allies occupied Williamsburg, about fifteen miles from 
Yorktown. 

The Count de Grasse had a limited period for operations on the 
American coast, and united with Count de St. Simon in urging an im- 
mediate attack upon Yorktown while its defenses were incomplete, 
the latter waiving seniority and proposing to serve under La Fayette. 
This officer, writing to Washington, on the arrival of the fleet, which 
had been met by one of his officers upon making Cape Henry, says, 
" I am net so hasty as the Count de Grasse, and think that having so 
sure a game to play, it would be madness, by the risk of an attack, to 
give anything to chance. Unless matters are very different from 
what I think they are, my opinion is, that we ought to be contented 
with preventing the enemy's forages, with militia, without committing 
our regulars. Whatever readiness the Marquis de St. Simon has 
been pleased to express to Colonel Gimat respecting his being under 
me, I shall do nothing without paying that deference which is due to 
age, talents and experience ; but would rather incline to the cautious 
line of conduct I have of late adopted." " I hope you will find we 



I78i.] LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 613 

have taken the best precautions to lessen his lordship's (Cornwallis') 
escape. I hardly believe he will make the attempt. If he does, he 
must give up ships, artillery, baggage, part of the horses, all the 
negroes; must be certain to lose the third of his army, and run the 
greatest risk to lose the whole, without gaining that glory which he 
may derive from a brilliant defense." Again, " September eighth," 
" If you knew how slowly things go on in this country ! ! The gover- 
nor does what he can ; the wheels of government are so rusty that no 
governor whatever will be able to set them free again. Time will 
prove that Mr. Jefferson has been too severely charged." ..." We 
will try, if not dangerous, upon a large scale, to form a good idea of 
the works ; but unless I am greatly deceived, there will be madness 
in attacking them now, with our force. Marquis de St. Simon, Count 
de Grasse and General Du Portail agree with me in opinion ; but 
should Lord Cornwallis come out against such a position as we have, 
everybody thinks that he can not but repent of it ; and should he 
beat us, he must soon prepare for another battle." 

During this period Lord Cornwallis had seriously entertained a 
purpose of attacking the allied army and made a careful reconnois- 
sance to ascertain its position and force. Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton 
in his narrative, more than once intimates that Lord Cornwallis had 
no right to depend upon the assurances contained in the dispatches 
of General Clinton, as being positive promises to furnish aid, and 
says, " England must lament the inactivity of the king's troops, 
whether it proceeded from the noble Earl's misconception, or from 
the suggestions of confidential attendants, who construed the Com- 
mander-in-chief's letters into a definite promise of relief." The dis- 
patches quoted on pages 623 and 631 are the basis for the opinion 
of Lord Cornwallis and for the intimations of Lieutenant-colonel Tarle- 
ton. He also argues that "Lord Cornwallis must have known the 
superiority of the French naval force, which General Clinton could 
not have known, when he wrote his dispatches." This position ignores 
the fact that the aggregate British naval force on the American coast 
was supposed to be superior to that of France, although divided, and 
unfortunate circumstances combined to prevent its concert of action. 
This was beyond the control of both Generals Clinton and Cornwallis. 
The letters of General La Fayette, already cited, show that he was 
conducting the campaign with reference to just such a movement as 
Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton advised, and that its promise of success 
was small. 



6l4 LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. [1781. 

It is no injustice to Tarleton or Clinton, to state, that their entire 
correspondence and discussion upon the events of the war, partakes 
of the nature of personal controversy, and the conclusions are very 
often unjust to others, rarely to themselves. 

The time was at hand for the arrival of Washington himself. Be- 
fore entering upon that portion of the narrative, a brief statement 
of the naval movements which involved such confusion of British 
opinion and realized such determining consequences, is properly in 
place. 

Just after the arrival of reinforcements for General Clinton, already 
noticed, the Count de Barras, under date of May eleventh, informed 
Washington that the Count de Grasse, then in the West Indies, ex- 
pected to leave Cape Francois for the Chesapeake, with from twenty- 
five to twenty-nine sail of the line, and three thousand two hundred 
soldiers ; but that such were his engagements with land and naval 
forces of Spain, then in the West Indies, that he must return by the 
middle of October. These facts materially changed the plan of cam- 
paign. New York had been the objective of attack, according to the 
original purpose of General Washington, although not favored by 
General Rochambeau or the French government. There were too 
many contingencies which rendered any permanent French naval 
superiority at New York uncertain, if not impossible. 

Washington promptly notified La Fayette, by letter of August 
fifteenth, of the change of plan, and explained to that ofificer the 
importance of controlling all avenues of escape, so that a concentrated 
movement could be made against Lord Cornwallis. It has been seen 
that General La Fayette was of full accord in opinion, and equal to 
the duty. The Count de Barras, commanding the French squadron 
at the north, consisting of seven ships of the line, was the senior of 
Count de Grasse, and had discretionary authority from the Marshal 
de Castries, French Minister of Marine, to cruise for British ships off 
the Banks of Newfoundland ; but he waived rank and independent 
command, and by this prompt exposure of his small fleet and a well- 
planned voyage, contributed greatly to the final result. Admiral 
Rodney commanding the British naval force in the West Indies, 
learned of the proposed movement of Count de Grasse, and detached 
Sir Samuel Hood with fourteen ships of the line to intercept him. 
The French force sent to the American coast was greater than under 
the existing circumstances he could have anticipated. Admiral Rod- 
ney presented the facts fully, during November and December, 1781, 



1781.] LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. 615 

before the House of Commons, but the discussion is immaterial, al- 
though he had Burke as his censor. The defense of Admiral Graves, 
who succeeded Admiral Arbuthnot at New York, equally discloses 
one simple fact, which is the material fact, that the French fleet was 
equal to cope with any which it might meet, and Count de Grasse 
was wise in thus increasing his squadron. The British fleet, so de- 
tached from the West India squadron, anticipated that it had only to 
supplement the New York and Newport fleets, and was not equal to 
the demand. Failure in concert of action brought additional disap- 
pointment. 

Admiral Hood sailed for America, crossed the mouth of Chesapeake 
Bay just before the arrival of Count de Grasse, without entering it ; 
looked into Delaware Bay and sailed for New York, where he arrived 
August twenty-eighth, and reported to Admiral Graves. That officer 
had but five ships of the line ready for sea ; but upon advices that 
Count de Barras had certainly started from Newport for the Chesa- 
peake, he took command of the entire squadron, and promptly sailed 
with nineteen ships of the line, on the last of August. On the fifth 
of September he passed within the capes without knowledge of the 
presence of a superior adversary force. The French fleet was weak- 
ened by the absence of seventeen hundred seamen who were up 
James River, and upon first intimation that a squadron was in the 
offing. Count de Grasse supposed it to be the squadron of Count de 
Barras. The right wing, however, moved promptly out of the bay 
soiitJnvardy followed from Lynn Bay by the remaining ships as they 
could slip anchor and make headway. The fleets manoeuvered 
for five days without coming to a general action, but with several 
sharp encounters. The French casualties were two hundred and 
twenty killed and wounded, and the English were three hundred and 
thirty-six. Several ships suffered considerable damage. Meanwhile, 
see map " Operations in Chesapeake Ba}-," Admiral Barras entered 
the bay from the north with seven ships of the line, fourteen trans- 
ports and a supply of siege guns, which were of vital importance to 
the allied army. Admiral Graves again entered the bay ; but being 
advised of the arrival of Count de Barras and apprehending danger 
to his fleet from the lateness of the season, with no fair prospect of 
an engagement on equal, or even fair terms, he sailed for New York. 
Such was the condition of affairs when Washington reached La 
Fayette's headquarters. The French fleet numbered thirty-five ships 
of the line, and no hostile squadron was in sight. 



6l6 LA FAYETTE AND CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA. fiySi. 

It is a fact to be noticed, that during the war of 1775-1781, these 
naval operations in Chesapeake Ray brought together one of the 
heaviest naval armaments known to maritime warfare, the opposing 
squadrons numbering fifty-two ships of the line when Admiral Graves 
sailed for New York. 




UiU* 



CHAPTER LXXIV. 

WASHINGTON AND ROCHAMBEAU. ARNOLD AT NEW LONDON. 
FROM THE HUDSON TO YORKTOWN. 

THE campaign of 1781 illustrated wise strategy, prompt logistics, 
and successful tactics, under circumstances of great difficulty. 
These can be appreciated only by constant reference to the whole 
theatre of war. The extent of coast, and the nature of the country 
behind that coast, are physical facts which enhance the value of the 
successes realized, and indicate the substantial aid which the United 
States received through the support of France. The British opera- 
tions were predicated upon the control of American waters. New 
York was still the general base, and through the movements made in 
the middle and southern zones, which were carried on from Ports- 
mouth and Charleston, the struggle was gradually coming to a sim- 
ple issue with Lord Cornwallis, who had in turn commanded in each 
zone. La Fayette and Greene held nominal relations of mutual sup- 
port ; but neither could receive early information of the movements 
of the other, so as to act in full accord, and the information which 
was from time to time received, was so differently interpreted, that it 
was for a long time uncertain what were the real fruits of Camden, 
Cowpens and Guilford. The march of Lord Cornwallis into Virginia 
was the first emphatic fact which enabled General Washington to 
plan an efficient offensive. The repeated detachment of troops from 
New York so sensibly lessened the capacity of its garrison for exten- 
sive field service at the north, that the American Commander-in-chief 
determined to attack that post, and as a secondary purpose, thereby to 
divert General Clinton from giving further aid to troops in the Southern 
States. As a matter of fact, the prudent conduct of the Virginia 
campaign eventually rallied to the support of General La Fayette an 
army, including militia, nearly as large as that of Washington, and the 
nominal strength of the allied army near Yorktown, early in Septem- 
ber was nearly or quite as great as that of Lord Cornwallis. ^ 



6l8 WASHINGTON AND ROCHAMBEAU. [1781. 

There were other elements which, as in previous campaigns, 
hampered operations at the north. The Indians were still trouble- 
some in Western New York, and the Canadian frontier continued to 
demand attention. The American navy had practically disappeared. 
The scarcity of money and a powerless recruiting service, increased 
the difficulties of carrying on the war in a manner that would use to 
the best advantage the troops of France. 

On the twenty-first of May, a military conference was held at 
Wethersfield, Connecticut, four miles south from Hartford, at which 
Generals Rochambeau and Chastellux on the part of the French army, 
met Washington for the purpose of determining a plan for the ensu- 
ing campaign. As the result of the interview, the Count de Rocham- 
beau wrote to Count de Grasse, requesting him to send his fleet to 
act in cooperation with Count de Barras, and to close the port of 
New York. It has already been noticed that the Count de Grasse 
indicated his purpose to sail for the Chesapeake, but to return to the 
West Indies by the middle of October, and that the French govern- 
ment did not deem a movement upon New York as practicable. It 
is to be made prominent in this connection, as the key to the policy 
of France, that her navy was upon a foreign coast, that it was spared 
with difficulty from the West Indies, and that the burden of such an 
expedition would almost entirely rest upon her shoulders. With the 
exception of the Crimean war in 1854, if that indeed be an exception, 
there is hardly to be found in military annals a more cordial coopera- 
tion than that which characterized the navy and army of Louis XV^I. 
in aid of the United States during the war of 1775-1781. The 
immediate junction of the two armies was first determined upon at 
Wethersfield, so as to be prepared for any good opportunity to begin 
operations. The American army, which exhibited an effective strength 
of less than forty-six hundred men, was ordered to Peekskill on the 
Hudson. The Count de Rochambeau with the Duke de Lauzun, 
marched from Newport, across the State of Connecticut and took post 
at Ridgebury. This was a small village near Salem, on the road to 
Danbury, about fifteen miles back from Long Island Sound. The 
first offensive design was to attack Morrisania, where Colonel De- 
lancey's Refugees had their headquarters. This corps, both mounted 
and foot, was the terror of the region, and Westchester County became 
the field of their operations, as at its first organization in 1776. Dur- 
ing one foray as far as the Croton River, a detachment had surprised 
a small post commanded by Colonel Christopher Green, already 



1781.] WASHINGTON AND ROCHAMBEAU. 619 

noticed for good conduct at Bunker Hill, Quebec and Red Rank, and 
he had been mistreated, with a severity which aroused the indignation 
of Washington and demanded punishment. 

A second design to be concurrently attempted, was to seize the 
British posts at the north end of New York Island. Sheldon's dra- 
goons and some continental troops were to cooperate with a French 
division under the Duke de Lauzun in the former enterprise, while 
General Lincoln was assigned to the command of a detachment of 
troops from the American army to prosecute the latter. This force 
was to descend the Hudson by boats, and the third of July was de- 
signated for both attacks. Governor Clinton of New York was advised 
of Washington's plan, so that he could concentrate the New York 
militia in case of success, and signal guns and fires had been pre- 
arranged, to give him notice of a favorable result. Washington, as a 
matter of fact, looked beyond the ostensible purpose of these orders, 
and hoped that a surprise of these posts would induce General Clinton 
to attempt their recapture, and thus bring on a general action between 
the armies. The reported detachment of a considerable foraging 
force from New York garrison into New Jersey also induced the 
belief that the English commander entertained no fears as to the 
safety of these detached posts, and that they would be but indiffer- 
ently guarded. 

General Lincoln left Peekskill with eight hundred men on the first 
of June, proceeded to Teller's Point, then took boats, and with 
muffled oars rowed down Tappan Sea at night. On the morning of 
the second, by hugging the eastern shore, he reached Dobb's Ferry 
without being discovered by the British. Washington moved at 
daylight, (about three o'clock \\\ that latitude) without baggage, 
leaving his tents standing, passed through Tarrytown, and reached 
Valentine's Hill, four miles above Kings'Bridge, by sunrise of the third. 
He was thus in a good position to support and cooperate with either 
expedition. 

General Lincoln crossed the Hudson in a small boat and landed 
at old Fort Lee, to reconnoitre the country opposite. He at once 
observed a British ship of war lying near the shore and that a large 
British camp had been established on the extreme north end of New 
York Island. A surprise of Fort Washington, or the outposts further 
up the island, was of course impossible. The troops previously sent 
to New Jersey had returned and reoccupied the British advance lines 
to the northward. General Lincoln left Peekskill with alternate 



620 WASHINGTON AND ROCHAMBEAU. [1781. 

orders, expressly providing for this emergency, and he at once recrossed 
the river, landed his troops just above Spuyten Duyvel Creek, near 
Old Fort Independence, and then occupied high ground near King's 
Bridge, so as to act in concert with the Duke de Lauzun, and cut off 
any detachment which might attempt to cross the Harlem to support 
Delancey. The Duke de Lauzun in the meanwhile had only reached 
East Chester. His troops had been wearied by a hot march over 
rough country and were several hours later than the time designated 
for the attack. The troops of General Lincoln were discovered by a 
foraging party of nearly fourteen hundred men, and a sharp skirmish 
ensued. The Duke de Lauzun heard the iiring and marched to its 
relief. Washington had already marched, and upon his approach the 
British retired to New York Island. Washington reconnoitred the 
position during the afternoon, then fell back to Valentine's Hill, and 
on the next day to Dobb's Ferry, where Count de Rochambeau joined 
him on the sixth. 

On the eighth. Sir Henry Clinton enclosed some intercepted 
letters of Washington to Cornwallis — stated that he was " threatened 
with a siege," and asked for " two thousand troops," adding, " the 
sooner they come the better." 

Meanwhile the American camp had been established with its 
right on the Hudson, covered by earthworks, and its left across Saw 
Mill river. For locality, see map " Hudson River Highlands." The 
French army occupied the hills still further eastward, as far as the 
river Bronx. 

General Washington, Count de Rochambeau, and Generals de 
Boville and Du Portail crossed to the Jersey Heights, and with a small 
escort of one hundred and fifty New Jersey troops, made examination 
of the New York Island outposts. This was immediately followed 
by a reconnoissancc in force, of the entire British front, from King's 
Bridge down the Hudson River and along Hell Gate channel. The 
command consisted of five thousand men, in two divisions, respectively 
led by the Count de Chastellux and General Lincoln. The troops 
marched during the evening of July twenty-first, reached King's 
Bridge at daylight, and formed on the hills back of Fort Indepen- 
dence. Lauzun's Lancers and Sheldon's light infantry scoured the 
vicinity of Morrisania, and Sheldon's dragoons went as far as Throg's 
Neck. The Refugees fled to islands, to vessels, and to the woods. 
A few were captured, but Delancey himself having succeeded Major 
Andr^ as Adjutant-general, no longer remained at the headquarters 



lySr.] WASHINGTON AND ROCHAMBEAU. 621 

of his old corps and was not exposed to capture. Generals Washing- 
ton and Rochambeau, attended by a squadron of dragoons, then made 
a careful, ostentatious examination of all the British advance works, 
and the line of the Harlem, passing repeatedly under fire from ves- 
sels and pickets. By midnight of the twenty-third they returned to 
their encampment. Mr. Irving says, " The immediate effect of this 
threatening movement appears in a letter of Sir Henry Clinton to 
Cornwallis, dated July 26th," requesting him to order three regiments 
to New York from Carolina, writing, " I shall probably want them, 
as well as the troops you may be able to spare me from the Chesa- 
peake, for such offensive or defensive operations as may offer in this 
quarter." Cornwallis had already ordered two of the European regi- 
ments, which could be spared during the inactive summer months, 
from Carolina to New York, and was " requested to renew the order." 
It has been seen in a previous chapter that Clinton had peremptorily 
and repeatedly ordered troops from Yorktown before the reconnois- 
sance above referred to. Clinton's dispatches of June 8th, i ith, 13th, 
19th and 28th, as well as of July ist, are of this general character. 
In that of the 8th he thus suggestively limits the previous semi- 
independent command of Cornwallis. (That officer had directly con- 
sulted the Home War Office and had been supported in his sugges- 
tions.) " As your lordship is now so near, it will be unnecessary for 
you to send your dispatches immediately to the Minister; you will 
therefore be so good as to send them to me in the future." 

The position of the American Commander-in-chief at this time was 
one of peculiar personal mortification. Appeals to State authorities 
failed to fill up his army. Three thousand Hessian reinforcements 
had landed at New York, and the government as well as himself 
would be compromised before the whole world, by failure to meet the 
just demands which the French auxiliaries had a right to press upon 
his attention. Relief came most opportunely. The frigate Concorde 
arrived at Newport, and a reiteration of the purpose of Count de 
Grasse to leave St. Domingo on the third of August, for the Chesa- 
peake direct, was announced by a special messenger. 

The possibilities of the future at once quickened him to immediate 
action. With a reticence so close, that the army could not fathom his 
plans, he re-organized his forces for a /a/sr demonstration against New 
York and a real movement upon Yorktown. The excellent Logistics 
of La Fayette's march in February, were to be equaled by the energy 
and favoring circumstances which attended the progress of the allied 



622 WASHINGTON AND ROCHAMBEAU. [lySi- 

armies under the personal direction of Washington. Letters to the 
Governors of northern States called for aid as if to capture New York. 
Letters to La Fayette and the Count de Grasse embodied such inti- 
mations of his plans as would induce proper caution to prevent the 
escape of Lord Cornwallis, and secure transportation at Head of Elk. 
Other letters to authorities in New Jersey and Philadelphia, expressly 
defining a plan of operations against New York via Staten Island, 
with the assurance of ample naval support, were exposed to intercep- 
tion and fell into the hands of General Clinton, 

As late as the nineteenth, the roads leading to King's Bridge were 
cleared of obstructions, and the army was put in readiness to advance 
against New York Island. On the same day the New Jersey regi- 
ment and that of Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson at Dobb's Ferry, 
to threaten Staten Island, and ostensibly to cover some bake-houses 
which were being erected for the purpose of giving color to the show 
of operations against New York. The plan of a large encampment 
had been prepared, which embraced Springfield and the Chatham 
Pass to Morristown, and this was allowed to find its way to Clinton's 
headquarters. General Heath was assigned to command of the Hud- 
son-river posts, with two regiments from New Hampshire, ten from 
Massachusetts, five from Connecticut, the Third artillery, Sheldon's 
dragoons, the invalid corps, all local companies, and the militia. 

The following forces were selected to accompany the Commander- 
in-chief, viz., the light infantry under Colonel Scammel, four light com- 
panies from New York and Connecticut, the Rhode Island regiment, 
under the new army establishment, two New York regiments, that of 
New Jersey and Hazen's regiment, (the last two already across the 
Hudson) and Lamb's artillery, in all about two thousand men. 

The American troops crossed on the twenty-first, at King's Ferry, 
and encamped near Haverstraw. The French army followed, and 
the army was united on the twenty-fifch. During the delay in the 
passage of the troops, Count de Rochambeau accompanied General 
Washington to a final inspection of West Point ; and the headquar- 
ters at New Windsor, between that post and Newburgh, were substan- 
tially abandoned. 

The American army marched promptly toward Springfield on the 
Rahway, and the French army for Whippany, toward Trenton. The 
American train was accompanied by bateaux on wheels, as if to cross 
more promptly to Staten Island, and Washington thus states his ob- 
ject : " That much trouble was taken, and finesse used, to misguide 



I78i.] WASHINGTON AND ROCHAMBEAU. 623 

and bewilder Sir Henry Clinton in regard to the real object, by ficti- 
tious communications as well as by making a deceptive provision of 
ovens, forage and boats in his neighborhood, is certain. Nor were 
less pains taken to deceive our own army, for I had always conceived 
when the imposition does not completely take place at home, it would 
never sufficiently succeed abroad." 

General Washington and suite reached Philadelphia about noon, 
August thirtieth. The army had already realized the fact that they 
were destined southward. Some dissatisfaction was manifested ; but 
Count de Rochambeau advanced twenty thousand dollars in gold 
upon the pledge of Robert Morris that he would refund the sum by 
the first of October, and the effect upon the troops, who had long 
been without any pay, was inspiring. The arrival of Colonel John 
Laurens from France, (reaching Boston on the twent}'-fifth,) was a 
source of still deeper satisfaction. He brought clothing, ammunition, 
and half a million of dollars in cash, as a part of six millions of livres, 
$1,1 1 1,1 1 1, generously furnished by Louis XVL Additional sums 
were pledged. Dr. Franklin had secured a loan of four millions of 
livres, $740,740 to cover American drafts, before the arrival of Colonel 
Laurens, and Count de Vergennes had agreed to guarantee a loan in 
Holland for ten million livres, $1,851,851 more. 

On the second of September the American army made its third 
glad entry into Philadelphia, and was received with enthusiasm. On 
the next day the French army, after a brief halt to clean uniforms 
and accoutrements, made its brilliant passage through the American 
capital. Their rich foreign uniforms contrasted with the faded cloth- 
ing of the column that had passed the day before. The whole popu- 
lation again mingled all tokens of congratulation and joy; but there 
was no time for protracted honors. The plainly equipped detachment 
of Washington's veterans, however, lost no credit, according to the 
French authorities, in the steadiness of their march and their fitness 
for battle. 

Dispatches here received from General La Fayette, dated on the 
twenty-first of August, informed General Washington that " the 
British troops were fortifying Gloucester" — that "a small garrison 
still remained at Portsmouth " — that he " had written to the Gov- 
ernor to collect six hundred militia upon Blackwatcr " — "to General 
Gregory near Portsmouth, that he had an account that the enemy 
intended to push a detachment to Carolina," — to General Wayne " to 
move to the southward and be ready to cross the James at West- 



624 ARNOLD AT NEW LONDON. [1781. 

over," and that " the army would soon assemble again upon the 
waters of the Chickahominy." This letter has been previously 
noticed, for other extracts. He had advised General Washington 
of the occupation of Yorktown, in a letter dated August eighth. 
Up to this time no further intelligence had been received of the 
movements of the Count de Grasse. 

On the second of September, while the American army was 
marching through Philadelphia, Sir Henry Clinton sent a courier 
vessel to Yorktown, with the following dispatch : {Clinton to Corn- 
wrt//^!?) " September second, 1 78 1." (In cypher.) Received fifteenth 
September. " Mr. Washington is moving an army to the southward 
with an appearance of haste, and gives out that he expects the coop- 
eration of a considerable French armament. Your lordship, however, 
may be assured, that if this should be the case, I shall either endeavor 
to reinforce the army under your command by all the means within the 
compass of my power, or make every possible diversion in your favor." 

" P. S. Washington, it is said, was to be at Trenton this day, and 
means to go in vessels to Christiana Creek, and from thence, by Head 
of Elk, down Chesapeake, in vessels also. . . . Washington has 
about four thousand French and two thousand rebel troops with him." 

On the fifth of September, General Washington started for Head 
of Elk. He had just passed Chester when a courier met him with 
dispatches which announced the arrival of the Count de Grasse. He 
returned to Chester to advise Count de Rochambeau of the news, and 
moved directly on, reaching Head of Elk the next morning. This 
dispatch reached Philadelphia during a banquet given by the French 
officers to the Chevalier de Luzerne, accompanied by the additional 
announcement of the landing of Count de St. Simon, and his junction 
with La Fayette. The day had closed with a review of the French 
army, which had been attended by the President of Congress ; and the 
city was thrilled with fresh pride and hope, as these successive excite- 
ments came in to brighten the national life. On the day that Wash- 
ington arrived at Head of Elk, Sir Henry Clinton sent the following 
dispatch to Lord Cornwallis : 

" Clinton to Cornwallis, Sept. sixth, at noon. (In cypher.) (Re- 
ceived sixteenth September): 

" As I find by your letters that De Grasse has got into the Chesa- 
peake, and I have no doubt that Washington is moving with, at least 
six thousand French and rebel troops against you, I think the best 
way to relieve you, is to join you, as soon as possible, with all the 



I78i.] ARNOLD AT NEW LONDON. 625 

force that can be spared from here, which is about four thousand 
men. TJicy are already embarked, (Itah'cs not in the original), and 
will proceed the instant I receive information from the admiral that 
we may venture ; or that from other intelligence the commodore 
and I should judge sufficient to move upon. By accounts from 
Europe we have every reason to expect Admiral Digby hourly on the 
coast." 

(This sixth day of September was La Fayette's twenty-fourth 
birthday.) 

On the same day a British force from New York landed in New 
England. 

As soon as General Clinton found that Washington had moved 
against Corhwallis, he attempted to check his march by an invasion 
of Connecticut ; and this was intrusted to the command of General 
Benedict Arnold. It was his native State, and he had become an 
object of as intense hatred as he had formerly commanded homage. 
No possible selection could have been more injudicious, as a matter 
of military policy, not excepting that of Tarleton or Simcoe ; and no 
man was better prepared by his antecedents to move wherever he 
could safely destroy life and property, regardless of restraint. The 
man whom Phillips and Cornwallis could not associate with, except 
officially, and whom Clinton endured under the pressure of past fra- 
ternity in his treason, was just the man whom Washington could safely 
leave to the care of the citizens and militia of New England. Any 
temporary success would only insure his destruction. A wild animal 
could commit ravage, but an aroused people would master him 
at last. So with Arnold. It was a very grave error to presume 
that he, of all men, could affect the movements of Washington and 
Rochambeau. If Clinton had taken the garrison of New York, or 
half of it, into the field, he would have aided, possibly have saved, 
Cornwallis. 

The expedition of Arnold consisting of the Thirty-eighth, one hun- 
dred Yagers, the Third battalion of New Jersey volunteers, the loyal 
Americans, American Refugees and artillerists, and three six pound- 
ers and one howitzer, left New York September fourth, and landed on 
both sides of New London harbor early on the sixth. Captain Beas- 
ley's report to the admiral states that it was about half past six when 
the vessels entered the harbor ; and according to Arnold's report the 
landing was effected about nine o'clock. Reference is made to map 
" Benedict Arnold at New London." This expedition was for pur- 
40 



626 ARNOLD AT NEW LONDON. [1781- 

poses of plunder and desolation, without anticipation of battle. 
Arnold landed on the west side, so as to enter the town. " An un- ' 
finished mere breastwork or water battery," as Hampstead styles it, 
called Fort Trumbull, almost open, landward, was the only defensive 
work, except a small redoubt on higher ground in the rear, called 
Fort Folly or Fort Nonsense. Fort Trumbull was occupied by Cap- 
tain Adam Shopley's detachment of State troops, less than thirty 
strong, usually stated at twenty-three or four men besides himself. 
Arnold detached Captain Willett with four companies of the Thirty- 
eighth to occupy Fort Trumbull, and advanced directly upon the 
town. Captain Willett's force was joined by one hundred and twenty 
American Refugees, under Captain Frink, who had been sent by Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Upham from Fort Franklin, a stockade fort at Lloyd's 
Neck, Simcoe's old headquarters on Long Island, nearly opposite 
New London. " During the previous year, 1780, there had been 
organized on Long Island a Board of Associated Loyalists, including 
such persons as would aid the king, but declined a regular military 
service. It provoked frightful collisions with citizens of opposite sen- 
timents, and some of the more barbarous minor operations of civil 
war. During July, 1781, Admiral Barras sent a detachment of troops 
from Newport, with three frigates, to reduce Fort William, then gar- 
risoned by nearly eight hundred Refugees, but abandoned the enter- 
prise after the capture of some British marines at Huntington Bay. 
Lossing states that the association was dissolved late in 1781, because 
of the manifest mischief it was working to the royal cause." 

Captain Shopley's men delivered one volley, disabling four or five of 
the assailants, and abandoned the fort, taking boats for Fort Griswold. 
One boat was shattered by a nine pounder ball, but about twenty 
of his men safely joined the other garrison. Arnold met with only a 
nominal resistance from hastily armed citizens, there being no con- 
siderable military force in the vicinity. 

The right wing, under Lieutenant-colonel Eyer, landed back of 
Pine Island, and marched in two divisions, the Fifty-fourth and 
Fortieth regiments respectively leading each. The New Jersey Volun- 
teers and artillery who landed last, were in the rear, and fell behind, 
while making the circuit of some swampy ground, so that they did 
not reach the summit of the hill upon which Fort Griswold rested 
until after the storming party gained possession of the rampart. As 
soon as Arnold secured possession of Fort Trumbull, he noticed that 
" the shipping in the harbor was actively engaged in preparations to 



I78i.] ARNOLD AT NEW LONDON. 627 

retire up the Norwich River " (Norwich, only thirteen miles distant, 
was Arnold's birth-place), and thus states the case in his report : *' I 
found the enemy's ships would escape, unless we could possess our- 
selves of Fort Griswold. From information I received, before and 
after my landing, I had reason to believe that Fort Griswold, on 
Groton side, was very incomplete ; and I was assured by friends to 
government, after my landing, that there were only twenty or thirty 
men in the fort, the inhabitants in general being on board the ships 
and busy in saving their property. I therefore dispatched an officer 
to Lieutenant-colonel Eyer, with the intelligence I had received, and 
requested him to make an attack on the fort as soon as possible; at 
which time I expected the howitzer was up, and would have been 
made use of. On my gaining a height of ground in the rear of New 
London from which I had a good prospect of Fort Griswold, I found it 
much more formidable than I expected, or I had formed an idea of 
from the information I had before received. I observed at the same 
time that the men who had escaped from Fort Trumbull had crossed 
in boats and had thrown them.selves into Fort Griswold, and a favor- 
able wind springing up about this time, the enemy's ships were escap- 
ing up the river, notwithstanding the fire from Fort Trumbull and a 
six-pounder I had brought with me. I immediately dispatched a boat, 
with an officer, to Lieutenant-colonel Eyer to countermand my first 
order; but the officer arrived a few minutes too late. After a most 
obstinate defense of near forty minutes, the fort was carried by the 
superior bravery and perseverance of the assailants." 

The character of Arnold's incursion is indicated by his confidence 
that he was to meet with no serious opposition and courted none. 
While he was watching Fort Griswold, the Fortieth and Fifty fourth 
were storming its works. The outline of this work, with a small 
advanced redoubt, connected with a covered way, is correctly given 
on the map, and any visitor, as late as 1876, could trace the steep 
parapet, to the south, the bastions, the deep ditch, and even examine 
the old well, and the triangular breastwork which guarded the entrance. 
A small knoll near by, Avery's Hill or Ledge, was the rendezvous 
for the assailants, who did not wait for their artillery, but with 
eager confidence, after gathering their forces, were ready to ad- 
vance to the assault. The position was strong ; but its defenders 
were few. The small reinforcement from Fort Trumbull did not 
make the garrison more than one hundred and sixty all told. It was 
a severe test for the handful of men who saw the approaching regu- 



628 ARNOLD AT NEW LONDON. [1781. 

lars, who knew that the opposite shore was already in British pos- 
session and that their lives were to be imperiled, seemingly, for hon- 
or's sake. But a successful defense might reverse the whole issue. 
New London had then not been fired. The only possible point of 
resistance was Fort Griswold. Success would drive the British right 
wing to their ships. 

According to Arnold's report, when his messenger reached Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Eyer, " he had already sent Captain Beckwith with a 
flag to demand a surrender." Captain Shopley received the flag, 
according to the statements contained in Lieutenant Stephen Ham- 
stead's narrative and the equally interesting work of Miss Caulkins, 
compiled from the statements of survivors of the assault. At first, " a 
council of war unanimously voted that the garrison was unable to 
defend themselves against so superior a force." " Colonel Nathan 
Gallup of the Groton militia, who was present, insisted however, that 
he could procure a reinforcement of two or three hundred militia, 
in fifteen minutes, \( the garrison would holdout; and Lieutenant- 
colonel Ledyard was unfortunately misled by these assurances, and 
returned, through Captain Shopley, an answer, declining to comply 
with the order. Unfortunately the Colonel failed to meet with that 
success which he expected — his men offered to meet the enemy in the 
field, but peremptorily declining to enter the fort to fight against such 
great odds with no chance to escaped 

As a fair, unsuccessful resistance involved, ordinarily, only a fair 
surrender, and as only such men as could be readily rallied could par- 
ticipate in the defense, it is evident that the quotation made can not 
be precisely historical. Militia would have preferred the fort to the 
exposure of Groton Hill. Barber, in his Historical Collections, states 
that " on the advance of the enemy Colonel Ledyard, having but one 
hundred and fifty men with him in the fort, sent out an officer to get 
assistance, as there were a number of hundreds of people collected in 
the vicinity; this officer by drinking too much, became intoxicated, 
and no reinforcement was obtained." 

The defense of Fort Griswold during the afternoon of September 
sixth, 1 78 1, was correctly characterized by Arnold as "most obsti- 
nate." His officially reported loss, viz., " one major, one captain, one 
lieutenant, two ensigns, two sergeants and forty rank and file killed ; 
and one lieutenant-colonel, two captains, one lieutenant, one ensign, 
eight sergeants, two drummers and one hundred and twenty-seven 
rank and file wounded, total of casualties one hundred and sixty- 



i7Si.] ARNOLD AT NEW LONDON. 629 

three," and exceeding the number of the garrison, indicates the char- 
acter of the resistance. 

The battle was short, and is briefly stated. The storming parties 
on the south and south-east were compelled to pass a deep ditch and 
climb an embankment at least twelve feet in height. The storming 
party from the east eventually pressed through three embrasures or 
deep cuts in the rampart flanking the salient angle, for which there 
were, so far as known, no guns. The first repulse was complete and 
with great slaughter. The second assault crowned the parapet, and 
from the moment the troops leaped into the small area of the parade, 
there was indiscriminate butchery. All that the American militia did 
at King's Mountain, and all that Tarleton did to avenge his defeat at 
Cowpens, was summed up in the punishment of the garrison of Fort 
Griswold for their obstinate defense. There is no redeeming feature 
which history can recognize. The larger portion of the British cas- 
ualties occurred outside of the fort, when they were on the trying ad- 
vance, and they could not, and no troops could, inflict great loss upon 
active opponents firing from the cover of short pickets, supermounting 
the parapet. The authorities are conclusive that the American loss 
was insignificant until the British troops occupied the works and the 
garrison had practically yielded the contest. 

Arnold says "eighty-five men were found dead in Fort Griswold, 
and sixty wounded, most of them mortally." He adds, " I believe 
we have about seventy prisoners besides the wounded, who are pa- 
roled." This included both sides of the river. He says " their (the 
American) loss on the other side (the New London side) must have 
been considerable ; but can not be ascertained." 

** Lieutenant-colonel Eyer and three other officers of the Fifty- 
fourth were wounded. Major Montgomery was killed by a spear in 
entering the enemy's works, and Major Broomfield succeeded to the 
command." 

The gate of the fort was opened by order of Lieutenant-colonel 
Ledyard ; and Lieutenant-colonel Buskirk, of the New Jersey Volun- 
teers, arrived in time to participate in the closing scene, so that the 
wanton slaughter of Ledyard after he surrendered his sword is to be 
charged to the memory of an American loyalist, and 7iot to a British 
regular officer. When once this work began, the wounded were not 
spared and the tragedy was complete. 

Meanwhile Arnold was actively engaged in less dangerous work. 
He says " ten or twelve ships were burned, and one loaded with naval 



630 ARNOLD AT NEW LONDON. [17S1. 

stores, among the former, the cargo of the Hannah, Captain Watson, 
from London, lately captured by the enemy. The whole of which 
was burned with the stores, which proved to contain a large quantity 
of powder unknown to us. The explosion of the powder and the 
change of wind soon after the stores were fired, communicated the 
flames to part of the town, which was, notwithstanding effort to pre- 
vent it, unfortunately destroyed." Sixty-five dwellings, thirty-one 
stores and warehouses, eighty ships, twenty barns, a meeting-house, 
court-house, jail, the market and custom-house were among the tro- 
phies which ended the military achievements of Benedict Arnold, 
and passed him over to the care of universal history. 

His daring spirit was indeed fretted by repeated injustice, but his 
ungovernable temper almost invariably induced the occasion for his 
many disappointments. With the vindication of his valor at Saratoga, 
there must be as freely perpetuated, the inevitable doom which awaits 
a traitor. 

From this episode of an important campaign the attention is at 
once diverted to operations which it did not embarrass. 

While the allied army was waiting for additional transportation at 
Head of Elk, General Washington, accompanied by Count de Rocham- 
beau, visited Baltimore, where they were received with illuminations 
and civil honors. On the ninth, accompanied by one staff officer, he 
visited, for the first time during six years, his home at Mount Vernon. 
On the tenth his own suite and Count de Rochambeau and suite 
became his guests. On the eleventh General Chastellux and aids-de- 
camp were added to the company. On the twelfth the hospitalities 
of the mansion yielded their claim to the behests of duty, and on the 
fourteenth day of September, 1781, the American Commander-in- 
chief reached the headquarters of General La Fayette at Williamsburg. 




G3a* 



CHAPTER LXXV. 

SIEGE OF YORKTOVVN. SURRENDER OF CORNWALLIS. CLOSE OF 

CAMPAIGN. 1781. 

GOOD strategy before New York isolated Clinton ; and equal 
strategy in Virginia and the Chesapeake isolated Cornwallis. 
The former, outgeneraled, could not overtake the American army by 
land, — could not divert its commanding general from the crowning 
objective of his campaign, — could not resolve to hazard something at 
his own post and throw the bulk of his army upon Philadelphia and 
the American rear; while to relieve Yorktown by sea required imme- 
diate action and the support of an adequate fleet. The following 
dispatch indicates the position of Lord Cornwallis: 

{Cormvallis to Clinton.) "York, i6th September, 1781. In 
cypher. Dispatches of 2d and 6th (already noticed) acknowledged. 
The enemy's fleet has returned. Two line of battle ships, and one 
frigate, lie at the mouth of this river; and three or four line of battle 
ships, several frigates and transports, went up the bay on 12th and 
14th. I hear Washington arrived at Williamsburg on the 14th. 
Some of his troops embarked at Head of Elk, and the others arrived 
at Baltimore on the 12th. If I had no hopes of relief, I would rather 
risk an action than defend rny half finished works ; but as you say 
Digby is hourly expected, and promise every exertion to assist me, I 
do not think myself justified in putting the fate of the war on so des- 
perate an attempt. By examining the transports with care, and turn- 
ing out useless mouths, my provisions will last six weeks from this 
day, if we can preserve them from accidents. The cavalry must, 1 
fear, be all lost. I am of opinion, that you can do me no effectual 
service, but by coming directly to this place. Lieutenant Conway of 
this command is just exchanged. He assures me that since the 
Rhode Island squadron has joined they have thirty-six sail of the 



632 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. [1781. 

line. This place is in no state of defense. If you can not relieve me 
very soon, you must be prepared to hear the worst. 
I have the honor to be, etc., 

CORNWALLIS." 

The following dispatches are cited in this connection : 
[Clinton to Cormvallis.) "New York, Sept. 24th, 178 1. In cypher. 
(Received Sept. 29th, 1781). Foregoing dispatch acknowledged. 
At a meeting of the general and flag officers held this day, it was 
determined that above five thousand men rank and file, shall be em- 
barked on board the king's ships, and the joint exertions of the army 
and navy made in a few days to relieve you, and afterwards to coop- 
erate with you. The fleet consists of twenty-three sail of the line, 
three of which are three-deckers. There is every reason to hope we 
start from hence the 5th of October. 

" P. S. Admiral Digby is this moment arrived at the Hook, with 
three sail of the line. As a venture, not knowing whether they can 
be seen by us, I request that if all is well, upon hearing a considerable 
firing towards the entrance of the Chesapeake, three large separate 
smokes may be made parallel to it, and if you possess the post of 
Gloucester, /"c^^/r. I shall send another runner soon." 

The following dispatch was sent in reply : 

"York, 10 P. M., Sept. 29th, 1781. In cypher. I have ventured 
these last two days to look General Washington's whole force in the 
face in their position on the outside of my works, and I have the 
pleasure to assure your excellency that there was but one wish 
throughout the whole army, which was that the enemy would 
advance. I have this evening received your letter of the 24th which 
has given me the greatest satisfaction. I shall retire this night within 
the works, and have no doubt if relief arrives in any reasonable time, 
York and Gloucester will be both in possession of His Majesty's 
troops. I believe your excellency must depend more on the sound 
of our cannon than the signal of smokes for information ; however, I 
will attempt it on the Gloucester side ; medicines are wanted." 

{Clinton to Corjizvallis) " New York, Sept. 25th, 1781, (duplicate) 
in cypher, received October 2d. My Lord : — My letter of yesterday 
will have informed your lordship of the number of ships and troops 
we can bring with us. It is supposed the necessary repairs of the 
fleet will detain us here to the fifth of October; and your lordship 



rySi.J SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 633 

must be sensible that unforeseen accidents may lengthen it out a day 
or two longer ; I therefore entreat you to lose no time in letting me 
know your real situation, and your opinion how upon our arrival we 
can best act to form a junction with you, together with the exact 
strength of the enemy's fleet, and what part of the Chesapeake they 
appear to be most jealous of. I have the honor to be, etc., 

H. ClIxNTON." 

" P. S. As your lordship must have better intelligence than we 
possibly can have, I request you will send a trusty person to each of 
the capes about the seventh of next month, with every information 
respecting the force and situation of the enemy you may judge neces- 
sary, and directions to continue there until our arrival, when small 
vessels will be sent to bring off any person they may find there." 

The following reply brings the correspondence of these officers up 
to the practical operations of the siege : 

{Cornxvallis to Clinton}) " Yorktown, Virginia, October 3d, 1781, 
in cypher. Sir : — I received your letter of the twenty-fifth September, 
last night. The enemy are encamped about two miles from us. On 
the night of the 30th of September they broke ground, and made two 
redoubts about eleven hundred yards from our works, which, with 
some works that had been constructed to secure our exterior position, 
occupy a gorge between two creeks which nearly embrace this post. 
They have finished these redoubts, and I expect they will go on with 
their works this night. From the time that the enemy have given us, 
and the uncommon exertions of the troops, our works are in a better 
state of defense than we had reason to hope. I can see no means of 
forming a junction with us but by York River; and I do not think 
that any diversion would be of any use to us. Our accounts of the 
strength of the French fleet have in general been, that they were 
thirty-five or six sail of the line ; they have frequently changed their 
position ; two ships of the line and one frigate lie at the mouth of 
this river, and our last accounts were, that the body of the fleet lay 
between the tail of the Horse-shoe and York-spit. And it is likewise 
said that four line of battle ships lay a few days ago in Hampton 
Road. I see little chance of my being able to send persons to wait 
for you at the capes, but I will if possible. I have the honor to be, etc., 

CORNWALLIS." 

British Position. York or Yorktown, ten miles up York River, is 
situated upon the south or rigJit bank (which was then quite a bluff,) 



^34 » SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. [1781. 

between two small creeks, which according to Cornwallis " nearly em- 
braced the post." The British right rested on a swamp which bor- 
dered the creek, west of the town. Batteries one, two and three, 
see map " Siege of Yorktown," covered this approach ; and a large 
redoubt, completely fraized and fronted by abatis, had been built upon 
the bluff beyond this creek, westward, between the Williamsburg road 
and the river. This redoubt was occupied by the Fusileers ; and the 
Guadaloupe, 28, frigate, lay at anchor off the mouth of the creek. 
The east branch of this creek flowed through a deep ravine, or 
"gorge," as Cornwallis styles it. It will be seen that any approach 
to the town from the west or the front, was hardly practicable, and a 
retreat of the garrison, by the same route, would be as difficult. To 
the south-east, following the course of the river, was a large space of 
solid surface cut into ravines, under cover of one of which the besieg- 
ers ultimately moved toward their second parallel, thus shortening 
the zig-zag approaches. On the high ground in front of the great 
ravine or gorge, the British had located several redoubts. It has 
been seen that Lord Cornwallis abandoned them upon receipt of 
Clinton's dispatch of the twenty-fourth. Tarleton severely criticises 
the movement ; but his opinion is to be associated with his other 
opinion which favored an attack upon the American camp. He 
entirely omits important considerations. To have retained the re- 
doubts until they were assaulted would have demanded successful 
resistance, since their defenders could not re-cross that ravine under 
pressure. Cornwallis saved the garrisons by abandoning the works. 
Their consequent occupation by the French was of value to the be- 
siegers, because it brought them within easy range of fire, and the 
ravine in turn protected them from any sally from the garrison. In 
view of the whole situation, the natural approaches were from the 
north-east, hence the redoubts five, six, seven and eight received 
more care. Houses had been leveled, and a second line of trenches 
had been placed in their rear, as a last defense. Two redoubts had 
also been advanced into the open ground in front. The allied armies 
made their regular siege approaches entirely upon this front. 

Gloucester Point, across the river, a mile distant, had been first for- 
tified. With swamps flanking both the retiring shores, there was 
solid surface in front, and then for more than a mile the ground was 
clear of woods. 

American Position. On the day after General Washington's arri- 
val at Williamsbure, he notified Count de Grasse that " such of the 



lySi.] SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 635 

American troops as found insufficient transportation at Head of Elk, 
were marching to Baltimore, to be put on board of transports that 
might be collected there, and requested assistance in this respect. 
In a postscript he remarks that " his wishes had been anticipated." 
Admiral Barras, who arrived on the tenth, had already sent ten trans- 
ports from the squadron, two frigates captured in the recent naval 
action, and some other prize vessels, to move the troops. They em- 
barked at Annapolis for James River. 

On the seventeenth. General Washington, the Count de Rocham- 
beau. General Knox, and General Du Portail embarked on the Queen 
Charlotte, and visited Count de Grasse on his flag-ship, the Ville de 
Paris, arriving on the eighteenth. They were received with appropri- 
ate honors, and confirmed their plans for conducting the siege. By 
reason of severe and contrary winds they did not regain Williamsburg 
until the twenty-second. The American Commander-in-chief was at 
once confronted with a question which threatened to destroy his well- 
laid plans. The arrival of Admiral Digby at New York with three 
ships of the line, reported at six, inclined Count de Grasse to re-unite 
his entire fleet, leave two vessels at the mouth of York, four frigates 
and some corvettes in the James, and then sail toward New York to 
intercept or engage the British fleet — tJicn " to act in concert ; but 
each on his side." An earnest appeal by La Fayette in person, per- 
suaded the Count de Grasse to change his purpose and accept the 
judgment of the generals commanding the land forces. On the 
twenty-fifth, the remaining troops reached Williamsburg, making a 
total force of twelve thousand regular troops, besides militia, which 
exceeded four thousand men. 

On the twenty-eighth, the entire army advanced and took a posi- 
tion within about two miles of the British advanced works, and on the 
twenty-ninth, after a thorough reconnoissance, the movement began 
for encircling the town and closing in upon its defenders. On the 
thirtieth it was found that Lord Cornwallis had withdrawn his troops 
from the front, and the allied lines were established in the general 
form of a semi-circle, with each extreme resting on the York River. 
During the skirmishing incident to reconnoitering service Colonel 
Scammel, whose services had greatly endeared him to the Command- 
er-in-chief and to the army, was mortally wounded, taken prisoner, 
and carried into Yorktown. He was removed to Williamsburg by 
consent of Lord Cornwallis, but died on the sixth of October. 

General Lincoln occupied the banks of Wormley's Creek, near 



636 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. [1781. 

Moore's house, and the general arrangement of the other troops, 
before the active operations of the siege began, is indicated on the 
map. 

On the Gloucester side, the Neck was occupied by the Duke de 
Lauzun with his legion of cavalry, and a body of Virginia militia under 
General Weedon. Eight hundred marines from the squadron of 
Count de Grasse landed on the first of October to reinforce the de- 
tachment. General de Cloisy was in command, and although repeated 
skirmishes ensued, no persistent efforts were made to break through 
the American lines, and the offensive action of the allies was limited 
to the confinement of the British troops to its defenses and the area in 
front of the works. On one occasion, while covering a foraging party, 
Colonel Tarleton was unhorsed. The British lost one officer and 
eleven men and the French Hussars lost two officers and fourteen 
men. The contradictory opinions expressed as to the merits of this 
skirmish are settled by Tarleton's own report of it, where he says : 
*' A dragoon's horse of the British legion, plunged, on being struck 
with a spear, and overthrew Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton and his 
horse. This circumstance happening to occur so much nearer to the 
body of the French than the British cavalry, excited an apprehension 
in the latter for the safety of their commanding officer. Impelled by 
this idea the whole of the English rear set out in full speed from its 
distant situation, and arrived in such disorder that its charge was 
unable to make any impression upon the Duke de Lauzun's Hussars. 
Meanwhile Tarleton escaped the enemy and obtained another horse, 
when, perceiving the broken state of his cavalry, occasioned by their 
anxiety for his safety, he ordered a retreat, to afford them an oppor- 
tunity of recovering from their confusion." 

Colonel Tarleton's closing adventure of the war, which did not 
lessen his reputation as a dashing cavalry officer, failed, as did his 
whole career, in establishing him any fame as a scientific soldier. 

It was not until the sixth that the heavy guns were brought up, 
and then the utmost vigor was used to push the siege. The Count 
de Grasse consented to stay on the coast until the first of November, 
notwithstanding the detention would be greater than he at first 
anticipated, since it was well understood that Sir Henry Clinton 
would attempt to relieve the post as soon as he could procure a 
squadron sufficiently strong to risk a conflict with the French fleet. 

Washington reported to the President of Congress, under date 
of October twelfth, " that the first parallel had been opened on the 



lySi.] SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 637 

sixth, at night, within six hundred yards of the enemy, and under 
the direction of General Lincoln, both French and American troops 
participating in the movement. One French officer wounded, and 
sixteen privates killed and wounded comprised the casualties." 

"On the seventh and eighth, work was advanced upon this paral- 
lel ; several redoubts were established and the French mounted heavy 
guns at the redoubts which the British abandoned on the twenty- 
ninth." " On the ninth, at five o'clock in the afternoon, the American 
battery on the right opened with six eighteen and twenty-four pound- 
ers, two mortars and two howitzers ; the French having opened fire 
on the left, at three o'clock, with four twelve pounders and six howit- 
zers. This fire was directed against the embrasures, dismounting 
guns, destroying the hastily constructed earthworks and preparing 
the way for the next advance. 

" On the tenth, two French batteries, one of two eighteen and 
twenty-four pounders and six mortars and howitzers, and the other 
of four eighteen pounders, opened fire, and two American batteries, 
one of four eighteen pounders and one of two mortars, joined in the 
cannonade. 

" During the evening a hot shot from one of the French batteries 
set the frigate Charon, 44, on fire and in the morning two transports 
shared the same fate. The Guadaloupe and other vessels were trans- 
ferred to the Gloucester shore to escape injury from shot and shell 
which passed over the city. 

"On the eleventh, the second parallel was established within three 
hundred yards of the British works, with the loss of but one man 
killed and two or three wounded." 

The condition of affairs within these works is very clearly indi- 
cated by the official reports of Lord Cornwallis, and he, of all men, 
was better situated to estimate the results thus far realized by the 
besieging forces. On the tenth he received a dispatch from Sir Henry 
Clinton by the hands of Major Cochran, dated " New York, September 
30th," (duplicate), in cypher, which reads as follows, " I am doing 
everything in my power to relieve you by a direct move, and I have 
every reason to hope, from the assurance given me this day by 
Admiral Graves, that we may pass the bar by the 12th of October, if 
the winds permit and no unfortunate accident happens. Answer." 

{Cormvallis to Clinton.) "October nth, 1781,121*1. In cypher. 
Cochran arrived yesterday. I have only to report that nothing but 
a direct move to York River, which includes a successful naval action, 



638 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. [1781. 

can save me. The enemy made their first parallel on tlie night of the 
sixth, at the distance of six hundred yards, and have perfected it, and 
constructed places of arms and batteries with great regularity and 
caution. On the evening of the ninth their batteries opened and 
have since continued firing without intermission, with about forty 
cannon, mostly heavy, and sixteen mortars, from eight to sixteen 
inches. We have lost about seventy men, and many of our works are 
considerably damaged ; and in such works, on disadvantageous 
ground, against so powerful an attack, one can not hope to make a 
very long resistance." " P. S. October nth, 5 P.M. Since my 
letter was written we have lost thirty men." 

" October 12th, .7 P. M. Last night the enemy made their second 
parallel at the distance of three hundred yards. We continue to lose 
men very fast." 

On the thirteenth and fourteenth the allies maintained fire from 
mortars, but occupied the time, chiefly, in completing the second 
parallel. The line of redoubts and batteries marked F. (French) had 
been completed, but it was essential to the completion of this parallel 
that the two advanced redoubts on the British left should be reduced 
and taken into the lines. Such had been the effect of the fire, so far 
as could be ascertained, that it was decided to take those by assault, 
and details of troops were made for the purpose. 

The American light infantry, under the direction of General La 
Fayette, were assigned to the assault of the redoubt nearest the 
river, and the force was organized as follows : — Colonel Gimat's battal- 
ion led the van, followed by that of Colonel Hamilton who took com- 
mand, then Colonel Laurens with eighty men, to take the redoubt in 
flank, and Colonel Barber's battalion, as a supporting column. 

The French column, under the direction of Baron de Viomenil, 
was led by the German Grenadier regiment of Count William Fosbach 
de Deux Fonts, supported by the grenadiers of the regiment of 
Gatinais. This regiment had been formed out of that of Auvergne, 
once commanded by De Rochambeau, and once known as the 
Regiment D^ Auvergne sans /ac/ie, '^ Auvergne, without a stain." The 
grenadiers were drawn up to receive their instructions and De Rocham- 
beau, in person, pledged himself to ask of Louis XVL the restoration 
of their old name if they did their duty. (The king subsequently re- 
deemed this pledge.) 

The attacks were made simultaneously, upon rocket signals, accord- 
ing to agreement. The redoubt nearest the river was defended by a 



I78i.] SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 639 

detachment of less than sixty men. Colonel Hamilton led the men 
rapidly forward with unloaded muskets, climbing over abatis as best 
possible, and in a very short time he was over the parapet. Laurens 
entered from the rear, and the occupation of the work was secured in 
a few minutes. Colonel Gimat and Colonel Barber who came up with 
his reserve promptly and followed the advance, were both wounded. 
The American loss was one sergeant and eight privates killed, seven 
officers and twenty-five non-commissioned officers and privates 
wounded. The British loss was but eight killed, (the resistance hav- 
ing ceased as soon as the American troops commanded the position) 
and seventeen prisoners, including Major Campbell, who commanded 
the redoubt. 

The redoubt which was assailed by the French was defended by 
more than a hundred men. The French sappers removed the abatis 
deliberately, under fire, and when a path was cleared, a steady vigor- 
ous charge with the bayonet effected the result. Count de Dumas, 
the Chevalier de Lameth, Adjutant-general of La Fayette, and the 
Count de Deux Fonts were wounded. Before the signal had been 
given some light words passed between the Baron de Viomenil and 
General La Fayette, as to the superiority of the French grenadiers for 
these attacks, and as soon as the Americans achieved their success, 
La Fayette, with prompt pleasantry, sent Major Barber to tender any 
needed assistance. The redoubts were taken into the second parallel 
before morning. 

The following dispatch, in cypher, dated October 15th, 1781, is 
the announcement which Lord Cornwallis made to Sir Henry Clinton 
of this disaster : 

" Sir : Last evening the enemy carried my two advanced redoubts 
by storm, and during the night have included these in their second 
parallel, which they are at present busy in perfecting. My situation 
has now become very critical. We dare not show a gun to their old 
batteries, and I expect that their new ones will open to-morrow 
morning, so that we shall soon be exposed to an assault in ruined 
works, in a bad position, and with weakened numbers. The safety of 
the place is therefore so precarious that I can not recommend that 
the fleet and army should run great risk in endeavoring to save us." 

The same officer wrote on the twentieth, giving an account of a 
sortie made from the post, and of his attempt to rescue the chief por- 
tion of his army ; and the narrative will adopt his description as more 
personal and impressive than that of the American officers. 



640 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. [1781. 

{Cornwallis to Clinton.) October 20th. " A little before day 
broke, on the morning of the sixteenth, I ordered a sortie of about 
three hundred and fifty men under Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, 
to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the greatest forward- 
ness and to spike the guns. A detachment of guards with the eight- 
ieth company of grenadiers under the command of Lieutenant-colonel 
Lake, attacked the one, and one of light infantry under the command 
of Major Armstrong commanded the other, and both succeeded in 
forcing the redoubts that covered them, spiking eleven guns, and kill- 
ing or wounding about one hundred French troops, which had the 
guard of that part of the trenches, and with little loss on our side. 
This action proved of little public advantage, for the cannon having 
been spiked in a hurry, were soon rendered fit for service again, and 
before dark the whole parallel and batteries appeared to be nearly 
complete. At this time we knew that there was no part of the whole 
front attacked on which we could show a single gun, and our shells 
were nearly expended. I therefore had only to choose between pre- 
paring to surrender next day, or endeavoring to get off with the 
greatest part of the troops, and I determined to attempt the latter. 
. . . It might at least delay the enemy in the prosecution of fur- 
ther enterprises. Sixteen large boats were ordered to be in readiness 
to receive troops precisely at ten o'clock. With these I hoped to 
pass the infantry during the night, abandoning our baggage, and leav- 
ing a detachment to capitulate for the towns-people, and the sick and 
wounded, on which subject a letter was ready to be delivered to Gen- 
eral Washington. . . . With the utmost secrecy the light in- 
fantry, greater part of the guards, and part of the Twenty-third regi- 
ment landed at Gloucester ; but at this critical moment, the weather, 
from being moderate and calm, changed to a most violent storm of 
wind and rain, and drove all of the boats, some of which had troops 
on board, down the river. ... In this situation with my little 
force divided, the enemy's batteries opened at daybreak ; the passage 
between this place and Gloucester was much exposed ; but the boats 
being now returned, they were ordered to bring back the troops, and 
they joined us in the forenoon without much loss. Our works were 
in the meantime going to ruin. We at that time could not fire a 
single gun, only one eight-inch and a little more than one hundred 
cohorn shells remained. ... I therefore proposed to capitulate." 

At about ten o'clock of the morning of the seventeenth of October 
and almost at the hour when Sir Henry Clinton, with a land force of 



i/Si] SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 641 

seven thousand choice troops under convoy of twenty-five ships of 
the Hne, two fifties and eight frigates were saihng down the Bay of 
New York to go to the relief of the worn-out garrison, a flag was sent 
to the American headquarters with the following note : 

" Earl Cornwallis to General Washington. 

"York, 17//* October, 1781. 
" Sir : I propose a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours 
and that two officers be appointed by each side, to meet at Mr. 
Moore's house, to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York 
and Gloucester. 

" I have the honor to be, etc., 

" Cornwallis." 

General Washington to Earl Cornwallis (Reply) : 

" My Lord : I have had the honor of receiving your lordship's 
letter of this date. 

"An ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood will 
readily incline me to listen to such terms for the surrender of your 
posts of York and Gloucester as are admissible. 

"I wish, previously to the meeting of commissioners, that your 
lordship's proposals in writing may be sent to the American lines, for 
which purpose a suspension of hostilities during two hours from the 
delivery of this letter, will be granted. 

" I have the honor to be, etc., 

" George Washington." 

In accordance with this condition Earl Cornwallis submitted a 
proposition at half-past four in the afternoon ; but its terms being 
too general, commissioners were appointed : the Viscount de Noailles 
and Lieutenant-colonel Laurens on the part of the allies, and Colonel 
Dundas and Major Ross on the part of the British, to define the 
conditions more explicitly. On the eighteenth, the articles were 
completed ; on the nineteenth they were signed by Cornwallis and 
Thomas Symonds at Yorktown, and by George Washington, Le 
Compte de Rochambeau and Le Compte de Barras, for himself 
and Compte de Grasse, " in the trenches before Yorktown, in Vir- 
ginia." 

At twelve o'clock, the two redoubts on the left flank of York were 
delivered over, one to American infantry and the other to French 
grenadiers. 

41 



642 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. [1781. 

At one o'clock, two works on the Gloucester side were delivered 
respectively to French and American troops. At two o'clock, the 
garrison of York marched out to the appointed place in front of the 
post, with shouldered arms, colors cased, drums beating a British 
march, grounded their arms and returned to their encampments to 
remain until dispatched to their several destinations in Virginia, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania. At three o'clock, the garrison of Glou- 
cester marched out, the cavalry with drawn swords, trumpets sound- 
ing and the infantry as prescribed for the garrison of York. 

The land forces became prisoners to the United States, and the 
marine forces to the naval army of France. 

The general conditions of the surrender were the same as those 
observed when General Lincoln surrendered Charleston during 1780. 

The British troops marched to the field of ceremony with their 
usual steadiness, and the whole army having received an issue of new 
clothing, their appearance was as soldierly as if on garrison parade. 
When General O'Hara approached General Washington and apolo- 
gized for the absence of General Cornwallis, on account of indisposi- 
tion, he was referred to General Lincoln. That officer received, and 
as promptly returned his sword, and the troops having deposited 
their arms returned to the post. The absence of Earl Cornwallis has 
been often criticised, as if his excuse was but a sham. He was too 
good a soldier to dodge disagreeable duty, and the ungenerous critics 
might recall the months of strain to which he had been subjected, be- 
fore passing censure upon one who had passed through so severe an 
ordeal. The subsequent courtesies which passed between himself and 
Washington are matters of history ; and the military sagacity of Lord 
Cornwallis was equal to his good taste, when, in response to a toast 
given by General Washington, " TJie British Ar7ny," Earl Cornwallis 
turning to his host, thus closed — " And when the illustrious part that 
your Excellency has borne in this long and laborious contest becomes 
matter of history, fame will gather your brightest laurels rather from 
the banks of the Delaware than from those of the Chesapeake." 

It was on the nineteenth of October, while the surrender was in 
progress, that Sir Henry Clinton left Sandy Hook. He made the 
Capes on the twenty-fourth, but returned on the twenty-ninth, when 
assured that the fate of the campaign was settled. 

" The general return of officers and privates surrendered at York- 
town, as taken from the original muster rolls, is stated by the com- 
missary of prisoners to have been as follows : — General and staff, 79 ; 



1 78 I.J SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 643 

artillery, 23; guards, 527; light infantry, 671 ; 17th regt., 245; 23d 
regt., 233 ; 33d regt., 260 ; 43d regt., 359 ; 71st regt., 300 ; 76th regt., 
715; 80th regt., 689 ; two battalions of Anspach, 1077, (these two 
battalions alone had colonels present) Prince Hereditary, 484 ; Regi- 
ment of de Bose, 349; Yagers, 74; British legion, 241; Queen's 
Rangers, 320 ; North Carolina vols., 142 ; Pioneers, 44 ; Engineers, 23 : 
Total, including commissary department and 80 followers of the 
army, 7,247 men : Total of ofificers and men, alone, 7,073 ; seamen and 
from shipping, about 900 officers and men." Other authorities 
increase this number to over 8,000. It is evident from this report 
that the record office return of August 15th, cited on page 462 and as 
intimated elsewhere, over-estimates the really effective force. The 
return of June 1st, 1782, for example, carries the "late garrison of 
Yorktown " into the record as 8,806 men. 

Seventy-five brass guns, 69 iron guns, 18 German and six British 
regimental standards, were among the trophies captured. 

The military chest contained ;^ 2,1 13 6s. sterling. The Guada- 
loupe, 28 ; the o/d Fowey, the Benetta (sloop), 24, and Vulcan, 
fire ship, 24 ; thirty transports, fifteen galleys, and many smaller 
vessels, with nearly nine hundred officers and seamen, were surren- 
dered to the French. 

The Benetta was placed at the disposal of Earl Cornwallis as a 
dispatch vessel, to be returned, or accounted for to the Count de 
Grasse. 

The American casualties during the siege, up to the sixteenth, as 
recorded in Washington's Diary, were twenty-three killed, sixty-five 
wounded ; the French, fifty-two killed, one hundred and thirty-four 
wounded. The British casualties were one hundred and fifty-six 
killed, three hundred and twenty-six wounded, and seventy missing. 
Major Cochran, acting aid-de-camp to Earl Cornwallis, was the only 
British field officer who fell during the siege. 

In the letter of Earl Cornwallis of the twentieth of October there 
occurs the following expression as to his treatment after the surrender. 
" The treatment, in general, that we have received from the 
enemy since our surrender, has been perfectly good and proper ; but 
the kindness and attention that has been shown us by the French 
officers in particular, their delicate sensibility of our situation, their 
generous and pressing offer of money, both public and private, to 
any amount, has really gone beyond what I can possibly describe, 
and will, I hope, make an impression on the breast of every British 



644 SIEGE OF YORKTJWN. [1781. 

officer, whenever the fortune of war should put any of them into our 
power." 

This testimonial of Earl Cornwallis is worthy of lasting mention 
and is in harmony with his own generous character and conduct. 

It is in this place proper to place him with Burgoyne, who, with 
like misfortunes, achieved a record unsurpassed, if equaled, by any 
other British General, for untiring, unselfish and skillful conduct under 
circumstances of protracted trial which no misfortune could tarnish. 

From Long Island to Yorktown, even in spite of the early errors 
of military policy which attach to this kind of war and which were 
maintained by the British Cabinet, he showed himself the rival of 
Howe in strategic skill, of Clinton in courage, and superior to both in 
appreciation of the opportunities and demands of the protracted 
struggle. The narrative has sufficiently illustrated the difficulties of 
his service ; and the criticisms of Tarleton and Clinton, after the war 
closed, do not disclose facts to show that he had alternatives of action, 
in the Southern or Virginia campaigns, which afforded him any better 
military opportunities than those which he in each case improved to 
the full extent of the troops and resources at his command. 

It would be unjust to General Clinton to take his own correspond- 
ence or even his own defense as explanatory of his intercourse with 
General Cornwallis during the Carolina and Virginia campaigns. In 
his vindication, which really lies in circumstances beyond his con- 
trol, he rests too much upon the assumption that one of the two 
officers must bear the responsibility of the failures, overlooking too 
often the fact, that adequate support was not furnished. He had, 
however, in his extreme assurance of success, encouraged the British 
ministry, in a direction exactly in harmony with its bias and wishes, 
and his repeated claims for more troops induced a conviction of in- 
efficiency. He was brave, as a soldier, but timid and uncertain in 
policy, and his excellence lay in execution, when the work was before 
him and action was the only alternative. Too much was expected of 
the British Generals, with the resources at their disposal, and the 
entire series of paper controversy seems like so many attempts to save 
one at another's expense, because there had to be a scape-goat for 
every unexpected military disaster. 

On the date last referred to, October twentieth, 1781, General 
Washington closed an order of congratulation to the allied army in 
the following words : 

" Divine service is to be performed to-morrow in the several brigades 



i7Si.] SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 645 

and divisions. The Commander-in-chief earnestly recommends that 
the troops, not on duty, should universally attend, with that serious- 
ness of deportment and gratitude of heart which the recognition of 
such reiterated and astonishing interpositions of Providence demand 
of us.". 

In closing the career of these two men who have filled prominent 
places in the Battle narrative, so near its close, there remains only to 
add the single statement, that the correspondence embodied in the 
text is to be accepted as written in good faith by both parties, and 
each suffered. Tlie French fleet was in their way. 

Washington paid his respects in person to Count de Grasse, and 
various enterprises were suggested for the vigorous prosecution of the 
advantage already gained. The most prominent was one against 
Charleston. A second proposed the transportation of La Fayette to 
Wilmington with a mixed command of French and American troops. 
The inevitable delays, the lateness of the season, the heavy draught 
of the ships, the augmentation of the British naval forces on the 
North American Station, and the urgent demand for his presence in 
the West Indies, were among the causes which deterred the Count de 
Grasse from such movements and eventually suspended further propo- 
sitions. On the fourth of November he left the coast, having received 
from Washington, Congress, and the American people, repeated 
acknowledgments of the services of himself and his fleet. A stand 
of colors and a piece of ordnance were voted to himself and Count de 
Rochambeau, and it " was decreed, that there should be a marble mon- 
ument erected at Yorktown to commemorate the alliance between 
France and the United States and the victory achieved by their as- 
sociated arms." 

The Marquis de St. Simon embarked his troops October thirty- 
first, and sailed for the West Indies. Count de Rochambeau remained 
in Virginia, with headquarters at Williamsburg, until the summer, 
holding his command subject to orders for any required detail. He 
afterward returned through Philadelphia to the Hudson; thence to 
New England in the fall, and sailed from Boston for the West Indies 
early in December, 1782. His army, whether in camp or on the 
march, was the theme of general praise for its admirable discipline 
and good deportment. 

General Lincoln conducted the main army to winter quarters in 
New Jersey and on the Hudson, and soon assumed his duties as Sec- 
retary of War ; St. Clair and Wayne went south to the reinforcement 



646 



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 



[1781. 



of Greene, and the army was thus widely distributed at the close of 
this last active campaign. La Fayette seeing no prospect of active 
service, returned to France, bearing with him the affection of the 
American people, next to that with which they honored Washing- 
ton. The usual relaxation of military obligation took place, increased 
greatly by the conviction that peace was not far distant, and the 
usual routine of embarrassment follov/ed the efforts to maintain an army. 

Sir Guy Carleton succeeded Sir Henry Clinton early in May, 1782, 
and on the seventh, he advised Washington that he had been asso- 
ciated with Admiral Digby in a commission to consider the terms of 
permanent peace. 

The moderate party in England received fresh strength ; the min- 
istry succumbed to the force of the last blow. France was as eager 
as other nations to stop the cost and waste of war, and the siege of 
Yorktown eventually wrought out for the people of the United States 
their National Independence. 

British Effective Force. 

Note. — From " Original Returns in the British Record Office." Date September ist, 
1781. 

New York Virginia South Carolina 

British 5932 5544 5024 

German 8629 2204 1596 

Provincials 2140 1137 3155 



Total 16,701 

Georgia 

British . 

German 486 . 

Provincials 598 . 



8S85 

East Florida 
•••• 546 



9775 

West Florida 
374 

55S 

2x1 



1084 

Nova Scotia 

British 1745 

German 562 .... 

Provincials ii45 • • • • 



546 

Providence Island 
135 



1143 

Bermudas 

. 354 



345: 



135 



354 



Total 42,075. 

Troops under Cornwallis in Virginia. 
Note. From " Original Returns in the British Record Office." Date August 1st, 1781. 

British 5541 Provincials 1137 

German 2148 On Detachments 607 



7689 



Total, 9,433. 



1744 




OiG* 



CHAPTER LXXVI. 



CONCLUSION. 



IN the consideration of the battles and some of the associated 
minor operations of the war of 1775-1781, in connection with 
estabhshed principles which must interpret the relations and value of 
military facts and military conduct, there are found some incidents 
of the history which are very properly retouched, at the close of the 
narrative. While partly involved in the general notice of the " Revo- 
lutionary Epoch " and more directly suggested by the discussion of 
"Wars between Nations" and " Military Principles Defined," they 
are worthy of re-statement, as the legitimate effects of permanent 
causes. 

General Features of tJic Strtiggle. This conflict, in the governing 
resistance of its authorized advocates, was Revolutionary ; and neither 
an Insurrection nor a simple Rebellion. It necessarily partook of 
elements which characterize Civil War (Chapter VI), and these elements 
were multiplied, exactly in proportion as the armies were too small, 
or too detached, to strike decisive blows in the field. Some of the 
partisan corps, on both sides, as with the guerilla parties during the 
Peninsula war in Portugal and .Spain, the wars of Vendee, and at 
certain stages of the American civil war of 1 861-5, were numerous, 
active and unsparing, just as they were at the time beyond the 
influence and control of organized troops. While skirmishing and 
scouting parties, which form the light troops of a regular army, are 
called upon to sever communications, seize and destroy depots of 
supplies, or otherwise disable an adversary, thereby to reduce his 
means of offensive action, it is however no more certain now, than it 
was during the period under notice, that violence to non-resisting 
soldiers, or citizens, and the infliction of suffering upon the defense- 
less people of the country where war prevails, is fatal to the best sue- 



648 CONCLUSION. [1781. 

cess. It is no less a violation of the rights and obHgations of war 
itself, and repugnant to the spirit of that Christianity which admits of 
no war, whatever, unless to subserve righteousness and enforce peace. 

The causes which, from the very inception of the conflict, seemed 
to force a wrong " Military Policy" upon the British Cabinet, were 
considered in the preliminary discussions ; and the perpetuation of that 
policy was interwoven with the progress of every campaign. The 
adoption of the views of the moderate party in England, as late as 
the close of Burgoyne's campaign, even at the cost of American 
Independence, would have secured to Great Britain a natural ally, and 
one well located to afford material aid to her operations in the West 
Indies. It might also have averted the European Coalition which 
drew inspiration, if not its existence, from the prolonged struggle in 
America. The progress of all attempts at reconciliation was attended 
by the assumption, that an unprincipled and groundless rebellion, 
impelled by an original purpose to obtain national independence, 
was the kind of opposition which was to be reduced to terms. This 
failure to appreciate the real character of the issue between Great 
Britain and the Colonies, involved, at the very outset, a failure to 
furnish adequate means for the prosecution of the war ; and the error 
grew more and more glaring, as the pressure from other adversaries 
made it impossible to supplement the defect. This error was recip- 
rocated by the American people. Their conduct of the war during 
each successive campaign is clearly indicative of a failure to adopt 
an energetic Military Policy, which alone promised early success. 
Its neglect involved nearly seven years of struggle and more than 
eight years of unrest and waste. The pressure of an emergency 
would indeed, now and then, arouse a feverish, popular response ; 
but when the danger passed by, relaxation ensued ; and then — a 
series of uncertainties, fluctuations and disasters, just at times, when 
exhaustive measures were vital to success. That multiplication of 
miseries, which were often related to mere hunger, cold, or want of 
money, had its germ in this lack of conscious obhgation to devote 
all available appliances to the quickest possible destruction of the Brit- 
ish army. 

There were natural causes for this state of affairs. The jealousy 
of central authority which individualized states, extended its enfee- 
bling influence to communities even smaller than states. Local and 
sectional prejudices were hardly less destructive, through their para- 
lyzing force, than British armies were in the operations of the field. 



lySi.] CONCLUSION. 649 

Tlie letters of General Greene, embodied in a statement of the true 
conditions to permanent success, as cited on page 85, are expressive 
of the true military policy which belonged to the colonies at the 
beginning of the war. 

It is impossible to examine the narrative, condensed as it is, with- 
out the conviction that a thorough cooperation of the colonies in 
the effort to raise a national army, irrespective of local dangers, would 
have lessened those dangers and would have diminished the cost and 
shortened the duration of the war. From the many documents, 
muster-rolls and official statements which have been cited, it appears 
that there were several occasions when the prompt support of the 
American army would have achieved victory; and it is equally true 
that the British army repeatedly had as good assurance of success, 
but for its over-estimate of the American forces in the field. And yet 
in proportion as the British forces diminished, or withheld the offen- 
sive, so did their opponents seem impatient of further sacrifice ; and 
the constant fluctuations of the American army, together with great 
scarcity of army supplies, as well as of money, made the opening and 
close of every campaign to appear as if a single bold stroke of the 
British troops must end the struggle. 

Even when the fall of Yorktown drew near, the effective strength 
of Washington's army at the north was less than that of the combined 
French armies of Rochambeau and St. Simon, and was not superior 
to the army of Cornwallis itself in respect of numbers. 

The apprehensions of La Fayette and of the French Minister of 
Finance, that the Americans would depend too implicitly upon ex- 
ternal aid, and would fail to meet a corresponding responsibility, were 
partially confirmed; and the occasional complaint that the French 
army and navy did no more, was largely based upon a consciousness 
of inadequate home effort, and the fatigue experienced under the 
pressure of protracted struggle. 

The reluctance of States to waive leadership and recognize one 
permanent responsibility, which impaired the efficiency of military 
action early in the war, was followed by extreme jealousy of a well 
organized and highly disciplined army. Because Bunker Hill ex- 
pressed the capacity of true valor to resist efficiently, under favoring 
opportunity, it did not follow that the fresh regiments of Stark, 
Chester, Prescott, or Christopher Greene were, man for man, in open 
field, the fighting peers of the British Fifth, Thirty-eighth, and Forty- 
second resriments which withered under their fire. The warnings, 



650 CONCLUSION. [1781. 

appeals and protests of Washington were even more earnest for dis- 
ciplined men than for food or clothing. He knew well that money 
and supplies would follow success ; and he knew just as well that the 
people would have confidence in an army only in the proportion that 
strict discipline, exact accountability, and fitness to sustain the strug- 
gle would give the pledge of an earnest purpose to finish the war. 
The patriotism which endured starvation and exposure at Valley 
Forge and Morristown had its strength in the discipline attained ; 
because a conscious fitness for duty inspired pride and courage, while 
the true patriot w^as willing to undergo the proper training v/hich 
would give to his energies the best capacity to achieve. 

With this brief resume of the errors and shortcomings of both 
Great Britain and the American Republic in the direction of Military 
Policy, there is involved another class of considerations which inspire 
awe, and unmistakably declare the true Philosophy of the American 
struggle for National Independence. 

The former regarded the effectual resistance of the colonies to be 
just as impossible as King Pharaoh of Egypt believed the persistent 
demands of the greatest patriotic leader of ancient times to be absurd, 
and innocent of danger to his ancestral rights and royal prerogative. 

The latter, in their long protracted importunity for satisfaction, 
equality and peace, besought, then resisted, struggled on, and still 
resisted, until the purpose to be emancipated became a part of the 
inner life. It was at the hearth-stone as well as in the skirmish. It 
was before the domestic altar, as well as in the tent or barracks. The 
hands of women wrought in silence and in tears, while their husbands 
fought the battle amid tumult and carnage. It was with all childish 
sports until mimic war gave precocious vigor to youth, and boys took 
part in a conflict with men. But as from year to year, deliverance 
ever beckoned forward, only to recede, campaign after campaign, and 
still there was hope, and with it progress ; the American people did 
not even then anticipate the great duration of that wearisome struggle, 
any more than the Hebrew militia forecast their forty years of tire- 
some marchings in pursuit of independence and peace. It was well 
they did not. Great Britain was blind to operations of the laws 
which gave her her liberty. America was blind to the cost of rescu- 
ing wiperiled liberty. The blindness of the one withheld the force. 
The blindness of the other supplied the faith. 

The Chariot of the Ruler of the Universe rode through and over 
the theatre of war. TJiese on the one side were stayed, and these on 



nsi.j CONCLUSION. 651 

the other side were encouraged. The weakness of physical might 
and power in a moral struggle, was made to exalt the emotional and 
the spiritual, and to vindicate man, by the interposition of his Maker. 

Bad MiHtary Policy, as a matter of human science, made the war 
of 1775-1781 long and costly. Infinite wisdom ordained for both 
parties an independent prosperity, a higher mission among the nations. 

Thus while " Military Science is the key to military history," there 
is an inner realm of unseen cause which the key of Providence alone 
controls, and that nation which has the sublimer faith will gather the 
fruit of peace, while others languish in the pursuit through the endless 
issues of controversy and blood. 

There is still another lesson to be drawn from this narrative, 
and one which the very weakness of the American army at that 
period has made impressive for all time, and that is, the ultimate 
dependence of all nations upon moral convictions, for the vindication 
of either personal or national liberty. Under the " Apology for the 
Art of War," the necessity for standing armies was made manifest. 
Under the review of the American Revolution, the capacity of a peo- 
ple led by a small army has been demonstrated. It is a confirmation 
of the general principles with which the narrative opened ; and an 
encouragement to all nations that there is to be a time when the 
administration of civil law alone will require ph)'sical force ; and when 
the superior obligation of equal justice will alike end armaments and 
armies. 

With this inevitable side drift which carries military policy into 
all the responsibilities of a national life, there is a necessary recurrence 
to other elements of the war under notice. 

The Strategy of the zvar of 1775-81 is best appreciated by exam- 
ination and application of the principles heretofore stated. Their 
repetition is not required. That the location of the American head- 
quarters in New Jersey and on the Hudson, admitted of all possible 
strategic eoinbinations diWd contingencies which were involved in move- 
ments of British troops from Canada, New York, or by the Chesapeake, 
is evident from the readiness with which such enterprises were met 
and foiled ; and it is equally evident that the so-called Fabian policy 
of Washington was based upon the conviction that a true strategic 
policy would be adopted on the part of the British Cabinet, and that 
zvas to destroy his army, and let cities, districts, and provinces fall 
through the want of compact, sufficient and disciplined defenders. 
The narrative affords the facts by which to judge of the skill employed 



652 CONCLUSION. [1781. 

in the direction of strategy. The example cited suggests the direc- 
tion of inquiry. 

The Logistics of the American army were embarrassed by the great 
extent of the country, its forests and mountains, its river courses, 
and marshes, and its widely diffused population. These elements did 
not alone delay the transportation and concentration of troops, but 
the productive lands were unequally worked, and in some sections 
there would be no surplus, and no ready means of accumulating supplies 
from other sections more densely peopled or under more general culture. 
The British troops availed themselves of the advantages which the 
control of the navigable waters and an organized commissariat sup- 
plied, backed by the power of a great empire. But the waste in 
handling supplies and the misconduct of officials were not exclusively 
confined to the Americans, who were inexperienced, and therefore 
improvident. Similar complaints were made of British officials. 
That class of supplies which was taken by partisan corps on either 
side was seldom carefully accounted for ; but this neglect is largely 
incident to that kind of military service. The repeated statements 
of General Washington as to the prevalence of venality, corruption, 
and malfeasance in office, were applied more directly to the general 
condition of the country, and largely to the operations of detached 
state, and other public agencies, and very seldom to the army which 
had become disciplined and reorganized under responsible control. 
The opportunities for fraud in the department of logistics, were then, 
as always, more numerous than in any other, and charges of miscon- 
duct in the matter of contracts, for example, were as frequent then as 
in later times. General Greene was well abused while quartermaster- 
general, but his vindication was complete. 

/;/ Grand Tactics, as well as in other subdivisions of the Art of 
War, the introductory chapters specified leading illustrations, which 
are afterwards more fully drawn out in detail. While the American 
regulars and all really experienced militia displayed steadiness a? 
well as courage, equal to that of their adversaries, the war illustrated 
a fact which has been a reflection upon its conduct, but is common 
to all wars, that no troops are exempt from a liability to panic and 
sudden disaster. At Hobkirk's Hill, an American regiment which 
had distinguished itself at the Cowpens, lost the battle by perfectly 
unnecessary misconduct ; and at Eutaw Springs the British Sixty- 
third and Sixty-fourth, veterans, after a too hasty advance, meeting 
unexpected resistance, gave way in equal disorder. Washington, 



I78i.] CONCLUSION. 653 

even at the risk of his Hfe, could not halt the flying regiments of Par- 
sons' brigade (page 226,) during the retreat from New York; but 
saved his army at Monmouth, by turning fugitives immediately upon 
their pursuers. This instance illustrates nearly all similar fights. 
Discipline tends to avert panic; but when self-possession is lost, it is 
the invisible and undetermined danger which takes away the breath, 
and then a shadow or a fancy, will whirl away the very men who 
would face any foe they could see and measure. The great defect 
of the American continental system was the constantly changing 
army basis, and this was the cause of nearly all tactical failures which 
were not incident to the ordinary operations of every war. 

Reference is particularly made to Chapters IX-XIII. inclusive, 
for the laws by which the conduct of the war of 1 775-1 781, no less 
than of all wars, is to be tested. 

Strength of Armies. The official records already cited show that 
the British force never exceeded about forty thousand men at any 
period, and this included the troops in Canada and Florida, as well 
as at the Bahama Islands, and was not until 1782. The American 
army, after 1776, never equaled thirty-eight thousand regulars at a 
single time. It is customary to give a great excess of force to the 
latter. The people at large constituted a nominal militia of the 
nature of a posse comitatus — minute men — coming at call, and dis- 
solving as quickly. They were not a proper army. They did indeed 
check forays, and afford temporary garrisons; but the smaller the 
army, and the greater the number of these isolated, transient detach- 
ments, the longer was the struggle, and the more wearing, as well as 
more unsatisfactory was every local result. 

The usual tabular statement of the forces of the United States 
which served at different periods during the war, is to be considered 
as a total of recorded years of enlistment, and not as the total of the 
men who served. Hence a man who served from April nineteenth, 
1775, until the formal cessation of hostilities, April nineteenth, 1783, 
counted as eight, in the aggregate. 

The following table gives the contributions of the various States 

to the Continental service, on the basis stated : 

New Hampshire 12,497 Delaware 2,386 

Massachusetts 69,907 Maryland I3-9I2 

Rhode Island 5,908 Virginia 26,678 

Connecticut 31.939 North Carolina 7>263 

New York 17,781 South Carolina 6,417 

New Jersey 10,726 Georgia 2,679 

Pennsylvania 25,678 

Total ...233,77T 



654 CONCLUSION. [1781. 

The British and American armies were alike Hmited in their ability 
to concentrate their forces. A reference to the map " Outlines of 
Atlantic Coast," furnishes a key to this difficulty. 

Washington controlled an interior line while at Middlebrook and 
Morristown, which nearly doubled both his offensive and defensive 
capacity ; and the British fleets would have been compensated for the 
American line of land-march through Virginia and the Carolinas, if the 
uncertainties of the sea and the inadequate garrison at New York had 
not cost them nearly as much delay as embarrassed the Americans in 
crossing the rivers and rough country of the States referred to. 

Naval Co-operation. Under the head of " Providence in war illus- 
trated," the contingencies of maritime movements were adverted to, 
and the narrative has shown that a fleet of transports rarely ventured 
even from New York to Newport without a delay which defeated the 
enterprise on foot. The British owed their chief success at the south 
to their control of the sea ; and Yorktown fell as soon as the remark- 
ably successful voyage of the Count de Grasse snatched away that 
supremacy in the Chesapeake. The American navy had been organ- 
ized with fair promise. The names and armaments of the principal 
ships, either built or authorized to be built under the sanction of 
Congress, have been given in their order as they were authorized. 
That they accomplished very little as a navy is involved in the general 
statement of a British naval blockade and an almost undisputed naval 
superiority. At Newport, New Bedford, Philadelphia, Charleston, 
Savannah and other ports, most of these vessels were burned or sunk, 
almost before they had spread canvas. At the outset of the war, 
seamen and good ship-builders abounded ; but heavy guns were not 
ready when the ships were, and the success of privateering, which 
gave to vessels of speed and light draught the best chance for prize 
money, soon reduced the number of men from whom to make good 
sailors. The protracted blockade of Newport, the expeditions along 
the coast, and the incursions which threatened the homes of seafaring 
men had a similar tendency. 

The Randolph, 32, Captain Biddle, one of the first vessels put in 
commission, blew up at sea during a night action, but her commander 
escaped. The adventures of Captains Biddle, John Paul Jones, Hop- 
kins, Barry, and others, are creditable to their memory; but the main 
fact remains, that while the American army, in 1781, was less than 
half its force during the early years of the war, the navy had but two 
really efficient ships, that survived the casualties of the contest. 



i/Si.] CONCLUSION. 655 

(Reference is made to note on page 144, close of Chapter XXII.. for 
the career of the American navy.) 

Foreign Officers. During the early efforts to interest France in 
behalf of the American cause, Mr. Silas Deane had induced many 
European officers to visit America under promise of commissions. 
The jealousy of this movement was so great that even General Greene 
at one time tendered his resignation, and was sharply rebuked by 
Congress for interference with its prerogative. Many failed to realize 
the purpose of their visit — others failed to merit the appointments 
received, and still others, of those whose names have appeared in this 
narrative, were an honor to the service. The names of Steuben, 
De Kalb, Kosciusko, Pulaski, Duplessis, Du Portail, Armand, Pleury, 
Gimat and others, are associated with honorable mention, while the 
extraordinary career of the youthful La Fayette is so suggestive of 
the success of the French alliance, that if his earnest promptings had 
not sent him early to America, it does not appear how that alliance 
could have been so completely and successfully maintained under cir- 
cumstances which repeatedly threatened its rupture. 

Military Changes. Generals Gage, Howe and Clinton, in succes- 
sive general command. Generals Burgoyne, Rawdon and Cornwallis, 
each in turn made prisoners of war, have been remembered, and their 
record, with that of Burgoyne, Knyphausen, Donop, Rahl, and scores 
of others, has been inspired by the motto with which these pages 
invited notice, '^ Justitia et praterea nil.'' 

If few traditions of the camp, or field, have enlivened this history 
neither has the intrusion of social gossip been needlessly interposed 
to impair the value of the acts of soldiers. The changes which the 
war wrought among the British characters who represented the prow- 
ess and glory of England, were shared by the leaders of the armies of 
the United States. Few of the early commanders took part in the 
closing scenes of the war. Schuyler, Sullivan, Varnum, Spencer and 
others were in the halls of legislation. The earnest and patriotic 
Putnam, who had so persistently labored to have a second fight, on 
Bunker Hill, on the memorable 17th of June, 1775, had retired from 
the service. Wayne and St. Clair joined Greene in the Southern 
department immediately after the surrender of Cornwallis. Muhlen- 
berg, promoted Major-general, retired to his farm in Pennsylvania. 
Lincoln, as elsewhere stated, became Secretary oi War. Knox, also 
promoted, who had followed the fortunes of Washington from Bos- 
ton in 1775, to Yorktown in 1781, afterward succeeded Lincoln as 



656 CONCLUSION. [1781. 

Secretary of War, and on the twenty-fifth of August, 1783, received 
from Sir Guy Carleton, the successor of Sir Henry Clinton, the sur- 
render of New York. Joseph Reed, first Colonel, then aid-de-camp, 
then tendered promotion, and then Adjutant-general, had resigned 
his commission as early as 1777, but as a member of Congress, or as 
Governor of Pennsylvania, he made his military association with 
Washington to enure to the well-being of the army. Of Governors 
Nelson and Clinton, and others, who combined high social position 
with great military zeal, and of subordinate officers throughout the 
north and south, there is allowed no further mention than that already 
afforded. 

This battle record has drawn to its support many interpreting 
facts which invite, yet exclude, a departure into the field of general 
history. Individuals only take their place, as links in a necessary 
chain, and their biography is so clipped as simply to fill the space 
which defines the principal battles of the war. 

If this venture shall inspire fresh interest in the "principles tvJiicJi 
underlie national defeitse,'' in the spirit of its dedication, and shall 
command respect for the valor which applied the Science of War to 
the Battles of the American Revolution, it will have accomplished its 
purpose. 

Great Britain and the United States, politically separated by that 
war, have so developed their national life through the arts of peace, 
that the ocean is no serious restriction upon their intercourse, and 
America, once the child, then the servant, then of mature age, now 
competes in honorable emulation, for an equal place among the 
nations. 

There were foreflashings of the future, even during the years of 
struggle ; and few gathered the rays with more prophetic skill than 
Governor Pownall. In the year 1 757 he had been the royal Governor 
of the Colony of Massachusetts. Its industries and its resources, its 
warfares, privations and sacrifices, its marvellous endurance under the 
strain of cold, famine and Indian incursions, and its elasticity where 
opportunity gave play to its real powers, had wrought into his very 
soul a recognition of the straight and narrow path by which such a 
people must rise to power. In writing of the New World, during 
January, 1780, he thus unfolds his views: 

" Nature hath removed her (America) far from the Old World and 
all its embroiling interests and wrangling politics ; without an enemy 
or a rival, or the entanglement of alliances. This new system has 



i7Si.] CONCLUSION. 657 

taken its equal station with the nations upon earth. Negotiations 
are of no consequence either to the right or the fact. The Independ- 
ence of America is fixed as fate. . . . The government of the 
new empire of America is Hable indeed to many disorders; but it is 
young and strong, and will struggle, by the vigor of internal, healing 
principles of life, against those evils, and surmount them. In North 
America the civilizing activity of the human race forms the growth 
of the State; we see all the inhabitants not only free, but allowing 
our universal naturalization to all who wish to be so. In a country 
like this, where every man has the full and free exertion of his powers, 
an unabated application and a perpetual struggle sharpens the wits 
and gives constant training to the mind. ... In agriculture and 
in mechanic handicrafts, the New World hath been led to many im- 
provements of implements, tools and machines — leading experience 
by the hand to many a new invention. This spirit of thus analyzing 
the mechanic powers hath established a kind of instauration of science 
in their hands. The settlers find fragments of time in which they 
make most of the articles of personal wear and household use, for 
home consumption. Here, no laws frame conditions on which a man 
is to exercise this or that trade. Here, no laws lock him up in that 
trade; and many a real philosopher, a politician, a warrior, emerges 
out of this wilderness, as the seed rises out of the ground where it 
hath lain buried for its season." 

With a peculiar forecast as to the necessary unity of the new 
States, then held together by so weak a band, this writer proceeds : 
" The nature of the eoast and of the xvinds, render navigation a per- 
petually moving intereourse of eoniniunication ; and the waters of tJie 
rivers render inland navigation but a further proeess of that com- 
munication : all which becomes, as it were, one vital principle of 
life, extending through one organized being — one nation. Will that 
most enterprising spirit be stopped at Cape Horn; or, not pass be- 
yond the Cape of Good Hope? Before long they will be found trad- 
ing in the South Sea, in Spice Islands, and in China. Commerce will 
open the door to emigration. By constant intcr-communication 
America will every day approach nearer and nearer to Europe." 

" North America has become a new primary planet, which, while it 
takes its own course in its own orbit, must shift the common centre 
of gravity." 

If such were the anticipations of good for America and the world 
from the separate nationality of Great Britain and the United States, 
42 



658 CONCLUSION. [1781. 

when seen only through the eye of faith, during a critical period of 
the war of 1775-81, there is infinitely more of hope for the nations in 
the assurance that all the progress then foreshadowed has strengthened 
the kindly relations of America and the mother country, and the les- 
sons of the war may be gladly recalled as so many fresh incentives to 
a perpetual peace. 

The war of 1 775-1 781, however, did not end without a similar 
aspiration for the future, as a part of that official act by which the 
American Commander-in-chief announced its approaching close; and 
at Meridian, July 4th, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and seventy-six, while all civilized nations are represented as 
the guests of America, to honor her industry, and rejoice in her liberty ; 
thus in the fraternity of that intercourse to relax all bonds but those 
of concord, and thus to renew their obligations to Righteousness, which 
alone exalteth a nation ; and while the hall which a century ago was 
the birthplace of the Republic, only a century later has become the 
scene of august ceremonies, in which the nations bear part, to ex- 
change greetings and pledge fellowship for the welfare of man, in the 
spirit of a broad humanity, it is not ill-suited, that the closing senti 
ment of a memorial record of that struggle should adopt the last 
military order of the struggle itself. 

" Headquarters, April 18, 1783. 

"The Commander-in-chief orders the cessation of hostilities 
between the United States of America and the King of Great Britain 
to be publicly proclaimed to-morrow at twelve at the New Building : 
and that the proclamation, which will be communicated herewith, be 
read to-morrow morning at the head of every regiment and corps of 
the army : after which, the Chaplains with the several brigades, will 
render thanks to Almighty God for all his mercies, particularly for his 
overruling the wrath of man to His own glory, and causing the rage 
of war to cease among the nations. 

On such a happy day which is the harbinger of peace, a day which 
completes the eighth year of the war, it would be ingratitude not to re- 
joice, it would be insensibility not to participate, in the general felicity. 

Happy, Thrice happy, sJiall tlicy be pronounced hereafter, who 
have contributed anything, ivho have performed the meanest office in 
erecting this stupendons fabric of freedom and empire on the broad basis 
of independency, who have assisted in protecting the rights of Jiiiman 
nature, and establishing an asylum for the poor and oppressed of all 
nations and religions." 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL TABLE. 



T N stating the principal authorities consulted, it is agreeable to acknowl- 
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abroad, especially Thomas Hughes, Q. C. ; J. C. Webster, Esq., Secretary 
AthencEum Club; Colonel Charles C. Chesney, R. E; Secretary Captain 
Douglass Galton, British Sci. Asso. ; Secretary H. W. Bates, Esq , R. Geog. 
Socy. ; Sir T. Duffus Hardy, Colonel H. W. Deedes, A. D. C, and William 
Blackmore, Esq. of London ; Professors RoUeston and Smith, of Oxford ; 
Professor Archer, of Edinburgh; Sir William Thompson and Professors 
Young and Thompson, of Glasgow ; Vice President Andrews, of Queens 
College, Belfast ; Professor Leslie and Steward Hingston, of Trinity College, 

Dublin. 

The courtesies of the Athenceum, Atheucneum Junior, United Service, 
United Service Junior, the Army and Navy and other London clubs opened 
valuable libraries and are gratefully remembered. 

The cordial aid of Adjutant-general William Stryker, of New Jersey, in 
the settlement of facts and names in connection with the war history of that 
State has been appreciated. 

{Quotations cited are given as written by the Authors referred to.) 



REFERENCES. 



[English Titles are retained for French or German reprints.] 



A. 

Adams ; Life and Works of John Adams. 
Adolphus' Hist, of Great Britain and Geo. III. 
Allen's (Ira) Vermont. 
Allen's (Ethan) Narrative. 
Almon's Remembrancer. 
American Archives. 

" Orderly Books. 
Andrews' History of the Wars of England, 

1775—1783- 
" History of the War with America. 
4 vols. London. 1785. 
Annual Register, 1774 — 1784. 
Army Returns, American. 

" British. 
Auburey's Travels. 

B. 

Bailey's Records of Patriotism. 
Bancroft's History of the United States. 
Barber's and Hoover's Historical Collections 
New York. 

" Historical Collections, Mass. 

" " " Conn. 

" History of New Haven. 
Bartlett's History of America. 
Barstow's History of New Hampshire. 
Bradford's Massachusetts. 
Belknap's New Hampshire. 
Bell's (Andrew), Journal, (Monmouth). 
Benton's Herkimer County. 
Bolton's History of Westchester County. 
Botta's (M.) American Revolution. 
Boone's Narrative. 
Butler's History of the United States. 

" " " Kentucky. 

Burgoyne's Letters. 

" Narrative and Documents. 



C. 

Caldwell's Greene. 
Camp Fires of the Revolution. 
Campbell's Annals of Tryon County, N. Y. 
" Border Warfare. 

" Virginia. 

Campaign of the Naval Army under Count 

De Grasse. 
Cassell's illustrated History of England. 
Chapman's Wyoming. 
Chastellux, Count de. Visit to America. 
Clark's (Joseph) Diary. 

" (John) Narrative of Battle of Bunker 
Hill. 
Clark's Naval History. 
Caulkin's (Miss) History of New London. 
Cleveland's Greenwood. 
Collins' Sketches of Kentucky. 

" New Jersey Gazette. 
Civil War in America. 
Cooper's Naval History. 

" Chronicles of Cooperstown. 
Connecticut Gazette. 
Cornwallis' Answer to Clinton. 

D. 

Dawson's Battles of the United States by 

Sea and Land. 
Day's Historical Collections of Pennsylvania. 
De Bermere's Narrative. 
De Haas' American Revolution. 
Duer's Lord Stirling. 
Dufour's Principles of Grand Strategy and 

Tactics. 
Dunlap's New York. 

E. 

Eager's History of Orange County, N. Y. 



REFERENCES. 



66 1 



Ellet's (Mrs.) Domestic History of American 

Revolution. 
Ellet's (Mrs.) Women of the Revolution. 
Encyclopedias, Biog. and general. 

F. 

Farmer and Moore's Historical Collections 

of New Hampshire. 
Franklin's Life and Writings. 
Filson's Kentucky. 
Felton's (John) Reflections, or History of 

Battle of Bunker Hill. 
Force's American Archives. 
Forrest's Sketches of Norfolk and Vicinity. 
Frothingham's Siege of Boston. 

o. 

Gage's (General) Official Returns. 
Gaines' New York Gazette and Mercury. 
Galloway's Letters to a Nobleman. 

" Reflections on the American Rev- 

olution. 
Galloway's Reply to William Howe's Obser- 
vations. 
Gardiner's Anecdotes of the Revolution. 
Gentleman's Magazine. 
Graham's Life of Morgan. 

" History of America, Vol. IV. 
Graydon's Memoirs. 
Girardine's Virginia. 

Green's (G. W.) German Element in the Rev- 
olutionary War. 
Green's Life of Greene. 
Gordon's History of New Jersey. 

" " " American Independence. 

H. 

Halleck's International Law. 

Hall's (Lieut.) Civil War. 

Hamilton's Works, by Hamilton. 

Hamley's (Colonel) Operations of War. 

Hazard's Register of Pennsylvania. 

Headley's Washington and his Generals. 

Heath's Memoirs. 

Hempstead's (Lieut.) Narrative. 

Hildreth's History of the United States. 

Hinman's Connecticut in the Revolution. 

Hinton's History of the United States. 

History of the Civil War. 

HoUister's Connecticut. 

Holmes' Annals. 

Holt's New York Gazette. 

Homan's History of Boston. 

Howe's (Sir William) Narrative. 

Historical Collections of Virginia. 
House of Commons. Proceedings. 



Ilowland (John), Life and Recollections of. 
Habley's History of the American Revolu- 
tion. 
Hughes' History of England. 
Hutchinson's Massachusetts. 
Humphreys' Putnam. 



Impartial History of the American War, 

(Dublin.) (Anonymous.) 
Irving's Life of Washington. 

J. 

Johnson's Life of Greene. 

" Traditions of the Revolution. 

" History of Salem, N. J. 
Jomini's Art of War. 

" Life of Napoleon. 

" Grand Military Campaigns. 

K. 

Knight's History of England. 

I.. 

La Fayette's Memoirs and Correspondence. 
Lamb, (General) Leaks' Life of. 

'•■ (Sergeant), Journal of Occurrences. 
Lee's Memoirs of the War. 
Lee (Charles), Memoirs and Correspondence. 
" Proceedings of General Court Martial. 
" (Lieut.-Col.) Memoirs of. 
" (Genl. II.) 
Lee's Campaign of 1778. 
Lodges' Portraits of illustrious personages, 

vol S. 
Lossing's Field Book of the Revolution. 
Washington and the Republic. 
" Life of Schuyler. 
" Centennial History of America. 

II. 

^L\HAN's (Lord) History of England. 

Manuscript Letters and Reports at London 
and Paris. 

Marshall's Washington. 
" Kentucky. 

Martin's North Carolina. 

Massachusetts, Committee of Safety Docu- 
ments. 

Maxwell's (Virginia) Historical Register. 

Memoirs of New York Hijitorical Society. 

Mills' Statistics. 

Memoirs of the Court of George III., Dukes 
of Buckingham and Chandos. 

Miner's Wyoming. 

Morris' (Robert) Diary 

Moore's (George H.) Treason of General Lee. 



662 



REFERENCES. 



Moore's Diary of the American Revolution. 
Moultrie's Memoirs. 
Muhlenberg, Life of. 
Murray's Elizabethtown. 

" (Rev. James), History of the War. 
Murray's Impartial History of the War in 

America. 2 vols. Newcastle. J 782. 
Maps of Authors Consulted. 

" " British Museum, London. 

" " " Officers and Engineers. 

" " Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris. 

" " Congressional Library, Washington. 

" " U. S. Coast Survey. 

" " U. S. Engineer Corps. 

" " New York Historical Society, N. Y. 

" " Pennsylvania Historical Society, 
Philadelphia. 

" " Public Record Office, London. 

" " Royal Ethnological Society, London. 

" " Royal Geographical Society, London. 

" " National Geographical Society Paris. 

" " Washington's Head Quarters, Mor- 
ristown, N. J. 

ST. 

Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne. 
New York, Documentary History of. 
New Jersey, Revolutionary Correspondence. 
New Hampshire, Historical Society Collec- 
tions. 
North American Pilot. 

O. 

Onderdonk's Kings County. 
" Queens " 

Suffolk " 
Orations of Webster, Everett, King and 
others in honor of men and battles. 

P. 

Parliamentary Register. 

Palmer's History of Lake Champlain. 

Paris Gazette, 1780, Survey of Procceedings. 

Summary of Operations. 
Pennsylvania Archives. 
" Ledger. 

" Packet. 

Peterson's Rhode Island. 
Peck's Wyoming. 
Pictorial History of George III. 
Provincial Convention of New York, Minutes 

of. 
Proceedings of New Jersey Historical Society. 
Putnam (General), Life of. 
Public Record Office, London, Official Papers. 



R. 

Ramsey's American Revolution. 

" Revolution of South Carolina. 

" Life of Washington. 
Randall's Jefferson. 
Rankin's History of France. 
Raynal (Abbe) American Revolution. 

" " Letters upon North American 

Affairs. 
Reed's (W^m. B.) Life of Joseph Reed. 
Riedesel's (Baron) Military Memoirs. 

" (Baroness) Memoirs. 

Ripley's Fight at Concord. 
Rivington's Royal Gazette, N. Y. 

S. 

Saffel's Records of the Revolutionary War. 
Sparks" Biographies. 

" Life and Treason of Arnold. 

" Washington. 

" Writings of Washington. 

" Life and Writings of Franklin. 
Scott's Military Dictionary. 
Shattock's Concord. 
.St. Clair's Narrative. 
Stedman's American War. 
Sedgwick's Life of Livingston. 
St. Leger's Account of Occurrences. 
Simcoe's Journal of the Operations of the 

Queen's Rangers. 
Simms' Diary. 

" South Carolina. 

" Schoharie County, N. Y. 
Stone's Life of Brandt. 

" Tryon County. 

" Wyoming. 

T. 

Tarbox's (J. N.) Life of General Putnam. 
Tarleton's Narrative and Campaign of 1780- 

1781. 
Transactions of Historical Societies of N.Y., 

N. J., Penn. and other States — so far as 

published. 
Thatcher's Military Journal. 
Tome's Battles by Land and Sea. 
Thompson's Long Island. 
Trumbull's Autobiography. 

" History of Connecticut. 

V. 

Van Campen (Major), Life of. 

W. 

Walter's History of England and .Sketches 
of New Jersey. 



REFERENCES. 



663 



Warren's (Mrs.) American Revolution. 

Ward's (S.) Battles of Long Island. 

Washington's Diary. 

Wheaton's International Law. 

Wheeler's North Carolina. 

Weems' Washington. 

" and Horry's Marion. 

Whitehead's Early History and Sketches of 
New Jersey. 

Whiteley's Revolutionary History of Dela- 
ware. 

White's Historical Collections of Georgia. 

Wither's Chronicles of the Border. 



Wilkinson's Memoirs. 
Willett's Narrative. 
Williams' Vermont. 

" (Colonel Otho) Narrative. 
Vvliite's Statistics of Georgia. 
Woolsey's International Law. 
Williamson's History of Maine. 
Wraxhall's Historical Memoirs. 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 

Y. 

Younck's History of the British Navy. 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



IN furnishing a Reference Index, the birth, b, and death, </, of some of the characters 
referred to in the Narrative, have been indicated, as suggestive of their age at tlie date 
of particular service, or opinion. 

The subsequent verdict of contemporaries has also been indicated in some instances ; as 
Cornwallis, sub Govr. Genl. of India ; Monroe, sub, Pres. U. S. A. 

Am. (American), Br. (British), F>\ (French), H. (Hessian), distinguish officers of similar 
name and rank. 

The omission of names, sometimes associated with service in leading battles, is in accord- 
ance with official reports or real fact. Thus Lord Percy is not named by General Clinton 
in his very minute report, as associated with the attack upon Fort Clinton ; and Colonel 
Haslet (Delaware) was member of a Court Martial at New York, while his regiment was in 
battle on Long Island. Brigades were often commanded by Colonels, so that personal 
brigades, (as Hitchcock's Brigade) do not indicate the rank. On the other hand, personal 
regiments participated in action during the absence of their colonel, who commanded a 
brigade or division. The rule in the British' army is given on page 171. There is a fre- 
quent use of titles, which were those of militia rank. The historical identity of the men is 
thus preserved, although they were not in the Continental service proper. 

Christian names are given, when required to distinguish two of similar name. 

Many names are given, in order to maintain due harmony with general histoiy, and 
because they interlink family associations which are cherished on both sides of the ocean. 
The skeleton of battle operations would be barren without these associations, even although 
the battles themselves were shaped by others, of more prominent responsibility. 

Abbreviations, /'. (killed), to. (wounded), /rw. (taken prisoner), com. commissioner. 



A. 

PAGE 

Abexake, Indians addressed by Bur- 

goyne 306 

Abercrombie, Col. 44th Foot, k. at Bun- 
ker Hill. . no 

Abercrombie, Lieut. Col. {Br), in skirm- 
ish at Crooked Billet Tavern. . . . 405 

leads a sortie from Yorktown 640 

Able bodied men, comiiellod to serve . . 265 
Abolition of American slavery, a mili- 
tary act 41 

Acknowledgments 2 and 659 

Acts of Parliament to be resisted I17 

Ac(k)land, John Duck Maj. at Bemis 

Heights 346 

mortally woundeil 347 

Ac(k)lan(l, Lady, with the army 350 

Actaeon, frigate, 38, burned off Fort Moul- 
trie 1S9 

Adair, John, sub. Maj. Genl. /'. 1757, d. 
1S40. 



PAGE 

Adair, John at Williamson's plantation. 507 

Adams, John, (statesman), sub. Pres. 
twice, h. 1735, (/. 17S2. 

on naval committee 144 

commissioner to meet Lord Howe, 

1776 223 

criticises \Vashington severely 383 

exerts valuable influence abroad . . . 540 

Adams, Samuel, (orator), b. 1722, d. 1 803. 
advised of Lord Percy's movement 

against Concord il 

jealous of an army 526 

Adams, Lieut. Col. (.-//;/.) k. at Free- 
man's Farm 342 

Adolphus, gives opinion of Trenton. . . . 265 

Agnew, James, Maj. Genl. (Br). 

w ith Genl. Howe at Brandy wine. . 367 
/•. in battle of Germantown 390 

Alaiin posts, from the Hudson to L. J. 

Sound 233 

Alarm stations, in New Jersey 499 



666 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



Albany, the fust objective of Burgoyne 305-10 
Allen, Ethan, Col. //. 1637, 1/ 1789. 

organizes expedition against Canada T19 

captures Ticonderoga 119 

asks for troops to conquer Canada. 120 
joins expedition against Montreal. . 121 

attempts to surprise Montreal 128 

iaken fn's., and sent to England. . . 128 

comments of Washington 128 

explanation of failure 128 

Alliance, frigate, takes La Fayette to 

France 465 

Alliances, rarely of lasting coherence. . . 79 

Allied army.before Yorktown 634 

Amiel, Ensign, brings dispatches to 

Cornwallis 605 

America fails in duty to France 539 

American affairs, in July, 1776 191 

December, 1778 461 

July, 178 1 617 

American army, under instruction 48 

contains many educated men 62 

deficient in Logistics 71-/2 

Light Infantry organized 87 

loose organization of 90 

condition before St. John's 128-9 

takes license to mean liberty 132 

condition at Montreal 133 

immorality rebuked 139 

re-organized, 1775 144 

condition before Boston 146-7 

its strength at New York, April, 

1776 157 

driven from Canada 161-3 

condition while in Canada 168 

at Charleston, 1776 184 

its strength, August, 1776 197 

on Long Island 204 

its strength, September, 1776 220 

its strength examined 224 

at Harlem Heights 231 

its strength, October, 1776 232 

abandons Harlem Heights 236 

in New Jersey, October, 1776 242 

southern troops in New Jersey 247 

Northern, in November, 1776 255 

Lee's grand division 256 

Heath's division 256 

Washington's division at Newark. . 256 

at Trenton December, 1776 256 

total strength, December, 22d, 1776. 267 

controls the Delaware 268 

on a skeleton basis 269 

to be made eighty battalions 279 

junior appointments.by Washington. 280 
on the Assanpink, January 1st, 

1777 284 

condition at Pluckemin 291 

by divisions and brigades 297 

strength, at Brandy wine 366 

total strength, December, 1777 . . 393-9 

celebrates the French alliance 404 

at Valley Forge 404 

strength early in 1778 409 

in pursuit of Clinton 414 

equal to Clinton's in numbers 416 

at Newport, 10,000, with militia. . . 448 



PACK 

American army, in winter quarters, 1778- 

1779 457 

at Middlebrook 458 

placed at eighty regular battalions. 463 
marches from Monmouth to the 

H udson 446 

at Morristown, winter of 1779-1780. 483 

on point of extinction 484 

suffers from cold and hunger 486 

suffers at the south for clothing, . . , 510 

suffers daily want at the south 524 

re-organized in 17S0 526 

located for winter quarters 527 

in a state of mutiny 536 

reduced to 5,000 effectives 539 

condition in 1781 587 

crosses the Hudson, 1781 622 

marches to Springfield 622 

passes through Philadelphia 623 

position before Yorktown 634-5 

by states, during the war 653 

basis,not stable 653 

American artillery, in October, 1776 232 

American batteries open before York- 
town 637 

American Centennial Year, celebrated 

July 4th, 1876 658 

American frigates, ordered to be built. . 144 

their fate during the war 145 

American Generals in Congress 655 

American Light Infantry attack redoubt 

at Yorktown 638 

American militia system involves inev- 

able faults 15 

American mistakes illustrated 647-^ 

American Navy recommended by Wash- 
ington 143 

impaired by privateer service 27S 

insignificant in 1 781 618 

American pickets along the Brandy- 
wine 368 

American regulars, equal to their adver- 
saries 652 

American Revolution, general features 

reviewed 646—7 

American ships destroyed at Charleston. 495 
American War, its result, the best for 

both nations 6 

applied true military science 17 

British theory 112 

Amherst, Jeffrey, Lord, stfd. Field Mar- 
shal, (^. 1717, </. 1797; states 40,000 

troops to be needed 412 

Andre, John Maj. Asst. Adjt. Genl. l>. 
1751,^.1780. 

his memory honored 78 

taken prisoner at St. John's 129 

describes Howe's fete at Philadel- 
phia 408 

reports the prisoners taken at 

Charleston 497 

agent of Clinton and Arnold 505 

captured and hung as a spy 506 

universal grief over his fate 506 

Angell, Colonel (Rhode Island) ; 

part of his command at Fort Mercer. 394 
at battle of Springfield 500 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



667 



Annapolis the rendezvous for La Fay- 
ette's army 592 

Anonymous (London) opinion of battle 

of Trenton 2S2 

Anstruther, John, Col. at J'reeman's 

Farm 341 

Antietam, Battle of, illustrates a good 

retreat 73 

Arbuthnot, Mariot, Admiral, /'. 1711, d. 

1794- 

arrives at New York 476 

reaches Charleston with a IJritish 

fleet 494 

lands marines at Mount I'leasanl.. 49*) 
at Gardiner's Bay, follows French 

fleet ' 5S5 

engages M. Destouches 5S5 

Archduke Charles, comments on a fine 

retreat 73 

Armaments necessarily waste States. ... 20 
Armand (Charles) Tatfin Ronarie, Mar- 
quis, Col. b. 1756, fl'. 1793. 
with La Fayette in New jersey. . . . 396 

at Battle of Camden 514 

his regiment recruited at large .... 526 

with cavalry at Jamestown bo8 

remembered 655 

Armies, when large, bleed nations slowly 

to death 20 

Armies of Europe merge the citizen in 

the martinet 15 

Armies of the Revolution, as given by 

Stedman 300 

Arms purchased in France, 1777 279 

Arms received from France 275 

Armstrong, Maj. {Am.), at Camden. . . . 514 
Armstrong, Maj. {£>:), makes sortie from 

Yorktown 640 

Armstrong, John, Brig. Genl. l>. 1758, </. 
1843. 

at Charleston iSi 

at Haddrell's Point 1S4 

at Brandywine 368 

on the Schuylkill 3S2 

at Germantown 387 

Arnold, Benedict, Maj. Genl. d. 1740, </. 
1801. 
arrives at Cambridge with a com- 
pany 119 

commissioned Colonel by Massa- 
chusetts 119 

starts for Ticonderoga 119 

joins Allen, without troops 119 

claims command by seniority 119 

over- ruled by Massachusetts 120 

takes and abandons St. John's .... 120 
gathers a small navy on Lake 

Champlain 120 

applies for men to conquer Canada. 120 

disbands his forces in anger 120 

his business antecedents at Quebec. 120 
represents Carleton's force as less 

than 600 men 120 

commands expedition to Quebec. . . 122 
marvelous endurance in the Wilder- 

ness 123 

arrives at Point Le\i 124 

demands surrender of (Quebec 131 



PAGE 

Arnold asks aid from Montgomery 132 

his army become mutinous 132 

his captains refuse to serve longer. . 134 
army restored to duty Ijy Mont- 

gt'mery 134 

daring assault on Quebec, repulsed 136 

is wounded by musket ball 136 

issues an unwise proclamation 161 

goes to Montreal on leave 162 

signs the cartel of .Sorel 166 

fights a naval battle on Lake Cham- 
plain 255 

instructed to attack Newport, R. I. 294 

omitted in promotions, 1777 296 

resigns in disgust 296 

lights well at Ridgefield, Ct 297 

prompt promotion follows 297 

commands at Philadelphia 298 

ordered to watch Trenton 299 

sent north to act with Schuyler. . . . 320 

starts to relieve Fort Schuyler 324 

his division at Freeman's Farm. . . . 341 

his relations to that battle 341-3 

various opinions cited 342-3 

his grievances 342-3 

complimented by Washington, Note. 344 
promoted after the surrender of Bur- 

goyne 344 

his passionate daring at Bemis 

Heights 347-3 

excited interview with Gates 349 

vindicated from Wilkinson's state- 
ments 349 

enters Philadelphia as Clinton re- 
tires 413 

reprimanded mildly by Court Mar- 
tial 490 

excuses himself from active com- 
mand 504 

assigned to West Point and depend- 
encies 505 

treasonable correspondence with 

Clinton 505 

demands reasonable pledges of re- 
ward 505 

fixes the price of his treason 506 

escapes arrest for treason. ....... . 506 

lands in Virginia 548 

not trusted by Clinton 548 

at Richmond 549 

hurries to his entrenchments 549 

his force in May 17S1 589 

at Petersburg 590 

destroys property at Osborne 590 

attempts correspondence with La 

Fayette 596 

returns to New York 597 

his relations to British officers. ... 625 
commands expedition to New Lon- 
don 625 

reports operations at New London. 627 

expected no opposition 627 

reports casualties at Fort Griswold. 629 
closes his military career in Ameiica. 630 
receives justice for his valor and his 

treason 630 

his birth-place near New London. . 627 
.Vrticles of confederation adopted 539 



668 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



Artillery, British, at Bemis Heights 347 

determined the battle of Guilford. . 561 

Artillery, American, during October, 

1776 232 

Art of war. Apology for 18-23 

sub-divisions stated 48 

Ashe, John, Brig. Genl., b. 1721, d. 17S1. 

routed at Brier Creek 464 

at Eutaw Springs 580 

Assanpink or Trenton River 284 

Atlee, Samuel J. b. 1738, d. 1786. 

joins the army 197 

in skii mish at Red Lion 20S 

is taken prisoner 209 

casualties of his battalion 211 

assigned to Mifflin's brigade 224 

Augusta, 64, ship-of-war, blows up near 

Fort Mercer 395 

Augusta, Ga. occupied by the British . . 519 
resists assault of American troops. . 520 
surrendered by the British 574 

Authority : there is a divine right of au- 
thority 33 

Authority is intrinsically arbitrary 33 

Aux Trembles, reached by General Ar- 
nold 132 

Aux Trembles, reached by General 

Carleton 132 



B. 

Bache, Mrs., daughter of Franklin, as 

to Washington 540 

Bailey, Lieut., {Br), k. at siege of Sa- 
vannah 4S2 

Bailey, Col. in northern army with 

' Gales .' 337 

Baird, Sir James, at battle of Brier 

Creek 464 

Baker, Col. at siege of Augusta, 1781. . 574 

Ball, Lieut., w. at Hobkirk's Hill 573 

Balcarras, Earl, 71:'. at battle of Hub- 
bard ton 317 

in battle at Freeman's Farm 340 

Bemis Heights 34^ 

before the House of Commons. .. . 340 
Balance of power, involves absurdities. 28 
Balfour, Lieut, Col. succeeds Patterson 

at Charleston 518 

pursues bad militar)' policy 522 

executes Colonel Haynes 575 

Baltimore the seat of Congress 266 

generous to La Fayette's com- 
mand 592 

renders honors to Rochambeau. . . . 630 
gives formal reception to Wash- 
ington 630 

Bancroft, George, (Diplomate and His- 
torian) /'. 1800. 

defines the war of 1775-1783 4 

renders just tribute to Putnam 97 

as to ])owder before Boston . 99 

describes the repulse at Bunker 

Hill 108 

states forces at Bunker Hill 100 

as to the invasion of Canada. ... 126 
as to the Battle of Three Rivers. . . 167 



Bancroft as to American northern army. 168 
as to Arnold at Freeman's Farm. . . 342 
as to Washington's nationalism. . . . 461 
pays tribute to the service of women. 488 

Barbarism, unrestrained in war 24 

fraught with danger in all ages. ... 22 
Barber, Francis, Col. b. 1751, </. 1783. 

u<. in the assault upon Yorktown . . . 639 
bears a message to Baron Viomenil. 639 
Barber (Historical Compiler) as to Fort 

Grisvvold 628 

Barnes, A. S. (Publisher) N. Y., con- 
tributes materials 154 

Barras, Paul Francois, Jean de Count, 
Admiral, b. 1755, d. 1829. 
arrives with French squadron in 

America 

corresponds with Washington 614 

waives rank and cooperates with 

other forces 614 

attempts Fort William, Long Is- 
land 626 

renders efficient aid in the Chesa- 
peake 635 

signs Articles of capitulation at 

Yorktown 641 

Barren Hill, skillfully occupied by La 

Fayette 406 

Barren issues, frequent in wars 43 

Barry, John, (At)/.) naval captain, serves 

with credit 654 

Barton, Lieut. Col. (Am.), captures Cienl. 

Prescott, (B>:) 409 

Base of Operations illustrated 50-1 

Baskingridge, the place of Genl. Lee's 

capture 258 

Battle of Wagram illustrates defective 

logistics 71 

Battles to be tested by fixed laws 13 

Battle of Lexington, (skirmish) April 19, 

1775, its lessons 8-11 

Bunker Hill, June 17th, 1775. . . 104-10 

the Cedars, May itith, 1775 163-4 

Long Island, Aug. 27th, '76. . . . 207-11 
Harlem Heights, (skirmish) Sept. 16, 

1776 207-11 

Chatterton Hill, (White Plains), 

Oct. 29th, 1776 241 

Trenton, Dec. 26lh, 1776 27C-6 

Princeton, Jany. 3d, 1777 288-9 

Hubbardton, July 7th, 1777 316 

Oriskany, July 6lh, 1777 324 

Bennington, Aug. i6th, 1777 332 

Freeman's Farm, Sept. 19th, 1777.. 339 
Bemis Heights, Oct. 7th, 1777 .... 345 

Brandywine, Sept. nth, 1777 369 

Paoli, (skirmish), Sept. 20th, 1777. . 383 

Germanto'.vn, Oct. 4th, 1777 384 

Monmouth, June 28th, 1778 416 

Wyoming, July 4th, 1778 459 

Quaker Hill, Aug. 29th, 1778 454 

Brier Creek March 3d, 1779 464 

Chemung, Aug. 29th, 1779 476 

Springfield, June 28th, 1780 500 

Camden, (Sanders' Creek), ^Nug. 

i6th, 17S0 513 

King's Mountain, Oct. 7th, 17S0. . . 520 
Fisli Dam Ford, Nov. iSth, 1780 . . 521 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



669 



PAGE 

Blackstocks, Nov. 20th, 1780 522 

Cowpens, Jany. 17th, 1781 542 

Guilford, March 15th, 1781 556 

Hobkirk's Hill, April 25th, 17S1 . . 571 
Eutaw Sprini;;s, Sept. 8th, 17S1. . . . 57S 

Jamestown, July gth, 1781 607 

Baume (Baum), Lieut. Col. (//), sent to 

Bennington 327 

reports the progress of his march. . . 329 

fortifies his position 331 

is defeated by Genl. Stark 332 

Baxter, Col., (A.) in defense of Fort Wash- 
ington 251 

Baylor, Col., {Am.) cavalry cut up near 

Tappan, N. Y 459 

Beacon signals through New Jersey. . . . 499 

Bee, Thomas, on com. safety, S. C 179 

Beadle, Col., {Br.) attacks post at the 

Cedars 165 

Beal, Col., {Aw.) with army of New 

York 224 

his brigade has but a week to serve. 256 
Beasley, Capt., {Br.) reports Arnold at 

New London 625 

Beatty, Capt., (S. C.) with Georgia troops 

at Cowpens 542 

Beatty, Captain, (Gunby's regiment) {i) 

at Hobkirk's Hill 572 

Beaufort, scene of brisk action 464 

Beckwith, Capt., demands surrender of 

Fort Griswold 62S 

Bedell, Col., {Am.) at the Cedars 164 

Bedford, Mass., destroyed by Genl. 

(irey 455 

Bellue, Capt., {Br.) 7U. at Monmouth. . . . 444 

Bemis, Heights and vicinity 33^ 

Battle 345 

Bennington, Battle 332 

Benson, Capt., {Am) before Hobkirk's 

Hill 571 

Beraud, Capt. {Am.) k. at siege of Sa- 
vannah 4S2 

Bereton, Capt. {Br.) 7u. at battle of 

Monmouth 444 

BIBLE gives definition of good and bad 

watchmen 77 

Bibliographical Table honors true valor . 21 
Biddle, Nicholas appointed naval captain. 144 

served with credit 654 

Bigelow, Major in Arnold's expedition 

to Quebec 121 

Biggin's Bridge, outpost of Charleston 

captured 49^ 

Billingsport on the Delaware, captured. 393 
Billings, Capt. {Am.) killed by muti- 
neers 537 

Bird, Dr. reports casualties at Chatter- 
ton's Hill 240 

Bird, Lieut. Col., (Br.) k. at German- 
town 390 

Birmingham Meeting House, (Battle of- 

Brandywine) 3^0 

Blackstock's Plantation, scene of skir- 
mish 522 

Bland, Theoderic Col. {Am.) b. 1742, d. 
1 790. 
reports reconnoissance of the 
Brandywine 370-2 



skirmishes with Tarleton's Legion. 496 
Blount, Major {Am.) at Eutaw Springs. 580 

Itoard of war appointed 5*^*^ 

Bond, Col, his brigade will serve two 

weeks longer 276 

Bonner, Lieut. Col. {Am) k. at Mon- 

moutii 444 

Boone, Daniel Col. b. 1735 (?) d. 1S20. 
captured, escapes, defends Boones- 

borough 460 

Bordcntown occupied by Col. Donop 

(//) 276 

by Col. Cadwallader. . . 276 

visited by British troops 404 

Borderie, de la, Lieut. (Pulaski's corps) 

k. at Little Neck 459 

Bosc, Baron de, Lieut. Col. (Pulaski's 

corps), k. at Little Neck 459 

Bose, Regiment {H.) at Battle of Guil- 

fonl 558 

at Battle of Eutaw Springs 5S2 

Boston, fortified in 1774 9 

under practical siege. 1775 9^ 

strength of garrison January 1776. . 10 

and vicinity, see map 154 

its garrison re-inforced 146 

depends upon Dorchester Heights. 1 12 

siege prosecuted in 1776 14^ 

its garrison under strict discipline. . 146 
is threatened by American army. . . 150 
is bombarded for three nights ... 151-2 
is lost by occupation of Dorchester 

Heights... 152 

is evacuated I53 

not a fit base for general operations. 155 

insurrection 1770. condemned 31 

Bowling Green, Ky. an objective from 

Louisville, 1861-5 51 

Botta, Carlo Guiseppe Guliemo (Ital.) 
historian, /;. 1768. d. 1S37. 

as to battle of Bunker Hill loS 

Trenton 2S2 

reviews New Jersey campaign 

1776-7 -92 

Boville, De, Maj. Genl. {Fr) recon- 
noitres with Washington 620 

Bowdoin, James, Pres. Mass. council ad- 
dressed by Lee 261 

Bowers, Brigadier Maj. {Br) brings 

dispatches to Cornwallis. . . . 610 

Boyd's Provincials surprised at Kettle 

Creek 464 

Boquet River, the site of Burgoyne's first 

camp 306 

Braddock's operations, of the old type. . 61 
Bradley's brigade to go out of service 

(60 men) 256 

Brandt, Joseph (Mohawk Indian) with 

St. Leger 323 

lays waste Cherry Valley 459 

Minnisink 474 

renews hostilities 524 

Brandvwine River described 367 

Battle of 369 

conflict as to position doubted 380 

not a serious defeat 3S1 

Bratton, Col. in skirmish at Williamson 

Plantation 50'^ 



6/0 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL LNDEX. 



Breed's Hill, (Breed's pasture) g7 

Brewer, Col. part of regiment at Bunker 

Hill loo 

Breyman, Lieut. Col. (//.) sent to sup- 
port Baume 3-9 

is delayed by a severe storm 330 

skirmishes near Van Schaick'.s M ill . 330 
gives a sad report of Baum's dis- 
aster 331 

at Battle of Freeman's Farm 340 

/'. in Battle of Bemis Heights ... . 349 

Brickell's brigade joins Gates 337 

Bridge, Ebenezer, Col. furnishes men 

for Bunker Hill 95 

Brier Creek, the scene of defeat of Genl. 

Ashe 464 

Brinsmade, James B. E.sq. New York 

city 2 

Bristol, 50, flag-ship of Admiral Parker 

at Charleston 1S6 

British Army, at Boston, re-inforced. . . . 146 
excelled in Logistics and Discipline. 71 

is shut up in Boston, 1775 116 

evacuates Boston 153 

approaches New York, 1776 159 

in Canada, re-inforced 164 

as assigned to America (Colonels 

named) 1 70-1 

in its regimental basis 171 

as estimated for in 1776 173 

organization and strength at New 

York 199 

advances on Long Island 202 

sends force to Montressor Island . . 225 
occupies Murray Hill, New York . . 227 

in possession of New York 227 

lands at Frog's Neck 234 

Pell's Point 235 

advances toward White Plains .... 236 
lakes a position before White 

Plains 239 

attacks Chatterton Hill 240 

crosses to the Hudson 242 

captures Fort Washington 251 

movements uncertain ; by land or 

sea 247 

at Brunswick, N. J 257 

counter-march on the Delaware. . . . 263 

inactive in Rhode Island 279 

restricted in its operations 293 

compared with American army by 

Stedman 301 

Official Return of June 3d, 1777, 

(Note) 321 

at Saratoga 352 

sails for Philadelphia 362 

on the Brandy wine 367 

at the Battle of Germantown 385 

evacuates Philadelphia 413 

Official Return of March 26th, 1778 411. 
at Newport 1778, and garrison spe- 
cified . . 448 

reduced by 5000 nien sent to West 

Indies 458 

Official Return of August 15th, 

1778 462 

February 5th, 1779 467 

re-inforced at New York 476 



British Army, Official Return of Decem- 
ber 1st, 1779 483 

as distributed in 1780 485 

in Southern States, 1780 485 

undergoes hardship at New 'N'ork. . 485 
Official Return of May 1st, 1780. . . 502 

August 1st, 1780 512 

December 1st, 1780 512 

draws supplies from N. J. and Conn., 524 

formation at battle of Guilford 558 

Official Return of May 1st, 1781. . . 575 

situation during April, 1781 588 

officers not responsible fur fate of 

Col. Ledyard 629 

in position at Yorktown 633 

surrenders at Yorktown 642 

Official Return of September 1st, 

1781 646 

under Cornwallis ... 646 

evacuates New York 656 

British Cabinet advise Indian auxil- 
iaries 304 

proposes operations at the south. . . 412 

initiates a southern campaign 446 

adopts a new policy in 1781 535 

fails to realize the danger f,9S 

British, commissioner in 1776 194 

conciliatory bills sent in place of 

troops 403 

dragoons and Indians rout each 

other 407 

frigates occupy East River and the 

Hudson 225 

frigates destroyed at Newport 44S 

increase their military stores 279 

Logistics excellent 73 

operations in western territories. . . 460 
policy affected by Arnold's intrigue. 505 

policy illustrated 647-S 

ships at Boston 1775, stated 96 

ships at Charleston 1776, stated . . 187 
future, one in interest with that of 

America 657 

Bromfield, Maj., {Br) succeeds F-yer at 

Fort Griswold 629 

Bronx River as a line of defense 236 

Brooklyn defenses ordered by Genl. Lee. 197 
defenses built by Genl. Greene. . . . 196 
defenses abandoned by Genl. Wash- 
ington 219 

Brooks, John, Col., (^w.)at Bunker Hill. 96 

at Bemis Heights 352 

Brown, John, Maj., {su/>.) colonel at 

Montreal 127 

at siege of Quebec 134 

Brown, Thomas, Lieut. Col., n\ ith Pro- 
vincials at Newport 44S 

in command at Augusta, Ga 519 

wounded in repelling, assault 520 

Bruff, Capt, (^;«.) wounded at Hobkirk's 

Hill 573 

Brunswick furnishes troops for Great 

Britain 1 73 

Brunswick, N. J., British depot of sup- 
plies 291 

Bryan's Refugees with Cornwallis 519 

at Hanging Rock 508 

Bryant, Lieut., (Am.) at Frogg's Neck. 234 



CHRONOLOGICAL AM) LiLNLKAL LVDEX. 



671 



PAGE 

Bruyn, Lieut. Col., {Am.) at Fort Clin- 
ton 359 

Ijiicl^iminster, William, Lieut. Col. at 

Ijunker Hill 100 

Buffington's Ford, (see note) 36S 

Buford, Aliraham, Col. regt. cut up by 

Tarleton 4^7 

Bull Run, battle, i86i, illubtrates te.\t . . 62 

Bunker Hill, described 93-4 

conditions of its occupation 95 

orders involved 96 

ships engaged 96 

situation of the armies 97-S 

reinforcements required 99 

the American forces engaged 100 

landing of the British troops 103 

the moral issue involved 103 

British plan of action 104 

advances repulsed 105-7 

Clinton and Burgoyne spectators . . 108 
opinions of authors and observers. . loS 

incidents of final assault 109-11 

notes upon the battle 11 2-1 16 

resistance useless after loss of re- 
doubt 115 

Clinton's counsel neglected 113 

bad policy of the attack 116 

the best possible result for both 

armies I16 

value of discipline inculcated 116 

casualties of regiments given by 

Washington (Note) in 

Bunyan, John,'(Poet) /' 1628 d 16S8. 

borrows metaphor from profession 

of arms 22 

Burgoyne, Sir John, Lieut. Genl., b. 
1730, d. 1792. 
arrives at Boston with Howe and 

Clinton 10 

is witness of the Battle of Bunker 

Hill loS 

gives his opinion of the battle. . . . 108 
advises to occupy Dorchester 

Heights 112 

a reminiscence of his experience, 

(note) 154 

assigned to expedition from Canada. 303 

constitution of his army 304 

sails from London for Quebec 305 

at 'I'hree Rivers, Canada 166 

occupies St. John's 168 

liis plans known in America 299 

deficient in light troops and trans- 
portation 305 

appeals to Indian tribes 306 

issues an impolitic proclamation. . . 306 

is answered by Washington 306 

explains expedition to Bennington. 328 
still deficient in transportation .... 328 
sends back all surplus baggage. . . . 328 

undergoes great trials 329 

arrives at Crown Point 307 

his views of a proper campaign. . . . 307 
arrives before Ticonderoga, July 

1st. 1777 308 

his artillery wrongly criticised, 64 and 308 

seizes Mount Hope. . . 308 

occupies Mount Defiance 309 



PAGE 

Burgoyne. controls Ticonderoga 313 

forces the bridge 314 

pursues the American army 314 

makes Hd. Qrs. at Skenesborough. 316 
issues a proclamation Julyioth... 318 

is answered by Schuyler 31S 

forced to build forty bridges 31S 

arrives at Fort Edward 319 

his auxiliaries untamable 320 

not responsible for personal outrages. 325 
" hiring Indians to be abhorred by 

posterity," 326 

writes to Lord Cermaine as to 

Indians 326 

" would lose every tribe, but not 

connive with them," 327 

deceived by Philip Skene 327 

puts the army on reduced rations. . .327 
instructs Lieut. Col. Baume fully.. 327 
inspects and increases Baume's com- 
mand 329 

bridges the Hudson with rafts 329 

sends Breyman to reinforce Baume. 330 

reports as to armed royalists 333 

receives harsh letter from Genl. 

t^ates 335 

makes a noble response 335 

writes Lord Germaine as to New 

England 337 

his " messengers to Howe are hung." 337 

secures rations for thirty days 337 

rebridges the Hudson 337 

approaches the American camp. . . . 33S 
fights a battle at Freeman's Fann. . 339 

his order of battle excellent 341 

jnits his army on short rations 345 

lights a battle at Bemis Heights. . . 345 

retires to Saratoga 350 

states the strength of his army 351 

calls council of war 351 

surrenders his army to Genl. Gates. 352 
receives message from Clinton. . . . 352 

is fully vindicated 353 

his character to be honored 353 

appears in the House of Commons 353 
opposes prosecution of the war. . . . 353 

his position fairly defined 354 

his standard of military obedience. . 354 

his instructions interpreted 356 

his defeat known in Europe 399 

Burd, Maj. (Aw.) captured on Long 

Island 207 

Burke, Edmund (statesman) 6. 1 730, d. 

1797- 

describes attack on Port Moultrie. 187 

his opinion of the battle 281 

Burk, Gov. N. Carolina taken prisoner. . 5S2 

Burnet, Major, Aid-de-camp of Genl. 

Steuben 529 

Burr, Aaron, s»d. Col. and Vice Pres. b. 
1756 ; d. 1836. 
a volunteer in Expedition to Quebec. 121 

Bush, Lieut. (.Im.) A: at siege of Sa- 
vannah 481 

Buskirk, Lieut. Col. induced the slaughter 

at l-'ort (Iriswold 628 

Butler, |ohn, Brig. Genl. at Battle of 

(iuilford 556 



6']2 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Butler, John, Col. with St. Leger, 1777 . 323 

Butler, Thomas, Colo:iel, at Monmouth. 434 

at Stony Point 472 

engages Cornwallis near Williams- 
burg 603 

Byron, John, Admiral, b. 1723, (/. 1786. 

relieves Lord Howe 447 

his fleet scattered by a storm 447 

goes to Boston to engage D'Estaing 450 

his fleet again disabled 450 

fought the Ocean in 1778 456 

c. 

Cadwallader, John, Brig. Gen., 3. 1743, 
d. 1786. 

at Fort Washington 248 

guarding the Delaware river 265 

to cooperate against Trenton 267 

to cross below Bordentown 271 

is thwarted by ice 271 

crosses the Delawaie Dec. 27, 1776. 276 
joins Washington at 'I'renton, Jan. 

I, 1777 2S4 

is promoted Brig. Gen 296 

Caldwell, Chaplain, has his church 

burned, 1780 485 

has his wife shot at Connecticut 

Farms 499 

Call, Major {A/n.), at battle of James- 
town 608 

Cambridge, Mass., effect of reported re- 
moval of powder 89 

Cambridge common the rendezvous for 

Bunker Hill detail 95 

Camden, Battle of, at Sanders Creek .517-18 

commanded by Lt. Col. Turnbull. . 519 

Campaign of 1775 considered 139 

1776 regains New Jersey for Ameri- 
cans 293 

1777 opened 294 

1778 involved several plans 404 

1779 involved several plans 463 

1780, condition of affairs 484 

1781 opened 534 

1 78 1 illustrated wise strategy 617 

1 78 1 briefly reviewed 617 

CamplDcll, Gov., of South Carolina 178 

Campbell, Lieut. Col. 71st Foot {Br.), 

taken prisoner 192 

captures Savannah 459 

Campbell, William, Col. {Am.) b. 1745, 
d. 1781. 

at King's Mountain 520 

at Guilford 556 

w. at Hobkirk's Hill 57.3 

uses bayonet at Eutaw Springs. . . . 580 

Campbell, Capt. {Br) reaches Burgoyne 

from Clinton 352 

Campbell, Maj. {Br) taken prisoner be- 
fore Yorktown 639 

Campbell, Capt. {Br.) 71st Foot, 10. at 

Charlotte, N. C 519 

Campbell, Adj. {Br) " Guards," 7..'. at 

New Haven, Conn 47° 

Canada as a British base 5^ 

as a base of operations in 1775 .... 117 

not in sympathy with New England 117 



PAGE 

Canada, invaded by American troops. . . 118 
only made graves for American 

armies 16S 

as judged by W'ashington 125-6 

involved two mutually dependent 

approaches 126 

invasion of, a failure 169 

expedition from, too late in 1777 . . 279 
expedition to, in 1778 abandoned. . 461 
invasion under La Fayette proposed 402 

Canadian Acts of Parliament obnoxious 117 

Carleton, Sir Guy, Gov., of Canada, sid) 
Gov. N. Y., b. 1724, d. 1808. 

adopted wise policy 118 

escapes from Montreal to Quebec. . 129 

unable tcC raise local troops 129 

conspicuous for gallantry at Quebec 137 
noble in conduct toward prisoners . 137 
" Americans, if not brothers, first 

cousins." 137 

retires from Crown Point 243 

opposes Indian auxiliaries, 1777... 270 

actively aids Burgoyne 305 

succeeds Clinton in New York. . . . 646 
with Admiral Digby as peace com- 
missioner 646 

surrenders New York to Gen. Knox 656 

Carleton, Major {Br), captures Forts 

George and Ann 523 

Carr, Lieut. Col. {Br) 35th Foot, k. at 

Chatterton Hill 241 

Carrington, Edward, Col., Quar. Mas. 
Gen. (south), b. 1749, d. 1 8 10. 

endorsed by Justice Johnson 530 

endorsed by Chief Justice Marshall 530 

explores the rivers of Virginia 530 

collects stores on the Roanoke 530 

reports boats secreted along the Dan 552 

provides boats at the ferries 552 

commis'er on exchange of prisoners 555 

takes artillery to Rugely's Mills 570 

brings artillery to Hobkirk Hill . . . 57° 

Carpenter, Capt. {Am) with artillery at 

Long Island 209 

Carroll, Charles, Md. b. 1737, d. 1832. 

commissioner to Canada 15S 

advises to abandon Canada 167 

Carroll, Rev. John,«/A. archbishop Bait. 

visits Canada 158 

Casualties, at Bunker Hill m 

in siege of Boston 1 54 

in Canada campaign 161 

at Three Rivers 167 

in attack upon Fort Moultrie 189 

at battle of Long Island 211-212 

at Fort Washington 251 

at battle of Trenton 274 

at Freeman's Farm 34^ 

at Bemis Heights 350 

of Burgoyne's campaign 353 

at Forts Clinton and Montgomery 359 

at battle of Germanlown 390-3 

at Fort Mercer 3^4 

at Fort Mifflin 395 

at Monmouth 444 

at the capture of Savannah 460 

at Brier Creek 4^5 

at New Haven, Conn 470 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



673 



Casualties, at Stony Point 47-5 

at Minnisink 474 

at Paulus I look 475 

at siege of Savannah 482 

at siege of Charleston 497 

at battle of Springfield 501 

at Hanging Rock 50S 

at battle of Camden 518 

at battle of King's Mountain 52(1 

at Blackstock's Plantation 521 

at battle of Cowpens 545 

at battle of Guilford 5(>--3 

at battle of Hobkirk's Hill 573 

at battle of Eutaw Springs 582 

at Williamsburg 604 

at siege of Yorktown 643 

Caswell, Richard, Brig. Genl., />. 1729,1-/. 
17S9. 
defeats Royalists at Moore's Creek 

B ridge 174 

unites with Gates 510 

at battle of Camden 517 

Cathcart, Capt. {J)>'-) 'o. at Mon- 
mouth 444 

Catharine II., of Russia, /'. 1729, </. 1796. 
adopts armed neutrality, as against 
England 527 

Caulkins, Nliss, states the assault of Fort 

Griswold 62S 

Cavalry of the war of 1 775-1 783 63-4 

Centennial year of Am. Iiidependencj 

honored 65S 

Cessation of hostilities formally declared 658 

Chambly, (Chamblee) occupied in 1775 218 

Charleston, a secondary British base. . . 51 

harbor in 1776 1 76-7 

state of affairs in June, 1776 181 

siege of, in 1780 494 

garrison in 1781 increased 583 

Charlestown. Heights to be occupied. . . 97 
burned during battle of Bunker 

Hill 107 

Neck abandoned 144 

Charles, Archduke of Prussia upon Re- 
treats ... 73 

Charles City Court House, visited by 

Simcoe 549 

Charlottesville, Va., the prison depot for 

Burgoyne's army 599 

visited by Tarleton 599 

Chase, Samuel, Md., b. 1741, d. 1811. 

commissioner to visit Canada 159 

advises to abandon Canada 167 

Chastellux, Francois Jean, Marquis de, 
Maj. Genl. />. 1734, d. 1789. 

, arrives with Rochaml)eau 503 

at Ridgebury, Conn 618 

commands a division 620 

visits Mount Vernon 630 

visits America after the war 33S 

Chalfield House, near Bemis Heights.. 336 

Chatham, Lord (William Pitt) statesman, 
^.1756, d. 1835. 
gives his opinion of the war 82-3 

Chatham, tile gateway to Morristowii 

fastness 487 

Chalterion Hill attacked by British 

troops 239 

43 



Cheeseman. Lieut. {A>?i.\ /;. at Quebec. 135 
Cheev'ers, E7ekiel, commissary instructed 

by Washington 246 

Cliemung, near Elmira, N. Y., a battle- 



field 



475 



Cheraw Hill abandoned by British 

troops 510 

Chesapeake Bay memorable in naval 

history f)i(3 

Cheever, l')avid, Mass., com. supplies ... 9 

Cherry Valley, massacre 459 

Chew House, not material to issue at 

Germantown 390 

Chewton, Lord, at Williamsburg 604 

Chester, John, Capt. at Bunkerllill no 

Chester's brigade in Spencer's division. 221 
Chicago Board of Trade battery noticed 76 
Chimney corner patriots disgust Wash- 
ington ' 587 

Chivalry based upon true manhood ... 22 
Christiana Creek, arrival of Washington's 

•"^rmy 366 

Christianity, the true life of all national 



life 



44 



Church, Benjamin, on Mass. com. safely 9 
Cilley's regiment with army of Gates . .'. 336 

Civil war. See War 29 

Civil war illustrated, at White Plains. . . 241 

by Tryon's e.\| edition 471 

at the South 581 

Clark, David, Col., with St. Leger, 1777 323 
Clark, Sir Francis, 7c. mortally at Bemis 

Heights 346 

Clark. George Rogers, Col., b. 1752, d. 

1808 461 

captures Vincennes (Indiana) 1779. 465 
Clark, Elijah, Col., in skirmish at Green 

■"^Prbig 507 

before Augusta, Ga 519 

repulsed at Augusta 520 

Clark's North Carolina regiment at 

Charleston, 1776 184 

Cleveland, Benj., Col., at King's .Moun- 
tain 52J 

Clinton, James, Brig. Gen., /'. 1736, d. 
1812. 

in Greene's division 237 

ill command of Fort "Clinton 355 

iu. in the assault upon Fort Clinton 360 

joins Sullivan against Indians 475 

Clinton, George, Gov., Brig. Gen., siil>. 
Vice-Pres., l>. iTid, d. 1812. 
in Heath's division at New York. . 221 

promoted Brig. Gen 296 

commands in the Highlands 296 

on Court of Inquiry as to .Schuyler. 312 

orders militia to aid Putnam 356 

modifies Pulnam's furloughs 356 

adjourns New York legislature .... 35S 

commands Fort Montgomery 358 

rejects demand for its surrender. . . 359 
escapes from Fort Montgomer)-. . . . 360 

cooperates with Washington 6ig 

distinguished for services 656 

Clinton, .Sir Henry, Lieut. Gen., b. 1738, 
d. 1795. 

sent to .\merica. 1775 lO 

gives sound advice at Boston 114 



674 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



Clinton, Sir Henry, as a volunteer at 

Bunker Hill io8 

advises to seize Dorchester Heights 112 
visits Gov. Tryon at New York. . . . 148 
is ordered to destroy rebel towns . . 150 
visits Lord Dunmore in Chesapeake 

Bay 175 

joins Earl Cornwallis at Wilmington 175 

issues a proclamation 175 

arrives at Charleston, S. C 184 

fails in operations against Fort 

Moultrie 18S 

returns to New York igo 

arrives at Staten Island 195 

makes an estimate of Gen. Howe's 

forces 199 

in the battle of Long Island 211 

routs Parson's brigade at New York 225 
is contrasted with Howe as to action 239 
commands expedition to Rhode 

Island 255 

his differences with Howe immaterial 298 

commands at New York 298 

wiites to Burgoyne, Sept., 1777. . . . 345 
makes an expedition up the Hudson 355 
captures Forts Clinton and Mont- 
gomery 359 

sends expedition to burn Kingston. 359 

returns to New York 361 

relieves Gen. Howe at Philadelphia 406 
attempts to capture La Fayette at 

Barren Hill 406 

abandons Philadelphia 412 

conducts his retreat with ability . . . 413 
halts at Monmouth, June 27, 1778 . 41S 

is pursued by Washington 421 

at battle of Monmouth 433 

makes report of the battle 44I-- 

retreats to New York 446 

writes Lord Germaine of his weak 

force 448 

sails to rescue Newport 455 

returns to New York 455 

again writes to Lord Germaine of his 

weak force 458 

reports his condition as critical. . . . 460 
seizes Verplancks and Stony Point. 466 

abandons Rhode Island 476 

abandons Verplancks and Stony 

Point 476 

proposes to attack Charleston again 476 

sails for South Carolina 483 

leaves Lieut. Gen. Knyphausen in 

command 483 

reports the strength of his army. . . . 485 

reports his Provincial force 486 

detailed organization of his expedi- 
tion 493-4 

is reinforced by Gen. Patterson. . . . 495 

captures Charleston 497 

issues a fatal proclamation 498 

reports the submission of Carolina . 498 
returns in cojifidence to New York. 500 
finds Gen. Knyphausen in New 

Jersey 500 

invades New Jersey 500 

advances upon Springfield 501 

reports as to his future plans 502 



Clinton, Sir Henry, starts to attack New- 
port, R. 1 503 

abandons the expedition 503 

sends Lord Germaine La Fayette's 

mock proclamation 504 

negotiates with Arnold for West 

Point _. 505 

reports to Lord Germaine Arnold's 

plans 505 

sends Andre to close a contract. . . . 505 
reports to Lord Germaine failure of 

the plan 506 

declines to exchange Arnold for 

Andre 506 

his relations to the British cabinet, 

17S1 535 

writes Lord Germaine as to Aui. 

mutiny 53S 

places Simcoe and Dundas with 

Arnold 548 

writes Gen. Phillips to aid Corn- 
wallis 567 

suggests a move against Philadelphia 56S 
writes Lord Germaine as to the army. 588 
writes Gen. Phillips as to the Middle 

States 589 

again proposes Philadelphia as the 

objective 596 

unjust to Cornwallis 597 

deficient in strategic skill 599 

makes an estimate of La Fayette's 

army 605 

orders Cornwallis to send troops to 

New York 605 

his plan against Philadelphia 606 

is reinforced from England 607 

hurries troops from Virginia 609 

checks movement of troops from 

Virginia 610 

his correspondence with Cornwallis 

noticed 610 

sends dispatches to Cornwallis 620 

rebukes Cornwallis 621 

writes that Washington has gone 

South 624 

will join Cornwallis soon as possible 624 

sends Arnold to Connecticut 625-6 

his relations to Arnold 625-6 

states his plan to succor Yorktown, 

Oct. 5 632 

expects to leave Oct. 12, 1781 637 

reaches the Chesapeake too late . . . 642 
his embarrassments recognized .... 644 
IS relieved by Sir Guy Carleton . . . 656 
Cloisy de {Fr) Genl., before Gloucester. 636 
Coalition against Great Britain formi- 
dable 527-8 

Cochran, Col., {Am.) occupies Fort Ed- 
ward 351 

Cochran, Maj., surprises the Onondaga 

Indians 463 

Cochran, Maj., {Br.) brings dispatches to 

Cornwallis 637 

X'. at Yorktown 643 

Coffin. Capt., {Br.) skirmishes at Eutaw 

Springs 578 

Colburn, Lieut Col., {Am.) k. at P>ee- 

man's Farm 342 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL LVDEX. 



675 



CoUett, William, Capt. S, C. troops 179 

Collett, lienjamin, Capt. S. C. troops. . . 179 
Collier, Sir George, aids to land troops 

at Long Lsland 200 

estimates the force landed 200 

conveys troops up the IIud>on.... 466 
accompanies invasion of Connecticut 46S 
reports destruction of Norwalk. ... 471 
relieved by Admiral Arbullinot. . . . 476 
Colonial warfare has its advantages. ... 61 
Colonel, as graded in the British armv. 171 

Colt, Capt. at Bunker Hill .'. no 

Colquhoun, Adj. (Br.) 70. at battle of 

Guilford 562 

Commissioners {A»i.) sent to Canada. . 158 

advise to abandon Canada 167 

meet Genl. and Admiral Howe. . . . 223 
arrange surrender of Cornwallis. . . 641 

stipulate for peace 656 

Committee of, Public Safety appointed 

by Massachusetts 9 

supplies appointed by Massachusetts 10 
Public Safety vote military supplies 10 

Congress meet Lord Howe 223 

Congress visit Valley Forge 403 

Congress confer with Washington. . 490 
Safety for South Carolina named.. 179 
Common Law as to defense, applies to 

States 245 

Commons, House of, on employment of 

auxiliaries 172 

Concave order of battle (See Order of 

Battle) 65-8 

Concentric and divergent lines defined 58 
Conciliatory bills incite mutiny in Brit- 
ish army 403 

Concord skirmish and its lessons Ii 

Concorde La, frigate, brings dispatches 

from De Grasse 621 

Condition of Great Britain in 17S0 527 

Conditions upon which the war of 1775- 

1783 opened 82 

Confederate currency at discount 463 

Confederation, Articles adopted 539 

Conger, Lieut. Col., {Br.) at Sunbury, 

Georgia 47S 

at Eutaw Springs 577 

Congress sends committee to Cambridge. 121 
disclaims operations against Canada. 126 
sendscommittee to meet Washington. 143 

proposes to employ Indians 158 

reinforces the army in Canada.... 159 
assigns 13,800 militia to the army 

at New York I59 

defines treason 178 

publishes Genl. Howe's proclama- 
tion 194 

authorizes eighty-five regiments for 

five years 222 

leaves to Washington the policy in 

New York 224 

sustains Schuyler in the Northern 

Department 255 

confers large powers on Washington. 263 

holds its session at Baltimore 266 

enlarges both army and authority of 

Washington 2S0 

adjourns to Lancaster and York. .. 3S4I 



P.\OB 

Congress authorizes call for militia 403 

declines to confer witii Cienl. Lee. . 409 
fixes the army at eighty battalions. 463 
jealous of Washington's virtues. . . . 489 
indorses court-martial of Arnold.. 490 

equalizes the pay of the army 490 

appoints Gates to Southern com- 
mand 4()o 

orders Pennsylvania troops south. . 584 

Connecticut supports the war 84 

militia greatly reduced 221 

troops in mutiny 491 

Connecticut Farms visited by British 

troops 499 

Conspiracy in Tryon Countv, New York. 

^ . ••: • 237-8 

Conscientious scruples as to bearing 

arms 265 

Conscript system of France 14 

Constitution adopted to take effect in 

November 461 

Continental armies (Europe) involve 

social waste 20 

Continental Congress meets, with powers 

assured 87 

Controversy as to Putnam and Prescott 

idle 94-9 

Conway, Brig. Gen., leads advance at 

Germantown 387 

cabal, incidentally mentioned 397 

made Inspector General 39S 

antagonistic to Washington 39S 

assigned to Canada under La Fayette 402 

resigns and goes to France 403 

Conway, Lieut. i^Br.) exchanged 631 

reports the strength of the French 

fleet 631 

Convex order of battle. (See Diagram, 

Chap. XL) and 66-8 

Cook's regiment at Bemis Heights 347 

Corbett, Thomas, intercepts British mails 178 
Coudray, de M., plans river defenses . . 382 
Corinth, Mississippi, represents a good 

retreat 73 

Cope, Lieut. {Br.) k. at Blackstock's 

plantation 522 

Cornell, Ezek., signs protest against 

D'Estaing 453 

Cornwallis, Frederick, a commissary of 

exchange 555 

Cornwallis, Charles, Earl, Lieut. Clen., 
sub. Gov. Gen. India, b. 1738, d. 
1805. 

sails for America, Feb., 1776 173 

lands at Wilmington, N. C 175 

accompanies Clinton to Charleston. 175 
arrives at New York in August. . . . 195 
moves with British Reserve to Flat- 

bu>h 201-2 

defeats Lord Stirling near Cortelyou 

House 210 

lands on New York Island 225 

joins the assault of Fort Washington 250 
delayed by Howe at Brunswick. ... 257 

crippled by Howe's orders 258 

encamps at Pennington 258 

gives up leave of absence, after 
Trenton 284 



6^e 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

CornwiilHs, resumes command of a di- 
vision 2S4 

skirmishes near Trenton 285 

marches against Washington 285 

outmanoeuvred at the Assanpink. . . 290 

regains New Brunswick 2gi 

engages Stirling near Woodbridge. 301 

with Howe at Chadd's Ford 367 

makes a brilliant move on the 

Brandy wine 37° 

pursues Washington to Chester. . . . 3S2 

enters Philadelphia 384 

joins Howe at Germantown 386 

at Billingsport, N.J 39^" 

skirmishes with Morgan at Edge 

Hill . 397 

joins Knyphausen at Chestnut Hill. 397 

at Allentown, en route for Monmouth. 413 

reaches New York with Clinton . . . 446 

makes an incursion into New Jersey 459 

with Clinton before Charleston. . . . 496 
succeeds Clinton ; marches to 

Camden 511 

rightly appreciates Gen. Gates .... 513 
reports the battle of Camden. . . 515-16 

invades North Carolina 519 

skirmishes at Charlotte 519 

at Winnsborough, S. C 521 

his march criticised by Tarleton. . . 521 

his position, Jan., 1781 535 

error as to restored British authority 536 

plans to strike Morgan and Greene 541 

marches up the Catawba 541 

sends Tarleton to strike Morgan. . . 542 

waits for Leslie at Turkey Creek . . 542 

is too late to cut off Morgan's retreat 542 

reports the battle of Cowpens 545 

is criticised by Tarleton 54^ 

arrives at Kamsour's Mills 545 

burns his surplus baggage and 

wagons 546 

pursues Morgan across the Catawba 546 
explains second invasion of North 

Carolina 550 

states his opinion of Cowpens 551 

fails to realize the support expected. 551 

is stopped at the river Yadkin 551 

stops at Salisbury four days 552 

burns additional baggage 552 

is stopped at the river Dan 552 

marches toward Salem . 552 

writes to Lord Germaine 552 

retires to Hillsborough 554 

his commissary (Stedman) explains. 554 

crosses the Haw and Allamance. . . 554 

marches toward Guilford 556 

fights the battle of Guilford 556 

saves the battle by artillery 561 

makes a narrow personal escape. . . 563 

declines to pursue Greene 564 

retires to Wilmington S'^'S 

gives the strength of his army 565 

communicates his plans to Clinton. 566 

vindicates his position 566 

writes to Lord Germaine 567 

is sustained by Lord Germaine .... 567 

explains his situation 568 

marches for Virginia 569 



PACK 

Cornwallis, directs Gen. Phillips to join 

at Petersburg 569 

is reinforced by Gen. Leslie . 595 

will dislodge La Fayette from Rich- 
mond 595 

states the "horrid enormities of our 

(j?;'.) privateers " 595 

gives Arnold leave to go to New 

York 595 

states his plan of campaign 598 

realizes his position 59S 

joins Tarleton and Simcoe at Elk 

Kill 602 

gives a foraging order to Tarleton. . 602 

retires to Westham , 603 

retires to Williamsburg 604 

engages Butler in a brisk action . . 604 

fights the battle of Jamestown 608 

retires to Portsmouth 6og 

correspondence with Clinton noticed 610 

reaches York town 611 

reconnoitres La Fayette's position . 613 

advises Clinton of his peril 631 

reconnoitres Washington's position. 632 

reports to Clinton the facts 633 

withdraws his advance detachments 634 

is unjustly criticised by Tarleton. . . 634 

is encouraged by Clinton 637 

reports progress of the siege 63S 

advises Clinton to lake no risks . . . 639 

makes sorties without benefit 640 

attempts to escape to Gloucester. . . 640 

reports his purpose to surrender . . . 640 

writes to Washington 641 

signs Articles of capitulation 64T 

compliments the strategy of Wash- 
ington 642 

acknowledges courtesies received . . 643 

fully vindicated by the facts 644 

Coryell Ferry guarded in 1776 by Lord 

Stirling 264 

Council of War (^;«.) as to Bunker Hill 93 
called by Arnold on march to 

Quebec 123 

before Quebec 163 

at .Sorel in Canada 166 

as to retreat from Brooklyn 216 

as to retreat from New York 224 

as to North river defenses 237 

retains Fort Washington 237 

as to offensive policy 242 

as to defense of Ticonderoga 311 

convened by Washington 365 

decides to cross the Brandywine. . . 366 

as to future movements 408 

advises a defensive policy 409 

before Savannah 4^9 

Court of Inquiry as to panic in Parson's 

brigade 226 

vindicates Schuyler 312 

Court-martial, as to Arnold (reprimand). 490 

as to Lee (suspension) 445 

Cowardice of commander at the Cedars. 166 

rebuked by Washington I47 

Cowpens, Battle described 542 

Cramahe, Lieut., Governor of Quebec . . 130 

Crane, Oliver, Rev. M. D., Alorristown, 

N.J 2 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



^71 



PAGE 

Crimean war illustrates an exceptional 

alliance yo 

Crochet. See orders of battle and dia- 
gram 65-8 

Cromile, Maj. /'. at King's Mountain. . . 520 

Cromwell. Oliver, Lord Protector of ICng- 
land, b. 1599, d. 1659. 
the interregnum noticed 5 

Crosswick's bridge repaired by IJritish 

troops, Dec. 1776 264. 

Crown Point evacuated by Genl. Carle- 
ton {Br.) 243 

evacuated by Genl. Gates {Am.)... 195 

Cruger, Lieut. Col., (i5;-.) at battle of Eu- 

tavv Springs 578 

Crusaders, defied social and national 

•■■gilts 27 

Cunningham, Maj., joins Morgan 541 

at battle of Cowpens 543 



D. 

Daggett, Naphtali, Rev. D.D. sub. Pres. 
Yale Col. b. 1727, (/. 1780. 
pris. at New Haven, harshly treat- 
ed 470 

Danbury, Conn., invaded by Clov. 

Tryon 297 

Dartmouth, Lord George, b. 164S, d. 1691. 

his opinion of the war S2-3 

proposes a southern expedition. ... 150 
objects to Boston as a base of opera- 
tions 155 

Davidson, William, Brig. Genl. {Am.) b. 
1746, d. 1781. 

joins Morgan 541 

is k. at McCowan's Ford 551 

Davis, Col., {Am.), captures arms and 

horses at Wahab's Plantation. ... 518 
Davis, Maj., notifies Sumter of Gates 

defeat 511 

Davis, Capt., {Am.) at Battle of Spring- 
field 501 

Dawson, Henry B., (historical student 
and writer) 

faithful as a historian 333 

gives account of Arnold at Free- 
man's Farm 342 

as to Battle of King's Moun- 
tain 521 

Day, Henry, Esq., lawyer. New York. . . 2 
Dayton, Elias, Col., b. 1735, (/. 1807. 

at the battle near Eli/.abethtown. . 499 

Dean, Silas, on naval committee 144 

contracts with foreign officers 655 

Dearborn, Henry, Maj, {sub. Maj. Genl.) 
b. 1 75 1, d. 1S29. 

at battle of Bemis Heights 347 

Deborre, Brig. Genl. attempts the posts 

at Staten Island 366 

disgraced at Brandywine 377 

De Bose, part of the regt. at Eutaw 

Springs 582 

Declaration of Independence dated July 

4th, 1776 160 

Declaration of Independence adopted by 

States 195 



PAGE 

De Estaing, Charles Hector, Count, {Fr.) 
Lieut. Genl., b, 1729, d. 1794. 
reaches the Delaware with French 

flt:et 446 

sails at once for New York 446 

unable to cross the bar 447 

arrives at Newport R. 1 449 

consults Sullivan as to attack 450 

not offended by Sullivan's landing. 450 

is confronted by British fleet 450 

both fleets disabled and dispersed. 451 
returns to Newport to collect his 

ships 452 

noble letter to Sullivan 452 

his departure brings a protest. . . . 453 

sails for Boston to refit 453 

offers to figlit his land forces 453 

fully vindicated in his course. . . . 452-3 
Admiral Howe appears oft" Boston. 455 
is threatened by Admiral Byron be- 
fore Boston 455 

sails lor West Indies 455 

api)ears off the coast of Georgia. . . 477 
summons Savannah to surrender. . 479 

leads an assaulting column 4S1 

is twice wounded ... 481 

returns to France 483 

Defense, Lines of 54 

Defensive, quasi, and double lines of de- 
fense 56 

with offensive return 51 

jiolicy of Washington 222 

De Fermoy, Roche, Brig. (ienl. on the 

Delavvare 264 

at Ticonderoga. 311 

De Fleurv, Louis, {Fr.) see Fleury De. 

De Gall, Brig. Genl. {Br.) at Battle of 

Bemis Heights 345 

De Grasse,* Francois Joseph Paul, b. 
1723, d. 1788. 

arrives in the Chesapeake 612 

approves the action of La Fayette. . 613 
engages the fleet of Admiral Graves. 615 

is visited by W\asliington 635 

jMoposes to leave the Chesapeake . . 635 
conforms to judgment of military 

men 635 

signs capitulation of Yorktown .... 641 

is honored by Congress 644 

leaves the American coast 644 

De Hart, Col., gives notice of reenlist- 

ments 276 

De Haas, appointed Brig. Gen 296 

De Heister, Lieut. Gen., assigned to 

service in America 173 

arrives at Gravesend 199 

lands on Long Island 200 

occupies a position before Flatbush 202 
captures Maj. Gen. Lord Stirling . . 2lo 
transfers his command to New 

Rochelle 235 

advances to ^Vhite Plains 235 

De Kail), Baron, Maj. Gen., b. 1732, d. 
1 7 So. 

In>pector Gen. vice Conway 399 

assigned to expedition to Canada. . 402 

sent to Souihern department 491 

marches to Hillsborough, S. C 509 



6/8 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



De Kalb, Baron, Maj. Gen., laments the 

difficulties of his position 509 

at Morristown, N. J., April 16, 1780 509 

at Buffalo Ford, July 6, 1780 509 

joined by Gen. Gates, July 25, 1780 509 
his advice neglected by Gen. Gates. 510 

gallant conduct at Camden 515 

mortally wounded at Camden 518 

remembered 655 

Delancey, Brig. Gen., organizes a bat- 
talion of lojalists 199 

operates in Westchester County . . . 619 

Adj. Gen. vice Maj. Andre 619 

Delatouche, M., offers to secure frigates 

for Washington 5g2 

Delaware river impassable, from ice . . . 285 
obstructed by chevaux de frise .... 364 
Delaware troops on nearly every battle 

field 491 

Deming, Capt. {Br.) k. at Chatterton Hill 241 
Denmark and Sweden unite in policy 

with Catharine 527 

De Peister, Abraham, Capt., at King's 

Mountain 520 

Desborough, I ieut., 7V. at Monmouth. . . 444 
Destouches succeeds to command of 

French fleet 5S4 

sends M. Tully to aid La Fayette. . 584 

sails for the Chesapeake 611 

in well-balanced engagement with 

Arbuthnot 612 

De Ternay arrives in America 503 

dies, and succeeded by M. Des- 
touches 584 

De Treville, Capt., shows gallantly at 

Beaufort ; 464 

De Trott, (H.) Ensign, k. at Guilford . . 563 
Deux Fonts, Count de, w. at Yorktown. 639 
Devin, Richard, Mass. Com. Safety .... 9 
Dictator recommended in Penn. in 1776. 280 
Dictatorial powers granted Washington 

for six months 280 

Dickinson, John, takes an interest in the 

war 86 

Dickinson, Philemon, Brig. Gen., b. 1732, 
d. 1808. 

operates in New Jersey 404 

at the battle of Monmouth 433 

at the battle of Springfield 501 

Digby, Admiral, arrives at New York . . 635 
associated as peace commissioner 

with Gen. Carleton 646 

Dillon, Gen., commands Franco-Irish 

brigade before Savannah 480 

Discipline alone holds men under fire . . 116 
gained the Battle of Bunker Hill.113-19 

of the American army 147 

of the British army 146, 513 

inculcated by the war 647-8 

tends to avert panics 653 

Discovery, the handmaid of military 

science 18 

Ditmas, Capt. {Br.) 7v. at Monmouth. . . 444 

Diversions illustrated 75 

Donnom, Capt. {Am.) k. at Savannah . . 482 
Donop, Col. (Hessian) at Long Island. . 200 

at New York Island 225 

at Chatterton Hill 239 



PAGE 

Donop, Col. (Hessian) at Fort Wash- 
ington 251 

advises Rahl to fortify Ti'enton. . . . 27G 

abandons Bordentown 276 

advice to Cornwallis 286 

at Germantown 386 

/'. in assault on Fort Mercer 394 

Dooley, Col. {Am.) in skirmish at Kettle 

Creek 464 

Dorchester Heights occupied Ijy Ameri- 
cans 152 

Dorchester, S. C, skirmish in 1781 

(noticed) 575 

Douglas, Lord, k. at Guilford 562 

Douglas' brigade in Spencer's division. . 221 
Drayton, Wm. H., b. 1742, d. 1779. 

Chief Justice of S. C, 1776 iRo 

on Com. Safety, S. C 179 

Du Buson, Lieut. Col../r/j-. at Camden. 518 
Du Corps {Br.) regiment at Germantown 386 
Dumas, Mathieu, Count de. Col., sub. 
marshal de Camp, and historian, b. 
1753, d. 1837. 

w. in assault at Yorktown 639 

Dundas, Lieut. Col., sent to Virginia 

with Arnold 548 

a commissioner at surrender of 

Yorktown 641 

Dunhohm, Capt. {A711.) w. at Hobkirk 

Hill 573 

Dunmore, Lord, burns Suffolk and de- 
mands troops 150 

arms slaves i74 

takes refuge on the Fowey man-of- 
war 86 

Du Plessis, Chevalier, engineer 593 

on duty with La Fayette 396 

remembered ... 655 

Du Portail, Lebegue, Brig. Gen. (/>'.) 

approves W^ashington's caution .... 404 
with Southern army ; captured at 

Charleston 527 

is succeeded as engineer by Kos- 
ciusko . . 527 

approves action of La Fayette 613 

with W'ashington in N. J., 1781 . . . 620 
visits Count de Grasse with W^ash- 

ington 635 

remembered 655 

Duquesne, Captain, repulsed at Boones- 

borough, Ky 460 

Durgess, Col., at battle of Monmouth . . 434 

E. 

East River under control of a British 

fleet 222 

Eaton, William, Brig. Genl. at Battle 

of Guilford 556 

Echelon,seeOrderofbattle and diagram. 66-8 
Education involves preparation for full 

duty as a citizen 15 

Effingham, Lord, gives an opinion of the 

war 83 

Elbert, Brig. Genl. at Tybee Island... 460 

pris. at Brier Creek 464 

Eldridge, Edward, commissioner to meet 

Lord Howe, 1776 223 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



679 



Elizabethtown visited by Lieut. Col. 

Buskirk 485 

visited by the British army 499 

Elliott Benjamin, Com. Safety, S. C. . . . 179 
Emerick's Chasseurs, attack Fort Clin- 
ton 358 

Emmett, Dr. Robert Atldison has the 

inventoiy made at Ticonderos^a. 119 
England, her glory in her intelligence 

and industry f' 

lost no real glory in the Virginia 

campaign 611 

Engineer corps of 1775-17S1 65 

Engineering defined 48 

Enlistments of American army more 

than half to expire 244 

Ennis, Col., (ii'r.) surprised at Musgrovc's 

Mills 51S 

Enos, Lieut. Col., starts with Arnold's 

expedition 121 

Erskine, Sir Wm., Brig. Genl. captured 

at sea 192 

advises Lord Cornwallis 210 

at Barren Hill : 406 

Europe against Great Britain. 527 

European recruits distributed in 1777. . 279 
European armies merge the citizen in 

the soldier 15 

Evacuation of Boston by Genl. Howe. . 151 
New York by Genl. Washington. . . 227 
New York by General Carleton.. .656 
Philadelphia, a military necessity.. 413 
Evarts, Wm. M. Hon., (scholar and ad- 
vocate, b. 1818 2 

Ewing, James, Brig. Genl., b. 1736, d 271 

to cross below Tienton, Dec. 1776. . 271 
at Mount Holly, Dec. 2Sth, 1776. . 276 

Eutaw Springs, last Southern battle 583 

Eyer, Lieut. Col., lands near New Lon- 
don 626 

w, (mortally), before Fort Griswold 629 



F. 



Fabian policy of Washington derided . . 392 
Fiiirhaven destroyed by Genl. Grey. . . . 455 
F^alconer, William, as to British position 

at Charleston l8S 

Fanning's Provincials at Newport 448 

F'anaticism unrestrained in war 24 

Ferguson, Maj., {Br.) at Chadd's Ford.. 369 
reports his attack upon Pulaski's 

quarters 459 

in skirmish with Col. Clark 507 

is killed at King's Mountain. 520 

Ferguson, Thomas, Com. Safety, S. C . . 179 
Febiger, Christian, Col. at Bunker Hill. 109 

accompanies Arnold to Quebec 131 

distinguished at Stony Point 472 

Fellows, John. Brig. Genl. at Long Island 217 
in Putnam's division at New York. . 220 

joins the armv of Gates 337 

guards east bank of the Hudson.. 350 
Findley, Capt., {Am.) sent to Genl. Ma- 
rion with artillery 570 

Fish Dam Ford, skirmish 521 



Fitzconnell, Ezek, signs protest ag'.inst 

D'Estaing 453 

Fitzgerald, Lieut. Col. {.Am.) at Mon- 
mouth 439 

testifies on trial of Genl. Lee 439 

Fleming, Capt., k. at battle of Princeton 289 
Fleury, Louis De, Lieut, stib Col. {Fi:) 

prisoner at Brandy wine 38 1 

at attack upon Fort Mercer 395 

wounded at Fort Mifflin 395 

at siege of Newport 452 

distinguished at Stony Point 473 

joins Count De Rochambeau 525 

remembered f>55 

Flemington occupied by Sullivan in re- 
treat 298 

Fog over East River in 1776 21S 

Brandywine River in 1777 3f>7 

Fiskkill Creek in 1777 35 1 

Germanlown in 1777 389 

Ford, Lieut. Col., (.-//«.) with new levies 

at Guilford 557 

lu. at Hobkirk's Hill 572 

Fords of the Brandywine at date of bat- 
tle • 3C'7 

Forbes, Maj., (AV.) in action near Fort 

Ann 315 

before the House of Commons. ... 315 

at battle of Freeman's Farm 340 

Foreign aid secured by England 171 

opposition made in Parliament. . . . 172 

invoked by America 278 

of advantage to America 655 

Foirest's {Am.) battery at Trenton 273 

Forlorn Hope ; its requirements 63 

Forman, Brig. Gen., at battle of German- 
town 387 

operates in New Jersey 39^ 

at battle of Monmouth 4^4 

testifies on trial of Gen. Lee 429 

Formation of troops under fire considered 580 
Forts at New York useless against ship^ 222 
Fort Ann, abandoned before Burgoyne's 

march 315 

Ann, burned 3' 5 

Forts Clinton and Montgomery 355 

Clinton and Montgomery, loss un- 
necessary 3"! 

Fort Defiance, opposite Ticonderoga . . . 309 
Edward, abandoned by Gen. Schuy- 
ler 319 

Edward, 16 miles from Fort George 32S 
Edward, occupied by Col. Cociiran. 351 

George, captured in Oct., 17S0 523 

Griswold, obstinately defended 629 

Griswold, surrendered 629 

Gunhy, surrendered to Lee 574 

Independence, abandoned 242 

Independence (new), abandoned. . . 360 
John's, St. captured by .Montgomery 129 
Forts Lee and Independence, their slrai- 

egic value 49 

Lee and Washington passed by 

frigates 232 

Fort Mercer, on Red Bank 393 

Mercer, reinforced 394 

Mercer, abandoned 39<^ 

Miftlm, on Mud Island 393 



68o 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



Fort Mifflin, reinforced 394 

MiOlin resists attack, 1777 395 

Milllin captured, Nov., 1777 395 

Montgomery and Clinton 355 

Motte, surrendered to Lee and 

M arion 574 

Moultrie, in 1776 ■. . . . 185-7 

Moultrie, captured in 1780 496 

Schuyler, at bend of the Mohawk. . 322 
Schuyler, supplies received for, in 

Aug., 1777. 323 

Schuyler, garrison of, in 1777 323 

Schuyler, timely reinforcement .... 323 
Schuyler, Herkimer's scouts pass in 323 

Stanwix, strengthened 280 

Ticonderoga, condition of garrison. 311 

Ticonderoga, captured 318 

Trumbull, captured by Capt. Willett 626 
Watson, taken by Lee and Marion. 569 
Washington, exposed eastward .... 249 

Washington, garrison of 247 

Washington and adjacent defenses. 248 
Washington, described by Graydon 248 

Washington, captured 251 

Washington, attack skillfully 

planned 249 

Fosbach, William de Deux Fonts, Col., 

at Yorktown 638 

7U. in storming redoubt 639 

Foster, Capt. {Br.) attacks the post at 

the Cedars 165 

enforces a severe cartel 165 

Founderies established in 1779 279 

Fowey, frigate, the refuge of Lord Dun- 
more 86 

at .siege of Savannah 478 

surrendered at Yorktown 642 

Fox, Charles James (statesman), l>. 1749, 
d. 1S06. 
gives opinion of battle of Guilford . 364 
favors Independence, as last resort. 399 
Fox, Adjt {Br.) w. at battle of Guilford 563 
Eraser, Brig. Gen. {Br^ at Three Rivers, 

Canada 166 

at Ticonderoga with Burgoyne .... 314 

pursues St. Clair's army 316 

gains credit at Hubbardton 316 

at battle of Freeman's Farm 339 

at battle of Bemis Heights 345 

mortally wounded 349 

Eraser, Col. {Br) sub. Brig. Gen., at 

Huntington, R. 1 471 

Fraser, Capt. {Br.) with sharpshooters at 

Bennington 329 

with sharpshooters at Bemis Heights 350 
Franklin, Benj. (Diplomate and States- 
man), h. 17 16, (/. 1790. 

chairman Com. S^afety, 1775 86 

visits American camp near Boston . 143 
his estimate of battle of Bunker Hill 116 

commissioner to Canada 151 

commissioner to meet Lord Howe 

1776 223 

his estimate of Washington 540 

his influence in Europe 540 

secures a foreign loan 623 

France pledges aid to America 400 

sends messenger with treaty 404 



France sends Rochambeau with troops. 490 
does not favor New York as an 

objective 614 

desires peace after siege of York- 
town closes 646 

Francis, Col. (^w.) withdraws from Fort 

Independence 316 

/'. at battle of Hubbardton 317 

Frederick II. the Great, b. i-]i2,d. 1786. 

as to reticence of purpose 268 

Freeman's P'arm, Ijattle of 339 

French fleet, off the Delaware 446 

at New York unaVjle to enter 447 

enters Newport harbor 448 

(See D'Estaing.) 

engages Admiral Howe's fleet 451 

repairs at Boston 453 

blockaded at Newport 504 

at Savannah 477 

off the Chesapeake 612 

engages Admiral Graves' fleet 615 

leaves American coast 644 

(See De Barras and De Grasse.) 

French Army at Newport 450 

its relations to American success. . . 535 

marches through Connecticut 61 S 

unites with Washington 620 

threatens New York . 620 

marches through Philadelphia 622 

is reviewed by the President of 

Congress 623 

opens batteries before Yorktown. . . 636 

winters in Virginia 644 

marches to Boston 644 

its discipline and conduct 644 

embarks for France 644 

Frigates built by America and their fate 278 
Frigates Phoenix and Rose pass Paulus 

Hook 193 

pass Forts Lee and Washington . . . 232 

ascend the Hudson to Tarrytown. . 235 

ascend the Hudson to Kingston. . . 327 

Frigate La Sensible brings French Treaty 404 

Alliance takes La Fayette to France 465 
Frink, Captain, at New London with 

Refugees ... 621-6 

Frothingham, Richard H. (author) as to 

forces at Bunker Hill 100 

as to Gen. Ward's orders to Col. 

Prescott 96 

as to the battle of Bunker Hill 108 

Front of operations 54 

Frye, Col., furnishes his men for battle 

of Bunker Hill 95 



G. 

Gadsden, Christopher, Col., b. 1724, r/. 
1805. 

commands 1st S. C. Infantry 179 

in command at Charleston 182 

in command at Fort Johnson 186 

on Naval Committee 144 

Gage, Thomas, Lieut. Gen., Gov. 

denounces the Provincial Congress. g 

requires 20,000 men 10 

adopts a bad military policy 10 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



681 



Gage, precipitates war by an expedition 

to Concord 11 

fortifies Boston Nec]< 83 

offers limited pardons 87 

resolves to occupy Charleston and 

Dorchester 93 

threatens to burn Charleston 113 

ordered home ; returns to England. 142 
Gaines, Lieut. {Am.) with artillery at 

Eutaw Springs 579 

Galloway, Joseph, Royalist and writer. 

as to Trenton 274 

criticises Gen. Howe 29S 

Galloway, Lieut. {Am.) 7c>. at Hobkirk 

Hill 573 

Gallup, Nathan, Col., near Port Griswold 62S 

Galvan, Maj., with La Fayette 586 

at battle of Jamestown 608 

Gambler, Capt., lands at Mount Pleas- 
ant, S. C 496 

lands on Sullivan Island 496 

Gansevoort, Peter, Col, /'. 1749, ii. 1S12. 

defends Fort Schuyler 322 

Gardiner's Bay, L. I., anchorage of 

British fleet off Newport 539 

Gardner, Thomas, Col., /•. at Banker Hill 109 

Mass. Com. Safety 9 

Gardner, Maj., 71'. at Alonmouth 444 

Gardner, Maine, base of Arnold's expe- 
dition 121 

Garth, Brig. Gen. {Br.) landed at New 

Haven, 1779 469 

with Gen. Eraser at Norwalk, 1779. 471 
Gates, Horatio, Maj. Gen., d. 172S, d. 
1806. 
Adjt. Gen. on organization of army. 90 

supersedes Sullivan in Canada 169 

evacuates Crown Point , . . . 195 

letter from Lee deriding Congress . 238 

his relations with Lee 238 

gives strength of Northern army. .255-6 

seeks to supplant Schuyler 255 

left without a command 255 

joins Washington 256 

letter from Washington 265 

on leave to go to Philadelphia .... 267 
absent from Trenton without leave. 275-7 
declines command of Ticonderoga. 310 

his captious conduct 310 

writes rudely to Washington 310 

neglected northern posts 310 

captious letter to Mr. Lovell 311 

takes leave of absen ce 311 

deportment toward Schuyler 334 

commands northern department . . . 335 
ignores the Commander-in-Chief. . . 335 

advances beyond Stillwater 336 

his army by brigades 336 

reports battle of Freeman's Farm. . 341 
at Saratoga, like Saul after One battle 344 

altercation with Arnold 346 

gives Arnold leave of absence 347 

excited interview with .Vrnold 349 

at deathbed of Sir Francis Clark . . 349 
endangers his army at Fishkill 

Creek 351 

strength of army at Saratoga 351 

surrender of Burgoyne 352 



Gates, Horatio, Maj. Gen., rect'ves letter 

of caution from Putnam 352 

retains troops not needed 397 

President of Board of War 398 

opposes Washington 398 

commands at Fishkill 403 

declines to fight Indians 475 

sent to southern command 492 

joins De Kalb at Hillsborough .... 509 

criticises southern operations 509 

adopts a bad line of march 509 

crosses the Pedee 510 

issues a proclamation 510 

advances to Lynch's Creek 510 

unites with Caswell's militia 510 

criticised by Tarleton 510 

at Rugely's Mills 511 

overestimates his force 511 

overconfulent and rash 513 

actual state of his army 514 

the gauge of his capacity 514 

orders immediate advance 514 

calls council of war 515 

a battle without orilers 515 

hastens from battle-field 517 

summoned before Court of Inquiry. 522 
Gatanae's regiment (/"X), distinguished 

at Yorktown 63S 

General, qualifications of a, defined by 

Jomini 80 

Generals, as originally named by 

Congress 89 

commissions withheld by Wash- 
ington 1 39 

promotions made (named) give dis- 
satisfaction 296 

George III., King of Great Britain, 
France, ami Ireland, d. 173S, </. 
1820. 
applies to Catharine of Russia and 

Holland for aid 173 

unwisely adjourns Parliament 400 

Georgia enters upon war 86 

Gerard, Monsieur, Conrad A., first minis- 
ter from France 40° 

pledges Louis XVI. to aid America 400 
Germaine, George, Lord (statesman). 

his opinion of the battle of Trenton 2S1 
initiates the Burgoyne Campaign . . 303 

initiates St. Leger's incur^ion 303 

writes to Gen. Howe as to Burgoyne 357 
writes to Clinton as to Tryon's raid 470 
sustains the intrigue with Arnold . . 505 

rebukes Sir Henry Clinton 567 

sustains Cornwallis 5^^ 

Germantown, battle, criticism of forma- 
tions 58-9 

its location and description 384-5 

plan unfolded 386 

practically an American victory . . . 391 

creates a sensation in Europe 400 

Gerrish, Samuel, at battle of Bunker Hill 109 
Gibson, Lieut, {/yr.) k. at Blackstocks. . 522 
Gilchrist, Lieut. {Br.) w. at Monmouth . 444 
Gill, Moses, Mass. Com. Supplies. ..... g 

Gimat, Col., with La Fayette in liis first 

enterprise 39^ 

at Ijattle of Monmouth 443 



682 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Gimat Col., serves with La Eayette in 

Virginia 5S6 

in assault of redoubt at Yorktown. . 638 

70. before Yorktown 639 

remembered 655 

Gist, Mordecai, Brig. Gen., l>. 1743, d. 
1792. 
on Court of Inquiry (Schuyler) .... 312 
skirmishes with Cornwallis at Edge 

Hill 397 

at battle of Camden 516 

escapes capture 5 1 S 

recruits for Gen. Greene's army . . . 529 
Glazier, Maj. of Marines, at Savannah . 481 
Gloucester Point, N. J., American ship- 
ping burned 396 

Gloucester Point, Virginia, described. . . 634 

occupied by Simcoe's Rangers 611 

invested by allied armies 635 

Glover, Col., s»6. Brig. Gen. 

conspicuous in retreat from Long 

Island 214 

in skirmish near New Rochelle. . . . 235 

at battle of Trenton 272 

promoted Brig. Gen 296 

on the Hudson 298 

joins Schuyler at Stillwater 319 

with army of Gates 337 

at Saratoga 351 

assigned to La Fayette's division . . 448 
commands brigade at Valley Forge. 

(See Map.) 448 

plans retreat from Newport 455 

ordered to cooperate with militia in 

Connecticut 471 

at Providence, Rhode Island 471 

Goar, Capt. 49th {Br.), /:. at Chatterton 

Hill 241 

Goodrick, Capt., /'. near Guilford 562 

Gordon, Wm., Rev. Dr. (author of history 
of the United States.) 
comments on the crisis in 1775 .... 10 
gives opinion of battle of Bunker 

Hill 108 

opinion of battle of Trenton 281 

as to Arnold at battle of Freeman's 

Farm 342 

opinion of battle of Monmouth. . . . 445 
Gore, Capt., A', at battle of Monmouth. . 444 

Gore, Lieut., k. at Guilford 563 

Goroffe, Lieut. (Br.) -uf. at Monmouth . . 444 

Goshen, armies separated by storm 383 

Gossip rebuked by Washington 195 

Governor's Island, New York, evacuated 

by Col. Prescott 219 

Grabouski, Count, >('. before Fort Clinton 359 
Graham, Col. (Am.) at Frog's Neck .... 234 
Graham, Maj. (Br.) makes a sally from 

Savannah 479 

Graham, Joseph, Maj. {Am.) w. at Char- 
lotte 5^9 

Graise, Lieut. (//.) /-. at Guilford 563 

Grand Tactics defined 48 

maxims to be applied 60 

at Bull Run explained 62 

of the war of 1775-1781 652 

Grant, Ulysses Simpson, Gen. U. S. A., 
sub. President twice, /'. 1822. 



PACK 

Grant, Ulysses Simpson. Gen. U. S. A. 
and Sherman, in 1861-5, in re- 
spect of Grand Strategy 57 

Grant, Maj. Gen. {Br.) at Long Island . 203 

joins Cornwallis at Brunswick 257 

puts (//.) off their guard at Trenton 269 
report of attack on Trenton con- 
sidered 269 

at the battle of Brandywine 366 

attacks Gen. Wayne near Paoli. . . . 383 

at the battle of Germantown 385 

threatens La Fayette at Barren Hill 406 

outgeneraled by La Fayette 407 

Grant, Lieut. Col. {Br.) 40th Foot, /'. at 

Long Island 209 

Grant, Maj. {Br.) w. at Hubbardton . . . 317 

k. in storming Fort Clinton 359 

Grant, Ensign, {Br.) k. in battle of Guil- 
ford 563 

Graves, Admiral. 

commands naval forces at Boston, 

1775 _ 143 

plans small incursions in New 

England 143 

is relieved by Admiral Shuldham. . 146 
returns to America with reinforce- 
ments 303 

at New York, 1780 503 

engages Count de Grasse off Chesa- 
peake Bay 615 

before the House of Commons .... 614 
Graydon, Col. {Atn) h. 1752, d. 1818. 

describes Fort Washington 248 

Grayson, William, Col. 

on Washington's staff 259 

Court of Inquiry (Schuyler) 312 

testifies on the trial of Lee 426 

at the battle of Monmouth 435 

Great Britain against the civilized world 

in 1780 570 

desires to have peace 646 

and the United States compete in 

the arts of peace 656 

Greaton, Col., sent to Canada 157 

regt. will serve two weeks longer . . 276 

Court of Inquiry (Schuyler) 312 

Greene, Nathaniel, Maj. Gen., b. 1740, 
d. 1786. 

excellent in Logistics 72 

as a type of the General 80 

his antecedents 80 

enters the service, 1775 85 

states certain requisites to success. . 85 

condition of his brigade 147 

builds field-works on Long Island . 197 
off duty, sick, when Howe landed. . 19S 

urges retreat from New York 221 

gives report of skirmish at Harlem 

Heights 230 

commands in New Jersey 231 

reports embezzlement of medical 

stores 232 

applies to join Washington 237 

ordered to remove or destroy hay, etc 243 
prepares itinerary for movement to 

Philadelphia 243 

estimates supplies for column of 
20,000 men 244 



CHRONOLOGICAL A\D GENERAL INDEX. 



683 



Greene, Nathaniel, Maj. Gen., admits ob- 
structions of the Hudson to have 
failed 

anticipates attack on Fort Wash- 
ington 

opinion as to their value, same as 
Howe's 

orders Morgan to del'end Fort 
Washington 

reports capture of Fort Lee 

is maliciously criticised 

commands division at battle of 
Trenton 

holds outposts at Trenton 

leads up the Millstone after battle 
of Prniceton 

sent, to state to Congress the condi- 
tion of the army 

sent to inspect Highland posts. . . . 

ordered to follow Howe 

selects American position at Chadd's 
Ford 

commands the reserve at Brandy- 
wine 

covers retreat of American army. . . 

commands division at Germantown. 

advises to attack New York and 
Philadelphia 

commands right wing at Monmouth 

ordered to Newport, Rhode Island. 

at the siege of Newport 

unites in protest sent D'F^staing. . . . 

goes to Boston to supply the French 
fleet 

applies for active service at the 
south 

quartermastergenl. in the terrible 
winter of 17S0 

appeals for aid for the army 

resigns as quartermaster-genl 

in command near Springfield, New 
Jersey 

succeeds Arnold at West Point. . . . 

plan for a flying army approved. . . 

writes letters to southern governors 

describes the southern army 

his department and powers enlarged 

issues a laconic order 

peculiar letter to Govr. Jefferson. . 

excelled in Logistics 

ordered the whole country explored. 

reached Charlotte 

writes to Jefferson 

discusses a soldier's life • 

in camp for two months, to organize 
his army • 

opens the southern campaign 

writes to Marion as to often shift- 
ing quarters 

letter to La Fayette 

his position stated 

hears of battle of Cowpens 

army without clothing, Indian style. 

rides 125 miles to join Morgan 

letters to Varnum, Gist, Smallwood 
and others 

on the banks of the Catawba 

orders operations commenced 



245 

247 

24S 

249 
252 

252 

271 

2S5 

290 

297 
297 
300 

367 

367 
380 

387 

404 

43S 
448 
451 
453 

457 
465 

488 
492 
492 

500 
506 
528 
529 
529 
529 
529 
530 
530 
531 
531 
531 
531 

532 
532 

532 
533 
541 
547 
547 
547 

548 
550 
550 



552 
553 
553 



Greene, Nathaniel, Maj. Gen., hurries 

Governors of States 550 

takes advantage of heavy rains . . 552 
concentrates his army at Guilford. . 552 
calls council of war, battle declineil 552 
organizes a jiicked light corps. . . 
army crosses the Dan in safety. . 
occujnes Habfax Court House. . 

army mustered, total given 553 

takes position between Haw and 

Deep rivers 554 

controls roads from Salisbury, (iuil- 

ford and Hillsborough 555 

near Guilford Court House, invites 

battle 555 

fights the battle of Guilford 557-9 

retreats after action at Guilford.. 561 
his opinion of battle of Guilford. . . . 564 

moves into South Carolina 566 

marches to Rugely's Mills 569 

orders Marion to join him 570 

operations near Camden 571 

battle plan of Hobkirk Hill good. . 573 

retires to Rugely's Mills 573 

raises the siege of Ninety Six 574 

goes to the High Hills of Santee. . 574 

advances to Eutaw Springs 577 

orders Lee, Marion and Pickens to 

join him 577 

at Burdell's on the Santee 577 

reinforced by Genl. Sumner 577 

fights battle of Eutaw Springs 578 

his report of the last attack 580-1 

retires to the High Hills 583 

hears of surrender of Cornwallis. . . 583 

his army less than 1000 men 583 

reconquered a large territory 583 

approves of La Fayette's detail to 

the south 586 

directs La F'ayette to report to 

Washington 594 

his jealousy of foreign appointments 

rebuked 655 

remains at the south 655 

Greene, Christopher, Col. (i-. 1737.'^- i7Si. 

goes to Quebec with Arnold 121 

commands F'ort Mercer 393 

ordered south, reaches the Pedee, 

Jan. 1781 533 

k. at post on Croton River 618 

Green, Colonel, of Virginia, at Fort 

Mifflm 394 

Green Mountain Boys, prefer Warner to 

Allen 127 

disgusted with Canada 

Green Farms, Ct. visited by Genl. 

Tiyon 

Greeting to the public 

Gregory, Genl., at battle of Camden. . . . 

pi-is. at battle of Camden 518 

near Portsmouth 623 

Grey, Maj. Genl. {Br.) at battle of 

Brandy wine 3^7 

at battle of Germantown 385 

in skirmish at Chestnut Hill 397 

threatens La Fayette's right 406 

destroys Bedford, F'airhaven and 
Martha's Vineyard 455 



132 

471 
1-2 



684 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Grey, Maj. Genl. surprisesBaylor's light 

horse at Tappan 459 

Grey, Lieut., k. at Savannah 48 1 

Giidley, Richard, Col. b. 171 1, ci. 1796. 

Engineer in Chief, 1775 84 

plans redoubt at Breed's Hill 94 

Griffin, Col. threatens outposts near 

Trenton 267 

to occupy attention of Colonel 

Donop 271 

fails to cross the river when ex- 
pected 276 

Griffiths, Dr., gives evidence on trial of 

Lee 425 

Griffiths, Col., regt. at Harlem Heights 229 
Grotius, Hugo, (Jurist), b. 1583, d. 1645. 

defines wars 25 

Guards and Outposts, their duties 39 

Bible discrimination between watch- 
men 77 

Guinea, coast of, (Br) campaign, ex- 
hibited good Logistics 69 

Gunby, Col., distinguished at Battle of 

Guilford 557 

loses credit at Hobkirk's Hill. . . . 572 



H. . 

Hale, Col. at Hubbardton 316 

regt. with Gates 336 

Hale, Nathan, Capt, {Am.), b. 1755, (/. 
1776. 
executed as a spy in Rutger's Or- 
chard 227 

his memory honored 78 

Hall, Benjamin, Mass. Com. Supplies. . 9 
Hall, (writer), as to Arnold at Freeman's 

Farm 342 

Halleck, Henry W. Maj. Genl. {Am.), 
military author antl jurist), b. 1814, 
d. i']T2. 
placed in command, 1862 — reasons 

of Pres. Lincoln ... 57 

distinguishes perfect and imperfect 

wars 25 

defines rebellion 31 

Hamilton, Alexander, Col. siib. eminent 
financier, b. 1757, d. 1804. 
introduced to Weshington by Genl. 

Greene 72 

saves his guns at Chatterton Hill 239 

sent to Gates foi troops 397 

as to D'Estaing at New York 447 

commands assault upon redoubt. . . 639 

sent to get shoes for the army 3S4 

Hamilton, Genl. {Br.), at battle of Bemis 

Heights 345 

Hamilton, Govr. at Detroit annoys the 

west 460 

left Detroit and recovered Vincennes 461 
Hamilton, Lieut. Col., N. C. Provincials 

pris 496 

Hamiltcrn's Provtncials join Cornwallis. 589 
riamley, Col., Br. Army, President 
Queen's Staff College, 1876. 
author of " Operations of War " . . . . 53 
as to occupation of a capital 53 



PACE 

Hamley Col., as to order of battle 66 

as to a good retreat 73 

Hammond, Sir Andrew, Commodore 
{Br.). 

commands Howe's fleet 364 

before House of Commons 364 

arrives in New York with reinforce- 
ments 476 

Hammond, Col. {Atn.) before Augusta. . 574 
Hampstead, Stephen, Lieut., report of 

Fort Griswold 62S 

Hampton, Wade, Col., distinguished at 

Eutaw Springs 581 

continues operations at the South . 583 
Hanau, troops, to be hired liy England. 171 
Hancock, John, Maj. Gen., Pres. of Con- 
gress (statesman), b. 1737, d. 1793. 

on Mass. Com. Safety 9 

has notice of Percy's expedition ... 11 
gives notice of bounty on reenlist- 

ment 244 

advises Washington of Howe's 

movements 365 

as a General before Newport 451 

signs protest to D'Estaing 453 

Hancock's Bridge, skirmish at, March 

25, 177S 405 

Hand, Edward, Col., b. 1744. 

at Gravesend, Long Island 201 

falls back to Flatbush 203 

at Prospect Hill 205 

at Frog's Neck 234 

has skirmish with Hessians 236 

rifle regiment at Trenton 275 

promoted 279 

riflemen pushed toward Princeton. . 285 

skirmishes with Cornwallis 285 

gallantry at Princeton 289 

appointed Adjt. Gen. vice Scammel 526 

Handshaw, Col., at Prospect Hill 

Hanging Rock, attacked by Sumter. . . . 50S 
Hanneman, Lieut., sent to Col. Baume. 330 
Harlem Heights, occupied by Wash- 
ington 226 

and vicinity 22S 

Harlem River defended by earthworks . 233 
Harnage, Maj. {Br.) w. at Freeman's 

Farm 341 

Harnet, Cornelius, excluded from Gen. 

Clinton's pardon 175 

Harrington, Earl of, before House of 

Commons 340 

Harris (Rawdon's Capt.), {Br.), k. at 

Bunker Hill 115 

Harrison, Ro'ot. H., Col., sends a report 

to President Hancock 375 

becomes Chief Justice of Maryland. 526 

at battle of Monmouth 439 

Harrison, Speaker House of Delegates, 

Va., consulted by Washington. . . 461 
Harrison, Benjamin, visits American 

camp 143 

Hart, de, Col., reports reenlistments. . . . 276 
Haslet, Col., Del. regt. joins army at 

Brooklyn 197 

attacks Majcjr Rogers' (Queen's 

Rangers 236 

his Dela wares, at Chatterton Hill. . 240 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL LN'DEX. 



685 



289 



527 



Haslet Col., Del. regt. k. at Princeton. . 

Hastings, Warren Gov. Gen. Bengal, b. 

1733, ,-/. 1818, contends for Britain 

in India 

Hathorn, Col., at Minnisink . .474 

Hawes, Col., at the battle of Hobkirk Hill 572 
Haynes, Col., executed by Col. Balfour. 575 
Hazen, Moses, Col., I). 1722. 

reports movements of Cornwallis. . . 370 
regt. good conduct at Brandy wine. 377 
regt. retained in the regular army. . 526 

sent into New Jersey 622 

Hazlevvcod, commander on the Delaware 363 

complimented for bravery 305 

neglected duty ogr 

Head Quarters of American Army. (See 

American Army) 291 

Heard's brigade in .Spencer's division . . 221 
ordered to reinforce F^ort Wash- 
ington 249 

Heath. Wm., Maj. Gen.,/;. 1735, d- 1S14. 

Mass. Com. Safety g 

a Gen. from Mass 10 

appointed Brig. Gen. by Congress. . 89 

as to Dorchester Heights 152 

ordered to New York 156 

efificient in retreat from Long IsI'd 216-17 

ordered to King's Bridge 221 

reaches White Plains 238 

assigned to the Highlands 247 

at Peekskill 256 

ordered to collect boats for his com- 
mand 291 

makes an attempt against Fort 

Independence 292 

reproved by Washington 292 

ordered from Boston 467 

stationed in the Highlands 622 

his army on the Hudson 622 

Heister, Gen. de, at Long Island 212 

Henry, Patrick (orator and statesman), 
b. 1736, d. 1799. 

his views of duty, in 1775 85 

denounced by Lord Dunmore 86 

and Lee's influence in Virginia. . . . 174 
Henry, Capt., dispatch to the Admiralty 47S 
Henderson, Lieut. Col., tc. at Eutaw 

Springs 

Herkimer, Nicholas, Brig. Gen., defeated 

against his advice at Oriskany. . . 

makes a counter proclamation to St. 

Leger 

Herrick, Col., at battle of Bennington. . 
Hesse Cassel, British contract for troops 171 

Hessian troops contracted for 171-3 

regiments at Fort Washington 251 

scattered through the Jerseys, Dec, 

1776 266 

surprised at Trenton 270 

casualties at Trenton 274-5 

effect of their capture at Trenton . . 276 

prisoners go to Philadelphia 276 

Hewes, Joseph, on Naval Committee. . . 144 
Hey wood, Thomas, Jr., Com. Safety, S. C. 179 
Hill, Lieut. (Br.), Asst. Engr., made 

map of battle of Germantown . .384-5 
Hill, Col., engages Maj. Forbes near 

Fort Ann 315 



581 



320 



332 

332 



l-AOE 

Hillsborough, captured by royalists. . . . 583 

Ilillhouse, James, Capt., j«/^. eminent law- 
yer and senator, b. 1754, J. 1832. 
during attack on New Haven 469 

History, to be placed by its interpreting 

philosophy ij 

Hitchcock, Col., gallantry at Princeton. 2S9 
sent with Greene and Varnum to 
Boston S4 

Hobkirk Hill, battle described 571 

opinion of Tarleton 573 

opinion of Stedman 574 

Holmes, Lieut. (./;;/.) k. at Savannah. . . 481 

Hood, Samuel, Sir, arrives in America . 615 
engages fleet of De Grasse 615 

Hopkins, John B., Naval Capt., serves 

with credit 654 

Hopkins, Stephen, on Naval Committee 144 

Horry, Daniel, Capt., in S. C. regiment. 179 
commands regt 184 

Horry, Peter, Capt., in S. C. regiment. . 179 
active at the South 575 

Horse racing and extravagance rebuked 

m Maryland 86 

Hotham, Commodore, up the Hudson. . 357 
arrives with Hessians 195 

Howard, Lieut. Col., at Cowpens 544 

at Guilford 557 

Howard, Brig. Gen. (Br.), volunteer, '<<<. 

at Guilford 563 

Hour of Preparation 82 

Houk, Christopher, and party destroyed 507 

Howe, Robert, Brig. Gen., serves in 

North Carolina 175 

his plantation laid waste 175 

is exempted from Gen. Clinton's 

pardon 175 

defeated at Tatnall's plantation . . . 460 

Howe, Richard, Lord, Admiral, b. 1725, 
d. 1799. 

arrives at New York 192 

acts as peace commissioner 194 

works for peace 195 

confers with committee of Congress 223 

strongly in favor of peace 223 

convoys Gen. Howe's army 363 

leaves Philadelphia 413 

escapes before D'Estaing's arrival. . 447 
recalled to England at his own 

request 447 

reinforced by Admiral Byron 450 

engages D'Estaing off Newport. . . . 450 

fleet disabled and dispersed 450 

regains New ^'ork 451 

sails for Boston seeking D'Estaing. 455 

Howe, Wm., Sir, Lieut. Gcn\.,b. i-J2i'^, d. 
1814. 

sent to America 10 

landing at Moulton's Point 103 

gallant conduct at Bunker Hill. . . . 104 
commits a grave error at Bunker 

Hill 114 

failed to improve success 114 

discussion o{ his plan 114 

eminent in strategy 114 

succeeded Gage at Boston 143 

his ill-judged proclamation 143 

maintains perfect discipline 146 



686 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



Howe, Wm., Sir, Lieut. Genl., regards 

New York as a prime objective . . 150 

as to Dorchester Heights 152 

evacuates Boston 153 

orders to spare private property ... 153 

sails for Halifax 154 

from Halifax to New York 192 

writes to Lord Germaine 192 

confers with Gov. Tryon 192 

divided operations criticised 193 

reports his arrival at New York . . . 193 

a peace commissioner 194 

corresponds with Washington 194 

his course has a parallel in 1861-5 . 194 
joined by Clinton and Cornwallis. . 195 

his admirable strategy 199 

detailed statement of his army .... 200 

lands troops with signal skill 200 

at battle of Long Island 207 

gains Sullivan's rear 211 

neglects to improve success 212 

goes into trenches 215 

reports American retreat 219 

his error on Long Island 219 

proposes terms of settlement 223 

his instructions limited 224 

lands in New York .... 225 

Head Quarters at the Beekman 

Mansion 227 

reports skirmish at Harlem Heights 228 

discussion of reports 230 

calls for more troops and ships .... 233 

lands at Frog's Neck .... 234 

reinforced by Hessians 235 

reinforced by Knyphausen 235 

valuable time lost 235 

good strategy and bad logistics. . . . 236 

loses time at White Plains 238 

battle at Chatterton Hill 239 

■waits arrival of Lord Percy 241 

Washington's army escapes 241 

marches to Dobbs Ferry 242 

plans movement on Philadelphia. . 243 

marches to King's Bridge 247 

his opinion of Forts Lee and Wash- 
ington 248 

matures a plan for the war 254 

requires 50,000 men 254 

halts Cornwallis in New Jersey. ... 257 

loses almost inevitable victory 258 

compliments Cornwallis on his cam- 
paign 258 

posts his army in winter quarters. . 258 
returns to New York, Dec. 14th, 

1776 265 

learns condition of American army 269 

paused at the hour for action 269 

his erroneous opinion of Trenton. . 275 

opposed to Indian auxiliaries 279 

calls for more troops 279 

his winter quarters 1776, an error. . 279 

issues a proclamation 279 

withdraws troops from Rhode Is- 
land 294 

marches toward Princeton 298 

reports to Lord Germaine his plans. 298 
controversy with Clinton immaterial 298 
criticised by Galloway 298 



PAGE 

Howe, Wm. Sir, Lieut. Genl., suddenly 

retires to Brunswick 300 

is followed to Piscataway 300 

this retreat criticised 300 

advances toward Washington 301 

abandons New Jersey 301 

asks for reinforcements 361 

writes a letter to be intercepted . . . 362 

sails for the Delaware 362 

plan of campaign, 1777 363 

is assured by Burgoyne's letters . . . 363 

reaches the Delaware 363 

sails for the Chesapeake 363 

states trials of American warfare. . . 364 

his movement considered 365 

lands up Elk River 366 

skirmishes with Maxwell 366 

attempts to flank Washington 370 

brilliant strategy employed 373 

reports his movements 375 

his report of battle of Brandy wine. 376 

a scientific soldier 381 

demonstrates toward Reading 382 

unjustly criticised for delay 382 

capture of Wilmington 382 

meets Washington near Goshen. , . 383 

armies separated by storm 383 

reaches Germantown 384 

his plan of battle 3S5 

bis report of battle 386 

threatens Washington at Chestnut 

Hill 397 

reports skirmish at Edge Hill 397 

retires to Philadelphia 398 

inactive during winter 401 

reasons stated by himself 402 

recalled to England 403 

expeditions to the country 415 

splendid parting pageant at Phila- 
delphia 408 

Hubbard, Col. at battle of Bennington. 332 
Hudson, Capt. lands at Mount Pleasant. 496 

lands on Sullivan's Island 496 

Iluger, Francis, Capt. in S. C. regiment 179 
Huger, Col. {Br.), Provincial regt. at 

Newport 454 

Huger, Isaac, Lieut. Col. b. 1725, d, 17S2. 

S. C. regt. at Tybee Island 459 

(Brig. Genl.) at siege of Savannah. . 481 

at Monk's Corner 496 

at battle of Guilford 557 

w. at Guilford 563 

at battle of Hobkirk Hill 572 

Huger, Maj. [Br.), 7v. at Charlotte 519 

Huger, Ensign, k. at Guilford 563 

Huger, John, Com. Safety, S. C 179 

Hughes, wrongly credits Arnold with 

plan to surprise Trenton 265 

his opinion of battle of Trenton. . . 2S1 

Hughes, Lieut, w. at Guilford 563 

Hull, Maj. at storming of Stony Point. . 472 
Humphreys, Andrew H., Brig. Genl., 

Engr. in Chief, U. S. Army 2 

Humphrey's, Maj. {Br.), at Freeman's 

Farm 340 

Hume, Lieut. {Ant.), k. at Savannah. . . . 482 

Huntington's reg't at Long Island 2cS 

promoted Brig. Genl 296 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



687 



Hyder Ali, sweeps through Madras. . , . 527 



I. 



Improvement of success 75 

Independence has its conditions 32 

Indian auxiliaries bring radical trouble. 325 

to be abhorred, said Burgoyne 326 

opposed by Genl. Schuyler 158 

Indian massacres in Wyoming and 

Cherry Valleys 459 

Indian scouts and British dragoons rout 

each other 407 

Inham, Lord, opposes the hire of Hes- 
sians 172 

Insurrection, see civil war 30-1 

has no apology 30 

imperils all ; benefits none 30 

Interior and exterior lines defined. ... 58 
Irvine, James, Brig. Genl. /;7J'. at Chest- 
nut Hill 397 

Irvine, Wm., Col./;7>. at Three Rivers 167 
Irving, Washington, (historian), diplo- 
mate and scholar, b. 1783, d. 1859. 
as to the retreat from Brooklyn. ... 218 
as to the march of Gates south . . . 509 

as to Jackson, a boy in battle 509 

Itinerary from Fort Lee to Philadel- 
phia 243 



J. 

Jackson, Maj., rallied troops at Bunker 

Hill no 

Jackson, Lieut., with artillery at Frogg's 

Neck 234 

at Fort Clinton 359 

Jackson, Andrew, sith. Maj. Genl, and 
Brest, twice, b. \l(il, d. 1S45. 

at skirmish at Hanging Rock 509 

Jacquerie insurrection, 1358, illustrates 

civil war lf> 

Jamaica road neglected at Long Island. 206 
Jameson, Maj. reports a scout along the 

Brandywine 372 

Janizaries in 1826 ; illustrate military 

policy 42 

Jasper, Sergt., at Fort Moultrie 189 

k. at siege of Savannah 48 1 

Jay, John, statesman and jurist, /'. 1745, 
d. 1829. 
proposed to burn New York. ..... 212 

in Spain 54° 

Jefiferson, Mason and Wythe the patrons 

of the west 461 

JeflFerson, Thomas, (statesman), Gov. sub. 
Brest, twice, b. 1743, d. July 4th, 
1826. 

rejects Arnold's proposals. 549 

deprecates larger powers in Wash- 
ington 599 

narrowly escapes capture by Tarle- 

ton C'Oi 

Jesuits, not expelled for their religion. . 42 
Johnson, Sir Wm., *. 1714. '^^ 1774 323 



Johnson, Sir John, excites Indian hostil- 
ities 164 

with St. Leger at Fort Schuyler. . . . 323 

incites hostilities in 1780 524 

Johnson, Col. Francis, Court of Inquiry, 

(Schuyler) .' . 312 

Johnson, William, U. S. Sup. Court 
(historical writer^ 
as to skirmish at Williamson's Plan- 
tation 5 ' 7 

comments on civil discord 542 

Jomini, Henri Baron de. General, mili- 
tary writer, b. \1'lf), d. i86g. 
ignores representative governments 27 

defines military policy 41 

distinguishes war on the map, and 

war on the field 44 

definition of base o( operations. . . 50 

upon a base of operations 51 

maxims in strategy (jo 

on tactical positions 67 

on the logistics of Napoleon 71-2 

opinion of a good retreat 73 

defines qualities of a good general. 80 

Jones, Maj. k. at Savannah 482 

Jones, Capt., gallant at Freeman's Farm 341 
Jones, John Paul, b. 1747, d. 1792. 

appointed Lieut 144 

distinguished as a commander 654 

Jubilee at Valley Forge over French 

alliance 404 

Jubilee at Philadelphia in honor of 

Lord Ilowe 40S 



K. 

Kaskasi<.IA (Illinois), taken by Clark . . 461 

Kelley, Lieut., w. at Monmouth 444 

Kelley, Ensign, w. at Guilford 563 

Kennedy, Lieut., k. at Monmouth 444 

Kennett Meeting House 3^9 

Kent, James. Chief Justice, N. Y. (jurist 

and author), b. 1763, d. 1S47. 

opinion of Schuyler 3^9 

Kentucky forts gallantly defended 460 

Kepple. Admiral, gives an opinion of 

the war ■■ •• • °3 

Kettle Creek, skirmish between Pickens 

and Boyd 4^4 

Kiechlines rifle battalion at Brooklyn . . 20S 
Kingston, Adjt. Gen., reports battle of 

Freeman's Farm 34i 

Kingston (Esopus) burned 360 

King's Bridge fortified 236 

King's Mountain, battle described 520 

Kirkwood's Delawares, at battle of Guil- 
ford 559 

at battle of Hobkirk Hill 57i 

at battle of Eutaw Springs 581 

Kitchell, Mrs. Uzal, noted for patriotism 487 
Knowles, Capt., lands on Sullivan Islaful 496 
Knowlton, Thomas. Capt., sttb. Colonel, 

at Bunker Hill 95 

Knowlton, /•. at Harlem Heights 229 

Knox, Col., sub. Maj. Gen. (secretary of 

war), b. 1750, d. 1S06. 
Col. of artillerj- I44 



688 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Knox, hauls cannon from Fort George to 

Boston 148 

at New York ig6 

to divide his artillery 246 

enlists artillerymen in Mass 294 

at Germantown 388 

advises to attack New York 404 

at Monmouth 439 

visits Count de Grasse 635 

is promoted 655 

with Washington through the war . 655 
succeeds Lincoln as Secretary of 

War 655 

receives the surrender c>f New York 656 

Knox, Lieut., 9th Penn., distinguished 

at Stony Point 472 

Knyphausen, Lieut. Gen., b. 1730, d. 
1789. 
selected to command auxiliaries ... 173 

arrives at Staten Island 235 

is transferred to New Rochelle .... 235 
marches toward Fort Washington . 242 

at Fort Washington 249 

at Kennett Square 367 

at Chadd's Ford 367 

engages Maxwell 369 

at Brandywine 370 

at Brandywine, forces Chadd's Ford 376 

at Germantown 386 

at Chestnut Hill 397 

en route for Monmouth 413 

at Monmouth 434 

retreats to New York 442 

in command at New York 483 

crosses on the ice to New Jersey. . . 485 
invades Westchester County, N. Y. 459 

invades New Jersey 498 

at Springfield, New Jersey 499 

not responsible for fate of Mrs. 

Caldwell 499 

retreats to Staten Island 500 

Kohler's (//.) heavy artilleiy at Trenton, 

1777 285 

Kosciusko, Thaddeus, Maj. Gen. {Pole), 

b. 1750? d. 1817. 

fortifies West Point 403 

plans camp for Gates 336 

succeeds Du Portail as Engineer-in- 

Chief 527 

explores the Catawba 531 

joins Greene 552 

at Ninety-Six 574 

remembered 655 



Lacey, Brig. Gen. {Br^ in skirmish at 

Crooked Billet 405 

La Fayette, Gilbert Mottier, Marquis de, 
Maj. Gen., b. 1757, d. 1835. 
from Newport to Boston and return 58 

assured the French Alliance 79 

a volunteer at battle of Brandywine 380 
attacks rear-guard of Comwallis in 

N.J 396 

assigned to a division vice Stephen. 396 
assigned to invasion of Canada. . . . 402 



PAGE 

La Fayette, concurs with Washington 

as to policy 404 

in command at Barren Hill 405 

his characteristics stated 406 

skillful conduct at Barren Hill .... 406 
pursues Clinton toward Monmouth. 414 

writes as to his movements 414 

is generous to Gen. Charles Lee ... 415 

confers with Lee as to battle 425 

shows gallantry at Monmouth 434 

is ordered to Newport 448 

visits D'Estaing at Boston 453 

conducts the retreat from Newport. 455 
goes to France in the frigate Alliance 465 

returns to America 490 

adjusts {Fi\) military assistance. . . . 491 
issues a mock appeal to Canada . . . 504 
proposes an expedition against New 

York.. . . 523 

applies to join Greene at the South. 528 

explains the American mutiny 538 

is sent to capture Arnold 584 

goes to Virginia 585 

visits Yorktown and Suffolk 585 

reconnoitres Portsmouth 585 

his instructions 586 

ordered to join Gi"eene 586 

retained in Virginia 586 

deals judiciously with deserters . ., 586 

advances toward Richmond 589 

at Hanover Court House 590 

repulses an attempted landing 591 

reports his rapid march to Virginia. 591 
receives 2,000 guineas from Balti- 
more 592 

plans an expedition to Wilmington 592 

his letters to Washington 592 

attempts to cut off Cornwallis 593 

finds Phillips' division in his way. . 593 

is confronted by two armies 593 

aids Greene with supplies 593 

is sustained by Washington 594 

assigned to command in Virginia. . 594 
advances to Wilton, below Rich- 
mond 594 

unfolds his plans to Hamilton 594 

appreciates the campaign 598 

makes a prediction of the result. . . . 600 

effects a junction with Wayne 603 

follows Cornwallis from Elk Hill . . 603 
effects a junction with Steuben .... 604 
reports skirmish at Williamsburg . . 604 
reports movements of Cornwallis . . 606 

hopes to assume the offensive 607 

is complimented by Tarleton 60S 

conspicuous in battle of Jamestown 609 

retires to Malvern Hill 609 

at Forks of Pamunky and Mattapony 61 1 
threatens the rear of Gloucester. ... 6n 

avoids false movements 611 

compliments Cornwallis 6n 

thanks Washington for the command 612 
delays the attack upon Yorktown. . 612 
anticipates the action of Cornwallis 613 
in full accord with Washington. . . . 614 

his relations with Greene 617 

his excellent logistics noticed 621 

reports the condition of his army. . 623 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



689 



La Fayette, reports the landing of French 

troops 624 

his 24th birthday, Sept. 6th, 1781. . C->2S 

directs the attack of a redoubt 638 

his pleasantry with Baron Viomenil 639 
returns to France after fall of York- 
town . 646 

his services recognized 655 

Lamb, John, Col.,/;. 1735, d. 1800. 

with Arnold in assault upon Quebec 136 
commands post at Anthony's Nose. 355 
at assault upon Fort Montgomery. . 359 
accompanies Washington to Vir- 
ginia 622 

Lamb. R., sergt. Royal Welsh Fusileers 

publishes his diary i63 

reports sufferings of .l/Ji. army in 

Canada if,8 

describes battle at Freeman's Farm 341 
his opinion of battle of Monmouth. 445 
his experience of battle of Guilford 563 
Lameth, Chevalier de, (/>-.) 70. before 

Yorkto wn 631 

Langdon, Samuel Rev., Pres. Harvard 
College. /'. 1723, </. 1797. 
invoked God's blessing upon march 

to Bunker Hill 95 

Langdon, John, on Am naval committee 144 
Landing of, British troops at Bunker Hill 103 

Long Island 200 

New York 225 

Frog's Neck 234 

Pell's Point 237 

Verplanck's Point 357 

Head of Elk 366 

in South Carolina 493 

French troops at Newport, R. I.. . . 450 

Savannah, Ga 47S 

Jamestown, Va 611 

La Sensible, frigate, brings the French 

treaty 404 

Lasher, Col. [Am.) in the Highlands. . 247 
Latimer, Col., in the army of Gates. . . . 336 
Laurens, Henry, (statesman), l>. 1724, d. 
1792. 

on Com. Safety, S. C 179 

Vice-president of South Carolina. . iSo 
captured on a mission to Holland. 52S 
Laurens, John, Lieut. Col., aid de-camp 
of Washington, h. 1753, d. 1782. 
Judge Advocate Court of Inquiry 

(Schuyler) 312 

with La Fayette in New Jersey. . . . 396 

sustains D'Estaing 447 

conspicuous at siege of Newport. . . 454 

in the assault upon .Savannah 481 

sent on special mission to France. . 539 
holds an interview with Count Ver- 

gennes 54° 

brings back gold for the American 

army 623 

conspicuous at siege of Vorktown. . 639 
a commissioner at capitulation of 

Yorktown 640 

Lake, Lieut. Col, {Br.) leads a sortie 

from Yorktown 640 

Lauzun, Duke de, with army of Rochani- 

beau 61S 

44 



P.\GE 

Lauzun, at Ridgebury, Connecticut . . . 619 
routs Delancey's Refugees at Morris- 

sania 620 

defeats Tarleton's Legion near 
Gloucester 638 

Lawson's Virginia battalion at Trenton. 273 

Lawson Brig. Genl. at battle of Guilford 557 

Learned, Brig. CJenl., ordered to relieve 

P'ort Schuyler 324 

at battle of P'reeman's Farm 336 

Bemis Heights 347 

Saratoga 351 

Ledyaid, William Col., {Am.), h. 1750 </. 

1781, commands Fort Griswold. . 62S 
wantonly killed by Royalists 629 

Lee, Richard Henry, (s'tatesman),*^. 1732, 
</. 1794. 

urges Virginia to arm 85 

on Am. naval committee 144 

cooperates with Patrick Henry in 

Virginia 174 

sent to find Charles Lee 262 

wishes the j)o\vers of Washington 
enlarged 598 

Lee, Ilenrv, Col. sid>, Brig. Genl. />. 1756, 
d. 1818. 

his skill with light troops 64 

at storming of Stony Point 472 

makes a dash at Paulus Hook. . . . 475 

his regiment recruited at large 526 

ordered to southern department. . . . 533 

ordered to join Morgan 550 

with Genl. (jreene on the Dan. . . . 552 
recrosses the Dan, for offensive 

action 553 

skirmishes before Guilford 560 

in the battle of Guilford 560 

at capture of Fort Watson 569 

at capture of Fort Motte 574 

at siege of Augusta 574 

captures P"ort Granby 574 

Lee, Charles, Maj. Genl. /i. 1731, d. 1782. 

with {Am.) army before Boston. ... 89 
resembled Arnold in volcanic temper 1 19 
sent to Connecticut to recruit troops 149 

ordered to New York 149 

denounces Congress 149 

his conduct at New York, (Note). . 160 
ordered to Canada, then to the south 174 

arrives at Charleston, S. C 182 

is controlled by President Rutledge 1 82 
gives wise counsel to the troops. ... 1S3 
visits Fort Sullivan during the battle 189 

joins Washington at the north 237 

is assigned, under restricting orders 237 

reaches White Plains 238 

writes to Gates, deriding Congress. 238 
criticises the | osition of the army. . 239 

is ordered to New Jersey 250 

in camp at North Castle 256 

commands a large division 256 

in New Jersey with his army 25S 

is captured at B.askingriiige 25S 

writes to tlates improperly 259 

disobeys Washington's orders 260 

insolent to Genl. Heath 261 

writes to R. H. Lee and B. Rush. . 262 
writes again to Heath 262 



690 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Lee, his capture mildly noticed by Wash- 
ington 263 

opposes Washington 398 

joins the army after exchange 409 

advises Washington 409 

on parole, before his exchange 409 

asks Congress to confer with him . . 410 
proposes a compromise of the war . 410 
gives improper information to Howe 410 

opposes the pursuit of Clinton 417 

begs La Fayette to yield his com- 
mand 415 

his policy defective 417 

commands a division of 5,000 men . 418 
understands Washington's wishes. . 422 

quibbles as to orders 424 

retreats at Monmouth 437 

has an altercation with Washington.440-1 
is convicted before court-martial. . . 445 

his circumstances considered 445 

his death a lesson 445 

declares the campaign of 1778 to be 

final 446 

Leighton, Capt. {Br.) w. at battle of 

Monmouth 444 

Leitch, Maj. [Am.) k. at Harlem Heights 229 
L' Enfant, Maj. (/>'.) tries to burn abatis 

at Savannah 479 

Leslie, Maj. Gen. (i>V.) lands on New 

York Island 225 

in skirmish at Harlem Heights. . . . 22g 
commands the assault at Chatterton 

Hill 240 

is stationed at Maidenhead, N. J.. . 285 

is ordered to join Cornwallia 541 

takes possession of Charleston 497 

invades Virginia 529 

fortifies Portsmouth and Norfolk . . 529 

marches to join Cornwallis 541 

effects a junction with Cornwallis. . 546 
is advised of reinforcements for 

Virginia 549 

at the battle of Guilford 558 

reinforces Cornwallis from New York 456 
Leslie, William, son of Earl of Levin, k. 

at Princeton 289 

Lexington and Concord, their lesson ... 8 
expedition, as judged by Stedman . 11 
expedition, as judged by Dr. Dwight 12 
battle, news spreads through the 

Colon.ies 81-6 

Light troops, their value illustrated . . . .63-4 
Light Infantry (Am.), authorized and 

distributed 87 

Lillington, Col. (Ani.) at Moore's Creek 

Bridge, Va I74 

Lincoln, Abraham, Pres. U. S., twice /'. 
1809 d. 1865. 
acts upon the basis of sound strategy 57 
Lincoln, Benjamin, Maj. Gen., />. 1733, 
d. 1 8 10. 

on Mass. Com. Supplies 9 

joins the army near New York .... 231 

before Fort Independence 292 

promoted Maj. Gen 296 

Pres. Court of Inquiry, as to Schuyler 312 
sent to threaten Burgoyne's com- 
munications 321 



Lincoln urges Gen. Stark tojoin thearmy 331 
succeeds to command of Arnold's 

division 347 

at Saratoga, after battle of Bemis 

Heights 35G 

makes a raid about Ticonderoga . . 351 
succeeds Gen. Robert Howe at the 

South 464 

opposed by Maj. Gen. Prevost 464 

unwisely divides his command 464 

retreats to Charleston 465 

proposes the capture of Savannah. . 477 
sends vessels to land /v'. troops. . . . 478 
commands an assaulting column ... 481 

raises the siege of .Savannah 483 

in command at Charleston 494 

surrenders Charleston to Gen. Leslie 497 

in expedition from Peekskill 6ig 

in skirmish near Fort Independence 619 
commands the right wing at York- 
town 635 

receives the surrender of Yorktown. 642 
conducts Am. army to winter 

quarters 645 

on duty as Secretary of War 655 

Lines of communication 58 

Lines of defense 55 

not to be held passively 56 

Lines of operation, the pathways of 

armies 54 

parallel and deep, illustrated 54 

Lines of Sherman's march to the sea, 

really but one 57 

Linsing, Col. {//.) in attack upon Fort 

Mercer 394 

Lisle, Lieut. Col., joins Am. army with 

his recruits 508 

Little, Moses, Col., sent men to Bunker 

Hill 100 

Little Neck, N. J., visited by Ferguson. 459 
Lively, frigate, opens fire upon Breed's 

Hill 98 

Livingston, James, Col., recruits a 

Canadian battalion 

at Chambly with Maj. Brown 129 

at siege of Quebec 134 

at battle of Freeman's Farm 336 

Livingston, Henry B., Col., at Ticon- 
deroga 312 

his opinion of the post 312 

at the battle of Freeman's Farm. . . 336 

at the battle of Monmouth 439 

at the siege of New])ort 451 

at the battle of Quaker's Hill 454 

Livingston, William, Gov. N. ].,/>. 1741, 
(/. 1790. 

supports Washington 246 

Locke, Francis, Col. (Am.) k. at Char- 
lotte, N. C 519 

at Ramsour's Mills 519 

Logan, Maj. (Am.) reconnoitres before 

Fort Clinton 359 

Logistics defined 48 

illustrated 6S-72 

when bad, imperils all 69 

embraces all executive functions. . . 69 

of America, in war of 1861-5 69 

of Prussia in 1870 69 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



691 



Logistics, the great care of Washington 140 
preeminent, at British landing on 

Long Island 200 

good, during Am. retreat from 

Brooklyn 2l6 

of Washington illustrated 245-6 

of La Fayette in Virginia 591 

of Great Britain in Abyssinia cam- 
paign 69 

of Great Britain on Coast of Guinea 69 

of march to Yorktown 621 

of the war of 1775-1783 652 

Long, Col. {Am.) post commander at 
Ticonderoga. 

retreats to Skenesborough 313 

abandons vessels and stores 314 

in skirmish near Fort Ann 315 

abandons Fort Ann 315 

Lords, House of, votes as to mercenary 

troops J ^2 

Losberg, Maj. Genl. (//.) at Newport, 

, . RI 454 

Lossing, Benson John, (historian of Am. 
Rev.), b. 1S13. 

as to Bunker Hill 108 

as to Hale's execution, (Note) 227 

states true basis of casualties at Ben- 
nington 333 

as to Arnold at Freeman's Farm. . 342 
his life devoted to American history 342 
his opinion of battle at King's 

Mountain 521 

his account of the Associated l^oy- 

alists 626 

his assistance recognized gratefully 2 
Louis XVI., King of France, b. 1754, (/. 

1793- 
designates I2,cx)0 men as aid to 

America 503 

furnishes 6 millions of livres for the 

war 623 

Louisville, Ky., (named in honor of 

Louis XVI.) 

a type of good base in 1 861-5 51 

Lunt's company at battle of Bunker 

Hill 100 

Lynn Bay, the anchorage of Count De 

Grasse, 1781 615 

Lynch, Thomas, at Am. camp near 

Boston 143 

Lowndes, Rawlins, Com. Safety, S. C . 179 

Lucan's Mill, scene of skirmish 390 

Lovell, Solomon, signs protest against 

D'Estaing 453 



M. 

Mackenzie's, strictures on Tarleton's 

campaign 522 

Mackey's Provincials at Saratoga 350 

MaGaw, Col. at Long Island 214 

thinks he can hold Fort Washington 245 

in command at P'ort Washington. . 2.^9 
declines surrender of Fort W.ashing- 

ton 249 

qualifies Howe's ultimatum 249 

Mahon, Lord, Philip Henry, Earl of 



Mahon, Stanhope, (statesman and his- 
torian), I). 1805. 
his opinion of battle of Trenton .. . 2S1 
his opinion of battle of Monmouth. 444 

Maitland. Lieut. Col., at Beaufort 478 

makes his way into Savannah 479 

distinguished at Savannah 482 

Maitland, Capt., (j9r.), K'. at Guilford.. 562 
Maidenhead, included in plan against 

'J'renlon 271 

Major Generals appointed, Arnold 

omitted 296 

Majoribanks, Maj., gallant conduct at 

Eutaw Springs 573 

Malmady, Col. at Eutaw Springs 578 

Malvern Hill, occupied by La Fayette. 609 
Mamelukes in 181 1, suppies?ed, why. . . 42 
.Manly, Capt. John, takes many prizes. . 140 
Marie, Antoinette, Queen of France, b. 
1755. «'• 1793- 
intercedes for the American cause. 490 
Marion, Francis, Brig. Genl., <^. 1732,^/. 
1795. 

captain in 1775 179 

his antecedents 186 

at Fort Moultrie 1S6 

detached by Gates 509 

in communication with Greene. . . . 532 

on Black River 532 

at capture of Fort Watson 569 

applies for artillerv 570 

at capture of Fort Motto 574 

commanded right wing at Futaw 

Springs 578 

continues operations at the south. . 5S3 
Marlborough, Duke, (John Churchill), b. 
1650, d. 1722. 

improved success 76 

Marshall, John, Chief Justice, U. .S. 
(historian and jurist.) /'. 1755, d. 
1836. 

opinion of Bunker Hill 108 

as to movement on Three Rivers. . 166 
gives casualties before White Plains 240 

opinion of Schuyler 319 

report of Arnold at Freeman's 

Farm 342 

statement of mutiny early in 1781. 537 
report of the American army in 

1781 ;•••• 537 

Martin, statement as to Bunker Hill. . . 97 
Martin, Gov. of N. C, pledges 10,000 

men to the crown J 74 

^L^rtha's Vineyard, destroyed by Genl. 

Grey 455 

Maryland, appoints Committee of Obser- 
vation 86 

troops at Brooklyn 197 

troops at Harlem Heights 229 

troops on nearly every battle field. 491 
troops, gallant conduct at Camden . 516 

troops at Eutaw Springs 578 

Mason, George, (Va.), supports Col. 

Clark at the west 461 

Massachusetts, Provincial Congress or- 
ganized for war. 1776 9 

calls u)ion New England for 30,000 
men 84 



692 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Massachusetts, makes war 84 

drafts one-fifth able bodied males. . 222 
troops detained at Newport by 

British movements 255 

orders a monument to Chevalier de 

St. Sauveur 455 

liberal to its troops during mutiny. 539 
Matthews, John, on special War Com- 
mittee 490 

Matthews, Maj. Gen). {Br.), at Fort 

Washington 250 

alarmed for stores at Brunswick. . . 291 

at Brandy wine 367 

lays waste Portsmouth and Norwalk 466 

at Connecticut Farms 498 

Mathews, Col. {Am.), captured light in- 
fantry at Germantown 389 

Mawhood, Col., attacks Mercer at 

Princeton 288 

at Quinton's Bridge 405 

Maxwell, Wm. Brig. Genl., b. in Ireland, 
d. 1798. 

Col. in Canada in 1776 166 

collected boats on the Delaware. . . 264 

commands at Morristown 264 

near Elizabethtown 294 

to pursue Howe to Piscataway. . . . 300 

retires before Howe 301 

skirmishes at Red Clay Creek 366 

gallantry before Cliadd's Ford 369 

good conduct at Brandy wine 380 

in the reserve at Germantown 388 

sent to protect Bordentown 404 

ordered to harass Clinton's retreat. 413 

skirmishes at Mount Holly 413 

present when Lee received his 

orders 424 

witness on trial of Lee 424-7 

goes with expedition against In- 
dians 475 

in the action near Springfield 499 

brigade at Springfield 500 

Maxwell, Capt., patrols Charlestown 

Neck 96 

Mayham, Col., designed the Mayham 

tower 574 

Mayson, James, Lieut Col., S.C. Rangers 179 
Mc Arthur, Maj., makes a gallant sally 

from Savannah 479 

in charge of British sick 51c 

McCall's mounted men at battle of Cow- 
pens 543 

slaughter royalists 541 

McConkey's Ferry, Washington crossed 

at, Dec. 26, 1776 271 

McCowan's Ford forced 551 

McCrea. Jane, her murder, Burgoyne not 

responsible 325 

McDonald, Capt.. uses stratagem at 

Hanging Roclc ^ . . . 508 

w. at Charlotte 519 

McDonald, Sergeant, at Fort Moultrie, 

w. mortally 1S9 

McDonald, Donald, raises a corps of 

royalists 174 

fris. by CoJ. Caswell 174 

McDougal, Alexander, Brig. Gen., b. 
1750, d. 1786 



PAGE 

McDougal, in retreat from Long Is- 
land 217 

brigade in Spencer's division 221 

brigade near Chatterton Hill 239 

succeeds Heath at PeeksIviU 296 

on the Hudson 29S 

at Peekskill, 1777 398 

at West Point with Kosciusko .... 403 

commands in the Highlands 458 

Secretary of Marine 5S8 

McDowell, Irwin, Maj. Gen., U. S. Army, 
b. 1818. 

at Bull Run 62 

McDowell, Charles, Col., at battle of 

King's Mountain 520 

McDowell, Maj., joins Morgan 541 

at battle of Cowpens . 543 

Mcintosh, Col., taken/m. at Brier Creek 465 
Mcintosh, Alexander, Maj , 2d S. C. regt 179 
McLaughrey, Lieut. Col., at Fort Clinton 359 
McLean, Gen., at Penobscot, Maine . . . 474 
McLean, Maj., with Royal Scotch at 

Quebec 130 

McLean, Capt., with light corps at Barren 

Hill 406 

McLeod, Lieut., with artillery at battle 

of Guilford 561 

McLeod, Donald, raises a corps of 

royalists 174 

McI>eod, Capt., attempts the capture of 

Jefferson 601 

McPherson, /'. at Quebec 135 

McPherson, Lieut. {Br.) k. at Savannah. 482 
McPherson, Maj. {Am) at Jamestown. . 608 
McPherson, Maj. {Br.) at Brier Creek . . 464 

Meeker, Maj., at Minnisink 474 

Mecklenburg County, N. C, character 

of people 519 

Meigs, Col., at Quebec 137 

makes an incursion at Sag Harbor. 297 

at Stony Point 472 

Mellon, Lieut., reaches Fort Schuyler . . 323 
Mental philosophy directs military 

success 18 

Mercer's (Capt.) evidence on trial of Lee 431 
Mercer, Hugh, Brig. Gen., b. 1721, d. 

1777- 

guarding the Delaware, Dec, 1776. 264 

attacked by Mawhood at Princeton 288 

w. mortally at Princeton 288 

Mercer, Lieut. Col. {Am.) cavalry at 

Jamestown 608 

Merlin, frigate, burned near Fort Mercer 395 

Mexico illustrates civil war 29 

Middleton, Arthur, Com. Safety, S. C. . . 179 
Mifflin, Thomas, Gen., b. 1744, (/. iSoo. 

prepares for assault on Boston ifo 

orilered to provide barracks, N. Y . 156 

brigade at King's Bridge 221 

instructed by Washington 246 

promoted Maj. Gen 296 

on the board of war 398 

neglected his duties. . . 398 

reports at Valley Forge 408 

Miller, Col., k. at Fort Washington .... 251 

Miles, Col., at Long Island 203 

Military Art levies upon all art if 

the enicma of essential force lO 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



693 



PAGE 

Military armaments bleed nations to 

death 20 

Military achievements hoiioied in 

Scripture 21-2 

Military changes of both armies durint^ 

the war 655 

Military commanders, selection of . . . .79-So 
Military conduct not to be controlled by 

the State 40 

Military education necessary for best 

national defense 15 

Military force gives sanction to civil 

force 20 

Military history instinct with nobility. . 20 

Military men must conduct war 43 

Military, personal, and municipal action 

have the same logic 16 

Military Policy, of Gage, 1776 10 

the State responsible for 40 

not to be confounded with military 

conduct 40-3 

illustrated by parable of Scripture. . 41 

illustrated, 1861-5 41-2 

in the Mamelukes in iSii, tiie Jani- 
zaries in 1826, and the expulsion 

of the Jesuits 42 

at Bunker Hill, faulty 114 

of Indian auxiliaries bad 279 

in the war of 1775-S1 650 

Military principles unfolded, not created 18 
Military science, never more worthy of 

study 23 

under a higher law 650 

Military service of different arms 63 

Military success, a matter of mental 

philosophy. . , 18 

Military stores ordered concentrated at 

Concord, 1775 9 

Military and civil codes related 17 

Military valor honored in sacred history. 2 1-2 
Militia of Massachusetts organized, 1774 83 
Militia the true dependence of England 

and America 14 

Militia system of America, too transient 15 

Mmor tactics defined 4'' 

Minnigerode, Col., tc. at Fort Mercer . . 394 
Minnisink, New York, laid waste by 

Brandt 474 

Minute men of 1775 9 

Mobilization of Germany 14 

Modern development pregnant with strife 22 

Molly {Br.), Captain 249 

Monck's Corner, skirmisli at 575 

Monckton, Lieut. Col., 41st Br. Foot, 

w. at Long Island 209 

k. at Hedge Row, Monmouth 442 

buried by Americans with honor . . 443 
Moncrief, Maj. (Br.), Chief Engineer at 

Savannah 4^2 

Monmouth and vicinity described. . . 419-21 
Monmouth Battle of— First skirmish. . . 433 

second skirmisli 434 

third skirmish 435 

Battle 43^ 

Monmouth, opinions of the result. . . . 444-5 
Montgomery, Richard, Brig. Genl. d. 

with Schuyler, to invade Canada. . . 120 



PACE 

Montgomery, arrives at Ticonderoga. . 127 

arrives at St. John's 128 

repulsed at St. John's 128 

captures St. John's 129 

finds army without discipline 129 

captures Montreal I2g 

disgusted with the army 133 

dissuaded from resigning 133 

joins Arnold in a snow storm 133 

leaves Wooster at Montreal 133 

demands surrender of Quebec 133 

/■. in assault on Quebec 135-6 

Montgomery, Maj., /:. at Fort Griswold 629 

Montgomery, frigate, burned in the 

Hudson 360 

Monroe, James, Lieut. sii/>. Pres. b. 175S, 
(i. July, 14, 1831. 
at battle of Trenton 273 

Montesquieu, Charles Baron de, b. i68g, 
d. 1755. 
declares the spirit of laws 21 

Monticello, Jefferson's home visited l)y 

Capt. McLeod 600 

Moore, Robert, Brig. Genl., excepted 

from Clinton's pardon 175 

Moore, George H., Sect. N. V. Histori- 
cal Society, 
disclosed Lee's plans 410 

Moore's, regt., in part at Bunker Hill. . . loO 

Moore's House near Vorktown, head- 
quarters of Lincoln 636 

Moore's Creek Bridge, skirmish 174 

Morgan, Capt., skirmishes before Hob- 
kirk's Hill 571 

Morgan, Daniel, Brig. Genl. b. 1737, </. 
1802. 

commands rifle corps 64 

sent to Boston in 1775, with Va. 

Light Infantry 87 

goes to Quebec with Arnold 121 

gallant conduct at Quebec 131 

made prisoner at (Quebec 137 

attacks Hessians on the Raritan. . . 300 

sent to army of Gates 335 

at Battle of Freeman's Farm 341 

at Battle of Bemis Heights 347 

joins Washington from the north. . 397 

.-.kirmishes with Cornwallis 397 

reinforces Maxwell in New Jersey. 414 

on Clinton's right flank. . . 416 

promoted and sent south 526 

threatens British posts 541 

fights battle of Cowpens 543 

retreats from Cowpens. . . 546 

eludes pursuit of Cornwallis 546 

disabled by rheumatism for further 

service 54^ 

crosses the Yadkin 55i 

suggests to Greene a plan of battle 557 

Morris, Gouverncur, advised of Miftlin's 

conduct 408 

Morris, Rol)ert, (financier and stales- 
man), /'. 1734. d. 1806. 
knew of attack on Trenton in ad- 
vance 268 

Secretary of Financial Bureau.... 5SS 
endorses for the United States. . . . 623 

Morris, Maj, Am.), k. at I'rincelon. . . 2S9 



694 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Moriisania, the headquarters of Delan- 

cey's Refugees 6 to 

Morristown, its strategic position 50 

a good rendezvous, Dec. 1776 264 

regts. from Ticonderoga to halt at. 266 
McDougall at, Dec. 27tli, 1776.... 276 
reenlistments at Dec. 27th, 1776... 276 

winter quarters, 1777 291 

again American winter quarters.,. 483 
and Valley Forge equally fearful. . 486 
the objective of Clinton in 1780. . . 500 

Morton's Hill 98 

Morton's Point, or Moulton's Point, 

(Note) 98 

Moslem wars, their type 27 

Motte, Rebecca, aids to burn Fort Motte 574 
Motte, Maj. {Am.), k. at Savannah. . . . 482 

Motte, Capl. at Quebec 136 

Motte, Isaac, Lieut. Col. 2nd S. C. regt. 179 

Motte, Charles, Captain 179 

Moulder, Capt. {Am.), with artillery at 

Trenton 288 

Moulton's Point, (Note.) 98 

Moultrie, Fort 185 

Moultrie, Wm., Brig. Genl., /'. 1730, </. 
1805. 

Col. in 1775 175 

builds Fort Sullivan , . ... 179 

his antecedents 180 

his faith in resistance 183 

his gallant defense 186 

rescues Beaufort 464 

describes slaughter at Savannah. . . , 481 
Mount Independence, opposite Ticon- 
deroga 308 

Mount Washington, (Lake Champlain) 

fortified 280 

Mowatt, Lieut., burns Falmouth, now 

Portland 143 

Moylan, Col., quartermaster 231 

Muhlenburg, Peter, Maj. Genl., d. 1746, 
d. 1807. 

prom>>ted Brig. Genl 296 

at battle of Brandywine 371 

on Court of Inquiry, Schuyler 312 

at Brandywine 367 

in reserve at Brandywine 370 

at Germantown 389 

advises to attack New York 404 

at Monmouth \ 444 

his brigade at storming of Stony 

Point 472 

in Virginia 529 

at Suffolk 585 

at Petersburgh 590 

promoted Maj. Genl ; retires from 

the army 655 

Mungen"s House near Bemis Heights. . 340 
Murfreesborough, retreat from 1861-5. . 73 
Murphy's N. C. troops at storming of 

Stony Point 472 

Murray Lindley, the friend of Greene.. 80 
Musgrave, Col., occupies Chew House at 

Germantown 388 

Musgrove sent by Greene across Catawba 532 
Musgrove's Mills, skirmish at, in favor 

of Americans 518 

Mutiny of American army 536 



P.\GK 

Mutiny, Connecticut troops 491 

New Jersey troops 463 

Pennsylvania troops 537 



IX. 



Napoleon I. (Bonaparte), Buonaparte, 
Emperor of France, i. 1769, </. 
1821. 
tested good strategy and logistics 

in first Italian campaign 61 

his methods compared with Brad- 
dock's 61 

used the sword of Habib 61 

valued good logistics 69 

styled by Jomini, "his own best 

chief of staff" 72 

uniformly improved success 76 

Napoleon III., Louis Bonaparte, d. 
1808, rt'. 1873. 
made war in 1870 without notice . . 46 

failed, through poor logistics 69 

Nash, Abner, Gov., N. C, addressed by 

Gen. Greene 529 

Nash, Francis, Brig. Gen., promoted. . . 296 
ill the reserve at battle of German- 
town 387 

k. at battle of Germantown 389 

National capital, rarely the prime objec- 
tive of a campaign 53 

National wars considered 25 

Nations responsible for a ready defense. 22 
Naval committee appointed by Am. 

Congress 144 

cooperation during the war 654 

regulations established 144 

Naval diversion {-Br.) from New York. . 201 
Naval engagement, between, D'Estaing 

and Howe 450 

Destouches and Arbuthnot 612 

De Grasse and Hood 615 

Naval operations at the sport of the 

elements i, 35, 39 

not guaranteed by steam propulsion 3 
Navy {Aw.) organized, and its fate 

144 (note) and 278 

Neal, Capt. {Am.) k. at battle of Prince- 
ton 288 

Neilson, Charles, as to Arnold at Free- 
man's Farm 342 

his log building fortified 336 

Nelson, Thomas, Brig. Gen., Gov. Va., 
b. 1738, d. 1789. 

at Williamsburg 594 

succeeds Jefferson as Governor 601 

his brothers captured 601 

honored for services rendered 65b 

Nelson, Maj. {Am.) protects river at 

Richmond 591 

Nesbit, Brig. Gen. {Br}) at Three Rivers 166 
Newark, N. J., visited by Knyphausen . 485 
New England to furnish troops for 

Canada 244 

loyalist battalion a failure 320 

free from British troops 488 

languid under relief from pressure. 488 
New England as judged by Burgoyne. . 337 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



695 



New Hampshire enters upon the war. . . 84 
liberal to her troops during tlie 

mutiny 539 

New Hampshire Grants disgust Gen. 

Riedescl 320 

New Haven, Conn., invaded hy Gen. 

Tryon 469 

New Jersey enters upon the war 85 

families honored by Pres. Tutlle. . . 487 

patriotism of her citizens 487 

regiments mutiny 491 

legislature relieves the suffering 

troops 4'J3 

for five years the theatre of war. . . . 502 
Newport, R. I., the key to New England 155 

occupied by British troops 255 

besieged by American troops. .... 44S 

threatetied by a Fr. fleet 448 

abandoned by Sir Henry Clinton . . 476 
New Rochelle the scene of a skirmish. . 235 
/' occupied by Lieut. Gen. Knyp- 

hausen 235 

New Windsor, near Newburgh, Wash- 
ington's Headquarters 467 

abandoned 622 

New York the primary British base 51 

enters upon the war 85 

treated as the British base in 1775 . iiS 
adopts Declaration of Independence 195 
in possession of the British army. . . 227 
evacuated by the American army . . 227 
militia attracted by Howe's pro- 
clamation 244 

Nichols, John, Col. {Am>i at Richmond, 

Va 549 

Ninety-Six garrisoned by British troops. 497 

successfully resists a siege 574 

is evacuated by British troops 57^ 

Nixon, John, Brig. Gen. (^w.) b. 1735, ^ 
d. 1815. ^ 

Col. at Bunker Hill 100 

in Spencer's division 221 

guarding the Delaware in 1776. . . . 265 

ordered to Albany 302 

joins Schuyler at Stillwater 319 

on court of inquiry as to Schuyler. . 312 

in battle of Freeman's Farm 336 

at Saratoga 35 1 

Norfolk, Va., bombarded by order of 

Lord Dunmore I49 

North American Pilot gives plan of 

Charleston harbor 1/6 

North Carolina enters upon the war 86 

maintains her position I75 

troops sent to Western territories. . 466 
troops at storming of Stony Point. . 472 

militia at battle of Camden 515-^7 

militia at battle of (juilford 55^ 

regulars at battle of Eutaw Springs. 578 
Noailles, Viscount de, commissioner at 

Yorktown ; ■ 641 

North, Lord Frederick, Earl of Guil- 
ford, b. 1733, d. 1792. 

anxious for peace 400 

his Conciliatory Bills reach New 

York 403 

Northern frontier threatened in 17S1 . . . 460 
Northern troops (.5n) sent into Indiana 460 



Norton, Lieut. Col. (i?n) attacks Young's 

House 486 

Nonvalk, Conn., burned by (ien. Tryon 470 
Va., laid waste by Gen. Matthews. . 466 
Norridgewock Falls reached by Arnold. 122 
Norwich, Conn., the birthplace of Bene- 
dict Arnold 627 

Nutting, Capt., at battle of Bunker Hill 96 



O. 



OlijECTlVF.s of War, considered 53 

Objectives of the war of 1 775-1 781 53 

Objective, not to be a capital, when. . . .53-4 

Oblique order of battle 66 

Obstacles, considered 55 

Obstructions, peculiar to this war 77 

of Burgoyne's campaign 328 

Offensive and defensive action 47 

Offensive return, when on the defensive 51 
"Officers, the very soul of an army." 

(Greene) 530 

to be made easy in their circum- 
stances 53*^ 

neither to beg, gamble, defraud, or 
resign, to live. (Washington.) . . 
Ogden's regt., got)d conduct at Brandy- 
wine 377 

O'Hara, Maj. Gen. {Br) b. 1756, d. 1791. 

pursues Morgan 552 

w. at battle of Guilford 561 

destroys fortifications at Portsmouth 6n 
joins Cornwallis at Yorktown ..... 61 1 
surrenders the army of Cornwallis . 642 
O'Hara, Lieut. {Br) k. at battle of 

Guilford 562 

Oneida Indians friendly to America ... 523 

attacked by Brandt 524 

Onondaga Indian settlement destroyed 

by troops 463 

On to Richmond, bad military policy, in 

1S61 44 

Opinions of Trenton : Lord Germaine, 
Gordon, Burke, Hughes, Stedman, 
Walter, Mahon, Abbe Raynal, 

and Anonvmous 281-2-3 

Opinions of Bunker Hill, (Ramsey) 108 

battle of the Cedars 165 

Monmouth 444-5 

50 
54 
54 
55 
56 
39 

496 
65 
67 
67 

323 
9 

386 
137 



Operations, base of 

lines of 

theatre of 

front of 

zones of 

Opportunitv given to men and nations. . 
Older, Capt.(i>V.), lands at .Mount Pleas- 
ant, S. C 

Orders of battle, defined 

principles stated.. 

illustrated by plate after page 

Oriskanv, battle of • . • 

Orne Azor, Mass. Com. Safety • 

O^born. Sir George, expected the attack 

upon Germantown "A" ' . ' ' 

Oswald, Eleazer, Lieut. Col., at Quebec 

with Arnold 



testifies on trial of Lee 429 



696 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



P. 

PAGE 

Palmer, Joseph, Mass. Com. Safety. . . 9 
Panic finds its sole limitation in disci- 
pline 653 

sometimes unavoidable 653 

of American troops at New York. . 226 

militia at Camden 517 

of good [Am.) troops at Hobkirk's 

Hill 572 

B/. regulars at Eutaw Springs. . . . 580 

Paoli, scene of disaster to Genl. Wayne. 3S3 
Parable of the Saviour illustrates Military 

policy 41 

Parker, Sir Peter, Admiral, /'. 16 16, c/. 
i8ir. 

leaves Cork for America 173 

approaches Charleston 180 

fails in attack upon Fort Sullivan. . 189 

reaches New York 195 

sails for Newport 255 

Parker, Hyde, Admiral, convoys troops to 

Savannah 459 

Parliament, Acts of, to be resisted, 1776 9 
Parrs, Maj. A/u. rifle corps with Sullivan, 

1779 ' 475 

Parry, Caleb, Lieut. Col. {A in.), killed on 

Long Island 209 

Parsons, James, Com. Safety, S. C 179 

Parsons, Samuel H. Brig. Genl., his ante- 
cedents 207 

at Long Island 209 

votes to abandon Brooklyn 217 

in Genl. Putnam's division 220 

his brigade panic-stricken 226 

his brigade well constituted 226 

before Fort Independence 292 

on the Hudson 298 

at Peekskill 502 

is too late to save Norwalk, Conn. . 471 
Partisan warfare ; regardless of parties. 575 
distinguished from legitimate opera- 
tions 647 

warfare at the South continued, 

1781 583 

Patterson, Adj. Genl. {Br.), holds inter- 
view with Washington 194 

demands surrender of Fort Wash- 
ington 249 

Patterson, Brig. Genl. {Br.), reinforces 

Clinton 495 

leaves Charleston for his health. ... 518 
Patterson, Col. {Am.), siili. Brig. Genl. 

part of regiment at Bunker Hill. . . 109 

sent to Canada 157 

at Princeton 2S9 

at Ticonderoga 311 

with Gates. ... 337 

at Saratoga 351 

advises to attack Philadelphia 404 

at Monmouth 444 

Passage of rivers considered 76 

Paulus Hook, attacked by Maj. Henry Lee 475 
Paumier, Lieut. {,Br.), w. at Monmouth 444 
Peabody, Nathaniel, on special war com- 
mittee 490 

Peace means rest, without waste 20 

the normal condition of society. ... 20 
assured, as armies are least needed. 21 i 



PAGE 

Penalties assured, lessen crime and war. 21 
Peekskill abandoned by Cienl. Putnam. . 360 
Pennebeck Hill, the camp of Washing- 
ton, Oct. 1777 387 

Penobscot the objective of a fatal expe- 
dition 474 

Pennsylvania insurrection considered.. 31 
adopts the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence 195 

troops, distinguished at Brooklyn . . 197 

troops, mutiny 537 

sent to Virginia under Wayne 584 

Pepperill, Col. {Aw.), at Frog's Neck. . . 234 

Percy, Hugh, Earl, Lieut. Genl. (Duke of 

Northumberland), l>. 1742, d. 1S17. 

commands a brigade at Boston. ... 10 

rescues the troops sent to Concord. 12 

advises to occupy Dorchester Heights 112 

distinguished at Bunker Hill 115 

ordered to recover Dorchester 

Heights 153 

is defeated by a storm 153 

at battle of Long Island 202 

stationed at McGowan's Pass 234 

joins Howe at White Plains 241 

at attack upon Fort Washington , . 250 

at Newport, Rhode Island 255 

Peter's Provincials with Baume at Ben- 
nington 329 

Peter, Capt. {Br.) 7i>. at battle of Guilford 562 
Petersburg, Va , taken by Phillips and 

Arnold 589 

Philadelphia engages in the war 85 

the objective of Gen. Howe in 1777 53 
regarded as a determining objective 363 

welcomes the American army 365 

occupied by Lord Cornwallis 384 

gives a fete to Gen. Howe 408 

is abandoned by Gen. Clinton 412 

its military value considered 412 

welcomes the Am. army, 178T 623 

welcomes the French army, 1781. . . 623 
Phillips, Maj. Gen. {Br.) at Three Rivers, 

Canada 166 

in Burgoyne's campaign 308 

occupies Mount Hope 308 

pursues Col. Long to Skenesborough 315 

returns to Ticonderoga 315 

reaches Fort George with artillery . 320 

at battle of Freeman's Farm 340 

at battle of Bemis Heights 345 

invades Virginia 566 

his force stated. May, 17S1. ...... 589 

at Chesterfield C. H 590 

returns to Petersburg 593 

dies, and succeeded by Arnold 596 

Phoenix and Roebuck, frigates, at Dobbs' 

F"erry 232 

Physical force, as a sanction of law .... 20 
Pickens, Andrew, Col. (S. C) /'. 1739, </. 
1S17. 

surprises Boyd's Provincials 464 

joins Gen. Morgan 541 

at battle of Cowpens 543 

before Augusta 574 

commands left wing at Eutaw 

Springs 578 

continues active operations, 17S1-2. 583 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



69; 



t 



PAGE 

Pickering, Timothy, Col. — Biig. Gen., 
sub. Sec. War, Sec. State, li. 1745, 
(/. 1829. 

succeeds Reed as Adjt. Gen. {Am.). 296 

appointed Quar. Mas. (}en 492 

Picl<ering, Brig. Gen., S. C, with militia, 

1781 569 

Pigeon, John, Mass. Com. Safety 9 

Pigot, Maj. Gen. {Br.) commands 

brigade at Boston 10 

distinguished at Bunker 1 1 ill 104 

in command at Newport, R. 1 448 

his plan for defense of Newport ... 451 

reports the defeat oi Am. army .... 454 
Pinckney, Charles C, sub. Diplomate 
and Statesman, b. 1746, d. 1825. 

a captain in South Carolina 179 

Com. Safety 1 79 

promoted colonel and at Charles- 
ton 181 

Pinckney, Thomas, sub. Diplomate and 
Statesman, b. 1729, d. 1779. 

in the State service of S. C 179 

Pitt, William (Statesman and Orator), b. 
1759, d. 1806. 

gives his opinion of Guilford ..... 564 
Pitcairn, Maj. {Br. marines) at Concord, 

Mass II 

k. at Bunker Hill. no 

his memory honored 12 

Plans and Counter Plans, 1776 255 

Plundering, endangered Bennington. . . . 333 

lost the battle of Eutaw Springs . . . 5S1 

Pollard, Ensign (j9;-.), /'. at Savannah .. 482 
Pomeroy, Seth, Brig. Gen. 

appointed Gen.-in-Cluef by Mass. . 9 

his antecedents 84 

appointed continental Brig. Gen. . . 89 

brave at Bunker Hill 100 

declines an active commission loo 

Poor, Enoch, Brig. Gen., b. 1736, d. . 

as Col., sent to Canada 157 

at battle of Princeton 289 

promoted Brig. Gen 296 

at Ticonderoga 311 

at PVeeman's Farm 336 

at Bemis Heights 347 

advises an attack upon New York . 404 

at Barren Hill 407 

at battle of Monmouth 444 

with Sullivan in expedition against 

Indians 475 

Pope, John, Maj. Gen., U. S. Army, b. 
1S23. 
his assignment in 1862 illustrates 

Military Policy 57 

Porter, Col., his regiment will serve two 

weeks longer 276 

Porter's militia neglect their duty at 

Barren Hill 4o6 

Porterfield, Col., nth Va. regt., in 

Arnold's expedition to Quebec. . . 137 

in skirmishing at Chadd's Ford . . . 369 

in Southern Department 510 

effects a junction with Gates 510 

taken /m. at battle of Camden. ... 518 
Port Royal. S. C, occupied by British 

troops 465 



PACE 

Portsmouth laid waste by Gen. Matthews 466 

occupied by Gen. Leslie 525 

fortified by Gen. Arnold 549 

demolished by (Jen. O'Hara 610 

Potter, Col. {Am.) k. at battle of Trenton 289 
Potts, Stacy, furnishes Col. Rahl his 

Headquarters 273 

Powell, Brig. Gen., with Burgoyne 215 

Powell, Capt. {Br.) iu. at battle of Mon- 
mouth 444 

Powder greatly needed at Boston 95 

seized in .South Carolina and Georgia 79 
Pownall, Thomas, Ex-Gov., reads the 

future of America 656-7 

Prescott, Maj. Gen. {Br.) captured near 

Montreal 129 

commands at Newport, R. I 255 

captured again by Col. Barton. . . . 409 

exchanged for Gen. Lee 409 

Prescott, William, Col., /'. 1726, d. 1795. 

his antecedents 84 

chief actor at redoubt on Bunker 

Hill 93 

advised the movement 95 

marched the command, under orders 96 
conspicuous for gallant conduct. ... 97 
his relations to the Ijattle (Note). . . 98 

with Warren the last to retreat . no 

makes rash proposal to regain the 

position ^10 

commands Governor's Island, N. Y. 197 
in Parsons' brigade at New York. . 226 

at Pell's Point with his regt 234 

Preparations for the war 82 

Piesident of Congress reviews Rocham- 

beau's army 624 

Prevost, Sir Augustine, Maj. Genl. at 

St. Augustine, Florida 446 

captures Sunbury, Georgia 464 

defeats Genl. Ashe at Brier Creek. 464 
demands the surrender of Charles- 
ton 465 

retires to Savannah 465 

gains time by parley with D'Estaing. 479 

destroys roads and bridges 479 

makes gallant defense of Savannah 479 
" Pride or principle must nerve the 

soldier," Greene 53' 

Principles of .-/w. AV-'. the life of English 

liberty ■ ■ 4 

mditary science defined in Chap. XL 60 

the Am. Rev. reviewed 646-7 

Prince Edward, C. H., visited by Tarle- 

ton 622 

Prince of Wales regiment nearly de- 
stroyed 50S 

Princeton, battle, an .-\merican success 2S8-9 
college occupied by British troops. 289 
Prisoners taken at Saratoga sent to Yir- 

ginia 353 

Privateering in high favor 278 

Privateers and British cruisers in 1776.. 399 
Proclamation of, day for fasting and 

]>rayer, 1776 ^o 

Burgoyne 3^6 

counter, of Washington 306 

of liurgoyne 3'8 

Schuyler 3iS 



698 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Proclamation of Howe 279 

Clinton 175 

Proctor, Thomas, Capt., commands guns 

at Chadd's Ford 368 

accompanies Sullivan against In- 
dians 475 

Promotions of Am. officers give dissatis- 
faction 296 

of general officers specified 296 

Prospect Hill occupied by Genl. Put- 
nam, (Note.) Ill 

Protest sent to Count D'Estaing, unten- 
able 453-4 

Providence in war illustrated. Chap. VII 35 

emphasized 650-51 

Provincial Congress, (Mass.) vote to raise 

an army 10 

Prussian Logistics excellent in 1870. ... 69 
Pulaski, Casimir, Count, Maj. Genl., b. 

1747,^^. 1779- 
rescues the post of Little Neck... 459 

skirmishes near Charleston 465 

k. at siege of Savannah 481 

is remembered 655 

Purchase of powder and cannon author- 
ized 87 

Putnam, Rufus, Col. engineer at Boston 152 

on Schuyler's Court of Inquiry 312 

Putnam, Israel, Maj. Genl. b. ijiS,tL 1790 

his antecedents 84 

an original appointment 89 

rt occupation of Bunker Hill 95 

his relations to the battle, (Note). . 98 

asks for reinforcements 99 

generally useful during the battle. . 102 
his efforts to rally the troops nearly 

fruitless 109 

retires to Prospect Hill, (Note). ... in 

in command at Boston 153 

succeeds Sullivan at Brooklyn 204 

in command during battle of Long 

Island 205 

neglects to test the reconnoissance. . 206 
sends Stirling to reinforce the pick- 
ets 207 

commands five brigades 220 

advises to abandon New Yoik 221 

covers the retreat from New York. . 225 

his division in peril 227 

fails to close the Hudson river. . . . 243 
has confidence in Fort Washington. 249 
in command at Philadelphia . . . . 271 
fails to cooperate in surprise of 

Trenton 276 

holds troops ready to go north 299 

warns Gates of Clinton's movements 352 

commands in the Highlands 355 

furloughs New York militia 356 

is out-generaled by Gen. Clinton. . 360 

retires from Fishkill 360 

reoccupies Fishkill 361 

his patriotism superior to his general- 
ship 361 

withholds troops from Washington. 384 
makes weak demonstrations upon 

New York 384 

still keeps troops from the main 
army 397 



PAGB 

Putnam, Israel, in Connecticut until Dec. 

1777 398 

in command at Danbury 458 

remembered in his retirement 655 

Pyle's loyalists utterly routed, (no quarter) 554 



Quebec, expedition of Arnold organized, 

1775 121 

statement of the march and trials . 122-24 

assault upon the lower town 130 

reinforced by McLean's Royal 

Scotch 130 

surrender demanded by Arnold. . . . 131 
surrender demanded by Montgomery 134 

plan of double assault 134 

Montgomery's assault and death 135-6 

Arnold's assault and fall 136-6 

siege raised 163 

Queen's Rangers at Chadd's Ford 370 

at Monmouth 441 

at Elizabethtown 499 

sent to Virginia 548 

Quinby's Bridge, skirmish at 575 

Quinton's Bridge, skirmish at, March 

i8th, 177S 405 

R. 

Raccoon rifles at Charleston 185 

Ragg {Br.), Lieut, of marines, />ris 200 

Rahl, (Rail) Col. (Hessian) at Chatterton 

Hill 239-40 

at Fort Washington 250 

a good fighter 268 

in command at Trenton 273 

7V. mortally at Trenton 274 

his error at Trenton 275 

controversy as to his name (Note). . 277 
Railways supported Prussian Logistics 

in 1S70 69 

Ramsey, David (M. D.), S. C. (historian), 
b. 1749, cf. 1815. 

opinion of Bunker Hill 108 

opinion of battle of Guilford 564 

as to Canadian sympathy 161 

Ramsey, Co!., at battle of Monmouth . . 439 
Ramsour's Mills, (Ramseur) skirmish. . . 498 
Randolph, frigate, under Biddle. . . .399, 654 
Rank of French and American officers 

regulated 491 

Raw troops may be pushed, when 116 

Rawdon, Francis, Lord, Marquis of 
Hastings, Earl, sub. Gov. Gen. 
India, b. 1754, d. 1825. 

uses good strategy at Camden 50 

gallantly at Bunker Hill 115 

reinforces Clinton at the South .... 491 

stationed at Camden 506 

gallant conduct at battle of Camden 516 

plans an attack upon Greene 571 

attacks Greene at Hobkirk Hill. . . 572 
pursues Greene a short distance . . . 572 

retires to Camden 573 

details of the battle 571-3 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



699 



Rawdon, Francis, goes to relief of 

Ninety-Six 574 

pursues Greene lo the Ennoree. . . . 574 

retires to Monk's Corner 574 

compromised by assent to Balfour's 

policy 575 

sails homeward, and is captured . . . 577 

meets Cornwallis at Yorktown .... 577 

Rawlings, Col. (Am.) at Fort Washington 248 

Tc. at Fort Washington 250 

Raynal, Abbe, opinion of Trenton 282 

Read, Col., at Bunker Hill 100 

Reade's Virginia militia at Hobkirk Hill 572 

Rear Guards, in retreat 74 

their importance 77 

Rebellion defined 31 

Reed, Col., at Princeton 289 

promoted Brig. Gen 296 

Reed, James, Col., at rail fence. Bunker 

"Hill 102 

Reed, Col. (S. C.) k. at Rocky Mount. . . 507 
Reed, Joseph, Adjt. Gen., sub. Gov. Pa., 
b. 1741, d. 1785. 

at Boston 157 

goes to New York 157 

at Harlem Heights 230 

his horse shot, in skirmish 230 

report of the skirmish 230 

describes the want of discipline. . . . 232 

proposes to resign 232 

at Chatterton Hill 240 

reports as to H. in New Jer-^ey .... 266 
urges operations in New Jersey. . . . 267 

distingui>hed for service 656 

Reed, Mrs. Esther, wife of Joseph Reed, 

honored by Bancroft 4S8 

Reenlistments in 1776, vital to American 

cause 277 

Regular army, a national police, nucleus 

for national defense 14 

Regular army of Great Britain and the 

United States 14 

Regular army, a basis for national defense 526 

Regular army necessary 651 

Republic of South Carolina 176-80 

Retreat, as treated by Jomini 73 

as treated by Archduke Charles. ... 73 

as treated by Col. Hamley 73 

when well conducted, to be honored 

with victory 74 

through New Jersey (See Wash- 
ington) 73 

from Barren Hill (See p. 406) 73 

from Philadelphia (See p. 413) .... 73 

discussed 73 

in American civil war 73 

from Long Island (See pp. 217-18). 73-4 

from Quebec 163 

from Hubbard ton 317 

of Lee from Monmouth 437 

from Newport 455 

from Cowpens 545 

from Guilford 564 

Retreating army, pursuit of 75 

Revolution, defined 32 

not an inherent right, but a contin- 
gent duty 32 

the last resort 33-4 



PAGE 

Revolutionary Epoch discussed 3-7 

Rhode Island, as a British base 58 

enters upon war 84 

Richardson, Col., at Harlem Heights . 229 
Richmond, Va., as an objective, 1861-5. 54 
Richmond, Duke, (Charles Lennox,) Sec. 
State, b. 1735, d. 1806. 

his prophecy 400 

denounces Hayne's execution 575 

Richmond occupied by Arnold 549 

Ridgebury the headquarters of Rocham- 

beau 61 8 

Riedesel, Friedrich Adolph, Baron, Maj. 
Gen., /;. 1730, d. 1800. 

arrives in Canada 164 

at Three Rivers 166 

with Burgoyne's expedition 309 

pursues St. Clair 314 

mistakes New England sentiment. . 320 
detained at Castleton by w. men. . . 320 

plan to mount his dragoons 327 

at battle of Freeman's Farm 340 

at battle of Bemis Heights 345 

Riedesel, Madame 350 

Rivers, as lines of operation 54 

Rivers, the passage of 76 

Roberdeau, Brig. Genl., reports some 

startling rumors 194 

brigade with Greene 237 

Roberts, Owen, Maj. 1st S. C. regt 179 

Robinson, Col., 7V. at Green Springs. . . 508 

Robinson, Lieut. {Br,), at Guilford 562 

Rochambeau, de, Jean Baptiste Donatien 
de Vimeur (/>.), Marshal,/;. 1725, 
d. 1807. 
arrives at Newport with French 

troops 503 

reports condition of American affairs 503 
concerts operations with Washing- 
ton , 584 

at Wethersfield 603 

again at Wethersfield 618 

at Ridgebury, Connecticut 618 

joins Washington 620 

reconnoitres in New Jersey 620 

with Washington at West Point.. . 622 
lends $20,000 in gold on pledge of 

Robert Morris 623 

marches his army through Philadel- 
phia 623 

his army reviewed by the President. 624 

joins Washington at Chester 624 

visits Baltimore 630 

visits Mount Vernon 630 

visits Count De Grasse 635 

honors his old regiment 638 

signs capitulation of Yorktown. . . . 641 

winters in Virginia, 1 781-2 644 

sails from Boston 644 

his army highly honored 644 

Rochambeau, Col. (/>.), goes to France 

for supplies 525 

Rocheblave commands at Kaskaskia... 461 
Rodney, George Bridges, Lord Admiral, 

sends Howe to America 614 

before House of Commons 615 

Rodney, Thomas, descrilies the stormy 

night, Dec. 26th, 1776 272 



700 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Rodney, Caesar, Gov. Del. addressed by 

Greene 529 

Roebuck, frio;ate, at Red Hook 201 

frigate, at Philadelphia 395 

Rohan Couniy, N. C, its people 519 

Rocky Mount, skirmish 507 

Rose, frigate, at New York, (map) Bat- 
tle of Long Island. 

at Savannah 478 

Ross, Lieut. Col. reconnoitres along the 

Brandywine 371 

Ross, Maj. {Br.), signs capitulation of 

Yorktown 641 

Royal Governors on ships of war 180 

Rugely's Mills, slaughter of American 

cavalry 497-3 

Rush, Benjamin, (statesman and philan- 
thropist), h. 1745. d. 1813. 

sent to find Lee 262 

Rutherford, Genl., sent to Black Swamp 464 
Rutledge, John, Gov. S. C, and sub. 
Chief Justice Sup. Court S. C, b. 
1739, d. 1800. 
eminent in defense of Fort Sullivan 181 
prevents a fatal blunder of Lee. . . . 182 
sends a laconic note to Moultrie. . . 188 

this note correctly cited 1S8 

is reelected Governor 465 

applies to D'Estaing for aid against 

Savannah 477 

has full powers at Charleston, 1780. 494 
Russell, Wm. Col. on Court of Inquiry, 

(Schuyler) : .... 312 



S. 



Sacred History honors military valor. . 21 
Saint Clair, Arthur, Maj. Gen,, b. 1734, 
d. 1818. 

Colonel in Canada 166 

at battle of Trenton 274 

at battle of Princeton 289 

appointed Adjt. tienl 296 

at Ticonderoga 299 

gives notice of Burgoyne's advance. 302 
confident of the strength of Ticon- 
deroga 3TI 

calls council of war 313 

abandons Ticonderoga 313 

retreats to Castleton 316 

joins Genl. Greene at the south. . . . 65s 

Saint John's, captured by Arnold 120 

captured by Montgomery 129 

abandoned by Sullivan 168 

occupied by Purgoyne 169 

Saint Leger, Barry, Colonel {Br.), com- 
mands expedition to Mohawk 

Valley .... 305 

reaches Oswego, New York 320 

executes a well planned movement. 323 

makes a proclamation 324 

suffers loss by a sortie from Fort 

Schuyler 324 

fights Genl. Herkimer at Oriskauy. 324 
writes Burgoyne hopefully of his 

prospects 324 

raises the siege of Fort Schuyler. . . 325 



PAGE 

Saint Leger, his retreat and its effect ... 325 
Saint Luc in charge of Burgoyne's 

Indian allies 326 

is offended by Burgoyne's honesty. . 327 
Saint Sauvier, Chevalier de, ^. at Boston 455 

is honored by a monument 455 

Saint Simon, Count de, lands at James- 
town with French troops 612 

is willing to serve under La Fayette 612 
participates in siege of Yorktown. . 612 
approves of La Fayette's action. . . . 612 

sails for the West Indies 645 

Salvin, Lieut. {B>:) k. at battle of Guil- 
ford 563 

Sander's Creek, (battle of Camden) 514 

Sargent, Colonel, reports British move- 
ments ; 225 

S-Xul, King of Israel, after battle, like 

Gates at Saratoga 344 

Savage, Capt. {Am.) at battle of James- 
town 608 

Savannah captured by Lieut. Col. Camp- 
bell (Br.) 459 

repels assault of allied armies. . 477-S3 
Scammel, Alexander, Col. Aid de 
camp. Adj. Genl. 
gives false alarm at Brooklyn .. . . 218 

at battle of Freeman's Farm 336 

accompanies Washington to Vir- 
ginia 622 

mortally tc. near Yorktown 635 

Schaick, Col., surprises a village of 

Onondaga Indians 463 

Schmultz, Capt. {Br.) k. at battle of 

Guilford 562 

Schloozer misstates Indian atrocities. . . 325 
Schnoener, Lieut. {Br.) k. at battle of 

Guilford 563 

Schuyler, Philip, Maj. Gen., sub. Sen- 
ator, b. 1733, d. 1804. 

appointed Brig. Gen 89 

sent to invade Canada 120 

is delayed by ill health 125 

joins the northern army 127 

captures St. John's, after siege. . . .128-9 
hears from Washington as to Allen's 

capture 128 

writes to Montgomery and others. 132-3 
underestimates the patience of Job. 139 
has tlie sympathy of Washington . . 139 

opposes Indian auxiliaries 158 

negotiates for peace with the Six 

Nations 159 

is relieved by Gates, but reinstated. 310 

orders forts put in good order 31 1 

doubts the strength of Ticonderoga. 312 

attempts to reinforce the post 312 

answers Burgoyne's second pro- 
clamation 31S 

obstructs Burgoyne's line of march. 318 
shares Washington's confidence. . . . 318 
is judged by Marshall, Kent, and 

Webster 319 

' abandons Fort George 319 

sends Lincoln to rear of Burgoyne. 321- 
sends troops to relieve Fort 

Schuyler 324 

is superseded by Gates 334 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



701 



Schuyler Philip, his deportment toward 

<^ates 335 

in Congress, on War Committee . . . 490 

his character vindicated 319 

declines to become Secretary of War 588 
Scott, Charles, Brig. Gen., sud. Gov. Ky., 
6. 1746, d. 1820. 

Col. at battle of Trenton 273 

with Washington at Valley Forge. 

(See Map) 

sent to reinforce Maxwell in New 

Jersey.... _ 414 

heard Washington's instructions to 

Lee 422 

at battle of Monmouth 435 

testifies on trial of Gen. Lee 422-6 

taken prisoner at Charlottesville. . . 600 
Scott, John Morin, Brig. Gen., d. 1730, 
i/. 1784. 

votes to abandon Long Island 217 

in Gen. Putnam's division at New 

York 220 

votes to abandon New York 224 

votes to defend Fort Washington . . 237 

promoted Brig. Gen 296 

before Fort Independence with 

Heath 292 

Scott, Winfield, Lieut. Gen. (Aw.) b. 
17S6, d. 1866. 
his supersedure in Mexico i)ad 

military policy 44 

Seaboth's, Anspach, regt. (//.) at siege 

of Newport 454 

" Sectional troops not favorably com- 
bined " (Washington) 294 

Sevier, John, Col. {Am) at battle of 

King's Mountain 520 

Sharpe, Granville {Br), (Philanthropist), 
b. 1734, d. 1813. 
resigned office rather than aid the war 83 
Shay's rebellion as a type of civil war. . . 31 
Shee, Col., joins the army at Brooklyn 

Heights 214 

Shelby, Isaac, Col., sub. Gov. Ky., b. 
1750, d. 1826. 

at battle of King's Mountain 520 

Sheldon, Elisha, Col., to complete a 

cavalry Ijattalion 266 

attacked by Tarleton at Pound 

Ridge 468 

to cooperate with De Lauzun's 

lancers 61S 

scatters Delancey's Refugees 619 

on duty along the Hudson 621 

Shepherd, Capt. (Am.) k. at Savannah. . 482 
Sheiburne, Henry, Maj. (Am.) gallant 

near " The Cedars " 165 

k. in battle of Germantown 389 

Sherman, William Tecumseh, General 
U. S. Army, b. 1820. 
accepts dedication of this volume. 

Personal Tribute 

his march to the sea, as a line of 

operations 57 

in 1S61-5, in respect of grand 

strategy 57 

Sheridan, Maj. (Br.) turns a house into 

a fort 578 



Shreve, Col. {Am.) at the battle of 

Springfield 501 

Ship-building in 1776, well-developed.. 276 
Shopley, Adam, Capt. {Am.) at Fort 

Trumbull 626 

at Fort Griswold 62S 

Shuldham, Admiral, relieves Admiral 

Graves at Boston 146 

his opinion of Am. occupation of 

Dorchester 152 

Siege of, Boston— (Chapter XXlff.')... 146 
reminiscence by Edwd. Storr. (note) 154 

Fort Schuyler by St. Leger 322 

Newport by Am. and A: tioops. . . 440 
Savannah by Am. and Fr. troops . . 477 

Charleston by Gen. Clinton 496 

Augusta by Am. troops 520 

Ninety-Six by Am. troops 574 

Yorktown by Am. and />. troops. . 631 
Silliman (Maj. Gen. Conn. Mil.), with 

brigade at New York 220 

pris. in skirmish near Danlnirv .... 297 
Sill, Maj. (Br.) k. in assault upon Fort 

Clinton 350 

Simcoe, J. Graves, Lieut. Col., sub. Gov. 
Canada, with Queen's Rangers at 

Quentin's Bridge 405 

with Queen's Rangers at Hancock's 

Bridge 405 

with Queen's Rangers at Crooked 

Billet Tavern 405 

UK at battle of Monmouth 444 

at Elizabethtown, New Jersey 499 

joins Arnold's expedition to Virginia 548 
enters Richmond and Westham . . . 549 
in skirmish at Charles City C. H. . . 549 
scatters militia near Williamsburg . 589 
drives Steuben from Point of Fork. 601 

often underrated as a soldier 6or 

retires to Westham on James River. 603 
has sharp skirmish with Butler .... 604 

has skirmish with La Fayette 606 

Simms, John, of Virginia Assembly, 

taken pris 601 

Simpson, Capt. {Br.) k. at Savannah . . . 482 

Sinews of war 78 

Singleton, Capt. (^;«.) at the battle of 

Camden 516 

at the battle of Guilford 55S 

Skene, Philip, Lieut. Col. {Br.) com'r. to 

enforce allegiance 318 

brought mischief only 327 

deceives Lieut. Col. Breyman 330 

surrenders ignominiously 352 

disappears from America 353 

Skenesborough taken by Gen. Phillips. . 314 
Skirmish at Moore's Creek Bridge, \'a., 

Dec. 9, 1775 (noticed) 174 

Danbury, Conn., April 25-7, 1777 

(incursion) 297 

near Fort Ann, June 7, 1777 (siiarp 

action) 315 

Lucan's Mills 39c 

Whitemarsh, Dec. 8, 1777 397 

Quinton's Bridge, Va., March 18, 

1778 .. 405 

Hancock's Bridge, N. J., March 21, 
1776 405 



702 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Skirmish at Crooked Billet Tavern, Penn. 

May I, 1778 405 

Tappan, N. Y., Sent. 27, 177S (sur- 
prise) 459 

Little Neck, N. J., Oct. 15, 1778 (no 
quarter) 45y 

Tatnal's Plantation, S. C, Nov. 27, 
1778 (action) 460 

Beaufort, S. C, Feb. 3, 1779 (sharp 
action) 464 

Kettle Creek, Ga Feb. 14, 1779 (rout) 464 

Stono Ferry, S. C, April 20, 1779 
(assault) 465 

Pound Ridge, N. Y., July 2, 1779. . 468 

New Haven, Conn., July 5, 1779 
(incursion) 469 

Fairfield, Conn., July 8, 1779 (in- 
cursion) 471 

Green Farms, Conn., July 9, 1779 
(incursion) 471 

Norwalk, Conn., July, 1779 (incur- 
sion) 471 

Minnisink, N. Y., July 22, 1779 (in- 
cursion) 474 

Newark, N. J. (incursion) 485 

Young's House, N. Y., Feb. 3, 1780 
(surprise) 486 

Waxhaw Creek, S. C, May 29, 1780 
(no quarter) ... 497 

Ramsour's (Ramseur's) Mills, S. C, 
June 20, 1780 (sharp action) .... 49S 

Connecticut Farms, N. J., June 7, 
T780 (incursion) 499 

Williamson's Plantation, S. C, July 
12, 1780 507 

Rocky Mount, S. C, July 30, 1780 
(bold assault) 507 

Rocky Mount, S. C, Aug. i, 1780 . 507 

Hanging Rock, S. C., Aug. 6, 1780 
(formal engagement) 508 

The Wateree, S. C, Aug. 15, 1780 
(surprise) 511 

Fishing Creek, S. C, Aug. 18, 1780 
(surprise) 511-12 

Musgrove's Mills, S. C, Aug. 18, 
1780 518 

Wahab's Plantation, S. C, Sept. 20, 
1780 518 

Charlotte, N. C, Sept. 26, 1780 519 

Fish Dam Ford, S. C, Nov. 9, 1780 521 

Blackstock's Plantation, S. C, Nov. 
20, 1780 (sharp action) 522 

Charles City C. H., Va., Jan. 8, 1781 549 

McCo\van"s Ford, N. C., Feb. i, 
1781 551 

Allamance Creek, Feb. 25, 1781 (no 
quarter) 554 

Wetzell's Mill, N. C, March 6, 1781 
(spirited action) 555 

Petersburg, Va., April 25, 1781 (re- 
treat secured) 589 

Brandon, Va., April 25, 1781 (re- 
treat secured) 589 

Osborne, Va. (stores destroyed). . . . 589 

before old Fort Independence, July 
2, 1781 , 620 

New London, Conn., Sept. 6, 1781 
(incursion) 625 



PAGE 

Skirmish at Stonington, Conn, (incursion) 142 

Quinliy Bridge (noticed) 575 

Monk's Corner, S. C. (noticed) .... 575 

Dorchester, S. C. (noticed) 575 

Williamsburg, Va. (sharp action) . . 604 

Gloucester, Va. (sharp action) 636 

Slaves armed by Lord Dunmore 174 

Small Pox in Canada affects the ylm. 

army 168 

Smallwood, William, Brig. Gen., sui>. 

Gov. Md., //. , d. 1792. 

Colonel, at battle of Long Island . . 197 

taken />r/s. on Long Island 209 

contrasts Br. and ^w. officers 232 

states his opinion of Washington. . . 233 
zc. in action at Chatterton Hill .... 240 
attempts the posts on Staten Island. 366 

at battle of Germantown 387 

in expedition to Wilmington, Del. . 398 

at battle of Camden 518 

succeeds De Kalb 526 

recruits for Greene's army 529 

Smeaton, Capt. (Br.) k. at battle of Guil- 
ford 562 

Smith, Brig. Gen. {Br.) at Newport, R. I. 454 
Smith, Joshua Helt, a mere tool of 

Arnold 506 

Smith, Lieut. Col., loth Br. Foot, at 

Concord 1 1-12 

rescued by Lord Percy 11 

Smith, Samuel, Lieut. Col. {Am.) w. at 

Fort Mifflin 395 

Smith, Maj. (Am) k. in skirmish at 

Green Spring 508 

" .Soldier's life one of devotion " (Greene) 526 

South America illustrates civil war 29 

Southern armies continue partisan war- 
fare, 1781 575 

South Carolina, enters upon war 86 

organizes troops in 1776 179 

takes the form of a Republic 180 

militia at Eutaw Springs 578 

Spain joins France against England . . . 476 
Sparks, Jared (Historian), /a 1789,./. 1866. 

as to conduct of royal governors ... 150 
as to Arnold at Bemis Heights .... 348 
as to Gen. Sullivan at battle of 

Brandy wine 378 

Spear, Maj. {Am.) reconnoitres at Buf- 

fington's Ford 368 

Specht, Brig. Gen. (//.) at battle of Free- 
man's Farm 340 

at battle of Bemis Heights 345 

Speedlove, Maj. {Br.) /;. at Bunker Hill. IIO 
Spencer's Ordinary Scene of Skirmish . 
Spencer, Joseph N., Maj. Gen., d. 1714, 
(/. 1 7 89. 

ap]5ointed Brig. Gen., 1776 89 

before Boston 156 

commands division at New York . . 221 
opposes evacuation of New York . . 221 
is assigned to expedition against 

Newport 294 

enters Congress 655 

Spies in war 78 

Hale and Andre memorable 78 

Springfield, Mass., selected for a gun 

foundry 294 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



703 



Springfield, N. J., threatened hy Knyp- 

hausen 4gg 

burned during the campaign 501 

Stark, John, Maj. Gen., b. 172S, d. 1S22. 

Colonel at Bunker Hill, 1775 gg 

renders good service 101-2 

describes the slaughter 108 

at battle of Trenton 274 

retires from the army. ... 331 

commands N. H. militia 331 

wins the battle of Bennington 332 

promoted in the army 334 

for a brief period with Gates 337 

assigned to expedition with La 

Fayette 402 

at battle of Springfield, N.J 501 

Statesmanshi|i, in war illustrated 40 

avoids certain issues 43 

defined by Jomini as military policy 44 

its significance considered 45 

States-General of Holland, furnish no 

troops for England 173 

join the enemies of England 5 28 

• Siaunton, Va., made the temporary 

capital 5gg 

Steam propulsion fails to master nature. 3 
Stedman, Charles, (y5r.), (staff officer and 
historian) gives opinion of affair 

at Lexington n 

battle of Bunker Hill 108 

criticises Genl. Howe at Brooklyn 

Heights 2ig 

statement as to Hessians at Trenton 

doubted 274 

as to battle of Trenton 2S1 

states the relative strength of the 

two armies 300 

on staff of Howe, Clinton and Corn- 

wallis 300 

gives opinion of battle of Hubbard- 

ton 316 

reports Arnold at Freeman's Farm. 342 
reviews Clinton's move up the Hud- 
son 356 

as to battle of Monmouth 445 

unjust to D'Estaing 447 

describes storm off Newport 450 

unjust to Knyphausen . . 500 

criticises Tarleton at Blackstock's. . 522 
explains retreat of Cornwallis from 

Hillsborough 554 

commissary for Cornwallis 554 

as to battle at Ho])kirk Hill 573 

as to battle of Eutaw Springs. . . 578-81 
Stedman, Capt. of Atlee's regt. at Long 

Island 208 

Stephen, Adam, Maj. Genl. 

Brig. Genl. guarding the Delaware. 264 

promoted Maj. Clenl 2g6 

at the battle of Brandywine, distin- 
guished 36g 

at battle of Germantown, disgraced 377 
dismissed the American .service. . . . 3go 
Stephens, Edward, Brig, flenl. b. 1744, 

d. 

promoted Maj. Genl 296 

joins Gates with Va. militia 515 

rallies militia after battle of Camden 517 



TAGE 

Stephens, Edward, surveys the Yad- 
kin 531 

escorts prisoners and returns to duty 550 

brings recruits to Greene 554 

at battle of Guilford 557 

in. at battle of Guilford 563 

Stirns, Maj. Genl. {H.) at Chadd's Ford 36g 

at tile battle of Brandywine 369 

at the battle of Germantown 3S5 

Sterling. Col. {Br) sub. Maj. Genl. at 

Fort Washington 250 

in New Jersey 394 

w. at battle of Springfield 499 

Steuben, Fredk. \Vm. Augustus, de, 
Baron, Maj. Genl., b. 1730, d. 1794. 

arrives at Valley Forge 403 

appointed Maj. Gen. without dissent 403 

in harmony with Washington 404 

at battle of Monmouth 443 

on duty in Virginia 530 

is threatened by Arnold 548 

acquiesces in La Fayette's assign- 
ment 586 

at Petersburgh and Brandon, V'a. . . 590 
is driven from Point of Fork by 

Sinicoe 602 

effects a junction with La Fayette. 603 

is remembered 655 

Stewart, Capt. {Br.) uses stratagem at 

Hanging Rock 50S 

Stewart, Lieut. Col., succeeds Lord 

Ravvdon 577 

in command at Orangeburgh 577 

retires to Eutaw Springs 582 

reports his movements 582 

makesgallant fight at Eutaw Springs 582 
reports the battle of Eutaw Springs 582 

retires to Monk's Corner 582 

Stewart, Maj. {Br.), k. before Fort 

Clinton 359 

Stewart, Ensign, {Br), k. at battle of 

Guilford 562 

Stewart, Lieut. Col., (Guards), k. at bat- 
tle of Guilford 562 

Stiles, Ezra, Pres. /'. 1727, d. 1795, Vale 

College, the friend of Greene. ... So 
Stirling, William Alexander, (Earl), Maj. 
Genl., b. 1726, /■. 17S3. 

Colonel in New Jersey 148 

ISrig. Genl. at battle of Long Island 205 

fights Genl. Grant's division 210 

fights Lord Cornwallis 210 

surrenders to Genl. De Heister. ... 210 

is exchanged 23 1 

reaches White Plains 238 

at battle of Trenton, (see map). . . . 27S 

guards the Delaware 264 

at battle of Princeton 289 

promoted Maj. Genl 296 

in command at Metuchin 300 

engages Lord Cornwallis 301 

at battle of Brandywine 377 

commands reser\'e at Germantown . . 3S7 
advises attack upon New York and 

Philadelphia 404 

commands left wing at Monmouth. 438 

Pres. court martial to try Lee 443 

crosses to Slaten Island on the ice 4S5 



704 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Stockwell, Lieut, goes to Albany to get 

aid for Fort Schuyler 324 

Stony Point abandoned by Avi. garrison 466 
occupied by Generals Clinton and 

Vaughan 466 

stormed by Genl. Wayne 472 

abandoned by Ani. troops 474 

abandoned by Genl. Clinton 476 

Stonington, Conn, cannonaded 142 

Stono Ferry, post {Br.) attacked without 

success 465 

Storms scatter fleet of Sir Peter Parker. 173 

part Howe and Washington 383 

delay Count D'Estaing four weeks. 447 

scatter Admiral Byron's fleet 447 

scatter fleets of Howe and D'Estaing 450 
drive Admiral Byron from Boston. . 455 
disperse fleet of Count D'Estaing. . . 482 
disperse Clinton's southern expedi- 
tion 493 

off" Newport in 1777 539 

scatter Arnold's Virginia expedition 548 

cut off the escape of Cornwallis. . . . 640 

Strategy defined 48 

deals first with the theatre of war. . 48 

of the war of 1775-83 651 

" " limited by bad logistics 141 

Strategic front 54 

movements, their philosophy 50 

■ movements of Washington, 1781 .. . 50 

skill shut up Clinton and Cornwallis 631 

Sullivan Island occupied by Genl. Clinton 1 77 

Fort, takes the name of Moultrie. . 190 

Sullivan, John, Maj. Genl. b. 1740, d. 

1795- 

Brig. Genl 89 

succeeds Thomas in Canada 159 

writes Washington from Sorel 164 

sends troops to Three Rivers 166 

underrates the British army 166 

reports battle at Three Rivers 167 

abandons Canada 167 

retires to Crown Point " • • • 168 

succeeds Greene (sick) on Long 

Island 203 

his confidence while at Brooklyn. . . 204 

is superseded by Putnam 204 

reports battle of Long Island 205 

responsible for bad reconnoissance. . 205 

taken /r?V. at Long Island 21 1 

bears a proposition from Genl. Howe 223 

is exchanged 231 

reaches White Plains, N. Y 238 

with Lee in New Jersey 258 

succeeds Lee in command of division 263 

commands right wing at Trenton. . 271 

is rebuked by Washington 296 

retires before Genl. Howe 298 

joins the main A»t. army 365 

attacks posts on Staten Island 366 

makes bad reconnoissance on the 

Brandywine 370 

finds Genl. Howe in his rear 372 

discusses his reconnoissance 372 

his statement to Congress considered 374 
withholds the credibility of dis- 
patches 375 

his division in disorder 376 



PAGB 

Sullivan, John, did not bring the right 

wing into action 376 

his report examined 377-8 

his position misunderstood by 

Sparks 37S 

writes to Hancock, (see letter) 379 

his personal bravery unquestioned. . 3S0 

at battle of German town 387 

shows gallantry at Ciermantown. . . . 388 
urges attack upon Philadelphia. . . . 399 

lands on Rhode Island 449 

commands at Providence, R. I . ... 448 
his relations to Count D'Estaing. . . 449 

his position before Newport 451 

reports his active force 452 

sends sharp protest to D'Estaing. . . 453 
issues, and modifies, a rash order. . . 453 

reports his retreat 455 

commands an Indian expedition. 475-6 

resigns and enters Congress 524 

Sumner, Jethro, Brig. Genl.. joins Greene 577 
at the i>attle of Eutaw Springs. .. 580 
Sumter, Thomas, Brig. Genl., b. 1734, d. 

1832. 

organizes a rifle regiment 180 

assails Rocky Mount 507 

assails Hanging Rock 507 

captures a valuable train 511 

is routed by Tarleton 512 

IV. at Blackstock's Plantation 522 

on duty between Canada and Ninety 

Six 5^)9 

occupies Orangeburg 574 

Sunbury, Ga. captured by Sir Aug. Pre- 

vost, Maj. Genl 464 

Surrender of Burgoyne's army 351 

Charleston 497 

Yorktown 643 

New York 656 

Svvearigen, Capt. {Am.), killed at battle 

of Freeman's Farm 341 

Sweet, (historical writer), as to troops at 

Bunker Hill lOO 

Symonds, Thomas, Capt. (Royal Navy), 

leads the attack at Fort Sullivan 186 
signs Articles of Capitulation, York- 
town 641 

Symonds, (Col.) New Hampshire militia, 

at battle of Bennington 332 



T. 

Tactics, Grand, defined and illustrated 48 

Tactics, Minor, defined 48 

Tait, Captain, {Am.), conspicuous at bat- 
tle of Covvpens 54° 

Talbot, Ensign, k. at battle of Guilford. 563 

Tames, Capt., k. at Savannah 482 

Tarleton, Banestre, Lieut. Col. b. 1754. 
d. 1833. 
attacks Sheldon's horse at Pound 

Ridge 468 

his views of a southern campaign . . 493 
loses confidence in royalist militia. 50S 
reports attack upon Hanging Rock 509 

has trouble with militia 510 

justly criticises Gates S^o 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



705 



PAGE 

Tarlelon, Banestre, reaches Camden... 510 

captures Sumter's command 512 

denounces Mecklenburg and Ro- 
han Counties, N. C 519 

can not trust nominal royalists 519 

reports battle of King's Mountain. 521 

repulsed at Blackstock's Plantation 522 

sent in pursuit of Morgan 541 

crowds Morgan over the Pacolet. . . 541 

states strength of his force 541 

report of battle of Covvpens 544-5 

criticises Cornvvallis for the disaster 545 

crosses the Catawba 551 

explains Greene's escape 553 

reports skirmish near Guilford 556 

battle of Guilford 559 

states the issue as doubtful 560 

compliments the Marylind tro(ips. . 561 

compliments Washington's cavalry. 561 

criticises the action 562 

w. at Guilford 563 

opinion of Hobkirk Hill 573 

report of battle of Eutaw Springs . . 5S2 

mounts his regt. on blooded horses. 589 

makes a raid upon Charlottesville. . 600 

reports his rapid march . . 601 

compliments La Fayette 603 

reports skirmish at Williamsburg . . 604 

attempts to capture Muhlenburg. . 604 

again compliments La Fayette .... 608 

criticism of battle of Jamestown . . . 608 

in reserve, at Jamestown 609 

incursion tiirough IJedfonl County . 610 

reports failure of expedition 610 

skirmishes near Williamsburg 611 

joins Cornwallis at Vorktown 611 

reconnoitres La Fayette's posi- 
tion 612 

unjustly questions actions of Corn- 
wallis 613 

his strictures noticed 614 

again criticises Cornwallis unjustly. 634 

reports skirmish with French lancers 636 

gains no fame as a scientific soldier. 636 

Tarrant's farm, scene of skirmish with 

Tarleton 551 

Taylor, Zachary, Maj. Gen., sub. Pres. 
U. S., b. 1784, d. 1850. 

opens war with Mexico 46 

Taylor, Major, at Bufifington's Ford . . . 373 

Ten Broeck, Col., joins the army of Gates 337 

in battle of Bemis Heights 34S 

Ternay, De, Chevalier, convoys Rocliam- 

beau's army from France 503 

dies at Newport, Rhode Island. . . . 525 

is succeeded by M. Destouches. . . . 525 

Tetes-de-Pont, their value 76 

Thayer, Major {Am.), at Quebec with 

Arnold I37 

at Fort Mifflin 395 

Thomas, John, Maj. Gen., appointed by 

Massachusetts 10 

appointed Lieut. Gen. of State 

forces 84 

appoiilted Continental Brig. Gen. . 89 

ordered to Canada 156 

retreats from Quebec i(>3 

died of small pox 1 ^'4 

45 



Thomas, George II., Maj. Gen., U. S. A., 
b. 1816, J. 1870. 
is represented as similar to Greene, 

in type of manhood 81 

Thompson, William, Biig. Gen., sent to 

Canada 157 

pns. at Three Rivers 166 

Thompson, Col. South Carolina Rangers 179 

on Sullivan Island 185 

at Tybee Island 459 

Three Rivers, battle at, described i66 

Ticonderoga, taken by Ethan .Mien. ... 119 

trophy list preserved 119 

taken by Burgoyne 313 

Tighlman, Lieut. Col., Aide-de-camp to 
Commander-in-Chief, at Harlem 

Heights 230 

at the battle of Monmouth 440 

Tomes, Robert, M.D. (Historical writer), 

as to Arnold at Freeman's Farm. 342 
Tonyne, Gov. {Br.) of St. Augustine. 

dispatches inteicepted 178 

Towers, Robert, seizes private arms for 

public use 265 

Treason, defined by Congress in 1776. . . 17S 
Trelawney, Lieut. Col., 70. at Monmouth 444 
Trenton, New Jersey, battle fought, Dec. 

26, 1776 

surprise proposed by Washington. . 267 

strength of garrison 270 

general plan of attack 271 

localities described and success 

realized 273 

prisoners removed to Newtown. . . . 275 

reoccupied by .\merican army 277 

skirmish with Cornwallis 2S6 

Triplett, Capt., conspicuous at battle of 

Cowpens 540 

Trophies of Bennington, overestimated . 332 
Trophies of Ticonderoga, inventory pre- 
served 119 

Trumback's regt. (//.) at Fort Clinton. . 35S 
Trumbull, Jonathan, Gov. Conn, (state.s- 
man), /'. 1710, </. 1 78 5. 

supports Washington 142 

sends troops to New York 156 

reports his visit to the northern army 16S 

writes Washington, 1776 197 

inspired many key-notes of the war. 253 
Trumbull, Jonathan, Jr., Col. (states- 
man), /'. 1740, li. 1804. 

commissary at Long Island 216 

on Washington's staff 526 

Tryon, Wm., Gov. of New York, confers 

with Gen. Clinton 148 

confers with Gen. Howe 192 

invades Connecticut 297 

skirmishes at Danbury and Ridge- 
field 297 

in expedition against Fort Clinton. 358 
publishes British Conciliatory Hdls. 403 

invades Connecticut again 468 

lands at New Haven 4^9 

4th of July proclamation 469 

burns Fairfield 47^ 

reports a raid upon Norwalk 470 

destroys Green Farms 471 

damages inflicted stated 471 



7o6 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Tryon, Wm., in expedition to Connecti- 
cut Farms 4gS 

Tiyon County, New York, disaffected . . 322 

Tucker, Sergeant, reports a scout on the 

Brand} wine 372 

Tully, de, M., sails with French troops 

for the Chesapeake 584 

Turnbull, Lieut. Col. (Br.) repels Sumter 

from Hanging Rock 507 

in command at Caiiiden 519 

Tuston, Col., at skirmish at Minnisink. . 474 

Tuttle, Joseph F., Rev. Dr., Pres. Wabash 
College, Indiana, historical writer 
and author i. iSiS. 
furnishes data as to New Jersey 

sacrifices 4S6 

has previously furnished notes to 
Irving and Bancroft 4S7 

Twiss, Lieut. (Bf.) reconnoitres Sugar 

Loaf Hill 309 

Tyer's plantation occupied by La Fay- 
ette 603 

Tylei, John, signs protest to D'Estaing 453 



u. 



Unreasonable or humiliating ultima- 
tum, bad policy 42 

Upham, Lieut. Col., sends refugees to 

aid Arnold 625 



V. 



Valentine's Hill, occupied by Wash- 
ington 236-620 

Valley Forge experiences 401 

encampment by brigades, (see map) 
Van Cortland, Col., at battle of Free- 
man's Farm 336 

Varick, Richard, Col. /'. 1752. 

states Arnold's relations to battle of 

Freeman's Farm 342 

Varnum, James Mitchell, Brig, Genl. /'. 
1749, d. 1789. 

promoted Brig. Genl 296 

with brigade at Peekskill 302 

joins Washington's army 396 

is sent to Woodbury near Red Bank 396 

advises an attack upon New York. . 404 

at the battle of Monmouth 436 

is assigned to La Fayette's division 448 

in Greene's original company 448 

enters Congress 655 

Vattel, Emerick, (jurist and writer), l>. 
1714, d. 1767. 
classifies wars, as lawful or unlawful 24 
Vaughan, John, Maj. Genl., at Wilming- 
ton with Cornwallis 175 

accompanies Clinton to Charleston. 175 

reaches New York 224 

on New York Island with Clinton. 225 

burns Kingston 360 

at the capture of Fort Clinton 358 

captures Stony Point 466 

Vaughan, Lieut. Col. {Am.), J>r/s. at 

Camden 518 

Vaughan, Lieut, {£>:), k. at Monmouth. 444 



PAGB 

Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Count de 
{Fr. Ministry), b. 1717, d. \~l%1. 
comments on battle of Germantown 400 
regards the American Congress as 

too exacting 532 

guarantees a loan from Holland, . . . 623 
Vergne, de la M., upon the action of 

Congress 489 

Verplanck's Point, abandoned by Sir 

Henry Clinton 476 

Victory or death, Washington's counter- 
sign, Dec. 25th, 1776 268 

Vincennes, (Indiana) captured by Col. 

Clark 461 

re-taken by Govr. Hamilton of De- 
troit 461 

re- taken by Col. Clark 465 

Viomenil, Baron, sails for the Chesa- 
peake with troops 584 

in charge of attack upon redoubt 

at Yorktown 63S 

Virginia, enters upon war 86 

riflemen at Quebec 121 

troops at Harlem Heights 22g 

sends troops to Indiana and Illinois 466 

militia at battle of Camden 516 

continentals at Eutaw Springs 579 

exerts her powers to the utmost. . . . SQ*^ 
Voits, Anspach regt. distinguished at 

Newport 454 



Wabash River, Indiana, controlled by 

Clarke's boats 466 

Wadsworth's brigade in Spencer's divis- 
ion 221 

Waggoner, Capt. (Am.), skirmishes at 

Chadd's Ford 369 

W^aldeck is to furnish England with 

troops 172 

Walker, Capt. (Am.) at battle of Spring- 
field, N.J 501 

Wallace, Sir James, convoys Clinton's 

army up the Hudson 358 

is captured near Savannah 477 

W^alton, George, Colonel, (Aw.), with 

riflemen at Tybee Island 459 

Walters, as to Trenton 281 

War, as a fact, not to be ignored, but reg- 
ulated t 18 

an extreme resort 20 

how induced 24 

offensive and defensive, only types of 

action 25 

classification of, simplified 25 

national, illustrated 26 

for conquest, wrong 27 

of intervention, considered 27 

to humiliate Slates, unsound 42 

when rightful 28 

generally fails of its purpose 28 

civil, defined and illustrated 29 

civil, insurrection defined 30- ^^ 

civil, rebellion defined 31-2 

civil, revolution defined 3--4 

Providence in, illustrated 35-9 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



r07 



TAGK 

War, its fundamental conditions slated. . 40 

begins in the closet 40 

its prosecution a matter of sounil 

policy 46 

theatre of 4^ 

Ward, Artemas, Maj. Genl., l>. 1727, </. 
iSoo. 

his antecedents 9. §4 

appointed Maj. Genl 89 

unequal to his position 94 

sends reinforcements to Banker Hill loi 

enters Boston with the army 153 

Warner, Seth, Col., l>. 1744, li. 1785. 

a volunteer at Bunker Hill 119 

joins Ethan Allen 120 

captures Crown Point 120 

visits Congress for a commi>sion. . . 120 

joins Schuyler's command 121 

elected Lieut. Col. over Allen. ... 127 

defeats General Carleton 129 

is distinguished at Hubbudtoi. . . . 316 
collects his command at Mancliuster 332 

reports to Genl. Stark 332 

efficient at Bennington 332 

at battle of Freeman's Farm ' 337 

Warren, Joseph, Dr. (orator and philan- 
thropist), /;. 1741, d. 1775. 

Mass. Com. Safety 9 

his opinion of the war 9 

his influence at Bunker Hill 99 

served with Prescott loi 

/'. at Bunker Hill no 

Washington, William, Col., /'. 1752, d. 
1810. 

Captain at battle of Trenton 272 

captures two guns at Trenton 272 

w. at battle of Trenton 274 

skirmishes with Tarleton 49^' 

is surprised at Monk's Corner 496 

destroys a loyalist detachment .... 541 

with Greene on the Dan 552 

at the battle of Guilford 557 

at the battle of Hobkirk Hill 572 

at the battle of Eutaw Springs .... 581 
w. and taken /m. at Eutaw Springs 581 
Washington, D. C, as an objective in 

war of i36i-5 53 

Washington, George, Gen., sii!>. Pres. 
twice b. 1732, d. 1799- 

antecedents of his early life 88 

appointed American Commander- 
in-Chief S9 

assumes command at Cambrid^'e. . . 90 
reports casualties at Bunker Hdl 

(note) ■ • I" 

sends Arnold on expedition lo 

Canada 121 

his theory of invasion of Canada. . . 125 
anticipates the action of G;-'n. Carle- 
ton 127 

urges Montgomery's march to .Mon- 
treal I-" 

urges Schuyler to lose not a moment 127 

writes to Schuyler as to powder 127 

writes to Schuyler as to Allen's cap- 
ture 12S 

anticipates Carleton's retreat to 
Quebec '32 



Washington, compliments Wooster on 

waiving rank 133 

urges Montgomery and ScJiuyler not 

lo resign 133 

withholds commissions from gen- 
erals 139 

writes lo Schuyler of his trials. ... 139 
describes the cnulition of the army. 139 
rebukes gambling and indecencies. 140 

attends to the logistics of war 14 ) 

rebukes religious bigotry in soldiers 141 
establishes new works about Boston 142 
writes Gov. Trumbull as to priva- 
teers 142 

restores plunder taken from citizens 143 
recommends a navy to be built. . . . 143 
calls council of New England gov- 
ernors 143 

submits a plan for attack upon 

Boston 144 

economizes the use of powder 144 

keeps up military show with few men 146 

his iiiea of military discipline 147 

denounces cowards and card playing 147 
writes Congress that he is out of 

powder 147 

wants powder or ice, to attack 

Boston 147 

writes to Joseph Reed of his plans. 147 
proposes to attack Dorchester 

Heights 143 

learns that Clinton plans an expedi- 
tion 143 

sends Lee to New York 148 

criticises Lee's conduct 149 

decides to attack Boston 150 

acts of his own will at Boston 151 

successful, when acting of his own 

will 151 

bombards Boston for three nights. . 151 

occupies Dorchester Heights 152 

enters Boston with his army ...... 153 

regards New York as Howe's o!)jec- 

tive 155 

leaves a garrison in Boston 156 

moves "his army to New York 156 

superintends march of the army . . . 156 
at New York, April to July, 1776. . 156 
sends supplies and troops to Canada 157 
rebukes soldiers for righting their 

own wrongs 157 

puts Putnam in command at New 

York 153 

puts Greene in command at Brooklyn 158 
writes Schuyler, -May, 1776, as to 

future plans 1 5*> 

expected a bloody summer 15S 

writes to Congress inclosing letter 

of Sullivan • I59 

has interview with Howe's .\djt. 

Gen 194 

describes to Schuyler the pea.e 

commission '94 

denounces gossip-mongers . 195 

sends more^roops to Cambridge. . . 195 
opposes the evacuation of Crown 

Point I9''> 

writes to Gov. Trumbull, .\ug., 1776 197 



7o8 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



Washington, places Sullivan at Brook- 
lyn, vice Greene, sick 203 

instructions to Putnam 204 

rebukes skulkers 204 

reports to Congress the British 

movements 204 

\ crosses to Brooklyn after battle 

begins 212 

his retention of Brooklyn is delib- 
erate 212-16 

at Brooklyn after the battle 214 

his policy is to postpone and gain 

time 216 

plans retreat from Brooklyn 216 

his self-possession during retreat. . . 21S 

reorganizes his divisions 220 

denounces robbing orchards 220 

urges a regular army establishment. 221 

advises three daily roll calls 221 

thinks it time to punish deserters . . 221 

affirms a defensive policy 222 

prepares to abandon New York. . . . 222 
writes to Congress as to New York. 222 

his army fading away 222 

calls a council of war 224 

begins to remove public stores 224 

headquarters changed from Robert 

Murray's to Roger Morris' 225 

reports a panic on New York Island 226 
his personal exposure, to stop a panic 226 
reports his position at Harlem .... 226 
reports a skirmish at Harlem 

Heights 229 

derides home-sickness 231 

censures conflicts in authority 231 

as to discipline at Harlem Heights. 231 
will inspect alarm posts, Oct. 11, 

1776 233 

offers a reward for captured horses. 236 
shows the weakness of Hessian 

cavalry 236 

his headquarters at Valentine's Hill 236 
by interior line, gains White Plains 236 
calls a council of war before march- 

.'ng 237 

his position at White Plains 238 

writes Gov. Trumbull for flour .... 238 
retires to North Castle Heights. . . . 241 
advises Congress of Howe's move- 
ments 242 

states to Gov. Livingston his anxiety 

for New Jersey 243 

writes to Greene, in doubt as to 

Fort Washington 243 

gives Greene directions as to Mount 

Washington 243 

his elaborate orders in logistics to 

Lee 245 I 

instructions to Lee, when to follow 

him 245 

is about to enter New Jersey 245 

to Gov. Livingston, as to unequal 

bounties 246 

to Miftlin, as to care of public 

property 246 

to Knox, that Lee will follow 246 

to Commissary Cheevers, that Lee 

will follow 246 



Washington, as to superfluous baggage. . 246 
assigns Heath to the Higiilands . . . 247 
to Congress, as to Fort Washington 247 

arrives at F"ort Lee 247 

reports his arrival at Fort Lee 249 

proposes to withdraw the garrison . 250 

reports capture of Fort Lee 251 

reports capture of Fort Washington 252 

letter to his brother 252 

his views considered 253 

marches from Fort Lee to Princeton 256 
secures all boats on the Delaware. . 257 
reports his march through New Jer- 
sey 257 

is at Trenton, Dec. 3d, 1776 257 

unable to find Lee 257 

orders Schuyler to send certain 

troops 257 

is behind the Delaware 257 

orders Lee to join him 259 

sends repeated letters to Lee that he 

needs him 260 

mildly notices Lee's capture 263 

receives enlarged authority 263 

writes to Govr. Trumbull, Dec. 14th, 

1776 265 

writes to Genl. Gates, Dec. 14th, 

1776 265 

sends Arnold to Rhode Island, Dec. 

1776 265 

writes to Heath, Dec. 14th, 1776. . . 265 
writes Congress Dec. 20th, assuming 

responsibdities 266 

orders three battalions of artillery 

raised 266 

orders the Ticonderoga regts. to 

Morristown 266 

unfolds to Reed his plan against 

Trenton 267 

his characteristic reticence 268 

entitled to credit for attack on Tarle- 

ton 268 

is compelled to take the offensive. . 269 
treatment of prisoners settled upon 

Dec. 1776 269 

plan of attack of H. post Dec. 26, 

1776 271 

fights the battle of Trenton 271-5 

substitutes the bayonet for powder. 272 
retires to Newtown, Dec. 27th, 1776. 275 
writes to Maxwell that he will again 

invade New Jersey 276 

writes to Heath to drive the enemy 277 
his interview with Maj. Wilkinson, 

(Note) 277 

his view of his enlarged powers. . . . 2S3 
army reinforced by Mercer and Cad- 

wallader 2S4 

again at Trenton, Jan. 1st, 1777... 284 

falls behind the Assanpink 285 

improves his opportunity 286 

intends to strike Brunswick 287 

employed a ruse while abandoning 

camp 287 

notifies Putnam of his plans 287 

takes a bold offensive 287 

his personal exposure at Princeton. 288 
burns bridge and moves to Pluckemin 290 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



709 



Washington, needs mounted troops. . . . 290 
makes his headquarters at Morris- 
town 291 

gives instructions to Heath antl Put- 
nam 291 

his report after Princeton 291 

orders troops from Peekskill 291 

reproves Heath for conduct before 

Fort Independence 292 

issues counter-proclamation toGenl. 

Howe's 292 

controls greater part of New Jersey. 293 
instructs Schuyler to use New Eng- 
land troops 294 

sends Knox to recruit artillerymen. 294 
represses plundering by militia. . . . 295 

protests against H. outrages 295 

writes Morris his opinion as to 

Howe's plans 295 

rebukes Sullivan 295 

makes an estimate of the British 

forces 297 

his army given by divisions and 

brigades 297 

writes Schuyler as to Ticonderoga. 297 
his new theory of Howe's plans. . . . 297 

strengthens ^Iiddlebrook 297 

removes to Middlebrook 298 

will not risk his army to save Phila- 
delphia 298 

orders a division from Peekskill. . . . 298 

orders pursuit of Howe 300 

marches to Quibbletown 300 

foils the plans of Plowe 301 

regains Middlebrook 301 

learns of Burgoyne's movements. . . 302 
issues a counter-proclamation to 

Burgoyne's 306 

writes letter to Gates and receives 

sharp reply 310 

has confidence in Schuyler 318 

writes Schuyler, foreshadowing Ben- 
nington 319 

writes .Schuyler, foreshadowing Oris- 

kany 325 

writes Schuyler as to relief of Fort 

Schuyler 325 

his forecast as to Fort Schuyler. . 325 
is ignored by Gates in official re- 
ports 335 

sends troops to Albany 344 

sends commission of Maj. Genl. to 

Arnold, with comments, (Note). . 354 
understands intercepted letters of 

Howe 362 

is disconcerted by Howe's move- 
ments 365 

marches through Philadelphia 365 

reaches Wilmington 365 

deceived by bad reconnoissance. . . . 370 
his purpose to cross the Brandywine 371 
countermands movement over the 

Brandywine 372 

mild letter to Sullivan 379 

sends whole right wing to meet 

Howe 376 

writes to Sullivan as to his conduct. 379 
moves to battle with the reserve. . . . 3S0 



PAGE 

Washington, covers the retreat at Brandy- 
wine 380 

retreats to Chester and reports to 

Congress 380 

marches to Philadelphia 382 

halts at Germantown one day 382 

orders Putnam to send him troops. 382 
strengthens defenses of the Dela- 
ware 382 

sends surgeons to Howe 382 

crosses at Swede's Ford, inviting 

battle '. 383 

recrosses the Schuylkill and camps 

on the Perkiomy 388 

moves to Yellow Springs and Nor- 
wich 383 

again orders Putnam to send troops. 384 
applies to Gates for Morgan's corps. 384 

his powers again enlarged 384 

marches to Germantown by four 

routes 387 

accompanies Sullivan's division. . . . 387 
his plan of battle of Germantown. . 387 
retires in good order from German- 
town 390 

his Fabian policy sneered at 392 

compliments defenders of Fort 

Mitllin 396 

sends Col. Hamilton to Gates for 

troops 397 

his report of skirmish at Edge Hill. 397 

complains of Mifflin 398-9 

pleads for the army 399 

at Valley Forge 399 

sends out skirmishing parties 402 

authorized to call out 3,000 militia. 403 

awaits action of British army 404 

is visited by a committe of Congress 403 
celebrates the French alliance at 

Valley Forge 404 

his confidence in La F"ayette 405 

observes the operations at Barren 

Hill 407 

notices Mifflin's arrival, sharply . . . 408 
calls a council of war as to future 

plans 408 

under-estimates British forces 40S 

learns of pr(jposed evacuation of 

Philadelphia 40S 

receives letters from Lee 410 

answers Lee's letter sharply 411 

pursues Clinton into New Jersey. . . 414 
intrusts pursuit of Clinton to La 

Fayette 4^4 

his army near Englishtown 415 

under obligations to pursue Clinton 417 
his instructions at Monmouth . . . .422-4 
instructs Lee to carry out La Fay- 
ette's plan 424 

instructs Lee to consult officers and 

form his plan of l)attle 423 

restores order at Monmouth 439-40 

his altercation with Lee 440-I 

profanity at Monmouth, not in tlie 

testimony 441 

marches to White Plains 446 

makes Newport his objective of 
operations 448 



7IO 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



Washington, assigns Varnum and Glover 

to La Fayette's division 448 

directs Sullivan to call upon militia 448 
sends Greene and La Fayette to 

Newport '. 448 

is advised of Lord Howe's expedi 

tion to Newport 449 

advises retreat from Newport 453 

solemnly notices his reoccupation 

of White Plains 457 

removes headquarters to Fishkill 

and Fredericksburg 457 

distributes the army for winter 

quarters 457 

removes headquarters to Middle- 
brook 458 

laments the diverse interests of 

sections 461 

draws a fearful picture of the times. 461-2 
describes the paramount claims of 

concert, dinner or supper 462 

proposes to punish Indian depreda- 
tions 463 

unable to aid the vSouth 465 

removes headquarters to New 

Windsor 467 

organizes an attack upon Stony 

J'oint 472 

orders N. C. and Va. troops to the 

south 483 

his headquarters at Morristown . . . 483 
his requisition upon New Jersey 

filled 48S 

criticises thirteen state sovereignties 489 
his written opinion of Schuyler. . . . 490 
explains mutinous conduct of troops 491 
complains of injustice to France. . . 492 
doubts a possible defense of Charles- 
ton 494 

is posted on the Short Hills 499 

is embarrassed by British movements 500 

appeals to States to fill quota 502 

makes New York objective of 

campaign 503 

in consultation with Rochambeau. . 504 

takes position at Prakeness 506 

confides to Schuyler the treachery 

in Vermont 524 

sends three regiments to Albany. . . 524 
compares rolling small and big 

snow-balls 524 

confers with Rochambeau . . 525 

writes Dr. Franklin the condition 

of affairs 525 

establishes winterquarlers for 1780-1 527 
his headquarters at New Windsor . 527 
keeps aloof from army during mutiny 538 
would congratulate Greene if he 

could help him 548 

writes to La Fayette 585 

meets Rochambeau at Newport. . . . 585 

sends La F'ayette after Arnold 585 

does not judge measures by after 

events 586 

gives gloomy abstract of public 

affairs 587 

thinks there are too many chimney 

corner patriots 587 ' 



PAGE 

Washington, urges Schuyler to become 

Secretary of war 588 

approves La Fayette's conduct 

toward Arnold 596 

confers with Rochambeau at Welh- 

ersfield 603 

modifies his plan of campaign 614 

advises La Fayette of his plan 614 

takes the offensive 617 

again at Wethersfield 618 

has a two-fold plan against New 

York 618 

at Valentine's Hill 620 

reconnoitres New York Island in 

force 620 

reconnoitres New Jersey 620 

mortified by his position before the 

world 621 

his false and his real plan 621 

summons aid as against New York. 622 
with Rochambeau at West Point . . 622 
enters Philadelphia with his army. . 623 
learns of the arrival of De Grasse. . 624 

proceeds to Head of Elk 624 

visits Baltimore 630 

at Mount Vernon 630 

joins La Fayette at Williamsburg. . 630 

visits Count De Grasse 635 

his plans in danger 635 

persuades De Grasse to remain. . . . 635 
reports the first parallel opened. . . . 636 
proposes conditions to Cornwallis. . 641 
signs capitulation of Yorktown .... 641 

congratulates the allies 644 

exchanges courtesies with De Grasse 645 
his plans for southern operations fail 645 

his criticisms of officials 652 

his control of interior lines 654 

orders a cessation of hostilities .... 65S 
commits America to God and 

posterity 658 

Water communication with Albany cut off 193 
Waterloo, Battle of, modified by rain ... 39 
Watson, Col. {Br.) diverted from his 

march to Camden 569 

joins Lord Rawdon 574 

Watson, Abraham, Mass. Com. Safety. . 9 
Wayne, Anthony, Maj. Gen., b. at Paoli, 

Penn., 1745, d. 1796. 
sent from Boston to New York. ... 157 

as Colonel in Canada 166 

in battle at Three Rivers 166 

gallant in battle at Three Rivers . . 167 

promoted Brig. Gen 296 

attacks Hessian rearguard in N.J. 300 
on Court of Inquiry as to Schuyler . 312 

at battle of Brandywine 367 

makes stout defense at Chadd's Ford 380 
is attacked near Paoli (his birthplace) 383 

at battle of Germantown 387 

commands left centre 388 

is fired upon by Steven's division . . 389 

his conduct in the action 390 

opposes Washington 398 

advises to attack Philadelphia 404 

joins La Fayette in pursuit of Clinton 414 
heard \Vashington's instructions to 

Lee 423 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



711 



PAGE 

Wayne, testifies on trial of Gen. Lee . .423-8 

urges the offensive movement 424 

in the hottest fight at Monmoutli. . 439 
posted near Dunderberg mountain. 467 

storms Stony Point 473 

unable to suppress nuitiny in the 

army •.••.••. 537 

joins La Fayette in Virginia 603 

conspicuous in battle of Jamestown 

Ford 608 

sent to fcut off retreat of Cornwallis. 611 

joins Greene at the south 645 

is remembered 655 

Webb, Col. {Am.), at battle of Trenton 272 
Webster, Lieut. Col. {Br. Guards), at 

Stony Point 466 

surprises Col. Washington at Monk's 

Corner 496 

at the battle of Camden 516 

pursues Morgan 55^ 

at battle of Guilford 559 

w. mortally at Guilford 563 

Webster, Daniel, (statesman and orator), 
b. 1782, d. 1S52. 

his opinion of Schuyler 319 

Weedon, Col. {Am) at Harlem Heights. 229 

promoted Brig. Genl 296 

in reserve at Brandywine 367-70 

in Virginia in 1781 530 

at Gloucester 636 

Wellington (Arthur Wellesley) Duke, 
sul'. Field Marshal, JBi: Com- 
mander-in-chief/'. 1769, d. 1852. 

invariably improved success 76 

W'emyss, Maj. Genl. {Br), failed against 

Sumter at Fish Dam Ford 521 

Wemys, Capt. {Br), with Queen's Rang- 
ers at Chadd's Ford 369 

Werner, Lieut. (//.), made plan of battle 

of Brandywine 370 

Wesley, John, (eminent divine), /'. 1703 
d. 1791. 

as to the war S2-3 

Wessons, Colonel, his regiment in part 

at Fort Schuyler 324 

at Freeman's Farm 336 

at battle of Monmouth 435 

Yv'est, Col. {Ami), at Newport, Rhode 

Island 451 

West Point, its strategic relations 46 

fortified by Mcl3ougall and Kos- 
ciusko 403 

entrusted to Arnold 505 

entrusted to Greene 506 

visited by Rochambeau 622 

Westham, destroyed by Col. Simcoe. . . . 549 

Westover, the retreat of Simcoe 602 

Wetzell's Mills, scene of a skirmish 555 

Wethersfield, Conn., the place of con- 
ference with Rochambeau. . . . 603-18 
Wheaton, Henry, (jurist), />. 1785, </. 184S. 

makes all citizens belligerents in war 25 
Whipple, William, Brig. Genl., joins 

Gates _ 337 

unites in the protest against D'Es- 

taing 453 

Whipple, Commodore, {Aw), commands 

fleet at Charleston 495 



PAGE 

Whitcombe, Asa, Col., his regt, in part 

at Bunker Hill 100 

White Plains, battle fought at Chatterton 

Hill 241 

White, Maj.,(.4w.), battle of Germantown 389 
Whitesborough, N. Y. near battle-field 

of Oriskany 323 

Wickam, Lieut. {Am), k. at Savannah. 482 
Wilkinson, James, Maj. Genl. b. 1757, d. 
1825.^ 

Maj., with Lee at his capture 259 

a volunteer at Trenton 275 

has interview with Washington, 

.(Note) 277 

his statements as to Arnold 342 

like a boy adventurer with Gates. . 343 
as to Arnold at Bemis Heights. . 348-g 

promoted Brig. Genl 398 

Willett, Marinus, Col., ^. 1744, </. 1826. 

ordered to Fort Schuyler 323 

reaches the post 323 

makes a sally 324 

operates against the Onondagas. , . . 463 
Willett, Capt. {Br.), at Fort Trumbull 

Conn 626 

Williams, James, Col. {.4in), k. at King's 

Mountain 520 

Williams, Maj. {Bi-) k. at Bunker Hill . no 
Williams, William, Com. Safety, S.C.. 179 
Williams, Otho H., Maj. Col. {Am.), b. 
174S, d. 1794. 

at Fort Washington 248 

IV. at Fort Washington 250 

Adj. Gen. of Gen. Gates at Cam- 
den ■ • ■ ■ 509 

at battle of Camden 514 

makes report of the battle 515 

detached with light troops 552 

at battle of Guilford 557 

at battle of Hobkirk's Hill 572 

at siege of Augusta 574 

at battle of Eutaw Springs 579 

Williams, a small post, threatened by 

Morgan 541 

Williams. Maj. {Br. Foot), taken /m. at 

Bemis Heights 347 

Williamson, James, Brig. Gen. {Am) 

sent to Augusta 464 

Williamson's Plantation, scene of 

skirmish 507 

Willis, Capt. {Br) 70. at battle of Mon- 
mouth 444 

Willis, Maj., of Conn., at battle of 

Jamestown 608 

Wilmousky, Capt. (//.) k. at battle of 

Guilford 563 

Winnsborough, Ileadquars. of Corn- 
wallis 521 

Winbach's regt. (//.) before Fort Mercer 394 

Winter at Valley Forge, Am. army 401 

Philadelphia, Br. army 401 

Morristown, .//;;. army 486 

New York, B>: army 485 

Wise, Maj. {Am) k. at Savannah 482 

Wolcott's brigade joins Gales 337 

Woodbridge, Benj. R., Col., his regt. in 

part at Bunker Hill lOO 

Woodbridge, N. J., a .>ub-post in 1776. . 232 



712 



CHRONOLOGICAL AND GENERAL INDEX. 



PAGE 

Woodford, William, Brig. Gen., promoted 296 

at Valley Forge (see Map) 

at battle of Monmouth 

reinforces Charleston 495 

Woodford, Lieut. Col., detached by Gates 511 
Woodhull, Nathaniel, Brig. Gen taken 

pris. Long Island 211 

Woolsey, Theodore Dwight, Rev. Dr., 
Ex. Pres. Yale College. Linguist 
and writer upon International 
law, b. 1801. 

defines a just war 24 

his encouragement recognized 2 

Wooster, Daniel, Maj. Gen., b. 171 r, d. 

^111- 

his antecedents 84 

joins Montgomery at St. John's . . . 129 

arrives at Quebec 133 

his patriotism conspicuous 133 

takes a subordinate command 133 

is recalled from Canada . 159 

demands surrender of Quebec 162 

before Fort Independence 292 

resigns his commission 296 

is mortally wounded 297 

Wright, Royal Gov. N. C, calls for 

troops 178 

Wykoff, a guide, at battle of Monmouth. 439 



PAGE 

Wyllis, Col. {Am.) at Bedford Pass, L. I. 205 
Wyngand, Lieut. {Br.) 2a. at battle of 

Guilford 563 

Wyoming Massacre (noticed) 459 

Wythe, (jeorge, Va., supports Col. Clark 

at the west 461 



Y. 



Yale College students, under Capt. 

James Hillhouse, at New Haven. 469 

Young's House captured, with garrison, 

byiY ' 486 

Yorke, Lieut. Col. (Br.) commanded 

brigade at battle of Jamestown . . 608 

Yorktown, surrendered to allied army. . 641 

conditions of capitulation 641 

strength of garrison surrendered . . . 643 

Year, Anno Domini, 1876, July 4th, cele- 
brated by all civilized nations. . . .658 

z. 

Zones of operations, defined 56 

during the war, 1 775-1 781 56 

during the war, 1861-1865 57 

their mutual dependence 57 



NOTE. 

RuTLEDGE, John, was nominated, but not confirmed, by the United States Senate, 
a Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 

/« A/emor/'am. 

Chesney, Charles C. (Br.), Royal Engineers, deceased after the Biographical 
Table went to press. His reputation deserves permanent honor. 



RMv'^4 



Omission in Index. 

Cadwalader, Lambert, Col., at Fort Washington. .. .24S. 



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